Conflict Mapping - Creighton University · Cover page designed by: Kazimuddin Ahmed Panos South Asia 110 Kharghuli Road (1st floor) Guwahati 781001 Assam, India Printed at : Saraighat

Conflict MappingAnd

Peace Processes in North East India

Edited by :

Lazar Jeyaseelan

North Eastern Social Research CentreGuwahati

Conflict Mapping and Peace Processes in Northeast India

© North Eastern Social Research Centre 2008

Published by:

North Eastern Social Research Centre110 Kharghuli Road (1st floor)Guwahati 781004Assam, India

Tel. (0361) 2602819Fax: (91-361) 2732629 (Attn NESRC)Email: [email protected] : www.creighton.edu/CollaborativeMinistry/NESRC

Cover page designed by:

Kazimuddin AhmedPanos South Asia110 Kharghuli Road (1st floor)Guwahati 781001Assam, India

Printed at : Saraighat Laser Print

Acknowledgement

This volume comes out of the efforts of some civil societyorganisations thatwanted togobeyond reliefandcharity toexploreavenuesofpeace.Realising thatabetterunderstandingof the issuesinvolvedinconflictsandpeacebuildingwasrequired,theyencouragedsomestudentsandotheryoungpersons todoastudyofafewareasoftension.Thepeacefellowshipswereadvertisedandtheapplicantswereinterviewed.ThoseappointedforthetaskwereguidedbyDrJerryThomas,DrL.JeyaseelanandDrWalterFernandes.ThestudiesweresponsoredbyCatholicReliefServices,Guwahati,undertheguidanceofGopenMosesandDebenSharma.

AftertheircompletionthecasestudieswereentrustedtoDrL.JeyaseelanofImphalforediting.Icontinuedtheworkofeditingafterhissuddendeathon14thApril2007.However,thebookremainsinhisnamebecausehehadthesenseofresponsibilitytosendmetheCDtwodaysbeforehissuddendeathattheyoungageof48.ThisbooktoohasbeensponsoredbyCatholicReliefServices.ForthisIthankMsEnak-shiDutta,RegionalManagerandMangneoLunghdum,peacestudiescoordinatoratCRS.

IoweanimmensedebtofgratitudetothestaffofNorthEasternSocialResearchCentre,inparticularMsAnamikaDekawhoworkeddayandnighttogetthebookreadyforthepresswellintimebeforethedateofrelease.Mr.KazimuddinAhmedofPanosdesignedthecover.Thisbookwouldhaveremainedincompletewithouttheirassistance.

October2007 Dr Walter FernandesNorthEasternSocialResearchCentre Director

III

Dedication

Dr. Lazar Jeyaseelan who had accepted the responsibility of edit-ing this book phoned and told me on 12th April 2007 that he had done what he could, that he was sending the CD to me and that I should complete this work. He must have had a premonition because he died of a massive heart attack two days later during a public function at Makhan Khallen village, Senipati District, Manipur.

Born at Madhurokkanmoi in Tamil Nadu on 24th June 1959, Jeyaseeland came to the Northeast at the young age of 18. He spent most of his years in the region in Manipur. After his doctorate from Manipur University he was active in the academic and civil society circles of the Northeast in general and of Ma-nipur in particular. Because of his administrative abilities for several years he was the Chancellor of the Imphal Archdiocese.

To Dr Jeyaseelan search for peace was a personal commit-ment. As an administrator he had witnessed the murder of some of his colleagues who refused to yield to extortionist demands. He felt dehumanised when he saw the atrocities committed by the security forces whose mandate is to protect the citizens. He, therefore, joined many other organisations that were searching for peace with justice. In gratitude for his commitment to peace we dedicate this book to him.

IV

Table of Contents

Title Author Page

Dedication

Acknowledgement

1.Introduction L.Jeyaseelan 1

2.ImpactofAssam-Nagaland

TerritorialDisputeintheDistrict ofGolaghat,Assam C.Kindo&D.Minj 83.ResponseoftheYouthtothe Karbi-KukiConflictInKarbi Anglong JosephDamzen 544.Community’sResponseofthe Karbi-KukiConflictinKarbiAngolong BuluTerang 94

5.Meitei-NagaConflictwithSpecialReferencetotheTerritorial IssueinManipur M.DominicMaring 113

6.Kuki-NagaConflictwithSpecial ReferencetotheChandelDistrictofManipur D.MichaelHaokip 1457.Kuki-PaiteConflictinthe ChurchandpurDistrictofManipur RebeccaC.Haokip 185

8.YouthintheContextoftheGaro- KhasiTensioninMeghalaya AmritSangma 209

9.TheGaro-KhasiTension:Implica- tionsfortheyouthandWomen SarahMariaBang 249

VII

INTRoDuCTIoN

LazarJeyaseelan

Conflictsoccurbecauseofavarietyofreasons.Thosewhoindulgeinthemjustifythemasstrugglesforjustice.Forsometheyareawayoflife.Mostordinarypeoplewanttoliveinpeacebutareoftendraggedintothemagainsttheirwill.Thoseaffectedbythemtendtoseeinsurgencyonlyasalawandorderissuethoughmostconflictsgobeyondit.Whenaproblemisnotsolvedforalongtime,popularresentmentcanresultinaconflict.Ifitcontinuesforalongtimeitcanbecomeavestedinterestofthosewhobenefitfromit.Theymayincludethecommunityleaders,themilitants,thesecurityforcesandbusinesspersons.Themilitantsgiveexpressiontotheresentmentthatismoreoftenthannot,createdbysocialandeconomicprocesses.Manycommonpersonsresorttoaconflictwhenthey,asanationorpeoplefeelaggrievedandnoneattendsto their grievances. Injustice too arouses genuine anger. Forexample,whenfacedwithatrocitiessuchasrape,murder,stealthandseriouscrimesagainsthumanity,particularlybythesecurityforceswhosemandateistoprotectthecitizens,peoplefeelangryandfrustrated.Ifthesecrimesarenotdealtwith,ordinarypeoplemayresorttoviolencetoundotheevil.Violencethusbecomesaspontaneousactthatisjustifiedasnaturalandjust.

The Situation in the Northeast

All suchsituations seemtoexist in the Northeast.Thecausesdiffer. Insomecasesitmaybepoverty,unemploymentor landalienation, inothercases it isatrocitiesby thesecurityforces ormilitants or criminal acts by anti-social elements. Inmanyinstancesitissearchforanewidentity.Grievancesbuildupwhennostepsaretakenagainsttheperpetratorsofinjustice.Angerandfrustrationbuildupwhengrievancesarenotattended

to.Thatbecomesabreedinggroundofviolence.TheNortheastneedstobeanalysedwithinthiscontextofasearchforanidentity,aneconomywhosebenefitsreachallthepeopleanditsethnicandculturaldiversity.MuchofIndiaknowstheregiononlyasoneofconflict.Thedecision-makerstendtointerprettheconflictsalmostexclusivelyasalawandorderissueandignorethecausesleadingtothem.

Thatgivesbirthtomilitantorganisationswhichtakeuptheissuesintheirownmanner.Theirpowergrowbecauseofabusesbythesecurityforcessuchaspseudo-encountersandrapesandthepossibilitytheyhaveofimpunitybyhidingbehindtheimmunityprovidedbytheArmedForcesSpecialPowersAct.TheUnitedLiberationFrontofAsom(ULFA),theUnitedNationalLiberationFront(U.N.L.F)ofManipur,NSCN-IMandKofNagalandareamongexamplesofmilitantgroups.Someofthemmaydemandsovereignty, a fewmay think of a plebiscite and othersmayaskforabiggerterritory. Ineverycase,theygiveexpressiontosomecultural,economicorsocialaspirationofthepeople.That legitimises the conflict as a struggle for a new identity,economyandpoliticalsetup.Someofthemsucceedpartially.TheMizoNationalFrontwonaMizoStateandrecognitionoftheircustomarylawthroughastruggle.ThemilitantoutfitsofNagalandwonaNagaState.Buttheyarenotalwayssatisfiedwiththatsuccess,sotheconflictcontinues.

Many of these developments take the region beyondinsurgency tomilitarisationwhich ismuchmore than the allpervadingpresenceofthesecurityforces.Whenaconflictcontinuesfor a long time, violence and counter-violencebecomepart ofeveryday life.Though thepeople pay its price, theydevelop asenseofhelplessnessandcometoacceptviolenceandotheraspectssuchasextortionthataccompanyitasintrinsictotheirlifeanddevelopapsycheofacceptanceofviolence.Anti-socialelements,

2 Conflict Mapping in NEI

theeconomic,thesecurityforcesandotherswhobenefitfromitdevelopavestedinterestinongoingconflicts.Someofthemevenworkagainstthosewhotrytobringaboutpeace.Theordinarypersonssuffer.Ethnicconflictsareoneofitsexpressions.

The ordinary people are usually ambiguous about suchdevelopments.Manyofthemsympathisewiththecausethatthemilitantgroupsupholdbutnotwiththeirviolentmethods.Mostmilitantsgroups in their turnsay thatnooneunderstands thembecausetheygiveexpressiontothegrievancesofthepeoplebutarerejectedasterrorists.Thattherearegrievancesisbeyonddoubt.Onecanincludeamongthemlackofdevelopment,deprivation,neglectoftheregion,diverseethniccommunitiesseekingjusticeandidentityandtherefusalofthepoliticalandeconomicdecision-makers to listen to the grievances. In the absenceof a healthydialoogue,mostgrievanceslieburiedbeneaththedebrisandfindexpressioninactsofsabotageandviolence.Theyaredesperateattempts to call the attention of the nation but continue to beviewedonly as lawandorder issues.The situationgetsworsewhencriminalorextortionistelementsexploitpeople’sdiscontentbyusingtheconflictasasourceofillegalincome.

The Background of This Volume

Thepresentbookdealswithsomeoftheseissues.ThefocusinthisvolumeislessonthenationaliststrugglesandmoreontheethnicconflictsinthreeStatesoftheregion.Lackofdevelopment,encroachmentontheirlandandothereventscauseshortagesthataddtothemassiveunemploymentfromwhichthepeopleoftheregionsuffer.Theyalsofeelthatthosewhocontroltheeconomydevaluetheircultureandattacktheiridentity.Everyethnicgroupbeginstofeelthatitsidentityandcultureareunderattack.Asaresult, economic, cultural andpolitical issuesmerge into one.Conflictsfollowfromit.

The region haswitnessedmany such conflicts and thisvolumebringssomeofthemtogether.Thechaptersarebasedonfield studiesdoneby students andyoungpersons, all of thembeginnerswhotriedtounderstandtheissuesandsuggestpossiblepeaceinitiatives.Theiranalysismaybeinadequatebutithelpsonetoidentifythemainconcernsthattheseconflictsexpress.Theyalsomentionpossibleconditionsforpeacebuilding.Thestudiesonwhichthesechaptersarebased,areanoutcomeoftherealisationbymanycivilsocietygroupsthatcharityandreliefworkcannotsolvetheproblemsoftheregion.Thesituationhastobeunderstoodfirsthand.Tomakeameaningfulintervention,onehastohaveanunderstandingoftherootsoftheconflictsconfrontingtheregionasawhole.Thatwastheeffortinthesestudies.

Ethnic Conflicts

Thefocusinthecasestudiesisonethnicconflicts.WebeginwiththeAssam-Nagalandborderdispute.WhenNagalandwasformedin1963,thebordersweredefinedonpaperbutoneisnotcertainthattheyweremarkedclearlyontheground.Asaresult,tensionhasprevailedbetweenAssamandNagalandformorethanfourdecades.Therehavebeenarmedclashesbetweenthepoliceforcesaswellasbetweenordinarypeople.Politicalelementshaveusedtheconflictanduncertaintytocreatetheirownvotebanks.Militantoutfitshaveexploitedthesituationtotheirownadvantage.BoththeStatesseemtoviewcontroloverthisoil-bearinglandasasourceoffuturerevenueandignorethegoodofthepeople.The“neutral” security forces that arebrought to the region tokeeppeaceseemtohavedevelopedavestedinterestintheconflictbyturningitintoasourceofincome.Thustheconflictcontinues.MinjandKindotrytounderstandtheforcesbehindit. DamzenlooksattheKarbi-Kukiconflictthatismainlyidentity-related. Can two ethnic groups live in peace in thesamedistrictwithoutintroducingthedomination-dependency

Introduction 3 4 Conflict Mapping in NEI

syndrome?ThedistrictisnamedaftertheKarbiswhoarecon-sideredindigenoustoit.AsectionoftheKukistriestofindanewidentitythroughanautonomouscouncilwithinthedistrict.Thethreatperceptionthatresultsfromitisaccentuatedbythemilitantgroups thatclaimto representandprotect theirowncommunities.Extortionaddstotheproblem.Terangcontinuesthesamethemeandtriestofindouttheresponseofthecom-munity.Outsidersmayinitiateprocessesofreconciliationbutultimatelygenuinepeacecancomeonlyfromthecommunitiesinvolved. InManipur the extension of theNaga-Centre ceasefirecaused amajor conflagration between theMeiteis andNagas.Maringidentifiestheprocessesthatledtoit.TheNaganationaliststrugglehasbeeninexistencefordecades.Theceasefireof1997beganapossiblepeaceprocess.AconditionofthemilitantoutfitswasgreaterNagaland. Insteadofseeing the issue inanoverallNorthEasternperspective, theCentreextended theceasefire toalltheNaga-inhabitedareas.TheNagasfoundanewidentityinNagalimbutitwasathreattotheMeiteiswhohavealsohadaneyeontriballand.Theyconsiderterritorialintegritybasictotheirpowerandidentity.Theproteststhatfollowedledtobloodshedandgreaterpolarisationthaninthepast.June18,2001markedthedeathofmanypersonsandithassincethenbeencommemo-ratedasMartyrs’Day.TheCentrewithdrewceasefireextensionwiththesamespeedwithwhichithadintroduceditthusfurtherpolarisingthecommunities.Theresearcherstrytounderstandtheissuesinvolvedandsearchforstepstowardspeace.

ManipurisrepresentativeofthediversityofethnicgroupsintheNortheast.Ithasalsowitnessedmanyconflictsbetweenthem.Twoofthemarestudiedinthisvolume.MichaelHaokipstudiestheKuki-Nagaconflict.BoththeNagasandKukisarealliancesofmanytribes.Loyaltieshavechangedattimes.Thus,therewasafoundationofconflictsbutabalancewaskeptformanycenturies

becauseoftheirinterdependenteconomies.Thecolonialdivideandrulepolicychangedthissituationsincetheyusedonesetoftribestocontroltherest.ParticipationintheWorldWarschangedthealliances.Theformationofmilitantgroupsamong bothofthemintensifiedtherivalrywhichhadbegunwiththeirquestforland.Aseriesofincidentsexplodedintoacrisis.

In her study of theKuki-Paite conflict,RebeccaHaokipshowshowreligionbecomesasourceofpowerandofalliances.OnetribetookcontroloftheoriginalChristiandenominationtowhichtheywereconverted.LeadersofthattribedominatedtheChurchaswellastribalorganisations.WhennewalliancesemergedoutofwhatwasoriginallyconsideredaKukiconglomerationbe-causeofdissatisfactionwiththisstructure,thosewhobrokeawayfromitjoinedbothanothertribeandanewChristiandenomination.Thusbothreligiousandtribaldivisionintensifiedtheirrivalry.

AfterManipurcomesMeghalayathatisinhabitedbythreemajortribesviz. theGaro,JaintiaandKhasi. TheGarobeinglesseducated,whentheStatewasformedtheyweregranted40%reservationsineducationandjobs.Today,theKhasi-Jaintiaalli-ancefeelsthattheyhavebeenwrongedbecausetheyarearoundtwothirdsoftheState’spopulation.Thathasbecometheboneofcontention.TheGaros feelneglectedanddemandaGaroStatemadeupoftheterritorieswithasubstantialGaropopulationintheGaroHillsaswellasintheKhasiHillsandAssam.Culturalandethnicdifferenceaddtothisdivide.Themilitantoutfitsaccentuatethedivisionsandaddtotheconflicts.AmritSangmastudiestheissuefromthepointofviewoftheyouthandSarahMariaBanglooksattheconflictfromwomen’spointofview.

CoNCLuSIoN

Thepresentvolumeisthusanefforttounderstandthecon-flictsintheNortheastandtakethembeyondthelawandorderor

Introduction 5 6 Conflict Mapping in NEI

militant-centredinterpretationtotheirsocial,culturalandeconomicorigins.Suggestionsaremadeforconflictresolution.someofthemmaysoundsimplisticoridealistic.Amidsuchsimplicity,thefocusisontheyouthandwomen,twogroupswithoutwhosesupportpeacewithjustice isnotpossible.Byfocusingonthesegroupsoneattemptstointroduceanelementofhope.Thethinkingbehindthesuggestionsisthatpeaceisnotmerelyabsenceofarms.Itisprimarilyasearchforanewandjustsocietythatcaninstilhopebuthasinrealitybecomeasourceofdivision.TheChurchandcivilsocietygroups,particularlywomen’sorganisations,seemtobethebestgroupstobringaboutunity.Theyneedtostudysometraditionalconflictmanagementsystemsandupdatethem.Theyneedtraininginmanytechniques.Women’sorganisations,forex-ample,havedonemuchforpeacebuttheyneedabetteranalyticaloutlookthanwhattheyhave.TheChurchesruninstitutionsthatbringallthetribestogetherunderoneroof.Buttheyhaveusedthemprimarilyforeducationandspiritualformation,notforpeace

IMPACT oF ASSAM-NAGALAND TER-RIToRIAL DISPuTE IN ThE DISTRICT

oF GoLAGhAT, ASSAM

Constantine Kindo & Daniel Minj

The vexed issue of theAssam-Nagaland border disputegoesallthewaybackto1866whentheNagaHillsDistrictwasformed.SincethenaseriesofeventsunfurledinthehistoryofthesetwoStatesthatculminatedintheformationofNagalandin1963.HowevertheBritishregimeaswellasthepost-1947IndianGovernmentnevertookcaretodemarcatetheAssam-Nagalandboundaryproperly.Thathasresultedinthelongterritorialdisputebetween these two states. The consequences of the lingeringterritorialdisputearenumerous.TheyneedtobeaddressedbytheCentreaswellastheStateGovernmentsofAssamandNagaland,tobringaboutanamicablesolutionandachievepeaceintheentireborderbelt.

Togetapictureofthisterritorialdisputeandtounderstandthegravityofthesituation,itisimperativetoretraceeventsthatledtothecreationofthestateofNagaland.Thesequenceofeventsleading to the Assam-Nagaland boundary dispute is equallybinding.TheclaimsofAssamandNagalandovertheforesttractsalongtheborderisinrealityaborderconflict.Assamclaimsthattheforesttractsarewellwithinitsterritoryasnotifiedin1925bytheBritishGovernment.TheNagascounterthatthealienrulerstriedtodeprivethepeopleofthethenNagaHillsdistrictoftheirlegitimate right to this vast andvaluable plains area.Thus theboundaryissuecentresroundthe1925notification.

Thepresentstudywasdoneinordertounderstandthesituation.Theresearchersinteractedwithanumberofgovernmentofficers,

Introduction 7

public leaders,church leaders,villageheadmen,seniorsettlers,intellectuals,securitypersonnel,studentleadersandthegeneralpublicamongNagasaswellasnon-Nagas.Theresponsewasgoodandwewereabletogathermuchinformationfromsuchinteraction.Contactwasfirstestablishedwiththenon-NagavillageheadmenthroughtheGaonBuraAssociationofGhulapaniarea.Throughthestudents’associationstheresearchersthencontactedtheNagaleaders.Basedontheunderstandinggotfromdocumentationandfromdiscussionwith them, this reportwill focuson the issuesaroundthedispute.

Geographical Status of the Assam-Nagaland Border Area

OntheNortheastcorneroftheRepublicofIndialietheStatesofAssamandNagaland.Assamextendsfromlatitude24.1ºNto26.0ºNinbreadthandlongitude89.67ºEto96.04ºEinlengthandaccommodates2.64percentofthecountry’spopulation.AssuchitisthemostpopulatedStateintheNortheast.ThesevenStatesoftheNortheast(ArunachalPradesh,Assam,Manipur,Meghalaya,Mizoram,NagalandandTripura)aresurroundedbyBhutan,TibetandChinatothenorth,MyanmartotheeastandBangladeshtothesouth.AssamhascommonborderswithalltheStatesoftheregionaswellaswithBhutanandBangaldesh.AtIndependence,AssamincludedthepresentStatesofMizoram,MeghalayaandNagaland.ItwasevenbiggerpriortothePartition.AsubstantialareaoftheprovincewenttoEastPakistan.However,by1980,itsareaof2,55,000sq.km.wasreducedto78,438sq.km.

After theYandaboo treatywith theBurmese emperor inFebruary1826theBritishregimetookoverthepoliticalcontrolof Assamandgraduallyconsolidateditsadministrativecontroloveritsfertileplains.WithinthisterritorylivedmanytribeswhomtheBritishadministratorsconsideredwildandhostile.ThetribeswhooccupiedtheHilltractsofAssamarecollectivelyknownas

Nagas.TheBritishrulersdidnotsucceedeasilyintakingcontroloftheirareas.Severalconflictsfollowedandultimatelytheywerebrought under the single administrative unit of theNagaHillsDistrictthroughaNotificationdated15November,1866thatread:

“Itisherebynotifiedthat,withthesanctionoftheGovernmentofIndia,theLieutenantGovernorhasbeenpleasedtoabolishthesub-divisionofNorthCacharinAssam,andtoconstituteaseparatedistrict,consistingofthatpartofthedistrictofNowgongwhichliesontherightbanksoftheriverDoyang.Thenameofthedistrictwill,forthepresentbetheNagaHills,anditsheadquarterswillbeSamoogooting.ItwillbeadministeredbyaDeputyCommissionerunderthecontroloftheCommissionerofAssam.”

Thedescriptionoftheterritoriesincludedinthenewdistrictof ‘NagaHills’wasvagueand lackedclarityandspecification.HoweverthisorderoftheBritishGovernmentpavedthewayfortheinclusionoflargetractsoflandalongthefoothillsintoAssam.TheBritishGovernment tried to rectify the loopholes om thenotificationof1866throughanotherorderdated28June,1875.InthemeantimetheteaindustryreceivedaboostinAssamandtheattentionoftheregimewasdrawntowardsthislucrativebusiness.Theeyesoftheteagardenmanagementfellonthesetractsoflandanditgotduepermissiontogrowteainthisarea.

SincetheinclusionofcertainreserveforestsofthefoothillsintheNagaHillsDistrictcreatedimpendimentsontheirway,theadministrationfelttheneedtoreorganisethedistrictboundaries.AsaresultchangeswereeffectedintheboundarylinefromtimetotimeincludingthetransferofthereserveforestsonthefoothillstotheadministrativecontroloftheSibsagardistrictofAssam(PresentSibsagar, Jorhat andGolaghatDistrict). In1913,DimapurwasincludedintotheNagaHillsDistrict.HavingundergoneseveralalterationstheboundaryoftheNagaHillsDistrictreceivedwhatwasconsideredafinalsettlementin1925throughNotificationNo.

Naga-Assam Dispute 9 10 Conflict Mapping in NEI

3102Rdated25November,1925.Itwassupposedtosuperisedeallpreviousnotifications.

It demarcatedwhat it called the permanent boundary linebetweenAssamandtheNagaHillsDistrict.Accordingtosomeclaims,exceptforashortstretchofabout20kilometrestowardsthenorthfromtheTaukokNaditotheTiokNadi,thisboundarylinewasdefinedaccuratelyand ingreatdetail inanotificationdated25thNovember1925,andwasnotalteredsubsequently.TheBritishregimeclaimedthatthenotificationwasbasedonasurveyconducted between1916 and1923. In theNotification naturalboundarieslikehills,rivers,streams,etc.arenotmentioned.Instead,numberedboundarypillarsinthedocumentsoftheSurveyofIndiaarementioned.Thesepillars have eitherperishedorhavebeenremoveddeliberately.Becauseofthislackofclarity,thenotificationtookmoretheformofguidelinesthandemarcationontheground.Asaresult,thegroundrealityremainedvaguethoughbothsidesagreedtofollowtheguidelines.Itremainedunchangedtill1947whenNagalandhadtwoadministrativeunitsknownastheNagaHillsDistrictandtheNagaTribalAreainhabitedalmostentirelybytheNagaTribes.On1stDecember,1957,theywerecombinedintoonetoformtheNagaHills-TuensangAreaandadministeredasa‘PartBTribalArea’.

1947markedbothindependenceandtheemergenceofA.Z.PhizounderwhoseleadersiptheNagaNationalCouncilraisedtheissueofsovereignNagaland.MuchbeforethattheNagashadbegundreamingofdevelopmentandprosperityoftheNagas.In1918,the‘NagaClub’wasformedconsistingofsomegovernmentemployeesandvillageHeadmen.ThiswasthepioneerandmajororganisationoftheNagas.On16January1929,themembersoftheNagaClubmettheSimonCommissionandraisedtheissueofindependenceoftheNagas.Intheirmemorandumtothecommissiontheyhad

stated,“youaretheonlypeoplewhohaveeverconqueredusandwhenyougo,weshouldbeasweare.”

In1945,the‘NagaHillsDistrictTribalCouncil’wasformedandon2February1946itwasrenamed‘NagaNationalCouncil’.On13July,1947theNNCmetMahatmaGandhitomaketheirdemandsclear.InJune1947thecommissionhadalreadysignedanine-pointcharterwithSirAkbarHydaritheGovernorofAssam.In1957,thefirstsittingofthe‘NagaPeople’sConvention’washeldatKohimaandMokokchung.On30January1980theseNagaorganisationstogetherformedTheNationalSocialistCouncilofNagaland’(NSCN)committedtothecauseofNagaintegration.ApartfromtheNSCN,alsotheNagaStudentsFederation,NagaHoho andother non-political organisations favour the creationofNagalim.TheNSCNhas taken thecause to“UnrepresentedNationsandPeople’sOrganisation”(UNPO)in1993.Theyhavesuccessfullyraisedtheissueof‘Independence’inthisandotherinternationalplatforms.

In1947beganthearmedstruggleforaNaganationthattheIndianarmysuppressedwithanironhand.TheGovernmentofIndiabannedtheNagaNationalCouncilandannouncedapriceonPhizo’shead.Thereareallegationsthatinthenameofsuppressinginsurgency the Indian army committed atrocities on theNagayouth,burntdownNagavillages,rapedwomenandcommittedotheratrocities.Thus,theNagaissuestoodasaseriouschallengetotheGovernment.MahatmaGandhiseemstohaveunderstoodtheNagacausebetterthanmostotherIndiannationalleadersdid.WhentheNNCleadersmethimon13thJuly1947,heisreportedtohavesaid:“Nagashaveeveryrighttobeindependent”.However,theconflictcontinued.

Inthemidstofturmoilapeaceprocessbeganinthehills.Onesectionof theNaganationalistsagreed toasolutionwithin the


frameworkoftheIndianconstitution.Atitssecondmeetingon20and21May1958heldatAmangvillageinMokokchungdistricttheNagaPeople’sConventiondemandedanewNagalandState.Initssupportitalsoprepareda16pointcharterofdemandsfromtheIndianGovernment.AfteraseriesofnegotiationstheIndianGovernmentconcededthedemandofanewstatecomprisingtheNagaHillsDistrict and theTuensang region.Thus,NagalandbecamethesixteenthStateoftheIndianUniononDecember1,1963basedonTheStateofNagalandAct1962whoseClause3(1)read:

3.FormationofthestateofNagaland(1)AsfromtheAppointeddaythereshallbeformedanewstatetobeknownasstateofNagalandcomprisingtheterritorieswhichimmediatelybeforethatdaywerecomprisedintheNagaHills–TuensangareaandthereuponthesaidterritoriesshallceasetoformpartofthestateofAssam.

ThustheboundariesofthenewstatewereexactlythesameastheboundariesofthecombinedNagaHillsDistrictandNagaTribalArea before 1957.However, the dispute continuedwithanothersectionoftheNagaNationalistMovementcontinuingtheirarmedstruggleforasovereignNagaland.Inrecentyearstheyspeakof‘Nagalim’orGreaterNagalandcomprisingtheNagainhabitedareas ofAssam,Manipur,Arunachal Pradesh andMyanmar.ThatcanbringmuchterritorynowformingpartofAssamunderNagalim.However,theborderdisputepre-datesthisclaimandisnotlinkedtoitdirectly.theborderdisputekeepslingeringandhastobesolved.

Profile of Golaghat District :(Extracted from Notes on Assam – Nagaland Border Areas of A,B,C and D Sectors under Golaghat District by J.C. Pegu Deputy Commissioner, Golaghat, Assam)

TotheWestofNagalandinAssamliethedistrictsofSivasagar,Jorhat,Golaghat,KarbiAnglong andNorthCacharHills.This

boundary has a total length of 434Kilometres.The entire 434kilometerstretchoftheAssam-Nagalandborder,predominantlyplainsland,haslongbeendisputedbythetwosides.Muchofthelandof this sensitive area comesunderReserveForestswhichofcoursearenowbeingencroacheduponbysettlersfrombothAssamandNagaland.UnderGolaghatDistrict,alongthedisputedborder,practicallynotracesofReserveForestsexist. Therichfloraandfaunaofyesteryearshavebeenreplacedbyhutsandthelandturnedintocultivablefieldsyieldingrichcrops.ThischangehasattractedmigrantsfromeverycornerofAssam,NagalandandevennearbyBangladeshinationals.

ThemaindisputedareaisontheborderofGolaghatdistrictsituatedbetweenthelatitudeof25ºand45ºNorth,andlongitudebetween93.15ºEThedistricthadapopulationof9,46,279in2001.Golaghat became a full-fledgedDistrict on 23rdOctober 1987.Thedistrictsituatedataheightof71metresaboveMSLisrichinfloraandfauna.FamousforitsonehornedRhinointheKazirangaNationalPark,itisboundedbyRiverBrahmaputraintheNorth,Nagalandin theSouth,KakadongaRiverandJorhatDistrict intheEastandNagaonandKarbi-AnglongDistrictsonitswesternboundary.TheentirepatchoftheAssam–NagalandborderunderGolaghatdistrictcoversapproximately125kilometresincluding4ReserveForests,viz.

1) DiphuReserveForest2) NamborReserveForest3) RengmaReserveForest4) DoyangReserveForest

DifferentethnicgroupshavesettledalongthedisputedAssam-NagalandborderinthedistrictofGolaghatinAssamandWokhain


Nagaland.OntheAssameseside,theAdivasisarethemajornon-Nagagroup.TheothergroupsaretheBodos,Nepalese,Muslims,Assamese,GarosandManipuris.

AmongtheNagas,twomajortribescanbefoundinthearea.Nagaland’sWokhadistrictsharesacommonboundarywiththeGolaghatdistrictofAssam.WokhadistrictisdominatedbytheLothatribeandhencethistribeisthedominantforceinthearea.ItisfollowedbytheSematribe.

Reserve Forest

Foradministrativeconvenience,theAssam-Nagalandborderareahasbeenconstitutedintosixsectors–A,B,C,D,EandFspread in thedistrictsofSivasagar,Jorhat,GolaghatandKarbiAnglonginAssam.TheentireareaisunderthecoverofReserveForests.In1872,theNamborReserveForestwasconstituted.TheReserveForestsofAbhoypurandDesoiwereformedwithinthethenSibsagarDistrict.In1887,theDiphuandRengmaReserveForestswereconstitutedwithintheNagaHillsDistrictintheareasthatoncebelongedtotheerstwhileNowgongDistrictandweretransferredtotheNagaHillsDistrictin1897foradministrativeconvenience.TheDoyangReserveForestwasconstitutedin1888intheSibsagarDistrict.

SectorsA,B,C andD fallwithin the district ofGolaghat,Assam, directly in the disputed zone on theAssam-Nagalandborder.Foradministrativeconvenience,thistroubletornareahasbeendividedintosectorsA,B,CandD.NeutralForceshavebeendeployedheretomaintainlawandorder.However,mostforestshavebeenoccupiedasTable1belowshows.

Sector‘A’ inDiphuReserveForesthasbeenformedtakingportionsofGolaghatandKarbi-AnglongDistrictsofAssam.The

sector covers an area of 18,365,71hectares.Encroachers haveestablished43villagesinit.Only5ofthemarenon-Nagavillages.According to the 2001 census, 18,050out of its populationof22,750areNagasand4,700arenon-Nagas.Togethertheyoccupyaround17,500outof its totalareaof18,365.71. In this,Nagasoccupy16,950haandnon-Nagas550ha.Assam’sadministrationisforallpracticalpurposesnon-existenthere.In1984and1987theGovernmentofNagalandestablishedpollingstationsinthissectorandonNovember28,1991,establishedasub-divisionwithasignboard‘Homeland’.AtHomelandtheAssamgovernmenthasbuiltahouseforitsBorderMagistratebutcitingsecurityreasonsnoB.M.resideshere.

Table1: Reserve Forests Sector Total land Encroached (ha)

1.DiphuReservedForest A 18363.00 18053.00

2.SouthNamborForest B 27240.00 2500.00

3.RengmaNamborForest C 13921.00 11800.00

4.DoyangNamborForest D 24635.77 23000.00

5.DesoiValleyNambarFrt. E/F 16381.45 13322.46

6.DesoiNamborForest F 2797.15 1532.34

7.TiruHillsNamborHills F 5954.55 4794.15

8.AbhoypurNamborForest F 6737.98 400.00

9.GelehiNamborForest F 5157.00 4000.00

Takenfrom:‘BriefNotesonAssam-NagalandBorderAreasofA,B,CandDsectorsunderGolaghatDistrict’byJ.C.Pegu,DeputyCommissioner,Golaghat.(Source : J.K. Pillai Commission Report, 1997)

‘B’sectorisintheNambarSouthReserveForestandandisapartoftheRengmaReserveForestcoveringanareaof27,057.55


ha.Thereareatotalof177villagesinit,126ofthemnon-Nagaand51Naga.Thetotalpopulationofthesectoris74,343outofwhich 50,420 are non-Nagas and 23,923Nagas. Encroachershaveoccupied25,000ha in thissector.Outof it15,000haarewithnon-Nagas and10,000hawith theNagas.The sectorhassevenposts of neutral forces atRengmapani,Nokhuti, Panjan,Chetiagaon,Yampha,MajgaonandRajapukhuri.Inaddition,therearesixAssampolicepostsatChungajanTiniali,Amguri,Dagaon,Rengmapani,ChungajanM.V.andPanjan.On10February1987,theNagalandgovernmentestablishedtheNewlandSubdivisionhere.Oilandnaturalgashavebeendiscoveredinthissectorandthat adds to the conflict since the twoStates aswell as theoilcompanieswantcontroloverit.

The‘C’sectorisinapartofRengmaReserveForestandasmallsectionofNambarSouthReserveForestcoveringanareaof13,921.68ha.Thereare84villagesinit,4ofthemNagaand80Non-Naga.Thetotalpopulationofthesectoris35,890outofwhom34,647areNon-Nagasand1,243areNagas.Theyhaveoccupied11,800outofits13,921.68ha.around2,000ofthemNagaand9,800Non-Naga.Thesectorhas4postsoftheNeutralForcesatUriamghat,Nopani,SilonijanandKhoraghatandanAssampoliceB.N.postatNopani.EconomicallythissectorisimportantasithasoilandnaturalgasatHaladhibari,GhulapaniandBidyapur.Besidesitlandisveryfertile.ManysuspectedBangladeshimigrantshavesettleddownhere.UriamghathasanAssamBorderMagistratebutnoneresideshere.

Sector ‘D’

SectorA,BandCare located in theDhansiri sub-divisionofGolaghatdistrict.‘D’sectorissituatedintheGolaghatsub-divisionofthedistrictandisintheDoyangReserveForest.Thetotalareaofthesectoris24,635.77hectares. Outofit,23,000hectaresareundertheoccupationofnon-Nagaencroachers,and

1,000hectaresareunderNagaoccupation.In1979,thethenJanataregimeofAssamproposedtodeclaretheDoyangReserveForestasaRevenueLand,butitfailedastheCentralGovernmentdidnotgivenecessaryapprovaltotheproposal.Thereareatotalofelevenposts of neutral forces in thisSector atSorupani,Chandanpur,Merapani, Kallojan,Udalipathar, Seedfarm,Negherbil, No.1Tarabil,Ratanpur,Kadamguri andBarogheria. TheAssamGovernmenthastheresidentialquartersandofficeofitsBorderMagistrateatMerapanibutnoB.M.residesthere.

Table 2: Land situation in Sectors A, B, C and D.

Sl.No.R.Forest Sector TL LO LO (Inha) Non-Nagas Nagas

1.DiphuR.Forest A 18,365.71 550 16,950

2.NamborSouthRF B 20,057.55 15,000 10,000

3.RengmaRF C 13,921.68 9800 2000

4.DoyangRF D 24,635.77 23,000 1000

*R:Reserved,TL:TotalLand,LO:LandOccupied

Causes of the Territorial Dispute

Several causes can be attributed to the territorial disputebetweenAssamandNagaland.Theycanbedividedchieflyintothefollowingheads:

a) Insurgency

SomelinkthedisputetoNagalim.However,asstatedabove,thisdemandisrecent.ThedisputeexistedmuchbeforeeventhedemandforasovereignNagalandwhichwasundertheaegisoftheNNCandlaterNSCN.OnecannotdenythattodaymostNagasdreamofagreaterNagalandjustastheyspokeofasovereignNaga


Stateinthepast.Butitisdifficulttostatewithanycertaintythatisisthemaincauseofthedispute.However,theyaswellasothermilitantoutfits likeULFAseem tohave intensified theconflct.TheNSCNinparticularhasbeenrunningaparallelgovernmentinNagalandandhasalargenumberofcadresandsupporters.Theyaswellasothermilitantoutfitsrequirebigamountstoruntheiradministration and to look after thewell-beingof their cadres.Thesebudgetarydemandsaremetbycollecing“taxes”bothwithinNagalandandinotherNagainhabitedareas.Itcanthusbecalledaforcethatintensifiestheconflictanddoesnotcreateitbyitself.

Table 3: Villages in Sectors A,B,C and D

ReserveForest Sector TotalVill.NagaVill. Non-NagaVill.

1.Diphu A 43 38 5

2.NamborSouth B 177 51 126

3.Rengma C 84 4 80

4.Dovang D 139 Nil 139

b) Governments’ Failure to Solve the Border Dispute

ThevaguenessofthebordersandtheCentralGovernment’sfailuretobringaboutanamicableandpermanentsolutiontothevexedborderdisputebetweenAssamandNagalandisitsimmediatecause.TheCentreaswellastheStategovernmentsofAssamandNagalanddonotlooksincereandseriousintheireffortstobringaboutapermanentsolutiontothisproblem.TheyhaveappointedCommissions but their reports andwell as agreements signedbetweentheStatesofAssamandNagalandremainonlyonpaper.Thepoliticalpartiesinpowerlookattheproblemonlyintermsofpoliticalgainsandlosses,veryoftenintheformofavotebank.Asaresult,theinhabitantsoftheboundaryhavetopasstheirlivesintension,fear,uncertaintyandassecondclasscitizens.ThefailureoftheBorderCommissionsisanotherreasonandthattoocanbe

attributedtotheprioritygiventothepoliticalinterestsonbothsidesoftheborder.TheSundaramCommissionof1971,R.K.ShastriCommissionof1985andJ.K.PillaiCommissionof1997failedtocontributemuchtothesolutionbecauseoneofthetwoStatesrejectedtheirreports.WhiletheSundaramandShastriCommissionreportswereunacceptabletoNagaland,AssamrejectedtheJ.K.PillaiCommission’sreport.Asaresult,thepeaceprocesssufferedasetback.

Tothepoliticalvestedinterestshouldprobablybeaddedthevalueoftheland,muchofitfertileandoilandgasbearing.Becauseof thedisputeno inhabitantcanclaimownershipoveranypartofthatland.Theyneedpermissionofthecommandingofficertobuildahouseandpayataxtocultivateit.Suchuncertaintycanhelpthosewhowouldliketohavethatlandforperspectingoil.ThepossiblerevenuefromitisanotherpossiblereasonforboththeStatestocontinuetoclaimthatlandandnotsettlingtheissueamicably.d) Encroachment of Reserved Forest land

SomethinkthattheAssamgovernment’snegligencehasledto the encroachment of theReserveForests along theAssam-NagalandborderinGolaghatDistrict.Othersareoftheviewthattheirpresentinhabitantswereencouragedtosettletherebysomepoliticalleadersinordertocreateavotebank.Oneofitsresultsisthatonceahometorichfloraandfauna,nowitisthemostdenselypopulated area of theDistrict. Instead of the forest, there aresmallhutsallover,interspersedwithagriculturalfieldsandsomescatteredtreesremaininginthenameofReserveForests.PeoplefrombothAssamandNagalandhavesettledherewith thesolepurposeofearningtheirdailybreadandclaimingtheareaastheirown.Thisbringsaboutfrictionamongthepeopleandaggravatestheterritorialdispute.

e) Breach of Interim Agreements


FourinterimagreementsweresignedbetweenthetwoStateGovenments in the presenceofShriKVKSundaram, the thenchairmanoftheLawCommission,asAdvisorintheMinistryofHomeAffairs.Twoofthemweresignedbythechiefsecretarieson31March1972atShillong,thethirdon2May1972atKohimaandthefourthon23May1972atShillong.Theagreementssoughttomaintainthestatusquointheborderareasuntiltheborderdisputewasresolved.Inprinciple,theagreementsstandeventodaybutinreality,thereisconstantbreachoftheseagreements.Violatingthegroundrules,thestategovernmentsofbothAssamandNagalandhavebeenundertakingdevelopmentalworksthroughtheirofficialagencies.Constructionofpermanentstructuressuchasschools,community halls, churches, supply of electricity,water supplyschemesandroadsareinprogress.

TheovertreasonthegovernmentsofboththeStatesgiveiscommondevelopmentbutbehindtheintentionseemstobetheirclaimovertheseareaswhichtheyreinforcethroughconstructionworks.As a result there is always resentment from both theStates.The public has to suffer this painwithout grumbling.Developmentalprojectsintheseareasoftenhaveanegativebearingonthepeaceprocess.

f) Seed Farm: A Bone of Contention between Assam and Nagaland

Intheeast,Kakadungariver;inthewest,Doyangriver;inthenorth,GhiladhariMouzaandintheSouthNagaHillsmorethan200sq.kminGolaghatDistrictistheDoyangReserveForest.ItisalsoknownassectorD.ThecontroversialseedfarmissituatedinthissectoratBhelowgurinearMerapani.Theseedfarmisofrecentorigin,after1973whenitbegantobetalkedaboutandwasstartedafterthe1985armedconflictofMerapani.Inrealitythereisnoseedfarmherebutonlycultivationdonebyengagingpaid

workers.

Theseed farm isspreadover1,000acres thataremanagedby theNagas. It has become amajor irritant betweenAssamandNagalandsincebothclaimthisplot.AssamclaimsthatitissituatedinAssambutitisunderthepatronageoftheNagalandGovernment.TheNagaefforttogaincontroloveritmeetswithvehementoppositionfromtheNagaside.TheStategovernmentshaveoftenengagedinconflictoverthisissue.SoNagalandhassetupaNagalandArmedPolicecampnearby, to safeguard itsinterests.

The highest tension over this plotwaswitnessed in 2004.On14February, 2004,Mr.NeiphiuRio, theChiefMinister ofNagalandaccompaniedbyahostofMinisters,civilandpoliceofficialsheldapublicmeetingat the farmsiteandplacedsignboards reading ‘Government ofNagaland’.Thatwas resentedbythepublicontheAssamsidewhichorganisedmassprotestsagainstit.Atonepointoftime,itwasthreateningtoturnintoamajorconflagrationandaseriouslawandorderproblem.However,thetimelyinterventionofthestudentleadersofthesetwosidespreventeditfromdeterioratingfurther.The‘AllAssamStudents’Union’(AASU)andthe‘NagaStudents’Federation’(NSF)tookaconciliatorystand.

g) The Landlords, Militants and the Neutral Forces

Thepeopleon theAssamsideof theborder claim that theyhavebecomevictimsoftaxcollectionbytheNagalandlordsandmilitantsbutitisdifficulttoattributeallthetensiontothem.WhatisclearisthatthegundominatesandtaxesarecollectedincashorkindfromthosecultivatinglandintheReserveForests.Those


refusingtopaythemhavetofacethegunorabductionforaheavyransom.Alsohousetaxiscollected.Thepeoplehavenochoicebuttosurrenderbeforethesophisticatedarms.ThosewhoclaimtorepresentthelandlordsandtheinsurgentoutfitshaveafreeaccesstotaxcollectionmainlyinsectorsA,BandC.

Theroleoftheneutralforcesdeployedintheareaoftensendswrongsignalstothepublic.Thepeopleonbothsidesallegethattheyarenotneutral.Instancesoftheseforcesharassinginnocentpeopleputaquestionmarkontheirneutrality.Thedisdainandfearwithwhichmostpeople lookat themisdetrimental to thepeaceprocess.PeopleontheAssamsideallegethattheneutralforcessupporttheNagasbutthelatterstatethattheysupporttheAssamese.Thus theyare thecentreofaccusationsandcounteraccusations.

h) Suspected Bangladeshi Nationals

AllegedBangladeshimigrantsareamajorissueintheNortheast.Thisborderbelthasnotbeensparedeither.Thereareallegationsthatithasbecometheirhavenbecauseoftheuncertaintyaroundtheborder areas.They are said to receive the support of somepolitical leaders and government officialswho have a vestedinterest in their presence.Theoriginal encroachers resent theirpresence.They claim that someof themhavegot their namesenrolledintheelectoralrollwiththehelpofinfluentialpoliceandgovernmentofficials.WeweretoldthatmostofthemarefoundaroundMerapaniinsectorDandBidyapurandKoraghatinsectorCandthattheirpresenceoftenleadstoconflicts.However,wecouldnotverifytheirpresenceandgotnodetailsofconflicts.

Most,however,considerthepoliticalpartiestherealcauseoftheconflictsand theunresolvedborderdisputebetweenAssamandNagaland.Theinhabitantsoftheareafeelthatthepolitical

partiesarenotsincereinfindingapermanentsolutiontothevexedproblem.Thecommonpeopleallegethattheyonlyignitetensionfortheirpoliticalgainandtreatthepeopleonlyasvotebanks.Theyenticethepeoplewithemptypromisesbeforeelectionsbutdonotkeepthem.Sotheproblempersists.

A ‘cause and effect’ relationship is clear but one shouldprobablyattributethesituationtoacombinationofcausesratherthanasingleone.That isoneof thereasonswhytheissuehasbecomeverysensitive.Asaresult,fearandtensionareescalating.Violentandunpleasantincidentsareaseriousthreattolawandorder.Noamountofpeacetalkswillbringaboutanyfruitfulandamicablesettlement,unlessthecausesaredealtwith.HencethestategovernmentsofAssamandNagalandtogetherwiththeCentreneedtotakeseriousmeasuresandplanpositiveandconstructiveactioninordertogetoutofthisbordertangle.

The Nature of the Conflict

Genesis of Encroachment :

ThislongstandingborderdisputeisduetoencroachmentoftheReserveForestbothbytheNagasandnon-Nagas.SectorsA,B,CandDthatarereserveforestsundertheBengalForestAct1878,werefreefromanyencroachmenttill1947.Tillthenonlyforestvillageswereallowedfortreeplantationandmaintenance.Four forest villages,Merapani, Soundangpathar,Kasomari andAmguriwere established inDoyangReservedForests in 1905andafewmorelateratUriamghat inRengmaReservedForestand atM.V.Chungajan inNumborSouth.Noother settlementhadbeenrecordedtill1947.AsaresultoftheNagapeacetalks,somemilitants of the hill state surrendered before theCentralGovernmentwhichaccordedthempermissiontosetupvillagesinDiphu,NamborSouthandTengmareserveforests.Someallegethattheyusedthesethickforestsasshelterformilitants.Bethat


asitmay,oneonlyknowsthattheNagalandGovernmentchosesomeofthemasvillageheadmen.Somestatethatitalsofacilitatedoccupationoftheareabytheirfollowers.

Thenext stage came in 1962when theAssamgovernmentissuedlandpattastoretiredarmypersonnelbetweenChungajanandBokajan.ItwasclaimedthatitspurposewasprotectionfromtheNagamilitants. Once the reserve forestwas thus opened,manyothersfromdifferentpartsofAssamsettledtherewiththehelpofsomepoliticalleaders.Thussettlementsgrewandtodaytheforestsareinhabitedfully.Inadditiontotheencroacherssometimberandcanemerchantshelpeddeforestation.Thus,encroachmentisthemainfeatureoftheconflict.Itwouldhavebeenmucheasierforthecentralgovernmenttosolvetheborderdispute,hadtherebeennoencroachmentof the reserve forestsbut all four sectorshavebeenoccupiedfullybybothNagaandnon-Nagasettlers.ThebignumberofNagavillagesespeciallyinsectorBGolaghatdistrictenjoyfullsupportoftheNagalandgovernmentwhichmakesbasicrequirementsincludingschoolbuildingsavailabletothem.However,thenon-NagasbelongingtoAssamareonlyusedasvotebanksofallthepoliticalparties.IncidentlythehighestnumberofvotersforGolaghatandSarupatharconstituenciescomefromtheseareas.Theyaredeprivedoftheirbasicamenities.Thefeelingamongthesettlers,realornot, thatmany recent arrivals are suspectedBangladeshinationals complicates the situation further.The real fear of theinhabitantsisthattheywilllosetheirland.Thus,onecanseeamongthemanxietyoverlandownership,tension,uncertaintyabouttheirfuture, threat from insurgents andconfusioncausedbydifferentpoliticalparities.TheirfutureseemstobebleakastheentireregionisneglectedbytheCentreandtheStategovernments.Theinhabitantsarerememberedonlyduringtheelections.

Various Aspects of the Conflict:

Theimpactoftheterritorialdisputecanthusbedividedintothreemainheads:

a) Land b) Security c) Taxation

a) Land

BothAssamandNagalandlayclaimoverthistractoflandbuttheentireregionhasnotbeendeclareddisputed.AtpresentonlytheDiphu,Rengma,NamborSouthandtheDoyangReservedForests,alsoknownasA,B,CandDsectorsaredisputed.However,becauseof thecomplexityof issues involved this territorialdisputehasbecomelongandcontentious.Bothsidesclaimtobelegitimateownersof the land.The failureof theCentre todemarcate theboundaryclearlyhasonlyaugmentedtheageoldconflict.Thispersistinglanddisputeleadstoviolenceandtheresidentsoftheareasuffermuchduetoit.Therehavebeenanumberofunpleasantincidentsandbarbaricactsresultinginthedeathofinnocentpeople.ThegruesomeincidentofChungajanin1979,Rajapukhuriin1989andthearmedconflictofMerapaniin1985canbecitedasglaringinstancesofsuchviolence.

