Confronting corporate welfare

Confronting Corporate Welfare

Thomas A. Hemphill

In the crusade to trim federal spending, it’s business’s turn to face the knife, But which funding programs? And how fur should we go?

0 n November 22, 1994, Robert Reich,

then U.S. Secretary of Labor, issued a chal- lenge to Washington’s public policy “think tanks” to identify business subsidies he char- acterized as “federal aid to dependent corporations.“’ Along with the many social welfare programs being targeted for reduction or term-

nation by the incoming Republican-controlled 104th Congress, Reich believed that “corporate welfare” subsidies would provide considerable fuel for deficit reduction. Reich challenged congressional Republicans to terminate inappropriate federal government involvement in the workings of the U.S economy.

Secretary Reich’s call to action was answered the following year with corporate welfare “white papers” issued by the libertarian Cato Institute, the centrist Progressive Policy Institute, and the liberal Center for Responsive Law and Essential Information. The reports’ findings and recom- mendations were stunning. The Cato Institute identified 125 federal programs that subsidize business to the tune of $85 billion annually. The Progressive Policy Institute found 121 spending and tax subsidies benefiting specific industries that, if eliminated or reformed, would save $265.2 million over five years. Not to be outdone, the Center for Responsive Law and Essential Informa- tion’s report uncovered 153 federal business welfare programs totaling $167.2 billion in taxpayer subsidies for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995.

How did corporate welfare endure under a Republican congress and a Democrat president? According to Cato Institute analysts Stephen Moore and Dean Stansel, it came out of the budget debate relatively unscathed. Of the $19.5 billion budgeted for the 35 least defensible pro-

grams identified by the Cato Institute. Congress cut only $2.8 billion (or 15 percent) for F~96. Moore and Stansel found that many programs were reduced nominally or not at all. Meanwhile, although President Clinton called Secretary Reich’s proposal an “attractive idea,” he clearly articulated that he did not endorse cutbacks in benefits to business. In fact, Moore and Stansel found that the Clinton administration actually proposed increased spending in the 35 least defensible programs. And the White House vetoed Republican budget bills because Republican re- ductions in corporate subsidies were deemed too large.

Defining Corporate Welfare

The condemnation of corporate welfare across the political spectrum may lead one to believe- incorrectly-that the definition of this concept is universally understood. But as we will see, the ideology of each public policy think tank or public interest group colors the definition of what constitutes “corporate welfare.”

The Cato Institute defines corporate welfare as special government subsidies or benefits that are targeted to specific industries or businesses. It can take the form of direct government grants, loans, insurance, or subsidies provided to businesses; trade barriers designed to protect U.S. firms in particular industries from foreign competition at the expense of American consumers; or a loophole in the tax code carved out solely for the benefit of a particular company or industry. How- ever, tax provisions that are universally available to all companies and industries, such as allowing faster write-off of capital equipment or a general tax cut for business, are not included in the definition.

The libertarian interpretation of the federal tax code differs markedly from liberal interest- group interpretations of federal corporate tax policy. The liberal definition of what constitutes corporate welfare often includes universal business tax provisions that are deemed inequitable,

Business Horizons / November-L)ecember 1997

especially when comparing the corporation’s “ability to pay” with the tax burden placed on other segments of American society.

The Progressive Policy Institute defines corporate welfare as subsidies that benefit specific industries. with the proviso that there may be offsetting social or economic policy reasons for preserving certain subsidies. The definition includes direct spending subsidies, direct and indi- rect tax subsidies, trade protections, and anti- competitive economic regulation as the concep- tual elements of corporate welfare.

The Center for Responsive Law and Essential Information includes the following elements in its definition: (1) direct payments to companies; (2) provision of public goods and services without adequate compensation from companies; (3) federal purchases from companies of goods and services at more than market value; (4) federal t3X breaks for businesses; and (5) business exemptions from laws.

A real-world example of a corporate welfare consensus is found in a “Dirty Dozen” list of federal subsidies and programs jointly issued in June 1995 by the three institutions. The list- which affects agriculture, defense, and construction industries, among others+onstitutes the core elements of corporate welfare targeted to

specific industries and firms: direct subsidies, tax breaks, regulatory exemptions, and trade protection. The three institutions unanimously recom- mended that this list of programs and subsidies be eliminated or significantly reduced from ~~96 and future budgets. Anticipated savings over the subsequent five years were estimated at between $16.2 and $18.5 million.

