T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y M a r c h 30, 1957

Congress and the Kuomintang Subhash Chandra Sarkar

OF la te there have been frequent comparisons between the Con­

gress P a r t y o f I n d i a and the K u o ­m i n t a n g o f China . Para l le ls have been d r a w n between these t w o par­ties and the thesis has been pu t f o r w a r d t h a t there is real danger i n I n d i a o f the Congress P a r t y f o l ­l o w i n g the fate of the K u o m i n t a n g in China.* However, the ana logy sought lacks h i s to r i ca l basis. A br ie f discussion of the h i s to ry of the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress and of the K u o m i n t a n g makes the point clear enough.

Origin of the Two Parties Even in the i r o r i g i n the Congress

and the K u o m i n t a n g are d iss imi lar . Coming as i t d i d much earl ier t h a n the K u o m i n t a n g the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress was f r o m i ts inception an open po l i t i ca l p a r t y w h i l e the pre­cursor o f the K u o m i n t a n g — t h e T u n g Meng Hui—was , a t a n y ra te a l l i t s leaders were members of a secret society. The I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Con­gress was founded in 1885 as a moderate and r e fo rmis t organisa­t i o n . By the t u r n o f the century however i t had a l ready become an a l l - I n d i a P a r t y w i t h a p rog ramme of f u l l independence for the count ry . I n 1905 the T u n g Meng H u i was jus t founded; i t had l i t t l e influence on the course of Chinese pol i t ics . The abol i t ion of Manchu r o y a l t y was as much the product of court intr igues as of the r evo lu t ionary forces o f w h i c h the T u n g Meng H u i was only a v e r y sma l l par t . When the K u o m i n t a n g held i t s f i rs t con­gress in 1924, the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress was a l ready in the t h i c k of the na t iona l movement. The Congress ranks became rad ica l as days passed. The opposite was the case in the K M T . A f t e r the death of Dr Sun Yat-Sen in 1925, the K u o ­m i n t a n g grew more and more con­servative. The Congress in I n d i a unified the whole coun t ry under one

" P o l i t i c a l Perspective fo r Economic P l a n n i n g " The Economic Week ly A n n u a l , 1957 Pp 73-75; also "Con­gress and the K u o m i n t a n g " in the Bengal i weekly Jugabani , Calcut ta , M a r c h 9, 1957 Pp 36-37. The ar t ic le in the Jugaban i is appar­en t ly based on an extended sum­m a r y o f the a r t i c le i n the Economic Week ly though the reference is no t exp l i c i t l y stated—SCS.

effective Government—a t h i n g the K M T w a s unable t o d o i n Ch ina a t any t ime of i ts l i f e .

Rise to Power The rise to power of the t w o par­

ties was equal ly different . A p a r t f r o m techniques of s t ruggle the Congress achieved power t h r o u g h I ts o w n efforts whereas ' f r o m i ts ve ry inception the K M T had count­ed upon the act ive assistance of the Chinese Communis t Pa r ty . As is we l l k n o w n , a t the momen t o f v ic­t o r y the K M T bet rayed the re­v o l u t i o n and i t s allies. I t compro­mised w i t h the fore ign imper ia l i s ts external ly , and w i t h na t ive landlords and commerc ia l bourgeoisie in ter­n a l l y . T h i s fac t m a r k e d a funda­m e n t a l t u r n In the h i s to ry o f the K M T . Wha teve r m a y b e said about the Congress decision to ac­cept the p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a no one w o u l d now go so f a r as to suggest t h a t It was a be t raya l of the cause of independence or a compromise w i t h imper i a l i sm.

F r o m 1928 onwards , the h i s to ry of the K u o m i n t a n g was one of abject surrender to foreign Imper ia l i sm a n d na t ive feudal ism. I t abandon­ed i t s ear l ier r evo lu t iona ry economic and po l i t i ca l ideals and instead re­sorted to oppor tunism to re ta in i ts miserable ho ld on power. I t con­nived at Japanese aggression u n t i l a lmost the whole of Ch ina was r u n over, and i t put off a l l programmes of economic and social reforms i n ­definitely. The self-seeking policies o f the K M T leaders annoyed even the progressive minded landlords and the i ndus t r i a l capi tal is ts of China ; so m u c h so t h a t some of t hem even found i t easier to cooperate w i t h the Chinese Communis t P a r t y t h a n w i t h the K u o m i n t a n g .