The reserve forests have been under civilian occupationformore than four decades.Under normal circumstances theywouldhavebeenturnedintorevenueland.Butitcannotbedonebecauseof theongoingdispute.Asa result, the settlersdonothaveownershiprightsdespitetheIndian Forest Conservation Act 1980.TheoncedensereserveforestsaretodaydevoidoftreesbuttheStategovernmentcantakenostepstoturnitintorevenuelandbecausethecase(civiloriginalJurisdiction,OriginalsuitNo.2of1988)filedbytheAssamgovernmentisstillpendingbeforethesupremecourt.Inthemeantime,thepeaceprocesshascometoahaltandthepeoplearedeprivedofcivicfacilities.

b) Security


Thus, encroachmentof reserve forests is themaincauseofthehostilitybetweentheNagasandnon-Nagas.Initiallytheaimwasjusttosettledownandearnalivelihoodbutsoonthescenariochangedwiththeextensionofterritorybecomingthemainaim.DirectlyorindirectlyboththeStatesareinvolvedinit.ToprotecttheNagaencroachers, theNagalandgovernmentpostedArmedPoliceintheseareas.AssamtriedtoevicttheNagavillagersbutfailedinit.InMarch1968theNagalandArmedPolicesetfiretoabout200housesofBodofamiliesintheDoyangReserveForest.The situation along the border became tense and deterioratedfurtherwhentheNagalandgovernmentestablishedI7NagalandArmedPolicePostsand13check-gates2ofthemmannedbytheCRPFinwhatAssamclaimstobeitsterritory.TheseandotheractionsthreatenedpeacealongtheborderbuttheissuealsodrewtheattentionoftheCentrewhichsawtheneedtoseekanamicableandpermanent settlement and appointed the onemanK.V.KSundaramcommission.Itsuggestedfourinterimagreementsbuttheeffortturnedouttobeafailure.

The States entered into these four InterimAgreements inordertomaintainpeaceandtranquilitybutneitherStateabidedbytheir terms.Bothpointedanaccusingfingerat theotherforgoingagainsttheagreements.Follwingthemwouldhavelookedlikegivinguptheirclaimovertheland.SoitbecameimperativefortheStatestogoagainstthem.Underthesecircumstances,theAssam-Nagaland boundary became the scene of great tensionandviolence.ItresultedintheChungajancarnageof5thJanuary1979.After this tragic incident both the state governmentsagreed towithdrawtheirStateArmedPoliceandreplacethemwithneutralforceswithaviewtorestorepeaceandnormalcyintheaffectedareas.

Accordinglytheneutralforcesweredeployedinthedisputedareas.Atpresentthereare31borderoutposts,26ofthemmannedbyCRPFand5bytheAssamPolice.Therearealsoanumberof

NagalandPoliceBattalion camps established by theNagalandGovernment.Theresponsibilityoftheneutralforcesistocreateandmaintainpeaceandtoprovidesecuritytothepeople.Butevenafter theirdeploymenttheoverallsituationremainsunchanged.Violence andbloodshed continuewith no security of life andproperty. Thepeoplecontinue to live in fear and tension.Thepeople are the victims of the conflict. Sometimes the securitypersonnel themselves become the cause of people’s insecurity.Hencethepeoplequestiontheirtherole.

After theChungajan incident, anothermeetingwas heldbetweenthetwoChiefMinisterson13April1979.Itwasdecidedthat“Nonewsettlementsshouldbeallowedintheseareasnorshallanynewencroachmentbepermited.”Eventhosewhohadfledtheareaoutoffearorpanicshouldbeallowedtosettleonlyintheirformerarea.AccordingtotheagreementanyconstructionorreconstructionrequiredpermissionfromtheBorderMagistrates.TheCRPFpersonnelmakefulluseofthisclause,demandmoneyfor any construction and allow it onlywhen they are satisfied.GraduallythepeoplehavestartedreactingandmanyconflictsandclashesaretakingplacebetweentheCRPFandthepeople.Thustheneutralityoftheneutralforceshascometobequestioned.

Therehavealsobeenmanycasesof inhumanactivitiesbuttheneutralforceshavedonenothingtopreventthemorarrestthemiscreants.Someallege that theyworkhand inglovewith theinsurgentsandhelpthemtoenforcetheirdemands.Othersthinkthatthesecuritypersonsthemselvesareafraidoftheinsurgents.Whatevethecase,thepeopleinallfoursectorsfacetroublefromthe neutral forces. Many conflicts between theCRPFand thepeoplehavebeenreported.Forexample,The Sentinel reportedon9July2004that,theCRPFpersonnelwereinvolvedincollectinggundataxfromthebusinesscommunityofMerapani.TheCRPFpersonnelofUdalipatherBorderoutpostinDsectorhadtofacethewrathofmorethan500womenforconfiscatingtheir tools,


vegetables and fish.According to a news item published in‘Pratidin’of15September2004,theyhadtofacegreatoppositionfromNagawomenafterkillingaNagayoungperson.ManyatimetheCRPFunithadtobechangedaftercommittingsuchatrocities.Itisanironythatthepeoplefacethegreatestinsecurityfromthosewhoshouldprotectthem.

C) Taxation

Whilelandistheprimaryproblemthepeopleface,taxationisthemostsensitiveissueinthearea.Innormalterms‘Taxation’meanstaxpaidtoagovernment.FortheinhabitantsofthedisputedAssam-Nagalandborder,thetermbearsadifferentconnotation.Hereitmeansthepowerfulresortingtoextortionofmoney,cropsanddomesticgoods.

Inthisvasttractoflandamongthesettlersthereare‘ProtectedEncroachers’.They do not possess land documents and henceneither State government collects taxes from them. But thelandyields rich crops.As the inter-state boundarydispute stillremainstobesolved,personswithgunpowerandsupportfromtheirmilitant outfits, regularly collect taxes from theweakercommunities.Taxationintheareaexistsinanorganisedaswellasinanunorganisedmanner.Someinsurgentoutfitscollecttheminanorganisedwaywhilesomeself-styledchairmenandleadersdoitinanunorganisedway.Generallythemilitantscollectitoverafixedperiodoftimeandatafixedrate.Theothersdoitaccordingtotheirwhimsandfancies. In sectorsA,B andC, ‘Tax’ can be classified under thefollowingheads:I)LandTax,ii)HouseTax,iii)Ransom,andiv)RandomDemands.Thosewithoutagunaretheworstvictimsoftaxation,sincetheyhavetogiveintothedemandsofthosewhoownguns.Theneutralforcesaremerespectatorswhencasesoftaxationcometotheirnotice.EventheAssamgovernmentremainspassive. In spite of numerous reports in themedia theAssam

governmentignorestheirplight.Asaresultthetaxcollectorshaveahayday.

a) Land Tax: Thosewhocollectthetaxclaimthatthedisputedlandbelongstothemanddemandcrop-sharingonanannualbasis.Thenon-Nagashavetopaythemfivetotenmounds(1mound=40kg.)ofpaddyperbighaannually.Somevillageshavestartedresistingthisillegaltaxbutonlyafterhavingpaidaheavyprice.

b) house Tax:ThepowerfulclaimalsohousetaxofRs120peryearonthepleathattheyhavesettledontheirland.

c) Ransom:Thosewhoresistthesedemandsoftenpayaheavyransomtothepowerfulwhoabducttheirkithandkin.Evenwithoutresistanceabductionseemstohavebecomeasourceofeasymoney.TheminimumamountdemandedisRs50,000.Thereareinstancesofkillingthehostageswhentheransomdemandisnotmet.

d) Random Demands: Thismodeoftaxationisverycommon.Anyonehavingagunandwishingtoearneasymoneycanadoptthismodetocollectmoneyevenfromthepoor. Thus the conflict is intensified by issues of land, securityand tax. Its primary cause is thenon-existenceof apermanentdemarcatedboundary.Ifthecentralandstategovernmentsmakeaconsciousefforttobringpeaceandharmonytothearea,theycantakemeaningfulstepstoendthesepractices.Onlythencanthepeople living in thedisputed territorycanhopeforabettertomorrow.Some major incidents in the Disputed Area since 1979

Peoplelivingalongtheboundary,havebeenfacingmanytragicincidentsaroundland,securityandtaxation.Theyhavebecomeapartofdailylifenow.SomeofthemosttragicandnotableincidentshavetakenplaceinGolaghatDistrictbetween1979-1989.


(a) The Chungajan Carnage, 5th January 1979

TheAssam-NagalandBorder has beenwitnessing tensionlong beforeNagalandwas granted statehood but the situationhasdeterioratedduetotheborderdispute.MeetingsbetweenthetwoStateshavebeenheldattheCommissioner,ChiefSecretaryandChiefMinister levels.At theirmeeting atKohimaon2ndJanuary1979thetwoChiefMinistersagreedtosettletheborderproblemthroughbilateraldiscussion,tomaintainthestatusquoandtoobservethespiritoftheInterimAgreementsof1972.Thesituationwasexpected to improveafter thiscordialdiscussion.Therewasageneralexpectationthatanewchapterhadbegunwiththisagreement.Butanorganisedlargescaleattackon5thJanuary1979shatteredthedreams.

Between3.00a.m.and5.00a.m.on5thJanuary1979,severalvillageswereattackedintheDiphu,RengmaandNamborSouthReserveForests.TheattackwasconcentratedonthevillagesnearChungajanTiniali,ChungajanMikirvillageandUriamghat.Theattackersarmedwithdaos,spearsandgunskilledwhomevertheycameacrossandburnt theirhuts.Theyalsoburnt twowoodenbridges on theChungajanRengnlilpaniRoad.Official recordsreveal thatasmanyas54villagerswerekilledand39 injured.Thepoliceintheborderoutpostsweretakenbysurpriseastheattackwas planned and carried out in the early hours and justafterthemeetingbetweenthetwoChiefMinisters.Only16oftheattackerscouldbeapprehended.NoteventhePolicePatrolPartywasspared.467hutswereburntdownandabout23,500personsoftheareaanditsneighbourhoodfledforsafety.Theserefugeeswereaccommodatedin13reliefcampssetupatSarupatharandBokajan.

Afterthisincident,theaffectedareasandtheiradjoiningareaswere declared ‘DisturbedArea’ under provisions of theAssam(DisturbedAreas)Act, 1955 and theArmed Forces (SpecialPowers)Act, 1958.On 28th January, theChiefMinisters of

AssamandNagalandmetatShillongtoreviewthesituation.TheChungajancarnagewas thefirstmajorcalculatedattackby theNagasonthenon-Nagas.

(b) Armed Conflict of Merapani, 4-6 June 1985

TheChungajancarnageof1979wasfollowedbyaseriesofincidentsalongtheAssam-NagalandborderinGolaghatDistrict.Thesequenceofeventsultimatelyledtothebloodyarmedconflictof1985atMerapaniand itsadjoiningareas. It isan irony thattheconflictbeganwhenthecommissionerlevelmeetingwasinprogressatChumukedimanearDimapur in thepresenceof theCentralobserver,aJointSecretaryintheministryofHomeAffairs

On 3rd June 1985, the commissioner levelmeetingwasscheduledtobeheldatChumukedimanearDimapur.Thecentralobservercouldreachthemeetingonlyon4thJune.At5.15p.m.on that day as themeetingwas in progress, informationwasreceivedthataconflicthadbrokenoutbetweentheNagaArmedPolice(NAP)accompaniedbyarmedNagaciviliansandtheAssamPoliceintheMerapaniarea.Itsimmediatecausewastheattemptto construct a permanent check-gate building atMerapani towhichtheAssamGovernmentobjected.Buton20thApril,aNagacontractorbuiltafencearoundthecheck-gate.AresidentPowaramKachari alleged that he had encroached on his a private land.Theofficer-in-charge(OC)ofMerapaniPoliceStationrequestedthecontractortostophiswork.Whenherefusedtocomplywiththerequest,thefencingmaterialswereseizedandbroughttotheMerapaniPoliceStation.Giventheprevailingtensionthatcouldbeviewedasadiscriminatoryactanditresultedinanarmedclashbetweenthepoliceforcesofthetwosides.Thetimelyinterventionofhigherlevelofficialsfrombothsidesavertedacrisis.However,thateveningtheMerapanipolicestationwasgheraoedbyciviliansdemandingreleaseoftheseizedmaterials.

In themeantime, tensionwas building up all along the


border.PeaceinitiativesweretakentoeasethesituationsincetheCommissionerlevelmeetingwasinprogressatChumukedima.Buttheclashbeganat4.20p.m.of4thJune,withattacksonPolicePostsatVeluguri,UpperMerapaniandNaghribil.ThetensionthenspreadtoSishupaniandDigholpaniBOPs.Therewasheavyfiringbythepoliceandciviliansarmedwithsophisticatedweapons.Thefiringcontinuedthewholedayof5thJune.Finally,on6thJune1985, thefiring came to ahaltwith theunderstanding that theCommissioner,UpperAssamDivisionandIGP(Border),AssamshouldgotoChumukedimafordiscussionwiththeircounterparts.

Loss of life and propertywas high. “Ninety six villagesinvolving7,607familieswereaffectedinthedisturbancesintheMerapaniarea.12schools,16temples,3mosques,onePWDResthouse,oneForestBeatOffice,oneMagistrate’squarters,oneVeterinary Sub-Centre, 2Gaon PanchayatOffices, onePoliceStationwith5quarters,oneForestcheckgate,5Bops,onericemill,onekeroseneoildepot,238shopsorsheds,oneBank and twoPWDbridgeswere destroyed. 4,386heads ofcattlewereeitherkilledorstolen.Threetrucks,onejeepandonepolicevanweredamaged.Twentyeightpolicepersonnelandthirteencivilianslost their livesand89policepersonneland12 civilianswere injuredduring the incident.Unofficialsourcesstatethatthelossoflifeandpropertyandthecasualtynumbersweremuchhigher.

Theaffectedpeoplewereshelteredin46reliefcampsopenedindifferentpartsofGolaghatDistrict.Initially32,229peoplewereaccommodated.ThearmedconflictofMerapanihasgonedowninhistoryasanexampleofbitterhostilitybetweenthetwootherwisefriendlypeoples.Thememoryofthosefatefuldayscontinuestohaunt thepeople.The tensioncontinuesandpeacehasbecomeelusive.

(C) The Massacre of Rajapukhuri, 7th April 1989

TheMerapaniarmedconflictwasfollowedbythe7thApril

1989 killings ofRajapukhuri village under Sarupathar P.S. insectorBofDhansirisub-divisioninGolaghatdistrict.ThethreevillagesareinhabitedbytheAdivasisandtheMuslimsofHokai,avillageestablishedbyoneHokaiSema,adjacenttoRajapukhuriNo.3.TensionhadbeenbuildingupintheareaasHokaiSemahadbeendemandingthewithdrawaloftheMuslimfamiliesfromthevillagesforfourtofiveyearsbefore1989.Astimepassed,itbecamealandissueandonthefatefulnightof7thApril1989,anattackwascarriedoutinthethreevillagesofRajapukhuri.Houseswereburnt,domesticanimalswerekilled,men,womenandchildrenwerebrutallyslaughtered!ThesleepingfolkofRajapukhuriweretaken by surprise.On the following day, the non-Nagas burntdownHokaivillageandkilledmanyNagas.TheretaliationwouldhavebeengreaterbutforthetimelyinterventionofFr.MathewChanikuzhy,ParishPriestofLachitgaonCatholicChurch.

Accordingtoofficialrecords, thedeathtollwas25with15injuredand178housesburntdown.Unofficial sourcesspeakofamuchhighertoll.Thecommonpeoplestillcomplainthatthekillings could have been prevented, had theAdministration ofAssamtakenprecautionarymeasures.Theyalsoquestiontheroleoftheneutralforcesbecausetheydonotseemtohaverespondedtothesituation.TheBOPsarelocatedclosetoRajapukhuriwherethekillingstookplacebuttheydidnotcometostopthem.Thisisatypicalexampleofanincidentduetothelanddisputealongtheborder.Suchincidentshavebeentakingplaceinthearearegularlybuttheoutsideworlddoesnothearaboutthem.

(d) Daldali Land Dispute, 1996

Daldaliisasmallnon-NagavillagesituatedinSector‘D’underMerapaniPSofGolaghatDistrict.Formaintaininglawandorder,thevillageisplacedunderChandanpurBOP.Approximately30Adivasifamiliesliveinthevillageestablishedintheearly1970sclosetotheNagahills.Thelandisveryfertileandthatseemstohaveattractedtheattentionofthesettlersinitsneighbourhood.


Becauseof it there has beenongoing tensionbetween the twocommunitiesbuttheAssamgovernmentdoesnotseemtohavetakenanystepstoprotectthepeople.On28thMay1996,AlexiusLakrawhowasleadingthepeopleintheirefforttosavetheirlandwasbrutallymurderedbysomearmedassailants.Thepeopleofthevillagefearingmoresuchattacks,leftbehindaround250bighasoflandandpropertyandaskedthePostCommandantofSarupaniBOPtoprovidethemsecurity.Asaresult,Chandailpuroutpostwasestablished.

A publicmeetingwas organised in the presence of theDeputy commissioners andBorderMagistrates ofGolaghatandWokhadistricts tobringabout anamicable solution to thedispute. Itwas decided that the land ofDaldali villagewouldremain seizeduntil the problemwas solved.As a resultmanylosttheirlandandwerelefthomeless.However,intheirabsencesome encroachers constructed a permanent structure adjacentto the Chandanpur outpost. To aggravate the situation theresidentshavebeenreceivingregularransomnotes.Theroleoftheneutral forces isbeingquestionedonceagainon this issue.Alsothelocalunitof the‘AllAdivasiStudents’AssociationofAssam’(AASAA)gotinvolvedintheissue.Amongotherstheymade itmandatory for the people to give up alcoholic drinksand banned giving their land to others.Also the commandantof Chandanpur outpost encouraged them in their endeavourbutthingstookanegativeturnwhenaninhabitantofBinaypurvillage was beaten up byAASAA activists for allegedlyassisting the land grabbers under the influence of liquor.Helodged a complaint at theChandanpur outpost resulting in thearrestofthePresidentandSecretaryoftheStudentBodyofthearea.Theywereallegedlytorturedinthecamp.

ThisturnofthingsdilutedtheeffortofthepeopleofDaldalitoprotecttheirland.TheyfeltthatthebloodAlexiusLakrahadshedforthiscause,thetortureofthestudentleadersandtheeffortof the localMahilaSamitiwere futile.Theyhave till date lost

over250bighasoftheirlandandtheAssamgovernmenthasnothelpedthemtoprotectit.TheAssamadministrationhasbeenasilentspectator.ThepublicoftheentireDoyangregion(SectorD)allegethattheneutralforcestoohavebecomesilentspectators

c) The Seed Farm Dispute

Thecontroversial‘SeedFarm’atVelururiisoneofthemostburningproblemsintheBorderdispute.Itoccupiesheadlineseverynowandthenintheprintmediabecauseofitsexceptionalnature.Of equal importance is the historyof the ‘SeedFarm’ and theemergenceofthedisputearerecordedinthemindsofthepeopleascentraltotheconflict.OnedoesnothavetorepeatwhathasalreadybeensaidearlierotherthantosaythatSriSoneswarBora,formerAgricultureMinisterintheJanataMinistryofthe1970shaswrittenoneversioninhisbook,Doyangor Hriday(HeartofDoyang).Ithasattainedimportanceaftertheclashesof1985andhasthusbecomeasymbolofthedispute.IthasattainedimportancealsobecauseinJune-July1973,theAssamGovernmentcarriedoutamassevictiondriveintheDoyangReservedForest.Theseedfarmbeganafterit.Thusitssymbolicvalueisimportantforthedispute.Itcontinuestobeacentreofattention.Thepeoplefearthatthisfarmmaybecomethecauseofanotherbloodyconflict.

d) Incidents related to Security

ThesituationalongtheAssam-Nagalandborderisalsoaffectedbylackoftrustbetweenthesecurityforcesandthepeopleandbydistrustbetweenthecommunities.Peopleonbothsidesfeelthatthesecurityforcesarenotneutralandareinvolvedintaxcollectionandharassmentofthelocalvillagers.Whenpersonsfromonesideareharassed, they feel that the security forces favour theotherwheninrealitytheymaybedoingthesametoboth.

The people report one such incident that took place undertheChandanpurBOPinGolaghatDistrictandwaspublicisedin


theprintmediainMay1996.Chandanpurvillage,situatedabout18kilometresfromMerapaniisinhabitedbyAdivasisandBodoKacharis.Asmentionedaboveon29May1996SriAlexiusLakraofDaldalivillagewaskilledinconnectionwiththelandissue.ThepeopleallegethattheCRPFofChandanpurandSarupaniBOPstooknostepstoaddresstheissueandthattheyprotectedthekillers.Thereactionofthepeopleandthelaterarrestofthepresidentandsecretaryofthestudentbodyhavealreadybeenreportedabove.Theyaddthatwhenabout200MahilaSamitimembersrequestedthepostcommandanttoreleasethem,theCRPFmisbehavedwiththemandthreatenedtotakeactionagainstthem.Asaresult,thenegotiationsturnedintoheatedexchangeofwords.IntheprocessaCRPFjawankickedaMahilaSamitimember.Thewomenbeathimupanddemandedanapologyfromhim.Fortunately,thejawanapologised and the student leaderswere released.That endedimmediateconfrontation.

Ofequalimportanceisthemoneythatthepeoplehavetopaytothesecurityforcestoconstructhouses.Thepeopleallegethattheneutralforcesdemandfromthemfreelabourandfoodarticlessuch as vegetables, chickens andgoats. “CRPFofficials askedpardon”weretheheadlinesinDainik Janambhumiof5thAugust,2000.According to the reportHridayKarmakar, a resident ofMilanpurunderSarupaniCRPFcamphadgotverbalpermissionfromthepostCommandanttobuildahouse.Afterhebegantobuildit,thepostcommandantwastransferred.Thenewcommandantwhowasbeingpostedthereforthesecondtime,summonedallthosewhowerebuildingnewhouses.AllturnedupexceptHridayKarmakar.Hewastherefore told tocometo thecampwiththevillageheadman.Whenhewentthenextdayhewasgivenadao(knife)andtoldtomakeasittingplacefortheminthecamp.Ashewasnotwillingtogivefreelabour,theCRPFpersonneltied

himupandkepthimunder the scorchingheat for a long timeandforcedhimtodothatworkafterit.Throughawrittennoticehewasthenorderedtodemolishhishousewithinthreedays.Hechallengedtheorderandcontinuedtheconstructionwork.Hridayunderstoodthat theCommandantwantedRs1,500, theamountwhichtheothershadgivenhimbutherefusedtopayit.InsteadhegotthepermissionfromtheBorderMagistrate,hadthepapercountersignedbytheSectorcommandantandgiventotheGaonBurahtobesubmittedinthecamp.

TheCommandantseemstohavefelthumiliatedso3jawansweresenttoHriday’shousearound3a.m.Theyaskedhimtoreportto thecampbutherefused.Afteramessagewasflashedtothecampthecommandantcamewithmorejawansandsurroundedthehouse.Hridayhadinthemeantimelockedhimselfinaroom.Hiswifeand2daughtershadgonetomeettheDeputyCommissioneratGolaghat.The jawans brokedown the house and forcefullyopenedthedooroftheroom.Hridaytookaspeartoattackthembutdecidedtosurrender.BeforetakinghimtothecampthejawanstookawayRs3,500fromhishouse,collectedthespearandknivesand reportedat theMerapani thana thathehad attacked themwhilepatrolling.Whenhereturnedfromthecamphewassoakedinblood.TheCommandantcalledameetingoftheGaonBurahsandaccusedhimofattackingtheCRPF.AtthemeetingitwasdecidedthatHridayshouldconstructaDurgaMandiratMilanpuraspunishmentforhisdisobedienceandattackingthejawans.

However,onthefollowingdaytheDCGolaghatvisitedthespottogetherwiththebordermagistrateandadoctor,foundHridayinaseriousphysicalconditionandgothimadmittedattheGolaghatCivilHospital.AtapeacemeetingthatfollowedthepublicaccusedthejawansofbarbaricactsafterwhichtheDeputyCommandantapologisedontheirbehalf.Hridayalsoclaimsthatapartfromhisrefusal to pay themmoney, another reason for ill treatinghim


wasthatthePostCommandantwantedhisdaughtertoteachthemAssameseinthecamp.Theyrefusedtogosincetheysuspectedulteriormotives.

AnothercaseconcernsthedeathofJiwanBarawhohailedfromNo.1AmgurivillageunderSarupatharP.S.inDhansirisubdivisionofGolaghatDistrict,1kmfromthecampof3rdAPBN,postedatM.VChungajan.TheAPBNcampis thegatewaytoAmguriVillage.JiwanBarawasatalentedfootballplayerandaregularmemberofthevillagefootballteam.On14thSeptember,2003,thevillage teamthatwonthefinalsofafootball tournamentatLahorijannearDimapurwasreturningtoAmguriamidstjubilation.Thatdaycoincidedwiththe‘RaisingDay’ofthe3rdAPBNandtheM.V.Chungajancampwasinafestivemood.ThevictoriousAmguriteamarrivedattheM.V.Chungajancampgatearound7.00p.m.ThejawanswhoweredrunkaskedtheteamnottoproceedtoAmguri.JiwanBarawhohadgoneahead,hearingthecommotionnearthegaterushedbacktoseewhatthematterwas.Thesituationhadgonebeyondcontrolandsomeofteammemberswereallegedlytakentothecampandbeatenup.Theagitatedcrowdtriedtoenterthecampandthejawansopenedfire.JiwanBarareceivedbulletinjuriesandsuccumbedimmediatelytothem.Afewotherstoowereinjured.Theagitatedmobdecidedtoburndownthecampbutfortunatelysomeothersdissuadedthemfromdoingit.

Thisincidentlikemanyothersraisesquestionsabouttheneutralstandingandbehaviourofthisforce,sodoesthereportinPratidinof18thMarch2004,thattheCRPFJawanscommittedthefton16thMarch,2004,atDavidpur.Whilepatrollingthevillagethejawansfoundanewlyconstructedhousewhichtheyinspectedandenquiredaboutitsowner.Thewomanofthehousesaidthatshewastheowner.Atthisstagethejawansarereportedtohavefelthurt,openedthehouseforcefullyanddemandedthatthefishthatwasinthehousebegiventothem.Inthiscasethepeopleplannedto attack the campbutweredissuaded fromdoing so. Instead,when the jawans returnedafterpatrolling the area, around400womensurroundedthem,accusedthemoftheftandconfiscated

thefish,vegetables,knivesandanaxetheyhadallegedlystolen.Theargumentcontinuedfrom10.00a.m.to3.00p.m.Ajawanwhotriedtoresistwasinjured.TheincidentendedwhenthePostCommandantcameandapologisedandalsotoldthemthattheyneedednopermissiontoconstructhousesbutwouldonlyneedtoinformthePostCommadantthroughtheGaonBurah.

AnothercrimeattributedtotheCRPFjawansstationedintheMerapaniareaisthedeathofaNagayoungmanon13thSeptember,2004.AccordingtoanewsiteminThe Sentinel of14thand16thSeptember2004,theCRPFpatrolshotattwomotorcycleborneNagayoungmenwhen theydidnotheedasignal tostop.Thepillion-riderwasseriouslyinjuredanddiedonthespot.Thenextday,theNagawomenoftheareacameoutinbignumberstoprotestagainstit.Theyshoutedslogans,brokeopenthegate,burntthebamboofencingofthecampanddemandedthatthebodybeburiedinfrontofthe61CRPFcampsinceitistheircustomtoburyapersonwherehediesinanaccident.Theythreatenedtoattackthecampagainifnotgivenpermission.TheGolaghatadministrationthathadtakenchargeofthedeadbodydelayedhandingitoverbecausetheywantedtoburytheyoungmaninfrontofthecamp.Thatalsocaused tensionbetween theNagasand theAssameseresidingintheMerapaniareawhothoughtthatitwasnotpropertoburythebodynearthecampanddemonstratedagainstit.LateratapeacemeetingbetweentheNagasandAssameseitwasagreedthatthebodywouldbeburiedintheareawheretheNagasareamajority.

These andother incidents, someof themmajor andothersminor,showwhataconflictcanleadto.Thesecurityforcesaresenttoprotectthembuttheycanbecomeathreattothepeople.Whateverthecase,itisclearthatthereislackoftrustbetweenthepeopleandtheneutralforce.Theyfeelthattheyusetheagreementonpriorpermissiontobuildhousestomakemoney.TheMahilaSamitihasthereforebeendemandingagenuinelyneutralforcein


thearea.Italsoshowstheeasewithwhichanincidentcantakeacommunalturn.Inthelastcase,forexample,theNagawomenreactedtothemurderofayoungmanbutitturnedintoaNaga-Assameseconflict.The latter thought that theNagaswhoweretryingtoadheretotheircustomwereusingtheincidenttotakecontrolofsomelandintheareawheretheyareaminority.Theseandotherincidentsshowthelackoftrustononesidebetweenthepeopleandwhataresupposedtobeneutralforceandontheotherbetweenthecommunities.Becauseoflackoftrustaminorincidentcanturnintoamajorconflagration.Lackoftrusthastobedealtwithforpeacetoreturn.Focustodayisontheterritoryandonlawandorder.Thepeoplemaybeignoredintheprocessandthesecurityforcescancausemoreinsecurity.Intheprocess,distrustbetweenthepeoplecangrow.

Chief Minister Level Meetings, Inquiry Commissions and Agreements

Sincetheearly1970saseriesofmeetingsatdifferentlevelshavetakenplacetosolvethelongstandingborderdispute.TheCentre has appointed inquiry commissions and a number ofagreementshavebeen signedbetweenAssamandNagaland tobring about a lasting solution but there has been no result tilltoday.In1972,fourInterimAgreementsweresignedbetweentheGovernmentsofAssamandNagaland,throughthemediationofShriKVKSundaramoftheonemancommissionontheAssam-NagalandborderproblemandAdviserintheMinistryofHomeAffairs.TheroleoftheCommissionwasto:

Ascertain the facts regarding theAssam-Nagalandboundaryandtheneedforanyadjustment,havingregardtoallthefactsofthesituationincludingtheprovisionsofsection3ofthestateofNagalandAct,1962.HewillconsulttheChiefMinistersofthetwoStateGovernmentsandsuchotherpersonsasheconsidersnecessary.Hewilltrytobringaboutanagreedsolutionlikelytopromote

thewelfareandinterestofthepeopleoftheStatesandtocreatefaithandgoodwillbetweenthem.Hewillalsoputforwardsuggestionsifnecessary,tomaintainpeaceandtranquilityintheborderareaspendinghisfinaladvice.

Having toured the border area on both sides and afterconsultinggovernmentrepresentativesandpeopleofdifferentwalksoflifeofbothstates,ShriKVKSundaramsubmittedhisReportin1976.

Thenfollowedletter325-PMO/79(40-42)of25thJanuary,1979fromtheprimeministertotheChiefMinisterofNagaland,inthewakeoftheChungajancarnageof5thJanuary1979.TheprimeministeraskedtheCMtoadoptmeasurestochecksuchincidentsinthefuture.

Then came themeetingbetween the two chiefministers atShillong to review thesituationafter theChungajankillingsof5th January 1979.The twoChiefMinisters agreed to intensifytheefforts to restorenormalcy in theaffectedareas,apprehendthemiscreants andmaintain the status quo.Then followed themeetingbetweentheHomeMinistersofIndiawiththeGovernors,chiefministersofthetwoStatesinDelhion28thJanuary1979.They sought towork out a permanent solution to the issue ofthelingeringAssam-Nagalandborderproblem.AfterthearmedconflictofMerapanion4-6June1985,on24thJuneameetingwas held at theKohimaRaj Bhavan between the two chiefministers.On21stAugusttheCentreappointedtheone-manB.C.MathurCommissionbuton11thNovemberdroppedhimfromtheCommissionwithoutassigningareasonandappointedR.K.Shastriinhisplace.TheShastricommissionofinquirysubmitteditsreportin1987.

Interactions

Thepresentresearchstudywasundertakeninverysensitiveareaswheretheconflicthadtakenplace.Ithastouchedthehearts


andmindsofthepeople.Theterritorialconflicthasaffectedeveryindividualoftheinter-stateborderarea.

Initially,thepeopleofeithersidelookedwithsuspicion.TheyhesitatedtoopentheirmouthandevensuspectedtheresearcherstobeGovernmentagents.However,ourvividexplanationoftheworkclearedthedoubtsfromtheirminds.Visits,meetingsandinteractionsgraduallyresultedinaseriesofactivitiesundertakeninthecontextoftheage-oldconflictwhichhasbeentormentingthem.Someoftheactivitiestakenupbythenon-Nagascanbesummarisedasfollows:

(a) Meeting with village leaders

Thepresent researchersmade it apoint tomeet thevillageheadmen, secretaries and elders after entering a village.After hearing about the purpose of the visit theywere veryaccommodative.The preliminarymeetings paved theway forthemeetingstofollow.Theleaderseagerlylistenedtowhattheresearchershadtosayandparticipatedactivelyinthediscussion.Theynarratedtheirtalesofhardshipandtragedywhichweretheoutcomeoftheage-oldborderdispute.

(b) Village and Circlewise meetings

Having interactedwith the present researchers, the villageleaders felt it necessary to discuss the impact of theAssam-Nagalandterritorialdisputewiththerestofthevillage.Asaresult,theyorganisedmeetingscirclewise.Thegeneralpublicwasmadeawareof theprevailingsituationalong theborder.Thepeoplethemselvescameforwardwithsuggestionstodealwithproblemofthesensitiveborderarea.Theywereespecial1yworriedaboutland issues in thearea. Nevertheless, theyweredetermined toprotecttheirland,propertyandrightsasIndiancitizens.

(c) Meeting with Gaon Bura (Village headman’s) Association

Meetingwiththe100strongGaonBurasofGhulapaniareawasanexceptionalexperience.UndertheinitiativeofMr.LeviTuti,president

oftheGaonBuraAssociation,100headsofvillageshadgatheredatGhulapani.Determinationwaswrittenstrongontheirfacesastheyexpressedtheirviews.Themeetingprovidedmuchinformationanddata.Theyhavebeenmaintainingrecordsoffamilies,landoccupiedbyeachfamilyandimportantevents.Thevillageheadmenareablysupportedbytheirsecretariesinmaintainingrecords.

(d) Meeting with Student organisations

The role of the Student Organisations is important inmaintaining peace and tranquility along theAssam-Nagalandborder areas. StudentBodies play a vital role inmaking thepeople awareof their constitutional rights andpressurising thegovernment.Theyalsocontributetowardstheunityofthepeople.Someofthenon-NagaStudentBodiesactiveintheseareasare:TheAllAssamStudents union (AASU),AllAdivasi StudentsAssociationofAssam(AASAA),AllAssamTeaTribesStudents’Association(AATTSA),AllBodoStudents’Union(ABSU),AllAssamNepali Students’Union (AANSU).TheNagaStudentsFederation(NSF)istheleadingNagaStudentBodyactiveontheNagalandside.Inaddition,theNorthEastStudentsOrganisation(NESO)istheforumoftheStudentBodiesofNortheastIndiaactiveinmattersofAssam-Nagalandborderdispute.ItwaslearntthatthesestudentOrganisationshavebeeninstrumentalinmaintainingpeaceandharmonyamongthepeopleintheregionandpressurisingtherespectivegovernmentsintakinginitiativestofindalastingsolutiontothevexedborderissue.

(e) Meeting with Mahila Samities

ThereareanumberofWomen’sorganisationsfunctioninginthedisputedAssam-Nagalandborderareas.Oneof them is theAdivasiMahilaSmiti ofDoyang area inDSector.TheSamitiundertheleadershipofMrs.SukesiEkkahasdistinguisheditselfbyconfronting theneutural forces.TheSamiti, timeandagainstooduptotheatrocitiescommittedagainstthesimpleandpeace


lovingpeopleofthearea.Ithasespeciallysucceededinprovidingsecuritytothemenfolkfromtheharassmentoftheneutralforces.Asaresult,oflate,thesecuritypersonnelhaveputacheckontheirunjustactivitiesinthearea.

(f) Meeting with Border Coordination Committees

TheAssam-NagalandBorderCoordinationCommittee,undertheaegisoftheAllAdivasiStudents’AssociationofAssamisanewbodyformedin2004.TheCommitteewasformedtoprotectandfightfortherightsofthepeopleoftheAssam-NagalandborderareasinthedistrictsofGolaghatandKarbiAnglonginAssam.Ithasbeen,timeandagain,pressurisingtheAssamGovernmentandtheCentralgovernmenttofindapermanentsolutiontotheage-oldborderdisputebetweenAssamandNagaland.TheAssam-NagalandBorderCoordinationStudents’Union(ANBCSU)isamajorBorderCoordinationCommittee,comprises fourStudentBodiesofAssam,viz.,theAllAssamStudents’Union(AASU),AllBodoStudents’Union(ABSU),theAllAssamteatribesStudents’Association(AATTSA)andtheAllAssamNepaliStudents’Union(AANSU).The researchershad theopportunityofmeeting theleadersoftheseStudentBodieson9thJuly,2004ontheoccasionoftheir100hr.hungerstrikeatGolaghatagainstthebarbariclathichargebySecurityForcesonpeacefulprotestorsoftheDoyangMuktiSamitiandBrihatarTenganiUnionSangramSamition9thJune2004.

(g) Doyang Mukti Sangram Samiti and Brihatar Tengani union Sangram Samiti

DoyangMuktiSangramSamitiandBrihatarTenganiUnionSangramSamiti are the two organisations from theDoyangRegioninDsector.Theyarerevolutionaryinnatureandwereformedwith a view to protect the rights of the poor farmingcommunity of theDoyang and Tengani region. They cameintofocusin2004whenthisledthegeneralpublicofDoyang

andTcngani to demonstrate atGolaghat to press theAssamgovernment to protect their land fromNaga encroachers anddemandpattas.

Theresearchershadtheopportunitytointeractwiththeleadersofthetwoorganisationson9thJune2004duringtheirmassrallyatGolaghat.Fromtheinteractionitwasevidentthatfear,tensionsanduncertaintyprevailinpeople’sminds.Anydevelopmentintheareaisviewedwithsuspicion.Themassresponseofthepeoplespeaksvolumes to this effect.On the other hand, the unjustified lathichargeanduseofteargasonpeacefulprotestorsbytheGolaghatAdministrationwasinstrumentalincreatingabitterrelationshipbetweentheAdministrationandtheOrganisation.

(h) Dispur and Delhi Chalo Programmes

TheDelhiChaloprogrammewasundertakenbytheAssam-NagalandBorderCoordinationCommitteeundertheleadershipofAASAAon13thDecember2004.Ontheotherhand,theDoyangMuktiSangramSamitiandtheBrihatarTenganiUnionSangramSamitihadtakenupaDispurChaloprogramon3rdMarch,2005.Itconcludedon19thMarchatMerapani. Thesemovements havegonedown in history as strugglesofthepeopleofDoyangandTenganiregiontoprotecttheirlandandrights.Inaddition,anumberoflocalprogrammeshavebeenorganisedattheinitiativeofthepeoplethemselves.(i) Dharnas, Processions and Submission of Memoranda Aseriesofprogrammeshavebeentakenupinconnectionwiththelong-standingborderdisputetopressurisetheStateandCentralGovernmentsduring2004bythepeopleoftheAssam-NagalandborderareasincollaborationwiththepeopleofGolaghatandKarbiAnglongdistricts.Differentpoliticalpartiesjoinedthem.SomeofthenotableprogrammesunderakenwerethemassrallyorganisedbytheDoyangMuktiSangramSamitiandtheBrihatarTenganiUnionSangramSamition9thJune2004atGolaghat,100hr.hunger


strike by theAssam-NagalandBorderCoordination Students’Union (ANBSCU) starting on 12th July, 2004.,memorandumsubmittedbyAssam-NagalandBordercoordinationCommitteeon13thDecember,2004tothePrimeMinisterandtheHomeMinisteranddharnabytheDoyangSurakshaMancha(DSM)on12thJuly,2004.AlltheseprogrammesreceivedmasspublicsupportfromtheaffectedareasofAssam.

(j) Documentation

DuringthecourseofvisitsandinteractionsoftheresearchersitwaslearntthatthepeopleinhabitingtheAssam-Nagalandborderdonotownthelandtheyoccupyandcultivate.Itisbecausethoseareasarestillreservedforestland,notdeclaredrevenuelandeventhoughpracticallynoforestremains.Asaresult,thepeopledonothavepattasandtheycannotpaytaxestothegovernment.ThepeopleareonlyrecognisedasProtectedEncroachers.

However,theycanobtaincertaindocumentsinsupportoftheiroccupationoftheland.Theycangetthedocumentsdulysignedbycompetentmagistratesonstampedpapersasaffidavits.Inaddition,the village headmen and secretariesmaintain village registers,showingthenumberoffamilieswithmembers,amountoflandtheyoccupy,etc.Thesedocumentsaretoberenewedannually.ItwasdiscoveredthatinA,BandCsectorsthesedocumentshavebeenmaintainedproperly.ButinDsectortherecordshavetobeupdated.

Thepositivesideofthisefforthasbeenthekeendesireofthepeopleforupdatingtheirrecords.Theyhaverealisedthatthesedocumentswillbecomevital,oncetheselandsaredeclaredrevenueland.Theywillformthebasisforgettingpattasthen.TheyhavealsorealisedtheimportanceoftheforestconservationAct1980,according towhich no encroachers ofReserveForests can berecognisedasProtectedEncroacherstilltheyaredeclaredsettlers.

OnthesideoftheofNagasettlersitisevidentthatthereisaclosecoordinationbetweentheNagalandgovernment,thegeneral

publicandtheinsurgentoutfits.TheNagashavebeenfulfillingthenormsforconstructinghousesbyobtainingpermissionfrombordermagistratesofbothAssamandNagaland.Theirrecordshavebeenmaintainedwithcare. Aboveall, theNagalandGovernment isalwaysreadytoassistthemintimesofneed.UnliketheirAssamcounterpartstheyfeelmoresecurewithregardtodocumentation,Thevillageheadmenalsodeservecreditinthisregard.

Some Conclusions

As stated in the beginning, the researchers interactedwiththevillage leaders, governmentofficials, securitypersonnel andothers andchecked thedocumentation.Their records show thatthevillagesinA,B,C,andDsectorswereestablishedafter1963.LachitgaonwasthefirsttobeestablishedundertheleadershipofSansayToppo.Theothervillagesfollowedafterclearingtheforest.Initiallythe“landlords”askedforameagercontributionbutseeingtherichcroptheyraisedtheirdemand.Thatisoneofthecausesoftheconflict.TheGolaghatdistrictadministrationstates thatwiththeriseinthepopulationofthesettlersaftertheyencroachedontheforestconflictsstartedbetweentheNagasandnon-Nagas.TheyattributetheChungajanconflictsof1979,Merapani in1985andRajapukhuriin1989tothiscause.Theopinionofthegeneralpublicis conditionedby thecommunity theybelong to.Thenon-NagapublicleadersthinkthattheconflictbeganwiththeencroachmentofAssamlandbyNagaswiththehelpofNagalandgovernmentandinsurgentoutfits.

Thus,opinionsdifferbutwhatisclearisthattheinactionoftheCentreandthetwogovernmentsisatthebasisoftheconflict.Other components add to it.After everymajor incident, theGovernmenthasappointedacommission.OneortheotherStateGovernmenthasrejectedtheirreports.TheCommisionshavethusfunctionedmoreasdelayingtacticsthanasasearchforasolution.Itisimportanttodealwiththataspect.Theleaderstendedinitiallytoreflectthestandpointoftheirowncommunity.Forexample,thestudentleadersstateemphaticallythattheywillnotgiveaninch


oflandtotheotherside.Theywouldlikethepoliticalleadersofdifferentpartiestocrossthepartylineandunitedlyfightforthecause of their territorial integrity.The student leaders are alsocriticaloftheroleofneutralforcesinthisregard.

Thus,theissueseemstohavereachedadeadend.TheCentreisdraggingitsfeetandtheStatesdonotshowmuchinterestinasolution.Theleadersrepresenttheirowncommunity.TheyfeelthatthefailureofthestategovernmentstosolvetheissueamicablyhasledthemtotheSupremeCourt.Thefinalverdictisawaited.WhileNagalandoptsforanout-of-courtsettlement,Assamfavoursacourtruling.Theleadersarenotcertainthattheverdictofeitherprocesswillbeacceptedwithoutpeople’sinvolvement.Initsabsence,thecriminalelementsseemtogettheupperhand.Thepeoplefeelthatthesecurityforcesmeanttobeneutral,areinrealitypartial.Itisdifficulttocometoaconclusiononthisissue.Onecanonlysaythatcorruptionseemstoberampantamongthem.Politicalleadersexploitthesituationtotheirownadvantage.

AftermuchdiscussionmanyleaderscameroundtotheviewthattheconflictshouldnotbetreatedasaterritorialdisputebetweenAssamandNagalandandasalawandorderproblem.Manyleaderssaidthatthepeoplehavetogetpriorityandthatthetensioncanbedefusedthroughdialoguebetweenthetwocommunitiesthatcanco-existpeacefully.SincemanyofthesettlersonbothsidesareChristianstheyfeltthatthechurchescanplayaroleinbringingthemtogetherbuttheStatetooshouldinterveneinit.

Conclusion

Theconflicthasbeenlingeringandthepeoplearethesufferers.Thetwostategovernmentshavebeenaccusingeachotherwhenpeaceshouldbetheirhighestpriority.Adialogueisrequiredthatcan lead to a certain amount of give and take.There are fourInterimAgreementswhosespiritcanbeusedasthestartingpointforadialogueinwhichthechurchescanplayamajorrolebecauseamajorityof theNagasand15-20%on theAssamesesideare

Christians.Assomechurchleaderssaid,theyneedtobeginwiththefoundationthat likeeveryreligiousperson,a trueChristianhastoshunviolence.AsNakulandNriame,astudentofGauhatiUniversitysaidinalettertotheeditorofThe Sentinelon6thJuly2004,“Gunandbloodshedhasbecomeourmotto,wherehasthewordofJesusChrist“PeaceandBrotherhood”vanished?Iwonder,IfeelashamedtocallmyselfaNaga.”

Afterthisstartingpointthetwosideshavetofacetherealissuesbeginningwithlackoftrustbetweenthem.Ithasbeencreatedbypersonswithavestedinterestindivisionamongthem.Someofthemhaveapoliticalinterestandotherslikethecriminalelementshaveafinancial interest in theconflict.Thesecurityforcescandevelop a vested interest if it becomes a sourceof income forthemthroughcorruption.Amajortaskofthethefacilitatorsistobreakthisviciouscircleofcrime,corruption,criminalisationandpoliticalvotebanks.Secondly,civilsocietygroupsneedtointerveneinapositiveway.Theymaybeginwithlegalanddevelopmentalactivities.ThepeoplelivingalongtheborderaredeprivedoftheState’sdevelopmentalschemesandbasicnecessitieslikehealthfacilities, education, drinkingwater and electricity.TheStategovernmentsclaimthattheyareunabletoimplementthemdueto opposition from their counterparts.Civil society groups cancome forwardwith commondevelopmental and joint culturalprogrammes, sports activities andothers that canhelp the twocommunities,theiryouthinparticulartointeractwitheachother.Alsolegalaspectshavetobeattendedto.Amajorproblemofmostsettlersistheabsenceoflandrecords.Thatfacilitatescorruptionsincecriminalelementstakechargeandexpoitthem.Itisimportanttoputalltherecordsinorder. Peaceparleys areuseful but they require the foundationofmutualtrustandhopeofdealingwiththeissuesthatdividethepeople.Civil society groups can be instrumental in it and indialoguingwiththestudentbodies.TheymayalsofindwaysofputtingpressureontheCentreandtheSupremeCourttoexpedite



mattersbecausepeoplearepayingthepriceoftheirdelays.OncetheCentreortheSupremeCourtgivetheirdecision,itisnotcertainthatallwillacceptit.Churchandcivilsocietyleaderscanthroughpeacetalkscreateaclimateofgiveandtakethatmakesitpossibleforbothtocometoacompromise. Suchprocesses are requiredalsobecause the economiesofthese two communities are interdependent.TheNagas dependonthenon-Nagasfortheirrationsandothercommoditieswhilethenon-NagasdependontheNagasfortheirincome.Nobuyingandsellingtakesplaceifonesideisabsent.Merapanitownisanexample.After every payment ofmonthly salary,Nagas comedowntoMerapaniforshopping.ExamplesofsuchmarketswherebusinesstakesplaceareGhualapani,NakhutiandAmphainsectorB,UriamghatandBidyapurinSectorC,Ratanpur,DayalpurandSarupaniinsectorD.Thesemarketscanverywellserveasgroundsforexchangeofpeaceresources.Besides,manyNagasdependonnon-Naga labourers tocultivate their landon thebasisofdailywagesorassharecroppers.Thenon-NagasdependontheNagasfortheirfirewoodandhouseconstructionmaterials.

Thesearesomeofthemeetingpoints.Onecanmentionmanymore suchas schools like theoneofGhulapanimanagedbyanon-NagabutbothNagaandAssamesestudentsstudythere.Whatisrequiredistrustthatcanbebuiltupthroughvariousmeasures.Whiledoingit,onecannotignorethefactthatmanyhaveavestedinterestintheirdivisionandtheywillputobstaclesontheirway.Whilepushingforpeace,wayshave tobefoundofgetting thecooperationoftheseelementsorofneutralisingthem.

END NoTES

1. BhubeneswarBhattacharyya,The Troubled Border(Guwahati:995).2. Ibid,P.103. Notesubmittedby theGovernmentofAssamto theAdvisoronAssamNagalandBoundary,1,May1972.4. Bhattacharyya,op. cit.,P.11.5. Ibid,P.16

6. Devojit Phukan,Asom nagaland Sima Samashya (Golaghat : PhukonGranthaPrakashan,2001),P.28.7. Ibid, P.308. Ibid.9. Ibid,P.Introduction.10. Ibid.11. ReportoftheAdvisorShriK.V.K.SundaramonAssam-NagalandBound-ary,1976.12. Ibid.13. Bhattacharyya,op. cit.P.17.14. Phukanop. cit.,P.23.15. Ibid.16. Ibid,P.25.17. Ibid,P.2618. Ibid, P.2719. Bhattacharyya, op. cit.,P.24.20. Ibid,P.26.21. SoneswarBora,Merapani Ashanta Kiyo?P.1.22. Doyangar Hridoi(Golaghat:2004),P.11.23. The Telegraph, Northeast(16February,2004)24. The Assam Tribute(27October,2004).25. SonewarBora,Doyang (Guwahati:2October,1973),P.2.26. Ibid.27. Phukanop. cit.,P.67.28. Bhattacharyya,op. cit.,P.129. The Assam Tribune(27October,2004).30. Phukanop. cit.,P.46.31. Bhattacharyya,op. cit.,P.20.32. Ibid.,P.23.33. Ibid.,P.24.34. MinutesofthemeetingbetweenChiefMinistersofAssamandNagaland

heldon13-04-1979.35. Bhattacharyya,op.cit.,P.24.36. FactsaboutAssam-NagalandBoarder(GovernmentofAssam,July1985).37. Ibid.38. Ibid.39. Munutesofthemeetingdated28-1-1979betweentheChiefMinistersof

AssamandNagaland.40. Bhattacharyya,op.cit.,P.69.41. FactsaboutAssam-NagalandBorder(GovernmentofAssam,July1985).42. ReportoftheAdviserShriK.V.K.SundaramonAssam-NagalandBound-

Naga-Assam Dispute 53

ary.43. Phukanop.cit.,P.93.

