Confucius and Aristotle

8/10/2019 Confucius and Aristotle

1/26

Virtue: Confucius and AristotleAuthor(s): Jiyuan Yu

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 323-347Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399830.

Accessed: 02/10/2014 17:15

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2/26

VIRTUE: CONFUCIUS

AND

ARISTOTLE

My

im

nthis

ssay

s to

compare

Aristotle's

onception

fvirtue

arete)

withConfucius'

ey

notion

en-which

has also been

interpreted

s

"virtue"l-in order o makeexplicitwhethernd towhat xtenthey

correspond.

he ssue sofcurrent

nterest

iven

hedistinctionetween

ethics nd

morality

n the

contemporary

evival f Aristotelian

irtue

ethics.2 onfucius

as been

interpreted

s a

thinker ho concentrated

on

ethics r

moral

hilosophy.

ow,

with

egard

othedistinction

e-

tween thics nd

morality,

e

may

sk

on which ide

Confuciusies.

s

ren,

nderstood

s a

virtue,

he ort f virtue hat

houldbe

treated s

standing

n

contrasto

morality?

hope

that he

following

ynoptic

om-

parison

of these

two

complex

notions

will be

helpful

ot

only

in

achieving

mutual

lluminationut lso

in

bringing

onfucius'

hinking

into heframeworkfcontemporaryirtuethics.

Structural

imilarity

The word

virtue" s

a

transliterationf the Latinvirtus

from

ir,

literally

manhood"),

which

was

in

turn

mployed y

Latin uthors o

translatehe Greek

rete,

riginally

eferring

o

excellenceof

manly

qualities.

he

word ren was

employed

n

the Book

of

Poetry

a

text

earlier

han

Confucius)

o describenoble huntsmen.

ome scholars

therefore

peculate

hat he

concept

f ren

means,

n a

sense,

manly"

or

"manhood."3

f

that

s

true,

n

etymological

arallel

between en

and virtue

arete)

omes o the urface.

But

hey

ome to be used

differently.

he term en onsists ftwo

components, eaning, espectively,

human" and

"two,"

and

points

towardhuman

elationships.

t is this ense that

igures

n

Confucius'

basic

teaching

hat

by

learning

o be

good

one becomes

person

f

ren.

n

Athenian

hilosophy,

he word

arete

s

associatedwith ristos

(excellent,

est)

nd means he

goodness

f

kind

f

hing

it

s

therefore

also

translated

s

"excellence").

For

Aristotle,

something's

irtue

or

excellence]

s relative o its wn

proper

unction

ergon),"4

hat

s,

the

characteristic

ctivity eculiar

o

something

r itsdistinctive

ark.5

virtuous s

an

X

that

ulfillsts

rgon

well.

Any

ind f

hing

an be said

to

possess

ts

specific)

irtue

y performing

tsfunction ell. Asfar s

human

eings

re

concerned,

irtues human xcellence r

goodness

with

egard

o

human

unction. s Aristotle

ays:

the

virtue f human

being

will

likewise be the state that makes a human

being good

and

makes

him

perform

is functionwell"

(1106a23-24).

Hence,

philosoph-

ically,

rete

s

related

o human

function,

hile ren o human relations.

Confucius does not furnish unifieddefinition f ren. Of various

utterances

ecorded nhis

Analects,

wo remarks

haracterizing

enhave

Jiyuan

u

Assistant

rofessor

f

Philosophy

ttheState

University

fNew

York

atBuffalo

f--

Philosophy

ast&

West

Volume

8,

Number

April

998

323-347

?

1998

byUniversity

f

Hawai'iPress

323

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3/26

Philosophy

ast

& West

been

thought

o be

fundamental:to

loveman"6 and

"to returno

li"

(12:1;

the

translationf

li

ranges

rom

rites" o

"propriety,"

cere-

mony,"

decorum"

nd

"manners").

hat, hen,

s the

relation etween

ren s

love and ren s

returning

o

li?

Which ne of

these wodetermi-

nations

hould e considereds

central?

n

the

prevailingnterpretation,

ren s love s taken s thefundamentaleaning,nd the wo spects f

the notion f ren n

question

re described

s

the

relation

etween

en

and

li.

This s

certainly

upportedy

he

following

emark:What an

a

mando with

i

who

s not en?"

3

3).

The

conformity

o

i

withoutnner

feeling

an

only

be a

formality,

ithout

ny

human

oodness.

Never-

theless,

iven

the

fact hat

ove is a natural

roperty,

ow can that

determine hat moral

goodness

s? A man

might

ove

his

parents,

brothers,

nd

friends,

uthe

may

till

e a

bank

obber,

drug muggler,

or

even

brutal

murderer.

onfuciuss notunaware

f his

ap

between

love

and human

good.

He

explicitly

laimsthat o be "fondof ren

without

eing

ond f

earning

s

iable

o

ead

to foolishness"

17: 8;

cf.

8:2).

Learning

eans o

learn

i,

o

recognize

t nd

embody

t n

one's

behavior. ence ren s

love s not dentical

ith uman

oodness,

nd

needs

o be constrained

y

i. "To returno

li"

turns ut to

be

equally

basic

for

eing ood,

hat

s,

being

person

fren.

fneitheren s love

norren s

returning

o

li

can be a

complete

otion

fhuman

oodness,

what s ren

n

uch sense?

Confuciusometimes iews ren

s

a

particular

uality, long

with

being

lever,

rustworthy,

orthright,ourageous,

nbending,

nd so on.

However,

here re also

many assages

n whichren s described s

a

comprehensiveirtue,ncluding

ll the bove

and othermoral

ualitiesand

determining

heir

oodness.

he distinctionetween en s exclu-

sive and inclusive

s well

recognized.7

ow, then,

s this

distinction

related o

thedistinctionetween

en s

returning

o

li

and as love?

s

there

unified otion o cover ll

these

spects?

While Confucius'

oncept

f ren nvolves tension etween en

as

returning

o

li

and ren s

love,

there

s

also

a tension t the heart

of Aristotle'sotion

f virtue.

ccording

o his

ergon

rgument,

uman

virtue

s the

good

performance

f

human

unction. ndhuman unction

is,

literally

ranslated,

the soul's

activity

hat

xpresses

eason"

kata

logon)

r "notwithout

he

reason"

me

aneu

logou)8

1098a5-6).

Kata

logon

nd me aneu

ogou

refero two

parts

f he oulthat

istinguish

human

eing

rom ther inds f nimals. he

formers the

part

hat

as

reason

n

itself,

nd the atter

s the

part

hat

s nonrationalut

obeys

reason

cf.

1102b14-1103al,

1198a4).

Aristotlehen ivides irtue

nto

two

kinds: hat

which

corresponds

o the

part

f the soul thathas reason

in itselfs intellectual irtue

dianoetike

rete,

or excellence

of intelli-

gence),

and thatwhich

corresponds

o the

part

f the soul that s nonra-

tional but

obeys

reason

is

ethical virtue

ethike

rete,

or

excellence

of

324



4/26

ethical

haracter).

tfollows hat ntellectualirtues theexcellence f

exercising

eason,

while thical irtue an be understoods theexcel-

lenceof

obeying

eason.9

The human

ood,"

for

xample

udaimonia

(happiness,

r

well-being),

ristotle

oncludes,

turns

ut to

be

the

soul's

activity

hat

xpresses

irtue"

1

98al

6).

Aristotle'srgon rgumentmmediatelyaces challenge. eason s

a natural

roperty aydistinguish

umans rom ther nimals utdoes

not eemto be

the riterion

hat

istinguishes

uman

ood

from

uman

evil.

