Conflicting Intuitions May Be Based On Differing Abilities: Evidence from Mental Imaging ResearchConflicting Intuitions May Be Based On Differing Abilities: Evidence from Mental Imaging

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Conflicting Intuitions May Be Based OnDiffering Abilities: Evidence from MentalImaging Research

Article in Journal of Consciousness Studies December 2008Impact Factor: 0.77

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Bill Faw

Conflicting Intuitions May Be

Based On Differing Abilities Evidence from Mental Imaging Research

Abstract: Much of the current imaging literature either denies theexistence of wakeful non-mental imagers, views non-imagersmotivationally as repressors or neurotic, or acknowledges thembut does not fully incorporate them into their models. Neurobiologiststesting for imaging loss seem to assume that visual recognition,describing objects, and free-hand drawing require the forming of conscious images. The intuition that the psyche never thinks without animage.... the reasoning mind thinks its ideas in the form of images (Aristotle) has a long tradition in philosophical psychology, from Aristot le through the British empiricists to the British-empiri-cist-inspired introspection paradigm of Titchener. The massive shift inearly experimental psychology to the introspective-antagonistic para-digm of Watsons behaviourism, may have sprung from the contraryintuition that no one thinks in mental images. In both cases, people seemed to assume that what is in ones own mind is in everybodysmind. A third, mediating, intuition that some people do not think with conscious mental imagery seems to be confirmed by empirical studies on many levels. From the early imagery interviews of FrancisGalton through many modern surveys, including my own, a consistent

diversity of self-reports on ones own mental imagery abilities suggests that some 2-5% of people are very poor- or non-visual-imagerswho, yet, maintain normal visual recognition abilities. Comparableestimates have been made in auditory and other imagery modalities.

Journal of Consciousness Studies , 16 , No. 4, 2009, pp. ????

Correspondence:Professor Bill Faw, Brewton Parker College, Mount Vernon, Georgia, USA.Email: [email protected]


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In addition to them, there is a variety of non-normal clinical non-imagers, who have partially or completely lost their imaging abilitiesdue to strokes or head trauma. Some of these become essentially likenatural non-imagers, but more of them suffer corresponding percep -tual and sensory-memory loss. A few even show perceptual losseswithout imaging losses. This suggests that those who have normal perceptual and approximately-normal memorial abilities but claimnot to be able to form mental images might have some sort of sublimi-nal imaging ability that allows normal perception but not conscious

supraliminal imaging.

Introduction

Confidence of knowing I recently (Faw, 2008) wrote a JCS book review on Hurlburt andSchwitzgebels (2007) book Describing Inner Experience: Proponent Meets Skeptic. Their book grew out of a pair of concurrent sessions atTucson-2002, where the two authors, I, and others gave presentationson first-person approaches. In the Q&Aof my paper on mental imagery, both Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel challenged my knowledge of my self report that I am a non-mental-imager!

While they only challenged my confidence of knowing that I am anon-imager, the sharpest response that psychologists and philosophers have given to my conference papers on mental imagery is disbe-lief that I (or anyone ) can be a wakeful non-mental-imager that Imust be mistaken (or worse!) when I report that when I close myeyes Isee nothing, I silently think and silently read (with no auditoryvoice), and am haunted by silent tunes (with no auditory sound). Butthat when asleep I have frequent vivid and occasionally-lucid dreamsin all sensory modalities. While awake I have good non-visual spatial imagery and motor imagery. I can understand other peoples surpriseover my dis-ability, because I was 35 or so before I realized (whilereading a pop psychology book) that anyone had actual mental pictures, including my wife of 15 years; and I was about 50 before a

student helping me with mental imagery research mentioned that heheard his own voice when he read; and a colleague said that she heardher choir directors voice in her head whenever she read the Bible, butother voices when she read other books.

Denial of normalnon-imaging It has been amazing to see how much of the current imaging literatureeither doubts the existence of my category (Richardson, 1994: a

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capacity to image vividly is present in most, if not all, organicallyintact individuals); views non-imagers motivationally as repressors(Kunzendorf, 19956a,b) or neurotic (Zangwill quoted in Brain,195 4); or acknowledge my category but dont fully incorporate it intotheir models (Farah, Kosslyn, and many others).

As recently as 1985, Botez and colleagues reported a so-calledunique case of a person with a pure inborn defectiverevisualization, without other material neurological deficits (p. 375).They were quite amazed that this natural non-imager could draw free

hand and recognize objects. Neurobiologists testing for imaging lossseem to assume that visual recognition, describing objects, andfree-hand drawing require the forming of conscious images Levineand colleagues (including Martha Farah), 1985): The objective abili-ties can be considered descriptions of the subjective phenomenon,means of providing acceptable evidence of its presence (p. 391). Thisobjective/subjective evidentiary concept derives from themediational behaviourism of Spence and Tolman , in which (unlikethe radical behaviourism of Watson and Skinner) one studiesbehaviour to infer mind .

Conflicting Intuitions About Imaging Abilities

Intuition A: All Thought Involves Imaging

Eidola vision and representationThe assumption that everyone who can recognize objects and every-one who dreams must have visual images while awake, suggests amore specific assumption which has a long tradition in philosophical psychology: that all normal thought involves imaging. This goes back at least to the eidolon/a ( / )-copy-theory which holds thatwe see because minute eidola (idols or copies) emanate from visibleobjectsand travel through the air to the eyes of the beholder statedto be one of Empedocles visual theories, by Aristotle (ca. 330BC/1952), in Sense and the Sensible (p. 674). Hobbes (1651/1939, p. 132)

refers to this view: grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle thatthe thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible species a visibleshow, apparition , or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye is seeing. The eidola theory of vision suggested a verysimple form of mental representations : memory traces, objects of imagination, and dream imagery are these eidola, having enteredthrough sense-organ pores and now in the mind. Thinkingmay be a

CONFLICTING INTUITIONS & MENTAL IMAGERY 3
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matter of these eidola rearranging themselves by laws of association a toy box theory of thinking.

