Conflicts and cooperation the two sides of governance

André TORRE

INRA – Agroparistech – Paristorre@agroparistech.fr

13th Summer School on Economic History, Philosophy, and History of Economic Thought, Acqui Terme, 1-8 September 2010

Aim of the presentation

• To assess the link between conflicts and governance

• Usually, governance is strongly linked with co-operative behaviors or with negotiation strategies

• My purpose is to show that conflicts also play a role in governance processes

• Stress on territorial governance• Focus on conflicts about space and

territories, namely land-use conflicts

Method• Assessment of the role and place of

conflicts in the economic literature• Comparison of the respective role and

place of conflicts and co-operative behaviors, especially with regards to the public decision and territorial governance

• Discussion about empirical results about conflicts

• Analytical conclusions about the role of conflicts in territorial governance processes

Plan of the presentation• I. Conflicts and economic analysis• II. Environmental externalities and public

decision: conflicts at stake• III. Towards a non definition of territorial

governance• IV. A brief and eclectic definition of conflicts• V. Empirical studies• VI. Analytical results• Conclusions: conflicts and governance are

the two facets of territorial governance processes

I. Conflicts and economic analysis

Conflicts• Conflicts are at the heart of:

– Main sociological analyses (Simmel, Coser…)

– Traditional and ongoing political sciences approaches

– Theories of war– Conflict resolution approaches

• Conflicts have sometimes been neglected or treated as market failures by mainstream economic theories

• They have received seldom treatment by traditional economic approaches (Walras…)

The absence of conflicts in the standard economic literature?

• The standard economic literature focuses on competition (in the sense of Arrow Debreu)

• Common features between the two notions:– Opposition between two (or more) distinct entities– Opposite goals and competition over the final issue– Rejection of non market cooperative solutions

• Differences– Rules of the games in competition (fixed by the

opponents or externally)– Rejection of power relations in a part of standard

theories• Conflicts, non market or non economic behaviors?

– They are not subject to public policies or anti-trust laws– They are rather relevant from courts and trials

Lot of Exceptions?• Marxian framework: social conflict at the heart

of the society• Commons? Institutionalism• Conflicts and opportunism: hold-ups, conflicts

of interest and resolution by hierarchy within organizations (Klein, Crawford, Alchian, 1985; Williamson, 1985…)

• Incomplete contracts (Grossman & Hart, 1986), residual claim and conflicts of interest within the firm

• Bertrand?

The intriguing contribution of Jack Hirshleifer

• Opposition between the cooperative solution (Coase) and the conflictual solution (Machiavelli)

• “ Human history is a record of the tension between the way of Niccolo Machiavelli and what might be called the way of Ronald Coase. According to Coase’s Theorem, people will never pass up an opportunity to cooperate by means of mutually advantageous exchange. What might be called Machiavelli’s Theorem states that no one will ever pass up an opportunity to gain a one-sided advantage by exploiting another party » (Hirshleifer, 2001: the Dark side of the force)

• Introductions of conflicts in the Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (1987)

• Very traditional models of General equilibrium including a variable called “conflicts”

The case of game theory• Major interest in the notion of conflicts (not

only in economic terms: sociology and war theories…). Schelling (1960), Rapoport (1960)…

• Prisoners’ dilemma: the inevitability of non cooperative behaviors

• Sometimes ambiguous positions with regards to conflicts– Repeated games (Axelrod, 1984) and superiority of

cooperative strategies– Non cooperative games: non communication between

actors involved • Credible threat and engagement (Schelling)

– Conflict linked to an action, an engagement of one of the players

– At the basis of the understanding of conflict behaviors

II. Environmental externalities and public decision:

conflicts at stake

Property rights and environmental externalities

• Negative externalities (pollution, emissions, degradation of landscapes…)

• Non market effects affecting the production functions of economic agents: market failures and non optimality

• Two categories of external effects:– private – public

• How to internalize these effects, e.g. how to solve tensions and conflicts resulting from these market failures?

Property rights and environmental externalities: solution 1: the Pigovian tax

• Pigou (1920): in the presence of negative externalities, the social cost of an activity is not covered by its private cost

• The Pigovian tax intends to correct the market outcome back to efficiency; the amount paid by the polluter is equal to the negative externality

• The market of pollution rights (Dales, 1968) follows the same path: it imposes a market where rights to pollute find their value and can be exchanged in a competitive way

Property rights and environmental externalities: solution 2: the

Coasian cooperation

• Coase (1960) is rather skeptical about the public Pigovian solution

• He claims for a private bilateral negotiation between the two agents

• But this cooperative behavior is only possible:– If there exists a complete system of

transferable property rights– In the absence of transaction costs

• Both ways:– Try to avoid or to prevent conflicts– Consider that there are realistic solutions to

these problems and that people will accept to enter into these ways of doing (empirical evidences)

The problem of public decision

• Public decision about the buildings of roads, airports, waste sites, energy infrastructures…

• Based (in France) on public economic calculus: planning, updating, optimum…

• Limits:– Inclusion of social dimensions and of the increasing

demand of local actors to take part to the process of decision (governance, participatory democracy…)

– Impossibility to integrate all the environmental issues– How to integrate and to allocate actual and future

rights and nuisances?