BIBLIoGRAPhy

1. Bhattacharyya, Bhubaneswar,The Troubled Border, ShriKhagendraNarayanDuttaBaruah,Guwahati,1995.

2. Bora,Soneswar,Doyang,Golaghat,2October,1973.3. Merapani, Ashanto Kiyo?4. Doyangar Chakulu, Golaghat,6July,2004.5. Doyangar Hirdoi,Golaghat,9August,2004.6. Phukan,Devojit,Asom Nagaland Sima Samasya, Rashmi Phukon, Phukan

Grantha Prakashan, Golaghat, December 2001.7. Note submitted by the Government of Assam to Advisor on Assam-Nagaland

Boundary, 1976.8. Report of the Advisor Shri K.V.K. Sundaram on Assam-Nagaland Boundary,

1976.9. Minutes of the Meeting dated 18-1-1979 between the Chief Ministers of

Assam and Nagaland.10. Minutes of the meeting between the Chief Ministers of Assam and Nagaland

held on 13-4-1979.

RESPoNSE oF ThE youTh To ThE kARBI-kukI CoNFLICT IN kARBI

ANGLoNGJoseph Damzen

1. Introduction

AmidtheconflictsintheNortheastistheoneofKarbiAnglong.During the last tenyears therehavebeenconflictsbetweentheKarbiandKuki,PnarandDimasa.Thathasturnedthedistrictintooneofongoingconflicts.Thestudydoneonthisissueisononeofthem.ItisanefforttounderstandtheKarbi-Kukiconflictandthepossibilitiesofpeace.

The Region

KarbiAnglong,thelandoftheKarbitribeisinAssamwhichisanancientlandwitharichculturalheritageandameetinggroundofpeopleof diverse races, cultures and civilisations. Its fertileland,richnaturalandforestresources,floraandfaunaencouragedthewandering tribes, communities and groups of people tosettledownandcontributewiththeirdiverseculturesandracialbackgroundstothefusionofanewcommunity.KarbiAnglongwithitsgeographicalareaof10,332sq.km.isitsbiggestdistrictinareawithapopulationof8,12,320in2001.MostofitsinhabitantsareoftheMongoloidstockbelongingtotheKarbi,Dimasa,Garo,Khasi,Jaintia,Kuki,andRengmaNagatribes.AlsosomeAdivasi,Assamese,Bengali,Nepaliandothersinhabitthedistrict.Thusitsharesthedistinctionofbeingameltingpotforpeopleofdifferentcultures,racesandlanguages.

Thedistrictliesbetween25°30and26°41Northlatitudeandbetween72°7and93°52Eastlongitude.ItisboundbyNagaonandGolaghatdistrictstotheNorth,NorthCacharHillsdistrictto

Karbi-Kuki Conflict in Youth 55 56 Conflict Mapping in NEI

theSouth,theStateofMeghalayatotheWestandNagalandtotheEast.Itsaveragealtitudeis740mtrsMSLbuttheKopili,JamunaandtheDhansirivalleyshaveanaveragealtitudeof200mtrs.Thedistrict is rich innatural resources likeforests, limestone,coal,teaandwildlife.ThedistrictheadquartersofDiphuhasarailwaystationandgoodtransportandcommunicationsnetworkwiththerestoftheStateandregion.KarbiAnglonghasthreecivilsub-divisionsatDiphu,HamrenandBokajan.TheofficiallanguageisEnglishwhileAssamese,Karbi,BengaliandHindiaresomeofthelanguagescommonlyspokenhere.

karbi Anglong is administrated by the Autonomous District Council constitutedin1951undertheSixthScheduleoftheIndianConstitutionunderArticles 214 (2) and275 (1).The formationofKarbiAnglongin1951ledtotheimmigrationofKarbisfromotherareas.KarbisarerecognisedasaSixthScheduledHilltribewhichprovidesthemspecialprivileges,provisionforreservationandprotectionfromexploitationbyothertribesandcommunitiesbecausetheyliveinaSixthScheduleDistrict.

Tracing the Background of the Conflict For thepurposeof thestudy, it is important toknowaboutthe twomainHill tribesofKarbiAnglong thatwereparties totheKarbi-Kukiconflict.Abriefdescriptionoftheirhistoricalandculturalbackgroundmaybehelpful.

The karbis

TheKarbiswhowere formerly known asMikirs belongto theMongoloid stock and are a part of theTibeto-Burmanlinguistic group.Anthropologists place them linguisticallybetween theKuki andNaga tribes.TheKarbis inhabitKarbiAnglong,NorthCacharHills,Golaghat,Nagaon andKamrupdistricts ofAssam,Meghalaya andArunachal Pradesh.Theycame to inhabit the Northeast region before the coming

of theAhoms in the early thirteenth century. Scholars andanthropologists agree that alongwith other tribes of the samelanguagegroups, theKarbishave theirorigin inMongoliaandreached here after several centuries. BarelongTerangwritesthattheKarbisalongwithothertribesfledfromChinatoavoidpersecution from theChinese rulers.1To avoid confrontationwithhostiletribes,theyagainmovedfromMyanmartoManipurandNagaland.2 After staying inManipur for about 500yearsthey, alongwith someKuki andNaga groupsmigrated to theBarakValleyinAssamleavingtherestofthetribeslikeLotha,Ao and otherNaga andKuki groups in the hills ofNagalandandManipur.3

TheKarbis havefive clans, namely- (i) Ingti, (ii)Terang,(iii)Teron, (iv)Timung and (v) Inghi.All the clans followcomplete exogamy.Marriagewithin the same clan is strictlyprohibited.Theydonotpractisepolygamy.Marriageofamalewith hismaternal uncle’s daughter is preferred.The familystructure ispatriarchal and the lineofdecent is traced throughthemaledescendants.

Traditionally they are an agricultural tribe practising Jhumorslashandburncultivation.Theyprefertoliveonthehilltopslike the other hill tribes of the region. Karbi villages arescatteredanddistantfromoneanother.Theirmenareskilledinbamboo, cane andwoodcraft.Women are goodweavers.Thetraditionalhandloomsystemofattaching the loomto thewaistoftheweaverissimilartotheKukiandNagahandloomsystem.

Though the spreadofChristianity in the early 20th centurycontributed greatly to the spread ofmodern education andtheir change of outlook, a vastmajority of theKarbis stillfollow their traditional beliefs and religion.Rites and ritualslikeChomangkan (a socio-religious ceremony) arewoven intotheir social system.One of theirmajor festivals,Rongker iscelebrated annually in the villages on a community basis to


appease the territorial deity for thewelfare of the village andtoward off diseases and natural calamities.HachaKekan isperformedaftertheharvestofpaddywherepeopleprayfortheprotectionofcropsfrompests.

The kukis

TheKukis, aScheduleHill tribe, belong to theMongoloidstockandtheTibeto-Burmanlinguisticgroup.Kukiisagenerictermforalargenumberofsub-tribesandclansthatarecloselyallied.Dr.ThangkhomangS.Gangterefersto20tribesorclansoftheKuki-Chin-MizolinguisticgrouprecognizedasScheduledTribesinManipurasKuki.TheyareAimol,Anal,Chiru,Chothe,Gangte,Hmar,Koirao,Koireng,Kom,Lamkang,Moyon,Mizo,Paite,Purum,Ralte,Simte,Sukte,Thadou,VaipheandZou.TheyarebelievedtohaveoriginatedinChinafromwheretheywenttoTibet before reachingMyanmar. Today they inhabitmanystretches fromNagaland,NorthCacharHills,KarbiAnglongandManipurinIndiatoChittagongHillTractsofBangladeshandsomepartsofMyanmar.AccordingtoMs.NazmeenAnarntheirmigration intoKarbiAnglong in the erstwhile SibsagardistricttookplaceaftertheKukiRebellionof1917-19.InKarbiAnglongonegroupinhabitssomepocketsofHamrensubdivisionandasecondoneinhabitstheSinghason-KhanbomonHillrangeofDiphusub-division.

Intheirtraditionmarriagewithintheclanisneitherprohibitednorencouraged.Sotheydonotfollowcompleteexogamybutpreferthemarriageofamanwiththematernaluncle’sdaughter.Theytoodonotpractisepolygamyandtheyhaveatraditionalsystemofbridepriceorman. Thefamilystructureispatriarchalasthelineofdescentistracedthroughtheman.LiketheKarbitheytooareJhum cultivatorsandprefertosettledownonhilltops.Theirvillagesareaclusterofhousesbuiltclosetoeachotherasprotectionfromalienraiders.AmajorityofthemhaveconvertedtoChristianitybuttheyadheretomostoftheirtraditions,culture,lawsandhabits,

ritesandritualssuchasbridepriceorMan, Chang-ai, Sa-ai, Chon, etc.TheirmostimportantfestivalisChavang Kut,celebratedaftertheharvesttoglorifyandthankthesupremebeingPanthein forblessingthemwithprosperityandpeace.

Circumstances leading to the karbi-kuki conflict

The two tribes have similarities in their origin, culture,traditionsandwayoflife.Theconflictthattookplacewasaresultofcertaineventsthatchangedtheiroutlookabouteachotherandledtheconflictingpartiestodevelopcertainattitudesandperceptions.Onecanmentionthefollowingasthemaineventsthatledtoit:

i) kuki Migration

Asmentioned above theKukis inhabit some areas underHamrensub-divisionandtheSinghason-KhanbomonhillrangesunderDiphusub-division.Accordingtothe1961census,2,914persons returnedKuki as theirmother tongue.By 1991 theirnumber reached 21,883.Their number according to the 2001censusisnotknownbuttheKukiInpi,theapexbodyofthetribeclaimsthataccordingtoitsinternalcensus,theyareabout35,000inKarbiAnglongatpresent.ThisrapidincreasehascontributedtothebeliefaboutKukiimmigration.Thesocio-politicaleventsinNagalandinthe1980saswellastheNaga-Kuki(1992-93)andtheKuki-Paite(1994-95)clashesinManipurforcedmanyofthemtolookforbetteropportunitieselsewhere.TheKarbiAnglongAutonomous Council (KAAC) then under theAutonomousStateDemandCommittee(ASDC)permittedmanyofthemtosettledownintheSinghasonandKhonbamonHills.Soitissafetobelieve that themigrationofKukisdid takeplace.ThoughsomeofthemmayhavemergedwiththeearliersettlersintheHamrensub-division,thelargergroupwassettledinSinghasonKhonbamonHills.


ii) The kRC and the ASDC (u)-kNA Mou

TheKukishavegotinvolvedinthesocio-politicaleventsofKarbiAnglong.ManyofthemhavebeenpartofthemovementforautonomousstatehoodforKarbiAnglongandNCHills.DuringtheASDCruleintheKAAC,ApaoHangsing,aKukipartymemberwasappointedtheChairmanoftheMinorityBoardofthedistrict.P.Lhouvhum,anotherKukipartymemberwasnominatedtothecounciltorepresentthemintheKAAC.AftertheemergenceoftheKukiNationalAssembly(KNA)inKarbiAnglongmanyofthemthoughtthataKukiRegionalCouncil(KRC)withinKarbiAnglongwouldenablethemtopreservetheiridentityanddevelop.TheKNAfirstraisedthedemandforaKRCin1992throughaMemorandumtotheStateGovernment.ItlaterhadtworoundsofnegotiationswiththeStateGovernmentin1998and1999.

TheASDCsplitin2000duetofactionalism.BothfactionstriedtoretainthenameofASDC.ThefactionledbyDr.JayantaRongpialignedwiththeCPI(ML)andwasrenamedASDC(Progressive)whilethefactionledbyHoliramTerangwasnamedASDC(United).In2004,duetotherulingoftheElectionCommission,ASDC(P)hadtorenameitselfCPI(ML).ASDC(U)waspermittedtoretainthenameofASDC.In2001theASDCsignedaMemorandumofUnderstanding (MOU)with the leadersof theKNA.Themostimportantamongitsfourpoints is therecognitionof theKukisasatradionalallyintheAutonomousStatehoodmovementandthattheASDC(U)wouldrecommendtheAutonomousRegionalCouncilundertheSixthSchedule.

iii. Emergence of karbi and kuki Extremist Groups

Asmentionedearlier,KarbiAnglonghasbeen struggling toachievestatehood.SeeingthelukewarmresponsefromtheStateandCentralGovernmentsandthefailureoftheprocesses,somegroupsdecidedtousearmedstruggleasameanstoachievetheirgoal.Twosuchgroups,theKarbiPeople’sForce(KPF)andtheKarbiNational

Volunteers(KNV)formedaUnitedFronton21stMay1999andnamedittheUnitedPeoples’DemocraticSolidarity(UPDS).TheUPDSsought to realise thedreamofa separate self-determinedinstitutionor independentKarbiAnglongandNCHillsandalsoaimedtoacceleratethesocio-culturalandeconomicupliftmentofthepeopleofthetwodistricts.TheUPDSlatersplitduetodisagreementoverwhethertoholdnegotiationswiththeCentreornot.OnefactionagreedtohavenegotiationswhiletheotherfactionledbyH.E.Kathardecidedtostayaway.TheH.E.KatharfactionofUPDShasbeenrenamedastheKLNLF.

TheKukiRevolutionaryArmy(KRA)wassimilarlyformedinManipurwiththeaimofusingarmedstruggleasameansofachieving a separate homeland for theKuki andwork for thesocio-cultural,politicalandeconomicupliftmentofitspeople.TheKRA(KarbiAnglongUnit)wasformedin2000-01.

Tension grewbetweenKLNLF andKRA since bothwereoperating in theSinghason-KhonbamonHills and theydid notconfineextortionortaxcollectiontotheirowncommunity.Manyminor skirmishes took place between the two groups and attimesinnocentvillagersbecamevictims.AnotherreasonforthetensionbetweenthemwastheUPDSbanonjhumcultivationintheSinghasonKhonbamonHillsonthegroundsthatitresultedinecologicaldamage.BoththecommunitiesfollowthismethodofcultivationbuttheKukifarmershadstartedgrowinggingeronalargescaleandweredevelopingeconomically.

The effects of the karbi-kuki conflict

Becauseof theKarbi-Kukiconflict,hundredsofpersonsofbothsideswerekilled,countlesspeoplewereinjuredandmanyvillagerswerereportedmissingaftertheattacks.Severalvillagesofboththecommunitiesweredestroyedcompletely.Someoftheotherdevelopmentsasaresultoftheconflictaregivenbelow.

Creation of an atmosphere of fear and mistrust


Themostimportantresultoftheconflictisafeelingofdistrustandfearof“theothertribe”.ItwasimpossibleforthevillagersofSinghasonandinitsneighbourhoodtocontinuetoliveinthatregion.AfewdaysafterclashesbeganbetweentheKLNLFandKRA,manyvillagersofthisareafledtheirhomesleavingtheirfieldsandotherbelongingsbehind.Theyavoidedcarefullyareaswheretheothertribewasinamajority.VillageDefencePartieswereformedinmanyvillagesandanatmosphereoffeardevelopedinthedistrict.Manyofthemfledtosaferareaswithinthedistrictand others likeNCHills.MostKuki villagers took shelter inNagalandandManipurwheresomereliefcampsweresetupforthem.Accordingtonewspaperreports,nearly2,000Kukivictimstookshelterinreliefcampsoutsidethedistrict.

Manypersonsfrombothsideshadtotakeshelterinthereliefcampsthatweresetupsoonaftertheconflictbegan.Thecampsweresetupincommunityhalls,governmentschoolsandofficebuildingsintownslikeManja,Longnit,Hidipi,Rongplimplam,Dillai,Khatkhati, Bokajan,UpperDeopani etc.TheDistrictAdministrationtookstepstoprovidehelptothevictimssoonafterthereliefcampsweresetup.Alsosocial,youth,Church,politicalandNon-GovernmentalOrganisationscameforwardtohelpthevictimsoftheconflictwhohadtakenshelterinthesecamps.Foodmaterials,medicines,clothes,blanketsandothernecessaryarticlesweredonatedby thepeopleof the areawhowerenot affecteddirectlybytheconflict.

TheStateandDistrictadministrationcalledinthearmyaftersometimeasthePolicewereunabletocontroltheactivitiesoftheKLNLFandtheKRA.TheArmyoperationswerepartlysuccessfulin bringing down the violence butwith their introduction inSinghasonandnearbyareas,therewerereportsofarmyatrocitieson thevillagers.Since theGeneralElectionswereapproachinginJune2004,mostpoliticalpartiestriedtotakeadvantageofthesituationbyblamingeachother for theiractions leading to theconflict.

TheAdministration has tried to rehabilitate the victims ofthe conflict by building houses, through grants and other aid.TheDeputyCommissioner ofKarbiAnglong has also paidcompensationtothenextofkinofthosekilledintheviolence.Asforthetwoextremistgroups,inarecentdevelopment,theKLNLFsurprisedmanypeoplebypubliclyexpressingitssupportforthedemandofaKukiRegionalCouncil.

youth organisations Active in karbi Anglong

As one of the objectives of this study is to understand theimpactoftheconflictonyouthorganisationsandtheirroleinandduringtheconflict,weshallgiveabriefdescriptionofsomeyouthorganisationsofKarbiAnglong.Weshalldiscusstheirformation,theiraimsandtheirbackground.

i) karbi Students’ Association (kSA)

TheKSAwasformedin1954toprovideaplatformfortheKarbiyouthtoworkunitedlyandupliftthestudentcommunity.In1986,thepoliticalpartyASDCwasformedundertheleadershipofDr.JayantaRongpiinordertolaunchamassmovementfortheimplementationofArticle244(A)andcreateanAutonomousstateofKarbiAnglongandNCHills.ThisledtoadivisionintheKSA.In2000,theASDCtoosplitasaresultofaclashofideologieswhenDr.RongpidecidedtoalignwiththeCPI(ML)tostrengthenthestatehoodmovement.TheASDCalignedwithKSAbutsplitagainwithonefactionbackingtheASDC(P)andtheotherbackingtheASDC(U).ThevarianceisnotintheobjectivesbutintheideologyofthefactionsoftheKSA.

ii. karbi Students’ and youth Forum (kSyF)

InMay2003,leadersofthethreefactionsoftheKSAcametogethertoformtheKarbiStudents’andYouthForum(KSYF)toprotestunitedlyagainstClause8oftheBodoTerritorialCouncilAccord that demanded theScheduledTribe (Hills) status and


privileges to theBodo settled inKarbiAnglongandNCHills.TheKSYFwasalsoaimedatbringingtheyouthfromdifferentpoliticalbackgroundstogetherunderonebannertoworkandfightfortherightsoftheyouthofKarbiAnglong.Itwasthusmeanttobeayouthorganisationwithoutanypoliticalleanings.Theyweretoworktogetherirrespectiveoftheirpoliticaldifferences.

iii. kuki Students’ organisation (kSo)

TheKukiStudents’Organisation(KSO)unitofKarbiAnglongwasformedin1995withitsofficeatManja.ItstandsfortheculturalandsocialinterestsoftheKukistudentsandisconsideredtheyouthwingoftheKNA.IthelpsinorganisingculturalprogrammesliketheannualChavangKutfestivalandinter-Kukivillagefootballcompetitionaswellascoachingclassesforweakstudents.IthasgoodlinkswiththeKSOunitsofManipur,Nagaland,Guwahati,ShillongandDelhi.

iv. united Christian youth Forum (uCyF)

Formed in 2002, theUCYF is a platform for theChristianyouthbelonging todifferent churches fromdifferent communalanddenominationalbackgroundstouniteandspreadthemessageofpeace,discussandworkoncommonproblemsandgoals.TheUCYFstartedholdingjointChristmascelebrationsfor theyouthandcommunitymembersofdifferentChristiandenominationsandorganisedtrainingandotherprogrammesforbuildingthecapacityoftheyouthinvariousfields.

v. Diphu Diocesan youth Commission (DDyC)

TheDDYCwasformedin1999,afterdissolvingtheCatholicYouthAssociation(DiphuDioceseUnit).IthasstoodasaplatformforCatholicyouthofdifferentcommunitiesandparishestocometogetherandworkforthedevelopmentofsocietyingeneralandtheyouthinparticular.TheDDYChasbeenholdingannualyouthconventionssince2000whosecentralthemeis‘peace’.Someof

thethemesintheconventionswere‘Givepeaceachance’,‘Youth:Channelsofpeace’andsoon.Apartfromtheseconventionsineachandeveryoneofitsprogramme,DDYChelpstheyouthtolearnandtalkaboutpeaceandtrainsleadersforit.SomeofthemembersofDDYChaveundergonetrainingonpeacebuildingorganisedbyNortheastRegionalYouthCommission(NERYC),CRSandHenryMartinInstitute.Thesepeace-buildingtrainershadearliergivenpeaceeducationtothestudentsofseveralhighschoolsinthedistrict.InNovember2004,themembersofthisteamofpeacebuildersmettogetherandformedapeaceclubcalledSadakos.ThemembersofSadakosresolved toworkharder towardsbringingpeaceandencouragingotheryouthnottouseviolence.

The Activities of the youth organisations during the Conflict

Duringtheconflictalltheaboveyouthorganisationsplayedamajorroleinprovidingrelieftoitsvictimswhohadtotakerefugein relief camps.They also assisted thewounded andprotestedagainst theviolence through theprintmediaandpublic rallies.Theyaskedthoseresortingtoviolencetolaydownarmsandsolvetheirdifferencesthroughtalks.On29thMarch2004,theKSYFtookoutaprotestrallyagainsttheKRA.Afterit theleadersofKSYFsubmittedaMemorandumtotheDeputyCommissionerthatincludeddemandsforpaymentofcompensationandex-gratiatothenextofkinofthevictims,adequatesecurityforpeopleintheaffectedareas,flushingouttheKRAmilitantsfromKarbiAnglongwithin15days,reliefforKarbivictimsandpunishmenttothosewhodirectlyorindirectlyencouragedviolence.

TheKSO on the other hand networkedwith theKSO ofNagaland,Manipur,Guwahati,ShillongandDelhitomobilisehelpfortheKukivictims.ItalsoplayedanactiveroleinrehabilitatingtheKukivictims.ButinApril2004,priortotheGeneralElections,theorganisationsurprisedeverybodyincludingtheKNAbycallingallmembersoftheKukicommunitytoboycotttheElections.


TheUCYFontheotherhand,expressedsolidaritywiththevictimsoftheconflictregardlessofreligionandcommunity.Itmobilisedcontributionsanddonationsfortheinmatesofreliefcampsandencouragedthepartnerorganisationstoindividuallyprovidefacilitiesandresourcesfortherehabilitationofsomeofthedisplacedpeople.Thus,togetherwithDDYCtheywereabletosupportconfidence-buildingmeasuresfortheKarbiandKukiyouthbybringingthemtogetherforprayergatheringsandyouthmeetings.Itenabledtheyouthfromboththecommunitiestomeetandinteractwitheachotherduringtheconflictandsharetheirviewswithoutfearorhesitation.Thepeaceeducationgiventothestudentsofsomehighschoolsinthedistrictcouldalsobe termedas successful as these studentsnotonlydistancedthemselvesfromtheconflictbutalsotriedtospreadthemessageofpeaceintheirownway.Theyalsomobilisedotheryouthincollectingfooditems,clothingandotherarticlesforthevictimslivinginreliefcamps.Alsootheryouthclubsandorganisationsmobilisedresourcesforthedisplacedvictmsinthecamps.

Analysis and Interpretation Thesample fordatacollection included90youngpersonsaged15to35 i.e.30eachfromamongtheKarbi,Kukiandathirdgroupconsistingofothercommunities.Agenderbalancewasmaintainedineachcommunity,soalsoabalancebetweentheurbanandruralbackgrounds.Theireducationalstatusrangedfromunder-matrictopost-graduate.9ofthe90werenotinthedistrictduring theconflictas theywerepursuing their studiesoutsidethedistrict.33oftherespondentsclaimedtobemembersofsomeyouthorganisationortheother.

The perception of the karbi-kuki conflict

Avastmajority(88%)oftherespondentsthinksthattheconflictcouldhavebeenavoided(Table 1& Figure 1).97%oftheKuki,67%oftheKarbiand100%oftherespondentsbelongingtoother

communitieswereclearthattheconflictcouldhavebeenresolvedusingnon-violentmethods.Only12%feltthatitwasneeded.

Table 1: Was the karbi-kuki conflict really necessary?(%)

Kuki Karbi OtherCommunities Total

M F M F M F

No 100 93.3 53.3 80 100 100 88

Yes 0 6.7 46.7 20 0 0 12

Whenaskedabouthowtherespondentsperceivedthenatureoftheconflict,41%replied that itwasmainlyastrugglebetweenundergroundgroups(SeeFigure 2).66.7%oftheKukiyouth,20%oftheKarbiand36.7%ofthosefromothercommunitiesbelievethattheconflictwouldnothavetakenplaceifthemilitantgroupsdidnotexist.Asmallernumber(33%)feelsthattheKarbi-Kukiconflictwasnothingbutpolitical.Thissectionof26.7%ofKukis,33.3%ofKarbisand40%oftheyouthfromtheothercommunitiesbelieved that the conflictwas a result of politics. 20%of therespondentsbelievedthatitwasastruggleforpreservationoftheidentityforboththetribes.Only6%oftherespondentsfeltthatthe

conflictwasbetweencommonpeople.

Table 2: The karbi-kuki conflict is in reality

Kuki KarbiOtherComm.Total

All figures in percentageM FMF M F Aconflictbetween 46.7 86.713.3 26.7 26.7 46.7 41 ExtremistGroups

Fig.1:Wastheconflictnecesary?

The conflict was really necessary

Yes12%

No88%


Apoliticalconflict 40 13.3 33.3 33.3 46.7 33.3 33

Aconflictofidentity 3.3 0 53.3 33.3 13.3 6.7 20

Aconf.betweenpeople 0 0 0 6.7 13.3 13.3 6

The effect of the conflict on youth

A hugemajority (71.1% -Table 3and Figure3) enjoyedfriendlyrelationshipwith theyouthofothercommunitiespriortotheconflict.66.7%ofKukis,73.3%ofKarbisand73.3%fromOtherCommunitiessaid that theyenjoyedcordialrelationshipswithotheryouth.Asmallersection(26.7%)wasmoreenthusiasticabouttheirrelationshipsandrepliedthattheywereveryfriendly.Only2%oftheKarbirespondentssaidthattheywereindifferentintheirrelationshipwiththeKukis.

Table 3: how was your relationship with people of ohtercommunities before the conflict? Kuki Karbi OtherComm.Total All figures in percentage M F M F MF Friendly 73.3 60 73.3 73.3 73.3 73.3 71

Veryfriendly 26.7 40 13.3 26.7 26.7 26.7 27 Indifferent 0 0 6.7 0 0 0 1 Nocontact 0 0 6.7 0 0 0 1

Whenaskedabouttheirinitialfeelingsonbecomingawareoftheconflict,57%saidthattheyfeltsad(Table 4andFigure 4).Thisfeelingwassharedby60%ofKukis,36.7%ofKarbisand76.7%fromothercommunities.17%oftherespondentscomposedof23.3%Kukis,20%Karbisand6.7%fromothercommunitiesexperiencedangeronhearingabouttheconflict.16%repliedthattheyexperiencedfearandonly8%feltliketakingrevengeforthelossoflivesandproperty.2%oftherespondentsclaimedtohavehadnoinitialreactiontotheconflict.

Table 4: your reaction at the start of the conflict was of- Kuki Karbi OtherComm. Total All figures in % M F M F M F Sorrow 60 60 26.7 46.7 86.7 66.7 57 Anger 40 6.7 33.3 6.6 13.3 0 17 Fear 03 3.3 13.3 26.7 0 20 16 Revengefu 0 0 26.7 20 0 0 8 Noreaction 0 0 0 0 0 13.3 2

Table 5: your relationship with people of other communities after the conflict has

Kuki Karbi OtherCommunities Total All figures in percen M F M F M F

Remainedthesame 40 26.7 33.460 53.3 33.3 41

Becomedistant 53.3 53.3 40 20 20 53.4 40


Improved 0 13.3 13.313.3 6.7 13.3 10

Changedtoenmity 6.7 6.7 13.36.7 20 0 9

Table 5andFigure 5showthat41%oftheyouthclaimedthat their relationshipshadnotchangedafter theconflict.Theyincluded33.3%oftheKuki,46.7%ofKarbiand43.3%others.Anequallybignumber(40%)saidthattheconflicthadchangedtheirwayofviewingrelationshipsandmadethemdistantfromearlierrelationships.Theyincluded53.3%ofKukis,30%ofKarbisand36.7%oftheothers.10%oftheyouthbelievedthattheyhadlearnttovaluerelationshipsasaresultoftheconflict.6.7%oftheKuki,13.3%ofKarbiand10%ofthoseofothercommunitiesfeltthattheirrelationshipswithothercommunitieshadimproved.Itissignificantthattheconflictwasabletoaffecttherelationshipsof9%oftheyouthwhoadmittedthattheyfeltinimicalagainstothercommunitiesandperceivedathreatfromthem.6.7%ofKukiyouth,10%ofKarbisand10%oftheyouthfromothercommunitiessharedthisfeeling.

Factors contributing to the conflict

Table 6andFigure 6showthat41%oftheyouthincluding53.3% of the Kuki, 23.3%Karbis amd 47.7% from othercommunitiesrecognisedthattheycouldnotsayhowthedemandforKukiRegionalCouncilcontributedtotheconflict.Anequallysignificantnumberof40%including20%ofKuki,60%ofKarbiand40%fromothercommunitiesbelievedthatthedemandhadindeed contributed to it by bringing about differences in therelationsbetweenthetwotribes.Only19%feltthatthedemanddidnotcontributetotheconflict.Thissectionwasmadeupof26.7%ofKuki,16.6%Karbiand13.3%youthfromothercommunities.

Table 6: Do you think that the demand for kuki Regional Council has contributed to the conflict-

Kuki Karbi OtherCommunitiesTotal

All figures in %. M F M F M F

Cannotsay 26.7 80 13.3 33.3 53.4 40 41

Yes 33.3 6.7 80 40 33.3 47.7 40

No 40 13.3 6.7 26.7 13.3 13.3 19

WhenaskedwhetherthedemandfortheKukiRegionalCouncilwasnecessary,66%replied in thenegative (Figure 7).Table 7showsthat49%oftherespondentsfeltthatthedemandwasnotnecessarybecauseitcouldsetabadprecedentandencouragealsoothertribestodemandsuchcouncils.Therestweredivided.SomebelievedthatthedemandwasunnecessaryastheydidnotconsiderKukisindigenousandothersfeltthatthemovecoulddividethedistrictinthenearfuture.However,34%feltthatthedemandwasnecessary.61.3%ofthembelievedthatitwasneededastheKukiareindigenous,29%feltthatbecauseofthecontributionofKukisindifferentfieldslikethestatehoodmovement,theirdemandwasnecessary.Infact,9.7%ofthissectionthoughtthatthehistoricbondsbetweenthetwotribesgavetheKukipeopletherighttodemandRegionalCouncil.

Table 7: Was the Demand for a kuki Regional Council

Necessary? Kuki Karbi OtherCom.Total All figures in % M F M F M F

No,becauseitcouldsetabad 20 33.3 26.7 33.3 26.7 53.3 33 exampleforothertribes. Yes,becausetheyareapartof 47.7 33.3 0 134 33.3 0 20.7 society.

No,becausetheyarenotapart 0 0 20 33.3 13.3 33.3 16.5 ofsociety.

No,becauseitcoulddividethe 0 13.3 53.3 20 6.7 6.7 16.5 district

Yes,becauseoftheircontri- 3.3.3 6.7 0 0 13.3 6.7 10 butionsinstatehoodmovement Yes,becauseKarbisandKuki 0 13.4 0 0 6.7 0 3.3 havehistoricbonds

WhenaskedwhethertheASDC-KNAMOUcouldhavecontributedtotheconflict,48%(66.7%ofKuki,33.3%ofKarbi,43.3%others)gavenoreply(Table 8andFigure 8).48%oftheyouth(33%Kuki,56.6%Karbiand53.3%others)saidthattheASDC-KNAMOUdid contribute to the conflict.Outof them,34.9%believedthattheMOUledtotheconflictsinceitcreatedbadbloodbetweenthetwotribes,thattheKarbisfeltitcouldsetabadexampleforothertribes.SotherejectionoftheMOUbythemledtobadrelationsbetweenthetwotribes.30.2%ofthissectionfeltthatthepropagandaunleashedbyrivalpoliticalpartiesopposingtheMOUgaverisetofeelingsofhatredagainsttheKukitribe.Only4%feltthattheconflictwasaresultofotherfactors.

Table 8: Could the ASDC-kNA have contributed to the conflict ? Kuki Karbi OtherCom. Total All figures in percentage M F M F M F

Cannotsay 73.3 9 33.3 33.3 40 47.7 48

Yes,becauseitledtobad 20 333 6.7 6.7 20 13.3 16.5 relationsbetweenthetribes Yes,becauseKarbisthought 6.7 0 33.3 20 13.3 26.7 16.5 setabadexample Yes,becauseofpropaganda 0 6.7 6.7 40 26.7 6.7 15 bypoliticalparties No,becauseofotherfactors 0 0 20 0 0 6.6 4Parties responsible for the conflict Whenaskedaboutthepartiesresponsiblefortheconflict,20%saidthattheextremistgroupsaloneshouldbeblamedforit(Figure 9).Table 9 shows that33.3%of theKukis, 13.3%eachof theKarbisandfromothercommunitiesfeltthisway.18.9%feltthatboththeextremistgroupsandthepoliticalpartiesshouldbeheldresponsibleforit.Theyincluded20%eachoftheKukiandKarbiand16.6%oftherespondentsfromothercommunities.Theyholdtheextremistgroupssolelyorjointlyresponsiblefortheconflict.theyfurtherconfirmthesentimentthattheexistenceofextremistgroups(KLNLFandKRA)wasanimportantcontributortotheconfiictandtheresultingviolence.

Table 9: Who was responsible for the karbi kuki confict?

Kuki Karbi OtherComm. Total


All figures in (%) M F M F M F

Extremistgroups 26.7 40 6.6 20 20 6.6 20

Extremistgroupsand

politicalparties 26.7 13.3 26.7 13.3 20 13.3 18.9

Commonpeople 20 6.7 40 33.3 13.3 0 18.9

Politicalparties 13.2 13.3 26.7 20 26.7 6.7 17.8

Cannotsay 6.7 20 0 6.7 6.7 66.7 17.8

Communalforces 6.7 6.7 0 6.7 13.3 6.7 6.6

Another18.9%oftherespondents(13.3%Kuki.36.6%Karbiand6.7%ofotheryouth)feltthatthecommonpeoplewhotookpartintheviolencewereresponsiblefortheconflict.Theremainingpersoneithercouldnotgiveanyreplyorblamedpoliticalpartiesorcommunalforcesfortheconflict.

Table 10 : how far were the Extremist Groups Responsible for the Conflict ? Kuki Karbi OtherCommunities Total All figures in % M F M F M F Partially 66.7 66.7 80 73.4 73.3 86.7 74 Fully 33.3 0 13.3 13.3 26.7 13.3 17 CannotSay 0 33.3 0 0 0 0 6 Notresponsible 0 0 6.7 13.3 0 0 3


Table 10showsthataverysignificantsection(74%)feelsthattheextremistgroupswerepartially responsible for theconflict.They include66.7%of theKuki,nearly77%of theKarbi and80%fromothercommunities.17%oftheyouthheldtheextremistgroupsfullyresponsiblefortheconflict.Againwhile6%oftheyouthsaidthattheycouldnotsayanythinginthisregard,3%didnotholdthemresponsibleatall.

When asked aboutwhy the respondents held extremistgroupsresponsiblefortheconflict,32%oftheyouth(SeeTable 11)saidthattheextremistgroupsgotinvolvedinordertoshowtheirsenseofresponsibilitytowardstheircommunities.Anotherequallylargesectionoftherespondentsfeltthattheextremistgroupswereinvolvedinordertoprotecttheinterestsoftheircommunity.14%oftheyouthfeltthatitwasastruggleforsupremacybetweentheKLNLFandKRAthatledthemtotheconflict.Asignificantsectionoftheyouth(10%)feltthattheyactedontheinstigationoflargerextremistgroups.Table 11: The Extremist groups responsible for the conflict because Kuki Karbi OtherCommunitiesTotalAll figures in % M F M F M FTheythinktheyareshowingresponsibilityfortheircommunity 33.3 20 40 46.7 33.3 20 32Theythinktheyareprotectingtheinterestoftheircommunity 46.7 40 20 53.3 26.7 6.7 32Ofstruggleforsupremacy 13.3 13.3 20 0 20 13.3 14

triedtoen-couratgepeace

46%

Cannotsay 6.7 0 0 0 13.3 53.3 12Theywereinstigatedbyabiggerextremistgroup 0 26.7 20 0 6.7 6.7 10

Role of District Administration during the conflict Whentherespondentswereaskedabouttheroleofthedistrictadministrationwithregardtotheconflict,amajorityofthem(67%)repliedthattheiractionswereunsatisfactory.Table 12showsthat90%oftheKukis,about77%oftheKarbisandabout37%oftherespondents fromothercommunitiesgave this response.Whileonly2%oftherespondentssaidthattheyweresatisfiedwiththeadministration’srolewithregardtotheconflict,30%oftheyouthcouldnotsayanything.

Table 12 : The Role of the District Administration with Regard to the karbi-kuki Conflict. Kuki Karbi OtherCommunities Total

All figures in % M F M F M F

Unsatisatisfactory 100 80 100 53.3 53.3 20 68

Cannotsay 0 20 0 46.7 40 73.3 30

Satisfactory 0 0 0 0 6.7 6.7 2

Response of youth and community to the conflict Table 13showsthat32%oftheyouthexperiencedfearoflossoflifeandpropertyduringtheconflict.Anothersignificantsectionstatedthattheconflictledtoachangeintheirrelationwithpeopleofothercommunities.19%oftherespondentssaidthattheyhadorwerethinkingaboutchangingtheirplaceofresidenceduetoanuncertainfuture.Anequallylargesectionofyouthcouldnotsayanything.

Table 13: As an Individual this Conflict has Led to- Kuki Karbi OtherComm. TotalAll figures in percentage M F M F M FFearoflossoflifeorproperty 33.3 40 53.3 13.3 40 13.3 32Changeinyourrelationshipwithpeopleofothercomm. 40 33.3 40 33.3 26.7 6.7 30Changeinplaceofwork,studyorresidenceduetouncertainfuture 26.7 26.7 6.72 6.7 13.3 13.3 19CannotSay 0 0 0 26.7 20 66.7 19

Whenaskedaboutthechangeatthecommunitylevelduetotheconflict,32%(Table 14)saidthat theircommunityhadlosttrustandconfidence in theothercommunities.Another section(25%)saidthattheircommunitiesweremoreunitedasaresultoftheconflictbutweredistancedfromothercommunities.23%saidthattheircommunitiesfearedfortheirsurvival.While17%


didnotsayanything,3%feltthattheircommunitiesweredividedinternallyasaresultoftheconflict.

Table 14: As A Community has This Conflict Led to Kuki Karbi OtherCom. TotalAll figures in percentage M F M F M FSuspicion/lossoftrustandconfidenceonothercomm. 53.340 20 33.3 26.7 20 32Unitywithinyourcommunitybutdivisionwithothercomm. 26.726.7 46.726.7 13.3 6.6 25Fearofsurvival 13.333.3 20 13.3 33.3 26.7 23Cannotsay 6.7 0 0 20 26.7 46.7 17Divisionwithinyourcomm. 0 0 13.36.7 0 0 3

Response of youth organisations’ to the conflict 33 respondents said that they weremembers of youthorganisations.Whenaskedaboutthereactionoftheirorganisations,46%saidthattheytriedtoencouragepeace.24%saidthattheirorganisationsmaintained contactswith other organisations andhoped to look forways toworkonmattersofpeace.Table 15andFigure 10 show that 30%of the youth claimed that theirorganisationswere able to take up peace initiatives.All therespondentsagreedthatreliefandrehabilitationworkwasapartof their peace initiatives. Some leaders of youth organisationsalso spoke about their difficulties in trying to have a dialoguebetweenthecommunities.LeadersofKarbiyouthorganisationsclaimedthatitwasdifficultbecausetheKukiyouthrepresentativeshesitatedtocomeforward.AlsotheKukiyouthorganisationswereconfusedabouthowtogoaboutworkingforpeaceespeciallytodecidewhichoftheKarbiyouthgroupstheycouldinteractwith.14%feltthatoncethepoliticalpartiesstoppedtakingadvantageofthesituationrelationswouldimprove.Only11%feltthatyouthorganisationscouldtakestepstoimproverelationsbetweenthetwotribes.Therestofthemsaidthatitwouldtakenegotiations

between theextremistgroups to improve relationsbetween thetribes.

Table 15: youth organisations’ Response to Conflict. All figures in percentage Kuki Karbi Others Total Triedtoencouragepeace 60 55 25 46 Workedforpeace 0 18 67 30 Maintainedrelationships withotherorganisations 40 27 8 24

Awareness about the Impact of the Conflicts Whenaskedabouttheimpactofconflictsondevelopment,63%(73.3%ofKuki,56.7%ofKarbiand63.3%ofothers(Table16andFigure11)believethatconflictsofthistypedoaffectdevelopmentandhamperprogressbut28%(23.3%Kukiand30%eachofKarbiandothers) felt it isnothampered, rather that itwashamperedevenbeforetheethnicconflictbyfactorssuchastheexistenceofextremistgroups,corruptionandpooradministration.9%wereundecidedandwereunabletoreply.Table 16: Do ethnic conflicts hamper development ? Kuki Karbi OtherCommunities Total

All figures in % M F M F M F

Yes 66.7 73.3 66.7 47.7 66.7 60 63

No 20 26.7 20 40 20 40 28

Cannotsay 13.3 0 13.3 13.3 13.3 0 9

how karbi-kuki Relations can Improve

Peacebasedonjusticeandmutualunderstandingwasourmainconcern.SoweaskedtherespondentshowKarbi-Kukirelationscouldimprove.37%ofthemsaidthattheycanimproveonlyiftheAdministrationworkstowardsbringingapermanentsolutiontothe


problem(Figure12).Table17showsthat66.7%ofKuki,16.7%ofKarbiand30%ofotheryouthbelievethattheAdministrationshouldtakestepsfortheimprovementofrelationsbetweenthetwotribes.28%(16.7%ofKukis,33.3%eachofKarbisandothers)believethathealingshouldtakeplaceatthecommunitylevel.

Table 17: Relation between karbis and kukis can improve when Kuki Karbi OtherComm.Total All figures in percentage M F M F M F Administratonbrings permanentsolutions 73.3 53.3 26.7 6.7 26.7 33.3 37 Peoplethemselvestake uppeaceinitiatives 6.7 26.7 13.3 53.3 20 47.7 28 Politicalpartiesstoptaking advantageofthesituation 0 6.7 47.7 13.3 20 0 14 Youthorganisations workforpeace 0 0 0 26.7 20 20 11 Extremistgroupshave negotiations 20 13.3 13.3 0 13.3 0 10Suggestions on how to Bring Peace and harmony WhentherespondentswereaskedabouttheirvisionofKarbiAnglongfive years hence, 58% said optimistically thatKarbiAnglongwillbealandofpeaceandharmony(Table 18)against27%whofeltthatthedistrictcouldfacemoreethnicclashesinthefuturewhile9%believedthatthedreamofautonomousstatehoodcanbearealitybythen.Only4%believedthatdifferentethnicgroupsinhabitingKarbiAnglongwilltrytobreakthedistrictintosmallerunits.2%feltthatthename‘KarbiAnglong’couldalsochangeinfiveyearsasthatitselfcouldbeasourceoftensioninthefutureanditschangecouldhelppeopletoviewitasalandofdifferenttribes.

Table 18 : In the Next Five years karbi Anglong May

Kuki Karbi OtherCommu. Total All figures in percent M F M F M FHavepeaceand harmony 66.773.433.366.7 53.3 53.3 58Havemoreethnic clashes 33.313.340 20 26.7 26.7 27Becomeanautonomous state 0 13.320 0 0 20 9Getdividedinto smallerparts 0 0 6.7 13.3 6.7 0 4Changeitsname 0 0 0 0 13.3 0 2

Whenaskedabouthowpeaceandharmonycouldbeachieved,24%(Table 19) replied thatbelieving inunity indiversitywasthe bestway to bring it about.Thosewho hold this view arerepresentedinsectionAinFigure 13.Theyfeltthatbeingdifferentdoesnotmeanthatpeoplecannotlivetogetherinpeace.Anotherlargesection(23%-sectionBinFigure 13),believesthateveniftherearedifferencestheycanliveinpeaceandharmonybyusingnon-violentmethods of solving problems. 21% (sectionC inFigure 13)saidthatonecanavoidconflictsbyrespectingthefactthateachtribeorcommunityhasitsownindividualneeds.20%(sectionDinFigure 13)feltthatrespectforeachother’scultureandtraditionscanpreventconflictsand14%feltthattheclimatewouldimproveoncethepoliticalpartiesstoppedtakingadvantageofthesituation.Only11%feelthatyouthorganisationscantakestepstoimproverelationsbetweenthetwotribes.Therestofthemsaidthatitwouldtakenegotiationsbetweentheextremistgroupstoimproverelationsbetweenthetribes.Anothersection(sectionEinFigure 13)feltthatawarenessofeachone’sdistinctcultureandtraditioncanresultinpeaceandharmony.

Table 19: We can have peace and harmony by-


Kuki Karbi OtherComm. Total All figures in percentage M F M F M FBelievinginunityindiversity 40 40 20 20 6.7 13.4 24Solvingdifferencesthroughnonviolence 33.3 26.7 13.3 13.3 40 13.3 23Respectingeachother’sneeds 20 26.7 20 26.7 20 13.3 21Respectingeachother’scultureandtraditions 0 0 33.4 26.7 13.3 47.7 20Learningabouteachother’scultureandtraditions 6.7 6.6 13.3 13.3 20 13.3 12

A- Believinginunityindiversity B- Solvingdifferencesthroughnon-violence C- Respectingeachothers’needs D- Respectingeachothers’cultureandtraditions E- Learningabouteachothers’cultureandtraditionsMain Findings and Suggestions So as a group the respondents feel that the conflictwasunnecessaryandavoidable.Mostfeelthatitwasbetweenextremistgroupsbutitresultedinstrainedrelationsandevenenmitybetweenthe twotribes.Severalsaid thesameaboutothers likepoliticalparties, communal forces andcommunity leaders.ThedemandfortheRegionalCouncilandtheASDC-KNAMOUwereseenasunnecessarystepsthatcontributedtotheconflict.Manyalsoclaimedthattheirorganisationshadtriedtoencouragepeaceandhadkeptupcontactswithothercommunities.Mostwerealsoawareoftheadverseeffectsofconflictssuchashamperingdevelopment.Theyaddedthattheadministrationshouldtrywithoutdelaytofindapermanentsolutiontotheproblemandthatonehastobelieveinunityanddiversityinordertomakepeacepossible.

The Do No harm (DNh) Analytical Framework

Themainfindings of the studyhavebeendescribed in theconflictresolutionformatknownastheDoNoHarmAnalyticalFramework(DNH).Suggestionsarealsomadetostrengthenlocalcapacitiesforpeaceusingthesameformat.Thisframeworkusesthe strategy to analyse howaid or developmental programmescanminimiseconflictsituationsbydevelopinglocalcapacitiesforpeace.Aidhasbeenknowntointeractwithconflictandinmanycases,itmaycontributenegativelytoconflictsthroughthetransferofresourcessuchasfood,medicalcare,medicalsuppliesortrainingandalsothroughimplicitorhiddenethicalmessages.So,theDoNoHarmFrameworkhelpstheimplementingagenciestopreventdoingharmthroughtheirreliefanddevelopmentprogrammes.

TheDoNoHarmFrameworkAnalysisiscarriedoutin6steps.Thefirstisidentificationofthepartiestotheconflict,theprocessesinvolvedinitandthecoreproblemandissuesunderlyingit.Thesecondstepistheidentificationandanalysisofdividers(factors,processes,actionsorfeelingsthatdividethetwoparties).Thethirdstepinvolvesidentificationoftheconnectors(factors,processes,actionsorfeelingscommontotheparties).Thefourthstepentailstheanalysisoftheprogrammesoftheorganisation.Thefifthstepis the analysis of the programmes’ impact on the dividers andconnectors.Thelaststepconsidersprogrammingoptions.

The Parties in the karbi-kuki Conflict

FromtheprecedingsectionsitisclearthatthemainpartiestotheconflictweretheKLNLFandtheKarbitribeontheonehand,andtheKRAandtheKukitribeontheother.Thepoliticalparties,youthorganisations,thedistrictadministration,thearmyandthepoliceweresecondaryparties.Theperceptionofeachof themain parties differs regarding the conflict. TheKarbiespeciallytheKLNLFperceptionisthattheKukiingeneralandtheKRAinparticularshouldfollowthelawofthelandandthatbeingaminority,theyshouldnothaveactedsoaggressively.The


KukiandKRAperceptionisthatitwasethniccleansingoftheircommunitybythemajoritytribe.Butbothexperiencedfearofeliminationandlossofcontroloverresourcesandproperty.

The conflict gave the political parties an opportunity toblameeachotherfortheircontributiontothesituation.Alltheoppositionparties blamed theCongress-I ruling at the state aswellasdistrictlevels,fornotdoingmuchtoreducethenumberofviolentincidents.TheCPI(ML)alsoheldtheASDCresponsiblefor the conflict because of itsAgreementwith theKNA.TheASDCretaliatedbyclaimingthatCPI(ML)President,Dr.RongpiwasresponsibleforpermittingtheKukimigrantsdisplacedfromManipurbytheKuki-PaiteandNaga-Kukiclashes,tosettledownin theSinghason-Khonbamonhills.Other political parties toousedtheconflicttogainpoliticalmileagejustbeforetheGeneralElectionsof2004.TheCongress-Iblamedboth theASDCandCPI(ML)fortheirpastforencouragingthesettlementofKukisinKarbiAnglongandthesubsequentdemandforaregionalcouncil.

