Conscientiousness and the Modular Mind: The Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions

Kevin MacDonald Department of PsychologyCalifornia State University-Long BeachLong Beach, CA 90840

International Society for Human Ethology, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI August 3, 2006.

Conscientiousness versus the Modular Mind

1. Evolutionary psychology 101: Modules and implicit processing

2. Domain general mechanisms and explicit processing: General intelligence and Conscientiousness/Effortful Control/Active Inhibition

3. Conscientiousness and Life History Theory 4. Effortful control inhibits implicit processing

Moral Outrage Aggression Ethnocentrism Sexual Arousal

5. Is explicit processing adaptive?

Evolutionary Psychology 101

Human cognitive architecture evolved to solve recurrent problems our ancestors faced during the Pleistocene. “For humans, the situations our ancestors

encountered as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers define the array of adaptive problems our cognitive mechanisms were designed to solve” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 87).

The mind is made up of many domain-specific mechanisms= “modules.”

Each module is specifically designed to solve an adaptive problem: The mind as a Swiss Army knife.

Evolutionary Psychology

Humans are designed to solve problems that range from “solicitation of assistance from one’s parents, to language acquisition, to modeling the spatial distribution of local objects, to coalition formation and cooperation, to the deduction of intentions on the basis of facial expressions, to avoiding incest…, to the interpretation of threats, to mate selection, to object recognition” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 88).

Evolutionary Psychology 101

Modules are “dedicated intelligences” that receive

characteristic inputs and produce characteristic output. Their operation is mandatory (i.e., they are

automatically triggered in the presence of appropriate environmental stimulation), fast, and unconscious (but their output may be conscious). (= implicit processing)

Massive Modularity

Modules have a built-in sense of relevance about what information is needed to solve an adaptive problem.

They are sensitive to correlated features of the evolutionary environment.

E.g. 1: Waist-to-hip ratio is an easily perceivable cue correlated with the ability to have future offspring (Singh, 1993).

E.g. 2: Facial recognition module. E.g. 3: Spatial information module—rotating figures in

space, etc.

Evolutionary Psychology and the EEA

Organisms adapt to recurrent problems in the EEA (= the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness—the environment humans evolved in which presented the problems solved by the set of human adaptations).

When the environment presents recurrent problems, the optimal solution is to develop domain-specific cognitive and psychological mechanisms specialized to handle specific types of input and generate certain types of solutions.

“Transient conditions that disappear after a single or a few generations may lead to some temporary change in the frequency of designs, but the associated selection pressures will disappear or reverse as often as conditions do. Therefore, it is only those conditions that recur, statistically accumulating across many generations, that lead to the construction of complex adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 69).

Modular Information processing domains: David Geary, The Origin of Mind, 2005. Folk Psychology

Self Self awareness: Represent self as social being and have a sense of

persistence of self through time Self schema: Knowledge of one’s own personality and relationships

with other people Individual

Nonverbal behavior: e.g., postural cues Facial expression Language Theory of Mind: Ability to infer intentions, beliefs, emotional states

and future behavior of individuals; no evidence in monkeys; controversial in chimpanzees

Person Schema: Knowledge of specific other people and their networks

Group Kin recognition: Mothers and babies recognize each other by smell;

children able to identify odor of full siblings, not half siblings or step-siblings

In-group/Out-group

Modular Information processing domains: David Geary, The Origin of Mind, 2005.

Folk Psychology Self

Self awareness: Represent self as social being and have a sense of persistence of self through time

Self schema: Knowledge of one’s own personality and relationships with other people

Individual Nonverbal behavior: e.g., postural cues Facial expression Language Theory of Mind: Ability to infer intentions, beliefs, emotional states

and future behavior of individuals; no evidence in monkeys; controversial in chimpanzees

Person Schema: Knowledge of specific other people and their networks

Group Kin recognition: Mothers and babies recognize each other by smell;

children able to identify odor of full siblings, not half siblings or step-siblings

In-group/Out-group

Modular Information processing domains: David Geary, The Origin of Mind, 2005. Folk Biology

All humans classify flora and fauna on basis of morphology, behavior, growth patterns, and ecological niche;

Disruptions of anterior temporal cortex disrupts ability to name living but not non-living things. (Not conclusive)

Folk Physics Systems sensitive to invariant features of physical space. For humans, this includes ability to mentally represent

physical objects and manipulate the objects, as in tool use. These may engage working memory: spatial intelligence.