AristotleThe assumption that all normal thought at least involves imaging wasarticulated by Aristotle in De Anima and in Treatise on the Principleof Life (cited in Mandler & Mandler, 1964). Selections from De Anima , On Sense and the Sensible , and On Dreams are from Aristotle(ca. 330BC/1952).

De Anima : thinking may be impossible without imagination(phantasia: ) (p. 632). To imagine is identical with thethinking of exactly the same as what one in the strictest sense perceives(p. 660). The soul never thinks without an image (phantasma:

) (p. 663). The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms inthe images (p. 664). When the mind is actively aware of anything it isnecessarily aware of it along with an image, for images are like sensu-ous contents except in that they contain no matter (p. 664).

Principle of Life : The reasoning mind thinks its ideas in the form of images; andas the mind determinesthe objects it shouldpursueor avoidin termsof these images, even in theabsence of sensation, so it is stimu-lated to action when occupied with them . When the mind there in itsworldof images says that a thingis pleasant or painfulherein the world

of things it pursues or avoids in a word, it acts. (p. 9).While some of these Aristotle quotes seem to indicate that thinking

can be reduced to imagination and images, others do not. Also, notethat imaging is not only crucial to thinking but leads directly to action : presumably the very entertaining of images of the pleasant or painfulobjects leads to our response!

Aristotle goes on in De Anima to differentiate between sensitiveimagination, found in all animals, and deliberative imagination,found only in calculative minds (p. 666) and differentiates imagina-tion from discursive reasoning (p. 659) while still portrayingthinking as involving imagination plus judgment. Words , as well asimages , play a crucial role in thinking. (See Nigel Thomas, 2008, for a

good review of Aristotles views of imagery and imagination andsome controversies in translation.)

De Anima : Thinking isdifferent fromperceiving and is held tobe in partimagination, in part judgment (p. 660). Concepts differ from images though they necessarily involve them (p. 664). Many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than manthere is no thinking or calculation but only imagination (p. 665). It ishearing that contributes most to the growth of intelligence. For rational

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discourseis composed of words, and each word is a thought-symbol(On Sense and the Sensible , p. 674).

Despite the importance he gave to imagination and images, Aris-totle accepted the claims that there are sleeping non-imagers : Thereare cases of persons who in their whole lives have never had a dream(On Dreams, p. 706).

British Empiricists: Thomas HobbesThe British empiricists Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and others held views

that perhaps put even more thinking weight on imagery. ThomasHobbes in Part I, Chapters 13 of Leviathan (1651/1939) articulatedthe close link between sensing and subsequent imaging. Italics withinquotes are from Hobbes.

Of Sense : there is no conception in a mans mind which hath not atfirst, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. Therest are derived from that original (p. 131).

Of Imagination : Imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense ;andis found in men, andmany other living creatures,as well sleeping aswaking [butwhenthe sense has decayedeven more]it is called mem-ory (p. 133).

Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations : wehaveno imagination

whereofwe never had thelikebeforein our senses . All fanciesaremotions within us, relics of those made in the sense. (p. 137).

Thomas (2008) suggests that Hobbes images might not be mental pictures in a robust sense. Hobbes differentiates between unguidedand regulated thought (p. 137) but expresses regulated thought interms of imagination of causes and effects (p 138). He lifts upAristotles sense of imagined outcomes leading directly to action inChapter 6 (Passions):

Passions : voluntary motion to move any of our limbs, in suchmanner as is first fanciedin our minds (which) fancy is but the relicsof the same motion, remaining after sense imagination is the firstinterval beginning of all voluntary motion (p. 148). Will is the last

appetite in deliberating (p. 154).

John LockeJohn Locke in Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690/1939)continued this tradition in Book II (Of Ideas) Chapter X (Of Retention):

Ourideas being nothing but actual perceptionsin the mind, which ceaseto be anything when thereis no perception of them, this laying up of our



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ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this thatthe mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions which it hasonce had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it hashad them before (p. 276).

Locke does, famously, add to sensations the mental power of re-flectionin Book II (Of Ideas in Chapter XI (Discerning) and Chapter XII (Complex Ideas)

Discerning : these very operations of the mind about ideas receivedfrom sensationsare themselves, when reflected on, another set of ideas,

derived from that other source of our knowledge which I call reflection(p. 282).

Complex Ideas : [complex ideas are] made by the mind out of simpleones (p. 283).

David HumeDavid Hume in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding(1748/1939), Section II (Origin of Ideas) and Section III (Associationof Ideas) tried to tighten up Lockes very loose (p. 596) confoundingof sensations and ideas and then to spell out laws of how ideas com- bine themselves. Italics within quotes are from Hume.

Origin : Impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less

lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on anyof those sensations or movements (p. 593). All our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more l ively ones (p. 594).[To understand] any meaning or idea, we need but inquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? (p. 596).

Association : There appear to be only three principles of connectionamong ideas, namely, resemblance, contiguity in time or place, andcause or effect (p. 597).

Edward Titchener This British Empiricist strand is more recently seen in the founder of American Structuralism, British-born Edward Titchener. In his 1909 Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes in

a section on Imagery and Sensationalism (pagination from longselections in Mandler & Mandler, 1964), Titchener dealt with the philosophical sensationalism of the British philosophers we have been treating, citing Baldwins definition for sensationalism (p. 172):

[Sensationalism is] the theory that all knowledge originates in sensa-tions; that all cognitions, even reflective ideas and so-called intuitions,can be traced back to elementary sensations.

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Titchener chided the philosophical sensationalists for not distin-guishing the theory of knowledge from the theory of thought (p173). Titchener separated these philosophers and his own experimen-tal psychological approach on this point:

Lockes ideaswere meanings, thought-tokens, bits of knowledge; thesensations and ideas of modern psychology are Erlebnisse , data of immediate experience (p. 173).

As historian of psychology, Tom Leahey (2004), states: Titchener built his psychology on the premise that the mind was made up of sensations or images of sensation and nothing else (p. 245).

