1. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

FACTS: Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68. Petitioner assails the validity of Executive Order 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds: that the Philippines is not a signatory to theHague Convention (War Crimes) and that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in thePhilippines.

ISSUE:Whether or not Executive Order 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunaljurisdiction is valid.

DECISION: Executive Order 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. Executive order 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerentnations (US and Japan). As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have been greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged off. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of the special law cited in the foregoing.

2. Lo Ching vs. Archbishop of Manila

FACTS: On August 30, 1940, the Archbishop of Manila through the Bank of the Philippine Islands leased a farm to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co. with Nos. 1095 with 1101 R. located at de la Calle Hidalgo, Manila, under a monthly income of P500 by the end of three years counting from the first of September 1940, extendable to two years (two years upon agreement of the parties). The tenant took the property bysetting it in a hotel. In February 1942, the Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and delivered the latter to German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the advent of the liberation army. In early February 1945, tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly rental fee. Before the end of August of that year, the landlord required the tenants to vacate the property, however, they refused. Therefore, the landlord on September 8, 1945 filed for an application for eviction in the Municipal Court of Manila. On October 8, 1945, it ordered the tenants to vacate the property and pay its monthly rent of P625 from the first September 1945, plus damages in the amount of P500 and legal expenses. The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full years, the occupation must be effective, and continuous material, which should not be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property, and the appellants are entitled to deduct that period of three years, all the time that no longer have the lease available to the Japanese army.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Hague Convention of 1907 allows occupation and seizure of private lands.

DECISION: No. The Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private property in the territory invaded. In contrast, states that: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. (application of the doctrine of incorporation)3. Victor Borovsky vs Commissioner of ImmigrationFACTS: In December, 1946, the President of the Philippines ordered petitioner's deportation as undesirable alien, after a proper investigation by the Deportation Board upon charges of being vagrant and habitual drunkard, engaged in espionage activities, whose presence and conduct endangered the public interest. Pursuant to such order, Borovsky was placed aboard a vessel bound for Shanghai; but the authorities there declined to admit him for lack of the proper visa, which the Chinese consulate in this country had refused to give. Wherefore he was brought back to the Philippines. Thereafter, he was temporarily released pending further arrangements for his banishment. And when subsequently a Russian boat called at Cebu, Borovsky was re-arrested and transported to Cebu for deportation; however, the captain of the boat declined to take him, explaining he had no permission from his government, to do so. Wherefore the petitioner is now confined in the premises of the New Bilibid Prison not exactly as a prisoner while the Government is exerting efforts to ship him to a foreign country.ISSUE: WON the continuous detention of the petitioner without a fix period pending deportation was valid?HELD: No. The court ruled that aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are "stateless." It is no less true however, that foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained as long as the Government is unable to deport him, is beside the point.Thus, the writ ofhabeas corpuswas issued commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by Section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. ( additional notes from other sources: prolonged detention of a stateless alien pending deportation was deemed illegal, citing the UDHR which is incorporated in Philippine Law; doctrine of incorporation still applies)

4. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA FACTS: The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.

ISSUES: 1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan? 2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. RULING: 1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanatingfrom the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue. (additional notes: doctrine of transformation applies, where it was declared that Sec.6, Art. II of the Constitution, was taken from the UDHR and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 recognizing health as a fundamental human right. Thus the authority of LLDA to issue a cease and desist order to prevent the pollution of Marilao River was upheld on the basis of principle of necessary implication.)5. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

Facts: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our country. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

Held: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard ofachievement for all peoples and all nations.The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic ofChina guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those ofthe United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.(additional notes: municipal law prevails over treaty if the law was passed in the exercise of police power, and police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.)

6. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)

Facts: In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independent operations as a duly commissioned military commander of the Carranza government, which had then made much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico.

Issue: Whether or not that the act of seizure and sale could be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin.

Held: The court notices judicially that the government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917. Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and international character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the regulations annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this case. The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative -- the political -- departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a foreign territory is a political question the determination of which by the political departments of the government conclusively binds the judges. When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court as to claims for damages based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. Tthe act could not be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin.

7. People vs Perfecto

Facts: On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding the disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The article of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

Issue: Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?

Held: The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in bated breath.The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag. Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.(additional notes: principle of state continuity; succession of states political laws are abrogated)

8. VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: Petitioners are creditors of the city of Manila before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate identity from the previous one and is not liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.

ISSUE: Is the present municipality liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the United States?

HELD: The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere change of sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral force. The city, acting as a corporation, possesses two kinds of powers: governmental and public. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for the presuming their total dissolution as a consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities. All three of plaintiffs in error are entitled to judgment.