Navigation via mental maps of routes and landmarks both involve parietal cortex, but route task also involved hippocampus. Posterior hippocampus of taxi drivers in London larger than age-matched men. Volume correlated with time spent as taxi driver (Maguire et al., 2000)

Domain General Mechanisms and Explicit processing General intelligence and the executive

processes of working memoryChiappe, D. & MacDonald, K. (2005). The evolution of domain-general

mechanisms in intelligence and learning. Journal of General Psychology, 132(1), 5–40.

MacDonald, K. B. (1991). A perspective on Darwinian psychology: The importance of domain-general mechanisms, plasticity, and

individual differences. Ethology and Sociobiology, 12, 449–480.

Able to define resources and develop strategies (plans) to achieve goals in rapidly changing, variable, and unpredictable environments.

Characteristics of Implicit and Explicit Cognitive Systems

Implicit System Explicit System

o Unconscious Consciouso Automatic Controllableo Fast Relatively slowo Evolved Early Evolved Lateo Common Across May be unique to

Species Humanso Pragmatic, context- Logical,

dependent de-contextualized,

abstract, rational o Social discourse Chesso Domain specific Domain general

Characteristics of Implicit and Explicit Cognitive SystemsParallel Processing Sequential Processing

of multiple sources of de-contextualized,of contextual abstract representationsinformation (e.g., face, body posture) High capacity Limited by attentional and

working memory resources.Effortless EffortfulHeuristic processing as General Intelligence as

paradigm paradigm

Acquisition by biology or Acquisition by culture and overlearning formal tuition

Cognitive mechanisms that operate on ecological or social information are predicted to vary with the extent to which that information tended to be invariant (resulting in evolved heuristics) or variant (resulting in evolved problem solving mechanisms) during the species’ evolutionary history and during a typical lifespan. From Geary, Origin of Mind, 2005, p. 168.

Heuristics:Fast, frugal, andimplicit mechanisms

Controlled Problem-Solving:Slow, effortful, complex, and explicit/consciousmechanisms

Invariant VariantInformation Patterns

Two routes to automatic processing

Evolved biases: E.g., automatic fear triggers (snakes) Overlearned automaticities: multiplication tables, driving a

car. The mind is designed to make common mental activities

unconscious and automatic so that the limited resources available to the conscious mind can be allocated to tasks requiring attention and cognitive resources (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).

Conscious, explicit, and effortful becomes unconconscious, implicit, and involuntary.

Implies importance of domain general associational mechanisms.

Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist 54, 462–479.

Intelligence vs. heuristic processing

Example of proposed evolved heuristics: Availability heuristic: People judge probability of events, like dying in a plane crash, based on examples from long term memory. Probably good in the environment humans evolved in, but not in mass media culture.

Stanovich: Higher IQ people are better able to inhibit heuristic processing in favor of abstract, decontextualized responses: E.g., conflicts between logical validity and the

believability of the conclusion; conflict between statistical evidence derived from a large

population of car-buyers versus heart-felt appeal from a friend.

K. Stanovich, Who is rational? Erlbaum, 1999.

Social (Evolved?) Heuristics versus the Rational Brain: Moral Outrage Sanfey et al. 2003: “The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-

Making in the Ultimatum Game” Science, 300, 1755. Proposer offers to split $10, and responder can either accept or

reject offer. Only one interaction. More people will reject more unfair offers (9-1, 8-2) made

by other people than offers made by computers This is irrational: Should accept any offer greater than 10-0. fMRI results: Unfair offers (not = 50/50) result in activation

of brain areas related to negative emotion, rational processing, and cognitive conflict.

Anterior Insula: Negative emotion: pain, disgust, and personal threat (=evolved heuristic)

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: linked to goal maintenance, executive control, and explicit processing (Rationality, effortful control)

Anterior Cingulate Cortex: implicated in cognitive conflict.

Social (Evolved?) Heuristics versus the Rational Brain Greater emotional activation to unfair offers made by

another human than a computer: Illustrates people’s tendency to place things in a social context when interacting with people rather than use abstract, decontextualized reasoning.

Conflict between rational areas of brain and irrational: Unfair offers that are subsequently rejected have greater anterior insula than DLPFC activation, whereas accepted offers exhibit greater DLPFC than anterior insula.

Conflict between emotional goal (resist unfairness) produced by automatic processing and rational goal (get money).