Titchener knew Galtons mental imagery research (which hadfound many cases of non-imagers) and placed himself within Galtonsspectra in Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes (Mandler & Mandler, 1964). He described his own imageryabilities:

My visual imagery voluntarily aroused as for Galtons breakfast tabletest, is extremely vivid, though it seems bodiless and papery whencompared with direct perception. I have never, so far as I am aware,experienced a visual hallucinations; I have no number-form; I knownothing of coloured hearing . On the other hand, my mind, in its ordi-nary operations, is a fairly complete picture gallery not of finished paintings, but of impressionist notes (p. 167) My mind is by no meansexclusively, is not even predominantly, of the visual type. I have agreat deal of auditory imagery; I have also a great deal of kinaestheticimagery (p. 171).

In a section on The Problem of Meaning, Titchener not only iden-tified ideas with images, but challenged the Wurzburg scholars find-ings that their introspections found even minute imageless holes intheir streams of images. Everyone (except Galton) seemed to assumethat what is in ones own mind is in everybodys mind!

I found not the faintest trace of an image-less apprehension (p. 181).What I have personally found does not, so far, shake my faith in sensa -tionalism (p. 182). I have turned round, time and time again, uponconsciousnesses like doubt, hesitation, belief, assent, trying to remem-

ber, having a thing on my tongues tip, and I have not been able to dis-cover the imageless processes (p. 183).

Intuition B: Nobody Thinks With Images

The massive shift in early experimental psychology, from the British-empiricist-inspired paradigm of introspection to the introspective-antagonistic paradigm of behaviourism, may also have sprung fromthe same philosophical assumption that ones own mental intuitionis



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representative of homo sapiens mentalis . I say this because it may bethat John Watson was a non-imager such as me. In his most-famous1913 article, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, he pennedthese very ambiguous words in a footnote:

There is need of questioning more and more the existence of what psy-chology calls imagery. Until a few years ago I thought that centrallyaroused visual sensations were as clear as those peripherally aroused. Ihad never accredited myself with any other kind. However, closer examination leads me to deny in my own case the presence of imageryin the Galtonian sense . Imagery becomes a mental luxury (even if itreally exists) without any functional significance (p. 175).

In his second-most-famous 1913 article, Image and Affection inBehavior, Watson (1913b) believes the centrally aroused sensa-tion or image if thought goes on in terms of centrally arousedsensations (p. 421) to be the most serious obstacle in psychologymoving from the structuralism of Titchener to behaviourism. Then hestates as his principal contention that there are no centrally initiated processes (p. 423), a claim which he footnoted as follows:

I may have to grant a few sporadic casesof imagery tohim who will not be otherwise convinced, but I insist that the images of such a one aresporadic, and as unnecessary to his well-being and well-thinking as afew hairs more or less on his head.

A few paragraphs later Watson wrote:

It is implied in my words that there exists or ought to exist a method of observingimplicit behavior [such as thought andimages]. There is noneat present. The larynx, I believe is the seat of most of the phenomena(p. 424).

His last sentence is amazing, suggesting that inner- speech is the rootof visual imagery as well as of verbal thought! With these two 1913articles, Watson began slaying the dragon of Introspective Experi-mental Psychology.

Watson continued to define Behaviourism. In Chapter 1 of thegreatly-revised 1930 version of his 192425 Behaviorism (1930/

1970), he made several statements about consciousness and imagery.Italics and curved parentheses e.g., ( introspection ) withinquotes are from Watson. The opening italicized phrases are the titlesof his various sections.

Old and New Psychology Contrasted : The behaviorist holds that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic (p. 2).

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Example of Such Concepts : [Wundt] substitutedthe term consciousnessfor the soul. Consciousness is not quite so unobservable as soul. Weobserve it by peeking in suddenly and catching it unawares as it were(introspection ) (p. 4). In the analyses of consciousness made by certainof the psychologists you find such elements as sensations and their ghosts, the images (p. 4).

Advent of Behaviorists : [The behaviorist] dropped from his scientificvocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image,desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjec-tively defined (p. 6).

Behaviorists Platform : saying is doing that is, behaving. Speak -ingovertly or to ourselves (thinking) is just as objective a typeof behav-ior as baseball (p. 6).

Does this Behavioristic Approach Leave Anything out of Psychology? :[Thereis a natural inclination to ask]: DoI not forget things and remember things, imagine things, have visual images and auditory images of things I once have seen and heard? (p. 9).

Is Behaviorism an Actual System of Psychology? : Psychology can dowithout the terms mind and consciousness, indeed it can find noobjective evidence for their existence . (p. 18).

Watson also picks up his inner-speech theory in Behaviorism(1930/1970), in chapters titled X: Talking and Thinkingand XI: Do

We AlwaysThink in Words?In Talking and Thinkinghe wrote that:What the psychologists have hitherto called thought is nothing but talk-ing to ourselves (p. 238).

While admitting that his earlier writings could be misconstrued assuggesting that the laryngeal movement as such played the predomi-nating role in thought (p 238), he still maintained that:

the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for implicitor internal speech (thought) . After our overt speech habits areformed, we are constantly talking to ourselves (thought) (p. 239).

And yet thought does not necessarily involve words.

Talkingand Thinking : The termthinkingshouldcoverall word behav-

ior of whatever kind that goes on subvocally (p. 243). Do We Always Think in Words? Manual and visceral organizations areoperative in thinking even when no verbal processes are present it shows that we could still think in some sort of way even if we had nowords! (pp. 2678). We can say that thinking is largely subvocal talk-ing provided we hasten to explain that it can occur without words(p. 268).



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Much of the formal study of imagery in particular and issues in consciousness in general retreated from the frontiers of psychologicalresearch with Watsons coup. In a provocative JCS article sub-titledJ.B. Watsons Rejection of Mental Images (2007), David Bermanand William Lyons survey a number of takes on Watsons 1913 rejec-tion of his own visual imaging abilities, and conclude that Watson wasa good visual imager but that he developed an ideological blindnessto mental images, showing a refusal or lack of desire any longer toadmit a capacity (p. 20).