Such a description h a r d l y fi ts in w i t h the practice of the Congress since independence. The Congress has abolished the pr incely feudal lords (whatever v iew one m a y t ake of the compensation clauses), i n ­troduced the u rgen t ly needed l and reforms (however Inadequate they m a y be) a n d has made sincere ef­fo r t s to l iquidate the fore ign poc­kets i n I n d i a . In cont ras t t o the K u o m i n t a n g w h i c h d i d n o t h i n g t o relieve the sufferings of the women of China , the Congress legal re forms have accorded the I n d i a n women a l ­

most f u l l equal i ty w i t h men in prac­t i c a l l y every sphere of l i fe .

The K M T seized power th rough be t raya l a n d treachery. A n d this lef t a permanent s tamp on its career. F r o m the ve ry s t a r t i t was a house d iv ided: Ch iang K a i Shek and W a n g Ching-Wei . Despite sh i f t i ng alliances the r i f t in the K u o m i n t a n g was never com­pletely healed. F r o m the very s ta r t of i ts po l i t i ca l ascendancy the Kuo­m i n t a n g h a d to spend most of i ts energy in f igh t ing i ts own ranks and the people by the Commu­nis t P a r t y . This incessant a rmed conflict made K u o m i n t a n g leadership h i g h l y in to le ran t o f any c r i t i c i sm however m i l d and led to an i ron d ic ta torship . The K u o m i n t a n g v i r ­t u a l l y made i t i l l ega l for any oppo­s i t ion to func t ion po l i t i ca l ly w i t h i n the borders of China . Ev iden t ly no such para l le l can be found in Con­gress conduct. Whatever m a y be the a t t i tude of the Congress P a r t y to the Communis ts or others i t has put up no legal or m i l i t a r y bars to opposit ion parties.

No Civil Liberties

The K u o m i n t a n g rule was as one non-Communis t Chinese Professor characterised i t . a bandi t rule. There was no rule of law. E v e r y body was at the mercy of the secret police of T a i L i . Mat te r s came to such a pass t h a t even foreigners, h i g h l y sympathet ic towards Chinese aspi­rat ions, found themselves support­i n g the fore ign e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l courts in China, since the i r people could at least demand and get f o r m a l jus­tice. F o r the Chinese however the protect ion of the e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l courts was not available, and they were completely at the mercy of the local K M T Chiefs. N o Chinese, unless he had enough money and h i g h connections, could expect any justice even as a f o r m a l i t y . There would be no t r i a l in most cases and the prosecuting police would si t on judgment as often as not. Can such a t h i n g be said of Congress rule? Whatever i ts other deficiencies, rule of l a w obtains in I n d i a ; and nobody can question t h a t fact.

No general election was held in Ch ina d u r i n g the 28 years of Kuo­m i n t a n g rule . A show of election was made ( f r o m w h i c h the m a i n opposition—-the Communists were

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T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y M a r c h 30, 1957

barred) jus t before its final doom but it came to nothing, since no responsible Chinese took those elec­tions seriously. The I n d i a n experi­ence is too we l l k n o w n to require recounting. The Congress orga­nised general elections on the basis of universal adul t franchise in less than five years t ime and there is no question tha t the elections were free and fai r .

There was no freedom of speech or assembly in K M T China. The Chiang clique refined the technique o f thought cont ro l . A l l l ibera l pro­fessors and wr i t e r s were persecuted —inc lud ing the great Lu Hsun. Miss Agnes Smedly describes in her book Ba t t l e H y m n o f China how L u Hsun's closest friends were l iquidat­ed one by one on his very face. The "Blue Shi r t s" o f Ta i L i k i l l ed the noted Chinese professor Wen 1-to in cold blood and in fu l l public know­ledge. No such th ing ever happen­ed in Congress Ind ia .

Inner Party Democracy The K M T was organised o n the

model of the Soviet Communis t Pa r ty whi le the organisat ional pat­tern of the Congress ran on federal lines. The Congress bodies are elected but i n China the K M T organs were mos t ly nominated. The cliques exis t ing w i t h i n the Congress can ha rd ly be compared w i t h those, l ike the "C C" . Whampoa T a i L i , Chiang and other cliques, w i t h i n the K M T .