ThebehaviouroftheKLNLFandtheKRAduringtheblown-outphasewasnotveryencouragingforthepeopleandorganisationsworkingforpeace.Neitherpartyresolvedtobackoutofviolence.Tillnowitisstillnotclearifthetwoundergroundgroupshavehadanynegotiationsornot,butthepresentsituationshowsthattheymayhavereachedsomesortofanunderstanding.

The process of the conflict

A reason of the conflict is that before violence broke outnomajor stepwas taken tobring theKLNLFandKRA to thenegotiatingtable.Violencebeganbecauseofthisfailureandledtolarge-scaledamageanddestruction.Theconflictresultedinthebreakdownofrelationsbetweenthetwotribes.Therewasconstantfearoflossoflifeandproperty.Manypeoplethoughtofchangingtheir placeofworkor study.Manyyouth,women, church andsocialorganisationstookoutpeace-ralliestotrytoconvincetheKLNLFandKRAtoputanendtotheviolence,instillconfidence

inpeoplethebelongingtoboththetribesandtoencouragepeopletogivepeaceachance.

Theyouthorganisationsfromboththecommunitiesattemptedwithout success to bring the youth from their respectivecommunities for talks.Negotiations took place inDecember2003betweentheirrepresentativesinthepresenceofanall-partydelegationfromtheAssamStateAssembly ledby theSpeaker.Suchdevelopmentsledtoatemporarycessationofviolence.Afteragapofnearlytwoandahalfmonths,violencestartedonceagain.Thedistrict administration’sactivities during the conflictwereunsatisfactory.Finally thearmyand thepolicewerecalled intotryandbringdownthescaleofviolence.Afterittherewerereportsofharassmentofinnocentvillagersbythem.BytheendofMarch,allviolentactivitiesstopped.Thoughmanyvictimswereabletoreturntotheirvillagessomefamilieswerestilllivinginreliefcampsatthetimeofthestudyinlate2004especiallyintheManjaandRongplimplamarea.Thiscanbecalledthecoolingphaseoftheconflict.

The Problem underlying the Conflict

FortheKukisthemainissuesunderlyingtheconflictarenon-recognitionofamajorportionoftheircommunityasindigenousandthefearofethniccleansingoftheirtribebythemajorityKarbitribe.FortheKarbistheissuewasastruggleforcontrolovertheresourceslikelandandforests.Theyfearedthattheircommunitywould be outnumbered in the near future ifKukimigrationfromManipur andNagaland did not stop.The atmosphere offiercecompetitionovertheshrinkingemploymentopportunities,agriculturalandothernaturalresourcesexistedalreadyinKarbiAnglong.Thegrowingnumberofpeopleofothercommunitiesdidnothelpinanyway.So,theunderlyingneedsoftheKukiweretheirrecognitionasanindigenoustribebytheKarbi.Incontrast,theKarbicommunitywantedanendtothemigrationofothertribesintothedistrictandstoppingtheKukidemandforanAutonomous


RegionalCouncil.

Themutually acceptable institutions that exist for both theparties are theKarbiAnglongAutonomousCouncil, theStateGovernmentandtheCentralGovernment.Allofthemcanaddressthefears,doubtsandneedsofboththeparties.Butasstatedabove,theKAAC’sresponsetotheconflicthasbeenunsatisfactorysofar.Boththepartiesalsohavecommoninterests.Thenaturalandeconomicresourcesintheareaareimportantforbothofthem.Theyalsofacesimilarproblemslikelackofsecurityofemployment,propertyandlife.Infactthemainreasonwhytheundergroundandthecommunitytookpartintheviolencewastheirprotection.

The Dividers in the Conflict

Amajorsystemorinstitutiondividingthecommunitiesistheexistenceofmilitantgroups.TheUPDSandKRAdonothesitatetousearmswhentheircommunity’sinterestsareatstake.Anothersystemthatdividesthetwotribesisthenon-existenceofawellfunctioning land settlement system in the district.The presentsystemcandividethetwocommunitiesasitisunderthecontroloftheKarbiAnglongAutonomousCouncilwhichisagainunderthecontroloftheKarbitribe.Anotherdivideristhepoliticalpartiesthathaveavestedinterestinthedivisionamongthetwocommunitiesinordertobuildtheirownvote-banks.Alsothebitterexperienceofboththetribesduringtheconflictcontributedtotheworseningoftheirties.Theburningofhouses,occupationoflandandtheattacksonpeoplepreventedthoseinterestedinpeacefromtakingstepsforthispurpose.Theeffortstotakerevengeforthelossoflifeandproperty led tofurtherviolence.Also thedisplacementoftheKukitotheNCHillsdistrictandtoNagalandandManipurkepttheatmosphereofhatredandtensionalive.

TheKukivictimswhohadtotakeshelterinthereliefcampssetupaftertheclashesalsoclaimthattheyhadlargelybeenignoredbythosegivingaidandthatmostaidprovidersshowedpartiality

byprovidinghelpmainlytotheKarbivictims.OnlytheChurchorganisations gave themcontinued support.This experienceofcommunal feelings getting precedence over the humanitarianaspectledtofurtherdivisionbetweenthetwo.Languageisanotherdivider.WhiletheKarbisareabletospeakAssameseandgenerallyuseitlocally,mostKukis(exceptthosewholiveinDiphutown)donotuseit.TheyspeakHindiorNagamese.

The Connectors in the Conflict

The institutions or systems that continue to link peopleacrossconflictlinesaretheeducational,religiousandeconomicinstitutions. Children and youth from both the communitiescontinuetogotoschoolsandcollegesfortheireducationalneeds.ChristiansfromboththeKukiandKarbicommunitiesalsointeractwitheachotherinchurchesandduringprayerandothermeetings.People fromboth the communities also come together duringweeklymarketdaysintheruralareasandinthetownsfortheireconomicneeds.

Alsohospitals,healthandothergovernmentdepartmentsaremeetingplacesfortheKukiandKarbisoareoccasionssuchasreligiousfestivalsofChristmasandEasterandtheculturalfeltivalsofboththetribespresentopportunities.Otheroccasionsareweeklymarketdaysintheruralareasandintheneighbouringtowns.Thecommunitiesalsoshareamutualdesireforpeaceandanamicablesolutiontotheproblemthatdividesthem.Theviolenceaffectedboththecommunities.Peoplefromboththetribeshavesufferedthetraumaoflossoflifeandproperty.So,bothstandtogainfromanendtotheconflict.

The Programmes of the organisation

Apart from suchmeeting points also economic connectorshavetobeestablishedinordertostrengthenthosestartedbysuchsocialprocesses.Thedevelopmentalactivitiesofthecivilsociety


groupsareamongthem.ForexampletheexperienceofJirsongAsongthathasbeenactiveinthefieldofhealth,socialwelfare,education and rural development for themarginalised inKarbiAnglongsince1985showsthatadedicatedstaffwithavisionarerequiredinordertodevelopaneducated,self-reliantcommunitybasedonhumanvalues.Theapproachiseducationandawarenessbuildingleadingtoself-reliance.Itisnottobelimitedtoanyonecommunity.JirsongAsonghasbeenreachingouttocommunitieslike theKarbi,Dimasa,Adivasis,Garos and theNepalis. Itsprogrammeslikemicrocredit,agriculture,healthandeducationareimplementedbythemanagementandstaffwhoarenotdividedoncommunal,religiousorotherlines.Alsothebeneficiariesarenotdividedontheselines.Itisimportantespeciallyinprovidingreliefsuchasfood,clothingandmedicinesduringtheconflicts.Mostofitsprogrammesareaimedatimprovingthelivingstandardsofthemarginalized.Theyouthandeducationprogrammesaimtoimproveandstrengthenthecommunity’sself-relianceandbuildvaluebasedcommunities.Mostofthemareimplementedthroughvariousyouthgroups.

WegiveheretheexampleofJirsongAsongbecauseitistypicalofdevelopmentagenciesthatcancombineeconomicdevelopmentwithawarenessbuilding.Thiscombinationcanbeanimportantconnector in the peace building process.One should also addamong all its initiatives, only its agriculture, health, youth andeducationprogrammeshavemadeanimpactonthedividersandconnectors.Themicro-creditprogrammehassofarnotincludedtheKukicommunity.

ThetraininginsustainablemethodsofagricultureandruraldevelopmentprovidedthroughStJoseph’sschoolbringtheKarbiandKukiyouthtogethersinceit ismeantforboth.Throughitshealthprogramme,Kukigirlshavebeenabletocompleteauxiliarynursing andmidwife courses.Themicro-credit programmes, ifextended toall thecommunities,canstrengthen theconnectorsbutmostagenciesdonotutilisethemfullyforthispurpose.The

opportunity they provide of improving the living standards ofcommunitiesaswellasgivingunemployedyouthanopportunityof choosing their destiny can play a constructive role in theircommunities.Itisoneofthewaysofshowingtheyouththatjoiningthemilitantsisnottheonlywayofdealingwithfrustration.TheyouthgroupslikeDDYC,UCYF,YCS,YSMandotherinstitutionscanbringtheyouthfromdifferentbackgroundstogether.Theseorganisationsshowedtheirpotentialevenduringtheconflict.Forexample, theUCYFprovidedaforumtobringKarbiandKukiyouthtogethertodiscusspeacebuildingmeasuresandprovideaidtothevictims.TheDDYC,YCSandYSMencouragedtheyouthintheuseofnon-violentmethodstosolveproblems.

TheseprogrammeshaveshowntheirpotentialbutmoreneedstobedoneparticularlytoinvolvetheKukismorethanatpresent.Today,womenandyouthfromdifferenttribesmeetandinteractduring themeetings, training and other programmes therebyincreasingtheirawarenessofandrespectforeachother’scultureand traditions.Since they alsodiscuss commonproblems suchmeetingscan increase trustandconfidence ineachother.Theyfeel today theneed to increase thenumberor levelof activitieslikemeetings,culturalandothereventsinordertoensuregreaterinteractionbetweentheyouthofthetwocommunities.Theyalsofeeltheneedtohavemotivationandtrainingprogrammes.Theseactivitieshavethusshowntheirpotentialbutmoreneedstobedone.

other Suggestions

Whilethepotentialexists,theyouthorganisationsalsofeltthattheywereunabletoworkeffectivelyforthereturnofnormalcyduring the conflict. ‘ProblemTreeAnalysis’was conducted inordertoidentifythecauseofthislacuna.Itwasfeltduringtheexercisethatthecoreproblemwassomeshortcomingsoftheyouthorganisations.

i) Theyouthdidnot taketimeoff to thinkbeforeresortingtoviolence.They acted instinctively and resorted to violence


possiblyduetothelackofawarenessofnon-violentmethodsofconflictresolutionorsimplybecauseoflackoftrustinthesemethods.Anotherreasonislackofaproperstructuretospreadreliableinformation.Thisconflictshowedhowthespreadofrumourscancreateasmuchdamageasactualviolence.Thatshows the need to organise some awareness programmes,seminars,workshopsandotheractivitiesontheimportanceofpeacebuildingandstrengthenexistingstructuresliketheprintmediaforthespreadofcorrectinformation.

ii) Someyouthorganisationsarenotempoweredtotakedecisionsbytheircommunities,thoughtheydesiretofindwaystoresolvetheconflictspeacefully.Theycannotactonthisdesireintheabsenceofpowercomingformtheircommunities.Byandlargethecommunitiesseemtolackfaithinthecapacityorabilityoftheyouthtoact.Itshowstheneedbothtohavesessionsmeanttostrengthen thecommunity’sconfidenceand faith in theirdecision-makingabilityandmotivationprogrammesmeanttoencouragetheyouthorganisationstotakestepsforthebenefitofthecommunity.

iii)TheKuki youth organisations claimed that because of thepresenceofsomanyKarbiyouthorganisations,itwasdifficultfor themtodecidewhichone toapproach to takeuppeaceinitiatives.Theywere afraid that if theKSOworkedout asettlementwithoneoftheKarbiyouthorganisations,theotherfactionsorgroupswouldcreatehurdlesonitsway.Besides,whentheconflictwasfullblown,itwasnaturalfortheyouthorganisationtobesuspiciousoftheorganisationsbelongingto theotherside. Itshows theneedforconfidencebuildingmeasuresonbothsidesofthedivide.

iv) There has also been lack of unity among theKarbi youthorganisations,mainly because of political and ideologicaldifferences.Itpreventedthemfromcomingtogethertotakecollectivedecisionsforapeacefulsettlement.KSYFprobablyhasthepotentialtoplaythisrolebutitcouldnotactunderthese

circumstances.Someyouthorganisationswerenotwillingtotakeanyinitiativepossiblybecausetheyhadtobeaccountableto the community that hadnot given themadequate poweror because theywere afraid of risk-taking. Someof themalsoseemtolackthedesiretogetinvolvedinpeacebuildingworkbecausetheyperceivethemselvesasbelongingtotheircommunityaloneorbecause they lackconfidence that theycanproduceresults.

Summary and Conclusion Itisclearfromwhathasprecededthattheconflicthasresultedinthebreakdownofrelationsbetweenthetwotribes.TheKarbi-Kuki conflictwas thefirst ethnic clash inKarbiAnglong.Thestudyontheconflictandtheroleof theyouthshowsthatpriortotheconflictmostofthemhadcordialrelationswiththeothercommunities.Thoughtherewascompetitionforemployment,tillthenithadnotcausedenmitybetweenthem.Infactthefirstreactionoftheyouthwhentheyheardoftheconflictwasoneofsorrow.Butastimepassedbytheybecamedistantfromothercommunities.Yet,theyhopethattheconflictwillnotleavealastingmarkonthembecausemostofthemviewtheconflictasunnecessaryandavoidable.Thoughmostvieweditasaclashbetweenextremistgroups, they are also aware of the political undertones.Thecommunitieshadtogetinvolvedastheirhousesandvillagesweredestroyedandpeoplewerekilledundertheprincipleof“aneyeforaneyeandatoothforatooth”.

Its root cause seems to be a crisis of identity.While theKarbisfearedthatifthemigrationofKukiscontinued,itwouldresultinfurtherstrugglesfortheexistingresources,theKukisweretryingtoprotectthemselvesthroughaRegionalCouncil.Itistruethateverytribeorcommunitylovesitsidentityanddoesnotwanttoloseit,butthisfearshouldnothaveescalatedtosuchanextentastogetthepeopletokilleachother.However,thecombinationofthemilitantgroups,politicalvestedinteresandlackofeffectivenessoftheadministrationledtoit.


Ontheotherside,theconflicthaspresentedanewchallengeto the youth organisations ofKarbiAnglong. Itwas their firstexperience of such a conflict and they did not know how todealwithiteffectively.Alsosomeproblemsaffectingtheyouthorganisationsaffectedtheirfunctioningduringtheconflict.Itshowstheneedforthemtoaddresstheseproblemsandequipthemselveswiththenecessarycapacitiesofworkingforpeace.Theyouthareawareof thenegative impactsof theconflictandhowtheyarehamperingthedevelopmentworkinthedistrict.However,theywere hamperedby the lack of faith of the community in theircapacitytoactonthisissue.Tosolvethisproblemthecommunitymustbegintohavefaithintheircapacityandencouragethemtoworkharderforsocialimprovementandgetinvolvedinconfidencebuildingmeasures between tribes. In order to bring change inthemindsetoftheyouthmotivationprogrammesontheirroleindevelopmentcanbeconducted.Finally,theyouthhavetofindwaysofensuringthatthevictimsoftheconflictregardlessoftheirtribearewellcompensatedforthelossessustainedduringtheconfiict.Youth organisations can ensure that the district administrationshowsequalconsiderationforallwhilepayingit.Thatcangoalongwayinshowingsolidarityandbringingpeoplefromdifferenttribesclosertoeachother.

Thedistrictadministrationhasthepoweraswellasthecapacitytofindpermanentsolutionstotheproblembutitdoesnotusethatpower.Peacecannotcomeunlessitplaysitsroleeffectively.Ithasthedutytotakemeasurestohealthepainoftheconflictbyprovidingadequatecompensationtoitsvictims,rehabilitatingthedisplacedand takingmeasures toprevent furtherconflagration.Theyouthalso feel thatboth their communities should initiatemeasuresrequiredtostrengthentheirbeliefinunityindiversity.Theyshouldrealisethattheanswersastowhotheyareandtowhichtribetheybelongarenotintheirhands.Buttheyhavecontrolovertheiractionsthatcaneitherrespecttherightofeachcommunitytobehuman.


Thus,wayshavetobefoundofrebuildingrelationsbetweenthetwo tribes.Theyouthorganisations,thecivilsocietygroupsandthecommunityleadershavebothtoworkwiththeadministrationtoensurethesuccessofthistaskandensurethatitperformsitsdutyofdevelopmentandlawandorder.BIBLIoGRAPhy

Terang,Barelong,The History of Karbi, PublisherUnknown,Guwahati,2003.Anam,Nazmeen,The Enchanting Karbi Hills,AngikPublication,Guwahati,2000.Gangte,ThankhomangS,The Kukis of Manipur,GyanPublishingHouse,NewDelhi,2003.Kathar,HarlongbiI,Thoughts on Indian Mongolians,Lipibon,Guwahati,2003.Lyall,Charles,The Mikirs,UnitedPublishers,Guwahati,1908.Phangcho,PhukanC, The Karbis of Northeast India,AngikPublication,Gu-wahati,2003.Phangcho,PhukanC,The Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills,Self,Diphu,2004.

The ASDC-KNA Memorandum of Understanding,Manja,4thDecember,2001.

The Telegraph,GuwahatiThe Sentinel,GuwahatiThe Assam Tribune,Guwahati

Karbi-Kuki Conflict in Youth 93

The Nagaland Post,DimapurThe Hills Times,DiphuArleng Daily,DiphuThek-Kere,DiphuThekar,Diphu

www.kukiforum.comwww.geocities.com/klnlf

CoMMuNITy’S RESPoNSE To ThE kARBI-kukI CoNFLICT IN kARBI AN-

GLoNGBulu Terang

IntheBritishagetheareasinhabitedbytheKarbiswerecalled‘PartiallyExcludedArea’and‘ExcludedArea’.Theprovisionof‘PartiallyExcludedArea’orderoperatedinthedistrictsofNagaonandSibsagar.TheKarbisettlementintheKhasiandJaintiaHillscame fullyunder theprovisionsof the ‘ExcludedArea’. AfterIndependence,theareasinhabitedbytheKarbiswerecarvedoutofNagaon,SibsagarandtheUnitedKhasiandJaintiaHillsandcollectivelyformedintotheUnitedMikirandNorthCacharHillsDistrict on 2ndFebruary 1970.MikirHills became a separateadministrativedistrictasKarbiAnglongon14thOctober1976.

Today it has a population of 4,22,559males and 3,89,721females. Its literacy rate is 58.83%. (male 68.11%and female48.65%) and population density is 78 per sq.km.The districtheadquartersisatDiphu.Ithasthreecivilsubdivisions-Diphu,Hamren andBokajan.TheKarbiAnglong district shares itsboundarieswithNagoan,JorhatandNorthCacharHillsdistrictsandalsowiththestatesofMeghalayaandNagaland.Inthenorthare theNagaon and Jorhat districts, in the south are theNorthCacharHillsandNagaland,JorhatdistrictandNagalandareintheeastandinthewestisthestateofMeghalaya.

The karbis

TheKarbi tribe is also amajor constituent of the tribalpopulationofNortheastIndiaingeneralandofassaminparticularTheyliveonthehills,plateauxandplainsofthecentralpartofNortheastIndia,especiallyinAssam.Ethnically,theybelongtotheIndo-mongoloidraceandlinguisticallytotheTibeto-Burmanfamilyoflanguages.TheKarbisorMikirsastheywereknownearlier,livemainlyintheKarbiAnglongdistrictbutarealsofound

insomepocketsofNagaon,Kamrup,Darang,GolaghatandN.C.HillsdistrictofAssam, inArunachalPradeshandin theSylhetdistrictofBangladesh.

Althoughclassifiedas“ScheduledHillTribe”bythecensusofIndia,theKarbislivebothonthehillsandintheBrahmaputraValley. In 1991 theKarbiwere 55% of theKarbiAnglongpopulationof8,04760.Astudyoftheirphysicalaspectsshowsthat theKarbi habitations are considerably diverse. The geo-physicalstructureinparticularhasformedadistinctiveecologicalbackgroundthathasgreatlyinfluencedtheirsettlementpattern,economy,populationandsocio-politicallife.

Table1 : Tribe-wise population in karbi Anglong according to 1971-91 census.

Name of the Tribe Percentage of total of ST Population Karbi 82.29 Dimasa 7.04 Garo 4.32 KhasiandJaintia 2.26 Kuki 2.82 Man-Tai 0.45 Hajong 0.18 Synteng 0.29 Mizo 0.16 Naga 0.02 Hmar 0.006 Pawi 0.002

Source: “Statistical profile of the Hill area of Assam” prepared by G.N. Das from the institue of Research for Schedule tribes and Schedule castes of Assam.

The kukis

ThelinguisticgroupslikeBaite,Changsan,Chongloi,Doungel,Gangte,Guite,Haokip,Hangsing,Lhouvum,PaiteandVaipheareput looselyunder theegalitarianethnicentitycalledtheKukis.They belong to theMongoloid stock and theTibeto-Burmanlinguisticgroup,asub-familyoftheTibeto-Chinese.TheyaresaidtopossessnodemarcatedterritoryoftheirownbutaresettledsincetimeimmemorialonthebanksoftheChindwinRiverinMyanmar,theNagaHills,NorthCacharHills inIndiaandtheChittagongHillsTractinBangladesh.AmajorityofthemliveinthestatesofManipur,NagalandandMizoram.TherestcanbefoundinalmostallthestatesoftheNortheast.In1991theywere21,883inKarbiAnglong.InNagalandtheyareconflatedwiththeZeliangNagatribe.Thus,thewordKukiisitselfinclusive.Officialdescriptionssuchasincensusreport,referto‘anyKukitribe’ofwhom37sub-tribeshavebeenidentifiedinManipur.

Background of the Conflict TheKarbis andDimasas are known to enjoy the status ofindigenoustribesinKarbiAnglongbecausetheyinhabitaclearlydemarcatedterritory.However,theKukisalthoughoneofthehilltribes,arenotconsideredindigenousin thetwohilldistrictsofAssam.BoththehilltribesandnineotherplainstribesintheoryinhabittheplainsofAssamwhiletheKukisaresaidnottohaveaterritoryoftheirowninAssam.Historically,theKukisareoneofthebiggestmigratingpeoplesintheNortheast.Theiridentityasahilltribeisacarry-overoftherecognitionandacknowledgementtheyhavereceivedinaverydifferentgeographicalandpoliticalstatusinAssam.Withoutawell-definedterritorydemarcatingtheirhabitation,theyarespreadinsmallpocketsprincipallyinManipur,Mizoram,Nagaland,Assamandelsewhere.

SomehistoriansbelievethatthesettlementofKukisinKarbiAnglongdistrictcanbeseenalongwiththeKarbicommunityinthesecondbatchofmigrationthattookplacefromtheManipurhillstoWestKarbiAnglongofHamrensubdivisionafterthethirteenth

Community and Karbi-Kuki Conflict 95 96 Conflict Mapping in NEI

century.But theirmigrationwasmuchless incomparisonwiththatoftheKarbi.Sotheirsettlementwasnotnoticeduntilthelate1980s.From theHamren sub-division, someof themmigratedtotheSinghasonhillrangeintheearly1960sinsearchofgoodfertilelandandeconomicprosperity.Butmostoftheirmigrationtookplaceinthelate1980sfromtheneighbouringManipurandNagalandduetodifferentreasons.

ThatdisprovesthestandofthosewhostatethattheKukiarenot indigenous toKarbiAnglong.According toanthropologistsandthelocalnon-KukistherearetwodifferentgroupsofKukisinKarbiAnglong.OnegroupthatcamesonecenturiesagoinhabitstheHamrenareaasindigenoustothedistrict.Theyarefullyintegratedwiththelocalpopulationinallrespects.Anthropologistscallthem‘OldKukis’whereastheKarbiscallthem‘Nochans.’TheothergroupthatisinvolvedinthepresentconflictseemstohavemigratedfromNagalandandManipurduringthelasttwodecades.Theyareknownasthe‘NewKukis’.Inotherwords,thepresentconflicthasnothingtodowiththe4to5thousand‘oldKukis’whoareconfinedtosmallpocketsinHamrenSub-division.Theconflicttookplacemainlywiththe‘newKukis’

As stated already (chapter 2), an identity crisis of both thetribesseemstobecentraltothisproblem.ThebasisoftheKarbiidentitycrisiswasthesuddenriseinthenumberoftheKukiinKarbiAnglong and their demand for aKukiRegionalCouncil(KRC).ManyKarbis felt that it could be a precedent and thatmanyothertribeswoulddemandit.TheywouldfinditdifficulttocallthedistrictKarbiAnglongafterit.TotheKukis,theclashesinManipurinthe1990swereamajorissue.TheKukicommunityasawholedidnothaveitsownadministrativeplatformordemarcatedterritory.TheformationofKRCwithinKarbiAnglongwastheirlasthopeofaplatformtoraisetheirvoiceinademocraticway.ItsfertilelandthatwasnotyetexploredwasanotherreasonfortheirmigrationtoKarbiAnglong.TheKukiswerefightingforanidentityfortwodecadesandwantedtheirdreamtocometruein

thedistantKarbiAnglong.

Activities of kRA and uPDS and the Conflict

Othercausestoocanbeaddedtoitsuchasthecollectionof“taxes”bytheKRAfrom2001.Itisageneralpracticeofallmilitantoutfits.InthiscaseKRAissaidtohavegonebeyondtheKukistosomeKarbivillageswhoseinhabitantswerepaying“taxes”alreadytotheUPDS.TheKRAclaimsthattheSinghasonHillsareawasaKukiterritoryandthatitistheirownland.TherefusalofsomeKarbistopaythetaxesandtheviolenceagainstthembytheKRAledtopolarisation.SomeKarbisjoinedtheUPDSorcontactedthisoutfitforprotection.ClasheswiththeKRAresultedfromit.SuchclasheswereinevitablebecausetheUPDSandKRAhavedifferentdemandsandneeds.TheUPDSconsidersitselftheprotectoroftheKarbisandtheKRAoftheKukis.Innocentcivilianswerecaughtinthecrossfirebetweenthem.Atthesametime,involvementofbiggeroutfitslikeNSCN(IM)cannotberuledout.ThisoutfithassignedaceasefireagreementwiththeCentre.Sotheirinvolvementcanaddtothebargainingpoweroftheirallies.

ThefratricidalKarbi-Kukiconflicttookatollofmorethan120livesapartfromtheburningdownofmorethan1,000housesinover100villagesbelongingtoboththecommunities.Thenumberof casualties is probablymuchhigher, asgovernment agenciescouldnotreachallthesitesofghastlyincidentsespeciallyinthehigherridgesofSinghason-Khonbamonmountainrange.Theentireepisodewastriggeredofffromthelastdecade.TheAssam Tribune reportedon2ndDecember,2003thataround5,000persons,bothKukiandKarbi,tookshelterineightReliefcampssetupatLongnit,Bokajan,Dillai,HidipiandManja.TheTelegraph reportedon7thDecember,2003that27Kukisweremissing.Othercommunitiestooweretrappedintheconflict.Forexample,someunidentifiedpersonssetfiretoaMizohouseinDimapur.On21January,2004suspectedUPDSmilitantskilled3Garos,IBodoand4KukisinHamrenSub-division.


ThePresidentofKukiInpiclaimedthatnearly500KukisfledtoNorthCacharHills,around150tookshelterintheManjareliefcamps,some125othersfromMolnom,Khengamol,Koimai,andNoumjangvillagesofSinghasonManjatookshelterinthereliefcamps atTuibuong, headquarters ofChurachandpurDistrict ofManipur and that 925Kukiswere in 4Relief camps inKarbiAnglong,200inNCHillsDistrict,250inChurachandpurDistrictofManipurand200inDimapur,Nagaland.TheKukiMovementforHumanRightsclaimsthatnearly320Kukihouseswereburntdownin10villages.

People’s Reaction Thepurposeofthisstudywastounderstandthereactionofordinarypeoplefromboththecommunities.Forthispurposetheresearcher collected data through a questionnaire fromninetyrespondents, 30 each from theKarbi,Kuki and othermixedcommunities.Therewasanequalnumberofmenandwomeninthissampleof90.Therespondentsbelonged to theagegroupsof15to70years.TheTablesthatfollowgivethereactionoftherespondentstothequestionsaskedofthem.Moreinformationwasgotthroughgroupdiscussioninsomevillagesandwithindividualknowledgeablepersons. Table2showsthat64percentoftherespondentswerefriendlywhile36percenthadnopriorcontactwithothercommunities.60percentoftheKarbi,61percentoftheKukiand70percentofthe“other”respondentshadfriendlyrelationswithothercommunities.40percentoftheKarbi,39percentoftheKukiand30percentoftherespondentsfromothercommunitieshadnopriorcontactwithothercommunities.MostKarbirespondentsknewtheKukionlythroughthe“gingerbusiness”,aspeoplefromKukicommunityusedtosellginger.

Table2: your Relations with People from other communities before the Conflict (%) Total Karbi Kuki Other

M F M F M F

a)Friendly 64% 62% 58% 71% 51% 72% 68%

b)Nocontact 36% 38% 42% 29% 49% 2 8 % 32% ThereactionoftherespondentsatthestartoftheKarbi-Kukiconflictdiffered(Table3).61percentfeltsadwhentheyheardoftheconflictand26percentfeltangrybecausetheyfeltthattheconflictwasnotrequired.13percentfeltliketakingrevengeontheothercommunity.Thosewhofeltsadincluded62percentoftheKarbi,48percentoftheKukiand73percent“others”.28percentoftheKarbirespondents,27percentoftheKukiand22percentofthe“others”experiencedangerwhile25percentoftheKuki,10percentoftheKarbiand5percentfromothercommunities,feltrevengeful.

Table 3: your Reaction at the Start of the karbi-kuki Conflict

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)Sorrow 61% 52% 72% 46% 51% 68% 78% b)Anger 26% 32% 24% 31% 23% 22% 22% c)Revengeful 13% 16% 4% 23% 26% 10% 0%

More thanhalf the respondents say that theconflictwasforpreservationofidentitywhile36percentthoughtthatitwasaconflictbetweeninsurgentgroups.12percentconsidereditapoliticalconflict.TheissueoftheKukipopulationrisingfrom21,883towhattheirorganisationsclaimtobe40,000in2001wasbasictoit.Thissuddenincreaseraisedquestionsaboutwhichofthecommunitiesisamajorityandwhoisaminority.Asexplainedabove,thedemandforaKukiRegionalCounciladdedtothetension.TheKarbifeltthatothertribestoocouldmakesuchademandandthattheythemselveswouldbepowerlessandwouldbecomeaminorityintheterritorythatisnamedaftertheirtribe.


Table 4: What Do you Think are the Causes of the Conflict?

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M Fa)Identitypreservation52% 58% 40% 52% 35% 67% 60%b)BetweenMilitants 36% 32% 36% 38% 40% 32% 38%c)APoliticalconflict 12% 10% 24% 10% 25% 1% 2% InthisstandtheyfellbackontheexperienceofothertribesliketheTripurisofTripurawhohavebecomeaminority.Thiswassharedby49%oftheKarbirespondentswhile44%oftheKukirespondentsand64%oftherespondentsfromothercommunitiesalsofeltthattheconflictwasduetoanidentitycrisisofthedifferentcommunities.

Table 5: Was It Necessary for Common People to Take Part in This Conflict?

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)Yes,forsurvivalof identity 48% 62% 42% 58% 43% 38% 45% b)Yes,for showingone’s responsibilitytowards one’sowncommunity 39% 34% 41% 38% 39% 45% 35% c)Yes,toretaliatefor lossofmembersofone’scommunity 13% 4% 17% 4% 18% 17% 20%

InTable5,theresponsetowhethercommonpeopleshouldhavejoinedtheconflictornotisseen.48%ofthetotalrespondentsfeltthattheyshouldhavetakenpartinthisconflictforthesurvivaloftheiridentity,39%saidthattakingpartintheconflictwasonewayofshowingtheirresponsibilitytowardstheirowncommunitywhile13%saidthattheyshouldretaliateortakerevengeforthelossofmembersofone’scommunity.

Table 6: Was the Demand of kuki Regional Council Nccessary?

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)Nobecauseitcould setanexamplefor othercommunities 56% 72% 62% 11% 18% 82% 90%b)Yes,becausetheyare apartofsociety 33% 6% 2% 89% 82% 12% 8%c)No,theyarenotpart ofsociety 11% 22% 36% 0% 0% 6% 2%

Two-thirds of the respondents feel that the demand forKRCwasnotnecessary.Table6shows thatnearly56%of therespondentssaidthatthedemandcouldsetanexampletoothercommunities.Asmanyas67%oftheKarbirespondentsand86%fromother communities against 15%of theKuki felt that thedemandforKRCcouldbecomeabadprecedent.Ofthe11%oftherespondentswhofeltthattheKukisarenotapartoftheirsocietysothedemandwasunnecessary,therewere29%Karbiand4%oftherespondentsfromothercommunities.Theone-thirdwhofeltthatthedemandwasnecessaryastheKukiswereapartoftheirsociety,included85%oftheKukiagainst4%oftheKarbiand10%fromothercommunities.

Table 7: Did the kRC Demand Contribute?

Total Karbi Kuki Other

M F M F M F a)Yes 56% 8% 85% 25% 11% 65% 68% b)No 27% 6% 10% 72% 68% 7% 20% c)CannotSay 17% 12% 5% 3% 21% 28% 30%

Table7showsthat56percentoftherespondentsfeltthatthedemandofKRChascontributed to theconflict,27percentdisagreewithitand17percentareunabletosayanything.Those


whofeltthatitcontributedtotheconflictinclude84percentoftheKarbi,67percent“others”and18percentKuki.70percentoftheKukidisagreedwithitagainst8percentoftheKarbiand4percentof“others”.

Table 8: Do you Think the ASDC (u)-kNA Mou Could have Led to the Conflict?

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)Yes 55% 65% 58% 38% 48% 72% 51% b)No 45% 35% 42% 62% 52% 28% 49%

Table8showsthat55percentoftherespondentsthoughtthattheMOUledtotheconflictagainst45percentwhodisagreedwithit.Only43percentoftheKukirespondentsagreedwithitagainst62eachfromtheremainingtwogroups.57percentoftheKukidisagreedwiththesuggestionagainst38percenteachfromtheKarbiand“others”..

Table 9: Who Do you Think Was Responsible for the Conflict? Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)Extremistsgroup 67% 62% 51% 72% 58% 82% 79%b)Politicalgroup 21% 28% 40% 11% 33% 11% 6% c)CommonPeople 12% 10% 9% 17% 9% 7% 15% Table9showsthattwo-thirdsoftherespondentssaythattheinvolvementofextremistgroupsledtotheconflict,21percentholdpoliticalpartiesresponsiblewhile12percentblamecommonpeopleforit.57percentoftheKarbis,65percentoftheKukisand81percentoftheothersholdtheextremistgroupsresponsibleforit.34percentoftheKarbisthinkthatpoliticalpartieswereresponsibleagainst22and8percenteachof theother twogroups.Only9

percentoftheKarbis,13percentoftheKukisand11percentoftheothersfeelthatthecommonpeoplecanbeheldresponsibleforit.

Table 10: Do you Think That Extremist Groups Were Responsible for the Conflict?

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)Partly 67% 63% 48% 72% 63% 82% 76%b)Fully 33% 37% 52% 28% 37% 18% 24%

Militant groups were acting on behalf of both thecommunities.Boththemilitantgroupsthinkthat,theyarefightingforacause.Thecommonpeoplearehappythatsomeoneisfightingontheirbehalfbutalsofeelthatthemilitantsarepartlyresponsiblefortheconflict.Only44percentoftheKarbis,32percentoftheKukis and 21 percent of “others” hold themilitants are fullyresponsibleforit.Table 11: The Role of the District Administration During the Conflict Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M Fa)Unsatisfactory 89% 100%100% 100% 100% 63% 72%b)CannotSay 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 28% 22%c)Satisfactory 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 6% Table11showsthat89percentof therespondentswereunhappywiththeroleoftheadministrationduringtheconflictand8percentcansaynothing.Only3%feltthattheadministrationdidsomethingandtheyaresatisfied.Thosewhoaredissatisfiedinclude100percentoftheKarbiandKukiand68percentoftherest.Inthelastgroup25percentsaidnothingand7percentweresatisfiedwiththeadministration.Groupdiscussionshowedthatthe


mainreasonforpeople’sdissatisfactionwaswhattheyconsideredthedivideandrulepolicyoftherulingpartyresponsibleforit.ItrepeatedthepropagandaoftheASDC(U)-KNA(MOU)atthepeakoftheconflict.

Table 12: When Can karbi-kuki Relations Improve?

Total Karbi Kuki Other M F M F M F a)People’sPeace Initiatives 57% 52% 38% 63% 51% 68% 72%b)YouthWorkforPeace 12% 15% 29% 10% 11% 4% 3%c)IfAdministrationTries 31% 33% 33% 27% 38% 28% 25%

Table12shows that57percentof therespondentsfeel thatKarbi-Kukirelationscanimproveifcommonpeople takestepstowardspeace.MoreKukisthanKarbisfeelthatcommonpeoplecanimproverelationsbetweenthetribes.Butasignificantsectionofthe“other”respondentsthinkthattheAdministrationhastotrytobringaboutapermanentsolutiontotheproblem.AthirdeachoftheKarbiandKukirespondentssaidthesame.

Main Findings and Suggestions Onecansummarisethefindingsbyshowingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesintheresponseofeachcommunity.Beforetheconflictthecommunitieshadfriendlyrelationswithoneanotherbuttherelationswerebasedmostlyonbusiness.TheKarbisboughtgingerfromtheKukiwhogrewitbutdidnotsocialisemuchwiththem.Thatisthemainreasonwhyamajorityofallthreegroupsfeelsthatthepeoplethemselveshavetotakepeaceinitiatives.Thatlookslikeasinceresuggestionbecause thoughtheir relationsdidnotgobeyondbusinessmostrespondentsweresadwhentheconflictbegan.Thathastobeseenalsointhecontextofmostnon-Kukis

believingthattheKRCdemandwasamajorcauseoftheconflictwhile amajority of theKuki believe that theASDC (U)-KNAMOUhadnothingtodowithit.

Whether they blame theMOU or not, amajority of therespondentsbelievethatthemilitantsareatleastpartlyresponsibleforthisconflictwhileothersbelievethatalsothecommonpeopleand political parties have to accept responsibility for it.TheKarbiandtheKukirespondentsweredissatisfiedwiththeworkof theadministrationand thepoliceduring theconflict.WhileamajorityoftheKarbirespondentsandsomerespondentsfromothercommunitiesdidnottaketheKukisasapartoftheirsociety,amajorityoftheKukirespondentsbelievedthattheyarepartoftheKarbisocietyandthattheyhavearighttodemandtheKRC.Thereisdifferenceofopinionalsoonthefollowup.Amajoritybelievedthatultimatelythecommonpeopleworkingtogethercansolvetheproblembecausethemilitantsandpoliticianswillusetheissuefortheirownpurpose.

Animportantfindingisthatthetribeswereconvincedthattheiridentityasacommunitywasindangeriftheydidnotreactfast.Fivemaincausesforthisidentitycrisiswerefoundoutthrough‘ProblemTreeAnalysis (PTA)’methodology.Theywere, non-recognitionofKukis as an indigenous tribeofKarbiAnglong,ethnictensionthatfollowed,theUPDO-KRAfeud,fightingforeconomicbenefitsandmigrationofKukisintoKarbiAnglong.

Main Findings through Do No harm (DNh) Framework

TheresearcherusedtheDoNoHarm(DNH)frameworkasaguidetodrawtheconclusionsfromtheanalysisofthedata.Thewholeconflictwasbetweentwocommunities,KarbisandKukisbuttheprimarypartiesinvolvedwerenotthecommonpeoplebutthemilitantgroupsi.e.UPDS(nowknownasKLNLF)andtheKukiRevolutionaryArmy (KRA).Other secondarygroups involvedwerepoliticalparties,socialorganisations,youthorganisations,people in reliefcamps, students, thearmyand thepolice.Also


theinvolvementofbiggermilitantoutfitslikeNSCN(IM)cannotberuledoutsincealargerbasecangivethemgreaterbargainingpowerinthepeacenegotiationswiththeGovernmentofIndiaandcontroloverthemilitantgroupsintheregion.WhetherNSCN-IMisinvolvedornot,manybelievethatthisconflictwouldnothaveturnedviolent,hadtherebeennoextremistgroupsactingonbehalfofboththecommunities.

Theanalysisalsoshowsthatthereisnotmuchdifferenceintheperceptionoftheconflictbythecommunities.Onealsomostrespondentsstrugglingwiththeemotionsofrevenge,hatred,unitywithintheirowntribeandtheneedforpeace.Unityofthetribebecomescrucialinasituationofthreat.RightlyorwronglytheKarbisfeelthethreatofbecomingaminorityinwhattheyconsidertheirownland.Theyfeelhurtbythispossibility.TheKukis,ontheotherside,feelthethreatbecausetheydonothavetheirownadministrativeplatformtoraisetheirvoiceandfeeltheneedtohaveittofightfortheirrights.Thus,asTable6shows,bothconsideritadoordiebattle.

Process

Therearethreemainphasesinthisconflict.Thefirstphaseissmallandrareincidentsofviolenceandconflictbetweenthetwoextremistgroups.Inthesecondphase,violencereachedthemaximumlevelinwhichtheextremistgroupsandcommonpeopleofboththecommunitieswereinvolved.Thethirdphasewasthecoolingdownofviolence.Theconflictcameundercontrol.Butthecoolingdownmaynotlastlongifasolutionisnotfoundwhentheconflictisinadormantstage.

Thewholeprocessofpoliticalmanipulationunitedthepeopleofthesametribebutdividedthemfromothers.Theroleplayedbyvariouspoliticalpartiesbecameclearwhentheytriedtousethecourseofeventsforpropagandaagainsttheotherparities.Thecommonpeopletoodidnothesitatetospreadrumoursduringtheconflict.Militantsofonecommunityshowednohesitationinkillingmembersofothercommunities.Alsosomeunpredictableincidents

tookplacesuchastheprotestrallyandinter-communitydiscussionleadingtoviolence.Themilitantsusedviolencebecausebothofthemwantedtoresolvetheconflicttotheadvantageortheirowncommunity.Revengewaswritlargeinalltheiractions.

Problems

Effortswerealsomadetoresolvetheconflict.Differentsocial,politicalandyouthorganisations tookpeace initiatives throughpeace rallies, presentationofmemoranda at the administrative,stateandcentrallevels,conductofpeaceconcerts,peaceseminars,groupdiscussions,wall paintings andposters.DifferentNGOstookuppeaceprograrnmestoresolvethisconflict.Butveryfewofthemwereeffectivebecausetheywereunabletosolvethebasicproblemssuchasthesearchforeconomicbenefits,employmentopportunities,landforsettlementandagriculture,administrative,socialandpoliticalcontrol.Themilitantgroupstooweretryingtogetcontroloverthegingerbusinessaswellasmilitarysupremacy.Thecommonpeoplefoughtforthepreservationoftheir‘Identity’.

Thoughthemaincauseoftheconflictisoneof“identitycrisis”otherreasonstooledtoitsuchascontrolovereconomicbenefits,land,influxofimmigrants.TheUPDS-KRAMOUshowsthateachmilitantgroupinvolvedintheconflicthaditsowninterest.Theywerecrucialinthespreadoftheconflictandinhelpingittogrowlargerthanitwouldhavebeenotherwise.Besides,thedemandsofthesetwotribesoftencontradictedeachother.Forexample,theKukiswantedaterritoryoftheirownandtheKACasaplatformtodemandtheirrecognitionasanindigenoustribeofKarbiAnglong.TheKarbivieweditasathreattotheiridentity.Othercommunitiesgottrappedinthisconflict.

Identifying and Analyzing Dividers and Connectors

Themaindividerswerethedifferentideologiesoftheyouth,political and social organisations. These institutionswhich


existedbefore this conflict, understood it differently.TheKukiStudents’OrganisationtriedtoholdpeacetalkswithKarbiyouthorganisationsbutcouldnotdoitsincethereweremanyKarbiyouthorganisations.Thatcontinuedthedivision.

Inthiscontextitwaseasytorousetheemotionsofthecommonpeopleandmanyofthemtookpartintheconflict.Differentsocialandpolitical students’ groups tookout protest rallies inDiphutown.Theyturnedviolent.MilitantgroupslikeUPDSandKRAclashedwitheachother.InthepasttheunitedASDC,themainpoliticalpartyofKarbiAnglongwasrespected.Butitsplitintotwoin2000duetoideologicaldifferences.NewgroupsemergedandoneofthemsignedtheMOU.Itledtofactionalfights.

On the other side, there aremany institutions like schools,churches,markets,hospitalsandtheKarbiAnglongAutonomousCouncilwheredifferentcommunitiescometogether.Forexample,theweeklymarketofManjatownisaplacewheretheKarbiandKukicontinuetobuyandselltheirgoodsinspiteoftheconflict.During theconflictand in thepost-conflictperiodmanyNGOsandsocialandyouthorganisationstookuppeaceprogrammesanddevelopmentalworkstobringKarbiAnglongbacktonormalcy.Theydidrehabilitationworklikeconstructionofhouses,givingbooks,feesandschooluniformstostudents.Theseandotherworksofcivilsocietygroupscanhelpwithpeaceandtoleranceamongcommonpeople.

Suggestions

While amajority of theKukis believe that theMOUhadnothingtodowiththeconflict,mostKarbisbelievetheopposite.TillTherulingpartytookuptheMOUasanissueatthepeakoftheconflict,ASDC(U)hadkepttheMOUasecret.Thatmadethe people ofKarbiAnglong feel that theywere being treatedunfairly.Thatitselfbecameadividerintheconflict.Butinsteadofcriticisingthepoliticalparties,itwouldbehealthierforthepeopletofindoutwhytheMOUcameintoexistence.Thatcanleadto

acompromiseonthisissue.Thepartiesinconflictshouldtrytonegotiate because they cannot achieve their objective throughviolence.That involves theircoming togetherunderacommonumbrellatodiscusstheMOUandunderstandtheneedsandrightsoftheKukisandKarbis.AtpresenttheMOUisdormantbecauseofoppositionfromallsides.Thissilenceisnotapermanentsolutionbecauseitcanexplodeanytime.

Themilitantgroupsstartedtheconflictandthenitspreadtothecommunity.Thesegroupsarefightingfortheirowncommunity.Sotheirsentimentshavetobeunderstoodwithoutacceptingtheirmethods.Peaceisnotpossibleuntilandunlessstepsaretakentounderstandtheissuestheyraise.PopularpressureisrequiredtogettheKLNLFandKRAtoworkforaceasefireagreementwiththeGovernmentofIndiaandgettheGovernmenttonegotiatewiththem.

Thecommonpeopleparticipatedintheconflictduetodifferentreasons,themostimportantbeinganidentitycrisis.Itisimportanttodealwithitandbringboththetribesunderoneplatformforabetterunderstanding.Civilsocietygroupsmaybeabletobringtheirleaderstogetherforaninitialdiscussionatsomespotawayfromtheconflictarea.Thenfollowstepstounderstandandrespectthefeelingsandrightsofothercommunities.Seminars,workshops,groupdiscussion,streetplays,etc.canassistinit.ThatmayrequireareviewofStatepoliciesonthesettlementofothercommunities.

ManyinstitutionslikeNGOs,socialandpoliticalgroupstriedto solve the conflict but they failed due to differences in theirideologyandunderstandingoftheissueandalsobecausesomeofthemplayedaone-sidedrole.TheKarbiAnglongAutonomousCouncilcanbringdifferentcommunitiestogetherthroughitswork.ThelandsettlementpolicyofKarbiAnglongisdifferentfromthatofothertribesandthatneedstobereviewed.

Summary and Conclusion ThestudywasnecessitatedbytheKarbi-Kukiconflictthathas


tobesolvedifthetwotribeshavetolivetogether.Themilitantgroupswere an important component in the conflict, sowerepoliticalparties.Theemotionalclimatetheycreatedagainsttheother tribes sucked the common people into the conflict.Theadministrationdidnotplayitsroleinpreventingorreducingtheimpactoftheconflict.Verylittlewasdonetodealwiththeidentitycrisis. Thisprocessresultedinmajordifferencesintheperceptionoftheconflictandincreatingemotionssuchasrevengeandhatred.Duringtheconflicteachtribecametogetheragainst theothers,forgettingtheirpolitical,religiousoreconomicdifferences.Manycommonpeopletookpartintheconflictbecauseofthefeelingthatthewholecommunitywasindanger.

Thesituationwasbroughundercontrolwiththeinterventionof different governmental and non-governmental agencies orchurch-based organisations.But the overall feeling that it is aconflictbetweentwocommunities(KarbiandKuki)toprotecttheiridentityhasnotdiedout.Amajorityonbothsidesdonotseetheinvolvementofthemilitantgroupsbutblametheadministration,politicalparties,youthorganisations,socialorganisations,commonpeopleandthepolicefornotplayingtheirrolewell.TheyignoretheroleofthemilitantgroupsthoughtheoriginoftheconflictistoagreatextenttheeffortoftheUPDSandKRAtogettheupperhand.

Wehavereferredtotheroleofthepoliticalpartiesduringthefirstphaseorthebeginningoftheconflict.Thesecondwastheblowoutphase.Thesmallincidentsofconflictbetweenthemilitantshadreachedtheordinarymembersofthetribes.Thethirdphasewasthecoolingdownordormantstagewithoutanysolution.Themilitantsandthepoliticalpartiestriedtomanipulateeachphase.ManyKarbi young persons realise thatwhile respecting theiridentitycrisis,theyshouldnothavetakentheissuetoanextreme.Nowtheyseetheneedtoinitiatesomepeacemoves.Everydarkcloudhasasilverlining.Itisimportantforthechurchandcivilsociety groups aswell as for the administration to understand

thesefeelingandtakethemforward.Differentorganisationsandindividualsofboththecommunitieshadcomeforwardforreliefwork.Thatcanbeusedasthefirststeptowardspeacebetweenthetribes.Peopletryingtounderstandthecoreproblemoftheconflictisthefirststeptowardspeace.