While Berman and Lyons might be correct that Watsons behavior-ismled to his rejection of imagery, it might be the other way around:his paucity of visual imagery might have led to his fervent behaviour-ism. Nigel Thomas (2008) asserts in his Imagery article in the Stan- ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that Watson questioned the veryexistence of imagery, and that behaviourist psychology led toiconophobia , a marked skepticism about imagery (if not its exis-tence, at least its psychological importance) among psychologistsand philosophers (section 1.1). Instead of weighing into the details, Iwill follow an insight by historian of psychology Thomas Leahey(personal communication) and suggest that Watson might have been astrong auditory but weak visual imager, and that he mainly took partin auditory imagery experiments several years before he became a behaviourist.

Thankfully, the resolution of this issue of Watsons imaging abilityis not crucial to mythesis. What I contend is the probability that strongimagers led philosophical and scientific psychology into introspective paths and the possibility that some poor imagers led it into behav-ioural paths.

Intuition C: At Least Some People Think Without Images

The contemporary denial or ignoring of natural-non-imagers, which Ireferenced in the opening paragraphs, is surprising because the phe-nomenon was reported prominently by the founders of the empiricalstudy of mental imagery: Sir Francis Galton (1880, 1883) and GeorgeBetts (1909).

Francis GaltonFrancis Galton (1880, 1883) launched the comparative study of men-tal imaging abilities with a series of open-ended questions on mentalsights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and bodily sensations, evoked by being asked to remember a recent dining experience: recall

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Titcheners reference to Galtons breakfast table test and Watsonsreference to imagery in the Galtonian sense. Galton found that themajority of the men of science (1880, p. 302) whom he first queriedseemed to be non-imagers. Galtons more extensive surveying gave amuch more modest (and frequently replicated) estimate that about5% responded to the request to form a mental picture with somethingas follows:

I recollect the breakfast table, but do not see it.

It is only as a figure of speech that I can describe myrecollectionof a sense as a mental imagewhich I can seewith my mindseye.

Dim, poor definition; could not sketch from it. I have a difficultyin seeing two images together.

No power of visualizing. Between sleeping and wakingsomeremarkable senses have occasionally presented themselves, butI cannot recall them when awake with eyes open.

Very occasionally an object or image will recall itself, but eventhen it is more like a generalized image than an individualimage.

These are in sharp contrast to responses from the set where the fac-ulty is very high, such as:

The image once seen is perfectly clear and bright. The mental imageappears to correspond in all respects with reality. I think it is as clear asthe actual scene.

Galtons own visual imaging abilities were very impoverished,according to his own report: I visualize with effort before Ithought of carefully trying, I would have emphatically declared thatmy field of view in the dark was essentially of a uniform black .(1883, p. 114). Even after practicing visual imaging, Galtons imagesdisappear out of sight and memory the instance I begin to think aboutanything . Presumably his paucity of imagery and his acknowl-edgement that others had good imagery spurred his research. Thisis a sign of a great scholar: he would have never launched mentalimagery research if he had assumed that everyone had squat imagery!

William JamesWhile presumably not one of Galtons queried men of science,William James wrote of his own poor visual imagery in his hugelyinfluential Principles of Psychology (1890/1981), stating that he can



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seldom call to mind even a single letter of the alphabet in purely reti-nal terms. I must trace the letter by running my mental eye over itscontour in order that the image of it shall have any distinctness at all(p. 708).

George BettsGeorge Betts (1909) took Galtons responses and created 7-pointscales from perfectly clear and as vivid as the actual experience tono image present at all, you only knowing that you are thinking of the

object.From this he found various percentages of non-imagers, rang-ing from 2% of his college students to 19% of psychologists.

Donald Hebb and othersDonald Hebb helped launch the modern cognitive-era study of mentalimagery in a seminal article in 1968, in which he urged studying men-tal imagery in ways that correlate self-report with objective tasks.Subsequent research by many notable researchers such as Akhter Ahsen, Martha Farah, Robert Finke, Steven Kosslyn, RobertKunzendorf, D.F. Marks, Stuart McKelvie, Alan Paivio, Alan Rich-ardson, and P.W. Sheehan has become more quantitative, focusingon objective tests of imaging ability, in addition to, or rather than self

report.

The Search for Normal Individual Differences

Imagery FactorsMost mental imaging research assesses imaging abilities on a contin-uumfrom poor to excellent imagers. These scales find that the mean ismuch closer to the vivid end of the continuum, with very few peopleon the non-vivid end. This skewing seems to have been universallyfound from Betts (1909) through Richardson (1994) and my own sur -veys where I have found up to 30% of 2500 responders markingthe best imagery option but only 25% marking the worst.

Imagery tests measure imaging vividness in several sensory modes,such as visual, auditory, touch, motor, taste, smell, and organic(bodily-sensation). Consistently significant positive correlationsamong all of the imaging modalities suggest a unified trait. However,the fact that these correlations tend to be moderate rather than high,and the fact that there seem to be fairly consistent differences in thevividness levels of different imagery modalities (e.g., that people tendto be better in, say, visual than in smell imagery), suggest independent

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imagery modality abilities. Betts (1909) found correlations betweensub-scales ranging from 0.40 (between visual and smell) to 0.78(between smell and taste). Factor analysis has suggested that the twomechanical modalities (touch and motor) and the two chemical senses(smell and taste) may constitute separate factors (Richardson, 1994).

Faws Galton- & Betts-ProfilesSince 1993 I have devised and with my North Carolina and Georgiastudents have administered four different Galton- and Betts-

derived mental imagery profiles to some 2,500 people. We have alsofound (along with Galton and Betts) in each set of surveying, some2-5% with extremely low imaging scores. Our most recent profile,given to 750 people, showed the following percentages for the lowestone or two categories:

When you try to form a mental picture, it is usually: (no image,vague & dim, somewhat clear, very clear): No image: 2.1%Vague & Dim: 8.2% (previous surveys claiming no visual imag-ery: 2.7%, 2.2%, 2.3%)

Is your visual imagery more like seeing (a blank wall; photos or slides; movie; mix of photos & movies) Blank wall: 4.6%;Photos or slides: 19.7%

When you try to form a mental sound, it is usually: (no image,vague & dim, somewhat clear, very clear) No image: 2% Vague& dim: 14.1% (previous surveys claiming no auditory imagery:815%)

When you read a magazine or book, do you: (silently think thewords, hear own voice; a voice not recognized, differentvoices) Silently think the words: 18.9%

When you are thinking about a song, do you: (silently hum it,faintly hear music, clearly hear) Silently hum: 12.1% faintlyhear: 17%

I would like to share a few of the written comments that persons

have written at the end of taking some of our surveys commentsthat rival Galtons in terms of poor or non-imaging ability.