– Conflicts and oppositions (increasing number): it becomes more and more difficult to launch large projects, especially to build new infrastructures

New cases in city planning and public construction recorded by

Administrative courts

Example: optimal location of a school equipment, indetermination between equity (0) and rationality (0’) (Thisse, 2007)

Theoretical answers: public choice

• Buchanan & Tullock (1962) suggest that the public interest is simply the aggregation of private decision makers

• The best way to obtain this is the calculus of consent. Minimizing: – External political cost (negative external effect due to

the distance between the public decision and the individual choice)

– Cost of negotiation (cost of the search for an agreement

• Logrolling: market-like transactions between individuals concerning various votes

Public choice: limits

• Free riding behaviors: Clarke & Grooves tax (1971, 1975)

• Comparability of the preferences, cardinality of the choices

• The impossibility of policies based on P. Choice theory (Acemoglu, 2002, 2003):– Belief different: political decision-makers do

not share the same opinions of what is good for the society

– They cannot reach a cooperative agreement of a coasian type because of their separate visions

Theoretical answers: social choice

• The social choice is intended to be in accordance with the social preference

• Arrow (1951, 1963) and the impossibility theorem, near the paradox of Condorcet: social choice can never fulfill even a few range of basic democratic conditions (unless it is a dictatorial one)

• Sen (1979): how to rescue the soldier Arrow?• By comparing interpersonal utilities, based on an

information base, both accepted by policy-makers and local agents

Social choice: limits

• Sen provides a pragmatic answer to the question of the social choice

• Integration of notions like justice in the capabilities approach

• Based on the freedom and capacity of choice of individuals

• We have to accept the limits of democracy by a constant reform process

III. Towards a non definition of territorial governance

Which need for a territorial governance?

• Territorial governance:

– A non definition– The crucial point: how to act together

in the territories, for an objective of territorial development (population is “in charge “ of the territory… and plan to go ahead) (Pierre, 2000, 2002)

– Projects and agreements between local stakeholders (public or local authorities, firms, inhabitants, public bodies, associations…)

Territorial governance is not only Policies and public intervention

• Laws (national level)

• Regulations and rules (national or international level)

• Public policies (national or decentralised)

• Planning documents (urbanism)

• Zoning (spatial or environment)

Territorial governance is not only the Co-ordination of actions of private or semi-public actors

• Local groups of actors– Regrouping of producers– Networks of innovators, of technology transfer– Poles and clusters– Local unions of producers (local foods or

labels) or planning associations (water, …) – Associations…

• Co-operation (concertation)Joint process of collection of elements for a solution

• NegotiationJoint decision building process

• DialogueHorizontal interactions between actors

• Consultation To collect actors opinions, without any guarantee about their consideration

• InformationTo inform a group of persons about the intentions or the decisions

• CommunicationTo diffuse a message and to obtain the support of the population to a proposition

Territorial governance is not only Different types of involvement to debates or decisions processes

Territorial governance includes conflicts as well?

• Are conflicts “something wrong”?

• Or a legitimate way:– To express oppositions to non desirable

infrastructures (wastes, nuclear plants…) or products (GMO, pesticides…)

– To impose the idea of new modes of production or new ways of living in front of dominant positions:

• Bio foods• Alternative energies• …

IV. A brief and eclectic definition of conflicts

Conflicts and the Hirshmanian tripod

• Hirschman (1970, 1995). Exit, voice, loyalty tripod. Application to the firm– Three possible responses to a dissension or a

disagreement– They pave the way to the analysis of the oppositions

between actors

• Exit : we leave the floor (spatial exit or vote with the feet, Tiebout, 1956; or exit in another activity)

• Loyalty : we play the game (acceptation of the rules of the game or later voting)

• Voice : public expression of the opposition: a way of analysis of land use conflicts

Conflicts and engagement

Separation between tensions and conflicts

• Tensions: opposition between actors and uses, without commitment (very common)

• Conflicts: based upon the commitment of one or several actors in opposition

• Commitment/engagement: linked with credible threat (tribunals, medias, publicization, confrontation, various signals)

V. Empirical studies

Ile-de-FranceIle-de-France

EstuairEstuaire de la e de la SeineSeine

EstuairEstuaire de la e de la LoireLoire

PNRPNRMontsMonts

d’Ardèched’ArdècheVoironnaiVoironnaiss

BresseBresse

HauteHauteCorseCorse

FranceFrance

ZoneZoneDesDesPuysPuys

BassinBassin de la de la

CharenteCharente

Littoral Littoral MontpelliéMontpelliérainrain

Ile de La RéunionIle de La Réunion

BassinBassin d’Arcacd’Arcac

honhon RuralRuralMidi Midi

PyrénéesPyrénées

Methods

• Analysis of data of trials and courts

• Analysis of regional daily press

• Surveys and Interviews of experts

→ Data base

• Surveys and interviews of actors

• Meetings follow-up

Objects of conflicts

• The dynamics of conflicts are constructed around an object, which materializes the oppositions between various actors or groups of actors

• By order of empirical importance :

Land management and urban sprawl Land use, urbanization, urbanism, city planning, real estate, urban planning… Crucial in areas under urban pressure (suburbs and coastal zones)

Objects of conflictsInfrastructures

Conflicts about the building of infrastructures: transports, energy, waste disposal, industrial production…

Hunting activitiesConflicts around hunting, and the co-existence with other land-uses (farmers…).