In November 1995, Senator John McCain (R- Arizona) and Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tennes- see) cosponsored legislation to eliminate the “Dirty Dozen“ list of corporate welfare programs. The McCain-Thompson proposal was defeated by a lopsided Senate vote of 75-24. Rut with such a broad ideological consensus allied against it, why does corporate welfare continue virtually un- abated? It survives because of a conspiracy of parochial (“pork-barrel”) politics, high-powered corporate and industry lobbying, and a campaign finance system that keeps these programs, regula- tions, and subsidies a constant on the Washington budget scene.

The Case For and Against Corporate Welfare

The proponents of business subsidies and exemptions-and they include members of both parties--offer a host of economic, social, and


national security justifications for continued federal assistance to corporations. The Cato Institute has identified the following arguments in support of corporate welfare programs, regulatory protection, and direct subsidies:

l They protect industries from failure to pre- serve high-paying American jobs.

l Important research activities are subsidized that private industries could not finance them- selves.

l They counteract the business subsidies of foreign governments to ensure a “level playing field” for domestic industries.

l They boost high-tech industries whose profitability is vital to American economic success in the twenty-first century.

l They maintain the viability of “strategic industries” that are essential to American national security.

l Ventures are financed that would otherwise be considered too risky for private capital markets.

l They assist socially disadvantaged groups, such as minorities and women, to establish new businesses.

“Proponents of these arguments testify to the value of federal programs, re&lator y pro tee tion, and direct subsidies as a stimulus to the U.S. economy. M

Proponents of these arguments testify to the value of federal programs, regulatory protection, and direct subsidies as a stimulus to the LJ.S.

economy. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Market Ac- cess Program is an important international trade assistance program for members of the Wine Institute, the trade association of the California wineries. Exports of Cali- fornia wine have increased over the last de- cade from $25 billion to $300 billion annually. According to John

DeLuca, president of the Wine Institute, this dra- matic growth in exports resulted largely from the few million dollars the wine companies receive annually from the federal government, allowing them to compete in a global market in which European countries spend $2 billion annually promoting their wines.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal agency. provides loans, loan guarantees, and political risk insurance to U.S. companies that invest in 140 countries. OPIC‘S critics have targeted the agency as an egregious example of a corporate welfare program. But Edmund Rice. executive director of the Washing- ton-based Coalition for Employment through Exports, believes that “dismantling or reducing these programs woultl amount to unilateral disar-

mament in the battle for world markets” (Pianun and Blustein 1997). According to Rice, Japan, Germany, France, and other industrial nations maintain substantial export-assistance programs for their domestic industries. Moreover, according to its 1996 income statement, OPIC’s revenues (generated from fees charged to companies using its financial services) exceeded its $32.5 million administrative costs by $42.6 million-which went to the U.S. Treasury. “This is a government program that provides valuable benefits to our country,” says Mildred Callear, OPIC’s treasurer. “And we are able to do it without costing taxpayers any money” (Bryce 1997).

Other supporters of business-government partnerships argue that not only major corporations but also many small entrepreneurial firms rely on federal R&D grants for products that gen- erate widespread public benefits that might otherwise go unfunded. Joel Johnson, vice president of the Aerospace Industries Association, a W’ash- ington-based trade group representing a profitable sector of the economy that receives billions of dollars in federal subsidies and tax breaks, defends the present government policies. “There are business and political leaders,” says Johnson, “who recognize that the only way the government-whether it is the Defense Department or the Energy Department-can afford the new technology is if it works with business. But that is a partnership. not welfare” (Sennott 1996).

In response to this vigorous defense of existing public policy, the Cato Institute offers an extensive list of counterarguments to corporate welfare (albeit from a libertarian perspective, which asserts a government should do little more than provide police and military protection; other than that, it should not interfere-either for good or ill-in citizens’ lives):

l The government has a disappointing record of picking industrial winners and losers.

l Corporate welfare is a huge drain on the federal treasury for very little economic benefit.

l It creates a tilted playing field among industries and firms.

l It fosters an incestuous relationship between business and government, most obviously through corporate campaign contributions.

l It raises costs to consumers. l The most efficient way to promote busi-

ness in hlerica is to reduce the overall cost and regulatory burden of government.

l It is anticapitalist, creating the “statist busi- nessman in America.”

l It is unconstitutional, lying outside Con- gress’s limited spending authority.