Leadership Only in respect of the i m m o b i l i t y

of the higher leaders is there any s im i l a r i t y between the Congress and the K u o m i n t a n g . Bu t the ob­jective outcome of such a pheno­menon in the two countries has been fundamenta l ly d i f fe ren t The Ind i an N a t i o n a l Congress has ma in ­tained great v i t a l i t y and has re ta in­ed popular appeal and support wh ich the K M T lost much earlier i n i ts career. The results of the Second General Elections in I n d i a make this point clear enough.

Opposition in China and Ind ia The foregoing analysis discloses

l i t t l e resemblance between the Con­gress and the Kuomin t ang . Nei ther in o r ig in , h i s to ry or develop­ment, nor in social, economic pol i ­cies and leadership do the parties resemble one another. Whi l e in China the K M T act ively suppress­ed a l l opposition, in I n d i a the Con­gress P a r t y has al lowed m a x i m u m possible scope for the emergence of the opposition and in Kera l a a Con-

munis t Government has been f o r m ­ed th rough popular vote for the f irs t t ime in the h is tory of the w o r l d .

Conclusion

The charge t ha t the prestige or the Congress P a r t y is m i l i t a t i n g against the emergence of an effec­t ive opposition ha rd ly bears any examinat ion . The g r o w t h of oppo­si t ion in every country is determin­ed by his tor ical , pol i t ica l and econo­mic forces. An opposition, cannot be created by the r u l i n g par ty , nor forestalled for ever. The fa i lure of the T u r k i s h experiment ' of offi­c ia l ly encouraging an opposition is a pointer to those who wou ld tend to blame the Congress for no t help­ing to create an opposition. How­ever, in the same Turkey after the Second W o r l d W a r when objective factors were conducive to the g r o w t h of opposition it. grew and u l t ima te ly was able to wrest power f r o m the ru l i ng par ty . On the other hand whi le a lmost every body is agreed on the unheal thy character of the relat ive numerica l preponderance of French pol i t i ca l parties there has been no noticeable t r end of any decline in t ha t number. In the U S A and U K an effective t h i r d pa r ty has fa i led to emerge, F r o m this i t is seen t ha t the pa r ty system is a product of his tory.

At this point an examinat ion of the bearing of an opposition on de­mocracy is cal led for since in com­mon parlance the t w o terms are w h o l l y interchangeable. W h i l e as a mat te r of fac t the existence of an opposition m a y fac i l i ta te the demo­crat ic funct ioning of society there is no absolute guarantee tha t i t would do so in a l l cases. Despite the existence of ve ry s t rong oppo­s i t ion in South Af r i ca , T u r k e y and E g y p t (before Nasser) none of them can be said to i l lus t ra te a democratic society. On the other hand, a lmost everybody agrees t h a t the present one-party States of Egypt , Yugosla­via , China and the U S S R are far more democratic t h a n they previous­ly were under m u l t i - p a r t y systems.

I t is idle to blame the Congress for the weakness of the opposition the reasons for w h i c h must be trac­ed elsewhere—in the great diver­sities of I n d i a n l ife and the poli­t i ca l i m m a t u r i t y of the opposition Except the Communists , none has an a l l - Ind i a organisa t ion conforming fu l ly to centra l guidance. The se­cond largest pol i t ica l par ty in I n d i a - the Pra ja Socialist Pa r ty presents the picture of a house d iv id ­ed. I t is not the f i rs t t ime tha t its

provincia l units have openly disobey­ed central direction in f igh t ing elec­tions and f o r m i n g Government. The Congress cer ta inly never stood in the w a y of the in te rna l so l idar i ty of the P S P. Even dur ing the Second General Elections the West Bengal uni t of the P S P flouted the direc­tives of Na t iona l Committee and formed electoral alliances w i t h the Communists . (The meri ts or de­merits of the actions are not under consideration here).