Negative externalities of production activitiesConflicts linked with the perception of nuisances by the population: pollution, risks, noises, odors…

Water resourcesQuantity, quality, erosion, risks mud flows…

Major oppositions between actorsObjects of conflicts Protesting

Actors

Contested

Actors

Land management

Infrastructures

Negative externalities (industry)

Associations

Local states

(municipalities)Federal state

Federal state

IndustrialsLocal states

Individuals

Hunting, Water

Negative externalities (agriculture)

Associations

Farmers

Industrials

Farmers

Individuals

Protected zones

Environment / Patrimony / landscapes

IndustrialsFarmers

Federal stateAssociations

Conflicts and geographical areas

• Suburbs– Various types of conflicts, especially linked

with urban extension and infrastructures for the cities

• Coastal zones– Industry: industrial infrastructures– Tourism: urban extension

• Mountains– Tourism, protection, urban extension

• Rural areas– Hunting, protection, agriculture

Three main geographical sources of opposition

• Superposition of uses– Divergent uses or intentions of use within a

single geographical area

• Contiguities– Problems of boundaries, property rights…

• Neighborhood– Problems of air or water pollution, landscapes

Conflicts and zoning

• The analysis of conflicts reveals the setting of a zoning of the French territory, in terms of socio-spatial differentiation

• Complex relations (with regards to the stages of the conflict and the expectations) between conflicts and :

– Land prices

– Houses renting and selling

The origins of land use conflicts• Land use conflicts in the French rural and

periurban areas are mainly linked with two major causes

• The main tangible (or local) features of the event (pollution, launching of a new infrastructure, waste…)

• The main characteristics of the neighboring actors:– Rich and educated inhabitants have access to

intellectual and jurisdictional resources, as well as to social networks; They will easily enter into the conflict

– Poorer people rarely have access to the same types of resources. They are also used to live near some sources of inconvenience

VI. Analytical outcomes

Preventive conflicts

• Land use conflicts are not eruptive ones

• Distinction between curative and preventive conflicts

• Land use conflicts are often of a preventive type

• Example: records to tribunals caused by a declaration of public interest or public inquiries for a project

Conflicts and public expression

• Conflicts provide an opportunity of public expression for various groups of actors, who are: – Unsatisfied about local decisions or projects– Overlooked within local governance structures

• These actors express the divergence of their preferences with the choices made (often by public authorities)

• Example: opposition to a public setting

Conflicts as signals and voice

• Conflicts are good signals:– They are a way, for the individuals or the

groups, to reveal their position and to let it know to partners and opponents

– They bring valuable information

• They provide with an alternative to:– Exit to the territory or the game– Loyalty (waiting for a democratic change)

• Collective and individual Voice (Dowding et al.), related to the causes of conflicts

Conflicts: individuals/holistic?

• Conflicts are a mean to ensure communication between actors:– They continue to exchange, keep links– Conflicts as alternatives to violence or to

apathy– “living societies”

• Empirical result: most conflicts are organized and managed at the level of groups of people, sharing the same objectives (associations…)

Conflicts and changes

• Conflicts are indicators of changes– Social changes, technical changes, economic

evolutions– They are often liked with innovation; issued

from and give rise to (new forms of governance, new technologies, new group of actors…)

• Changes provoke resistances, which can conduct to conflicts :– Important changes often lead to long and big

conflicts (social and spatial extensions of the conflict)

Conflicts as components of the process of public decision

• Each public decision is faced with a reaction of the population: it can lead to conflicts

• Sen’s idea of the correction of democracy failures and of imperfect public decisions

• Conflicts are part of a process of trials and errors

• Each conflict reveals the limits of the public decision

• Conflicts are part of the territorial governance process

• After each conflict, the public decision-makers can change the decisions

• It opens the way to new development paths

Conflicts as drivers of change?

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Conclusions

Conflicts and cooperation• The opposition between conflict and

cooperation is not decisive • The dynamics of conflict and cooperation

are parts of one same territorial governance process

• Conflict oppose people with similar goals (development…) but with divergent opinions about the ways and methods to reach them

• This complex alchemy is at the core of the evolutions of the local systems

Territorial governance• The process of territorial governance• has two complementary facets

– A co-operative one – A controversial one

• Their respective importance is variable according tothe periods and situations

• Territorial Governance – is fostered by phases of high levels of

conflict during which oppositions and opinions are expressed and alliances are formed

– also rests on more consensual phases during which agreements and compromises between the different parties are found and implemented (with each party renouncing certain claims or demands)

Conflicts and territorial governance

• These agreements serve as catalysts of territorial dynamics

• They are the foundations of common projects of development

• Cooperation is a mode of coordination between actors

• So is conflict (when it is not violent)

Thank you for attention !