Real-world examples of these counterarguments abound. Ronald Brown, the late Secretary of Commerce, led nine international trade junkets for 170 CEOs that resulted in approximately $80

billion in company contracts. Although spokes- people for the Commerce Department insist that company CEOs were invited on these missions based solely on the need for a federal government assist in closing deals, Federal Election Commission records show otherwise. Fifteen of the 24 executives who accompanied Secretary Brown to the People’s Republic of China had contributed to the Democratic National Commit- tee (DNC) either individually or through their companies. On a Latin American junket, 11 of the 22 CEOs invited were DNC contributors. It was also reported that the CEO of Cellular Communi- cations International was included on a trip to India after one of President Clinton’s college classmates wrote to Department of Commerce officials, noting in his correspondence that the CEO was a “very generous donor” to the Demo- cratic Party.

For comparative purposes, it would be help- ful to know the number of companies listed in the Fortune 500 or Business Week 1000 that contributed “soft money” to the DNC or Republican National Committee. Unfortunately, such a de- tailed study has been discussed but not yet un- dertaken, says Sheila Krumholz, staff member of the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization in Washington that specializes in the study of Congress (particu- larly the role money plays in its elections and actions).

The Department of Agriculture’s Market Ac- cess Program (MAP) spent $85.5 million in ~1’96 advertising products of America’s largest and most profitable companies overseas. In 1993, American taxpayers spent $6.6 million a year promoting Sunkist oranges; Ernest &Julio Gallo received $4.9 million to market its wines internationally; $1.5 million was spent pushing sales of mink coats; M&M Mars received $1 million to improve consumer recognition of its candy; and Campbell Soup received more than $500,000 to defray its advertising expenses. Although the 1996 appropriations bill targeted assistance for advertising promotions of small businesses, major companies still benefit from payments to industry associations and agricultural cooperatives.

Through Sematech, a consortium of major U.S. computer microchip producers, the Pentagon provides nearly $100 million a year of direct subsidy to the industry. However, of the more than 200 chip manufacturers in the United States, only the 14 largest, including Intel and National Semi- conductor, receive support from Sematech. Origi- nally designed to help U.S. firms compete against foreign competition, Sematech now subsidizes the largest producers to battle smaller domestic competitors. It also helped Digital Equipment Corporation, though Digital still shifted part of its work force and capital to Ireland and Singapore.

Not all the counterarguments against corporate welfare are representative of the various interest groups critical of the concept. But the Cato list of criticisms is quite exhaustive and especially convincing in the present era of deficit reduction and government downsizing.

Public Policy Reform

Because earlier efforts to rein in corporate welfare met with limited success, a new bipartisan effort has been announced for the 105th Con- gress. Buoyed by last year’s success at blocking Congress’s efforts to double the appropriation of OPIC and reauthorizing funding for only one year rather than the five years it had sought, Stop

“Because earlier e%xts to rein in corporate welfare met wifb limkd success, a new bipartisan eRbi+ has been announced for the 705th Congfess.”

coalition representing a range of taxpayer, consumer, free market, and environmental groups, decided to expand its array of targets. The SCW Coalition announced in late January 1997 a “hit list” of 12 corporate welfare programs for Congress to eliminate that would result in an estimated savings to taxpayers of $11.5 billion over five years. The coalition has strong House support from Budget Committee Chair John R. Kasich (R-Ohio), a long- time congressional foe of corporate welfare; Rep. Edward Royce (R-California); and Rep. Robert E. Andrews (D-New Jersey).

The SCW Coalition reviewed most federal spending programs (except entitlement programs) before reaching consensus on the following wide-ranging list of 12 initial targets:

l commercial research endeavors (Fossil Energy Research and Development Program, Clean Coal Technology Program);

l export advertising for food and wine companies (MAP);

l low-interest loans, loan guarantees, and political risk insurance for American corporations investing in developing countries (OPIC);

l funding of inappropriate policies of the International Monetary Fund (General Agree- ments to Borrow, IMF Enhanced Structural Ad- justment Facility);

l costly, inefficient subsidies for road and highway construction (Timber Roads in the Na- tional Forest Program, Appalachian Regional Commission Roads Program, Highway Demon- stration Projects);

l wasteful energy subsidies for major corporations and a select group of residential consum-


ers (Pyroprocessing Progrdm. Rural Utilities Ser- vice); and

l an expensive and potentially environmen- tally clamaging public water works project in southwest Colorado (Animas La Plats).