I know the person is there but I have a hard time seeing him,esp. Details of the face. It is more the actions and events that Iam most aware of actions, events, responses, words, feelings, but not actual forms or pictures. I have a very difficult time pic -turing anyone or anything. I can picture geometric objects better



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than people. I dream in ideas rather than pictures. Im just awarethat it is happening; neither in black and white or color.

I can picture what it would look like or I know what it looks like, but I cant actually see an image in my head. Thinking about andI think I can see it but I dont. Dont really ever remember dreaming except when dream of incidents in my life or of some-thing that happened to me as a child or that will happen to me inthe future. Usually just wake up with feelings or am disoriented.

I just get a sense of the object. A feeling that I dont need to see it

I already know it. Just now beginning to realize that some people can actually see things in their minds so to speak. I wonder how vivid it is. I always thought mental picture was just a phrase. When they image an apple what is the background? Is it black or is the apple on a table.

No visual image at all. Sort of a non-sensory feel of the object,action, etc.

Think of object remember parts of object and try to form pic-ture, but doesnt work.

When I try to form an image nothing happens. It is just blank.

Never aware of use of mental imagery in myself or in others.

When I am asked to form an image and fill out a pamphlet in afew minutes I dont see much of anything If I can close myeyes and think then I see clearly. Sometimes pictures are clear I could touch them Sometimes just an outline.

Mental pictures come to me, vaguely but in color, but I cannotcontrol them or call them up intentionally.

These are, again, in sharp contrast with statements from personschecking off much higher imaging self ratings. These latter includeone student who wrote that he has walked into a wall more than once, because he imaged a doorway there. Probably our most poignant com-ment came from a 40-something colleague of mine, who had becometotally blind some 10 years earlier. After having been in his present

office for several months he experienced a sudden moment in whichhe seemed to be able to see everything in his office, clearly and brightly. For a moment he thought he had regained his sight! Then herealized sadly that his tactile and spatial acquaintance with things inhis office came together in vivid visual imagery. A minute later he wasblind again.

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Eidetic Imagery: Vividness, Accuracy, and Control One of the referees for this article helpfully suggested that I raise theissue of eidetic or photographic imagery in regard to the studentwho has walked into walls and my blind colleague. Eidetic, of course, comes from the Greek eidetikos/eidos: form or shape, whichrelates to the eidola-copy-theories of Empedocles referenced earlier.Eidetic images are defined as visual impressions recalled vividlyand readily reproducible with great accuracy(Websters, 1991). Notethree characteristics of eidetic images: vividness, readily reproduc-

ible, and great accuracy. If Empedocles were correct that eidola wereactual copies of the objects arriving at the eye, one might assume thateveryone would be eidetic!

Classic treatments of eidetic imagery relate to cases whereby a per-son can look at a cluster of 10,000 dots and retain that accuratelyenough to form a stereogram when looking later at another cluster of 10,000 dots presumably able to superimpose the eidetic image ontothe new perceptual image. Based on extensive research with eideticimagers, R.N. Haber (1979) maintained that eidetic imagery is quali-tatively different from normal imagery and very rare. Many eideticimagery researchers also maintain that children tend more towardeidetic powers than adults. Many contemporary researchers of general

mental imagery abilities remain agnostic or divided in both thequalitative-distinctiveness and the age claims (Kunzendorf & Sheikh,1990; Finke, 1993; Richardson, 1994).

Robert Kunzendorf (1990) has studied a number of very vividimagers whom he calls eidekers. My impression is that they wouldnot be eidekers in the classic sense with the seeming amazing accu-racy and reproducibility but clearly persons with very vivid imag-ery. My 1997 article reviewed some of Kunzendorfs remarkablefindings of primary visual area (V1) and even electro-retinogram andautonomic activation in vivid, but not in non-vivid, imagers.

Researchers in general imaging abilities have often dissociated thedimensions of vividness and control ( Gordon, 1949; Richardson,1994). In Thomas(2008) terms, vividnesswould be a measure of im-agery experiences, while control would be a measure of imageryrepresentations or processes.

Richardson (1994) found a mean correlation (Pearsons r) of 0.36 between measures of vividness and control in normal individuals over 12 studies. My own surveys found even higher correlations between vividness and control: r=0.44 with an n=264; and r=0.75with an n=629). This suggests a positive moderate-to-high

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279704022_Twenty_years_of_haunting_eidetic_imagery_Where's_the_ghost?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5722379_An_investigation_into_some_of_the_factors_that_favor_the_formation_of_stereotyped_images?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279704022_Twenty_years_of_haunting_eidetic_imagery_Where's_the_ghost?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5722379_An_investigation_into_some_of_the_factors_that_favor_the_formation_of_stereotyped_images?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==


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relationship between these two factors. Some poor visual imagerswhom I have studied say that they experience brief spontaneousimages but can neither hold or transform them, nor generate themat will.

This dissociation can be seen neurologically. Russell Brains (1954;also in Faw, 1997) case 2 was a man, who, due to a frontal concussion,lost controlled-, but not spontaneous-imaging abilities: he could visu-alize things only if they come to me as an impression, but I cantmake them come.

The eidetic imagery characteristic of readily reproducible seemsto be an extreme case of control. The eidetic characteristic of greataccuracy seems to be a matter of memory. Going back to mywall-walking-into student and greatly disappointed blind colleague,they seem to have very vivid imagery, but not necessarily great con-trol nor accurate eidetic memory.