Conscientiousness: The Other Inhibitory SystemConscientiousness in personality psychology:

Effortful Control: Involves explicit processing Delay of gratification Inhibition of dominant responses (overlearned or innate) Pay close attention to detail (= focused attention) Persevere in unpleasant tasks Correlated ~.5 with school success Planning for long-term goals Dependable, responsible behavior Linked to pfc functioning Inhibitory connections to Behavioral Approach System.

(BAS linked to reward-oriented behavior, impulsivity, sensation seeking, dominance, sex, etc.)

Slow developing ― Lack of conscientiousness defines immaturity.

Conscientiousness: The Other Inhibitory SystemDevelopment of Conscientiousness: Kochanska et al. Increasing coherence between 22 and 33 months of age among a variety of

tasks assessing the ability to inhibit dominant responses waiting for signal before eating snack, not peeking while gift is wrapped, not touching wrapped gift until experimenter returns.

In general, inhibitory ability increased during this age span Girls > Boys Effortful control also predicted ability to modulate anger (tight seat belt

restraint) and ability to modulate joy (reaction to puppet show). This suggests effortful control is linked to control over automatic processing

stemming from affective reactions.

Kochanska, G., Murray, K.T., & Harlan, E. (2000). Effortful control in early childhood: Continuity and change, antecedents, and implications for social development. Developmental Psychology, 36, 220–232.

Tests of inhibition of dominant response (antisaccade, stop-signal, stroop) do not predict Gf: Friedman et al. (2006). Not All Executive Functions Are Related to Intelligence Psychological Science. 17, 172-179.

g is negatively correlated with Conscientiousness?

Some evidence Conscientiousness is negatively related to IQ:

o Moutafi et al., PAID, 38, 1021-1033 (2005): r = -0.24 N= 192

o Moutafi et al., PAID, 37, 1013-1022 (2004): beta = -0.24; N=4639

o Conscientiousness as compensation for IQ: Moutafi et al. (2005) suggest that people lower in fluid intelligence make up for their deficit by trying harder.

.

g is uncorrelated with ConscientiousnessOther studies and meta-analyses find non-

significant correlations:Austin et al., 2002: PAID, 32, 1391-1411Correlations between general ability and

personality:Conscientiousness 0.04 (n=405)Neuroticism 0.15** (n=424)Extraversion 0.00 (n=401)Openness 0.34*** (n=411)Agreeableness 0.04 (n=405)

g is uncorrelated with Conscientiousness

2004Wonderlic

N~103

2005Ravens-18

N ~ 82

2004-2005Ravens-18

N ~ 185

Dominance -.010 .052 .02

Love .066 -.179 p < .1 -.057

Conscientious -.043 .008 -.02

Neuroticism .042 -.061 -.004

Openness .137 -.10 .029

Effortful Control and aggression: The general aggression modelAnderson and Bushman, 2002.

Prepotent, evolved cues for aggression: Berkowitz

Aversive experiences produce tendencies for fight or flight in animals and humans. hot temperatures shock-induced pain loud noises foul odors Crowded freeways??Berkowitz, L. (1990). On the formation and regulation of anger and aggression: a cognitive-neoassociationistic

analysis. American Psychologist, 45, 494–503.

Evolutionary Psychology and Aggression: David BussWhere’s the pfc? Motives for aggression: Status, reputation, honor and sexual

jealousy as key motives for aggression. Adaptive problems “to which aggression might have evolved as a

solution” (p. 608): Co-opting resources held by others Defending against attack Inflicting costs on intrasexual rivals Negotiating status and power hierarchies Deterring rivals from future aggression Deterring long-term mates from sexual infidelity Reducing resources expended on unrelated children.

Costs (e.g., possibility of retaliation) built into the module.

Buss, D. M., & Shackelford, T. K. (1997). Human aggression in evolutionary perspective. Clinical Psychology Review, 17, 605–619.

Duntley, J. D., & Buss, D. M. (2004). The evolution of evil. In A. G. Miller (Ed.), The Social Psychology of Good and Evil. New York: Guilford

Buss: Impulsivity as design feature of aggression as an evolved module

After being beaten, “I had stone hatred for him, and I righteously couldn’t wait to see the look on his face when I blew him away. As soon as he popped out of the liquor store door, I charged right up to him, rammed the barrel in his chest, and pulled the trigger” (in Duntley & Buss, 2005, p. xxx).