In the Senate, John McCain and Edward M. Kennecly (D-Massachusetts) are reviving proposed legislation to create :I nine-member Corpo- rate Subsidy Reform Commission--modeled afta the military base closure commission-that would target clubious programs and tax loopholes for reform or termination. Senator McCain cosponsored similar legislation (S. 1376. the Corporate Subsidies Review, Refmm, and Termination Act of 1995) with Senator Space Al,raham (R-Wiscon- sin) that lapsed in the 104th Congress. Under the M&tin-Kennedy bill, Congress woulcl ha\~ four months in which to apprmre. reject. or arnencl the comniission’s recotniiiendatit)ns.

In March 1997, the Progressive Caucus, ;I group of 58 lil3eral congressional Democrats. announced its corporate >velfrrre list of 15 examples of tax breaks and fcdcral subsidies to he eliminated. Its propos;il bmild save $56.7 billion the first year and $261.6 trillion o\‘er the next five years. The list was endorsecl by the Coalition on Human Needs. the National Eclucation Associa- tion, the Center for Community Change. the Com- munit!, Nutrition Institute, Coninion Cause, Tax Watch, ancl the Corporate We:llthf3rc Project. among others. Unlike the SCW propos;il, Lvhich concentrates on spending progrmis only, the Progressive Caucus emphasizes tax deductions for corporations 2nd \vealthy inclividuals. Its tax propos:ils will not be seriously considerecl by the Rel”il,licaii-contr~)llcd Congress. hut certain spending progranis. such 3s OPIC, will receive stronger hipartisan support for elimination.

The McCain-Kennedy legislation is ;i one- time proposal for ;iddreasing corporate m:elfare. Hut what shoultl Congress do \vhen evaluating sul,siclies or tas and regulatory breaks for corporations on an ongoing basis? i.he 1ilmUrian Cat0 Institute position is stlniglitfor\v~ir~l: eliminate all fornis of clirect subsidy to corporations, save tax pro\,isions applicable across the board to all husi- nesscs. Hut the Cat0 approach is ;I minority policy position. Other suggested corporate accountabil- ity proposals arc’ applied to specific prograins or expenditures and are categorized as follows:

Disclosure. The federal gm~ernment \\~uld consolidate 3rd regul:irly report information about corporate assistance prog’anis. expenditures. anct recipients, thereby allowing for precise siiiiiiiiary statistics on the total nuinl3er and costs of programs. This suggested approach contrasts with the present ambiguity involving which definition of “corporate \velfare” is being usecl in a report. the consequent range of ~m~granis 3rd expenditures identified. and irregular reporting

by nongovernniental organizations. Public hear- ings would be held before new corporate assistance prograins are introduced. Corporations would he required each year to report publicly the specific type of assistance received, the purposes and uses of the assistance. and the costs and benefits to taxpayers.

Evaluation. The corporate community has been a strong supporter of cost-benefit analyses applied to business regulation. In turn, such analyses would be applied to new corporate assistance programs and schedulecl periodically for existing programs. The Progressive Policy Institute \vould not support subsidies “where there is no offsetting social policy objective,” and Robert Reich would support corporate subsidies where the federal expmditure st‘i~es ;I “broader public benefit.”

Time Limits and Penalties. “hleans testing” \vould be required for companies receiving federal assistance. This woulcl inclucle strict tinie liniits (legislati\.e “sunsets”) for conipanies to recei\,e government subsidies. In :kcldition, Con- gress could aclopt a “three strikes and you’re out” rule canceling fecleral assistance to corporations convictecl of felonies.