Acting

ationally

nd

acting

well

ethically

o

not

eem

to be iden-

tical.

f

ne

performs

r

obeys

ne's rationalunction

ell,

we

would

ay

that ne

is

ntelligent

r clever ather

han

hat ne

is

good

n

the thical

sense.For

ntelligence

ay

be

put

o

the

ervice

f vil ctions. clever

bankrobber r

a

thief ith

ophisticated

kills t

stealing

s

"good"

as a

robber

r as a

thief,

ut

s

unlikely

o be

accepted

s

being

good

ethi-

cally.

There

s a

gap

between

ational

xcellence nd social

respect.

For

Aristotle,owever,

here s another imensionf human ature:

"Man is

by

nature

political

social]

nimal."10

person

annot ive

n

isolation

romome

ommunity

nd must

articipate

n

nd share he ife

of

society.

thical

irtue,

hich

s

the oul's

activity

n

obeying

eason

according

o the

ergon

rgument,

s,

n a more

irect

ense,

oncerned

with

haracter

ethos)

1103a17),

which s

informed

y

social and cul-

tural ustoms nd habits

ethos).

t

s

the

disposition

r

quality

ofeel

nd

act

n

ways

dmired

y

he

ociety.

hiskind f

table, ettled,

nd

long-

lasting isposition

orms state

hexis,

which

n

Greek s

related o "to

have")."

In

terms f the

claimthat human

eing

s a social

animal,

Aristotlevoids ocrates' xtreme

osition

f

ntellectualism,

nd

xpandsthe rea of ethics romhe

tudy

f moral

knowledge

nd

reasoning

o

the

tudy

f

development

f

good

habits f

feeling

nd action.

Aristotle'sistinctionetween ntellectualirtuend ethical irtues

hencenot

nly

asedon

the

wo

parts

f

he

oul,

but

orresponds

o the

dual dimensionsfa

person's

uman ature s a

purely

ationalnimal

and as

a

social animal. here re various ebates

egarding

owto rec-

oncilethese.

n

Aristotle's

thics,

hey

ead to two

eemingly

ncompat-

ible notions f eudaimonia

happiness).

udaimonias the

activity

hat

expresses

irtue

1098a1

).

According

o

the

ergon rgument,

he

best

life hould e thatwhichmost

ully

xercises

ne's rational

ctivity,

nd

that, orAristotle,s the ife f

contemplation

NEX,7 ff.). n theother

hand,

eudaimonia

s the mostdesirable ort f lifeneeds to include

all

intrinsically

orthwhilectivities

nd,

in

addition,

xternal

oods

(1099a31-b6).12

The ssue hat s more ssential

o our

current

urpose

is this: is ethical virtuedeterminedmore

fundamentally

y

the

estab-

lishedhabits nd customs f the

particular

ultural nd historical ontext

into which one

happens

to be

thrown,

r

by

human

rationality,

hich

belongs

to

any self-determininggency?

Intellectualvirtue includes

Jiyuan

u

325



5/26

Philosophy

ast

West

theoretical

isdom,

nd

practical

wisdom

phronesis).3

While

theo-

retical isdom

oes not nvolve

ction,

ractical

isdom s "concerned

with ction bout

what s

good

or

bad

for human

eing"

1140b4-6).

The

question,

hen,

s

about herelation etween

ractical

isdom

and ethical

irtue.

n

theone

hand,

thical irtuemust e theexcel-

lence ofobeying eason,nd Aristotlelaims hat full irtue cannot

be

acquired

without

ractical

isdom"

1145a1

).

On theother

and,

he

says: "practical

wisdom,

he

eye

of the

soul,

cannot each

ts

fully

developed

tatewithout irtue"

1144a30-31);

and it is his

recurring

remarkhat virtuemakes he

goal

correct,

nd

practical

isdommakes

what

promotes

he

goal."14

We seem to be

caught

n

a

cycle

between

ethical irtuend

practical

isdom

1144b31-32).

This

ssay

ntends

o

argue

hat

complete

otion fvirtue

n Aris-

totle ies

n

an

interplay

etween he

wodeterminationsf ntellectual

virtuend ethical irtue.

imilarly,

complete

otion fren

n

Confucius

lies

n

a synthesisf

thetwo determinations

f

ren s love and

ren s

returning

o

li. On this

basis,

try

o

provide

n

answer o each of

the

questions

aised bove. Bothrenand Aristotle's

irtue re concerned

with

how a

person

hould ive

within

society.

WhileAristotle's

irtue

hinges

n

practical

isdom,

en s

contingent

n filial ove.

This

s

be-

cause

while

Aristotle

mphasizes

how

a

person

s a

self-determining

being

an

live,

Confucius'

i is

an

ideal social

system,

nd

hence

his

concern

s

how

person

an

comply

with

i,

rather

han

what

we should

comply

with.

inally,

will

how hat

ifferent

onceptions

fvirtuelso

lead

to

different

ictures

f he ultivationfvirtue.

Li,Ethos,

nd PracticalWisdom

Letus start ith onfucius'

en s

returning

o

li. Li

originally

efers

to therules

oncerning

ituals

r ceremoniesnvolved

n

religious

ffairs.

IntheAnalectst s conceived armore

roadly,ontaining

oth bstract

principles

nd detailed ormsf ocial

regulations.

t

prescribes

ot

nly

what herelationsetween ulernd

subject

hould e

3

18,

3

19)

and

what ne

ought

o do

in

supporting

ne's

parents,

n

holding

funeral,

and

in

paying

or sacrifice

2:5),

but lso

whatkind f

ceremonial

ap

one should

wear,

nd even whenone should

prostrate

neself

efore

ascending

teps

n

to

see a

king

9:3).

This atter

rescription

s

like he

rule hat

equires

netowear black ieto a fellows' inner tOxford.

Both

re

cultural

orms

atherhanmoral emands.

n

12:1,

Confucius

claims hat

eturning

o

i

means hat ne

should ollow

he

guidance

f

i

in

"looking,"

listening,"

speaking,"

nd

"moving."

One

has

no

way

of

taking

his

stand

unless he knows

i"

(20:3).

Li is thus the

totality

f

socially

acceptable

behavior

patterns

nd

lifestyles,

ncluding

othmoral

and non-moral orms. t

orresponds

o Aristotle'sthos

social

custom),1s

that

s,

the traditionalocial mores nd cultural

ettings.

326



6/26

When Confucius

laims hat enmeans o returno

li,

he is

asking

each

agent

o act n

conformity

ith ocial

values,

nd

thereby

ecome

accepted

nd

respected

y

he

ociety

rtraditione or he s n.To be a

person

f ren

s first

f

all

to be a social

person,

quipped

withwhat

Aristotle

alls

"excellence fcharacter"r "ethical irtue."

YetConfucius'i mmediatelyurns ut not o be ethos r custom s

such

in

Chinese:

eng

u).

He

is not commonsense oralist.

i

is an

object

hatConfucius

equires

s to "return

o"

(fu)

atherhan

imply

to

"conform

ith." he word

return"n Chinesemeans o

go

back

to

what

we

have

deviated rom.

i

thushas a

particular

eference,

he

ii

of

theZhou

dynasty

from

a.

1122

B.C.).

Confucius as a

profound

om-

mitmento the

Zhou

li:

"The Zhou had the

dvantage

f

surveying

he

two

preceding ynasties.

ow

resplendent

s

its

ulture

wen)

follow

Zhou"

3 14).