BIBLIoGRAPhy

Terang,Barelong,The History of Karbi, PublisherUnknown,Guwahati,2003.Lyall,Charles,The Mikirs,UnitedPublishers,Guwahati,1908.Phangcho,PhukanC,The Karbis of Northeast India,AngikPublication,Gu-wahati,2003.Phangcho,PhukanC,Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills,Phangcho,PhukanCPublisher,2001.

other Sources :MoU between ASDC (U) and KNA,Manja,4thDecember,2000.RegionalNewspaperslikeThe Telegraph, The Sentinel, The Assam Tribune, The Nagaland Post, etc.LocalNewspaperslikeThe Hill Times, The Arleng Daily, The Thek-Kere, The Thekar, etc.

Websitesontheinternet: www.geocities.com/klnlf www.kukifourm.com



MEITEI-NAGA CoNFLICT WTh SPECIAL REFERENCE To ThE TERRITo-

RIAL ISSuE IN MANIPuR

M. Dominic Maring

June2001witnessedtensionandviolencebetweentheMeiteiandtheNagasofManipurontheissueofextensionoftheceasefirebetweentheCentreandtheNSCN-IMtoalltheNagainhabitedterritories.Aroundathirdofthe populationofManipurbelongtotheNagaandothertribes.WhiletheNagaswelcomedthismove,other communities, especially theMeiteiwho are 60%of itspopulationlivingmainlyintheValleyfeltthreatened.Thatresultedin a conflict, death and arson.Today theMeitei commemorateJune18asMartyrs’daysincemostdeathswereonthatday.Thispaperisanefforttounderstandtheissuesinvolvedandsearchforpossiblesolutions.

The Background of Manipur

Manipur,oneoftheSevenSistersoftheNortheast,withanareaof22,327sq.km.issituatedintheextremecornerofthecountryborderingMyanmarintheeast,Nagalandinthenorth,Assaminthewest,andMizoraminthesouth.Geographically,Manipurisaregionwithaveryfertilevalleyof1,834sq.km.anddifficulthillrangesof15,154sq.km.ItliesbetweenLongitudeof93.03Eto94.78EandLatitudeof23.83Nto25.63N.Dueto such geo-topographical factors, the State was relativelyunaffectedbywidersocio-economic,political,andculturalcrosscurrents.So its interactionwasconfined to theneighbouringareasofCachar,Nagaland,Tripura,Assam,Mizoram,Myanmarandtheadjoininghills.

ManipuristheabodeofvariousethnicgroupsofwhichMeiteisandMeiteiPangals,whoresideinthevalley,arethelargest.

Thehillmen,dwellinthesurroundinghillranges.‘Historically,theoriginofthepeopleofManipurisuncertain,butastraditiongoes,theyareanamalgamationofseveralhilltribes,theKoomalsoftheEast;theMoirangsoftheSouth;andtheMeiteiandLooangsoftheNortheast.’2Accordingtothe2001census,itstotalpopulationis 23,88,634ofwhom12,07,338 aremales and11,81,296 arefemales.Theestimatedincreaseofpopulationinthedecade1991to2001,is5,51,845(30.04%).Thedensityis107personspersq.kmandthesexratiois978.Theliteracyrateofthestateis68.87%i.e.males77.87%andfemales59.70%.Thedecennialgrowth,sexratioandliteracyratearethushigherthanthenationalaverage.

IntheoldendaysManipurwasknowntotheneighbouringstatesbydifferentnamessuchas‘Mecklay’,‘Cassey’,‘Kase’,‘Kathe’,‘Makeli’,‘Magli’and‘Moglan’.ItisalsobelievedthatManipurderiveditsname,becausetherewasmuch‘DiamondOre’intheancienttimes;‘Mani’meaning‘diamond’and‘pur’meaning‘place’.1ManipurwasalsooneoftheoldestindependentkingdomsofSoutheastAsia.Ithaditsowncivilisation,traditionsandculturalheritage.Thepuyas(atraditionalwrittenrecord)giveanaccountofitspre-historicandproto-historicperiodwhichstartswiththeaccessionof‘NongdaLairenPakhangba’in33A.D.Heandhissuccessorsstartedtheprocessofnationbuildingbyconqueringalltheclansinthevalley.Itwascompletedinthe15thcentury.Withit,ManipurbecameafullfledgednationunderthebanneroftheNingthoujadynasty.WiththeconquestoftheKabowValley,theboundaryofManipurcrossedthehillrangesandextendeduptotheTransChindwin(nowinMyanmar)basin.

Inthefirsthalfofthe18thcentury,thepowerandprestigeofManipurreacheditszenithundertheleadershipofKingPamheiba.Throughhisundauntedspirit,hecarriedhisvictoriousarmiesuptotheimperialcityofAva.Healsoeffectedasuccessfulreligiousreformation.Inthesecondhalfofthecentury,Burmaretaliated

Meitei-Naga Conflict 115 116 Conflict Mapping in NEI

foritsdefeatthroughseveralonslaughts.ThatiswhenManipursought thehelpof theBritishstationedinAssam.But in thelastpartofthecentury,Manipurregainedpeaceandprosperityunder the initiativeofRajashreeBagyachandra.AthisdeathManipur entered its ‘DarkAge’, due towars of successionamonghissons.Takingadvantageofthesituation,theBurmeseinvadeditin1819andoccupiedManipurfrom1819to1826.Theatrocitiesthatresultedfromitarerememberedas“SevenYearsDevastation”(Chahitaretkhuntakpa).TheBritishthenmadeGambhirSinghtherulerofManipurbydrivingtheBurmeseoutofManipur.

Then came theYandabooTreaty of 24 February 1826.ThroughittheBurmeseemperorcededallhisterritoriestotheEastIndiaCompanyandrecognisedGambhirSinghasanindependentrulerofManipur.TheEastIndiaCompanythenbegantointerfereintheinternalaffairsofManipurandthatledtothe“Anglo-ManipurWarof1891.”Afteritsdefeat,thefateofManipurwasinthehandsoftheBritish.AftertheIndianIndependencein1947,ManipurwasmergedwiththeIndianUnionon15thOctober1949,underthe“ManipurMergerAgreement”.Itbecameafull-fledgedstatein1972.

The Population of Manipur

The‘Meitei’whoarealsocommonlycalled‘Manipuri’,isthedominantethnicgroupofManipur,livingmostlyinthevalley.There is a sizeableMuslim population calledMeitei-Pangals(MeiteiMuslims).TherearealsoScheduledCastessuchasDhupi(Dhopi),Lois,Muchi(Ravidas),Namasudra,Patni,SutradharandYaithibi.TheMeiteinumber13,61,521(57%).TheMeiteiPangals(ManipuriMuslims)are1,67,201(7%).Thus,64percentofthepopulationisMeitei.

Most tribes live in the hills.Among them, SenapatiDistricthasthehighestpopulationwith3,79,214,followedbyChurachandpur, 2,28,707,Ukhrul,1,40,946,Chandel,1,22,714

andTamenglong,1,11,493. The tribal population totals about7,13,813. TheNaga tribes ofManipur are theTangkhul, theZeliangrong(Ze-Zemei,Liang-Liangmei,Rong-Rongmei),Mao,Maram, Poumai,Maring, Anal, Lamkang,Monsang,Mayon,Thangal,Chothe,Tarao,Chiru,AngamiandtheSema.TheZemeandtheLiangmeiaretheKachaNagas.

TheTangkhulsliveinUkhrulDistrictandmostZeliangrongslive inTamenglongDistrictandinsomepocketsof theImphalvalley.TheMaos, theMarams, thePoumais, theThangals, theAngamisand theSemas live in theSenapatiDistrictborderingNagaland.TheMarings,theAnals,theLamkangs,theMonsangs,theMoyonsandtheTaraosareconcentratedinChandelDistrictborderingMyanmar.TheChirus are scattered inTamenglong,ChurachandpurandSenapatiDistrict.

The Meitei-Naga Relationship in the Past & Present

Table1showsthat38.36percentoftheNagasfeelthattherewas ‘cordial relationship’ before the June 18th 2001Uprising.But51.88percentofthemfeelthatitwasnotsocordial’.Ontheotherside49percentoftheMeiteisfeelthattheirrelationshipwas‘cordial’beforetheJune18th2001Uprisingand33percentsaystronglythatit‘wasnotsocordial’.31.58percentoftheneutralgroup feel thatMeitei-Naga relationshipwas cordial but 57.89percentofthesamegroupstronglyfeltotherwise.

Table 1:TheRrelationship Between the Meiteis and the Nagas before June 18th 2001 uprising was (119 respones) Responses Nagas (%) Meiteis (%) Neutral Gruop (%) Cordial 51 38.36 64 49 42 31.58Notsocordial 69 51.88 44 33 77 57.89NoComment 13 9.76 25 18 14 10.53

1L.Jeyaseelan,ImpactoftheMissionaryMovementinManipur(NewDelhi:ScholarPublish-ingHouse(P)Ltd.,1996,p2.2Ibid,p8


According to Table 2, 17% of theNagas say that therelationshipbetweentheMeiteisandtheNagasinthepostJune18th 2001Uprising has ‘improved’. 47 percent of them saythatit‘gotworse’andthatit‘willneverimprove’.Inthesamemanner,47.89percentof theMeiteis state that the relationshiphas‘improved’but31.09percentstatethattherelationship‘gotworse’ in the post June18th 2001Uprising and12.61percentoftheMeiteissuggestthatit‘willneverimprove’.While21.01percentofneutralgroupfeelthattherelationshiphas‘improved’inthepostJune18th2001Uprising,53.78percentsaythatit‘gotworse’.

Table 2: The Meiteis think that the Nagas are (based on the interview responses of 265 persons)

Responses Nagas (%) Meiteis (%) NeutralGroup (%)Improved 20 17 57 47.89 25 21.01Gotworse 56 47 37 31.09 64 53.78Willneverimprove 30 25 15 12.61 16 13.45Willgetworse 13 11 10 8.41 14 11.76

Social Relationship

InTable3onefindsthat44.15percentoftheNagasstronglyfeelthattheMeiteisthinkthattheNagasareinferiortothem.Inthesamespirit,40.38percentofMeiteisstatethattheNagasareinferiortothembutathirdoftheMeiteis(33.58percent)feelthattheNagasaresuperiortothem.Ontheotherside33.96percentoftheneutralgroupstatethattheNagasareinferiortotheMeiteisand26.42percentobjecttothisview.TheysaythattheNagasaresuperiortotheMeiteis.Ofimportanceisthefactthatnonespeaksofequality.thequestionisofonegroupbeingsuperiororinferiortotheother.Thisattitudeisbasictoaconflict.

Aftersuperiorityandinferioritycomestheissueoflikesanddislikes(Table3).25percentoftheNagarespondentsdisliketheattitudeoftheMeiteis.40.38percentofthemfeelstronglythat

theMeiteiattitudeisoneofintolerance.Ontheotherside,45.19percentoftheMeiteifeelthattheNagasdislikethemagainst28.84percentwhostatethattheyareintolerant.Inthesamespirit45.19percentoftheneutralgroupfeelthattheNagaattitudetowardstheMeiteisisoneofdislikeand19.24percentspeakofintolerance.

That there are differences in theNaga-Meitei relations isobvious.TheNagasocialstructure isdifferentfromthatof theMeiteis.TheNagawoman’sstatusisbetterthanthatofherMeiteicounterparts.DifferencesexistalsointheirhistorybecauseoftheHinduisationoftheMeitei.TheNagascontinuedtobeAnimists.Thustwopeopleswhowerecloselyrelatedweredivided.ThencametheKingdomin the18thcentury thatcametobeviewedpredominantly asMeitei.Theprocesswas completedwith theChristianisation of theNagas.Amajor dividerwas the purity-pollutionthatcamewithHinduismthattheNagasdidnothave.Because of it theMeitei donot allow theNagas or the tribalsingeneral, toentertheirhouseoreatwiththem.TheexclusivetribaltendencycomplementsitontheNagaside.Theexclusivetendenciesarestillfoundamongsomehavebeenstrengthenedbytheirreligiousconversionandrecentpoliticaldevelopments.Thus,thepresentisbuiltonthepast.

Table 3: Attitude Towards the Nagas or Meitei (104 respones)

Responses Nagas (%) Meiteis (%) Neutral Group (%)

Dislike 27 25.96 47 45.19 47 45.19 Toleration 25 24.04 20 19.24 26 25 Intolerance 42 40.38 30 28.84 20 19.24NoComment 10 09.62 7 06.73 11 10.57

Economic Relations

Agriculture is themainstayof theeconomyofboth theMeiteisandtheNagas.Butthehilltribespractisejhumcultivationand a few are involved in terrace farming.TheMeitei beinga peasant community in the plains, practisewet cultivation.


Traditionallythehillpeopleusedtobringagriculturalproducelikeplaintainleaves,bambooshoots(UsoiorSoibum)vegetables,tealeaves,firewood,charcoalandfruitsdowntotheplainsforsalein itsopenbazars/markets. In return theyused tobuyessentialcommodities likeNgari (fermentedfish),fish,dal, salt,onions,oil,mustardleaves,potatoesandclothes.Theinternaltradedealtchieflyinfooditems.Itwascarriedoutessentiallybywomen.Theexistingtrade,bothexternalandinternalissmallinscaleandisessentiallytomeetthelocaldemands.

Thus, the economic tiesmake the hill and valley peopleinseparable.Any disturbance to them can result in amajoreconomic crisis.Both the hill and plains peoplewould sufferbecauseofit.NationalHighways39and56aretheState’slifeline.RecenttensionshaveresultedintheirblockadeandthathasaffectedthecommerciallifeinthecapitalImphal.Thus,whileeconomicrelationsarecrucial,theseactionsbasedonsocialtensionshaveledtostrainedrelationsbetweenthetwocommunities.

Ethnic Relations

Even though both claim that they belong to theTibeto-Burman family, there arewide ethnic and cultural differencesbetween them.Tradtionally theNagaswerewarriorsandhead-huntingtribeswhiletheMeiteiwereperceivedasconquerors.Ofcoursetherehavebeensomeintermarriagesinthepastandtheycontinueevennow.Buttheyareexceptionsratherthantherule.

Over time, they have developed ethnic relations ofintoleranceandmutualdistrust.Eachgroupwants tooutdo theother.TheMeiteisliveinacompactareainthevalley,speakthesamelanguageandfollowthesametraditionalculturalpractices.Therefore,theywieldpowerinthevalley.TheNagasontheotherhand,arescatteredalloverthehilldistricts,speakdifferentdialectsandfollowdifferentculturalpractices.TheMeiteiandNagaslivingnthevalleyshowsignsoffriendshipbutintheirheartstheyareaconfusedlot2.Theydonotfeelateasewithoneanother.

Cultural Relationst

Todaythesetwocommunitiesprofessdifferentfaiths.TheMeiteis feel thatHinduismissuperior toChristianitywhile thetribalsfeel theoppositeaboutHinduism.OntheothersideonecannotsayeasilythatChristianityunitestheNagas.Therehavebeenmanyconflictsbetweenthemthoughtheybelongtothesamereligion.Theirtribalidentitygetsprecedenceovertheirreligiousbelonging.However, onmany issues their religion becomes astrongbasisforNagaunity.4ThedifferenceismuchgreaterwithHinduism.Soreligionhasbecomeadivisivefactor.

However, some practices that link theMeitei andNagacultureshavecomedownfromthepast.Forinstance,whentheMeiteiscelebratetheLai Haraoba(actofworship),aTangkhulcostumeshouldberepresentedinNongpok Ningthou and Panthoibi Lai-haraoba.TheKanglei Haraobacannotbecompletedwithoutit.Formerly,before theRaja laid the foundationof apalace, aritualprayerhadtobesaidbyapriestoftheKabuiNagatribe.Itwasdone,forinstance,whentheLangmangdong,theLangthabal(1709)andSangaiproupalaceswereconstructed.

TheNagasandtheMeiteifollowedacommontraditionalsowhilebuildingahouse.Generally,thehousesofbothfacedtheeastandhaveawoodencrossontopofthehouse.Thetraditionalkitchen or fire place of both of them stands on three stones(PhungaNungduminMeitei).Bothstorewaterinapitchertotheleftofthehouseorkitchen.ThereareothersimilaritiesbetweenindividualNaga tribesand theMeitei forexample, themannerinwhichtheMaringsandtheMeiteipropitiatedthespirits.TheMaringspracticeKannathuitochaseawaythespiritsduringillness,pestilenceanddrought.TheMeiteipractisedthou-thouba.BothkeephouseholddeitieslikeChimthraiandSanamahioftheMeiteis.TheLainingthou phunal NingthouisworshippedbybothMeiteisandthephunalMarings.TheMorung(Dormitory)systemisfoundamongbothbutthenamediffers.Theseandotherinstancesshow


deepculturallinkagesbetweenthetwobutoflatedivisionshavearisenamongthem.

The Political Relationship

Table4showsthat31.07percentoftheNagasfeelthatthe‘IndianGovernment’playsadivideandruleroleand45.63percentblamethepoliticiansforit.Ontheotherside,36.80percentoftheMeiteisfeelthat‘politicians’playthisroleand46.61percentblamethe‘IndianGovernment’forit.35.92percentoftheneutralgroupstatethattheIndianGovernmentplaysthedividingpolicy.

Table 4: Who is Dividing the People? (responses of 103 persons)

Responeses Nagas (%) Meiteis (%) Neutral Group (%)Politicians 47 45.63 38 36.80 45 43.69StudentUnions 0 54.85 0 54.95 07 6.79Outsiders 0 32.92 10 9.70 08 7.77IndianGovt. 32 31.07 48 46.61 37 35.92Militants 16 15.53 02 01.94 06 5.83

In thepast,Nagashaveplayedan important role in thepoliticaldevelopmentoftheState.Forexample,Sameirong(518-568)whoruledManipur in the6thcentury issaid tobeof theTangkhultribe.Mongyamba(1562-1597)andGaribniwas(1709-1748)aresaidtobefromtheAnalandThangaltribesrespectively.Thus,intheirtraditiontheyshowedsomepoliticalunity.KabuiSalangMaibaplayedaprominentroleinthelegendofKhambaThoibi.ManyTangkhuls,Thangals,Kabuis,MaringsandAnalsparticipatedinthecompaignagainsttheBurmese.ButtodaytheNagasfeelthattheMeiteiofficerspostedinthehilldistrictsarenotcommittedtoNagaorothertribalinterests.Thatcausessuspicionamongthem.Traditional Way of Conflict resolutionTable 5: Is There an Indigenous Way of Solving Conflicts? (274 responses)

Responses Dialogue Negotiation Symbols Traditional resolutionNo.ofpers. 160 111 03 00Percentage 58.39% 40.52% 1.09% 0%

Table5showsthat58.39percentoftherespondentsfeelthat‘dialogue’istheonlymeanstoresolveaconflictwhile40.52percentwant‘negotiations’.Theyalsofeelthatthereisnoexistingsymboltoaddresstheproblemofconflictorpeace.Thereisnotraditionalpracticeofresolvingconflicts.Othersareoftheviewthattraditionallyconflictswereresolvedthroughnegotiationsanddialogue.Dr.Gangtefeelsthatemotionalbondingandrenewaloftrustareamongtoolsofconflictresolution.Whethertraditionalsystemsexistedornot,todaythebestwayistoacceptandrespecttherights,traditions,cultureandreligiouspracticesofeachother.Thetraditionalbondofa‘co-existingspirit’cancontributetoasolution.Duringthecease-firedeclarationin2001betweenGOIandNSCN(IM),Nagasusedthe‘Whiteflag’asasymbolofpeace,whiletheMeiteisused‘Blackflag’asasignofprotest.Agrievanceis that theState’snaturalandothereconomicresourcesarenotdistributedequally.Onemayneedtolookatthisgrievance.Thatrequiresdialogue.5

Inthepastsomehavetriedtopromotepeaceintheregionthroughmusic.Forinstance,asongwascomposedonunityandrespectforotherscalled,“Ogri”.TheMeiteisangitintheMaoNagaareatostrikeachordofunityandforgivenessandnottorevoltagainstMaharajaKirtiChandraSingh.AlsoBhupenHazarikaofAssam sang a songof love and forgiveness to theNagas atKohima in 1964 in themidst of bloodshed.Some suggest thatNagaswearingMeiteiclothesandMeiteiswearingNagaclothesonceafortnightcanbecomeanexternalsignofthetwoacceptingeachother.Otherswantclubsandunionstobeoganisedareawise,ratherthanbycommunity.”6

The Question of Territorial Integrity

Ultimately,however,onecannotdenythatthe‘Question


of Territorial Integrity’ hasbecomecrucialtotheconflict.TheagreementbetweentheGovernmentofIndia(GOI)andNSCN-IMextendingtheceasefire “without territorial limits” causedaturmoilinManipurinJune2001.SuchanextensionmakestheMeiteibelieve that territorial integrity isat stake.On theotherside,thetribalsbelievethatforcenturiesthehillareashavebeenneglected by theMeitei rulers. Psychologically, tribals havedevelopedaninferioritycomplexinspiteofthepoliticalpowertheyhavegained.Theyfeelthatmostdevelopmentschemesarecentred round Imphaland thevalleyand that thehill areasareneglected.Theschemesmeantforthehillsareoftenmanipulatedbythehillpoliticiansandleadersthemselves.Therefore,Nagapeopleandtheirareasremainundeveloped.MoneymeantfordevelopingtheNagaareasgetsintothehandsoftheMeiteileaders.Besides,theMeiteiaswellasNagaundergroundmovementscreatealotof disturbance in thedevelopmentalwork.They take contractsforworksandsubmitcompletionreportswithoutcompletingthework.1

Table 6: Whom is Responsible for the Conflict? (75 responses) Responses Nagas (%) Meiteis (%) NeutralGroup (%)TheNagapeople 05 6.67 05 6.66 05 6.66TheMeiteis 20 26.66 08 10.66 20 26.67TheIndianGovt. 25 33.33 25 33.34 35 46.67Theext.ofCease-FireintoManipur 15 20.00 31 41.34 07 9.34MilitantsofManipur 05 6.67 01 1.34 05 6.66ClubandAssociations 05 6.67 05 6.66 03 4.00

33.33% of theNaga respondents say that the IndianGovernmentisresponsiblefortheconflict,butothersfeelthattheMeiteioppositiontotheextensionofceasefireisitsrealcause.Ontheotherside33.34%oftheMeiteisfeelstronglythattheIndianGovernmentshouldbeheldresponsibleforitandonly41.34%saythatextensionofceasefireledtotheconflict.TheyfeelthatitsrootcauseisthatMuivah,whohailsfromManipurhasbeen

unwillingtoacceptthestateofManipurasitexists.TheactivitiesoftheNagaClubfoundedin1918spreadtotheneighbouringhillsofManipurgraduallyand‘ManipurPanClub’,(1939)spreaditsculturalactivitieseventoGuwahati.ThesegroupswereinfluencedbythealliancebetweenpersonslikeA.Z.PhizoandHijamIrabotofManipur.TheymetinBurmainthe1950sbutfailedtoreachChinadespitetheassistanceofThakinAhanTun,theChiefoftheCommunistPartyofBurma.

ThetwoleadersfailedalsotoachievetheirpoliticalobjectivesbutembracedculturalRevolutionfortheirpeople.ThepoliticaleventsaroundthePartitionmovedsofastthatneithertheMeiteinortheNagascouldcopewiththesuddenchange.MeiteisdidnotmakeanissueofitinitiallysincetheyweretoldthatbeingHindustheybelongedtoIndia.TheNagas,beingneitherHindusnorMuslims,didnotknowwheretheybelongedinthisreligion-basedPartition.TheywatchedwithapprehensiontheterritorialconsolidationoftheIndianUnionaccomplishedbySardarPatel,theIronManofIndia.

AmidthisuncertainntycametheintegrationofManipurwithIndiaandtheconsolidationoftheManipuriState.TheNagasfeltthat theywere taken forgranted in theprocessofassimilation.Slowly a feeling grew among them that their destiny did notco-existwiththatoftheMeiteis.TheywereapprehensiveoftheleadershipofManipurdominatedbyoneethnicgroup.2Thus,theconflictbetweenthetwobeganslowlybuthasgotintensifiedintherecentpast.TheCentre’sdecisionon theceasefirewidenedtheemotionalgapbetweenthem.Thestategovernment’spolicyoftryingtoextendtheManipurLandRevenue(MLR)Act1960tothehillareasisresentedbythehilltribes.Theyfeelthatitisanefforttoalienatetheirland.TheMeiteifeelthatthetribeswhoare40percentofthepopulationareoccupying60percentofthelandleavingonly40percentforthemwhilethetribesfeelthatthe


Meiteiaremonopolisingallthejobs.

These and other instances result in accusations ofdiscrimination.TheNagasclaimthattheMeiteiattimescallthem“Hao”(alowstatustribal)orconsiderthem“Amangba”(Unclean).ThesetermsdevaluetheirsocialandculturalsystemsandcreateabinaryoppositionbetweentheMeiteisandthehillpeople.Theycarrywithinthemanideologyofpurityandpollution,whichistheveryfoundationofthecastesystemwhilethetribesarecastelesssocieties.

Thus, tension existedbetween the two for somedecades.TheCentre seems to have been ignorant of this situation andtookadecisionbasedpurelyonpartypoliticalconsiderationsandextendedtheceasefirebeyondNagalandtotheneighbouringareaswherevertheNagaslived.ThatwasamodeoftellingManipurthattheCentreconsideredtheNagaHillsapartofNagaland.TheMeitei considered it a threat to the territorial integrity of theirStatebecausetheyneededbothpowerandlandinthehills.ThatintensifiedtheconflictofJune2001.ItsflashpointwasthekillingofpeopleonJune18.TheMeiteiobserveitasMartyrs’Dayandithasbecomeasymbolofdivisionbetweenthetwo.

Table7showsthat32.19percentoftheNagasfeelthattheethnicconflictisduetonon-practiceofmoralsandethicsagainst47.27percentwhothinkthatitisbecauseofrivalrybetweentheircommunities.Similarly,38.35percentoftheMeiteisfeelthatitisduetonon-practiceofmoralsandethicsagainst53.43percentwhoattributeittorivalrybetweenthetwo.BothblamealsotheCentreforit.

Table 7: other Causes of the Ethnic Conflict (146 responses)

Responses Nagas (%) Meiteis (%) NeutralGroup (%) Familybreakdown 30 20.54 12 8.22 0 0Non-practiceofmorals&ethics 47 32.19 56 38.35 57 39.04Rivalrybetween

differentcomm. 69 47.27 78 53.43 89 60.96

Sinceitbecameclearthatanidentitysearchwasintegraltothisconflict,theywerequestionedalsoonthisissue.65.66percentoftheNagas feelthatitisduetothegrowingethnicidentityissueagainst34.34percentwhodisagree withit.OntheMeiteiside54.82percentagree withitagainst45.18percentwhodisagree.Anidentitysearchisnotdestructiveinitself.ButinManipurandinmuchoftheNortheastithaslapsedinto“ethinicityconstruction”whichhasinittheseedofsocialdivision.Tillaboutacenturyago,thehilltribeswereknownonlyasAnal,Maring,Kabui,Tangkhul,Mao,Thangal,Maram,Chiru and soon.Today this identity iscombinedwiththeirNagabelonging.

ItisasocialprocessthattheMeiteiareunabletodealwith.Theytooarestrugglingwithasimilarcrisis.Ithassub-consciouslyprompted theNagas to demand territorial integration and theMeiteistodemandtheterritorialintegrityofManipur.ThereisnoprovisionintheIndianConstitutiontodealwithsuchdevelopmentsbecausetheyaresocialandpsychologicalissues,notlegal.SotheStatetendstotakerecoursetoapurelylawandorderapproach.ThatiswhathappenedinManipurwhentheinitialpoliticalmovefailed.Inthecontext,theNagafeelingofneglectbecameintegraltotheiridentitysearch.Apoliticalsolutionhasbeenfoundtothequestionbyallotting20outof60seatsinthelegislativeassemblytothetribes.Buttheyfeelthatitdoesnotsolvetheproblemoftheirperceivedorrealdiscrimination.Alltheseissuescametogetherwhentheextensionoftheceasefirewasannouncedandpolarisedthetwosides.

The Meitei Stand

TheMeiteisareunitedintheirthinkingthatManipurshouldneverbedivided.TheydonotrecogniseanyNaga,KukiorMeiteiarea.Alllandbelongstoallpeople.Tosomeextentitisapositivedevelopment.SomeMeiteis donot evenwant to use theword‘Kangleipak’asitcangivetheimpressionthatitisMeiteiland


andantagonisethetribalandothercommunities.Theywantallto show their solidarity for the preservation of their territorialintegrity.Theyarepreparedtohearallviews,evendissent,butultimatelytheyimposetheirview.SomeofthemstatethatiftheNagaswant‘GreaterNagaland’theyshouldleaveManipurandgotoNagalandbutnottaketheirlandwiththem.Theyclaimtobeagainstnocommunityinparticular,butonlyagainsttheNSCN(IM)buttheygivetheimpressionthattheyarenotseriousontheissueofpoliticalautonomytothetribals,suchasimplementingtheprovisionsofthe6thScheduleoftheConstitution.TheysaythatnodiscriminationispractisedinManipuragainsttheNagasandaddthatformanyyears,tribalsweretheChiefMinistersofManipur.Theywanttoknowwhythetribalareaswerenotdevelopedduringtheirtime.

Theyadd that thehereditaryRajas ruledover thehillsaskingsofalli.e.tribes,MeiteisandMeiteiPangals,thattheyarenotagainstanhonourablesettlementoftheNSCN-IMdemand,butthatitcannotbeatthecostofManipurwhosesuzeraintyoncerangedfromtheKabowValleytotheSurmaValley.

For theNSCN (IM) negotiations to be successful, boththey and theUnionGovernment should jointly declare thattherewillbenobreakingupof Manipur.Alleffortsshouldbemadetowardsaholisticsolutionandtheinterestsofeverygroupshouldbetakenintoconsideration.ItshouldbecleartotheUnionGovernmentandtotheNSCN(IM)thattheManipuriswillnotstand in thewayofpeaceas longas the territorial integrityofManipur ismaintained.They are afraid that if theNaga areasdisintegrate; Churachandpur, Tengnoupal and Moreh maymakesimilarclaims to joinMizoram.Theysay that theNagasexpandedtheirideologyfromindependentvillagestostatehood.Nowtheyaredreamingofasovereignnation.TheyconsideritNagaexpansionismandathreattopeaceandterritorialintegrity.

The Naga Claim

TheNagasclaimthattheMeiteisalwaysdiscriminateagainstthem, that theirareasarenotdevelopedthat thedevelopmentalschemesarecentredonly inandaroundImphaland thevalley.TheyaddthattheirareaswereartificiallyintegratedbythekingandthenbytheBritishtoservetheircolonialinterests,thattheywereneverruledoverbytheMeiteiRajas.Theydiscardtheclaimof theMeitei assimilation of the hills areas through conquestsandadd:“Wearenotaskingforanyone’sland;itisourlandanditshouldbereturnedtous.Theruleofthekingsextendedonlytothevalley.TheNagaswereruledbytheVicePresidentoftheDurbardirectlyduringtheBritishoccupation.Itissubstantiatedbyhistory.WenowwanttouniteNagainhabitedareasunderoneadministrativeunit.FailuretointegratetheseareasintoNagalim(GreaterNagaland)wouldresultinaawasteofeffortsofthelast50years.”Aminorityamongthemfeelsthattheywereneveronenationbutconsistedofvariouswarringtribes.ManywholiveclosetotheImphalvalleywantnodivision.Theyseetheirfuturehereanddonotwanttoleavetheplace.TheyfearthattheymaynotbetreatedwellintheproposednewNagaland.

Onemay add that it is to a great extent an issue of landand territory.The political identity of theNagas, has reachedthenational level fromthevillageor tribalpolity. It isamajorachievementofthe‘NagaNationalMovement.’Todaytheyhavedeveloped a psycheof belonging to a nationof their own andarefighting for their collective rights through their nationalistmovement,basedonagreatdesiretolivetogetherasafamily,freefromalieninterferenceorimposeddesireof“SelfRule.’’Thisishowtheydefinethe‘NagaMovementforfreedomandfeelthatveryoftenitismisunderstoodandmisquoted.TheyhaveclaimedforhalfacenturythattheyarenotofIndianoriginliketheAryansandDravidiansbutoftheMongoloidracialstock.TheyareacastelesssocietythatisdifferentfromtheIndiancaste-basedsociety.

The Naga Nationalist Struggle


Since the independence of India, theNaga people havechallenged the nationbuildingprocess andwhat they considerimpositionofitssingleadministrativesystemontheirancestralland.They feel that the historical roots of theNaga politicalmovementareasoldascolonialexpansionintheNagaHills,thattheyfoughtagainsttheBritishcolonialistsforintrudingintotheir“wayoflife.”Eventually,thestrugglebecameaninsurrectionintheearly1950s.ThearmedwingoftheNagaNationalCouncil(NNC)emergedasthe‘NagaArmy’.OnemayaddthattheNagaNationalistethosemergedinthe1940sthroughthewaragainstJapaneseinvasion.Thus,theNagapoliticalmovementisoneoftheoldeststrugglesinthesub-continent.

ThefirsteverroundofNagaPeacetalkswasheldinthe1960sunderIndiraGandhibutthetalksfailed.ThisfailuredividedtheNagasocietypolitically.AsectionoftheNagaleadersendorsedtheShillongAccord of November 11, 1975.Discontentmentwith theAccord spilt the germof sectional rivalry, leading totheformationofanothermilitantmovementcalledthe‘NationalSocialistCouncilofNagaland’(NSCN).Thesadepisodeofthe1960sandtheNagaPeacetalkscontinuetobeabadmemorytomanyNagas.TheNSCNitselfsplitintotwofactionsduringthe1980sbutpoliticalunitycontinuesonthenationalistissue.SotheNagasfeelhumiliatedbythedevelopmentsofthe1960sand70sandthesplitbecausetheseeventsareatthebasisofthepresentsocio-politicaldivideamongtheNagas.

ThepresentGOI-NSCN(IM)ceasefiretalksareconditioned

bythesedevelopments.Theyareunconditionaltalksatthehighestpolitical level carriedon at a venueoutside India.The leadersvisited India inDecember 2004 and in January2005 andheldtalkswiththeGovernmentofIndiatospeedupthepeaceprocess.Butthetalksarecontinuingwithverylittlehopeofsuccess.TheNagas feel thatNagalim is essential for their identity and thatit is integral to thepeacetalks.TheNSCN(IM)hasdreamsofestablishingaNagalimcarvingoutportionsoftheterritoriesoftheneighbouringstates.Theoutfitclaimsatotalareaof1,20,000sq.KmastheirNagasnaturalterritory.Thatisthereasonforextendingthe ceasefire to all theNaga inhabited areas.TheNaga-MeiteiconflictthatfollowedforcedtheUnionGovernmenttowithdrawthisorder.Thatbecameamajorsetbacktothenegotiationssothestalematecontinues.

The Government’s Response

TheCentralGovernmentwantstobringpeacebutdoesnotknowhowtogoaboutit.TheywanttosettletheNagaissue,butnotatthecostoftheMeiteiinterests.Somethinkthatitwantsthetalksandtheceasefireagreementtogoononlytowearthemoutsinceitthinksthatthemilitantswillbereluctanttogetbacktothearmsagain.ItcannotaffordtoalienateeithertheNagasortheMeiteissoitmayoptforthestatusquobygivingsomesortoflocalautonomytotheNagainhabitedareas.TheStateGovernmentwantsthestatusquotobemaintained.NomemberofthelegislatureorParliamentofManipurwantstheStatetobedividedbutthepressuregroupsareintheforefrontoftheNagalimdemand. Asfarasthepresentthemeisconcerned,theGovernmentconsistsofthreeconstituents,thepoliticians,bureaucratsandthesecurity forces.The lastplayan interventionist roleofsecurityforce deployment, relief services and organisingmeetings fordialogue.10OfficiallytheremainingwingsoftheGovernmentdonothaveadefiniteroleinconflictmanagement.Wheretheyhavepower,theyhavebeencautious.Article3oftheConstitutionafter

1AninterviewwithA.MangolijaoSingh,dated20-05-04atKhurai.2AninterviewwithMadamCecilia,dated12-06-04atNepaliBasti.3AninterviewwithDr.BenedictMorung,dated02-04-04atMinuthong.4AninterviewwithSirBenjaminGangte,ex-principal,D.M.CollegeArts,dated28-05-04atChingmeirong.5AninterviewwithDr.T.S.Gangte,dated03-07-04atOldNambulane,Imphal.6AninterviewwithRSJassal,dated07-05-04atChingmeirong,textpublishedin‘TheSangaiExpress-Newspaper’,29June,2004.


the18thAmendmentgivespowertotheParliamenttoformnewStatesorUnionTerritories,unitingordividingpartsofexistingunits.TheGovernmentisalsosupposedtofindwaysofpacifyingthepartiesinaconflictthroughwelldefinedeconomicpoliciesthatalsosolvetheunemploymentproblemandmaintainandimprovethesocialandeconomicconditionofthehillareas.Ithastakensomeinitiativesbyrecruitingtheyouthinthesecurityforces.ThereservationpolicyisresentedbytheMeiteis. Becauseofthefearofantagonisingoneortheotherparty,in practice theCentre has done nothing substantial tomanagethe conflict.A Five point ceasefire agreementwas signed incontinuation of the ongoing peace process, during ameetingwhichwasheldon13and14June,2001inBangkok,Thailand,betweentherepresentativesoftheGovernmentofIndia(GOI)and theNational SocialistCouncil ofNagaland (NSCN-IM).Article(I)oftheagreementallowedtheextensionoftheceasefire“without territorial limits”.Byfirstextending theceasefireandthenwithdrawing,theCentreanatagonisedbothsides.Thepeopleperceiveitasdelaytacticsandthathasabadeffectintherelationsbetweenthetwo.Itsrolehastobetofindcompromisesthatcanbringittoalogicalconclusionwithouteithersidelosingface.The Present Conflict Situation

Table8showsthat34.55percentoftherespondentsfeelthatthe18thJune,2001uprisingwasanimmaturereactionwhile28percentstatethatitwastotallyunexpected.Ontheotherhand23percentthinkthatitwasnecessaryand10.55percentsaythatitwastotallyunnecessary.TheextensionofceasefireintoManipurwasitsmaincause.TheMeiteisfearedthatitwoulddisturbtheterritorialintegrityofManipur.ThethenHomeMinisterShriL.K.Advaniexplained“withoutterritoriallimits”asnottouchingtheterritorybuttheMeiteiswerenotconvincedandvowedtoprotecttheirterritory.

Table 8: The Cause of the Present conflict (260 responses)

Responses No. of persons PercentageMeiteiDomination 25 9.62NagaDomination 16 6.16RiseofMilitancy 54 20.76FailureoftheStateGovernment 73 28.08UnemploymentorPoverty 28 10.76

Practiceofinjusticetowardshillpeople 64 24.62

AsTable8shows,28.08percentspeakofthe‘failureoftheStateGovernment’asthemainreasonoftheconflictwhile24.62percentstatethatitisduetothe‘practiceofinjusticetowardsthehillpeople’.20.76percentthinkthatitisduetothe‘riseofmilitancy’inthestateandonly10.76percentstatethatitisduetounemploymentandpoverty.TheyperceivetheGovernment’shandlingof theproblemandtheriseofmilitancyas themainreasonsfortheongoingtusslebutignoreothercauses.

TheNaga desire of integrationwithNagalim and theMeitei determination to preserve the territorial integrity ofManipur thus contradict each other.But themajor reason oftheuprisingisthegrowingethnicidentityonbothsidesandtheeffortsforitspreservation.2AccusationssuchasneglectbytheMeiteisandirresponsiblebehaviouroftheNagasfollowfromit.ThewronghandlingoftheprocessbytheCentrecompletedtheviciouscircle.SomealsoholdtheState’spoliticiansresponsibleforitbecauseinsteadofaddressingtheState’sproblems,theyhavebeenlookingfortheirpersonalbenefitsandgains.Otherssaythatthenon-implementationofthe‘SixthSchedule’inthehillareasisitsrootcause.Someviewtheuprisingasasuddenprovocation,notaconflict.Theseissueshavetobeseeninthecontextoflackofdevelopmentandtheresentmentfollowingfromit.

Table 9: how Do People of other communities Perceive the uprising? (275 responses)

Responses was necessary Totally Totally An immature No comment


unne

cess

ary

unex

pect

ed

reac

tion

No.ofpersons

66

29

77

95

8Percentage

24%

10.54%

28%

34.55%

2.91%

Nat

ure

and

Impa

ct o

f the

Con

flict

Theconflictthatbeganwiththeextensionoftheceasefire,w

asviolent.Itcauseddamagetopublic

property,bandhs,boycotts,blockadeetc.andculminatedintheviolentprotestofJune18,2001.W

hen

protestorsfrom

alldirectionsgatheredinfrontoftheRajBhavan.Afterovercom

ingsecuritybarricades

amidstthelathichargeandteargasshells,theyturnedviolentandburntdow

ntheManipurAssem

bly

Secretariat,officesofpoliticalparties,9MLA

quartersandtheC

hiefMinister’soffice.TwoMLA

s,namely,

K.Tom

baandN.B

iharisufferedseriousburninjuriesandtheManipurLegislativeAssem

blySpeaker

Shri.S.D

hananjoywascaughtan

dbeatenupbythep

rostestors.18personsdiedwhenthesecurityforces

openedfire.TheviolencewasnotdirectedtowardstheNagas,thoughinsom

ecasestheirpropertiesin

andaroundIm

phalw

eredamaged.Thefearpsychosisitcreatedremainseventoday.Som

eofthem

left

theV

alley.Afewofthemreturnedaftersom

etim

eandothersremainedforalongtimeinthereliefcam

patSenapati.SomeNagashavesoldtheirplotsandhouses.

Everyconflictaffectsnormallife.Thesocio-econom

iclifegetsaffected.Thissectionwillexamine

someo

fitseffects.Thefi

rstispolarisation.Theco

nflictrem

ainsaliveinthem

indsbothoftheN

agasan

dtheMeiteis.Ithascauseddistrustamongthem

.Theydislikeeachotherbutsh

owoutwardtoleranceand

speakagainsttheotherwhentheyareamongtheirown.Onecannotblameoneortheothersideforit.

Thestudyofpeople’sm

ovem

ents,likethatoftheNagasisnotfreefrom

criticism

.Intheeffo

rttoachieve

theirgoals,theyhavecreatedcontroversiesandhaveindulgedinawarofarmsandwords.N

ow,among themexistdoubts,apprehensionsandfear.Passionandemotions

haveblurredthevisiononbothsides.TheMeiteiaredeterminedtosafeguardterritorialintegrityandtheNagasarecommittedtoNagalim. Theconflicthasthusreachedthe“criticaldemocraticwayofpoliticalbargaining”.Ithasbroughttotheforeallegationsmadeinprivateaboutthe“riseofmilitancyandinjusticetowardsthehillpeople”.Thetwopartieshavenotchallengedeachotherphysicallybuthaveexchangedharshwords.Emotionshavebeenroused.Awrongmovecanignitethesparkthatcanturnintoaconflagration.Arroganceanddisgusthavegrownonbothsides.TheNagafeelfrustratedbutithasalsobroughtnewlifetotheirstruggle. Therespondentswerealsoaskedwhethersomehadbenefitedfromtheconflict.AsTable10shows,66.06percentbelievethatthe economic situation and living standards have deteriorated.27.37percentadd that theconflict is solely responsible for thebackwardness of their society.But 46.35 percent feel that thepoliticianshavebenefitedmost from it. 17.88percent feel thatunderthepoliticians’shadow,businesspeoplehavegotitsbenefits.7.15%feelthatthemilitantgroupstoogetitsbenefits.Butthereisnearunanimityinsayingthatthegeneralpublicandcivilsocietyhavesuffered.Table 10: Who Benefited the Most from the Conflict (274 responses)

Responses No. of persons Percentage Thepoliticians 12746.35 UndergroundGroups 4717.15 Educatedpersons 134.75 Governmentservants 82.92


Meirapaibis

8

2.92

Businessp

eople

49

17.88

Nocomments

22

8.03

Inotherwords,theceasefireisawatermarkanditsim

pactisbeyondmeasurement.Itclaimed18

preciouslivesandhundredsofpersonsweremaimed.O

newom

an,Smt.SorokhaibamSobitaDevi,39

wasinjuredinthefiringincidentandhadherrightlegamputated.54vehiclesweredamaged.A

llthese

addtothelossthatthegeneralpublichassu

ffered.Tothissh

ouldbeaddedthelossofpublicproperty.

Tabl

e 11

: Wha

t will

the

confl

ict B

ring

to M

anip

ur (2

74 r

espo

nses

)R

espo

nses

In

depe

nden

ce

Gre

ater

G

reat

er

Non

e A

ny

No

fo

r M

anip

ur

Free

dom

/Aut

onom

y N

agal

and

othe

r co

mm

ent

No.ofpersons

20

25

25

128

62

14P

ercentage

7.29

9.13

9.13

46.72

22.63

5.10

46.72percentoftherespondentsfeelthattheconflictw

illbringnothingtoM

anipurand22.63

percentdidnotwanttogiveanopinion.M

ostpeopleareconfusedandsu

pporttheirrespectivepolitical

movem

entsunsureofwhethertheywillbringanypositiveresultornot.

Tabl

e 12

: Wha

t has

bee

n th

e C

ontr

ibut

ion

of t

he c

onfli

ct?

(274

res

pons

es)

Res

pons

es

No.

of p

erso

ns

Perc

enta

geT

ostrengthenthebondbetweenMeiteis&Nagas

50

18.24

Broughtaboutunityam

ongNagas

25

9.13

StronglydividedthepeopleofM

anipur

72

26.28

Intensifiedplainandhillpeoplerivalry

92

33.58

Anyother

20

7.29

NoCom

ment

15

5.48

Farfromunitingthepeople,26.28percentfeelthatitwilldividethemajorcommunitiesofM

anipur.

Normalrelationshipwillbedifficult.But33.58percentfeelstronglythatithasstrengthenedthebond

betweentheM

eiteisan

dNagas.Itsim

pactisfeltinvariousfields.Ithasdisplacedpeopleb

othintheh

ills

andthevalley.Som

eNagafamiliessettledintheplains,havegonetothehillsfearingviolence.Som

eMeiteifam

iliessettledinthehillscam

ebacktotheplains.Thefearpsychosishasgrownbothamongthe

NagasintheplainsandtheMeiteisinthehills.A

saresult,M

eiteiofficersdonotw

anttobepostedto

thehillsandtheNagasdonotw

anttobeserveintheValley.

Thebiggestcasualtyiscommonpeople’swelfare.B

ecauseoftheconflict,theGovernm

entis

concernedmorew

ithlawan

dorderandlesswithdevelopment.Withsomanygroupsan

dleaderscalling

oneformofprotestortheother,ordinarypeopleareu

nabletoearnalivelihood.Priceshaverisen,schools

andcollegesareclosed,childrenlosetheireducation,insh

ort,thereisutterchaos.A

sarespondentsaid

“Thesoonerwerealiseoursituationandbringpeace,thebetterforallofus.Otherwise,w

earealldoomed”.

Sugg

estio

ns fo

r C

onfli

ct R

esol

utio

n

ManipuristypicalofS

tatesinconflict.Itsproblemsaregenuinebutdiffi

culttoaddressunderthe

existingconstitutionalp

rovisions.How

ever,onecannotstoptrying.Problem

svaryfrompoliticalto


economictoeducationthatcanprepareoneforemployment,rightsanddutiesoftheStateandcitizensandterritorialintegrity.

Inthiscontextweaskedtherespondentswhatmeansshouldbeadoptedtosolvetheseproblems.Ofthe274personswhorepliedtothisquestion,49.27percentfeelthatthebestwayofsolvingtheNaga-Meiteiconflictisahearttoheartdialoguebetweenthetwoparties.Ontheotherside,33.57percentfeelthatitisimportanttoliveinundividedManipurinordertosolvetheproblemandbringpeace.Dialogue should bewith this understanding.But 31.74percentoftherespondentsfeelthatthesolutiontotheconflictliesinthehandsoftheGovernmentofIndiaagainst31.37percentwhostatethatitshouldbelefttothepeacemakers.Only15.67percentofthosewhorepliedtothisquestionthinkthatitshouldbelefttothepoliticians.

Will it happen Again?

Whethertherecanbepeaceornotdependsonwhetherthepeoplefeelthattheconflictwilltakeplaceagin.MostpeoplethinkthattheJune2001conflicttookthembysurpriseandthatitwillnothappenagain.AfeelingspreadthattheCentrewasnotsensitivetoMeiteifeelingswhentheyextendedtheceasefire.Theconflicthas,therefore,createddiscontentmentinboththecommunities.Todaytheyliveinmutualdistrust.Sectionsofbothhavebeendisplaced.Theconflicthasledtochaosandputtheclockback.Table 13 : What is the Solution to the conflict? (274 responses)

R

espo

nses

Po

litic

ians

u

nder

grou

nd

Indi

an

Inte

rnat

iona

l Pe

ace

Non

e of

N

o

G

roup

G

ovt.

Com

mun

ity M

aker

s ab

ove

Com

men

tsNo.ofpersons

43

10

87

16

86

23

9Percentage

15.67

3.63

31.74

5.82

31.37

8.50

3.27

Thegraph(p.143)showsthat35.77percentoftherespondentsfeelthatm

anywereforcedtosupport

theagitationand22.99percentsaythat‘peoplewerenotsupportiveoftheconflict.’Ontheotherhand,

20.80percentareofthev

iewthattheyweresupportivewhile6.06percentw

ereindifferent.Theirattitude

dependedverymuchontheextenttowhichtheyagreedordisagreedwiththedemandforN

agalim,the

feelingthatthehillsareneglectedandthestatem

entthattheNagashavearight“tointerveneuntilthe

IndianGovernm

enttakestheproperdecision”.1

Thus,theoverallfeelingam

ongthep

eopleisthattheco

nflictisbasedonclaimsandco

unterclaims

byth

etwocontestingparties.Itisimportantto

dealw

ithth

eperceptionofneglect,thefeelingthat

developm

entispossibleonlythroughintegrityorN

agalim.Itcannotcom

efromclaimsandcounterclaims

butthrougheffo

rtsmadetohelptheNagastofeelthattheybelongtoM

anipur.Forthattohappen,they

havetodevelopastakeinterritorialintegrityandcontrolovereconomicresources.Itisalsoimportant

toidentifysomeconnectors.Sotherespondentsw

ereaskedwhocouldhelpwiththesolution(Table13)

Tabl

e 14

: Who

has

so fa

r Pl

ayed

a M

ajor

Rol

e in

Sol

ving

the

Prob

lem

? (2

74 r

espo

nses

) R

espo

nses

T

he

The

T

he

Nag

a M

eite

i A

ny

No

G

ovt.