The opposition is divided on many lines: ideological, pol i t ica l , economic, religious, l inguist ic , cu l tu ra l and re­gional . There is l i t t l e in common between the Communis t Pa r ty and the M u s l i m League though both are opposed to the Congress. The major opposition parties, the Communists, the Praja Socialists and the Jan Sangh are also divided amongst themselves The numerous opposi­t ion parties may be classified in to several broad groups. A p a r t f r o m the na t ional parties (Congress, Com­munist, P S P and Jan Sangh) the organisations are: 1) communal bodies: The H i n d u Mahasabha, the Mus l im League, the A k a l i Da l , the D r a v i d a Munne t ra Kazagham. the Scheduled Castes Federation, the R a m Rajya Parishad, the Jha rkhand P a r t y and others; 2) Regional Po l i ­t ica l Groups: Gana tan t ra Parishad of Orissa, the Jagi rdar Par ty in Rajas than support ing the vested i n ­terests of landlords and ex-rulers. 3) Splinter Pol i t i ca l Groups: Revo­lu t iona ry Socialist Par ty . Revolu­t ionary Communis t Par ty , Peasants' and Worke r s ' Par ty , the F o r w a r d Bloc, the Socialist P a r t y (of Dr Loh ia ) , the Kera l a Socialist Pa r ty and others A p a r t f rom their an t i -Congress s tand (which is determin­ed by m u t u a l l y confl ict ing motives) these parties have no th ing in com­mon among themselves. The result is tha t dur ing the Second General Elections though the non-Congress votes upto March 12 exceeded those of the Congress by three mil l ions, the Congress got twice as many seats as d id the anti-Congress Parties combined.

It is no wonder then that the opposition is weak in India The direct responsibili ty of the Congress Par ty in keeping the opposition weak and divided is nothing unusual for any ru l i ng par ty and is hardly to be called significant. The differen­ces w i t h i n the opposition ranks arise f rom historical causes and cannot so easily be removed unt i l the social basis of such differences are done

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away w i t h . Moreover such diver­gent pol i t ica l forces, i t should be noted are by no means peculiar to I n d i a a lone—history shows t h a t such pol i t i ca l confusion has been character is t ic of a lmost a l l societies in t r ans i t i on . Stable polit ics is i m ­possible w i t h o u t a stable economic background . In the w o r l d o f today stable p a r t y system can be found only in countries w i t h m a r k e d eco­nomic and social s t a b i l i t y — i n the h i g h l y indust r ia l i sed countries of Western Europe and N o r t h Amer ica . The countries of Eas tern Europe and L a t i n A m e r i c a on the other hand, because of delayed reforms, present a very unstable po l i t i ca l scene. In the t r an s i t i ona l society, o f As i a and A f r i c a such ins t ab i l ty is bound to be very m a r k e d and

there is n o t h i n g for r id icule or amaze­ment i n t h a t s i tua t ion .

W h i l e i t i s fashionable in cer ta in quarters to pu t a l l the blame upon the Congress in I n d i a and the r u l ­i ng parties in other A s i a n lands for the weaknesses of the opposit ion the responsibi l i ty of opposit ion lea­ders themselves for such a state of affairs is genera l ly overlooked in the discussions. Suffice it to recal l t h a t the m a i n po l i t i ca l opposit ion in the Chief As ian countries—the Communis t part ies in Ind i a , I ndo ­nesia and Burma—have since open­ly admi t t ed the i r g rave mistakes in the assessment of po l i t i c a l events, forces and personalities immedia te ly upon the close of the Second W o r l d War . The acceptance of the i r p o l i ­cies wou ld have spelt disaster f o r

the countries concerned. Th i s fact has g rave ly shaken the confidence of the masses in the w i s d o m of the opposit ion—at least t empora r i l y .

B l a m i n g the Congress P a r t y in I n d i a f o r the weakness of the oppo­s i t ion in the face of the aforemen­t ioned h i s to r i ca l facts m a y sat isfy one's v a n i t y bu t can h a r d l y be ac­cepted as a reasonable proposi t ion. Th i s is no t to idealise whatever the Congress has done, nor even to iden­t i f y oneself w i t h the Congress ideals and policies. The Congress has also commi t t ed grave blunders w i l l y n i l l y . B u t the opposit ion fa i led to g a i n by Congress lapses because of i t s i n ­herent weaknesses. T h a t is a h a r d fac t w h i c h one w i t h an objective v iew can h a r d l y deny.

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