He evenclaims hat his

et f

iwouldnot

e

changed

or

more

han hundred

enerations:

Should here e

a

successor o the

Zhou,

ven

a

hundred

enerations

ence an be known"

2:23).

In

Confucius'

ime,

he hou

dynastyollapsed

nto

many

mall

tates

thathad been

warring

gainst

ach other.

hinese

ociety

nderwent

a turbulent

eriod

f

transition

uring

hich herewas little

rder nd

stability.

hen the Zhou house overthrewts

predecessor,

he

Shang

dynasty,

t

laimed hat he

Shang

had

forfeited

he Tian

Ming

Mandate

of

Heaven)

or

Tian

Dao

(Way

of

Heaven)

hrough

ts

misrule,

hile ts

own social institutions

onformedo thewillof

Heaven.Yet

they

were

now broken.

Where,

hen,

ould

be found he

Way

of Heaven

o order

the tate nd

guide

people's

ives? his s

thebasic

problem

or

re-Qin

Chinese

philosophy.

onfucius'

nswer

s

that he

ocial turmoil

f

the

timeswas due tothe oss f he raditionalalues f heZhouculture. e

therefore

equires

s to

"return"o the social

frameworkf that

deal

state.

en

s

returning

o i

means o

be

a

person

cceptable

ccording

o

theZhou

i.

Although

heAnalects

oes not

present blueprint

fthe

Zhou

i,16

its

ore turns

ut

to be

a

humane ocial

hierarchy

odeled n

family

relationships.

Letthe ruler e a

ruler,

he

ubject subject,

hefather

a

father,

he on

a

son"

(12

11).

A

society

s

governed y

a

network

f

nameseach of which reflects

statuswhich has a

prescribed

et

of

duties.

An

ordered

ociety

s

that

n

whichnames re "rectified."f

ach

person layed role uitable o thepersonage eassumedn ociety,he

society

wouldbe

pacified

nd harmonious.

Confucius'

pholding

f the

Zhou

li

has been

interpreted

s testi-

mony

o his radical conservatism r

traditionalism; ence,

those scholars

who would

uphold

Confucius

generally

"nd

not

to

clarify

hat his

li

is

the Zhou

li.

However,

Confucius'

onservatism

s not

necessarily

fault.

His beliefswere

generatedby

hisreflection n

the

brutal ocial

reality

f

his time. This

might

e

compared

with Edmund Burke's

conservatism,

Jiyuan

u

327



7/26

Philosophy

ast

& West

the

result

f

his

reflectionn

the

violence f the

French evolution.t

does

sometimeseem

hat onfucius

ails o

distinguish

learly

etween

fundamental

rinciples

nd the rivial

egulations

n

theZhou

ii,

nd his

frequentmphasis

n

regulatory

etail

onveys

n

impression

f

rigidity.

Nevertheless,

hathe

really

mbraces s the

spirit

nd

essenceof the

Zhou li.Whenhe claims hat heZhou i willnot hange or hundred

generations

2:23, 3:14),

he

is not

aying

hat oneof he

detailed

eg-

ulations f

heZhou

i

s

changeable.

s a

matter

f

fact,

e does

endorse

some

changes.

or

nstance,

rugality

s

preferred

o

extravagance

n

cer-

emonial

ractice

3:4),

and a

ceremonial

ap

of

inen an be

exchanged

for

cap

ofblack ilk or easons f

economy

9:3).

Confucius

ully

ealizes

hat heZhou

i

itself

s

a

development

rom

the

preceding

wo

dynasties,ncorporatingvariety

f

good

elements

from hem

15:11).

The

idea of social

development

s not lien to his

thinking.

hat hould

emain

nchanged,

owever,

s

the

deep meaning

of the Zhou

li,

the

truly

adical lterationf which an

only

ead to

calamity.

s his

disciple

i-Xia

ays:

If

ne does not

verstep

hebounds

in

major

matters,

t sof

no

consequence

f

ne is

notmeticulous

nminor

matters"

19:

11).

Confucius

dmires

he hou

i

becausehe believes hat

thismust

e

the deal

of

ocial

regulation,

nd this s the ontext ithin

which

umanity

an find ts ull

xpression.

i

s

thus

he

Way,

r

ogos.17

To "return"

s

not

imply

o

go

back,

but o holdonto he uthentic.

person

f ren hould

mbody

he uthentic

pirit

f a culture. hinese

civilizations the

ongest-lived

fhistorical

raditions,

nd

it s

generally

believed hatConfucianism

s what has

generated

he

cohesive

force

behind

his ivilization. nd he

trength

f

Confucianism

s ts nsistence

on traditionalalues.

Confucius oes not

present

etailed

ustification

or

why

heZhou

i

is thebasisfor he dealethical nd

political

rder. e seems o believe

that

thas a

divinity

hat s derived

rom

heHeaven

Tian)

nd

Dao. The

fact hat heZhou

i

had declined

n his

ime

he ascribes o thefact hat

Dao had not

prevailed

n the

mpire

16:2,

5:6).

To illustrate

herela-

tionbetween

ian

nd

li,

we must ere ntroducenother

major

notion

of Confucius:

e. Whileren s referredo

as

virtue,

e

in

various rans-

lations

s also

defined s

virtue. he identical ranslation

or hese wo

concepts

ould be

justified

n the

ground

hat

e in

Chinese

s derived

fromtoget" nd nConfuciusan be understoodsthe onsequencef

returning

o li.

t s hence

counterpart

fethical irtue

n

Aristotle.

f

culture

li)

acquires

he

pirit

f Dao

(or

Heavenly

ao),

it s endowed

with "de."

It s in this ense

that

Confucius

ays

that he de of Zhou

"can

be said to have been the

highest"

8:20).

If

person

ives naccordance

with

i,

thenhe

has

de.

SometimesConfucius

makesthe

direct

laim that

heaven is the author f de

(7:23;

cf. also

9:5),

and sometimes

he

jus-

tifies

e

in terms f the

operation

of Heaven. For

instance,

n Chinese

328



8/26

culture,

levertalk or

loquacity

s

not

considered s a

de

(15:27,

17:17).

Why

s this?

onfucius

xplains:

What

does Heaven ver

ay?

Yet there re the four easons

going

round

nd there re the

hundred

things oming

nto

eing.

Whatdoes

Heavenever

ay?"

17:19).

Con-

fucius akes heZhou

i

as thefull

mbodimentf Dao or

ogos.

He furtheristinguisheshe "de ofthegentleman"rom he "de of

the small

man,"

butnever

ays

what he

ground

s for his

distinction,

thus

iving

ise o someconfusion

n

understanding

his

oncept.

uch

distinction

eems o

suggest recisely

hedistinctionetween

heZhou

i

(ethos)

nd

ethos

n

general.

f

e is cultivatedut f heZhou

i,

t s a de

ofthe

gentleman,

nd

if t

s a habitual

uality

ut ofthe

prevailing

ut

non-authentic

thos,

t s

thede of he mallman.He

says:

The

village

worthy

s theruin fde"

(17:13).

But he

xistence

f

he

villageworthy

is no doubt kind

f

radition.

good

person

houldneithere liked or

disliked

y

ll

inthe

village,

ut hould

e liked

y

those

who are

good

and disliked

y

hosewho are bad

(13:24).

WhileConfucius'thics s confined

o the

acred

Zhou

i,

Aristotle's

ethos s

simply

he

prevailing

ocial customs

nd

conventions.

ristotle

believes hat

human

eing

must

e

a social

animal,

nd

accordingly

must onformo social

norms.

evertheless,

ike

Confucius,

e does not

feel hat

o cultivatethical irtues

simply

matter

f

passively

om-

plying

ith

he

xisting

ustoms

nd

rules,

whatever

heymay

be. It s

possible

hat

he

existing

nds are

in

conflict,

nd are

not

ven

good.