NG

os

Clu

bs u

Gs

uG

s o

ther

C

omm

ent

No.of

persons

72

110

27

080

40

17

1.AninterviewwithMr.Benjamin,dated15thSept.2004,atPalaceGate. 2.AninterviewwithRSJassal,dated07-05-04atChingmeirong,textpublishedin‘The SangaiExpress-Newspaper’,29June,2004,p.2. 3.Ksh.ImokantaSingh,“TheSangaiExpressNewspaper”,dated6thFebruary,2004,p-2. 4.RSJassal,op,cit,p-2. 5.Mr.Benjamin,interview. 6.Source:AMCTA,ManipurFactFile,2001,p-22 7.Ibid,dated15thSept.2004. 8.Ibid,p-23. 9.Ibid 10.Ibid,p-3


Percentage 26.28 40.15 9.86 2.9 20 14.59 6.20

Table14showsthat40.15%thinkthatthenon-GovernmentalOrganisationshaveplayedamajorroleinsolvingtheproblemsand26.28%feelthatthestatehasnottakenmuchinterestinsolvingtheproblems.Therefore,thesolutiontotheongoingconflictliesinthehandsofimpartialpeacemakers.

63.83%feelthatinordertosolvetheMeitei-NagaConflict,both theMeitei andNagas have to follow the policy of giveand take. 26.65%disagreewith this statement. In any conflictresolution,thecontestingpartieshavetochangetheirpositioninordertoachievemeaningfulsolution,ensuringawin-winsituation

Realistic options

Table 15: What if Nagas Continue to demand Nagalim and Meiter Don’t yield? (274 responses) Responses No. of persons Percentage Lessentheconflict 08 2.92 Furtherincreasethetension 101 36.87 Willbecomeacausefor anotheruprising 153 55.84 Nocomment 12 4.37 Table15showsthat55.84percentoftherespondentsfeelthatiftheNagascontinuetodemandGreaterNagalandandMeiteisdonotyield, itwill lead toanotheruprisingand36.87% thinkthattensionwillgrow.Thus,thepeoplerealisethattheMeiteisandNagascannotgoontakingthesameposition.Theywantapragmaticsolutionbutarenotclearonwhatitis.Sotheywerequestionedonthemajorcauses.

Table 16: Is Land the Bone of Contention (269 responses)

Responses yes No No comment No.ofpersons 165 67 37

Percentage 61.34 24.90 13.76 61.34percentobservedthatlandistheboneofcontentionagainst24.9percentwhodisagreedand13.76percentwhohadnocommenttomake.Thusmostfeelthateventhosewhowantthemergerofthe‘Naga-inhabitedareas’with‘Nagalim’isarealisticoptionshouldworkitoutthroughnegotiationsandnotimpositionothers.It isbecauseboththesideshavesomedoubtsaboutthemergerofNaga-inhabitedterritories.

Hence,thefirstoptionisprobablynotrealistic.Ontheotherhand,onecannotdenythattheNagasofManipurdonotgettheirjustshareofwhatistheirduefromthestateandevenofwhatcomesfromtheCentreintheirname.Secondly,Muivah,aTangkhulandseveralotherimportantleadersoftheNSCN-IMhailingfromUkhrulwouldfindnoplaceinthedispensationofNagalimunlesstheterritoriesaremerged!

Thus, the situation is complex.What, then, are realisticoptions?OnecannotexpecttheMeiteitogivetheNagaswhattheyfeelistheirdue.Ontheotherside,onecannotputalltheblameontheMeiteialone.ThepresentstateofaffairscouldnothavecontinuedwithoutthedirectorindirectcooperationoftheNagapoliticalleaders.AwayoutofthisdilemmahastobefoundofensuringjusticetotheNagaswithoutposingtoomuchofathreattotheMeiteiandothers.Whatisthewayout?

1.AUnionterritorystatusforthe‘Nagadistricts’mightbeapossibility,butwouldthatbeeasyorfeasibleoncethe‘integration’optionisdiscounted?

2. Another option could be the Bodo land model or theBodoTerritorialCouncil.Though itwill be preceded by longnegotiations,bothsidesmayultimatelyacceptthissolution.

3.A thirdoption is to revive the6th schedulewith thedistrictautonomouscouncilsandremoveonceandforallthepowerofthestateGovernmenttosupersedeanddissolvethesecouncils.What


isdue to thehillsshouldgodirectly to thedistricts thatwouldcontinuetobelongtothestateofManipur,butitsminimumneedswouldbeattendedto.

4.TosatisfytheprestigeandneedsoftheleadersandnegotatorsofNagalim, the twodistricts, namelyTirap andChanglangofArunachalpradeshcouldbefullymergedwithNagalim.

5.TheintegrationthatispossibleamongtheNagaswould b einthestyleofwhatexistsinBelgium.Forasmallpopulationofabout10millionpeople,therearefourGovernments-aFlemishone,aFrenchone,athirdfor thecityofBrusselsandthefourth,thenationalgovernment.TheFlemishgovernmentlooksafter all the affairs of theFlemish areas, in addition to all theculturalmattersof theFlemishwherever they live.TheFrenchgovernmentlooks afteralltheaffairsoftheWalloonareaandtheculturalmattersofalltheFrenchspeakingpeoplenomatterwheretheylive.Ifwecopythatmodel,thegovernmentofKohimawilllookafterallthematterswithinNagaland,andtheculturalmattersofalltheNagas,nomatterwheretheylive.ThiscouldgiveemotionalandculturalintegrationtoalltheNagas.

Conclusion Inthisstudy,thecauseoftheconflictbetweentheMeiteisand theNagashasbeenanalysed. It ishappeningdue tomanyreasonssuchaslackofGovernmentpolicytodealwiththeproblem,communicationgapbetween the twogroups, rigidstandof thegroupsandsoon. Theimpactoftheconflictreallycutsoneofffromtheother.Thisconflicthasledtochaosandconfusion.ItisasensitivematterandtheNagasareputtothetest.TheMeiteishavelostthetrustoftheNagasandtheNagashavebeendisplacedandfeelneglectedanddiscriminatedagainst.Hence,incourseoftime,adesireoftheNagastouniteunderoneumbrellabecameinevitable.Theconflictcannotbepinneddowntoadefinitetime,butithasbeenthereforalongtime.

TheMeiteis arenotprepared to allow theNagas to formGreaterNagalandasitwillmeanslicinguptheterritoryofManipur.Itwouldcreateeconomicimbalanceandreductioninthesizeofthestate.ManypeopleofManipurdesireanhonourablesolutionevenwhilekeepingManipur’sterritoryintact.

Thepeopleinthevalley,theMeiteis,inthehills,theNagasandKuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, have time and again demanded areconsiderationofthisrealityinoneformortheother.Yearsofneglect, poor communication facilities and lackof motivationfor growth haveworsened the situation.Amidst the confusinginstability, plagued by years of insurgency, exploitation bypoliticiansandcontractors,thedeteriorationoflawandorderetc,industrialists are reluctant to invest in the state.With frequentbandhs, strikes and social tension, peace and stability in this“paradiseonearth”seemstobeadistantdream.Intheend,anhonourablesolutionhastobefoundkeepingthesentimentsoftheMeiteisandthejointdemandsoftheNagasinmind.

1..ManipurFactFile,2001,pp1-2.2AninterviewwithProf.Gangmumei,dated15thMay2004,atMajorkhul.3Ibid.


BIBLIoGRAPhy

A. PRIMARy SouRCES : 1. PrivateIndividuals,GroupofSchoolteachersandGovt.Officers. 2. Reportsofinterviewsheldwithvarioussectionsofpeoplelikeelders,

clubleadersandgovernmentservantsofthestateofManipur. 3. Localsocialinstitutions. 4. ReoportsofFieldStudySurvey,observationandconsultations. 5. Unwritten,UnrecordedoralHistory. 6. Reportsofquestionnaireandscheduledquestionnaire.B. SECoNDARy SouRCES :

1. Books a) JeyaseelanL., Impact of the Missionary Movement in Manipur,

ScholarPublishingHouse(P)Ltd.,NewDelhi,1996. b) DunE.W.,Gazetteer of Manipur,VivekPublishingCompany,Delhi,

1981. c) RoyJyotirmoy,History of Manipur,1958. d) SinghLokendraN.,Unquiet Valley,MittalPublications,NewDelhi,

1981. e) TarapotPhanjoubam,Bleeding Manipur,Har-AnandPublications

Pvt.Ltd.,NewDelhi,2004. f) HoramRingkahao,The Genesis of the Naga Political Movement,

TangkhulAvenue,1998. g) AoALanungsang,From Phizo to Muivah,AMittalPublication,

2002. h) HodsonT.C.,The Naga Tribes of Manipur,LowPricePublications,

Delhi,1982. i) HodsonT.C.,The Meitheis,LowPricePublications,Delhi,1982. j) AllManipurCollegeTeachers’Association(AMCTA),Manipur

Fact File,2001. 2. News Papers a) JassalR.S.,TheSangaiExpress,1stJuly,Imphal,2004. b) NewmaiWillubou,TheSangaiExpress,23rdNovember,2004. c) SinghKshImmokanta,TheSangaiExpress,6thFebruary,2003. d) AnandR.K.,TheTelegraph,(Northeast),8thJanuary,2003.

Res

pons

esSupportive

NotSupportive

Indifferent

Forcedto

Nocomment

57=20.80%

63=22.99%

44=16.06%

98=35.77%

12=4.38%

No. of persons

20406080100

120

1.Ibid.2.AninterviewwithFr.MCGeorge,dated13theNov.2004,atChingmeirong.


kukI-NAGA CoNFLICT IN SPECIAL REFERENCE To ThE ChANDEL

DISTRICT oF MANIPuR

D. Michael Haokip

Manipur, one of the “Seven Sisters” of theNortheast isdescribed as the ‘Land ofGems’, ‘Jewel of India’, ‘ALittleParadise’,‘AFloweronLoftyHeights’,and‘TheSwitzerlandofIndia’1.TheStatehasalsoexperiencedmajorethnicconflicts,theonebetweentheNagasandKukisbeingamongthebestknownamongthem.Thispaperisanefforttounderstandit.

1. The Land and the People

Manipurconstitutinglessthan1percentofIndia’slandmasshasanareaof22,327sq.kmandapopulationof23,88,634(2001census)2.Ithasaninternationalboundaryofabout350kmwiththeKabowValleyandChinHillsofMyanmaron theeast andsoutheast.Therestof theboundary issharedwithNagaland inthenorth,NorthCacharHillsandCacharDistrictofAssamtothewestandMizoramtothesouth3.

Thestateisdividedintotwotractsnamely,thehillsandthevalley.Thevalleyliesinthecentralpartofthestate.ThehillsthatareanoffshootoftheHimalayassurroundthevalley.Theaverageelevationofthevalleyisabout950MSLandthatofthehillsisbetween1,500and1,800metres4.Manipurhasanumberofrivers,suchastheImphal,theThoubal,theIril,theNambul,theLockchaoandtheChakpi.AlltherivershavetheirsourceinthehillslyingtotheNorthandNortheastofthevalley.TheyrunfromnorthtosouthexcepttheKhugawhichrunsfromsouthtonorthintotheLoktakLake,thebiggestnaturallakeinEasternIndia.TheBarakisthe

biggestriverinManipur5.Administrativelythestateisdividedintoninedistricts,ofwhichImphalEast,ImphalWest,ThoubalandBishnupurareinthevalley.Chandel,Churachandpur,Senapati,UkhrulandTamenglongareinthehills.

Manipur has 32 recognised scheduled tribes and the non-tribalMeiteis.Theybelongtovariousethno-linguistictraitsbutcanbedividedintothreebroadcategoriesofMeiteis,NagaandChin-Kuki-Mizo.All of thembelong to theMongoloid stock.MostoftheMeiteis,thedominantethnicgroupalsocommonlycalledManipuris,liveinthevalley.TheyspeakaTibeto-Burmanlanguagebutdifferculturallyfromthesurroundinghilltribes.Theyarenon-tribalsandfollowHinducustoms6.

TheNagatribesinhabitingManipurare:(1)TheAnal,(2)TheChiru,(3)TheChothe,(4)TheKaram,(5)TheKoireng,(6) The Lamkang, (7) TheMao, (8) TheMaram, (9) TheMaring,(10)TheMonshang,(11)TheMoyon,(12)ThePoumai,(13)ThePuimei,(14)TheTangkhul,(15)TheTarao,(16)TheTangal,(17)TheZeliangrong7.

TheChin-Kuki-MizotribeslivinginManipurare:(1)TheKom, (2)ThePurum, (3)TheGangte, (4)ThePaite, (5)TheSimte,(6)TheThadou,(7)TheVaiphei,(8)TheSukte(Tedim-Chin),(9)TheHmar,(10)TheZou,(11)TheRalte,and(12)TheotherMizoLushaiTribes8.Contrarytothisclaim,aKukiauthorclaimsthefollowingtribesalsoastheKukis:(1)TheAnal,(2)TheAimol,(3)TheBaites/Beite,(4)TheChiru,(5)TheChonghang(ChongloiandHangshing),(6)TheChothe,(7)TheDoungels,(8)TheGuite,(9)TheGangte,(10)TheHmar,(11)TheHaokip,(12)TheKom,(13)TheKolhen,(14)TheKipgen,(15)TheLhungdim,(16)TheLamkang,(17)TheLunkim,(18)TheChangsan,(19)TheLenthang,(20)TheThangneo,(21)TheLhangum,(22)TheLhanghal, (23)TheMilhem, (24)TheMuzon-Monshang, (25)

Kuki-Naga Conflict 147 148 Conflict Mapping in NEI

TheMate,(26)TheMaring,(27)ThePaite,(28)TheSimte,(29)The Sitlhou, (30)TheLhouvum, (31)The Singsit, (32)TheTouthang,(33)TheTarao,(34)TheVaiphei,(35)TheZou9.Whenwecomparethetwolists,wecanseearepetitionof8(eight)tribesnamely:(1)TheAnal,(2)TheChiru,(3)TheChothe,(4)TheLamkang,(5)TheMaring,(6)TheMonshang,(7)TheMoyon,(8)TheTarao,whoareincludedinthelistofKukitribes.TheterritorialdistributionofScheduleTribesinthedistrictsofManipurisgivenbelow:10

origin (Migration and Settlement) It is believed that the ImphalValleywas underwater orwasswampyandnotfitforhumanhabitation.“Thoughthesearecededfromthatarea,thevalleyportionofManipurremainedunderwaterforalongtime.TheManipurPuranasalsorefertothisfact,whereitisfoundthatinthebeginningeverythingwasunderwater”11.Writingabout theoriginanddistributionof theNagas,R.R.Shimraysays:“MostoftheNagatribeshavemoreorlessthesamestorythattheycamefromtheholeoftheearth.Astotheiroriginanddispersal,thevarioustribesoftheNagashavenowaccepted‘Makhel’astheiroriginalplacefromwheretheydispersedthemselves.Therearemanyhistoricalfactssuchasstonemonolithsandsacredtreesplantedat‘Makhel’whentheywereabout todisperse themselves todifferentdirections. OnedistinctpracticeoftheNagasisthattheyerectstonemonumentsandalsoplantsacredtreeswherevertheysettle”12.

TheKukis, according to theoral informationcollectedbyWilliamShaw, trace their origin from thebowels of the earth,knownas‘Khul’orcalled“TheThadouKukisliveinalargeareaofhillycountryboundedbytheAngamiNagasoftheNagahillsdistrictinthenorth,theprovinceofBurmaintheeast,theChinhillsandLushaihillsinthesouthandtheDistrictofCacharinthe

west.Mainly,itmaybesaidthattheyoccupythehillsofthestateofManipuronallsidesoftheImphalValley”13.

Tribes of ManipurSl.no. Name of District Name of Communities 1.ManipurNorth(RedesignatedasSenapati 1.Mao(MajorGroup) District) 2.Maram(-do-) 3.ThadouKuki(-do-) 4.Kabui(Minorgroup) 5.Tangkhul(-do-) 6.Maring(-do-) 7.Chiru(-do-) 8.Kom(-do-) 9.Koireng(-do-) 10.Vaiphei(-do-) 11.KachaNaga(-do-) 12.Sema(-do-) 13.Keirao(-do-)

2.ManipurWest(RedesignatedasTamenglong)1.Kabui(MajorGroup) District) 2.ThadouKuki (MinorGroup) 3.Gangte(Minor Group) 3.ManipurSouth(RedesignatedasChurachandpur 1.Hmar(MajorGroup)District) 2.Paite(-do-) 3.ThadouKuki(-do) 4.Anal(MinorGroup) 5.Chothe(-do-) 6.Kabui(-do-) 7.Kom(-do-) 8.Vaiphei(-do-) 9.Zou(-do-) 10.Mizo(-do-) 11.Gangte(-do-)


12.Simte(-do-) 13.Ralte(-do-) 14.Salte(-do-) 4.TengnoupalDistrict(RedesignatedasChandelDist.) 1.Anal(Major Group) 2.Maring(-do-) 3.ThadouKuki(-do) 4.Lamkang(Minor Group) 5.Zou(-do-) 6.Gangte(-do-) 7.Moyon(-do-) 8.Monshang(-do-) 9.Aimol(-do-) 10.Chothe(-do-) 11.Purum(-do-) 12.Mizo(-do-) 13.Tangkhul(-do-) 14.Kom(-do-) 5ManipurCentral(Redesignatedandbifurcatedinto 1.Kabui(Major threedistrictsasfollows: Group) (i)BishnupurDistrict 2.Representativesof (ii)ThoubalDistrict mostofthetribes (iii)ImphalDistrict are found insmall number. 6ManipurEast(RedesignatedasUkhrulDistrict). 1.Tangkhul(Major Group) 2.ThadouKuki (MinorGroup)

Many persons whom the author interviewed, found itdifficult to ascertain the cultural differences between theNagasandtheKukis.However,traditionallyeachtribehadadifferentname.TheAnalscalledtheKukis‘Makhe’andthemselvesincludingMoyon,Monsang,LamkangandMaringas‘Pakan’.TheKukiscalledthemselves‘Eimi’andtheAnals‘Khowl’.Thesevariedfromplacetoplace,e.g.,theKukisinSenapatidistrictcalledtheNagas‘Milong’.RegardingtheoldtraditionMr.Kothar

says: “Erection of stone over dead bodies andmaking villagegatewasverycommonandimportantamongtheNagasinoldentimes thoughnotveryprevalentnow-a-days, but somepeopleofMaring tribecontinue iteven today. Inmarriage, theAnalshadabeliefthatMasumandMachalweretheirprogenitorclansfromthecave,andmarriagebetweenthesameclanisforbiddeneventoday.Whereas,amongtheKukisithadbeenacustomtomarrytheirmaternaluncle’sdaughterordistantrelativesoftheirmaternalsideorgrandmother’sside”14.Manysimilaritiesexistinfestivalstoo.AlmostallthetribesofChandeldistrictcelebratetheChavang-Kut,whichtheKukisclaimastheirmostimportantpost-harvestfestival.AccordingtoKotharMonsang:“ItwastheMonsangtribewhofirstcelebrateditinabigway,nodoubt,ithadbeencelebratedatvillagelevelsinoldendays,beforetheManipurGovernmentacknowledgeditasastatefestivalandfixedNovember1stastheChavangKutday”.

Inrelationships,therewasasystemof‘Mangai-Shabah’an‘inter-tribefamilyfriend’.AccordingtoMr.Wungreiyo:“Itwasacustomarypracticetohaveafamilyfriendoftheothertribe.Asvillageswereclose-by,specialhomegrownvegetables,fruits,etc.,werealwaysgiventothe‘Mangai’family.Thesystembecamesoclosethatsometimeswhenpropertyissold,ithastogothroughtheMangai”.ManysimilaritiesanddissimilartiesexistbetweentheKukisandtheNagas.Infactnothingdistinctdemarcatestheirtraditions, cultures and customs. Both of themare clusters ofdifferenttribes.Hence,whatoneNagatribepractises,cannotbecalledthetraditionofalltheNagas.ThesameholdsgoodfortheKukis.DifferencesexistintheNagaandKukilanguages.Nagaadministrationisdemocratic.Theyelecttheirvillagechief,whereastheKukishavehereditaryvillagechiefs.

2. Traces of the Conflict in the Past Conflicts are not born suddenly.Grievances accumulatedoveraperiodoftimebecomeasourceofconflict.Theenquiries


made,show thata few incidents indicatecertainconflictingsituationsthatexistedintheChandeldistrict.

The earliestwritten agreement between different tribesinChandel district is traced back to 10-05-19421.Six tribesparticipatedinthatmeetingheldatMonbivillage.Theyare(1)Anal,(2)Khongjai(Thadou-Kuki)2,(3)Kom,(4)Lamkang,(5)Moyon,and(6)Zou.TheagreementsignedbyMr.SPThampan(possiblytheonlyeducatedpersoninthosedays)statedthatthesixtribeshadagreedtoaccepteachotherassiblingsofthesamemother,andnottowagewarsorusetheswordagainsteachother.Tomarktheoccasion,theykilledamithun3hadacustomarylawofoathtakingceremonyfollowedbyacommonmeal.256delegateswhoattendedthemeetinghailedfrom69villages.Thereareseveralcustomspractisedduringacommonmeal.ForexampleMr.LeoKamchinthangsays:“Afterkillingtheanimalusuallytheytakeouttheheartandliveroftheanimalandcookitseparately.Whentheorgansoftheanimalsarecookedtheeldestofthedifferenttribeseatfirst,aftermakingapromise.Theyusuallycutthetailoftheanimalwithaknifewhilemakingapromisesymbolisingthatiftheydon’tfollowtheagreementtheywillbelikethetailoftheanimal”4.SomeleadersareoftheopinionthatthemeetingatMonbivillagewasnotbecausetherewasaconflictorawarbutwasaprecautiontakenbytheleadersofthosedaystostandunitedagainsttheBritishorAlliedarmies5.

The Lamkangs also have their own story of somemisunderstandingwith theKukis.Mr.MichaelBepaul says:“Probablyaroundtheyear800A.D,HaikatheonlyvillageoftheLamkangwasattackedbytheKukiswithoutanypriorinformationanditwasthisincidentwhichledtothescatteringoftheLamkangtribe”6.AccordingtotheKukiversion:“OneKukiladywenttothevillagecemeterytopayrespectstooneofherkinwhodiedafewdaysback.Asshewascryingoverthetomb,amanshotherwithanarrow.Theassailantwhilebeingchased,raninthedirectionoftheLamkangvillage.TheKukisthoughtthatitwasaLamkang

manwhoshotthelady,sotheycalledtogetheralltheirkinsandpreparedameal toavengethedeathof theirdaughterandtheyattackedthevillage”7.

Mr.SumpiModalsays:“TheAnaltribewasalsoattackedbytheKukisorKamhaogroup,around1865A.D.,manykillingsandburningsofhousestookplaceinthosedays,asweweretoldbyourforefathers”8.Regardinganotherincident,aKukisays:“OnlyAnalKhullenwasnotattackedasithadanicefencingarounditsvillage,TheAnalsandtheMeiteisbelievedthatthefencingwasputupby‘VangbrelLai’(nameofadeity)9.Onceanentirevillagewasbutchered,buttheattackerswerefromtheChinstateofthepresentMyanmaroftheSuktetribe.TheyalsohavekilledandchasedtheKukisofpresentManipur”10.Anotherreportsays:“TheLongjachiefwasalsokilledandhisdaughterwasalsokidnappedbythistribefromMyanmar.ThefolktalesandsongsoftheKukisdescribehowthisinvadingtribefromMyanmarmistreatedthem”11.

RecallingtherelationshipbetweenthetwotribesduringhisyoungerdaysMr.Zilngamsays:“InthosedaysLonpi(Monbi)andLongjawerebigvillagesandhadmanyyouthwhowereoftenveryunruly.Moreover,theyhadabeliefthatiftheytouchthebosomoftheAnaldamselstheywillhavelotsofchickensforeating.SotheyouthfromthetwovillagestriedtotouchthebosomoftheAnaldamsels,whenevertheymetthemontheirwaytotheirjhumfields,muchtotheembarassmentoftheyoungladies”12.

Accordingtoaconfession:“Whenweweresmallweusedtochallengewheneverwesawchildrenofadifferentvillage,eventhoughwewereofthesametribe;therewasnoloveandsolidaritybetweenpeopleasitexiststoday.Therewasawar,asweweretoldbyourforefathers,whichwecalledthe‘KhongjaiLan’.ButitwasnotaparticularisedwaranditdidnotaffecttheotherNagatribes.Thosedaysfightswereverycommonevenamongthesametribesofdifferentvillages.Reasonsforthefightsareverydifficulttoanalysenowandnotveryclear.ButtheKukisplayedagreat


roleintheinter-triberivalries”13.

AccordingtoMr.Shokhothang(aKuki):“Therewerealsomanykillings andmaltreatment throughout the history butwecometolearnthattherewasnodirectwarbetweenthetwotribes.TherewasnodirectwarbetweentheKukisandtheNagasbutveryoftentheyusedtotakerevengeoneachotheroverthekillingsandmaltreatments.NagaswerethefirstsettlersofNorthernManipurandeveninthepast,theylivedinbigvillagesbuttheywereverydisunitedandeventheTangkhulsdidn’thaveacommonlanguageoftheirown.Everyvillagespokeadifferentdialecteventhoughtheywere of the same tribe. Conflictswere purely betweenvillagestovillages.Andthedefeatedvillagesusuallyaskedthehelpofanothervillage.ManytimesitwastheKukiswhohelpedthedefeatedvillagestoavenge,andtheywerealwayssuccessfulbecause they knew ‘Gallou Thu’ (a blackmagic used duringwar).ButsomeoftheKukiswerenotverygoodtotheNagasastheyused tomistreat them,especially thosewhomtheycaughtas‘prisonersofwar’;but,somegotmixedupwiththeKukisandbecame‘Behpa’(averyclosefamilyfriend)tothem”14.

Regarding the reason as towhy theKukis, especially theHaokipclanmigratedtotheNorthernsideofManipur,Mr.JohnThangjalethasthistosay:“AftermigratingfromMyanmar,oneoftheMeiteikingscaughtoneHaokipchief,whosenamewasPuNehlamandmutilatedhisbodywhilekillinghim(hisskinwastakenoff).Itangeredhispeopleverymuch;sohisdescendantsplannedtoattacktheMeiteisaftercirclingthevalleywheretheMeiteikingdomwasestablished.TheyknewthatManipurkingdomwassurroundedbythehillsandiftheycouldencirclethevalley,theMeiteiscouldbeeasilydefeated,butmuchtothedissapointmentoftheKukis,theBritishersarrivedanditspoiledtheirplan”15.Dr.Khuplamcommentedthat:“TherehadbeenastrongsubjugationoftheNagasbytheKukisfromthe19thcentury.ButtheKukisstronglybelievedthattheKukis,theNagasandtheMeiteisaredescendantsofthesamemotherandKukisaretheeldest,Nagas

themiddleandMeiteistheyoungest”16.

The19thcenturybroughtChristianitytotheregion.Thesamecenturyalsobroughtthecoloniserswiththeirdivideandrulepolicy.ThefirstmissionariesofManipurwereRev.WilliamPettregrewandRev.RobertWatkins.TheformerworkedintheNagainhabitedareasofManipurwiththepermissionoftheBritishbutthelatterworkedintheKukiinhabitedareas,withouttheirpermission.SohehadtoleaveManipureventhoughhewasverypopularthosedays.Anexampleoftheopendivideandrulepolicyisof1917:“Whenthey(theTangkhuls)heardthattheKukiswerewagingwaragainsttheBritish,on10thOctober1917,theymadeapledgetoassisttheirKukirulersbykillingabuffalo.But,inordertoreversethe10thOctoberdecisionoftheTangkhuls,Mr.HigginsandMr.PettigrewcalledameetingwiththeTangkhulleadersatPhadang.TheTangkhulsrenegadedontheircommitmenttotheKukisandsubmittedtotheBritishwhopersuadedthemwithprovisionsofsalt,oil,sugar,etc”17.

Becauseoftheirdivideandrulepolicy:“TherecentethnicconflictoftheKukisandtheNagascouldbeconsideredasthethirdone.Aboutthefirstone,ithasbeennarratedtousbyoureldersandaboutthesecond,Icannotremember,clearlyasIwasstillveryyoung,butIrememberguardingthevillagewithourvillageyouthsandthethirdistherecentKuki-Nagaethnicconflict”18.RegardingthesecondKuki-Nagaconflict,someKukielderssay:“ItwastheKukiandtheKhulrivalrywhichtookplaceduringtheearly50s.InthosedaystheKukisocietywasdividedinto‘KukisikiandKukimakhai’(25paiseKukisand50paiseKukis)asitwaspropagatedbytheKukiintellectualcirclesofthosedays.TheybrandedsomeoftheKukiclansassuperiorandothers,inferior.Thishappenedbecauseofthelingua-francaofthetribe.ThemajorityoftheKukisspokethepresentThadou-Kukilanguage;so,theintellectualcirclescalledthesmallclansasKukisiki(25paiseKuki)becausetheywerenotabletospeaktheThadou-Kukilanguage.ThoseintheinferiorgroupstartedavoidingtheuseofthenameKukiastheir


tribeandcalledthemselvesas‘Khulmi’(peopleofcaveorigin).Asaresult,therewasaconflictwithintheKukitribe.NoKukiclanwasexempted;everyonewasinvolvedinthatconflictanditwasfromthisincidentthattheOldKukitribeschangedthenameof their tribe”19.Recollecting about theKukis and theKhulmirivalry,Mr.Warngamsays:“ItwasstartedbyMr.S.P.ThampanashewantedtocontesttheManipurTerritorialMemberelection(beforeManipurgotstatehood);hewasdefeated.ButitwasnotaparticularisedwarbetweentheKukisandtheNagasliketherecentconflict.ItwasawarwhichaffectedalltheclansoftheChandeldistrict”20.

TheNSCN-IM21andtheKNA22hasthistosayintheirbooksregardingtheideologiesofthetwotribes.“Attheinternationallevel,theNagashadtheopportunitytoparticipateactivelyinthetwoworldwarsinsupportofthealliedforces.In1919,4,000NagasjoinedtheLabourCorpsandreachedFrance.Afewofthemarestillalive.In1944,theNagapeopleextendedtheirfullestsupportandcooperationtothealliedforcesprovidingfood,shelter,guidesandotheressentialservicesinsideandoutsideNagalim.Thesamehadbeendulyacknowledged.InthewordsofFieldMarshalSirWilliamSlim(cf.“Defeatintovictory”):“ThegallantNagaswhoseloyalty,eveninthemostdepressingtimesoftheinvasionhadneverfaltered.Despitefloggings,torture,executionandtheburningoftheirvillages,theyrefusedtoaidtheJapaneseinanywayorbetrayourtroops.Theiractivehelptouswasbeyondvalueorpraise....Theyguidedourcolumns,collectedinformation,ambushedenemypatrols,carriedoursuppliesandbroughtinourwoundedundertheheaviestfire,andthen,beingthegentlementheywere,oftenrefusedallpayment.ManyaBritishandIndiansoldieroweshislifetotheNagas.Nosoldierofthe14thArmywhometthemwillneverthinkofthem,butwithadmirationandaffection”23.

ItisjusttheoppositeofwhattheKukisdidastheyfoughttheBritish(1917-1919)becausetheydidnotwanttogotoFranceasLabourCorps.TheythoughtthattheBritishrulerswereintruding

intotheirkingdomandtheyjoinedtheAxisforcesduringtheFirstWorldWar.TheyattackedandburntdownthevillageswhosidedwiththeBritishforcessparingnone.Duringthe2ndWorldWar,theysidedwith theJapanese, joining the INA(IndianNationalArmy)ofSubashChandraBose.

With regard to the past conflicts, these are some of the things propagated by the two organisations:

“From(1840-1918)therewasawide-scaledestructionoflivesandpropertyandforcibleoccupationofvillagelandsbytheKukinomadswithBritish support, following “ColonelMcCulloch’spolicyofplantingKukisettlementsonexposedfrontier”24.

On the other side, the Kukis say:

“DuetothechallengeposedtotheirsupremacytheKukisofZale’n-gam,heldmeetingsatvariousplacesinthehills,toorganiseaconcertedcampaignagainsttheBritish.TheyfoughttheBritishasearlyas1845-1871,inordertodrivethemoutfromZale’n-gam.TheaccountofthegreatwarhasbeenchronicledbytheBritishthemselveswhorecordeditas‘TheGreatKukiInvasionofthe1860s’.InThe‘MilitaryReportontheChin-Lusheicountry’,ColE.BElly,Asst.QuarterMasterGeneral,writes:“In1845,1847-1848,1849-1850-1851therewereraids,culminatinginwhat iscalled theGreat Invasionof the1860swhere15villageswereburntorplundered,188British subjectskilled and100carriedintocaptivity.In1864raidsrecommencedandwerecontinuedin1866-1867,1868-1869,1869-1870and in1870-1871”25.TheseandotherinstancesshowthattherelationshipbetweentheNagasandtheKukiswasnotverycordial.

3. Reasons for the Present Conflict Manypersonswhomtheauthormet,thinkthattheKuki-NagaethnicconflictflaredupatMoreh.Theeventsthatledtoitanditsaftermathwillbediscussedinthissection.

A kuki perspective


AccordingtoMr.Tongkhohao:“Therehadbeenanundercur-rentoftensionbetweentheKukisandtheNagaslongbeforetheconflictstarted......astheNagamilitantsstartedkillingsomeoftheprominentleadersandciviliansoftheKukicommunityandafortunatefewweresparedtheirlivesafterbeingbeatenblackandblue”1.TheNSCN-IMalsocollectedhousetaxfromtheKukis.Accordingtooneaccount:“FromeachhouseholdtheydemandedRs.400to500.InourvillagewemanagedtocollectRs.1,500buttheywroteRs.6,000inthereceiptwhichtheytoldusnottolose”2.Ms.TeresaHoilamadds:“TherewerevarioustypesoftaxesleviedontheKukisespeciallyintheMoreharea.Theydividedpeopleintodifferentcategories.SomeofthemhadtopaymorethanRs.3,000.Thosewhodidnotpaywereeitherkilledortorturedandsomebusinessmen’struckswereburntdown.Cuttingandsellingoftreeswasalsoprohibited.Eveniftreesweretobecut,wehadto inform themilitantsandhad topaymoneyas itsprice.Themilitantsnotifiedtaxdeadlines.AstheKukileadersconsidereditunconstitutionalandwerenotabletopaythemoney,theyrequestedtheKNA(KukiNationalArmy)tocometoMoreh”3.

Mostofthosewhomtheauthormetcouldnotdenythattheselectionof80councilteachersatChandelin1992wasoneofthemaincausesofthetension.PeterSenpu,whowasinvolvedin the incident says: “Vacancies for 80 council teacherswereadvertisedwhenMr.T.NHaokipwas theMinisterofState forTribalDevelopment.ItwasagreedthenthattheselectionwillbedonewhenMembersoftheDistrictCouncilwereelected.IthadbeensupersededbytheGovernmentofManipurin1988-89forChandelDistrict.ButwhenMorungMokungabecametheMinisterofTribalDevelopment,hehurrieduptheprocessinspiteoftheearlieragreement.TheKukiscouldnotagreetotheselectionofthecouncilteachersandso,theKukiStudents’Organisation(KSO)calledabandhinChandeldistrict.Ignoringthebandh,theNagascameinbignumbersandascuffletookplaceatavillagecalledZionlhang.IwasalsocaughtbytheNagavolunteersandhanded

overtothemilitants.Iwasblindfoldedandtakentotheforestarea,mostprobablytobekilled,buttheMoyonleadersnegotiatedmyreleaseandIwasfreed”4.

AlsotwoprominantKukimilitantgroupscameoutstronglysayingthatlandwasthecoreissue.TheywantChandeldistrict,SardarHills, some parts ofUkhrul andTamenglong and theChurachandpurdistrict,inshorttheKukidominatedareasofthehilldistrictsofManipur,tobedesignatedasKukiland.

The Naga perspective

NagasthinkthattheKukisworkedhandinglovewiththeIndianArmyincheckingtheNagaundergroundmovement.Ac-cordingtoRingo“Mr.Holkhomanganex-MPwithsomeoftheKukileaderswenttotheIndianArmyandtoldthemthattheyhadbeenharassedbytheNagaUGs,sotheywouldformtheirownUG(Underground)grouptohelptheIndianGovernmentincheck-ingNagaUGs”5.AMagazinepublishedbytheNagasduringtheconflictsays:

“ThecollusionofKukimilitantsandtheIndianArmedForcesisanopensecretnow.ThenewsreportaspublishedinThe Telegraphdated24thMarch1993reads,“ThepresidentoftheKukiNationalOrganisation(KNO)ofwhichtheKNAisthemilitarywing,Mr.Hanglen,admittedtothiscorrespondentthattheorganisationwasin touchwithcertainarmycantonments in theregion.HeevenclaimedthathewasinvitedfortalksinNewDelhiwiththeChiefofArmyStaffGen.S.FRodriguesonChristmasEvelastyear”6.

MostNagasthinkthatnolandissuewasinvolvedinthecon-flict.ItstartedbecauseofclashesbetweenthemilitantsinMoreh.Mr.KotharMonsangsays:“TheUGlevelwarbetweentheKNAandNSCN-IMstartedinMoreh.ItwasbecauseoftaxcollectionandmonopolyofthetownbytheNSCN-IM.Feelinginsecure,theKNAstartedchasingawaytheNagas.Muivahdidnotknowabouttheconflictbecauseduringtheconflictwesentarepresentativeto


Muivahtocontroltheconfictandhisresponsewas,“IcancontroltheNagasbutwhoisgoingtocontroltheKukis?”TheconflictstoppedwhenMuivahdirectedtheHomeMinistrytoletthein-nocentKukipeoplefree.Regardingterritories,theNagaswillnotfinditdifficulttonegotiatebecausetheNagaswillnotclaimastheirownareas,forexampleDingpithatareinhabitedmostlybytheKukis”7.

Anothersourcesays:“TherecentconflictwasstartedbytheKukisandtheMaringsofTengnoupalareaovertheappointmentof80councilteachers”8.Regardingtaxes,anexcerptfromtheNagaStudents’Federationsays: “SomeoftheKukislivinginthevillagesoftheregionhadapparentlyrefusedtopaytaxestotheNSCNonthegroundthattheydidnotsubscribetoNaganationalism.NSCNhasbeencollectingthis“housetax”fromeveryhouseholdintheNagaareassinceitsinception.Nagashavebeenpayingitwillingly.KukislivingintheNagaareaswerealsopayingthis“tax”tillthen.HoweveritseemsthatsomeoftheKukivillagersofMorehregionhaddecidedtostoppayingthis“tax”toNSCN.Whatmotivatedthemtochangetheirpositionwedonotknow,butthisdecisionmadeitclearthatasectionoftheKukiswerepreparedtotakeontheNSCN.TherewerereportsthattheKukiNationalArmyandtheKukiFederalCouncilhavebeencompaigningthatKukisshouldnotpaythisillegaltaxtoNSCNanylonger.SomeoftheKukisalsocomplainedthatNSCNwasforcingtheKukistopaymorethanwhatwaschargedfromtheNagas.TheyalsoclaimedthattheNSCNwerethreateningtoevictthoseKukiswhowererefusingtopaythisillegaltax”9.

Some Nagas also think that the conflict was a proxy war:

“Resortingtoproxywarisnogameofoneupmanshipinthenationalandinternationalgameofpolitics.Ironically,helpless-nessanddesperationisnosecretnowamongthepolicymakersofIndia,whenitcomestodealingwiththerisingtideofNagaNationalismandthemenacinggrowthofNationalSocialistCouncil

ofNagaland(NSCN-IM);IndiaturnedablindeyetoallnormsofinternationalpoliticalethicstotreadontheimmoralpathofsettingtowarbetweenNagasandKukisbackingtheKukimilitantstothehilttotackletheNagamilitantsofthedreadedNationalSocialistCouncilofNagalandledbyIsakSwuandTh.Muivah.TheproxywarofIndiaagainstNaganationiscontinuingwithnoendinsight.Forobviousreasons,IndianmediafightshyoftermingthecurrentNaga-Kukiwarasproxywar”10.

AccordingtoaconfessionmadebyanAnalNaga:“TherewasalotofpoliticswithintheNagasociety,evenbeforetheconflictstarted.PriortothebreakupoftheNSCNitseemseverybodyintheorganisationknewtheinevitablebuttheAnalswerekeptignorantoftheimpendingbreakup.Sowhentheybrokeup,Analswereonbothsides,somewerewiththeIMgroupandtheotherswiththeKgroup.IntheChakpikarongareaitwastheKhaplanggroupwhocamefirst.So,whenevertheIMgroupcametoourplacetheywilldolotsofthingswhichwehatedbutwearehelplessinfrontoftheguns.EvenaftertheThingsanvillageincidentwheretheIMgroupkilled26men,theydidnotguardourvillages.Sowecansaythat,theyareindirectlyinvitingtheKukistoattacktheAnals.ThemainreasonoftherecentconflictwaspurelybecauseofthepastrivalriesbetweentheHaokipclansoftheKukisandtheTangkhulNagas”11.

The Moreh Incident That Began the Ethnic conflict

Accordingtoareliableopinion:“ThepeopleofMorehheardthatKNAfromMyanmarhadreachedManipurandwerestayingatLaichingHill(ahillnearMoreh)andsomeKukileadersusedtosendmessagestotheKNAusingtheKSO(KukiStudents’Or-ganisation)leadersnamelyMr.OnkholetandMr.Haopaotocarrythemessages.Ononesuchtrip,thetwoyouthleaderswerecaughtbytheNSCN-IMcadresaftertheyreturnedfromtheKNAcamp,andonbeingsearchedtheyfoundaletterfromtheKNA.So,IMcadrestiedtheirhandsandtookthembacktotheircamp.Whentheyreachedthetopofthehill,theywerethreatenedtobeshot


iftheydidnottellthemaboutthelocationofthecamp.Feelingcaughtbetweenthedevilandthedeepsea,theypointedtotheop-positedirectionandtheyranindifferentdirections.ButtheywerefireduponandOnkholetwaskilled.HisfriendHaopaoescapedandwashelpedbyajhumcultivatorwhountiedhishandsandheinformedothersof thesituation.Afterhe reachedbackMoreh,manypeoplefromthetownwentinsearchforthedeadbody.ThatnightKNAenteredMoreh”12.Rememberingthesentimentofthepeopleduringthosedays,Mr.Jamthangsays:“Onkholetbeingastudentleader,everybodyfeltthathediedforhistribeandpeoplewereveryannoyedtowardstheNagas.TherewasapublicprotestinMorehwithhisdeadbodybeingcarriedinprocessioninthetown”13.

how the Nagas Fled from Moreh As soon as theKNAenteredMoreh therewas ameetingwith the leaders.Thangkholun(KNAleader)wasnot infavourofstayingtogetherwiththeNagasinMorehashefeltthattheywereaidingtheIMgroup.SotheycalledanemergencymeetingwiththeNagaleadersandtoldthemnottoaidandentertaintheIMgroupanymore.Theyexpressed their inability toabidebythisorderbecausethoughtheydidnotwanttodoit,theIMgroupforcedthemtoact.EventhoughtherewasnoformalwarningtoleaveMoreh,theNagasstartedfleeingthatsamenight. OnKNAsviewoftheNagas,Mr.Kampusays“Mr.Thang-kholunwasnotinfavourofhavingawarwiththeNSCN”.Quot-inghimhesaid,“InfactwhenwecamebackfromKachin,theysentuswithrupeesonelakhandeighteengunsandonthewaywewerelookedafterbyourNagabrethrenfor3fullmonths.Wearefightingforacommoncauseandthereisnopointoffightingwiththem.Evenwhentheystartedfiringatuswedidnotfirebackaswethoughtthattheymistookusandweshoutedthenameoftheirleadersbutwhentheydidnotstop,wereturnedthefireback”14. ThuswhatbeganatMoreh,afightfordominancebetweentheNagaandKukimilitantgroupsspread to theotherpartsof

Manipur.Boththecommunitiessuffered.

4. Spread of the Conflict

Acccordingtosomeofthoseaffectedbytheconflict,“SoonaftertheNagasfledMoreh,someNagasfromtheMaoareacameforanexcursiontoMoreh.WhensomeyouthofMorehlearntthattheywereNagas,theychallengedthemnotknowingfromwhichplacetheycameandwhytheyhadcome.SoascufflebrokeoutandthoseinnocentMaoNagaswerebeatenupseverelybysomeKukiyouth fromMoreh.When the affectedparty reachedMao, theystartedpullingdownKukisattheMaogate”1.“MasskillingsstartedwhenonecaptainoftheNSCN-IMheardfromsomesourcesthattheKNAwasgoingtohaveameetingatLeisanTengnoupal(aKukivillage).Sohewenttheretoambushthemontheway.Hewaitedforthemfortwodaysbutnobodyturnedup.Atlasthecameuponagroupofpeople.Onfurtherenquirieshebecamefrustratedandkilledthem.Theywereinnocentvillagerswhohadcomeforacustomarygettogetherwiththeirfamiliesatanothervillage”2.

Itwasaclearcaseofmisunderstanding.According toapersonalaccount:“MyvillageChehjang is justnearaKukivillage.Wehadbeenlivingtogetherformanyyears.OnedaytheIMcadrescametoourvillageandtheywerenottreatedwellbyourvillagerssotheygotwild,wentandkilledsomepeopleofourneighbouringKukivillage.Ourneighbouringvillagersthoughtthattheyweresentbyus,astheysawthemcomingfromourvillage.Sosuspicionandhatredstartedgrowingbetweenthetwovillages”3.

Another personnarrates: “Theway the conflict came intotheSugnu-ChakpikarongareaofChandeldistrictwasalittlebitdifferent.Whenkillingandlootingstarted,wehadameetingofthevillagechiefscomprisingallthetribes.WeagreednottohelpanyUGs,not toguard thevillageandnot tomakeanyvillagefencing.Butduringthosedays,therewasagreatrivalrybetweentheIMandKgroupoftheNSCN.NearChakpikarong,theIMhad


acamp,calledBulloh-campandthiscampwasattackedbytheK-cadres.Whilerunningawayfromtheircamp,oneofthecadresrantowardsTuinou(aKukivillage).Thisparticularvillagewasguardedbytheirvillagers,andoneoftheguardsshotdeadoneIMcadre.TheIMcadresgotangryandburntdownthewholevillage.This particular village later shifted toThingsan but theywereattackedagainbytheIMcadresinNovember1994.26personswerekilledintheattack.TherewasstrongcondemnationofthisincidentevenintheNagacirclesbuttheIMcadressaidthatthisparticularincidentwasnotrelatedtotheethnicconflictbutwastoavengethedeathoftheirslaincadre”4.

AccordingtoZilngam,aKukichief, thebeginningof theconflictwas a little bit different.He says: “The recent conflictstartedwithasmallproblem.SomeeldersoftheNagas(Anals)hatedsomeoftheKukileaders,sotheyusedtheNagaUGsformakingthemcollecttaxesandtheyusedthismoneyforpartyinganddrinking.Idon’tthinkitwouldreachthetopleaders.SomeKukiswhohadmonetaryproblemswith theNagasand startedinstigatingthepeopleagainsttheother(oneexampleisNehthang,whostartedthefirstKukiUGgroup,hadsomemonetaryproblemswithSuiza(aNaga)andthisproblemremainedunsettled).WhenwetalkabouttheNagatax,itisveryconfusingbecausetheNagasnevercollectedtaxesinourvillage.ItcouldbebecauseofthepastrelationshipbetweentheBaitesandtheNagaswhentheformerstartedtheChinLiberationMovement,theyoncehadanagreementnottotroubleeachotherbuttohelpandsupporteachother.Therecentconflictisaboutfightingforpower.TheNagascontrolallthedistrictheadquartersandmostof the sub-divisionsarealsounderthem.TheKukiscannotmovefreelyinmostoftheoffices.WhenevermoneyisdrawnfromanygovernmentsourcetheNagaUGs are there to demand a percentage cut.Another conflict ispossibleifthingsarenotsolvedproperly”5.

Insomeplacesitwasadifferentscenario.Theauthorwastoldthat:“OrderswereissuedbytheUGsaswellastherespective

tribalorganisationstoguardthevillages.Peoplestartedmakingbunkersandvillagefences.Manyrumoursapreadinthebeginning.TherewasawidecirculationabouttheKukiUGspreparingtoburntheNagavillagesandvice-versa.ManyofusbelievedthenewsbecausewesawtheKukivillagersmakingtheirvillagefences.Picturesandnewsofkillingsandburning,werealwaysreportedinthenewspapers.Itbroughtmorecommunalfeelingsandenmitytowardseachother.OtherstoldusthatthesonsandrelativesofourMangai(closefamilyfriend)hadjoinedinburningthevillages.Thatbrokeallourtrustandconfidencetowardstheothertribes.Inourarea,wealllivedclose-by.Therewasoneincidentwheretheseneighbouringvillagersattackedeachother.Mongneljang(Kuki)andThawai(Naga)villagerswerejustoneandahalfkilometersapart.One day theKukis came and challenged the villagers.Runningoutofpatience, theystartedchasing theKukis.Asaresulttherewasfiringbetweenthetwo.NeartheNagavillagewasanIndianArmyoutpost.Assoonastheyheardthesoundofthegunthesoldiersstartedfiringtowardstheplace.TheNagaswereunabletoproceedandsomegotwoundedfromtheArmybulletsbuttheKukisweresafebecausetherewasasmallhillockinbetweenthem.SomanyofusthoughtthattheArmysidedwiththeKukis”6.

Inthemidstoftheconflict,theChurchhasbeenoneofthemosttrustedandrespectedinstitutions.Butwhatwasitsroleduringthe conflict?According to a report: “Atfirst, itwas theNagaswhoattackedusandkilledusonebyone.Ourleaderswhospokeagainstthemsaidthatwewerejustdefendingourselves.Weneverattackedthemfirst.EvenintheKCLF(KukiChristianLeadersFellowship)meetings,during theconflict,weopenlydiscussedthemethodologyweused.Somescholarswentalittlefurthertosaythatweneedtochangeourstrategyfromdefencetoattack.WhenwethuschangedourstrategytheNagasstoppedattackingus.AlsotheWorldBaptistAlliancecameoncetosettletheconflictbetweenus.ThemeetingwasheldatAsokaHotel.Mostprominent


pastorsandevangelistsofboththetribescameforthemeeting.Butnothingconcretecameofit.Instead,wealmostusedourfistsagainsteachother. Iwas told that theTangkhulNagasarestillangrywithusbecausesomeoftheirforefathersweremaltreatedbyourforefathers.ItisanopensecretthattheTangkhulsusedtoactouthowtheirforefathersweremaltreatedbyourforefathers.ThathasbeenrecordedinavideoandshowntovariousNagapeople.IwasreallyshockedwhenIfirstheardaboutit.ThefirstNGOwhoreceivedforeignaidforvictimsoftheconflictwastheVVD(VolunteerforVillageDevelopment).Butitsdirector,thehusbandofaTangkhullady,showedalotofpartialitytowardsthevictimswhilegivingreliefmaterials.TheNagaUGsstolethepackedfooditems,fromtheMBC(ManipurBaptistConvention)godownandtheemptypackageswerefoundneartheKukivillageswhichwereburntdown”7.