9. Holy See vs. Del Rosario

FACTS: A piece of real property was acquired by the Holy See by way of donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The purpose was to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. Later, the Holy See sold the property on condition that it will evict the squatters therein. For failure to comply with the condition, the Holy See was sued. It moved to dismiss on the ground of state immunity.

ISSUE: Whether respondent trial court has jurisdiction over petitioner being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign, the Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine Government since 1957.The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The DFA has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts.

Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the countrys foreign relations.

10. Underhill vs Hernandez

Facts: In the early part of 1892, a revolution was initiated in Venezuela. The parties to this conflict were Palacio and Crespo. Gen. Hernandez, who belonged to the Crespo, the Anti-Administration, prevailed over all the engagement that took place during the revolution in Venezuela. Gen. Hernandez, filled over the vacant positions and eventually, succeeded in taking the possession of the entire capital of Venezuela. George Underhill, a citizen of United States, who had constructed a waterworks system for the city of Bolivar, under a contract of Government. After the entry of Gen. Hernandez, Underhill applied to him for passport to leave the city. Gen. Hernandez, as officer in command refused to the request of Underhill as well as to the other request made by others on Underhills behalf. Eventually, this request was granted and Underhills passport was given to him and already left the country.

Issue: Whether or not the acts committed by the Government of Venezuela as Acts of State are subject to the adjudication by other State.

Held: Gen. Hernandez, in his refusal by Underhills application for leave of country was justified as Acts of State. The revolution was successful and the revolutionary government was recognized by the United States. Since it was accepted by the people, it is therefore considered as fully established government. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals in concluding that the acts of the defendants were the acts of the government of Venezuela and as such are not subject of adjudication in the courts of another government. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. (additional notes: acts of state doctrine: a state should not inquire into the legal validity of the public acts of another state done within the territory of the latter.)11. Republic of the Phils. vs Marcos, 806 Fd. 344, US Court of Appeals

Facts: Plaintiff Republic in this case filed an injunction against the transfer or encumbrance of five pieces of real properties in New York. The complaint alleged that there was conspiracy committed between the Marcoses and the other defendants in this case and by virtue thereof, assets and properties acquired by or for the benefit of the Marcoses were placed in the names of nominees. In this way the five properties in New York were allegedly purchased for the benefit of the Marcoses from the proceeds of moneys and assets stolen from the Philippine government. The Republic ask the court to enjoin and restrain the defendants from transferring, conveying, encumbering, or in any way adversely affecting the rights of the government of the Philippines in and to the properties pending determination as to the true ownership of an entitlement to the parcels of land. The plaintiff presented evidence which shows that indeed Marcoses was the owner of the five New York properties involved in this case and they proved also that the funds used to purchase said properties were illegally obtained. The defendants raise the defense of Act of State Doctrine which prohibits the other state to interfere with its conduct.

Issue: Whether or not the acts committed by the Defendants are Act of State which therefore prohibits the other State to interfere with its conduct.

Held: The Act of State Doctrine will not apply in this case. The Doctrine applies when an official acts in his official capacity but not for his own benefit. The defendants failed to rebut the evidence presented by the Republic. The case relied upon by the defendants which will justify their acts was not applicable to this case. They failed to demonstrate that the acts of Marcoses were public in nature which even if illegal the Philippine Law will protect them. Another consideration which limits the applicability of the doctrine even to the Marcos public acts was that Marcos Government was no longer in power. What has always been affirmed by this court is that the acts must be public acts of the sovereign.

12. U.Svs. Ruiz

Facts:The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issue:Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