Within he ame social

context,

here re rival ists

f

virtuesnd differ-

ent definitions

or he same virtues.

his

situation

s not

exceptional

within he

polls

ofAthens

n

the

fifth

entury,

s Plato's

arly ialoguesattest. or

xample,

Aristotle

istinguishes

etween a

good

man" and

"a

good

citizen"

1130b28,

Politics

276b34).

Social

norms,

onstitu-

tions,

nd forms

f

governmenthange,

nd the

meaning

f a

"good

citizen"

hanges ccordingly.

There s not ne

single

irtue

f he

good

citizen hat

s

perfect

irtue"

Politics

276b32-33).

n

contrast,

here s a

single

perfect

irtue

orhuman

beings

s human

beings, amely

heir

reason.

Aristotle's

umanity

iesboth

n

his

maintaining

imselfs a self-

determining

erson

nd

as a

person

elf-determined

y

he ocial

norms.

But ince

his thics oncernsmorewhat

good person

houldbe

than

what

good

citizen

hould

be,

reason

becomes he ultimate etermi-

nant. For t sourdecisions odo what s

good

orbad,not urbeliefs,

thatmake

he haracter e have"

1112a4).

Hence,

whileone cannot ive

n

isolation

rom

ociety,

ne must

maintain reflective

ttitude owardethos norder o be a

good person.

This reflective unction

s

one's

practical

wisdom

phronesis).

irst,

rac-

tical wisdom

helps

one to understand

why

the

ways

of

behavior

that

one has learned

are

really

noble and true.One therefore

roceeds

from

knowing

that"

(oti)

to

knowing

why"

(dioti).

A

person

of

experience

Jiyuan

u

329



9/26

Philosophy

ast

& West

sometimesan

do betterhan

person

f

knowledge,

ut

knowledge

s

still

uperior

o

experience

ecause t

grasps

he

ause,

while

xperience

does not.18

person

f

practical

isdom

phronimos)

erforms

virtu-

ous

act because

t s

really

irtuous,

atherhan simulacrumf

virtue.

Second,

practical

isdom oes not

merely rovide person

with

more rticulatepinion s towhy he nstructedehaviorsgood,but s

also

required

o

compare

arious iewsof what

goodness

s,

andthen

also

to

grasp

he rue

onception

fwhat nds re

really

ood

and hould

be

pursued

n

conflicting

ituations

1143b21-22).'9

This

larificationf

existing

nds s

itselflso the

process

f

achieving

new end. ForAris-

totle,

ractical

isdom

s

concerned

ith he

onception

f he

good

ife

in

general,

nd the

phronimos

eliberates ell "about

what

promotes

living

ell

n

general"

1140a27-28).

Third,

ractical

isdom

has

a dimension

f

contextuality

r

partic-

ularity.

ristotle

cknowledges

hat he

ubject

f

thics

s

ndeterminate,

and that niversalrinciplesre not lexiblenoughocopewith arious

particular

ituations

1098a26

ff.,

103b34).

Practicalwisdom s con-

cerned

with

ctions,

nd

actions re

always

bout

particulars.

ence t

has a dimension

f

perception,

hat

s,

practical

ntuition,

or

etermining

what houldbe

done

or

can be

done well

in

certain

articular

ircum-

stances: For

nothing erceptible

s

easily

defined,

nd

[since]

hese

[circumstances

f

virtuousnd vicious

ction]

re

particulars,

he

udge-

ment bout hem

epends

n

perception."20

practical

erception

ec-

ognizes

he

alient

eatures

f he

particulars

nd s aware f he

imits

f

the

universal

rinciples

n

application.

racticalwisdom hus

nables

one to reach n

equilibrium

etween

he

universalnd

he

particular

nd

to be aware fwhat hould e done naccordancewith he

good

end n

a

concrete ituation.

Aristotle

hen

evelops

he

opics

elated

o

practical

isdom,

uch

as

choice,

deliberation,

esponsibility,

ncontinence

akrasia),

nd so

on. In

contrast,

onfucius

ays

ittlebout

hese ssues.21 his s

largely

because

his i

is not

omething

owardwhich

we are

required

o main-

tain

criticalttitude. e have a

choice

only

between

ollowing

i

and

falling

nto

isorder. or

Confucius,

a

good

man" nd "a

good

citizen"

should

not

e

different,

nd ndeed t s as a

good

citizen hat ne

can be

a

good person.

Aristotleoes

agree

that

n

the bestform

f

society

good person

nd a

good

citizenwouldbe the ame,but hebest ormf

society

s

to be found

hrough

he

cience

of

politics.

oth

Aristotlend

Confucius

re concernedwithwhat

good

person

houldbe

and con-

nect hiswith ocial culture

nd tradition.

owever,

hileAristotle

ug-

gests

n attitude hat s notone ofblind

compliance

with

radition,

on-

fucius nsists n the

continuity

nd

authenticity

f

tradition. t is out of

thisbelief hatConfuciusdevotes much of his life o the

transmission

f

the

ancient

lassics,

which

record he

li

or

civilization

f

Zhou.

330



10/26

Nevertheless,

he

ackof an Aristotelianotion f

practical

isdom

turns ut

to

be

the

weakness

n

Confucius'

hinking.

ere we need

to

discuss nother

f

his

mportant

otions:

i

which

s

generally

ranslated

as

"righteousness,"

meaning,"

r

"morality").

none

instance,

e

says:

"In

dealing

with heworld he

gentleman

s not

nvariably

or nd

against

anything.e is on the ide ofyi" (4:10). What, hen,syi, nd what s

its

relation

o

li? Yi

appears

n

theAnalects

wenty-four

imes

without

unified efinition

r

elucidation.

More

often,

his erm

s

used

n

oppo-

sition o

personal

dvantage

r

profit

-also

ii):

"The

gentleman

nder-

stands

i,

he mallman understandshat

s

profitable"

4:16;

cf. lso

19:1,

7:15,

14:13).

Yi in

this ense means he

principle

f

right

e-

havior,

n

contrasto

egoism.

t

s

something

ike he

principle

f

ustice

or what ction ne should ollow r conformo.This

ense

s

in

fact ot

far rom

i.22

The

relation etween

i

and

yi

can

be

understoods follows.

s

we

mentioned

arlier,i

has both ts

etailed ormsnd

its

pirit.ts

detailed

formsannot over ll the

possible

nd

complex

ituations

n

our

ctual

life.

When

uch situation

ccurs,

we

should ct n

accordancewith he

spirit

f

i,

he

rightness

greed

o and believed n

by

the

ommunity.

i

is thus loseto

the onventionfwhat s

morally

inding.23

ccordingly,

Confucius

s

saying,

n

the

passage

at 4:10

(quoted

bove),

hat

when

a

particular

ct

lacks he

guidance

f

theconcrete orm f

i,

we must

follow

he

rightyi).

And the

sourceof the

right

s

the

spirit

f

li,

or

authenticradition.

If

we

should

dhere o

yi

in a

situation

here

he

concrete

egu-

lations f

ii

are not

available,

we

need

a

way

to

udge

and

elaborate

what sthe

right

yi),

hat

s,

what onstituteshe

deep spirit

f ior the

enduring

ao and what s

peripheral

o the

uthenticradition. e

need

to

reflect

pon

what

oncrete orms f

i

embody

he

uthentic

pirit

f

the tradition

nd what should

be

emended,

evised,

nd even

partly

rejected.