Manypersonscouldnotbelievethat theycouldbesimplyattackedbytheirneighbouringvillages.TheKukisthoughtthattheirneighbouringNagavillageswouldneverattackthem.TheNagas thought thesameabout theirKukineighbours.Onealsobelievesthattherewasthirdpartyinvolvementinspreadingtheconflict.AccordingtoMr.Moshel“Politicalleadersinfluencedthepeopleverymuch.Theyinstigatedtheirpeopleagainsttheotherfortheirownbenefit.TheconflictingtribesneverattackedMeiteis.Theywerefreetomoveanywheretheyliked.Manyatime,whenthevillagersranawayfromtheirvillagestheyaskedtheMeiteistoguardtheirproperty.Itturnedoutlikemakingthemonkeyguardthepaddy.Theynevergotitback.Somanypeoplesuspectnowthat theMeiteishadahand in instigating the twocommunitiestofightinordertoweakentribalunity.TheMeiteiOrganisationsremainedsilentduringtheconflictandnoneofthemcameforwardtohelpthevictimsandrefugees.Thegovernmenttooneglectedthepeopleanddidnotbotherabouttheirneedsandaspirations.Theconflictwasnottackledintheearlystages.Theymadestatementsbutnoactionwastakensoitcouldnotsolveanyproblem”8.Mr.

Ngamseihasthistosay:“TheAnalsorLamkangsoranyotherNagasofChandelwouldneverattacktheKukis,unlesstheywereforcedbytheTangkhulsofUkhrul”9.Ontheotherhand,manyNagasareoftheviewthatitwastheIndianArmythatmadethetwocommunitiesfightagainsteachother.

Peace initiativeswere not effective during the conflict.Accordingtoaleader:“In1994,undertheADCofChandel,someleaderswereselectedfortheformationofthepeacecommittee.Wehadpeacetalksbutitwasuseless.Nobodycameupwithaconcretesolution.TheydidnotfindoutwhytheKukisandNagasfought.Sopeoplecontinuedtobekilledandhouseswereburnteveryday.Peoplekeepontakingrevengeoneachother.Once,Mr.Arthur(aTangkhul)cametoMorehforadialogueandpeacewiththeKNA,andeverythingwasdiscussed.Pigswerekilledandmealswerepreparedforacommunitycelebration.Butunluckilyonthatdayitself,someIM-cadreskilled3personsfromMangkang(Kukivillage).Mr.Thanglun(KNAleader)gotsoupsetwiththatincidentthathewasdeterminedtokillalltheNagaleaderswhocametoMorehontheirreturnjourney.Wepersuadedhimnottokillthem,knowingthatthepeoplewillhavetofacetheconsequences.ThewholenightwepleadedwithhimforthesafetyoftheNagaleadersandatlastheagreed.ThenwewentanddroppedallofthemwiththeSDCofMoreh.Wetookmanystepsforpeacebutnothinggoodcameup,soIresignedfromthepeacecommittee”10.AccordingtotheKNF(KukiNationalFront),theystartedjoiningtheconflictaftertheiroperationalareawastouched.TheirfounderLt.Mr.Nehlunwasalsonotinfavouroftheconflict.Accordingtohim,theNagascannotgivewhattheKukiswantandvice-versa.Soeachandeverypersonfavouredhisorherowntribeagainsttheotherduringtheconflict”11.

5. Impact of the Conflict on the Present Society

Wehave justseenhowtheconflict in theChandeldistrictbetweentheNagasandKukisgotintensifiedandreachedapoint


ofnoreturn.Eventodayasaresearcher,:“Thewoundsarehealedbutnotthescars”.

Aquestionwas asked: “Whose communitywas theworstaffectedintheconflict?”Forthis,wehavetwoopinionsfromthetwotribesandeachof themtries toclaimmorecasualties.Mr.Chumrhing(AnalNaga)says:“InChandeldistrict,theNagasweremoreaffectedduringtheconflict,especially,theAnalcommunitywastheworstaffected,39peoplediedintheclashand8ofthemwerewomen”1.TheKNO(KukiNationalOrganisation)claimedthat112peoplediedinChandelDistrictaloneintheconflictoutofthetotal888victims2.ButasocialworkerintheFGC-VVD(FraternalGreenCross-VolunteerforVillageDevelopment)says:“Accordingtooursurvey,theKukisweremoreaffectedcomparingtotheNagas,morepeoplekilledandmoreoftheirhousestorched,theconflictwasreallyhorribleandwhenitendedtheKukisstartedobservingitas‘BlackDay’inremembranceofthosewhowerekilledintheconflict.Thistypeofoccasionwillbringmorehatredinthefuturethanunity.Rehabilitationoftheaffectedvictimsdidnottakeplaceproperly.Thevalleypeopletookgreatadvantageoftheconflictandmostofthereliefmaterialswentintothepocketsofthevalleypeople,andoutof100%only10-20%reachedthepeople.TheManipurisknowthatifweleaveManipur,mostoftheforestresourceswillbegoneforever,sotheywantustofightmore,sothatwewillnothavepeace.Thefewinter-marriageswehadbetweenuswereputasunderbytheUGs.OrderswereissuedbytheUGstogetdivorceandthefewwomenfromothertribeswhoremainedbackwiththeirhusbands,tookgreatriskinhelpingthehusband’ssidebyeitherjoiningorhelpinginthekilling,inordertoshowtheirloyality.EvenbuyingofPhaneks(aclothwrappedaroundthewaistbygirls)andtheuseofothercommunityshawlswereprohibited”3.But disagreeingwith the aboveopinionMr.MoshelaNaga,hasthistosay:“DuringtheconflictthosewhomarriedaKukioritsfamilyclanslikeChins,PaitesorHmarwenttoChurachandpurandstayedtherepeacefullyduringtheconflict”4.

With the intensification of the conflict,more problemswereadded.ToquoteMr.Ronglo,asocialworker:“TheconflictbroughtinmoreUGgroupstoourland.Thegovernmentseemstohavebeeninvolvedindirectlyinhelpingthem.AlmostalltheemployeescontributeapercentageoftheirsalariestotheUGs.Itisanopensecretnowthatalmostallthepoliticianshavelinkswiththem.EvenduringtheconflictthethenPresidentofIndiaMr.R.VenkataramanrelyingontheGovernor’sreportaccusedthethenC.MofManipur,Mr.RishangKeishingofbeinginvolveddirectlyintheconflict.Becauseoftheemployees’contribution,theUGshaveregularwayofgettingmoneyfromeverydepartment.Againthissystemofcollectingmoneyhasaffectedthepeopleindirectly.Forexample,an IASofficer from theSouthwas transferred toChandel.Atfirst,hewasscaredoftheplacebecauseoftheUGproblems.SohestayedinanImphalGuestHousefortwomonthsandrantheofficefromImphal.ThenhewenttoChandelandtheUGsstarteddemandingmoneyfromhim.Torecoverthemoneyhehadcontributed,hestartedtakingbribesfromthecommonpeople.Aftersevenmonths,hewastransferedasthepubliccomplainedabouthim.Bythat time,hehadbecomefullycorrupt tryingtoadjusttothesituation.TheMLAsusedtheUGsduringtheelectioncampaign.Whentheyfailedtogetaministerialberth,theycausedafear-psychosisamongthepeoplewhodidnotvoteforthecandidatesupportedbytheUGs.Atthesametime,wheneverwevisitedtheothertribalvillageswewerenotfeelingatease”5.

Agreeingwiththecomment,aKukisays:“Wearenotscaredofeachothernow.Weknowwewillnotbekilledwhenweareintheirvillages,butthereisalwaysafearinthemindsofthepeople.Forexample,recentlyoneAnalfamilycameforKi-inlut6toourvillage.Observingthem,Ididn’tfindthemroamingfreelyinthevillage.Nobody threatened thembut at the same time,nobodywantedtotalktothem.Sothereisuneasinessamongourselvesevennow”7.After theconflict, theNagasaccusedtheKukisofcomingclosertotheMeiteisforgettingthepastrelationships.A


Mr.Zilngamsays:“Wetalkandwisheachotherwheneverwemeetontheroadbutbeingscaredwedonotdiscloseanythingtoeachother.Forpersonswholosttheirfamilymembersintheconflict,itisverydifficulttomakefriendship.PersonallyIdon’thatethem,butIdon’tlikethemeither.Ihatethemmorethanlikingthem,becauseNagashavedevelopedasuperioritycomplextowardstheKukisaftertheconflict”.

Land andpropertieswhichwere abandonedby theKukisduringtheconflictareyettoberecovered.Insomeplaces,peoplewentbackbecausetheyhavepattasfortheirland.Insomeplacesplotsweresoldatalowpriceandinsomeothercases,theownersnevergotbacktheirlandormoney.Onethingisclearnow.TheNagasaswellas theKukis liveinmoreor lesscompactareas.Theyarenotmixinganymore.ThesituationinChakpikarongcontinuestobeveryconfusingandisdifferentfromthatofotherplaces.WeseemanyKukislivingtogetherwiththeAnalNagas.They have become refugees in their own land because of theclashesbetweentheUKLF(UnitedKhulmiLiberationFront)andtheUNLF(UnitedNationalLiberationFront)inrecentmonths.MostofthemarefromtheDingpiarea(neartheIndo-Myanmarborder).TheKukishadbeenlivingtogetherwiththeAnalNagasforthelastthreeyearsaftertheconflict.Abouttheirrelationship,aKukichiefsays:“OurrelationswiththeAnalsareverycordialinChandelDistrict.SometimesIusedtowonderwhatotherpeopleofourowntribelivingindifferentdistrictswouldsay.TheycanevenaccuseusofsidingwiththeNagas.OneexampleisthecomingupoftheUnitedKukiLiberationFront(UKLF),aKukiundergroundgroupwhichisworkingcloselywiththeNSCN-IM”8.

RegardingthestatusoftheUGs(militants)intheirsociety,Mr.Thenthangsays:“TheNagashadalonghistoryofinsurgencyandtheyhadattainedaninternationalstatus.Theyareinternationallyenlightenedinpoliticsandtheywant theKukis toacceptNaganationalism.TheKukishavealonghistoryoftheirown,buttheconflict occurred suddenly.Thepeople are not yet prepared to

acceptitpsychologically,sowehavemanyUGgroupsbelongingto our tribe. Some groups are behaving like gangsters.Theycollecttaxesinthenameofthetribeandusethemfortheirownpurpose.Duringtheelections,theyworkforcandidateswhohirethem.WhentheeircandidatesareelectedtheywillbefoundinthequartersoftheMLAs”9.

With regard to thewoes and sufferingsof theKukisMr.FrancisBaitesays:“Becauseoftheconflict,theKukisocietyisnot free fromconflict tillnow.Abig tensionerupted inMorehsoon after theKuki-Naga conflict, and soon after therewas aPaite-Kuki conflict inChurachandpur.Manypeople got killedandmanyhouseswereburntdown.EventhoughtheleadersoftheKNAandZRA(ZomiRevolutionaryArmy)havereachedanunderstandingnow,theplightofthevictimsisstillmiserable.Nowtheyarecallingtheconflictasmallfamilyfeud,buttheKukiandPaiteconflicthassharpenedthedistinctionsintheKukifamily.Whentheconflictsubsided,someUGswhosidedwiththeNagaslikeKRAandUKLFhavereturnedtotheKukifold.Duringtheconflicttherewasagreatenmitybetweenthemandtheykilledeachother.TheKukiNationalFront(KNF)isalsodividedintomanysub-groupsnowandrivalrybetweenthemisverystrong.Recently,therewasapropagandathatwheneverwehaveacommonenemyourUGsareunited.NowpeoplearescaredwhethertheUGswillstart anotherwarwithother communities.Again in theDingpiarea(nearIndo-Myanmarborder)therearemanyvalleymilitantsoperatingnow.TheUKLFhasbeentryingtochasethemoutbuttheyarenotsuccessful.SomeKukisgenuinelyfearthatthereisabigpossibilitythatthevalleypeoplewillencroachonKukilandslowlyintheyearstocome”10.

TheNagashaveadifferentperspectiveontheKukis.Mr.Moshelsays:“Kukistoowilljoinusoneday.Theywillbenefitmoreinjoiningusthanbygoingawayfromus.Insomeareas,likeMarimchiblock,theIMleadersandtheKNAleadershavealreadyreachedanunderstanding.Theyusedtocometogetherandhave


commonmeals.ThefirstonewasinMarimchiandthesecondonewasinMoreh.Averyuniqueincidenthappenedduringoneofthesefixedmeetings.Mr.Ngamjatong(KNAleader)wasonhiswayforthemeetingwiththeIMleadersandanassailantshothimandranaway.IfNgamjatonghaddiedinthatattack,itwouldhavesurelyledtothesecondconflict.TheIMleadersgotsoangrywiththeactthattheypassedanordertokillthepotentialassasin.HewascaughtandbroughttothecourtoftheNSCN,interrogatedandwasabouttobeshotbuthepleadedhisignoranceabouttheplannedmeetingandinthepresenceofNgamjatong,hewasforgivenandsetfree”11.

ThemilliondollarquestioniswhethertheNagaandKukihopesandaspirationswillberealisedwhenthereislackoftrustbetweenthem.Onlytimewilltell.Toliveinpeacethereisnoalternativeotherthantoreachmutualunderstandingandresolvingallthedifferencesamicably.

6. Conflict Resolution in the Past

Regarding the past conflict resolution system,Mr. LeoKamchinthang says: “Our forefathers certainly had someformalitiestosettletheinter-tribeconflicts.ButwiththecomingofNagaUGsandmodernity,itisnotapplicableanymore.NagaUGsdirectlyorindirectlysolvedsomecasesbytakingdecisionsontheirown.Localleadersandchiefsareleftout.Oflate,whenwe have to settle inter-tribe cases, people prefer to go to thegovernmentcourtsinsteadofthetribalcourts.Aftertheconflict,KukistooimitatetheNagaUG.Intheoldendays,peopleusedtocometogethertosolvecasesinvolvingtwocommunities”1.

AccordingtotherecordsofS.P.ThampanatameetingonMay10,1942the256delegatesfrom69villagescomprisingallthechiefsandeldersof6differentcommunitiesinChandeldistrict,tookanoathandagreedthat,whenevertheyhadaproblemareatheywouldmeetanddiscussit in thepresenceof threeelectedpersons:(1)S.PThampan(Anal),(2)NgulKhup(Kuki/Khongsai),

(3)N.H.Kanlun(Anal).Theyalsoresolvedthatincaseofawar,theft, or changing sides, etc., the culprits shouldbefinedwithaMithun.Thesecasesshouldbesettledeither inMonbi (Kukivillage) orAnalKhullen (AnalNagavillage). Inter-tribe casesweretobesolvedinthepresenceofthesethreepersons.

Theresearcherfoundnowrittendocumentbutlearntthateachtribewasabletosolveitsownproblemsincludingmurdercaseswithoutreferringthemtocourts.Mr.Holkhojam(aKuki)says:“Everytribehaditsownwaysofsolvingitsproblems.TheKukishadtheirowncustoms.Wehavenowrittenrulesandregulationsbutwejudgeaccordingtoourtraditionsandcustoms.Inthepast,acomplainantbroughtrice-beer(nowteaisokay)tothevillagechief,whogatheredallhisministersandtogethertheyheardthecase.Dateswerefixedforthesecondhearingofthecasewhereinthechiefalsoinvitedthedefendant.Inallthecases,thechiefisthemainjudgeandiftheycannotcometoaconclusion,thenextstepiscalled‘Twilut’(enteringwater).Apriest(thempu)usuallyconductsthisceremony.Beforeheallowedthecomplainantandthedefendanttoenterthewater,hewouldcallonGodandthespiritofthewatertohelptheminidentifyingthewrongandspeakthetruth.Itisbelievedthatwhoeveriswrong,cannotstayinsidethewaterfor longeventhoughtheymayknowswimming.Thosewhoare right,even though theymaynotknowhowtoswim,willbeabletostayinthewaterforaverylongtime.Thewrongfellowissupposedtofeelhotoraburningsensationassoonasheentersthewater.Ifthatdoesnothelp,thelastresortinsolvingproblemsistakinganoath.Forexample,iftheproblemisaboutclaimingtheownershipofaMithun,thepersonwhoclaimstheownershiphastotakeanoath.Forthisparticularceremonythreethingsarenecessary:(1)Dusttosymbolisetheearth,(2)Charcoaltosymbolisefireand(3)alittlebloodoftheanimal.Thepersonmakingapromisehastodrinkthemixtureofallthesethreethings.Astipulatedtimeisusuallygiven.Theoathtakerhastosay:“IfIlie,letmeturntodustanddiewithfirewithin6months”.If


thetimeboththegroupsagreeis6months,thenafterthedrink,theoathtakerbitesthetoothofatiger,tosignifythatifhehadlied,thetigershouldbitehimwhenhegoesouttothejungle”2.Agreeingwiththeabovecircumstances,NicholasThumpum(anAnalNaga)hasthistosay:“TheaboveceremoniesarepractisedintheAnalcommunityevennow.Lastyear,twoeldersdied,whileenteringinthewaterforacaseinChakpikarong.Manypeoplehavediedinthepastwhiletakinganoath.Sometimeseventheirchildrenhavedied.Oathtakingceremoniesareusuallydoneoutsidethevillage”.

Manyofthesecustomshavebeenmodifiedintherecentpast.AccordingtoMr.Chumshing:“AnapplicationtosettleacasewithacourtfeeofRs.100shouldbefirstsubmittedtothechief.Thenthechiefwithhisministerialcolleagueswillstarttheenquiryaboutthecase.Afterknowingfullythecaseandtheopinionsofboththeparties,datesarefixedforthehearingwhenboththecomplainantandtherespondentarepresent.Themainideais tomakethemcompromiseonthecaseasfaraspossible.TheAnalcommunityalsohasChiefAssociationstolookintotheoveralladministrationin the area. Penalties are imposedon the peoplewho lose thecase”3.Agreeingtothesimilaritiesandthedifferencesbetweenthetwotribes,JohnThangjaletsays:“Complaintagainstachiefwasunheardofinthepast,becauseifthevillagerswerenothappywiththechief,theyleftthevillageandshiftedtoanothervillage.IntheKukisociety,avillagerownsaplotaslongasheenjoysthepleasureoftheChief.KukiChiefsareverypowerfulandevenmurdercasesaresolvedinthevillagecourts”4.AccordingtoMr.Phungreiyo,theTangkhulshavevillagecourtsat thegrassrootslevel.Thereare4-5sub-divisionalcourtsinaregionandtherearefourregionsnamelyeastern,western,northernandsouthernandabovealltheseregions,theyhaveTangkhulNagaLong,astheirapexbody.Whateverisnotsolvedbythevillageorregionalcourtsisbroughttotheapexbody,whosedecisionwillbebinding”5.

7. Towards a Peaceful Solution

Fromourstudy,welearntthatamajorityofthepeopleblametheUGs forflaringup the conflict andbringingup communaltensionbecausetheycontroleverythingandthegovernmenthasnorealcontroloverthesituation.Mr.Ronglosays:“In2002,aKukiUGgroupdemandedRs5lakhsfromourorganisation.Wedidnothavesomuchmoneyandwerescaredbecauseifwegivetoonegroup,otherswillstartdemandingthesameasmorethan30insurgentgroupsareoperatinginManipur.SowetooktheissuetotheKukileadersofthearea.TheycalledabigmeetinginvitingtheUGgrouptoo.Aswecouldnotcometoaconclusion,theyarrangedanothermeetingandpleadedwiththemnottodemandanymoneyandtotakebacktheirdemandletter.Wehighlightedthedifficultiesandhardshipswefaced.Theyunderstoodusandwewereexempted”.1

Talkingabout thedecisionmakersMr.Wungreiyosays:“Atthevillagelevel,chiefsusuallytakedecisionsandinthearealevel, it isoftenrichpeoplewhohad interest inpoliticsand intribe level (amongtheNagas) thosewhohadstrongsupportersandhaving a linkwith the politicians (onmost occasions it istheGovernment employees).These peoplework hand-in-handwith theUGs”2.Ms.KimGangte (ExM.P) says about futureinterventions:“Governmentaccordingtomeistheselectedfew.Itisnotsomethingdivine.ThedecisionsoftheGovrnmentareofafewandnotthewishofthepeople.TheGovernment’sactioninanyfieldistostopnepotismandfavouritismingivingjobsandGovernmentsanctions.Politicalleadersshouldbetheguardiansofordinarypeopleandtheyshouldsacrificetheirlifeforthepeople.NGOs,includingChurchorganisationsandUnionsshouldworktogetherfortheunityofthepeople.Theyshouldactasapressuregrouponthegovernment.Thereshouldbeanetworkingsystembetweenthesegroups.Theseorganisationsshouldjoinhandsforthecauseofthepeople.UGsshouldabstainfrominterferinginanytypeofelectionsheldinthestate”3.

Regarding perceptions of the people these days,Dominic


Lamkangsays:“Theotherdayoneofmyfriendsrangmeupandinformedmeofa situation inBangalorewhereaMizostudentstabbedoneMonsangboy.Hewasaskingmewhetherweshouldforgivehim,becausetheMizostudentsmadeanapologyfortheincident.Whenwelookatthesituation,weshouldknowthatthereisnoneedtocommunalisetheissueasthematterinvolvedjusttwostudents.Inthesedays,everythingistakenonacommunalbasis.Thistypeofcommunalisingagainsteachotheristhegreatestsetbacktowardsthebuildingupofapeacefulsociety”4.

Asforthechurches’roleinhelpingthevictimsinconflicts,Mr.Dongkhokaisays:“IntheKukisociety,duringtheconflict,someChurchescameupwiththeirreliefmaterialstopopularisetheirChurchandmission.Thosemotivesarewrong,althoughwhattheydidisright.Thisisalsooneofthereasonswhywecannottrusteachotherandwhyoursocietyisdivided.Peaceinvolveseverybody, everyone’s involvement is necessary. With regardtotheNagaUGs,if theystill includeSardarHills,ChandelasNagainhabitedareasandwishtoincludeitintheirdemandforGreaterNagalim,itcanbecomeasourceofconflictinthefuturetoo.ButiftheNagasreallywantpeace,theyshoulddoitthroughnegotiationsandeachgroupshouldbefaithful”5.RegardingtheroleoftheUGs,Mr.Moshelsays:“UGsshouldbeneutral.Theyshouldcatchorpunishpeopleafterproperenquiry.Theyshouldnotthreatenorfrightenpeoplesimply;warningsshouldbegivenbeforetheytakeanydrasticaction.Ihaveseenthemdoingallsortsofunnecessarythings.NowwefeellikelaughingabouttheKuki–Nagaclashthattookplaceintherecentpast”6.

Peoplefeelthatthemilitantshavearoletoplayinthepeaceinitiatives.For example,Mr.Chumrhing says: “As the conflictgotworsened,wemetPaolen(KNAleader)andappealedtohimforpeace.OnMay15,1997withPaolen’spermissionandundertheMLAMr.Hangkhanpao’s leadership,we killed two cowsandhadanexchangeofgiftsandotheritemsinChakpikarong.Itwasafterthiseventthattheconflictstartedcoolingdown.Itwas

becauseoftheinitiativetakenbymanypeoplethatweembracedpeace”7.Withregardtofutureinterventions,Mr.Ronglohasthistosay:“Largesectionsofpeopleareafraidofwarnow.Theydon’twanttohavecivilwaragainforthesecondtime.Whatwecandonowistocreateaplatformforthepeopletosharetheirwoesandproblemsoftheconflict.AndmeticulouslyarrangeculturalexchangeprogrammesforlostMangaistomeetandsharetheirpastrelationship.WehavealsocometolearnthatinsomeplaceslikeLitan,UGsofbothgroupsstayedtogether,theydon’thaveanyexchangeoffire,tillnow”8.Thisshowsthatmutualtrustandunderstandingisalwayspossible.

Mr.Thenthangsays:“TheKuki-Nagaimbroglioisadelicatematter. It should be addressed after knowing the historicalbackground.Itcoversmanysubjectsandagendas,eventhoughtherewas no agenda or any specific pointwhenwe startedfighting.Now each tribe should discuss the real problem andaskitselfwhatitwasfightingfor.Conventionsshouldbeheldandunanimousdecisionsshouldbetakenfirst.Weshouldhavepeacewitheachother,resolvedbytherepresentativeofeachtribe.Thenalonewecanhavelastingpeace.Thereisnowayforpeaceexceptthroughdialoguepromotedbyreligiousleaders”9.

Most leaders whom the researchermet agree that thepeacecommitteesformedattheinitiativeofthethenMLAMr.HangkhanpaoinChakpikarongshouldbeactivated.Theydidnotlastforlong.Someoftheproblems,accordingtoMr.Chumrhingare that: “Therewas lackofmoney for conducting camps andseminars and asmost of the volunteerswere elders, therewasnobodytorunthefamilyorseetothefinancialproblemsofthefamily.Someofthevolunteerswerealsonotsincere.SometimeswhentheywereenrustedwiththetaskofmeetingtheUGs,theycamebackwithalotofexcuses”10. However,theyearningforpeacecontinuesfromboththecommunities.

8. Conclusion


Peacemakingisnotaneasytaskespeciallywhenthepartiesindisputedonotwishtoundertakethejourneytowardsit.Thisstudyshowedtwodifferentopinionswithregardto‘peace’.AccordingtoMr.Nehmang: “Peace is the need of the hour for theKukisociety.Duringtheseyears,Ihavespentmytimeinpropagationofpeaceandunityinourtribe.IhavemetalmostalltheKukiUGleaders.Ihavetoldthemofthenecessityofacommonplatformforanationalmovement.Allof themagreed,but inpractice itisdifficulttofollowit.Inoursociety,welackleadersandeachUGgroupisinfestedwithcorruptionanddivisiononthebasisofclans.UnlesswecometogetherandcarveoutourownStatetherewon’tbeanylastingpeaceinoursociety”1.Mr.Kothar(aNaga)confirmingtheneedforNagaunitysays:“UntiltheNagasachievesovereigntyorSouthernNagaland,theconflictwillcontinue.Inthebeginningwewereallmadeawarethattillwestandunitedwewouldnotgeteventhebasichumanrights.Soforus,unityisthemainpriority.Thoughdivided,werespectourleadersandthat’sthesecretofNagaunity”2.

Mr.Osteenhasthistosay:“High-handednessoftheUGsindivertingpublicdevelopmentfundsfor theirownorganisationscanalsobecheckedifthepeopleareawareofhowandforwhatpurposethefundscamein.Inthistypeofasituation,unlessthepublic takes the initiative, the law-enforcing agencies like thepoliceandarmycandonothing.Thepublichasalsotherighttoknowhowfundsarespent.Ifthepeopleareawareofthesethings,corruptioncanbecheckedinoursociety”3.Aboutthetaskofthefuture,Mr.Chumrhingsays:“Anumberofworkshopsforpeaceshouldbeconductedtoawakenourpeople.Thepeoplenowdon’tevenknowthemeaningofaworkshop.Forthemworkshopisaplacewherewerepairjeepsandothermachines.Soonaftertheconflict,Iorganisedoneworkshopforallthechiefsbutnobodyturnedup.OnenquiryIlearntthattheydon’thaveanymachinesandvehicles.Churchvisitstooarenecessary,becauseweareallChristiansandwecanmakethebestuseofthisplatform.Andthe

UGsshouldbemadeawareofthereligiouscompulsionsofseekingapeacefulresolutiontotheconflict”4.

AsforindulgingincounterviolenceandconflictMr.Francissays:“IftheUGsreallywantterritory,theyshouldtaketheadviceof the public leaders and shouldwork hand-in-handwith theNGOs,whocanplayamediatoryrole.TheproblemofManipurcannotbesolvedthroughanarmyoperationtotamethemilitants.Negotiation iswhatwe require.After sending the army, if thegovernmentscrutinisesitsactivities,theywilllearnhowthearmyplaysadoublegame”5.KimGangteadds:“Wheretherearehumansthereareconflicts.Butsolutionsarealwaysthere.Womencanplayagreatroleinconflictresolution.Comparedtomentheyarebynaturepeace-loving.AsBillClintonsaid,“IfWomenwerethereinCampDavid,CampDavidwouldnothavefailed”6.

AccordingtoMr.LeoKamchinthang:“Duringtheconflict,the government did nothing for the people.When the conflictescalatedthegovernmentdidnotdoanythingtostopit.Atthatjuncture,someNGOscametohelpthepeople,butpeopledidnotbelievethem.Theysuspectedthemandsomeeventhreatenedthemandtoldthemnottocometotheirareaanymore.TheNGOswereafraidandretreated.IftheNGOsfromoutsidecouldinvolvesomelocalpeople,itwouldbegood.AfterknowingtherealintentionsoftheNGOs,thelocalpeoplewilltrustthem.ThepeopleingeneraldidnotunderstandtheirtruemotivesinceManipurhasaverybignumberofNGOs,mostofthemonlygettingmoneyfromdonoragenciesanddoingnothingforpeople’swelfare.SopeoplehaveawrongperceptionofNGOs.When it comes toagovernmentundertaking,wehardlysee sincerepeople takingup the jobofenablingpeace”7.

Ontheimportanceoffrequentmeetingsoftheleaders,Mr.LakshmiPrasadsays:“Frequentmeetingsof leaderswillbringunderstandingamong thedifferent tribes.Thesedayswhenwesee young personswe suspect them to beUGs. Ifwe have a


platformwherewecanmeetfrequently,naturallywewillknoweachother’sproblemsandwillcomeclosertoeachother.Becauseoftheconflict,wecannotvisiteachotherbecausethereisabiggapbetweenus.Ifwecansolvethiscommunicationgapwecancomeclosertopeace”8.Ontheimportanceofcommunication,Mr.Francisadds:“Ifwecanhavecontactswithourfriendseverynowandthen,wewillbeabletoknoweachotherbetterandshareourproblemsmore.Butnow,wedon’thaveanyphoneconnectionsinthevillages,forgetaboutelectricityandthetelephone,theinter-tribe friendship cannot growbetweenus, especially for peoplelivingintheinteriorregions.Thegovernmentisnotignorantaboutthis,butwhatcanwedo?”9.

Also addressing the problem of underdevelopment is akeyissueinestablishingpeace.ThisstudyhasshownthatboththeNagaandKukicommunitieshavereachedacrucialstageintheiridentityassertion.TheNagaswanttobeunitedunderoneumbrella.TheKukisremaindivided.SomearesupportingtheterritorialintegrityofManipur,whileotherswishtohavea separateKukiland. The division of the land according tothewishes of theNagas,Meiteis andKukis is the bone ofcontention.Thesethreeentitiesneedtosittogether,hearandunderstandeachother,withrespectandseewhateachonecangiveandtake.TheyneedalsotolookatthepracticalaspectsofsafeguardingtheterritorialintegrityofManipur.ThequestiontodayiswhetheritispossibleaftertheestrangementthatoneseesintheStatetoday.Fixedideasandobstinatestandswillnothelpinreachinganhonourablesolutioninthenearfuture.NGOsandvoluntaryandwelfareagenciescanplayamediatoryroleinhelpingoutthecommunitiesinconflicttoarriveatpeacebasedonjusticetoall.

*******

ENDNoTES

N. B. The numbers concern the sections of the paper.

1. 1. B.KAhluwaliaandShashiAhluwalia,Social Change in Manipur (Delhi- 1984)p.1;citedinL.Jeyaseelan,Impact of the Missionary Movement in Manipur(NewDelhi:ScholarPublishingHouse,1996),p.2.

2. ReseaRch RefeRence and TRaining division, Public division MinisTRy of infoRMaTion and bRoadcasTing, goveRnMenT of india, IndIa 2004 P.789.

3. T. s gangTe, The KuKIs of ManIpur (new delhi : gyan Publishing house, 1993) P.28.

4. l. Jeyaseelan, IMpacT of The MIssIonary MoveMenT In ManIpur (new delhi : scholaR Publishing house, 1996) P.2.

5. T. s gangTe, ibid., P.28. 6. l. Jeyaseelan, oP.ciT., P.1. 7. The Nagas Perspective,publishedbytheUnitedNagaCouncilWorkingGroup,

p.5.

8. JyoTiRMony Roy, hIsTory of ManIpur (iMPhal : 1973), P.189 ciTed in l. Jeyaseelan oP.ciT., P.11.

9. P.s haokiP, Zal’n-gaM The kuki naTion (kuki naTional oRganisaTion), PP.31-62.

10. T.SGangte,op.cit.,pp34-35.

11. J. Roy, oP.ciT., P.3. see also of n.ToMbi, ManIpur: a sTudy’, PP24-25 and l. ibungohal singh, InTroducTIon To ManIpur, 1963, P.55 ciTed in uniTed naga council woRking gRouP, The naga perspecTIve.

12. R.R shiMRay, orIgIn and culTure of The nagas, (new delhi : MRs. PaMleiPhi shiMRay, 1985) P.26.

13. WilliamShaw,The Thadou Kukis,1929,pp11and24. 14. An interviewwithMr.KotharMonshang,MonsangpanthaVillage, datedJuly 10,2004.

2.1. Datesarenotclear,inonepageitisentered10-05-1942and ontwopagesitisdated10-07-1942.


2. Thadou kukis weRe also known as khongsai in The PasT.

3. TRibal way of descRibing The yeaR of a MiThun oR aniMal. iT Means The MiThun had five youngeR siblings. 4. an inTeRview wiTh MR. leo kaMchinThang, sugnu, daTed 03-07-04. 5. an inTeRview wiTh MR. John ThangJaleT haokiP, k. sabi village, dT 17-08-04. 6. an inTeRview wiTh MR. Michael bePaul, chandel, daTed 09-07-04. 7. an inTeRview wiTh MR. ZilngaM baiTe, k.sabi village, daTed, 09-09-04. 8. an inTeRview wiTh MR. suMPi Modal, chakPikaRong, daTed 18-10-04. 9. a MeiTei deiTy who was believed To have MaRRied an anal lady. 10. an inTeRview wiTh MR. ngaMsei baiTe, sugnu, daTed 19-09-04. 11. AninterviewwithMr.JohnThangjaletHaokip.

12. AninterviewwithMr.ZilngamBaite.

13. AninterviewwithMr.Wurngam,Chandel,dated10-07-2004.

14. AninterviewwithShokhothang,Moreh,dated4-06-2004. 15. AninterviewwithJohnThangjaletHaokip. 16. AninterviewwithDr.Khuplam,Moreh,dated5-06-2004.

17. P.s. haokiP, Zale’n-gaM The kuki naTion (kuki naTional oRganisaTion – 1998), P. 84. 18. an inTeRview wiTh MR. suMPi Modal, chakPikaRong, daTed 18-10-2004. 19. an inTeRview wiTh MR. ngulkhuP, MR. John ThangJaleT and MR. ZilngaM, sugnu, daTed 17-08-2004. 20. an inTeRviewn wiTh MR. wuRngaM. 21. NSCN-IM(NationalSocialistCouncilofNagalim,Isak-Muivah).

22. KNA(KukiNationalArmy). 23. MinistryofInformationandPublicity,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublic ofNagalim,50yearsofResistance,p.7.

24. MinisTRy of infoRMaTion and PubliciTy, ibid., P.98. 25. P.S.Haokip,op.cit.,p.74.

3. 1. AninterviewwithMr.TongkhohaoHaokip,Moreh,dated,25-05-04.

2. an inTeRview wiTh MR. J.k. MaTe, iMPhal, daTed, 17-07-04. 3. an inTeRview wiTh Ms. TeResa hoilaM, MoReh, daTed, 02-06-04. 4. an inTeRview wiTh MR. PeTeR senPu, iMPhal, daTed, 17-07-04. 5. AninterviewwithMr.Ringo,Prawllawnvillage,dated10-07-04.

6. Indo-naga crIsIs (PRess Review and coMMenT) delhi, deceMbeR 1994, naga inTeResT gRouP (nig), P.3. 7. an inTeRview wiTh MR. koThaR Monsang, MonsangPanTha village. 8. an inTeRview wiTh MR. chuMRhing anal, chakPikaRong. 9. an inTRoducTion To The eThnic PRobleM

in ManiPuR and a RePoRTage on The naga-kuki clash: a PRose in counTeR-insuRgency, naga sTudenTs fedeRaTion, kohiMa: nagaland.

10. Indo-NagaCrisis,op.cit.,p.2.

11. an inTeRview wiTh MR. waRngaM, chakPikaRong, daTed sePTeMbeR16, 2004.

12. an inTeRview wiTh MR. kaMPu gangTe, MoReh, daTed, 02-06-04.

13. an inTeRview wiTh MR. JosePh JaMThang baiTe, MoReh, daTed, 01-06-04.

14. AninterviewwithMr.Kampu.


4. 1. AninterviewwithMr.TongkhohaoHaokip,Moreh.

2. AninterviewwithMr.KotharMonshang,Monsangpanthavillage.

3. an inTeRview wiTh MR. Michael bePaul, chandel.

4. an inTeRview wiTh MR. chuMRhing, chakPikaRong.

5. AninterviewwithMr.Zilngam,K.Sabivillage,dated09-09-04.

6. an inTeRview wiTh MR. wungReiyo, iMPhal, daTed 15-07-04.

7. AninterviewwithRev.MangseiBaite,PresbeterianChurch,Sugnu,dated,15-08-04.

8. an inTeRview wiTh MR. Moshel, Pallel, daTed, 11-09-04.

9. an inTeRview wiTh MR. ngaMsei baiTe, sugnu, daTed, 19-09-04.

10. an inTeRview wiTh MR. kaMPu gangTe, MoReh.

11. AninterviewwithMr.Dongkhokai,Churachandpur,dated,24-06-04.

5. 1. AninterviewwithMr.Chumrhing.

2. P.s haokiP, oP.ciT., PP., 207-258.

3. an inTeRview wiTh MR. wungReiyo, iMPhal, daTed 15-07-04.

4. an inTeRview wiTh MR. Moshel, Pallel, 11-09-04.

5. an inTeRview wiTh MR. Ronglo, iMPhal, daTed 16-07-04.

6. AKukicustomarypracticeofpayingtheBride’sprice.

7. an inTeRview wiTh doulun, sugnu, daTed, 10-09-04.

8. AninterviewwithMr.NgamseiBaite,Sugnu,dated19-09-04. 9. AninterviewwithMr.ThenthangHaokip,Moreh,dated,07-06-04.

10. an inTeRview wiTh MR. fRancis baiTe, MoReh.

11. AninterviewwithMr.Moshel,Pallel,.Dated,11-09-04.

6. 1. AninterviewwithMr.LeoKamchinthang,Sugnu,dated,02-07-04. 2. AninterviewwithJohnHolkhojam,Moreh,dated,29-05-04. 3. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.CHUMRHING,CHAKPIKARONG. 4. AninterviewwithJohnThangjalet. 5. AninterviewwithMr.Phungreiyo,Imphal,18-05-04.

7. 1. AninterviewwithMr.Ronglo,dated,16-07-04. 2. AninterviewwithMr.Wungrreiyo. 3. ANINTERVIEWWITHMS.KIMGANGTE,IMPHAL. 4. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.DOMINICLAMKANG,IMPHAL. 5. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.DONGKHOKAI,CHURACHANDPUR,

DATED,24-06-04. 6. AninterviewwithMr.Moshel,Pallel,dated,11-09-04. 7. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.CHUMRHING,CHAKPIKARONG,

DATED,16-08-04. 8. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.RONGLO. 9. AN INTERVIEWWITHMR.THENTHANG,MOREH,DATED,

(7/6/04) 10. AninterviewwithMr.Chumrhing.8. 1. AninterviewwithMr.Nehmang,Moreh,dated,06-06-04. 2. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.KOTHAR. 3. ANINTERVIEWWITHMR.HENRYOSTEEN,MOREH,DATED,


ThE kukI-PAITE CoNFLICT IN ThE ChuRAChANDPuR DISTRICT

oF MANIPuR

Rebecca C. Haokip

1949 marked the merger ofManipur with the IndianUnion. In 1972Manipur became a full-fledged Statewith a60-seat LegislativeAssembly 19 of its seats reserved for thetribals and one for the ScheduledCastes.Manipur elects 2members of Parliament to theLokSabha and 1 to theRajyaSabha.Churachandpur is one of its districts. Its headquarterChurachandpur,alsocalledLamka,isthesecondbiggesttowninManipur.Itlies62kmSouthwestofImphaland56kmfromtheIndo-MyanmarbordertotheextremesouthofManipur.thetri-junctionofImphal-Lamka,Lamka-Singngat-TidimRoadandLamka-SugnuRoadontheslopesontheWestbankofTuithaRiver.

Churachandpurislocatedbetween92059”and93050”longitude,23055”to24030”Nlatitudeatanaltitudeofabout914mMSL.Thedistrictenjoysafairseasonalpatternofhotandcold,wetanddryweatherwithamaximumtemperatureof370Candaminimumof10C.Thehighestandlowestannualrainfallrecordedis308mmto597mmandamaximumandminimumhumidityof100to61p.c.

ThoughofficiallyknownasChurachandpurthelocalresidentscall the districtLamka,whichmeans the confluence ofTedimRoadandTipaimukhRoad.TheLamkatownoncebelongedtoPuSemthongHaokip,Suongpipa.TeisiengbecamethetwinvillageofLamka.In1930,PuZenhangValteboughttheChurachandpurOldBazaarareafromtheTeisiengvillagechiefforapotofricewine.SincethenLamkahasgrownfromasmalltwinvillagetoa sprawling town. It is one of the fastest developing towns inManipur.ItisinhabitedbytheChin-Kuki-MizoorCHIKIMwhichisasynonymforPaite,Hmar,Thadou,Zou,Gangte,Simte,VaipheiandMizos.AllofthemareChristians.Socross-toppedchurchesadornthetown.Asdifferenttribalcommunitiesrushtothetown,

there is keenbut healthy competitionbetween themespeciallyin education and employment. Lamka, also a tourist spot hasproducedmanycentralandstategovernmentofficials.Italsohasanamazingnumberofartsandcraftsproducts.Thelanguagesordialectsspokeninthedistrictare:Paite,Hmar,Thadou,Vaiphei,Zou,Gangte,Lushai/Mizo,Simte,Kom,Kabui,Manipuri,Hindi,Bengali,Nepali,PunjabiandAssamese.

Loveofartandbeautyisinherentinthepeople.Itisdifficultto find a Chin-Kuki-Mizowho cannot sing or dance. Theirartisticandgenerallycreativenaturehasfoundexpressioninthecolourfulhandloomandhandicraftproductsthatareworldfamousfortheirdesignsandcolour.Eachethnicgrouphasitsowndistinctculture and traditions deeply embedded in its dances,music,dressesandcustomarypractices.Foodhabitstiltheavilytowardsnon-vegetarianism.Women’sdressesareartistic.Ayoungpersonmaybeafootballplayer,asocialleader,achoirleader,aguitarstrummingsinger,anagriculturallabourerandalove-lornlonerrolledintoone.Churachandpurisalsoknownasthe“LandofPresidents”whoheaddifferentChristiandenominations.

ChavangKutisanautumnfestivaloftheChin-Kuki-Mizoethnicgroup.Theyunderstandoneanother’sdialectbecausetheyshare a commonorigin and folklore.Their festivals are givendifferentnamesindifferentplaces,butthespiritoftheircelebrationisthesame.Itisahappyoccasionforfood-stock-ladenvillagerstomakemerryafterayear’shardlabourinthefields.Itisalsoathanksgivingfestivalinhonourofthegiverofanabundantharvest.ThemodernKutisobservedon1stNovember.

origin and Settlement of kukis and Paites in Churachandpur

‘Kuki’isaBengaliterm,appliedtovarioushilltribessuchas theLushais,RangkholsandThadous. It seems tohavebeenknown at a comparatively early period.1Hill people living intheNorthwestofMyanmarandNortheastofIndiaareknownas

The Kuki-Paite Conflict 187 188 Conflict Mapping in NEI

KukitotheBengalis.TheearliestuseofthisnameinEnglishwasfoundin1792.Bengalisfoundthemculturallybackward,becauseKuki literallymeans‘wildhillpeople.’TheBurmesecall themChins.2NewKukisarealsocalled‘Thados’whoseMeitheinameistobeKongjaiorKhongjai.ThelatterisalsoreportedastheArakanesenameforLakher. NoneoftheOldKukigroupsarenumericallysignificant,butseveral(Aimol,Chawte,Purum,Kom,Vaiphei)havebeensubjectsofmodernethnographicortheoreticalstudies.OtherOldKukigroupsaretheAnal,theBaite,theChiru,theKolhen (Koireng,Koirao), theHrangkhol, theHollam, theLamkangandtheHmar.KhawthlangisalsoreportedasanamefortheThadosorNewKukis.

SomeoftheKukigroupsaretheLushaiorLusei,thelatteroriginallythenameofSilo-speakingdialectcalledDuhlien.3TheThadous4 predominantly settled throughout Manipur are alsofoundinAssam,NagalandandMizoram.FormerlytheThadousinhabitedtheChinandKachinstatesofMyanmarandtheSylhetdistrictofBangladesh.TheThadousmigratedtoManipurenmassefromdifferent regions during 1600-1660 in the reign ofKing“Paikhomba”.ThebrethrenofMaharajaTouthienmang,theMeiteiswhohadalreadysettledintheManipurvalleyfailedtorecognisetheir identity though theywere descendants ofTouthienmang.Sotheysimplycalledthem‘Khongjais.’J.W.EdgartheDeputyCommissionerofCachar(Kachar)wrote inhisMemoNo.170dated 16thApril 1870 toE.B.Simson,ChiefCommissioner ofDhaka that,”Thadous are called asKhongjai by theMeiteis inManipooree”.

In the 1792-1799 survey of theManipurHills theBritishEthnologicalResearchOfficers.RawlinsandDalton,identifiedthefollowingtribesasCucu/Kuki.In1886,Capt.E.W.DunrecordedinthefirstGazetteerofManipur,theAnal,Aimol,Chothe,Chiru,Lamgang,Moyon,Monsang,Kom,Koireng,Koirao,Maring,Purum,Ralte,Simte,Gangte,Paite,Hmar,Thadou,Vaiphei,ZouandLushai.5In1903,these21tribeswereaffiliatedtotheKuki

nomenclatureaccordingtoDr.Grierson,ChairmanoftheLinguisticSurveyofIndia.Sotheword‘Kuki’isagenerictermandnotaseparateorindependenttribe. TheThadouswerecalledbydifferentnamesbycommunitiesliving around them.TheBurmese call themThadouChin, theLushai - the LushoungThadou, theMeitei - Khongjai, theTangkhuls-theKhongchai/Kachami,theMaos-theKusamei,theAnals-Makheng,theKacharis-Thangkamsa,theBengalis-Cuci/KukiandtheBritish-NewKuki.TribeslivingintheChinHillsofMyanmarcontinuetosettledowninSouthernManipur.It isinterestingtonotethatthemeaningofPaite,oneoftheimportanttribesofKuki-Chinfamilyis“apeopleintheprocessofgoingormigrating”.Thustheirtraditionisnomadic. TheearlyThadousettlementsinManipurhavealonghistory.TheyplayedavitalroleundertheMaharajahsofManipur.ThePaitesareknowntohaveenteredManipurfromtheChinHills,muchlaterthantheThadous,onlyafterWorldWarII.InMyanmarthePaitearealsoknownasSukte.TheThadousandthePaitesshareacommonoriginandfolkloreandminordifferencesindialect.Theyunderstandeachother.Accordingtoanoraltradition,allthenon-Nagatribeswereofonefamily,childrenoftheirprogenitor‘Thadou’whomigratedfromKhul/Sinlung/Chhinlung.6WhatisclearisthatboththeThadouandPaiteareamigratoryracewhooccupyavillagefor2to4yearsatatimeandmovetoanewplacewheretheyfindfreshlandfitforcultivation.Theirstaplefoodisriceproducedthroughjhumcultivation.Theyprefertobuildtheirvillagesonhilltops.Theirhousesaresmall.Theypaygreatattentionto theirgenealogy.Theypaybrideprice, itsamountdependingonthereputationofherfamily.Bridepriceispaidintheformofdomesticatedanimalslikebuffaloes,mithuns,ammunition,beadsandmoneyorthroughpersonalbondage. Inrecenttimes,astheotherethnicgroupsbrokeawayfromtheKukinomenclature,onlytheThadousretainedtheKukiidentity.Itdoesnotsatisfyallofthemsothecommunityispolarisedonthis


issue.IthascreatedaschismamongtheThadouwithacentrifugalmovement of a group of political, social and church leaderstryingtowinothersbacktotheKukifold.PeopleusingtheKukinomenclaturearelabelledasascheduledtribewithaderivativeofanyotherKukitribeorasanunspecifiedtribe.This‘any-Kuki’identityhasfurtherconfusedthecommonpeopleandhasplayedaroleintheKuki-NagaorKuki-Paiteconflict.Thus,theyarepassingthroughanidentitycrisis.Lately,theThadous/KukisinManipurandMizosinMizoramhavebeentryingtoprovethattheyarethedescendantsofManasseh/Manmasi,theLostTribeofIsrael.7IItiscreatingitsownripplesintheirsociety.

Denominational Division Among the kuki and Paite

ChristianitycametotheSoutherndistrictsofManipuron7thMay1910,propagatedbytheWelshPresbyterianmissionary,RobertWatkinofAizawl.Tilldate,7thMayisobservedas“MissionaryDay” all over the districtwith church services as onSundaysandbeautifulchoirssingingineverychurch.RobertWatkinwithhistwointerpretersPuThangkhaiandPuLunpaopreachedtheGospelinSenvon,aThadouvillageborderingonMizoramandbaptisedPuKamkholunSingson,chiefofSenvonvillage.WithhisconversionthewholevillagewasconvertedtoChristianitywithinashortperiod.WiththeirconversiontheChristiancommunityofSenvon founded the“Thadou-KukiPioneerMission” (TKPM).ThismissionmadealotofprogresswiththeconversionofallthetribesofChurachandpurdistricttoChristianity.AstheTKPMhasthenameonlyoftheThadoutribe,in1942itsnamewaschangedtoNorthEastIndiaGeneralMission(NEIGM).