13. U.S. vs. GuintoFACTS: The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

14. US vs RodrigoFacts: Fabian Genove was a cook at the CAMP JOHN Hay in Baguio. He was dismissed because it was found out that he poured URINE into the soup stock used for cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamanchia his manager, suspended him and referred the case to his superiors for dismissal. Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. Genove, filed a complaint in the RTC. He seeks to recover damages for his dismissal. Lamanchia was joined by the US to dismiss the complaint for he was an USAF officer at Camp and his actions are of official capacity.Issue: Wheter or not the suit is in effect against the US?Held: Petition Granted. Civil case dismissed. The restaurant services offered at the Camp John Hay Station operated for profit as a commercial and not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self-immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US Government can claim such immunity because by entering into employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.Still, the court holds that the complaint against the petitioners in the lower court be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted quite properly in terminating the private respondents employment for his unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the soup stock with urine.15. JUSMAG PHIL vs NLRCFACTS: Herein private respondent Florencio Sacramento was hired by the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-PHIL) as one of the security assistance support personnel (SASP) from 1969-1992. He was then suspended and eventually his services were terminated because the position held by him as an illustrator 2 was abolished. Being the incumbent President of the JUSMAG-PHIL. Filipino Civilian Employees Association, a labor organization duly registered with DOLE, Sacramento filed a complaint against JUSMAG on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from work. JUSMAG then filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint invoking immunity from suit which was favored by the Labor Arbiter Cueto in its order dimissing said complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that JUSMAG is estopped from invoking immunity from suit because it failed to refute the existence of employer-employee relationship; and it has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of herein private respondent. Hence this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not JUSMAG-PHIL has immunity from suit? HELD: Yes. JUSMAG was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States when it hired private respondent pursuant to the Military Agreement between America and the Philippines. A suit against JUSMAG is a suit against the United States and in the absence of a consent or waiver from suit by the latter, the caomplaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Philippines recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. Immunity is commonly known as the exemption of the state and its organs from judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem habeat imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). As it stands now, the doctrine of immunity from suit is restricted only to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and propriety acts.16. Lasco vs UNRFNREFacts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity.Held: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. (additional notes: immunity is extended to diplomatic personnel to the UN diplomatic immunity)17. World Health Organization v. Aquino

Facts: Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

18. ICMC VS CALLEJA

FACTS: ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity.On February 5, 1987 Med Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med Arbiters Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

HELD: The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

19. Callado v International Research Institute

Facts: Petitioner herein was a driver employed by International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). One day, while driving IRRI's vehicle to NAIA and back to the Institute, petitioner figured an accident.IRRI's Human Resource Development Manager conducted a preliminary invetigation against the petitioner with his knowledge. Petitioner submitted an answer as defense of the damages against him. Meanwhile IRRI issued a Notice of Termination on February 11, 1990. So petitioner filed a complaint before the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, indemnity pay with moral damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote to the labor arbiter and the labor arbiter admitted IRRI's defense from immunity and issued an order which states that in all cases of termination, respondent waives its immunity which leads to labor arbiter to set aside and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner contends that PD 1620 of Article 3 which granted the immunity of IRRI as international organization may not be invoked and Memorandum "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to PD No. 1620 may be waived.

ISSUE: Did the International Rice Research Institute waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an Employer-Employee Relationship?

HELD: It was stipulated in Article 3 of PD No 1620 that "Immunity from any penal, civil, administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his duly authorized. " It is clearly stated that the grant to immunity by IRRI and an express waiver by the Director-General is the only way to abandon immunity. In cases of dismissed employees, the institute may waive its immunity if it signifies the waiver as discretionary on its part. Thus the court ruled on the negative and dismiss the petition.

20. SEA FDEC vs. NLRC

FACTS: Two labor cases were file by the herein private respondents against the petitioner before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner. The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization compose of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases. The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

RULING: The court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. SEAFDEC including its Departments enjoys functional dependence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The Obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions. Besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

21. North Sea Continental shelf cases, 1969 ICJ (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands)I.C.J. Reports 1969

FACTS: The International Court of Justice delivered judgment, by 11 votes to 6. Both Denmark and the Netherlands submitted an individual dispute with Germany to the ICJ involving claims to the North Sea Continental Shelf. These two separate claims were joined by the ICJ, and decided as one case. The parties sought a method by which the Continental Shelf could be fairly delimited. All parties agreed the Court was not to physically apportion claims, but merely prescribe a method of delimitation for the parties to follow.

Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the method of equidistance should be implemented. This is that each State claimed all areas that are closer to itself than any other state. They claimed that the Geneva Convention supported this method. Moreover, it was alleged to have been an a priori rule of law, a rule of customary international law, and a general rule of conventional practicality

Germany, who had not ratified the Geneva Convention, claimed that the rule of equidistance was unfair. The State also argued for an apportionment of the shelf that was proportional to the size of each states adjacent land.

ISSUE: 1. Is the Geneva Convention binding on a State that has not ratified it?1. Is the equidistance rule international law?