We must

dentify

hen

he Dao or

Way prevails

r when

t s

hidden.

onfucius'

otion f

yi

seems o

open

thedoorfor

n Aristote-

lian

practical

isdom,

uthe fails o work

tout.

He

has a

major

irtue

called "wisdom"

zhi),

but t

must lso be

based on

conformity

o

Ii.

"How can theman be considered

ise

who,

whenhe has the

choice,

does not ettle

n

ren?"

9:1).

Yet

he

says

nothing

urther

bouthow

hi,

based on ren, an determinehatyi s.24

Filial ove nd

Self-love

The main

problem

ddressed

by

Aristotle's thics s

howone should

live. WhenConfucius laims

that

person

of ren sto live n

accordance

with

i,

he seems

already

o have

provided

n

answer

o

this

uestion.

He

then

needs

to

deal

with

how it s

possible

for

person

to

"returno" or

"comply

with"

li.

For,

unlikeMencius after

im,

Confucius s

not

a

uto-

@

MIJ

Jiyuan

u

331



11/26

Philosophy

ast West

pian oncerning

uman

ature. e does not elieve hat uman atures

innately

rogrammed

o

comply

with

i.

nstead,

e has

a

deep

suspicion

that t s

naturally

ttracted

o

ren:

I

havenevermet manwhofinds

en

attractive

r

a man

who

finds ot-ren

epulsive.

manwho finds

en

attractiveannotbe

surpassed"

4:6).

When he claims hat en s "to

returnoli,"themore omplete xpressions "to overcomeneself nd

to returno

li."

Accordingly,

n

returning

o

li,

one must irst

f

all dis-

cipline

he self."

Of

course,

ne

could be

forced

o

accept

the

requirements

f

li

through unishment.

et

n

that ase one

"will

stay

ut of

trouble

ut

will

have

no

senseof shame"

2:3).

Confucius'

i

might

e

normative,

but

n

contrast

o both

Kantian thics nd

utilitarianism,

t

s not ome-

thing

xternal

hat ne

ought

o

obey

without

egard

o

one's inner

motivation.

or

him,

thics s not matterfhowwe

should e

bounded

(obligare),

ut fhowwe

can

follow ocial rules

willingly

nd

naturally.

It

s

against

his

background

hatConfuciusntroduces

is

other

major

interpretation

f ren: Ren s to ove

humanity"

12 22).

Ren as

love s based on the

feeling

ne

has

toward ne's own

par-

ents nd brothers.

Filial

piety

nd

brotherly

ove

are theroots

f

ren"

(1 2).25

In

Confucius'

iew,

hese oots ave

hemost

mportant

thical

value: "The

gentleman

ourisheshe

roots,

or nce theroots re estab-

lished,

hedao

will

grow

herefrom"

1 2).

If

amily

ove

s thebasis

for

dao

to

prevail, iven

the relation

etweendao and

li,

ren as

love

becomes

fundamentalor

ren as

returning

o

Ii.

Filial

ove as natural

sentiment

s inborn nd not

culturallypecific.

What s

required

s to

cherish nd nurture

t.

Filial ove is crucialbecause Confucius elieves hat

ratitude

nd

affectionoward

ne's

parents

nable one

willingly

o

accept parental

authority

nd the hierarchical

elation etween

arent

nd

child. uch

an

ingrained

nd ntimateelations

given

s

ustification

or he

practice

of he

hree-year ourningeriod

fter

parent

ies:

"A

child eases

to

be nursed

y

his

parents

nly

whenhe is three

ears

ld. Three

years'

mourning

s observed

hroughout

he

Empire"

17:21).

To

repay

hree

years

with

hree

ears

mightppear

oo

formal,

ut

he dea here s that

filial

ove

mightnspire

n

internal

eeling

hat auses

one

willingly

o

carry

ut he

responsibility

oward ne's

parents.

inship

nvolves nat-

uralhierarchyndthrought s established aturaluthorityelations,

while

ts

extension/expansion

o other ocial relations

aturalizes

he

idea of

hierarchy

nd

authority

n

thewider

ociety.

y

he ame

token,

the

eeling

oward

ne's brothers akes ne

agreeably

ltruistic.

family

may

notbe

a democratic orum r

provide

context or

quality,

ut

t

s

a

place

one loves to be

in.

The idea of ren s love

is

the

expansion

ofthe roots ffilial ove.

This

expansion

consists

n

the

transferring

f

the

family

elations f

hierarchy

332



12/26

and

fraternity

o the

argerociety.

s

a

good

father akes

good

ruler,

a

good

son

makes

good

subject.

A

person

f ren

tarts ith

oving

the

parent,

nd

then

graduallyxpands

he circle f ove.

"The

young

should ehavewith ilial

iety

t

home,

nd with

rotherly

ove broad"

(1

6);

eventually,

All

withinhe

Four eas are his

brothers"

12:5).

"A

manwhopossesses ilial ietyndbrotherlyove sunlikelyotransgress

against

is

uperiors,

nd to

ncline o

start

rebellion"

1

2).

Hence,

hedetermination

hat

ren s to love man" serves o

ustify

the

nner asis of

returning

o

li.

Earlier

mentioned,

utwithout is-

cussion,

hat here s

a

well-recognized

ut

unspecified

istinction

n

Confucius etween en s

complete

irtuend ren s

particular

irtue.

f

my

rgument

hus

ar s

sound,

his istinction

an

be set on an intelli-

gible

foundation.

hileren s

love seems

particular

irtue,

en n ts

complete

ense s a

synthesis

f ren s love

and ren s

returning

o

li.

Neither

s

dispensable.

n theone

hand,

he

conformity

o

li

must e

basedon ren s love:

What an a man

do

with iwho s not en?"

3: 3);

on the ther

and,

en s love tself ust e

regulatedy

i:

being

fond

of

ren

without

eing

fond f

learning

i.e.,

i]

is

liableto

lead

to

fool-

ishness"

17: 8).

One

can be

fully

ood

only

when ne conforms

o i

out

of ove.

Although

onfucius

oes not

pecify,

tdoes not eemfar rom

his mind

hat

uch an

interplay

r

synthesis

nderlies ll admirable

characteristics,

hat

s,

particular

irtues.

or

nstance,

ourage

annot e

characterized

s a virtue

f

tdoes not ontain his

unity

f ren

s love

and ren s

returning

o li. It

will

become

unruly

fnot

regulated y

li

(8:2, 17:8),

but

f t

s notmotivated

y

ove

t

will

lso lead to

unruly

behavior

8:10).

Even

filial

iety

s a virtue s determined

y

such

a

unity.

n theone

hand,

ilial

iety

eeds o conformo

ii:

"When

your

parents

re

alive,

omply

with

i

n

serving

hem;

when

hey

ie,

comply

with

i in

burying

hem nd

in

sacrificing

o them"

2:5).

On theother

hand,

t

requires

feeling

f love

in

serving

ne's

parents;

therwise

"Evenhounds

nd horses

re,

n

ome

way,provided

ith

ood.

f

man

showsno

reverence,

here s the

difference?"

2

7).

Ren as love not

only keeps

the

compliance

with i

from

eing

matter

f

externally

mposed

imitations,

ut also

provides

n inner

ground

or ltruism.irtuesan be either

elf-regarding

r

other-regarding

or both.

t has

been

a central oncern or irtue thics

o

provide

he

rationaleor ltruism,hats,

other-regarding

irtue. onfucius'

nsight

s

that

f

we want o nurture

ltruism,

hen

ilial ove

serves s

a

root r an

innate

pring.26

Like

Confucius,

ristotle

ully

cknowledges

he ntrinsic

oodness

of ove.