Authenticity of Self Report?

Disputing starkly-contrasting reportsOne has to assume a superior externalperspective from which to dispute such extreme differences in self report. There are far more thanlinguistic or folk-psychological-terminological distinctions between the person who reports: just now beginning to realize thatsome people can actually see things in their minds so to speak, andmy blind colleague who was fooled by the vivid visual imaginal expe-rience of his un-seen office! It does makes skeptical sense to questionwhether people filling out a 5- or 7-scale survey all mean the same byvague and dim! But it seems untoward to dispute such strong state-ments of mental imaging abilities and the lack thereof as seen inthe self-reports that Galton and I and many others have elicited.

Waking vs dreaming imaging While I have done a little dream work both in terms of sleep labsand in terms of eliciting dream reports I am puzzled by the general

assumption that everybody dreams. Even Aristotle and Lockeseemed to accept the reports of some who claimed not to. Sleepresearchers sometimes make such a statement even after finding con-sistent lack of REM-type dreaming in some subjects.

Our research suggests that there are wakeful non-imagers who havevivid dreams (such as me) and there appear to be both wakefulimagers and non-imagers who claim not to have REM-type dreams.And yet, it has still surprised me that we find only moderate positive

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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10385619_Loss_of_visualization?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10385619_Loss_of_visualization?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==


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correlations between self reports of waking and dreaming . For instance, in one sample of 516 subjects we had several moderate posi -tive correlations:

Freq of imaging in color w/ freq of dreams in color: r=0.49

Only image in black & white w/ freq of dream in black andwhite: r=0.51

Imaging visual vividness & dream in color: r=0.15

Waking Imagery movement & dreaming movement: r=0.24

Interestingly, the two factors that together define lucid dreaming (Ihave dreams in which I am aware I am dreaming and I have dreams Ifeel I am partially controlling) correlated 0.50 in frequency. In Faw(1997) I posed several possible mechanisms that might account for aseeming double dissociation between waking and sleeping imagery.The jury seems to be out on that issue I believe this is a crucial butunrecognized question for consciousness science.

Self reports and objective tasksHowever, self reports are quite limited! So, in addition to subjectiveself report surveys, we have run a dozen or so experiments with moreobjective mental imagery variables: (1) comparing the use of imageryvs. non-imagery strategies and/or (2) comparing high- vs. low-report-ing imagers in cognitive tasks such as memory for picture detail, paired associate word memory, serial-position-effect word remember-ing, puzzle solving, story comprehension; and various forms of suc-cess and failuremental practice such as piano sight reading, basket ball, and beanbag toss. (Yes, beanbag toss I kid you not!)

Consistent with other researchers, I have found strong robusteffects from instructing subjects to use imagery strategies (versussilent verbal repetition), but only modest correlations (yet sometimeswith significant t-test or chi-square differences) between reportedphenomenalmental imagery and the representationaluse of mentalimagery in these tasks. Researchers such as Kunzendorf and Kosslyn,who have been able to test a number of non-imagers and presumably-super imagers, find much stronger effects. My 1997 article reviewssome of Kunzendorfs remarkable findings of V-1 and even electro-retinogram and autonomic activation in vivid, but not in non-vivid,imagers what he calls eidekers! It is my intuition that those witheven mediocre imaging ability will be able to use it for visual memorytasks about as well as those with vivid imagery. The really important



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comparisons are between persons who report no or very-poor imageryand anyone else!

However, what is usually concluded in articles and talks is thatthere are only modest correlations between self-reported imageryabilities and performance on visual memory tasks, with the implica-tion that this is an indictment against the validity of self-report as by Eric Schwitzgebel in various writings, talks, and in personalconversation. This is consistent with the sentiment whereby neuro- psychological reports of clinical imaging loss assume that success in

such objective tasks as describing from the memory the shape andcolour of giraffes is sufficient evidence of the presence of subjectivemental imagery.

I have published a review of brain mechanisms in mental imageryabilities ( Faw, 1997 ), in which I argue that the mechanisms involvedin objective or representational evidence of mental imaging abilitiesactually partially dissociate from those responsible for phenomenalexperience and/or report, thus necessitating on conceptual grounds amodest positive correlation between the two. We will explore some of that evidence in the next section.

Looking at Non-Normal Clinical Non-Imagers

Not only are there natural non-imagers, there are also clinical non-imagers. A few of these clinical non-imagers seem to becomeessentially like natural non-imagers. In these few cases, people, who because of brain damage lose the ability to form mental images,remain capable of perceptual and memory tasks normally associatedwith imagery, e.g., recognizing objects and being able to describe or draw them from memory: Brain (1941; 1954); Nielsen (1955) ; Basso,Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1980; Pena-Casanova et al ., 1985 ).

During the Q&A of a speech by Herbert Simon at an American Psy-chological Association conference a decade ago, I asked Simon whathe could say about brain mechanisms involved in mental imaging not much! I commenced to suggest some of the mechanisms. Rightafter my exchange with Simon, another psychologist came over towhere I was standing and told me about how she had lost visual imag-ing ability from an auto accident in the past year. For months shefound it hard to understand some of what she heard because she couldnot convert the words into pictures. Over a 6 months time she learnedto encode all she heard through auditory imagery and regained comprehension without visual imagery. People in this category alongwith natural non-imagers such as myself can do reasonably well on

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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/14050984_Outlining_a_brain_model_of_mental_imaging_abilities?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31045178_VISUAL_OBJECT-AGNOSIA_WITH_SPECIAL_REFERENCE_TO_THE_GESTALT_THEORY?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10385619_Loss_of_visualization?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/9216597_Occipital_lobes_dreams_and_psychosis?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273549199_Optic_aphasia_optic_apraxia_and_loss_of_dreaming?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273549199_Optic_aphasia_optic_apraxia_and_loss_of_dreaming?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273549199_Optic_aphasia_optic_apraxia_and_loss_of_dreaming?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273549199_Optic_aphasia_optic_apraxia_and_loss_of_dreaming?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/9216597_Occipital_lobes_dreams_and_psychosis?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/14050984_Outlining_a_brain_model_of_mental_imaging_abilities?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10385619_Loss_of_visualization?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31045178_VISUAL_OBJECT-AGNOSIA_WITH_SPECIAL_REFERENCE_TO_THE_GESTALT_THEORY?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==


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many of the objective tests of mental imagery loss, such as describ-ing the colors and physical characteristics of common objects andanimals.