DECISION:The Court found that the Geneva Convention is not binding on German, as it did not ratify it. While the Geneva Convention does call for the rule of equidistance, the Court found that the Geneva Convention was not binding upon Germany. Moreover, the stipulations outlined in the Geneva Convention would have allowed Germany to opt out in this area, so its membership in the treaty is a moot point. Upon inspection of the language of both the Geneva Convention and the Truman Proclamation, equidistance was found to be a last resort rather than an a priori rule. Also looking to these sources, the Court rejected claims which included equidistance in customary international law. Theses texts which originally included the rule of equidistance only did so for secondary purposes, and the utilization of it was insufficient to prove it to be either customary international law, or a general law of practicality. The Court also pointed out mathematical problems of contradiction under the rule.The Court rejected Germanys claim of proportional apportionment because doing so would intrude upon the natural claims due to States based on natural prolongations of land. Also, the Courts role was to outline a mechanism of delimitation only.The Court found, therefore, that the two parties must draw up an agreement taking both the maximization of area and proportionality into account. These were to be based upon equitable principles. The holding here is somewhat inconclusive, but the opinion is significant to international law, regardless.The international law elements of the case are the power of treaties, customary international law, and the principle of equidistance in claims to sea territory. The rule of law upheld in this case is the Geneva Convention.

22. Blackmer vs. US

FACTS: Blackmer (D) wasfound to be in contempt of court for failing to respond to subpoenas served upon him in France requiring his appearance inthe United States. Blackmer (D) was a U.S. (P) citizen who resided in France. He was served subpoenas to appear in court as a witness in a criminal trial in the United States. When he failed to respond to the subpoenas, contempt proceedings were initiated and Blackmer (D) was found guilty and fined. Blackmer (D) appealed, claiming the federal statute was unconstitutional.

ISSUE: For the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam, must there be due process?

HELD:For the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam, there must be due process.The Court did not find the statute to be unconstitutional. Blackmer(D)alleged that there was inadequate notice.(Hughes, C.J.) Yes. For the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam, there must be due process. Due process requires appropriate notice of the judicial action and an opportunity to be heard. The statute provides that when the presence of a citizen of the United States who resides abroad is required in court, a subpoena be issued addressed to a consul of the United States. The consul must serve the subpoena on the witness personally with a tender of traveling expenses. Upon proof of such service and of the failure of the witness to appear, a court order may be issued. If the witness fails to comply with the court order, the court may adjudge the witness guilty of contempt. Congress acted pursuant to itsauthorityin enacting the statute and it could prescribe a penalty to enforce it. Affirmed (additional notes: nationality principle applies the state has jurisdiction over its nationals anywhere in the world, based on the theory that a national is entitled to the protection of the state wherever he may be, and thus, is bound to it by duty of obedience and allegiance, unless he is prepared to renounce his nationality; this applies to civil cases only but in this case, the Court upheld a judgement for contempt against Blackmer in a criminal case)

23. The Schooner Exchange vs. Mcfaddon

FACTS: Two Americans claimed that they owned and were entitled to possession of the Schooner exchange on the high seas and that they now owned it and were entitled to possession of the ship. The United States and France were at peace and that a public ship of the emperor of France had been compelled by bad weather to enter to the port of Philadelphia and was prevented by leaving by process of the court. The district court granted the United States of the request to dismiss the claims of ownership and ordered that the ship be released.The circuit court reversed, and the United States appealed to the U.S Supreme court.

ISSUE: Are national ships of war entering the port of a friendly power to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction?

RULING: National ship of war entering into the port of a friendly power are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction. This case implicated the absolute form of sovereign immunity from judicial jurisdiction. The court highlighted three principles; the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign country; the immunity that all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers; that a sovereign is understood to cede portion of his territorial jurisdiction when he allows troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions. (additional notes: warships and other public vessels of another states are generally immune from local jurisdiction under the fiction that they are floating territory of the flag State. Their crew members are immune from local jurisdiction while on shore duty but not when they are off-duty.)

24. US vs LOOK CHAW

Facts: Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on August 19, 1909, several persons, Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he orderedtwo other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district or the wharf of Cebu. The court ruled in favor of the government and against the defendant, hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port

Decision: Decision of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with modification. That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. (additional notes: English Rule applies the coastal state shall have jurisdiction over all offenses committed on board the vessel except those which compromise the peace of the port.)

25. People vs Wong Cheng

Facts: The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant.The defendant accused ofhaving illegally smoked opium,aboardthe merchantvesselChangsa ofEnglish nationality whilethe said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted tothe dismissal of the case.

Issue: Whether or not thePhilippine courts has jurisdiction over the crime committed by Wong Chengaboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters?

Held: Yes.The crime onthe caseat bar was committed inour internal waters thus having our court theright of jurisdiction over the offense committed.The court said Having the opium smoked within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is a breach of the public order, because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effectswithin ourterritory.Therefore,the demurrer is revoked and court ordered furtherproceedings. (application of the English Rule)