Philia,

which s

generally

ranslated s

"friendship,"

s the central

topic

in

several

treatises.27 uman

beings

are

political

rsocial

animals,

"tending

by

nature

o

live

together

withothers"

1169bl

7),

while

"The

will to live

together

s

friendship

philiaY')"

Politics1280b38).

Philia in-

Jiyuan

u

333



13/26

Philosophy

ast

West

cludes

every

ind

f

social

relation

nvolving

utual

oving

nd

liking,

and hence "love" seems better

ranslation.28

texists ot

nly

within

family

members

nd

fellow

itizens,

ut

lso

in

various ssociations

f

individuals ho share

common nterest

n

utility,leasure,

r virtue.

The formerind

s

natural,

hile he

atter

s

voluntary.

ForAristotle,t sfriendshiphat reates familyonnexions,roth-

erhood,

ommon acrifices"

Politics

280b37),

nd it

s "the

greatest

good

of tates"

Politics

262b8)

to

have

and to

preserve riendship.

t

a

personal

evel,

riendship

s

necessary

or

happiness

eudaimonia).

t

is not

merely

he

"greatest"

nd "most

necessary"

f external

oods

(1169bl10,

154a4-5),

but

lso intrinsico

a

happy

ife. or ne needs t

in

all circumstancesnd

in

every eriod

f ife.A man

without riends

cannot

be

happy

1155a5-6, 1169b8-10,

1169bl

6-17).

It

creates

n

arena

for

ne to realize nd

express

ne's virtue. he naturalove or

friendship

ithin he

family

s

also

highly

alued

by

Aristotle.

parent

loves hischildren

ecause

he

regards

hem

s

"something

f

himself,"

and children

ovetheir

arents

ecause

they

egard

hem s the

source

of

origin"

1161

1

-19).

Brothersove ach other ecause

hey

refrom

the ame

parents.

The

discussion

f

friendship

r oveearnsAristotleredit or

utting

friendship

nd

family

ttachment

s

important,

ntrinsictems

nto

he

ethical

phere.

his

s

regarded

s

a

significant

dvantage

f his ethics

over modernmoral heories hat ocus nstead n

impartiality

nd the

impersonaloint

fview.Aristotle'siscussion f

friendship,

specially

of

amily

ove,

orrectslato's adical

nti-family

osition

n

he

Republic.

BothConfuciusnd Aristotledvocate he thical tatus f

ove,

but

their iscussions ifferncertain

ignificantspects.

he

family

ovethat

Confucius

mphasizes

s

filial

ove,

the love of children oward heir

parents.

ilial ove s

prior

o virtuend is the

root

f he

atter.

e nur-

ture his oot o the ffecthat

ociety

s seen as an

enlarged

amily.

ll

social

sympathy

r

love

s

derived rom ilial ove and can be reduced

to it.On

the ther

and,

he

amily

oveAristotle

mphasizes

s

parental

love.He

believes

hat

arental

ove

oward

hildrens

more

ntensehan

theother

way

round. his s because

parents

now hildren etternd

have a

stronger

enseof

possessing,

nd

also

because

their

ove

toward

their hildrentarts

ight

romheir

irth,

while hildren ecome ond f

theparent hen imehaspassed ndthey ave cquired omecompre-

hension r

perception"

1161b27).

Since

a

parent

s

an adult nd

has

already

stablished stable

haracter,

arental

ovecannot e

a

starting

point

or he formationf virtue nd is not ssociatedwith he notion

that a state is an

enlarged family.

Hence,

when Aristotle

istinguishes

between natural

amily

oveand

voluntary

ocial

love,

he never

ays

that

the latter s derivedfrom heformer.He draws a clear-cutdistinction

between household and

political

ife,

nd claims that t is

mistaken

o

334



14/26

think hat amiliesnd

city-states

re different

nly

n

size

ratherhan n

kind

Politics

,1).

He

trulycknowledges

he

mportance

f

family

nd

social

sympathy

n

ethics, ut,

unlike

onfucius,

e fails

o

appreciate

family

ove

as an

ethicalvalue that

s

the basis

for

ther ocial

regu-

lations.29

n

dealing

with

amily

nd emotional

ommitment,

onfucius

goesmuchfurtherhanAristotle,orhe notonlydoes justice o these

ethical

phenomena

ut lso considers hem n

Archimedean

oint

or

his

thics.

For

Aristotle,

ocial love

and

friendship

re

an

extension f one's

love

ofoneself

atherhan n extension

f

filial ove:"The

defining

ea-

tures f

friendship

hat refound

n

friendship

o

one's

neighbours

ould

seem o be derived

rom

eatures

f

friendship

oward neself"

1166al

-

2).

All

forms

f

ove must

e

understood

nthe

ontext f elf-love.uch

an

analysis

f he ssence f

friendship

s associatedwith

Aristotle's

iew

that human

eing

s

essentially

rational

eing.

He declares hat The

good person

must

e

a self-lover."30

e

distinguishes

wo kinds

f elf-

lovers: ne

is a

base

egoist

who does his

best

o

gratifyppetite

nd the

nonrational

art

f the oul

1186bl17, 168b22-23);

the

other

ursues

the

gratification

ftherational

art

fthe

oul,

for eason

s,

above

all,

"what

ach

person

s,

and the decent

person

ikes hismost fall."31

The

good

manas a self-lover

s

the atter

ind,

who

is

obedient o the

voice

of reason

within

imself nd sets

his

life

n

accordancewith

rationality.

We once

again

face

he

relation etween ristotle'sual

dimensions

of

human

ature.

human

eing

s a social

nimal

equires

ove,

ut s a

rational

eing xplains

henature

f

ove.The oveofotherss

groundedinthe oveof elf. tfollowshat human

eing

s,

firstf

ll,

a rational

being

atherhan social

being,

lbeit he attertatus

s

ndispensable.

Aristotles

charged

with

eaving

ittle oom or ltruism

n

his thics.

He failsto

explain why

a rational

erson

needs to

cultivate

ther-

regarding

irtues.

good person

will

perform

ctions

n

other

eople's

interests,

ut hat

s for he

perfection

f

one's own character.

f

o,

when

there

s a conflict

ith

ther

gents

n

pursuing

he

development

f heir

own

characters,

t

s

rationalor moral

gent

o

develop

his

wn,

rather

than

urtailing

t.

Furthermore,

ccording

o Aristotle's

thics,

ne should

only

pursue

he

ctions

hat

re relevanto one's

development

f

thical

character. ristotle'sirtuouserson ouldcertainlye altruisticut of

habituation,

ut rationalelf-love

ccount eemsnot o be sufficiento

justify

his

endency.

n

discussing

he

paradigm

ase of

friendship,

hat

is,

the

friendship

ased on

virtue,

r what

Cooper

called

"character

friendship,"32

ristotle

eeps remarking

hat hosefriends

wish

good

to their riendor hefriend'swn sake"

1156b10-12;cf.1156al 7-18,

1156b10;

cf. also

EE

1244b1

5-22,

Rhetoric

385a18-19).

Many

com-

mentators

ccordingly nterpret

he virtue f

friendship

s a

supplement

Jiyuan

u

335



15/26

Philosophy

ast& West

or modification

f

Aristotle's

gocentric

thics. ut his

hardly

tands

p

under lose

scrutiny.

ristotle

till

xplains

his orm f

ltruism

n

terms

of rational elf-love:

In

loving

heir riend

hey

ove what

s

good

for

hemselves"

1157b33).