One of the referees for this paper suggested that I might use Levineet al. (1982) at this point to strengthen my case. It shows the reversecondition from the psychologists tale to me at APA. Levine and col-leagues patient EB could understand heard-speech or read-wordsonly when they triggered visual images of their referents. Thus, inslowly reading the sentence, the boy threw the dog the bone, EB

developed a mental image of a boy throwing a dog while reading thefirst five words, but was unable to transform that into the correctimage while reading the last two words, and thus was unable to under-stand the full sentence. EB repeatedly stated that he was unable tomentally speak to himself.

More frequently, persons losing previous visual or auditory wakingand/or dream imagery suffer severe corresponding perceptual and sensory-memory loss often with very specific temporal and/or parietal lesions. They have Charcot-Wilbrand Syndrome, firstidentified by Charcot in 1883, and then named by Critchley in 1953(Critchley, 1953).

Even more remarkable is the fact that some brain-damage casesshow perceptual losses without imaging losses ( Nielsen, 1955; Pena-Casanova et al ., 1985; Behrmann et al. , 1992 ). This includes the patient MD ( Jankowiak et al ., 1992 ), who could no longer recognizeobjects that he saw (object agnosia), but, when asked, was able todraw complex objects from memory (suggesting intact mental imag-ing abilities), but then could not recognize what he drew ! Still another patient ( Trojano & Grossi, 1992 ) could not recognize objects nor draw them without seeing them, but claimed that he could generatevisual mental images of them. In such cases, Martha Farah ( Farah &Levine, 1988; Farah, 1984 ) urges neurologists not to honor their claims presumably not to believe their reports. In Faw (1997), I por-trayed this as the mediational-behaviourism bias mentioned above!

It would seem to me that the most scientifically-sound approach

would be to take their self report seriously unless you find evidence of frontal lobe damage and anosagnosia (lack of knowledge of what ailsyou)! Take the psychologist who spoke to me after the Herbert Simontalk: at one time she had vivid conscious visual imagery that helpedher understand speech. Now she doesnt! She was even astute enoughto report the recovery process of moving from being an imag-ery-decoder to being an auditory-decoder of language. Is there anyscientific or philosophical reason to question her self-report in that?

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16066458_Language_in_the_absence_of_inner_speech?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16066458_Language_in_the_absence_of_inner_speech?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16066458_Language_in_the_absence_of_inner_speech?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/9216597_Occipital_lobes_dreams_and_psychosis?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21748709_Dissociation_between_Mental_Imagery_and_Object_Recognition_in_a_Brain-Damaged_patient?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21748709_Dissociation_between_Mental_Imagery_and_Object_Recognition_in_a_Brain-Damaged_patient?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21748709_Dissociation_between_Mental_Imagery_and_Object_Recognition_in_a_Brain-Damaged_patient?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243769038_Preserved_Visual_Imagery_and_Categorization_in_a_Case_of_Visual_Agnosia?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243769038_Preserved_Visual_Imagery_and_Categorization_in_a_Case_of_Visual_Agnosia?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243769038_Preserved_Visual_Imagery_and_Categorization_in_a_Case_of_Visual_Agnosia?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21705481_Impaired_drawing_from_memory_in_a_visual_agnosic_patient?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20111812_Is_Visual_Imagery_Really_Visual_Overlooked_Evidence_From_Neuropsychology?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20111812_Is_Visual_Imagery_Really_Visual_Overlooked_Evidence_From_Neuropsychology?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16800329_The_neurological_basis_of_mental_imagery_A_componential_analysis?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20111812_Is_Visual_Imagery_Really_Visual_Overlooked_Evidence_From_Neuropsychology?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20111812_Is_Visual_Imagery_Really_Visual_Overlooked_Evidence_From_Neuropsychology?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21705481_Impaired_drawing_from_memory_in_a_visual_agnosic_patient?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/9216597_Occipital_lobes_dreams_and_psychosis?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16066458_Language_in_the_absence_of_inner_speech?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16066458_Language_in_the_absence_of_inner_speech?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243769038_Preserved_Visual_Imagery_and_Categorization_in_a_Case_of_Visual_Agnosia?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16800329_The_neurological_basis_of_mental_imagery_A_componential_analysis?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21748709_Dissociation_between_Mental_Imagery_and_Object_Recognition_in_a_Brain-Damaged_patient?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==


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While most patients are not that articulate, persons who could not rec-ognize objects nor draw them from memory but claim to be able togenerate visual mental images of objects may point us to profounddouble-dissociations between perception and imagery, if we are opento the possibility that they know that they are still forming the kind of mental images that they could form before. It is NOT a scientificapproach to distrust all self report. Taking self report seriously is NOT a shameful thing in hard science! It often tells us much more than purely behavioural measures.

Subliminal Mental Imagery?Because there are natural non-imagers and even some clinical non-imagers who can still perform (if less well) the tasks usuallyrelated to imagery, such as recognition, describing perceptual attrib-utes from memory, and drawing from memory, it seems to be a mis-take to say that they lack all mental imaging mechanisms. Instead, itmight be that they form some type of entry level representation(Goldenberg, 1992 ) or neurophysiological schemas which do notthemselves enter consciousness (Brain, 1956), or have proposi-tionalbut not analogue retrieval ( Basso et al. , 1980 ), or form imagesat a subliminal levelincapable of conscious retrieval and reporting(Botez et al, 1985); or form images but do not recognize them (Hebb,1968).