Jbst ho\v seriously is the business coniniunity taking the recent public policy assault on corporate welfare? Acc~ording to Stephen Moore, author of the Cat0 Institute’s polemic against corporate \velf:lre, it has struck ;I rar\. ner\.e \\zithin the American business community. “IBM and the big guys \\‘ant to h3i.e lunch bvith us :i lot lately.” says Moore. “They are dying to tell LIS ho\v important these programs arc” (Scnnott 1996)

A lthoiigh corporate \velfare progranis reni;iinecl \,irtu:illy intact through the budget battles of the 104th Congress.

the political nionientuni to reduce government spending on them has ;rccelerated in the face of the 2002 I3:il:inced budget deaclline. In the last Congress, the entitlement programs for the poor, such as Medicaid and bdfarc. Lverc successfully targeted for reform Lvith savings of :in cstimatecl $60 billion nnticipatcd through 200. A growing niinil~cr of legislators believe the 105th Congress should concentrate its efforts on reforming corporate \velfare progr;lnis that will result in similar deficit-reclucing savings over the next five years.

Republic:ins in Congress can rt’st assuretl of popul:ir support for targeting corporate welfare in the upconiing I3iidget battles. In early 1995. Ke- pul>lican pollster Frank Luntz sull-eyed voters to gauge the political appeal of certain words and ~>hrascs, and founcl that “corporate \\&dre” fin- ished third Idiind “foreign aid” and “\vaste, fraud. and alxise” as “things the public flips out on” (Rosenb:lum 1997). House B&get Chair John Kasich believes Republicans should be zealously

targeting unwarranted government subsidies for elimination, regardless of whether they are for people or corporations. Moreover, many free- market congressional Republicans (especially those elected to the 104th Congress) feel no particular obligation to defend business subsidies.

For many Democrats, corporate welfare is an extension of their traditional attacks on the seem- ingly unbridled power of business to influence the American political process favorably. The balanced budget agreement allows these Demo- crats to focus their political philosophy in a prag- matic fashion: by targeting for elimination federal programs and tax breaks subsidizing specific companies or sectors of the American economy. From the perspective of these Democrats, the poor took their appropriations “hit” in the last Congress, and it is now only equitable for big business to forgo its share of federal government largesse.

The campaigns mounted against corporate welfare by Congressman Kasich, the Progressive Caucus, the SCW Coalition, and Senators McCain and Kennedy have caused serious concern at the White House and among business lobbyists and industry associations on Washington’s K Street. The White House budget plan for FY98 includes a heavy emphasis on the closing of many business tax loopholes. including tax breaks on ccr- tain stock transactions and exports by multina- tional corporations, as well as some cuts in un- necessary corporate subsidies. Total savings from the president’s list are estimated to be as high as S60 billion over five years. But the current consensus against corporate Lvelfare will be appropriation oriented. not tax focused.

Clinton administration officials have decided to shelve their plans for an efficiency-enhancing merger of three business export assistance agencies that could be targeted for elimination by Congress: the Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and the Trade and Development Agency. Opponents of the merger believe savings would be small, and there is little enthusiasm for the proposal among congressional supporters of the agencies. Accord- ing to Edmund Rice, executive director of the Coalition for Employment through Exports, “the business community and a number of foreign policy organizations in town are very concerned that Chairman Kasich seems to be targeting these agencies“ (Blustein 1997). For the Export-Import Bank and OPIC, the political budget strategy will involve an interagency group working closely with the White House (and business lobbyists) to coordinate reauthorization efforts. The FY98 budget submitted by the Administration will allow OPIC to be entirely self-funding, which may de- flect congressional budget focus.

Mobilization efforts to protect targeted programs are under way. Agency officials will high-

light the economic benefits accruing to constitu- ents in specific congressional districts and states. Business lobbyists will confirm the importance of these programs to the future economic success of companies in a legislator’s domain. The issue of campaign financing is always looming in the political background, with the omnipresent threat of a member of Congress losing contributions from disgruntled corporate and industry sources. And the White House still holds the threat of a budget veto, along with the president’s personal influence to stymie unsolicited downsizing of the executive branch.