A

virtue riend

s

"anotherme"

or

"another

self."We care for riends ecause a friend

s

a mirror

y

which

can

contemplate yselfetter.33 hatwe seek inthiskind f love is the

friend's

ationality

nd

persistent

raits f

character,

ather han the

friend's

ccidental

roperties.y xperiencing

hat

haracter

e

enrich

and

develop

urown ethical haracters.

nthefinal

nalysis

he

oveof

one's

virtuous

riends

s still

elf-oriented.34

Confucius'

en s

love

provides

sort f

ustification

or

ltruism.

Nevertheless,

is

altruisms

graded.

ove s

certainly

niversal,

orwe

are

required

o treat ll

people

under eaven s brothers.etthis oes

notmean hat man fren hould ove

veryonequally.

he

expansion

of love is hierarchicalnd makesdistinctions.his idea

is

explicitly

defendedyMencius ncriticizingheMoist ype f mpartialniversal

love.This

graded

ove has been accused

of

partiality.

onetheless,

t

s

intrinsico Confucius'

hinking.

ove mustbe rooted

n

family

ove

because

the

atter

nvolves n

inherent

ntimacy

etween ffectionnd

ethical

training.

enial of this

ntimacy

ill

destroy

he

Confucian

ground

f

complying

ith

i,

in

particular

he inner

round

f other-

regarding

irtue. uch a

graded

ove seems to be echoed

in

con-

temporaryociobiology

nd

evolutionary

thics,

which

uggest

hatwe

have a

gene-determined

ltruistic

endency

s

a human

daptation

n

evolution,ut,

verything

eing

qual,

we are

biologically

eterminedo

cooperate

irst

f

ll with ur

lose

kin

nd others hose

reciprocation

s

expected.

t s also echoed n

contemporary

nvironmental

thics,

hich

extends he

cope

ofmoral

ommunityeyond

uman

eings

o

animals

and evento naturetself.

An

equal

and

impartial

niversalove

is

definitely

ore

desirable,

but as the

highest

thical

virtue t

requires

n

independent

ource

of

justification.

he central oncern

f

modernmoral

ystems

s such a

justification.

utneither

eontology

orutilitarianism

s

thought

o

fulfill

this

ask

atisfactorily.

oth

re ccusedof

holding

n

impersonal

oint

f

view.As

a matter

f

fact,

ne's affectionoward

ther,

nknownhildren

cannot

e as

intense

s

toward ne's

own.Williams'

amous

roblem

f

whether rescuer s permittedo rescuehis wife irst35illpresent

dilemma or

n

advocate

f

mpartial

ove,

butnot

or onfucius.

Given ts

fundamental

tatus,

onfucius

rotects

ilial

ove

strongly

from

ny

harm. his s

illustrated

n the

case of

a

father ho steals

sheep.

The

governor

f the

village

believes that the son who testifies

against

uch a father s an

example

of

a

"straight"

erson.

On

the con-

trary,

onfucius laims

that

"Fathers

over

up

for heir

ons,

and sons

cover

up

for heir athers.n suchbehavior s

straightness

o be found s a

336



16/26

matter

f

course"

18:18).

Whathe is

saying

s

that hefather

ight

e

open

to

punishment

or is

wrongdoing,

ut

t s nothis on's

position

o

take

responsibility

or

eeing

hat

ustice

s done.36

amily

ove itselfs

certainly

ubject

othe

regulation

fethos r

yi rightness),

ut

f

nethos

encourages

he

disruption

ffilial

ove,

t

s,

for

onfucius,

he

greatest

evil.

Cultivation

For

Confucius,

e,

the

acquired

ren,

s

"to

get,"

nd

for

Aristotle,

ethical irtues connectedwith

hexis"

having).

oth to

get"

nd "to

have"

require process

f ethical

raining

nd cultural efinement.

or

Confucius,

his

s

a

process

f

expanding

ne's filial

ove to

society

o

that ne

may

willinglyccept

heconstraintsf

i;

for

Aristotle,

his

s

a

process

f the

habituation

nd

development

f

practical

wisdom.But

bothbelievethat

uch

a

process

f

cultivations

lifelong,

nd

virtues

are

eventually

nternalized

s

second

nature.

ccording

o

Confucius,

e

himselfethisheart n

learning

t

fifteen,

utnot

until

eventy

ould he

followhis heart's

esire without

verstepping

he line"

(2:4).

That

amounts

o

saying

hat t

that ime he

disposition

as well

entrenched

and was a

hexis,

r second nature

n

the

Aristotelian

ense

1103a31-

b21).

Confucius iews

the

process

f cultivation

s

mainly

matter f

education.

ublic ducation

s

an

extension f

family

ducation. he

Chinese word for

"education,"

iaoyu,

is

composed

of two

words:

"teaching" jiao)

and

"nurturing"yu),

nd this

ducation

s

not

merely

for he

purpose

f

conveying nowledge,

ut

also

for

haping

orrect

behavior

atterns

nd

internalizing

hem s

part

f one's character.n

Hansen's

words,

t

s "character

uilding."37

uch

n

educations

carried

out

through

dual dialectic.

n

theone

hand,

person

s

taught y

his

parents,

eachers,

nd

the

noble

people

surrounding

im

what

hould

be

done and howto do it.He is

required

o

respect

ll

thosewho teach

him

s

father-like.n

Chinese

ulture,

teacher s

traditionally

alled

"teacher-father,"

nd

the

proverb

oes,

A

teacher fone

day

makes

father or ll life."

Government

fficials,

s

the

practitioners

f

li,

are

called

"parent

fficers."he headof he

tate s called"the

tate

ather,"

and the

irst

ady

he

statemother." n the

ther

and,

father

upports

hisfamily,ut more

mportantly

houldbe seen as an educator,s is

reflected

n

the

proverb

hat it s a fault or

father

nly

o

support

ut

not o

educate."

A

teacher's

uty

s not

merely

o

teach,

ut lso to

serve

as a model of ethical

behavior.

In

China,

the

duty

of a

teacher is fre-

quently

described

as

"to

be

a

teacher and model forothers." Further-

more,

he functionfa rulers not

only

to

order,

ut

lso,

and

even

more

importantly,

o serve as a model of

behavior for he

people.

The basic

principle

f

governing

s

"to

guide

them

people]

by

de,

and

keep

them

Jiyuan

u

337



17/26

Philosophy

ast West

in inewith

i"

ratherhan

to

employ

unishment"

2:3;

cf. lso

2:1).

This s

because,

n

sense,

ulersrealso

teachers,

nd arealso

required

to love heir

ubjects

s

their wn children.

Hence,

hehierarchical

elationship

s a

model-copyelationship

f

behaviors,

nd each forman be

reduced

o a

teacher-pupilelationship,

which s inturn educed oa father-sonelationship.hepersonswho

are

superior

re

supposed

o

establish

hemselvess the

paradigm

f

humanity,

hat

s,

hemodel or

uniors

nd inferiorso follow nd catch

up

with.

ociety

s an

extended

chool s

well

as an extended

amily.

Confucius

s

reported

o

have remarked

hat here s a

single

hread

pervading

is

dao

(4:15),

which s

interpretedy

his

disciple

s

"zhong

and

shu."

The character xin"

heart)

s

a

component

f

bothwords.