“Effective strategies sometimes require immediate action. Ponderous time delays and real-time extended reflection would result in failure. Stated differently, we propose that “impulsivity” is actually a design feature of certain adaptations that promotes their tactical effectiveness. The fact that they appear to external observers to be products of the lack of judicious reflection may speak to the profound inability of human intuitions to grasp the logic of evolved design, or to our moral judgments that classify certain strategies as good or bad. Speedy, immediate, real-time responses can be the product of adaptive design rather than “mechanical failure.” ” Duntley & Buss, 2004, p. 118

Explicit processing and Aggression

Costs and benefits calculated via explicit prefrontal mechanisms. Explicit assessments of costs/benefits influence

aggression (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994) Aid for victim, retaliation Likelihood of being caught (e.g., DNA

fingerprinting) Penalties at law

PFC is involved in active inhibition of prepotent subcortical impulsive aggression.

PFC Inhibition of sub-cortical aggression impulses: Damasio; Anderson et al. Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are

driven by immediate rather than long-term rewards Children with damage in this area have immature, egocentric moral

reasoning and are prone to stealing and aggression. Damasio’s “somatic marker” hypothesis proposes that the deficit stems from the lack of inhibitory emotions normally attached to negative future possibilities.

Patients with prefrontal damage originating in infancy exhibited a general lack of conscientiousness (lack of dependability, inability to plan for the future, proneness to immediate rewards rather than long term goals), impulsive rather than instrumental, goal-directed aggression, and lack of guilt for transgressions against others.

Damasio, A. R. (1994/2000). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Quill (HarperCollins).

Anderson, S. W., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1999). Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience  2, 1032–1037.

PFC Inhibition of sub-cortical aggression impulses: Raine et al., 1998

Impulsive murderers had relatively lower left and right prefrontal functioning and higher right hemisphere sub-cortical functioning.

Predatory murderers whose crimes involved planning and deliberation had prefrontal functioning that was more equivalent to comparisons, while also having excessively high right sub-cortical activity.

Results “support the hypothesis that emotional, unplanned impulsive murderers are less able to regulate and control aggressive impulses generated from sub-cortical structures due to deficient prefrontal regulation” (p. 319).

PFC Inhibition of sub-cortical aggression impulses: Raine et al., 1998

Both impulsive and predatory murderers have “excessive subcortical activity” (p. 319)—what one might term “modular aggression.”

Predatory murderers are better able to control these impulses stemming from subcortical areas because of adequate prefrontral functioning.

Raine, A., Meloy, J. R., Buhrle, S., Stoddard, J., LaCasse, L., & Muchsbaum, M. S. (1998). Reduced prefrontal and increased subcortical brain functioning assessed using Positron Emission Tomography in predatory and affective murderers. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 16, 319–332.

Implicit mechanisms related to ethnocentrism1.) Evolutionary tendencies:

Genetic similarity theory Social identity theory (ingroup/outgroup

dynamics)Evolved human kinds moduleIndividualism/collectivism

2.) Negative attitudes toward outgroups may be overlearned in addition to or even instead of having an evolutionary component.

Preference for own race occurs by 3 months, not present at 1 month. Affected by exposure to outgroup faces.

Bar-Haim et al. (2006). Nature-Nurture and own-race face processing. Psychological Science, 17, 159-163.

Kelly et al. (2005). Three-months but not newborns prefer own-race faces. Developmental Science, 8. F31-F36.

Explicit processing in the prefrontal cortex can inhibit the negative emotions from the amygdala: Cunningham et al., fMRI study: Psychological Science, 15, 806–813, 2004.

All subjects reported explicitly conscious internalized desires to respond without prejudice.

White subjects had a stronger amygdala response to photos of Blacks than Whites if the photos were displayed for a very short period of time (30 msec) insufficient to be represented explicitly in the prefrontal area.

At longer periods (525 msec), no difference in amygdala response to Black and White faces, and the prefrontal region was activated: Ventromedial pfc, dorsolateral pfc, anterior cingulate cortex.

Explicit processing in the prefrontal cortex can inhibit the negative emotions from the amygdala: Cunningham et al., fMRI study: Psychological Science, 15, 806–813, 2004.

Greater prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex activation was associated with a lower amygdala response, indicating that conscious control and inhibitory abilities associated with these areas of the brain can affect emotional response to photos of outgroup members.

“These results suggest that controlled processing can moderate, and even override, activity that would otherwise result from automatic processing” (Cunningham et al., 2004, p. 811).