But corporate welfare opponents on Capitol Hill and among the SCW Coalition are resolute in their convictions. They are here for the long-term siege. not simply for the upcoming budget battle. and they believe that “sharing the pain” of the balanced budget agreement has increasing public support. In each budget battle, political trade-offs will be made, say opponents, but programs will receive reduced allocations or be eliminated. For corporate welfare opponents, each small victory helps to shrink the corporate welfare state, a shared vision they keep in sight. 0

Notes

1. In this speech, Secretary Reich refers to a report written by Robert J. Shapiro that lists 68 unproductive economic subsidies and proposes reforms that would save raxpayers $225 billion over five years (Cut and Imwt to Compete and Win: A Budget Strategy,for American Groulth, Policy Report No. 18, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, DC: January 1994). In 1994, President Clinton and Congress approved reforms affecting four subsidies listed in that report, for a total five-year savings of approximately $19.4 billion.

References

Paul Blustein, “House Coalition Deals Blow to Over- seas Insurer OPIC.“ Washington Post, September 12, 1996. p. 1)ll.

Paul Blustein, “‘Corponlte Welfare’ Fight Heats Up.” Washington Post, Jammy 24, 1997. p, D3.

Robert Bryce. “As IJncle Sam Sells Insurance, Critics See ‘Corporate Welfare,“’ 78e Christian Science Moni- tot; February 11, 1997, Business si Money Section, p. 8.

Center for Responsible Law and Essential Information, Corporate Welfare Project, “Cutting Federal Grants & Subsidies to Corporations: First Dirty Dozen List and Five Year Savings,” News Release, June 13. 1995.

Bob Davis, “Reich Outlines Plan of Cost-Benefit Tests for U.S. Programs,” Wall Street.Journal, May 31, 1995, p. BlO(E).

House Progressive Caucus, “The Progressive Caucus Says: Let the American People Choose: It’s About Pri- orities,” ncl.


Stephen Moore, and Dean Stansel, Ending Corporate Welfare as We Know It, Policy Analysis No. 225, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1995.

Stephen Moore and Dean Stansel, How Corporate Welfare Won: Clinton and Congress Retreat from Cut- ting Business Subsidies, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., Policy Analysis No. 254, May 15, 1996.

Stephen Moore and Dean Stansel, “Put an End to Cor- porate Welfare,” USA Toda_y, September 1995, pp. 24- 26.

Eric Pianun and Paul Blustein, “‘Welfare’ Reformers Aim at Gohaths,” Washington Post, January 29, 1997, p. A19.

“Powerful and Odd Bedfellows Unite to Eliminate Corporate Welfare,” Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition, Washington, D.C.. News Release, January 28, 1997.

Robert Reich, “Revolt of the Anxious Class,” speech before the Democratic Leadership Council. Washing- ton, D.C., November 22, 1994.

David E. Rosenbaum, “Corporate Welfare’s New En- emies,” New York Times, February 2, 1997, Week in Review Section, pp. 1. 6.

David E. Rosenbaum. “LiberdIS Move to Fight ‘Corpo- rate Welfare,“’ Nell York Times, March 13, 1997, p. Bll.

Jacob M. Schlesinger, “As Opponents of ‘Corporate Welfare’ Mobilize on Left and Right, Business Has Reason to Worry,” Wall Street,Journal, December 18. 1996, p. A22(E).

Gerald F. Seib, “Corporate Perks: A Juicy Target in Both Parties,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1996, p. A12(E).

Charles M. Sennott, “The $150 Billion ‘Welfare’ Recipi- ents: U.S. Corporations,” Boston Globe, July 7, 1996, National/Foreign Section, p. 1.

Robert J. Shapiro. Cut-and-Imest: A Budget Strategy for the New Economy, Progressive Policy Institute, Wdsh- ington, D.C., Policy Report No. 23, March 1995.

Janice C. Shields, Aidfor Dependent Colporations (AFDO 1995, Essential Information, Washington, D.C., 1995.

Janice C. Shields, “Getting Corporations Off the Public Dole,” Busine.s.s aud SocieQ Retjiew, Summer 1995, pp. 4-8.

Janice Shields and James M. Sheehan, “Left and Right Come Together on Ending Corporate Welfare,” Wash- ingtorl Times, June 13, 1995. p. A23.

Aaron Zitner and Charles M. Sennott, “Business Clout Keeps the Government Breaks Coming,” Boston Globe, July 9. 1996, National/Foreign Section, p. 1.

Thomas A. Hemphill is a fiscal officer for the New Jersey Department of Environ- mental Protection, Trenton, New Jersey.

Business Horizons I: November-l~ecember 199:

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Confronting corporate welfare