Zhong,

raditionally

endereds

"loyalty,"

s betterranslated

y

D. C.

Lau

as

"doing

ne's

best,"

hat

s,

none's

relationships

ith thers.

hu,

etymologically

elated

o

"as,"

is

explained y

Confuciuso

mean Do

not mpose

n others hat

you yourself

o notdesire"

15:24),

and its

translation

aries:

using

neself s a measure

o

gauge

others"

Lau),

"altruism"

Wing-tsit

han),

"consideration"

Waley),

"reciprocity"

(Dawson),

nd

so on. Shu

s

intrinsically

elated o ren

n ts

tymologi-

cally

relational

ense,38

nd

n

one instance

onfuciusonsiders

en he

positive

rticulation

f he

principle

f

hu:

A

person

f

ren

helps

thers

to take

heirtand nsofar

s he himself ishes

o takehis

tand,

nd

gets

others

here nsofar

s he himself ishes o

get

here"

6:30).

How

to

interpret

his

single

hread" as been a

matterf consid-

erable

ontroversy.

iven

he relation etween

hu and

ren,

nd

given

that

he

elf f

ren

person

n

Confucius

s

essentially

mbedded

n his

relations ith is

family

embers,

suggest eading

he

single

hread"

as

meaning

hat ne

shoulddo one's bestto deal

with thers s one

deals with ne's

parents

nd brothers.

nterpreted

his

way,

Confucius'

"single

hread" ndicates

owone can extend

ilial

oveto

society;

hat

is,

t s a

way

of

cultivating

irtue.

his eems o be confirmed

y

Con-

fucius'

emarkhat To

be able to

udge

others

y

what

s

near o our-

selves

may

be called

themethod f

realizing

en."39

ne's

parents

nd

brothers

re

certainly

hat re closest o a

person.

o make

n

analogy

of

them

n

deciding

what

ne

should r should

notdo

in

dealing

with

others

s the rt f

cquiring

irtue.

n

Chinese thical

raining,

person

is

generally

old tothink fhim s

your

rother"r "tothinkf her s

your

ister" hen

deciding

hat

you

hould r shouldnotdo

in

dealing

with

thers.

ven n the

training

f a

self-regarding

irtue

uch as dili-

gence,

a

person

s

taught to

work hardto earn honorfor

your

parents"

or that

if you

bear inmind

your parent's

hardship

n

raisingyou, you

will

not be

lazy."

The

family-centered

ulture fthe Chinese

is

essen-

tially

ndebted o Confucius'

eaching.

Aristotle

grees

with

Confucius

hathuman

beings

are not

by

nature

338



18/26

ethically ood.

As

he

says,

the

many,

specially

he

young,

o not

ind

it

pleasant

o

live

n a

temperate

nd resistant

ay"

1179b34-35).

Vir-

tue

does not

evelop

pontaneously.

hecultivation

fmoral irtue

tarts

withhabit.

A

virtue

s

acquired

y doing

good things

epeatedly;

n

this

way

one can

fall nto

hehabit

f

doing

hem. he

process

fhabituation

essentiallynvolves racticend repetition.Character6thos),s the

word tself

ndicates,

s that

which s

developed

rom abit

ethos]"

EE

1220a39-b3).

It s a

process

f

moderating

ne's

desires

nd emotions

and

directing

hem

oward

ppropriatebjects.

This

requires

hatwe

should

e

brought

p

from

ur

very outh

to

find

leasure

nd

pain

s

it s

appropriate"

1104b1

-13).

Since

a

good

upbringing

s a

matterf

luck,

Aristotle'sultivation

fvirtue

s

dependent

n

luck.

A

good

upbringing

mplies

hatone has

a

good

ethical-training

environment,

nd

there s a correct

rder f some

sort o follow.Good

instructionsan come

from

hefather:a

father's ords nd

habits ave

influence,

nd all the

more ecause

of

kinship

nd

because oftheben-

efits

e

does;

for

is hildrenre

already

ond f

him nd

naturallyeady

to

obey"

1180b5-7).

But

he role f

a fatherr

any

other ndividuals

limited,

or a

father'snstruction"

acks "influence

nd

compelling

power."

t s the aw

that has the

power

hat

ompels"

1180al19-22),

because

many

people

fear

penalties

ather han hame.

Accordingly,

habituation

s more

n

issue

for

he

society

ather

hanfor he

family.

"Law must

rescribe

heir

pbringing

nd

practices"

1179a35).

A

good

upbringing

ainly

equires

hat

ne live under

ust

aws,

nd Aristotle

accordingly

ays

more

ttentiono the

functionf

legislation

hanof

the

family

n

moral ducation.

he standard

y

which

goodpolitical

system

s

distinguished

rom bad one iswhethert

ffectively

acilitates

habituation.

During

he

ourse

f

habituation,

any eople

become ccustomed

to

things

hat

hey

sed

to

find

ainful,

nd even

come to take

pleasure

in

doing

uch

things.

his kind f

well

brought-up

erson

ccordingly

possesses

"a

character uitable

or

virtue,

ondof what

is fineand

objecting

o what s shameful"

1179b30-31).

For

Aristotle,

eople

with

such

a nature

re

"like

ground

hat s to nourish

eed,"

and

only

hey

can be

taught hrough

thical

rgument

nd

be

proper

tudentsf

his

ethics,

hile ther

eople

without

his ature ontinue

o

require

rutish

methods f constraint1179b24-29).This s in contrasto Confucius'

viewof habituation

hat ocuses

n the

xpansion

ffilial ove

hrough

an

emulation

f

hemodels

hat

urround

ne,

rather

han n

therole f

law and

punishment.

onfucius

lways

dopts negative

tance oward

litigation

12:13).

For

Aristotle,

ultivating

abituation

s a

process

f

acting

n

accor-

dancewith

he

good

nstructions

hat ne receives

rom ne's fathernd

with he aws

of one's

community,

s

well as a

process

f

developing

Jiyuan

u

339



19/26

Philosophy

ast

West

one's

practical

isdom.40n

the

ourse

f

repeatedly

erforming

ctions

said

to be noble nd

ust,

ne

comesto

realize

why

hey

re

said to

be

good.

One's

dependence

n

other

eople

elling

ne

what o

do dimin-

ishes,

nd one

comesto

see what

s

right

or

neself.

A

person

lso

comesto

develop

practical

erception

f what

houldbe

done

in

a

particularircumstance.he exerciseof rationaludgment ecomes

inherent

n

education.

onfucius'

icture

f

ultivation,

n

contrast,

acks

the

development

f

practical

isdom.

Earlier e

mentionedhat n

Aristotle's

oncept

f

virtue here

s

a

cycle

between

ractical

isdom

nd ethical

irtue. n

the one

hand,

practical

isdom s not

imply

matterf

rational

alculation;

t

s

dis-

tinguished

rom

uch

notions f

capacity

s

deliberation

bouleusis)

nd

cleverness

deinotes).

t

s not

morally

ndifferent,

ut

nvolves n

essen-

tialreference

o,

or

presupposes,

thical

irtue

1143bl

1-14,

1144a30-

31).

Aristotle

xplicitly

eclares hat we

cannot

e

a

person

f

practical

wisdom

without

einggood" (1144a36),and he thereforeejects he

idea that n

incontinent

erson

as

practical

isdom.

ractical

isdom

is

inseparable

rom

thical irtue

nd is

embedded

n

the

radition.n

the ther

and,

ractical

isdom

lso

reflectsnd

criticizes

he

radition,

as

we have

ndicated

n

the

econd

ection f

this

ssay.

Vi

Documents

Confucius and Aristotle