All of these formulations distinguish between some sort of sublimi-nal imaging ability and the forming of supra-liminal or consciousimages. I see at least three alternate solutions to the dilemma: either (1) describing and drawing objects from memory does not require thegeneration of mental images ; or (2) describing and drawing objectsfrom memory requires generation of a subliminal but not a consciousimaging process; or (3) describing and drawing objects from memoryrequires the generating of mental images, but not the detecting of those generated mental images. Persons such as me may thus generatesubliminal images (#2) or generate but not consciously detect theimages we generate (#3).

This idea of subliminal imaging ability which carries much of the cognitive processing that imagery is thought to carry: minus recallof fine detail seems to be similar to a recent move reviewed byThomas (2008) where imagery is referred to as a type of underlyingrepresentation rather than a specific form of subjective experience.Again, Faw (1997) gives an outline of a brain model of mental imag-ing abilities and deals with some of these issues.

20 B. FAW
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21670324_Loss_of_visual_imagery_and_loss_of_visual_knowledge-A_case_study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21670324_Loss_of_visual_imagery_and_loss_of_visual_knowledge-A_case_study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15756112_Loss_of_Mental_Imagery_A_Case_Study?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-7ad4131f16c3aca92abfd556b2fd3d57-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMzQ4OTU1NTtBUzoyNDQyNTM1MjM3MDU4NTdAMTQzNTI0NTk4NjU2Nw==


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Conflicting Intuitions Continue

I would like to close where I began, on a personal more accurately:interpersonal note. As indicated in my first section, there are manycontemporary imagery researchers who do not know that there arecard-carrying non-imagers, or ignore them, or dismiss their claims. Ihave gotten challenges from both psychologists and philosophers asto the accuracy of my own intuition that, as far as I know, I have never had wakeful mental imagery in any sensory modality, but that I havevivid, frequent, and occasionally-lucid dreams. One psychologist,who does most of his empirical research on mental imagery with the blind (!), took me outside at the end of a North Carolina CognitionGroup conference, told me to close my eyes, gave me instructions towalk so-many paces straight, then left, then right, etc., and then askedme with my eyes still shut to point back to where I had come.When I pointed fairly accurately, he exclaimed, see, you can image!He would not believe me that I saw nothing but my gray eye lids.However, it is this kind of experience that convinces me that I havenormal spatial imagery abilities!

Even Stephen Kosslyn, probably the best imagery researcher of our day, disputed part of my claim when I cornered him after his talk at theInternational Congress of Psychology in Montreal in 1996. He could

not understand how I could tell him that limes are green and lemonsare yellow and elephants have long trunks if my claims were correct(in his Q&A) that I cannot form mental images. He did not contest theexistence of non-imagers, but my alleged abilities did not seem to cor-respond with my condition. In contrast, I have met a couple of Atlanta-based cognitive psychologists who have identified to me thatthey are also non-imagers and that they are also drawn to the study of mental imagery: perhaps to see how the other 97.3% live!

Interestingly, I have had a warm response from philosophers withwhom I have been in dialogue about this. Natika Newton and RalphEllis questioned my intuitions several years ago at the Southern(USA) Society for Philosophy and Psychology when I mentioned mynon-imaging in a paper. They raised a lot of questions about mynon-imaging, but then concluded something like the following: well,we must assume that your intuition is true for you. Newtons entireapproach is based on an Aristotelian assumption that all thoughtinvolves imagery although some verbal thought retains only rem-nants of its imaginal foundation. Far from rejecting my conflictingintuition, Newton, Ellis, Owen Flanagan, William Robinson, BillLycan, and many others have given me good dialogue about this.



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This clash of intuitions has led to some very fruitful developmentof my thinking on mental imagery. The key point is that I (and many of Galtons and my own non-imager respondents) would describe someof my non-imaging experiences more as subliminal-imaging rather thanas propositional thinking. When I amtrying to picturethe faceof my wife (now of 48 years!), for example, I try to remember seeing it but dont seeit. It is almost as if I try to draw her profile, nose, andmouth on water sort of outlining it but leaving no visual trace; rem-iniscent of William Jamesself report. This is a very different experi-

ence than trying to recall semantic facts about her, such as her age,height, etc which is probably how I can recall that lemons are yellowand that trunks have elephants, or whatever! In fact, I come prettyclose to buying Natikas basic premise that all thought involves imag-ery although some verbal thought retains only remnants of itsimaginal foundation. Except, that for some of us the imagery is sub-liminal sort of quasi-there . And that is my intuition!

This article demonstrates the value of peer review. It is morecomprehensive and clearer because of two anonymous reviewers. Itcontains most of their suggestions. The rest must await a subsequentarticle or book.

References

Aristotle (ca. 330 BC/1952), On the Soul (pp. 63168); On Sense and the Sensible(pp. 67389); On Dreams (pp 70262). In: The works of Aristotle , vol. 1 (Chi-cago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.).

Basso, A., Bisiach, E. & Luzzatti, C. (1980), Loss of mental imagery, a casestudy, Neuropsychologia , 18 , pp. 43542.

Behrmann, M., Winocur, G. & Moscovitsch, M. (1992), Dissociation betweenmental imagery and object recognition in a brain-damaged patient, Nature ,359 , pp. 63637.

Berman, David & Lyons, William (2007), The first modern battle for conscious-ness: J.B. Watsons rejection of mental images, Journal of ConsciousnessStudies , 14 (11), pp. 526.

Betts, G.H. (1909), The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery (New York:TeachersCollege. Columbia University).

Botez, M.I., Olivier, M., Verzina, J.L., Botez, T. & Kaufman, B. (1985), Defectiverevisualization, dissociation between cognitive and imagistic thought casestudy and short review of the literature, Cortex , 21 , pp. 37589.

Brain, W.R. (1941), Visual object-agnosia with special reference to the gestalttheory, Brain , 64 , pp. 4362.

Brain, W.R. (1954), Loss of visualization, Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine , 4, pp. 28890.

Critchley, M. (1953), Parietal Lobes (London: Edward Arnold).Farah, M.J. (1984), The neurological basis of mental imagery. A componential

analysis, Cognition , 18 , pp. 24572.

22 B. FAW
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