Inhibition of sexual arousal by the pfc: Beauregard et al., 2001; Journal of Neuroscience 21, RC 165-1-6.

Subjects observe erotic films that brought “rapidly and automatically a marked positive change in the subjective emotional experience of healthy male subjects, change correlated with significant activation of [sub-cortical] limbic brain regions”

Inhibitory condition: subjects instructed to voluntarily inhibit sexual arousal to the erotic stimuli. Subjects “were encouraged to distance themselves from these stimuli, that is, to become a detached observer.”

Inhibition of sexual arousal by the pfc: Beauregard et al., 2001; Journal of Neuroscience 21, RC 165-1-6. Erotic films activated right amygdala, the hypothalamus, and the

right anterior temporal pole [Brodmann area (BA) 38]. Inhibition resulted in no difference between erotic film and neutral film in these areas.

Inhibition associated with activation of right dorsolateral PFC (superior frontal gyrus) and the right Anterior Cingulate Cortex. Subvocal rehearsal component of verbal working memory also involved. Sexual ideology??

Inhibition of sexual arousal by the pfc: Beauregard et al., 2001; Journal of Neuroscience 21, RC 165-1-6 “The normal functioning of the neural network linking the right

dorsolateral PFC, right ACC, right amygdala, right anterior temporal pole, and hypothalamus may constitute a fundamental psychobiological mechanism through which human beings can consciously and willfully self-regulate their emotional responses, using various metacognitive processes. From a phylogenetic perspective, such a circuit may implement one of the most remarkable human faculties that has emerged in the course of human evolution. At both an individual and a collective level, a defect of this neural circuitry . . . may have disastrous psychological and social consequences. Ontologically, the present findings suggest that humans have the capacity to influence the electrochemical dynamics of their brains, by voluntarily changing the nature of the mind processes unfolding in the psychological space.”

Is Conscientiousness/Effortful Control/Active Inhibition Adaptive?

Adaptiveness of Conscientiousness/Effortful Control/Active Inhibition:

Expand universe of potential costs and benefits for behavior beyond evolutionarily recurrent implicit contexts (e.g., cheating wives, ) to include explicit representations of the context and costs and benefits, allowing, e.g., plans to take advantage of arbitrary associations between rewards, punishments and behavior.

Implies domain-general learning mechanisms.

Ability to inhibit prepotent responses when costs outweigh benefits, as calculated by explicit processing

Example: Aggression: Explicit assessments of costs/benefits influence aggression (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994)

Aid for victim (explicitly represented networks of allies)

Likelihood of being caught (e.g., DNA evidence) Penalties at law

Is Conscientiousness/Effortful Control/Active Inhibition Adaptive in the Modern World?

Yes: Strong correlations between lack of inhibitory control and school and work force failure, incarceration for violent crimes (sociopathy, psychopathy, Buss’s examples), etc. Eisenberg, N., et al. (2000). Prediction of elementary school children's

externalizing problem behaviors from attentional and behavioral regulation and negative emotionality. Child Development,71, 1367-1382.

Downside: Public explicit space may not reflect individual interests. Explicit public space: Social controls, ideology, media images. Enormous energy expended on controlling explicit space: Media,

government (US, USSR, National Socialism), schools Explicit public space often reflects conflicts of interest but most

people can’t influence explicit cultural space.

Conclusion

Conscientiousness/Effortful Control/Active Inhibition is a central system for inhibiting evolved tendencies and other automatic responses in the service of long term goals (e.g., college education and good job) and dealing with exigencies of the real world (e.g., calculating costs and benefits, such as aware of social controls providing penalties for engaging in disinhibited behavior) = Rationality.

Conclusion

Still in flux on exact prefrontal and other cortical mechanisms: PFC generally involved in inhibition of prepotent responses, but different areas inhibit different types of prepotent responses;

Orbitomedial prefrontal cortex implicated in Phineas Gage, Damasio’s work.

ACC implicated in Beauregard et al.’s work on inhibition of sexual arousal.

Conclusion

Data suggest that the basis is a set of non-modular, domain-general control mechanisms: Conscientiousness as a personality trait with a wide

range of correlates; suggests domain-general control function.

“The consistent involvement of control–appraisal system dynamics in various forms of regulation [selective attention; reappraisal] suggests a common functional architecture that might be flexibly deployed to support multiple types of control strategies that regulate multiple types of emotional responses” (Ochsner & Gross, Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 246, 2005)

These control mechanisms are separate from general intelligence.