The Root of the Conflict between kukis & Paites

TheKukiandPaiteconflicthasalonghistory,someofwhichhasbeenmentionedabove.The21tribesoftheKukinomenclaturefoundedtheKukiCompanyin1948,withtheKukiInnasitsofficeatImphal.AlltheaffiliatedKukitribescontributedincashorkindintheconstructionofitsoffice.Butthenoticesandresolutionsof

themeetingwererecordedandprintedonlyintheThadoudialect.Moreover,mostoftheprominentleadersoftheKukiCompanybelonged to theThadou tribe.So,within a short periodof theformationoftheKukiCompany,the14tribes:theAnal,theKom,theAimol,theChothe,thePurum,theChiru,theLamkang,theMaring,theHmar,thePaite,theMoyon,theMonsang,theKoireng,theKoirao,demandedthatthemeetingnoticesandresolutionsbecirculatedeitherinManipuriorEnglishastheotherscouldnotunderstandThadoufully.OthersinsistedonretainingtheThadoudialectasthesoleKukilanguagebecauseoftheirlargepopulationandthepositionstheyheldinsociety.SomeKukileadersdemandedthattheotherKukitribesshouldbeabletospeakandunderstandthedialect8.Inreactiontothisattitudeoftheleadership,theothertribesleft theCompanyandformedanewgroupknownasthe“KhulUnion”.TodaytheKukinomenclaturestandsalonewiththeThadous.

AroundthistimesomeKukitribesseemtohavemadeatransitionof affiliation from theKuki to theNaga family, as the ‘KhulUniontoaNagaTribe.’“Originally,theMoyon,theMonsang,theLamkang,theMaring,theAnal,thePurum,theKom,theChothe,theKoirao,theKoireng,belongedtotheoldKukitribes.ButtheyhavechangedtheiraffiliationandarenowincludedintheNagasub-nation.”9From1950,theKhulUnionmovedaheadsuccessfullyandinashorttimethese10tribeswereconvertedtotheBaptistChurchbytheTangkhulsandlater,affiliatedtotheNagafamily.Afterit,theHmar,Paite,Simte,Zou,Vaiphei,GangtesandafewThadoutribesstoodontheirowntill1995withnoKukiorNagaaffiliation.Butasnopoliticalorsocialactivitiescouldbecarriedoutasanindividualorminortribe,aneworganisation,“TheSevenTribes”wasfoundedattheinitiativeofthePaite.

A New Nomenclature

In1995, thenameof the ‘SevenTribes’ inChurachandpurdistrictwaschangedto“ZomiRe-unificationOrganization(ZRO)”


attheinitiativeofthePaite.Itsformationdayisobservedeveryyearon20thFebruaryas‘ZomiNamNi.’TheZomianditstribesareHmar,Zou,Vaiphei,Gangte,Simte,ZomiandPaite.SomebelievethattheformationoftheZomiidentityornomenclaturewasinitiatedbythePaiteswithapoliticalmotiveofgettingtheminortribestocapturethestrongholdofthetownwheretheyaredominatingandaretryingtomakeittheirhomelandwithitsnewnameZogam(whichmeans‘LandofZo’s’).

With this objective of forming an autonomous area for arecognisednomenclatureandtoensurethepoliticalsecurityfortheunifiedtribes,theZomiRevolutionaryArmy(ZRA),amilitantwingwasinstalledastheZomisopposedtheirinclusionoftheKukinomenclature.ThisdevelopmentmadetheKukisfeeluneasy.TheformationofZRAopenedawayfortheyoungPaiteorZomitribestobecomemorepatrioticandtakeuparmstodefendZomiagainstitsenemies.TherewasanallegationthattheZRAwastrainedandsuppliedwitharmsandammunitionbytheNSCN(IM).TherewasalsoanallegationthatthePaiteshaveaffiliatedthemselvestotheNagatribe.

ThisdevelopmentwidenedthedifferencesbetweentheKukiNationalFront(KNF)andtheZRA.TheKNFamilitantgroupformedinthe1990swiththeobjectiveofestablishingahomelandinManipurforthenon-Nagas,gottheThadou-KukispeakingtribestopayallsocialtaxespaidtillthentotheThadou/Kukispeakingtribes.Inthechangedsituation,theKNFdemandedmoremoneyand levied taxes also onother tribes.Thenon-Kuki tribes feltharassedandtheZRAappealedtotheKNFnottotaxthepersonsaffiliatedtotheZomigroup.Thataddedtothetensionbasedtillthenondenominationaldifferences.ManyKukisfeltthattheuseoftheZominomenclaturewithouttheirconsentwasinstigatedbysomeexternalforcesandplayedintotheirhands.

The Conflict in 1997-1998

From1997 to early 1998was the zenith of theKuki-Paite

ethnicconflictthatresultedinkillings,bloodshed,abductionsandburningofhouses.Whatwasfriendlyrelationshipbetweenthetwoturnedinimical.TheflashpointwasthekillingofaThadou-Kukiteenager,aclassIXstudentofBlueStarAcademybyhisPaiteclassmates.Withit,thesimmeringdifferencesweretransformedintoangerandhatred.Realviolencethatstartedon24thJune1997wasfollowedbymanygoryincidents.

24th June 1997: Tuesdayaround8p.m.,10ZRAcadreswerekilledbytheKNFatSaikul,aPaitevillageinChurachandpurdistrict.4villagerswerekilledintheshoot-out.

25th June 1997:Inretaliation,agroupofPaiteyoutharmedwithsharp objects attackedD.Phailien, aThadou-Kuki dominatedlocality in Churachandpur town, at 6 in themorning.Afterit the branch office ofThadou StudentAssociation (TSA),ChurachandpurCollege,I.B.RoadnearNewBazarandMunicipalOfficechowkidar,Mr.Jamthang’shousewereburntdown.Laterthatday, theresidentsofBungmual,aPaitedominated localityinthetown,attackedD.Phailienwithgunskilling8people.Mrs.Niengkholhing(33)w/oMr.ThongsatHaokip,pregnantandinchildlabourwaskilledbrutally.Laterintheevening,agroupofarmedKukisattackedtheOldChurachandpurMissionCompoundandburntdown15houses.ThesetwoincidentspavedthewayfortheKuki-Paiteconflictorethnicclashes.HereisaChronologyofsomemajorincidentsrecordedbetween1997and1998.

8th July 1997:Tuesday,KNFandZRAsignedthe1stCeasefireAgreementthatwaslaterbreached.

18th July 1997: Friday,KNFandZRAsignedthesecondCeasefireAgreementbutthattoowasbreached.

2nd Sept. 1997: T.SingtamvillageunderSingngat sub-divisionwasattackedbytheZRAforthesecondtimekilling12peopleandburningdown30houses.ThisvillagebelongstotheSimtetribewhosesub-clanisTaichomwhospeakThadouastheywere


neighboursoftheThadous.Thiswasthesolereasonforthesecondattack.

7th Sept.1997 TheKukiburntdown4Paitehouses,2inPangjol,alocality1½Kmsfromthetownand2inMissionVeng,alocalityinChurachandpurtownmainlyoccupiedbythePaites.

8th Sept 1997:ThroughtheinitiativeofDr.ChaltonlienAmo,aPeaceCommitteewasformedandthetwogroupssignedaceasefireagreementagain.

17th Sept.1997:13housesinTuithapi,aPaitevillagewereburntdownbytheKukis.

28th Sept 1997 :Towardstheevening,K.Phaicham,aThadou-KukilocalityinthetownwasattackedbytheZRAcadreswhoretreatedafterastrongdefenceandretaliationbythelocalsentinels.

5th october1997:ZRAattackedM.Lhahvo,aKukivillagenearthetown,killing5peopleandburningdown17houses.

24th oct.1997: ZRAattackedSantingI&II,aGangtetwinvillageburningdown91houses.Another188houseswereburntintheneighbouringvillages,Muolhoicheng,PamjalandSinjaang.

25th oct.1997: At11.45p.m.,ZRAcadres attackedSielmat, aHmar locality in the town andBijaangVaipheiVeng, burningdown5housesinSielmatand18housesinBijaang.InSielmat,apregnantwomanreadyfordeliveryandherdaughteraged4wereburnttodeath.InBijaang,thelocalcaretakerMr.LetngulTouthang(asub-tribeoftheThadou)andMr.SiehkholunNeisiel(aclanoftheVaiphei)werealsoshotdead.

30th oct.1997: Around 12.00 noon,Tuibuangwas attackedallegedlybyZRAincollaborationwiththeIRB(Manipur).Nonewsofdeath,damageordestructionwasrecorded.Towardstheevening5KukivillagesbetweenLamkaandSugnu(avillageinChandeldistrictborderingChurachandpur)wereattackedbytheZRAburning31houses, 11 inPhaizawl village, 9 inLeijaang

village,8inL.Muolhoivillage,3peoplewerealsoshotdead.

31st oct. 1997: Around2therewasanattackonHeinglep,asub-divisioncentreontheNorthernsideofthetown,burningdown98houses.Inthecounter-attack13ZRAcadreswerekilled.

9th Nov. 1997:Towardsmorning,24houses inHaijaangand15housesinTuipiphai,KukivillagesunderThanlon,asub-divisionalcentreontheWesternsideofthedistrict,wereburntdown.

10th Nov. 1997: Sumchinvum, a Zou village andHaijaang, aKukivillagenearSingngat,asub-divisionalcentreontheEasternsideofthedistrict,wereattacked.6houseswereburntdownatSumchinvumand20housesinHaijaang.Inthecounterattack17ZRAcadreswerekilled.

13th Nov. 1997:AtnightGeltuiandB.Tuallian,VaipheivillagesonthewaytoSingngatwereattackedandallthehousesinboththevillageswereburntdown,soalso2ShaktimantrucksinS.Geltuivillage.Thereisnorecordofthenumberofhousesburnt.

15th Nov. 1997: AtnightSongpeh,aKukivillageontheSugnuRoadwasattacked.Intheencounterthatfollowed,10ZRAcadreswerekilled.Simultaneously,theKNFattackedTangnuom,aPaitevillagenearNewLamka.2villagerswerekilled.

16th Nov. 1997: Around11pm,Thingchom,aHmarvillageandLajaangphai on the bankof theTuithaRiver,were attacked. 7houseswereburntdown.4membersofafamily,5ZRAcadresand5cowswerekilledintheencounter.Thatverynight,Lamjaang,aPaitevillagewasattackedbyKNFburning14houses,killing1personandwounding2.

26th Nov. 1997: InSielmat,aPeaceBanquetwashostedbyMr.RishangKeishing,thethenCMofManipur.Meanwhile,PhaichamandLhaangjol,aKukilocalityinthetownwereattaked.

27th Nov. 1997:TuibuongKamdouVengwas attacked but theattackersretreatedbecauseofstrongdefence.53ZRAcadresdied


whenK.Phaichamwasattacked.

5th Dec1997:AtTuibuongcheckpostbytheCRPF,4AK47Rifleswith 6000 bullets and other foreign-made ammunitionswererecoveredbytheCRPFfromsomevehiclesbelongingallegedlytotheIRBandtheZRAandtheEvangelicalConventionChurch(ECC).At9.30amthatsameday,8IRBvehiclescarryingreliefmaterialforthePaiteinThanlonsub-divisionwereambushednearSantingvillageallegedlybytheKNF.20IRBriflemenand17Paiteciviliansinthevehicleswerekilledand17IRBmenwereinjured.

6th Dec. 1997: Atnightaround11.35p.m.,theIRBpostinSaikul,aPaitevillageinChurachandpurdistrictwasattackedand27houseswereburntdown.

10th Dec. 1997: Around3.00am4villagesundertheSaikulpolicestationwereattackedbythejointcadresofNSCN(IM)andZRA.The villages are: Saichang,K.Suongphel, L.Muolnuom andChaningpokpi.Morethan150houseswereburnt,7peoplediedandmorethan10injured.

12th Dec. 1997: 48housesinKamusaichang,aKukivillagewereburntdownatnoon.Around2pm2buseswithPaitepassengerscoming from Imphalwere halted atTuibuong at the CRPFcheckpostandsomearmsandammunitionwererecoveredfromthem.

13th Dec. 1997: 7.30pm,Paangjol,avillagenearThingkangphai,aMizolocalitywasattackedallegedlybytheKNFburning2houses.

16th Dec. 1997: UnitedFrontManipur (UFM)governmentwasformedundertheChiefministershipofW.NipamachaSinghand26ministersweresworn-in.

24th Dec. 1997: 3.00p.m.2villagesinTuilaphaiarea,T.ThenjolandTuikotwereattackedallegedlybythePaitesburning18housesinT.Thenjoland8housesinTuikot.MrT.HenkomofT.Thenjoltakenhostage.Becauseofviolence,peoplewerenotinamoodto

celebrateChristmas.SoChristmasandNewYearserviceswereconductedinahurrywithhighsecurity.Everylocalityofthetownissilentbecauseoffearofpendingattacks.

29th Dec. 1997: Inthemorning,Khuongjaang,avillageinThanlonsub-divisionwas attackedand22housesburntdownallegedlybytheZomiNationalVolunteers(ZNV)formedbythePaitestodefendZongram,theareatheydominated

30th Dec. 1997: N.MaokotavillageinSingngatsub-divisionwasattackedand25houseswereburntallegedlybyKNF.

31st Dec. 1997: Muoljen,avillageinSingngatsub-divisionwasattackedand23houseswereburntdownallegedlybytheKNF.

03rd Jan. 1998: 2.00 pmL. Phaimuol, aKuki village inSingngat sub-divisionwas attacked allegedly by theZRA. 2personswerekilledandmorethan50houseswereburntdown.

09th Jan. 1998: P.Munlien,avillageonTipaimukhRoadwas attacked allegedlybyKNF.33houseswereburnt down2villagerswereshotdeadand1waswoundedseriously.

12th Jan. 1998: Vokbual,aPaitevillagewasattackedallegedlybytheKNFand70housesburntdown.

15th Jan. 1998: At11.35am therewasanattackandexchangeof fire at Lhaangjol on persons involved in socialwork.Mr.Chinkholian,Editor,ManipurExpresswaswoundedbyastraybullet.TherewasasecondattackatnightonZoVengbuttheIndianarmyintervened.IntheencounterMr.Gospelthang26yearsofNewLamkawasshotdeadand1AK47Riflewasrecovered.

17th Jan. 1998: TheChurachandpur Police Stationwasattackedandammunitiontakenawayfromtheartilleryroomofthestation.

08th Feb. 1998: Sainoujaang, a Simte village inThanlon sub-divisionwasattackedand40housesburnt.


11th Feb. 1998: At2.30amD.Phailienwasattacked,5personswerekilled,4woundedand52houseswereburntdown.

Agreement of the kuki Inpi and Zomi Council

What started as an attack and counterattack between theKukisandthePaiteson24thJune1997,ledtomuchviolenceandlossof livesandtheburningdownofhundreds ofhouses.So,theStateGovernmentbroughttheleadersrepresentingboththecommunitiestothenegotiatingtable.ItledtoaMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU)signedonMarch26th1998,followedbyaceasefireAgreementwhichwasextendedthrice.Astherewasnoseriousviolenceduringsixmonths,realnegotiationstookplaceat theendofSeptember1998.Peace talkswereheldunder theleadershipoftheChiefMinisterNipamachaSinghhelpedbyhiscabinetcolleaguesandthedistrictadministrator.InthesetalksitwasrecalledthattheattackonSaikulVillageonJune25,1997inwhich10Paiteswerekilledwastheturningpoint.AfterhearingthePaites,theKukiInpileadersapologisedtothePaitesandarrangedanapologybanqueton29thSeptember1998,bykillingacow.Itwasaccordingtotheir traditionofmakingpeace.TheKICandZCleaderssharedthemeal.InresponsetheZCleadersarrangedabanquetbykillingapigon30thSeptember1998toshowtheiracceptanceoftheapology.

Afterthesegesturesofpeace,theKICandZCleaderssignedawrittenagreementon1stOctober1998inthepresenceofChiefMinisterNipamachaSingh.Withitthetownthatwasabattlefieldchangedonceagainintoapeacefulplace. ThepointsofagreementslaiddownbytheKICandZCare: 1.ThateveryindividualortribeshouldbegiventhefreedomtobeeitherKukiorZomiorhaveanyother identity.Noforceshouldbeusedagainstthosewhomakethischoice. 2.Thosewhohaveduringtheconflict,occupiedthepropertyorhousesofthosewhofledshouldreturnthemtotherightfulowner.

3.TheKukiandZomimilitantgroupsshouldnot“levytaxes”onanyoneotherthanpersonsoftheirowntribe.Itincludesgovernmentemployees,thepublicingeneral,contractorsandbusinessmen. 4. ThisMoU is meant for all tribes, individuals andorganisationsandtobefollowedbyallwassignedbythefollowingonbehalfoftheKukisandZomison1stOctober1998. Sd/-AlbertGengoukhup Sd/-H.Thuomson President,KIC President,PNC/MemberZC

Sd/-KhaijalamGangte Sd/-K.Vungjalian ChiefofChiengkonpang Chairman,ZC

Sd/-NggamhaoTouthang Sd/-Thangkhangin Advisor,KIC ZCMember

Sd/-PaokholalVaiphei Sd/-KhaipaoHaokip Ex.Pre.VNO/MemberKIC Advisor,KIC

Sd/S.Nengdoulian Sd/-KhupkholianSimte Pre.VNO/MemberZC PresidentSNC/KICMember

Witnesses:

1. W.NipamachaSingh,ChiefMinister,Manipur2. Dr.L.ChandramaniSingh,Dy.CM,Manipur3. V.Hangkhanlian,Minister4. T.N.Haokip,Minister(Seri)5. T.T.Haokip,Dy.Speaker6. N.Songchinkhup,Minister(Transport)7. Dr.ChaltonlienAmo,Minister8. P.BharatSingh,Specialsecretary,Home9. SriramTaranikanti,DC/CCPur10. H.Kulla,MeiteiSocietyPresident11. AlbertRenthlei,President,MizoPeopleConvention12. L.B.Sona,Speaker,ZC13. PaokhoseiKipgen,SocialWorke


Mapping of the armed groups which are involved in the conflict:

Consequences of the Conflict

Theyear-longethnicclashcauseddisplacement,killingsandconfusion.Manypersonsfromthetownmigratedtosafeareas.TheconflictwentbeyondtheKukisandPaitesandforcedalltribesofthedistricttogetinvolved.TheZomisthemselvespresentadividedpicture.ManyZomitribesliketheSimtes,Gangtes,VaipheisandZouswerevictimsoftheconflictasmanyoftheirmembershavemarriageallianceswiththeThadou-KukisandsomeofthemspeaktheThadou-Kukidialect.InasituationofconflictitwasdifficulttofindoutwhoisaPaiteorKuki.Theconflictaffectedtheeconomy,education,socialsystem,religion,emotionalandpoliticallifeofthepeopleofChurachandpur.

The Economy

Even though 45%of the town dwellers are governmentemployees,earningalivelihoodwasnotamajorproblemtotheremaininginhabitants.Intheprivatesector,runningschoolsandteachinginthem,producinghandloomandhandicraftsprovideemploymenttotheyoung.Bambooproductsarethesourceofincomeofmany.Thedistrictisalsoknownforitswildfruits,banana,jackfruit,pineapple,wildorchards.Somemadecharcoal.ThetownisacentreoftradewithBurma(Myanmar).

Theconflictdamagedtheeconomyofthedistrictespeciallyoftheurbaninhabitants.Duringtheviolencepeopleweredeprivedoftheirbasicneeds.Villagerscouldnotcometothetowntoselltheirproducts.Theyhadtostayindoorsduringtheconflictunabletogotothefieldsorharvesttheircrops.Manycultivatorslosttheirharvestsincetheyhadtofleetheirvillages.Governmentemployeescouldnotgettheirsalariesasbanksandgovernmentofficeswerecloseddowninsomepartofthedistrict.Self-employedpersonshadtoremainjobless.

Asaresult,mosthadtodependontheirsavingsanddaily

wageearnershadtoborrowmoney.Moneylendersgainedalotsincetheychargedahighrateofinterestduringtheconflict.Theborrowersfellintothedebttrapaftertheconflict.Forsurvivalmany sold their clothes, furniture, television sets, refrigerators,jewellery,housesandevenplotsoflandatathrowawayprice.Mr.Lun,whoownedaasingle-storeyedbuildingintheheartofthetownandsoldit,said:“Itwaslikesellingraggedclothes,nobodyknockedatmydoororlookedatmybuilding.PeoplewerenotreadytobuymybuildingevenforRs.30,000/.Insuchasituation,landorhousewasnotthatimportant,preservinglifewasdear.”

During theconflict therewasanunequaldistributionofsupplies,goodsandmoney.Thebusinesspersonsbenefitedfromitsincetheyhadagoodstockintheirgo-downs.Priceswerehikedsincepeoplehadnochoicebuttobuythegoods.ThebenefitalsowenttothenearbyThadou-KukiandHmarvillages,situatedclosetothetownontheTedimRoad.Peoplecouldenterthetownonlythroughthisroad.SothePaiteswereconfinedtothetown.Newmarketswere opened in the areaswheremostThadou-Kukiesrefugees settled. Since the Paiteswere economically affectedoreven facedstarvation, theywere forced tomakegesturesofnegotiationstowardstheThadou-Kuki.

Education

Educational institutions remained closed for a long timeduringtheconflictinordertoavoidbeingcaughtinthecross-fire.Asaresult,morethan65%ofthecollegestudentsand80%ofhighschoolstudentscouldnotpursuetheirstudiesandhadtoseekadmissionelsewhereevenoutsidethestate.Thosewhocouldnotgoout,remainedwithouteducationtillthesituationimproved.

Childrenofdisplacedfamilieshadtosufferalotsincetheyhadtoadjusttothenewschoolenvironment.Itcausedemotionalandmentaldepression.Povertyforcedabout30%ofthestudentstodiscontinuetheirstudiesinordertoworkandearnaliving.Someyoungpersonsevenjoinedtheunderground.


Social Life

Whentheviolenceended,thetownwasdividedintotwo:thePaitedominatedareaof“zogam”and theKukidominatedareacalled“homeland.”Itaffectedthesocialfabricofthedistrictingeneralandofthetowninparticular.Manypeoplemovedtotheneighbouringdistrictsorstatesforbetterjobopportunities.Somebecamehomelessandjoblessaspovertygrew.Withsomanypeoplemovingawayfromthevillages,robberyincreased.Peoplebegantomakeeasymoneybysellingprohibiteddrugs,liquorandeventhroughthefleshtrade.TheriseindrugabuseresultedinariseinHIV/AIDS.ThedistrictisnowoccupyingthesecondplaceinHIV/AIDSinfectioninthestate.

Ontheotherside,theconsequencesoftheconflictopenedtheeyesofmanytriballeaders.SometribeswithdrewfromtheZomialliance.Leadershipchangeoccurredonbothsides.Personswithabetterstrategy,ideasandobjectivestooksidesintheconflictandintensifiedthedivision.Manyorganisationsexhortedtheircommunitiesnottogetinvolvedintheconflictbytakingsides.sincebothsidesabducted thosewhom theysuspectedofbeingenemies.They rarely came out alive.The social fabricwasdestroyed.Goodneighboursbecameenemies.Thosewhomigratedawayfromthetowncreatednewlocalitiesorvillages.

FamiliesofmixedmarriageswithPaite-Kukipartnerssufferedthemost.Althoughtherewasnoseriousdomesticviolenceamongthemtherewerecasesofsuchpartnersbeingharassedandforcedtoabandontheother.Forexample,aThadou-KukidoctorDrSeimarriedKim(trueidnentitywithheld)aPaite.Theysettleddowninthetownandhadtwodaughtersandason.Thechildrenwerefluent inboth thedialectsbutafter15yearsofmarriage,whentheconflictbeganDr.Sei’sfamilyaskedhimtostayoutoftownsince theyconsideredhis in-laws fanaticPaite.He ignored thewarningbutknowingtheseriousnessofthesituation,hiswifeleftherhouseandtookthechildrenawaywithher.On24thJune1997,

Mrs.Kim’sparentsinvitedherandthechildrenfordinner.Dr.Seididnotattendthedinnerashehadnightdutyinthehospital.OnthefollowingdaybegantheunexpectedattackonaKukilocality.InsteadofgoinghomeDr.Seihadtoescapetohisrelatives’place.Thatmorninghishousewasburntdown.Somethinkthathisownin-lawswerebehindtheincident.Hehadtolivealonewithouthiswifeandchildren.AfterthreeweeksMrsKimriskingherlifeandthatofherchildrenranawayfromherparent’shouse.Herparentssearchedforthemandthoughtthattheyhavebeenkilled.AfteramonththeylearntthatsheandherchildrenhadmovedtoSouthIndia.Dr.SeistayedaloneinthegovernmentquartersandoftenvisitedhisfamilyintheSouth.Theycontinuetolivethereandrarelycomehome.Cordial relationshipbetween theKukisandPaitesthatexistedpriortotheconflictisyettoberestored.

Women

Becauseoftheconflictmanywomenhavedevelopedailmentslikeheartdisease,respiratoryproblems,insomniaandpalpitation.Manyhave fallen victims to alcohol or have entered thefleshtrade.AmongtheethnicgroupsofChurachandpurwomenenjoymanyprivilegesandareenterprising.Theyarenotboundonlytotheirchildrenanddomesticchoresbutarecompetitive.However,manyofthemlosttheirlivelihood,familyandhomebecauseoftheconflict.Manybecamewidows,hadtolookaftertheirchildrenwithnodefinitesourceofincome.ThenumberofwidowsisbiggeramongthePaitethanamongtheKuki.

Orphanshavefoundsupportfromtheircommunities,becausethereisatraditionalpracticeofthenextofkinorgrandparentsadoptingorphans.Theirchurchesprovidedworktosomewidows.Boththecommunitiesalsoraisedfundstohelpthewidowsandorphans caught in the conflict. Some social and philanthropicorganisations provided help. Siamsinpawlpi, a Paite studentorganisation,openedaresidentialschoolforsuchchildrenwithfundsprovidedbytheRajivGandhiFoundation.Teachersofthisspecialschoolareemployedonavoluntarybasiswithoutasalary.


PrivateschoolsliketheSoikholalIdealSchool,St.PaulInstitute,Bethany,etc.providethemeducationfreeofcostoratconcessionalrates.OrphanageslikeCovenantChildren’sHome,Saikot;SanggahMuonIn,providesheltertoorphans.ZomiMothers’AssociationandKukiMothers’Associationwereformedtoassistthesemothersandchildren.

youth

Theconflicthadanadverseimpactontheyouth,especiallyPaite.TheKukiyouthseemtohavebeenlessaffectedbecauseoftheirpreviousexperienceoftheKuki-Nagaconflict.ThereweremoredeathsamongthePaitethanKukiyouth.ArumourspreadduringtheconflictthatthePaitedeathtollwasrisingandthatmanywereburied ina commongrave.Muchafter theconflictmanymotherswerecryingfortheirsonswhodidnotreturnhome.

Someofthemweredraggedoutoftheirhomesandaskedtotakeuparmsinordertodefendtheircommunity.EvenaftertheconflictmanyPaiteandKukiyouthjoinedtheundergroundgroupsbecausetheyhadlostsomeoneinthefamily.Therewasariseinalcoholism,drugabuseand traffickingamong theyouth.Somethinkthatacauseofthisriseisthattheyouthneededcouragewhentheyhad tocommitactsofviolence.Prostitution too increasedamongtheyouthastheyhadnoothersourceofincome.ItresultedinthespreadofHIV/AIDSanditcausedseveraldeaths.

People’s Emotional Well-being

Theconflicthasresultedinagreatamountoffearinpeople’sminds.Manywere diagnosedwith cardiac and respiratoryproblems.Manypromotedopenhatredfor theothergroupanddevelopedangerandstrongprejudicesagainstthoseinvolvedintheconflict.Mr.Doukholal,aresidentofoneof thevillagesinChurachandpurdistrictlosthisconsciousness.Hedidnotbelongtoeithergroupinvolvedintheconflict.Asanelderlycitizen,heplayedhispartinlookingafterthevillageduringtheviolencebutthestressandtensiontooktheirtollonhim.Atpresentheisunable

torecogniseanyoneandremainssilentmostofthetime.

Religion

Variouschurchdenominationsexperiencedseriousproblemsbecausemany familieswere displaced.Membership of somechurchdenominationsincreasedanditdecreasedinothers.Theconflictmadealltheethnictribesofthedistrictthinkintermsofstayingtogetherorgetunitedundertheirspecificethnicgroup.Whenpeoplestartedmovingouttotheirownsettlements,somedenominationsgotdividedfurtheraccording to theiraffinity. Italsoincludedclansorsub-clanalliances.

on Politics

Thepeaceagreementdidnotendtheviolence.Amidsuchuncertainty,many groups got involved in political processesin order to find a political settlement.When the conflictwassuppressed,thedivisionsgotstronger.Newfactionsemergedwithnew leaders, objectives and strategies.Various political groupssurvivedinthedistrictwiththesupportofthemilitantgroups.

Inthemeantime,theZominomenclatureremainswiththePaitesaloneandafewsupportersfromotherethnicgroupsjoiningthem.Minortribeswhoweredraggedintotheconflictarefacingapredicament.Theywanttobeleftalonebutthosewhowishtowieldpowerareleaningheavilyonmilitantsupportforpoliticalsurvival.Thatleavestheminortribeswithadilemma.

Mapping of Zomi tribe after the conflict

MaitesareaminortribeandtheyspeakthelocallanguageoftheareawheretheysettledownindifferentdistrictsofManipur.MostofthemspeaktheThadou-KukilanguageandothersspeaktheZou,ThangkhalandGangtedialects.TouthangsareoriginallyaThadou-Kukisub-tribe.AftertheconflicttheyareaffiliatedtothePaite.TheHmar,GangteandasomeothersaffiliatedtotheZomiareleavingittostandasindividualtribes.Theyarelookeduponasfactions.Thusmanyofthefeelisolated.


Suggestions for Conflict Resolution

OnecanthusseethatevennineyearsafterthepeaceaccordnormalyhasnotreturnedtoChurchandpur.Returnofnormalcywouldrequirenotonlyphysicalefforts,butalsospiritualhealing.As a Protestant pastor said, “without genuine forgiveness andreconciliationtherecannotbetruepeacefromtheheartsofpeople.ThegreatestandlastingpeacecomesonlyfromJesusChrist,SonofGod.”AstheKukisandPaitesareChristians,therehasbeenalotofcompetitioninchurchactivities.Variousactivitiesofwomen,elders,youthandchildrenintheirrespectivechurcheshavebeenaguidingfactor.ConflictResolutionorTransformationprogrammeshouldnowbecomeapartofthechurchactivity.Thedivisionofthetwobeganwithdenominationaldivision.Bothhavenowtocreatespaceforhealingandreconciliation.

Thesecondgoalshouldbetochangetherigidsocialideas.Thestrongprejudicesandstereotypingofothercommunitiesneedtochange,peoplehavetobehelpedtoexploreandvaluediversity,respect,tolerateandaccepttheother.Itwouldthenenhancethepeople’sability to see things fromanother’sperspective,breakdownstereotypes,inculcatetoleranceandacceptdifferences.

Peopleingeneral,lackleadershipskillsandintheprocesstheyaremisleadingthelesseducated.Therefore,takinginitiativesforanempowermentprocessonsocialskillswillhelppeopletomoveawayfromself-absorptiontounderstandingotherrealitiesthatmakeacommunity.Itwouldbeasteptowardstransformationandopennessinrelationships.Seriousreconciliationprocesstoowouldremovefear,angerandinsecurityfromthemindsandheartsofthepublic.ThedistrictalsohasasmallgroupofLocalCapacityforPeace(LCP)thatisoperatinginsmallunits.Peacebuildinghasbeenattemptedonlybysocio-politicalorganisationsinaveryconventionalmanner.TheNGOsinthedistricthavebeenoperatingongenderbasedprogrammes,HIV/AIDS,globalisation, socio-economicandagro-businessprogrammes.Aparticipatorystyleof

peace-basedprogrammecanbeonenewwaytohelpthepeopletoseethepositiveaspectsoftheconflict.Elicitingparticipationhas been appreciated because of its simplemethodology.Theprogrammeshouldhavea strongandcreative followupat thegrassrootslevel.Thenextstepcouldbeimpartinglearningskillsforpeacebuildinginordertobringtogetherpeopleofalltribesanddenominations.

Afamilycannolongeroffergrowingchildrenasurefutureinthepresentsituation.Schoolscanplayavitalroleinhelpingchildren to be open to others and thus initiate the process ofsocialising.Thatcanbeahelpincreatinganenvironmentofpeace.Forthis,teachersshouldplayanimportantroleandgetinvolvedinthetaskofgoingbeyondtheirtraditionalmissionofteaching.Anotherpositiveinterventioncouldbe toprovideopportunitiesfor education through scholarships and concessions tomanychildrenwhoseparentsarenotinapositiontosupportitsexpenses.Scholarshipsandfeeconcessioncanbeoneofitstools.

The next step can be promotion of self-employment andsustenance. This can be linked to agro-based developmentprogrammes.NGOscantakeinitiativestohelpvillagerswhoarebyandlargecultivators.Today,manyyoungcultivatorsareeitherhighersecondaryorcollegedropouts.Theseyoungfarmerscanbehelpedtogrowbettercropsthroughawarenessonnewfarmingmethods.Theselfhelpgroupsinthedistrictcanbesupportedwithloansandprovidedanopportunitytomakealiving.Trainingtheunemployedyouthinhandicrafts,carpentry,sewingandweavingisanotherpossiblecontribution.

SomebigorganisationsareseriouslyinvolvedinHIV/AIDSprevention,treatmentandrehabilitation.Thisvirusisspreadingfast.Manymen,womenandchildrenhavelosttheirlivestoit.ParentswhoknowthattheirchildrenareHIV/AIDSvictimskeepitasecretforfearofsocialstigma.Manygirlsorwomenwhoareinfecteddonotknowthattheyareinfected.Onepossibilityistohelpthisgrouptolivetogetherunderthesameroofandfightthe


virustogetheremotionallyandphysically.Ithastogohandinhandwithpeople’seducationthroughthemedia.Infact,theactivitiesaroundHIV/AIDSseemtobringdifferentpeoplestogether.

Anotheractivitythatbringsallthetribestogetheris‘ChavangKut’,aharvestfestivalofallthetribescelebratedon1stNovembereachyearwithgreatpompandshow.Onthisdaypeoplefromthevillagesandtownscometogethertoenjoythefolkdances,songsandmusic.Itcanbeusedforpeacepromotionactivities.

Conclusion

Peaceandcommunalharmonyarecentraltoajustsociety.Insurgency,corruption,killingsandothersocialevilsco-existinthedistrictofChurachandpur,homeofatleast8ethnicgroupswitharichculturalheritage.Itwillnotbeanexaggerationtosaythatalltheproblemsoftheworldarefoundinthistinydistrict,whichonceenjoyedahealthysociallifeandenvironment.Theconflictdoesnotseemtobeending.Itisbecomingaviciouscircleandthat hampers development. People keep expecting inter-ethnicconflicts and arephysically and emotionally affectedby it.AllthetribesbeingChristians,theyhavetobelievethat“There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.”(Gal3:27-28) “For in the one spirit we were baptised into one body-Jews or Greeks, slaves or free-and we are all made to drink of one spirit” (ICor12:13). “Peace I leave with you;my peace I give to you. I do not give to you as the world gives. Do not let your hearts be troubled, and do not let them be afraid.” (Jn14:27).

It is clear that physical unitywill not bepossiblewithoutemotional and spiritual unity. Solidarity and onenesswill beexperiencedonlywhenwerealiseandrespectthebeautyofourdifferences.Theoutcomewillnaturallybepeace.Anobservationthatcanbemadeaboutthedistrictisthatreligiouspracticesaresuperficial.Insteadofhelpingpeopletoseekliberationandpeace,religionseemstobecomeacentreofpower,positionandinfluence.

Its leaders dabble in politics in order to assert their sectarianmentality.Thispassiveattitudehasaddedtotheconflict.InsteadthechurchesandNGO’shavetohelpthepeopletosortouttheirdifferencesthroughdialogueandpeacefulmeans.

END NoTES

1. GeorgeA.Grierson,Linguistic Survey of India(1904),p.59.

2. DARCHHAWNA,MIzoRAM DISTRICT GAzETTEER (GOVTOFMIZORAM:ART&CULTUREDEPARTMENT,1989),PP.23-24.

3. FRANKM.LEBARETAL,ETHNIC GRoUPS oF MAINLAND SoUTH EAST ASIA(NEWHAVEN,1964),P.50.

4. THADOUS - THE SO-CALLEDKUKISWILL BETERMEDASTHADOUSINTHISCHAPTER.

5. ThomasMenamparampil,“AGlossaryofTribalGroupsinNorthEastInia,”The Thinker(May-August,1975),pp.37-42.

6. Khul/Sinlung/Chhinlung-atermfortheGreatWallofChina7. The Week(September12,2004),pp.12-13.8. KUKISIKI,KUKIMAKHAIISATERMINTHADOUDIALECTFOR

50PAISE&25PAISE,LITERALLYTOMEANNOTINCOMPARISONOUTOF100%

9. RamaChakrovartti,People of Manipur(NewDelhi:BRPublishingCor-poration,1986),p.18.


youTh IN ThE CoNTExT oF ThE GA-Ro-khASI TENSIoN IN MEGhALAyA

Amrit Sangma

MeghalayaisoneofthesevenstatesoftheNortheast,popularlyknownas‘sevensisters’.Itstotalareais22,429sq.kmsanditspopulationwas2,306,069in2001.ItsmaintribesaretheGaro,KhasiandJaintia.TheStateisdividedinto3districtsintheGaroHills, 4 districts in theKhasiHills and 1 in the JaintiaHills.However,thepeopleofGaroHillsandKhasiHillshavealwaysbeenkeptapartbythegeographicalfeatures.Meghalayaisahighlandregionconsistingofmountains,rocksandforestsandtheroadcommunicationbetweenthesetworegionsispoor.IntheabsenceofaroadconnectingTuraandShillongdirectly,peoplefromTurahavetogotoShillongviaGuwahati,thecapitalofAssam.Desspitethesedifferencestherehasbeenconsiderableculturalexchangebetween them through inter-marriage in the borderingvillagesandevenincities.

TheGarosareoftheBodoTibeto-BurmanstockandhavesettledintheGaroHillsforthepast400yearsafterbeingoustedfromtheKochterritoryofCoochBehar.TheGarosocietywasdividedinto3majorexogamous,‘kin-groups’orKachis, namelyMarak, Sangma andMomin.They are further subdivided intogroupssuchasAreng,ShirraandEbang.Theirsisamatrilinealsociety inwhich theheadof the familyorNokma is generallythe youngest daughter.But her husband assuming the role oftheheadmanactsinconcertwiththeeldersandadministerstheproperty.Thus,theirsocietyiscontrolledbymen.

Also theKhasi belonging to theMon-Khmer group arematrilineal.Propertyinheritanceisthroughthedaughterbutitisforallpurposescontrolledbythemales,particularlythemother’sbrother.Thewomanowns theproperty.Childrenbelong to themother’sclanandwhatever thehusbandearnsbecomespartof

thematrilinealproperty.Thestatusofthewomanhasinsuredafavourable sex ratio. Jaintia is ageneric term for theSyntengs(alsoknownasPnar)andothersubgroupsbelongingtothelandofthetwelveDoloi (localgovernor).TheJaintiasaresaidtohavemigratedtotheirpresenthomefromSouthEastAsia.Theytooarematrilineal.Inheritanceofthethreetraditionaltiersofgovernance,syiem,doloiandheadmanishereditaryandpassesfromuncletonephew.

IncomparisontherearemoresimilaritiesbetweentheKhasisand the Jaintias than between theKhasis and theGaros.TheKhasisandtheJaintiashavethesameoriginandaresociallyandlinguisticallylinkedwiththelargergroupofMon-Khmers.TheGarosseemtohaveanentirelydifferentbackground.However,these three tribeshave three commonalities. 1.Theybelong tomatrilinealsocieties;2.TheyascendedintotheirpresenthillsaftertemporarysettlementintheBrahmaputravalley;3.TheylackalongrecordedhistoryorascriptandlivedinpoliticalisolationtilltheBritishintegratedtheseareasintheircolonialstates.

The Research Problem and objectives

ThisstudyisabouttherelationshipbetweentheKhasiandGarotribes.Thereisageneralfeelingoftensionbetweenthembutthereisnoreportofanycommunalriotsuptonow.Youngpeopleplayacrucialroleinacommunityandthefutureofanycommunityisbasedonthedevelopmentofandbytheyouth.Therefore,thestudyison“YouthinthecontextofGaro-KhasiTensionintheStateofMeghalaya.”Theobjectivesofthestudyare:

1.Togain anunderstandingof theKhasi-Garo tension and itsimpactonthecivilsocietyingeneralandtheyouthinparticular.

2.Toidentifyfactorsthatmayleadtoviolenceinthefuture.

3.Tostudytheroleofyouthorganisationsintheconflict.

4.To suggest interventionmeasures to be adopted by youth

Garo-Kuki Tension and Youth 211 212 Conflict Mapping in NEI

organisationsandthecivilsociety.

A Brief history of the Problem

MeghalayawasbornasaresultoftheAllPartyHillLeaders’Conference’s(APHLC)struggletopreservetribalidentity.Morespecifically,itisaresultofthestrugglebythetribalstopreservetheirethnicityandculturalidentity.TheAPHLCmeetingwascalledatShillongwiththeassistanceofCapt.W.ASangmatodiscussthegravesituationarisingoutoftheimpendingOfficialLanguageActoftheGovernmentofAssam.TheAPHLCplayedanimportantroleinbringingStatehoodtotheHillpeopleofKhasi-JaintiaandGaroHills.

ThoughMeghalayawascreatedasahomelandoftheKhasis,Garos and Jaintiason21 January,1972, at present the relationbetweenthesethreetribesisbecomingmoreandmoretense.Todayitlooksasifnobodyatthattimerealiseditoritwasoutoffocusthat the three tribesofGaro,Khasi and Jaintiahave their ownidentityandthatthismightcreateafrictionintheirrelationshipandconsequentlyhamper thedevelopmentof thestate. Itmusthave never occurred in theminds of theHill Leaders,morespecificallytheGaro,KhasiJaintialeadersthatthesethreetribesmayfeelapoliticalimbalancewhenitcomestosharingthestate’sinfrastructuresandotherresources,andthatthestateofMeghalayamaynotbesufficient,todistinctlymaintainthediversifiedidentityofthethreetribes.

Background of the Conflict

ThissectiondealswiththenatureoftheGaro-Khasitensionand gives the history of the student organisations of thesecommunities.Thetensionrevolvesaroundtwomainissues:

1.ReservationPolicyand

2.GreaterGaroLand(GGL).

The Reservation Policy

The reservation policy of 1971 demarcates 40 percent ofgovernmentjobsandseatsintheeducationalinstitutionsfortheGarosand40percentfor theKhasis.TheKhasiquotaincludessub-tribesliketheWarsoftheEastKhasihills,thePnarsoftheJaintia hills, theBhoi of theRiBhoi district and theMaramsandLyngamsofWestKhasi.5percentisforothertribesand15percentforthenon-tribals.Thisdivisionof40:40:5outof85%ofreservationearmarkedfortribalshasbeenaboneofcontentionamongdevelopedandlessdevelopedcommunities.

Furthermore, objections about regional disparity anddiscrimination,mainlybetweentheKhasiHillsandGaroHillshavebeenraised,leadingtoevenademandforaseparatestatewithinMeghalayaonethnicandgeographicallines.Thisissymptomaticofacombinationoffactors,mainlyethnic,politicalandadministrativefailures.theGarocomplainoflackofaccesstotheeducationalinstitutionsmostofwhichareintheKhasimajoritystatecapitalShillong.

TheKhasisfeelthatthereservationpolicyhastobereviewedandthethreetribesshouldenjoyreservationsequallyunderthesamegeneralquotaof90percent.Thatcanpromotestudentsandyouthonmeritbasisratherthanbycasteortribe.TheotheroptiontheKhasiscontemplateistohaveadistributionofthereservationsproportionatetothepopulationofthetribes,i.e.,Khasi-Garoat60:30ratio.TheKhasiscontendthattheGarosareattimesnoteligibleforcertainpostsastheydonothaveproperqualifications.Asaresult,thepostliesvacanttillaqualifiedGaroisfound.Itispathetictoseeanofficeunutilisedbecauseofitwhenotherqualifiedpeoplecanmanageitsmoothlyforthedevelopmentofthestate.

Table 1: Reservation Chart, 1971


Tribes Population 2001 Reservation in % Khasi-Jaintia1 4,43,596 40% Garo 8,62,473 40% Others 20% Garo-KhasiPopulation 5,81,123 difference

Table1showsthatin1971therewere14,43,596KhasisinMeghalayaand8,62.473Garos.Thus,thedistributionofseatswasnotproportionatetotheirnumber.ThoughtheJaintiasmaintaintheirownculturalidentity,theycomeundertheKhasiumbrellaandgetasharefromtheir40percentquota.TheKhasiStudents’Unions(KSU)saysthattheGaroweregiventhesamequotadespitethebigdifferenceof5,81,123intheirpopulationonlybecausetheywereeducationallymorebackward(KSU Pamphlet 2003). Nowtheywantthattochange.

TheKhasiStudents’Union(KSU)demandsthatthecombinedKhasi-Jaintia-Garo quota be raised to 90 percentwhich theGaroshaveresistedastheyfeelthatthebettereducatedKhasiswillmakeinroadsintotheirentitlement.Garorecruitmentinthehigherechelonsofgovernmentislessthantheirnumberswarrant.ThiswasreportedlyamongthefactorsthatledtheGaroNationalCouncil,hithertoafactionoftheHillpeople’sUnion,tocallforaseparateGaroState(Verghese 1996: 203).

TheGaroStudents’Union(GSU)feelsthattheyhaveneverenjoyed fully the 40percent allotment of jobs.Theyhavehadnotmore than15-20percentof thequota.Unfortunately, thereisnorecordoftheportfoliosheldbythegovernmentofficers.Intheabsenceofanydocumentationontheimplementationofthereservationpolicy it isnotproper tocutdown10percentfromtheGaroquotaastheyhavebeenunofficiallydeprivedoftheir40percentsharesincetheinceptionoftheMeghalayastate.BeforereviewingtheReservationpolicy,itwillbenecessarytoseehoweffectivelyithasbeenimplemented(GSU, Tura)

As for the removalof the reservationsand recruitmentonmerit,theGarosfeelthatKhasismaycompeteonthegeneralquota,notfortheScheduledTribe(ST)seats,iftheythinkthattheyarequalifiedforthem.MeritcannotbethebasisatpresentbecauserightnowtheKhasishavebetteraccesstoeducationalfacilitiesthantheGarosdo.Thelatterneedreservationssincetheyarefarbehindtheothertribalgroups.Theyfeelthattheirlackofprogressisduetolackofaneducationalinfrastructure,notbecauseoflethargycreatedbythereservations.Comparedtothepastwhentherewashardlyanygoodeducationalinstitution,theGarohillsarenowinabetterpositionwiththecomingofsomegoodprivateinstitutions.Thenumberofgraduatestoohasincreasedasaresult.ThereisnocompetitionforreservationsbetweentheKhasisandGaros.RealcompetitioniswithintheGarocommunity.

OntheothersideistheJaintiaissue.They“arenotsatisfiedwith the arrangement of the reservationpolicy. Theykeepondemandingaseparatequotafortheirethnicgroup.TheyfeelthatbyhavingacombinedreservationforjobswiththeKhasis,theywillnotbefullyrepresentedinthegovernmentestablishments.”(8. Pakem cd.)

The Issue of a Separate Garo State and ANVC

Unlikethereservationpolicy,GreaterGaroLand(GGL)isanissueraisedbyafewpersonsunderthebannerofA’chikNationalVolunteersCouncil(ANVC),amilitantgroupoperatingintheGaroHills.IthasarousedthesentimentsoftheKhasisasthedemandforGGLincludesavastareaoftheKhasiland.ANVChasidentified49villagesofWestKhasiHillshavingaGaropopulationof36,124tobeamalgamatedinGGL.Italsoclaims76villagesofKamrupand195ofGoalparadistricthavingaGaropopulationof23,625and62,228respectively.SomeGarosthinkthatGGLcansolvetheReservationproblem.* Shreeranjan. Perspective of Development in Meghalaya. (A publication of State Institute of Rural Development (SIRD) Meghalaya 200 I.) Pg.19


TheANVCwas formed on 20thDecember 1995withthe objective to form a separateGarolandAutonomousState.AccordingtoANVC“TheGarosdonothaveastateoftheirownforthepreservationoftheirownnationalidentity.ThepresentstateofMeghalayaisnotspecificallymeantfortheGaros.Neitherthenomenclature“Meghalaya”hasanysignificancefortheGarosnoritcarriesanymeaning‘oridentityforthem”(ANVC 1999: Pg. 11).

TheissueofaGaroStateismucholderthanwhatitseemstobe.EvenbeforethefoundingofMeghalaya,on21January,1972theGarosdemandedthat theybeunitedunderonejurisdiction.ANVCisadesperateoutcomeofthatdemand.TheGaroNationalCouncilsubmittedamemorandumtotheGovernorofAssamandthePrimeMinisteron31stJanuary1956for:

I.InclusionintheautonomousdistrictofGaroHills,theplainareascontiguoustoitwhicharepredominantlyinhabitedbytheGaros.

II.RecognitionoftheGaroslivingintheplaindistrictsofAssamasmembersofthescheduledTribe.(ANVC, 1999 Pg. 7).

In theirmemorandum to theCentre theANVC regrettedthat,“TheMeghalayaStatehasbeencreatedbythethenbenignGovernmentheadedbySmt.IndiraGandhi...........buttheage-olddemandoftheGaroslivingintheKamrupandGoalparadistrictsofAssamwasleftoutagain.”(Ibid Pg. 7).

According toANVC the separateGarolandwill comprise thefollowingareas:

a)TheexistingGaroHillsautonomousdistrictsofEast,WestandSouthGaroHills.

b)GaroinhabitedareasofKhasiHills,lyingcontiguoustoGaroHills;

c)TheGaroinhabitedareasofGoalparaandSouthKamrupdistrictsofAssamlyingcontiguoustoGaroHills(Ibid Pg. 10).

WhileANVCdemandsaseparateGaroLand,theyalsostate

that thepeople in thevillageswant tobeapartofMeghalaya.ButtheyaredesirousofunitingallthevillagesinhabitedbytheGaros...andthequestionofrectificationoftheboundarytoincludetheseareasinMeghalayadefinitelydeservesconsideration(Ibid Pg.5). “AlltheGarosinKamrupandGoalparadistrictofAssamexpressedakeendesireforrectificationofdistrictboundariestobeunderMeghalayaStatewhicharecontiguoussothatthepeopleofthesametribearebroughtunderonecommonadministration.”(Ibid Pg 6). ItistruethatsomeGarosincludingGSUsupportthedemandoftheANVCforaSeparateGaroLandbutanattemptshouldbemadetounderstandwhethertheGarosactuallyneedaseparateGaroLandoramoreorganisedintegrityofMeghalaya.

khasi View on Greater Garo Land

TheKSUdisagrees totally on this issue.They feel that itwouldneverbepossibleforANVCandtheirassociatestoattainGreaterGaroLand.ItmaybepossibletohavethepresentGaroHillsasaseparateStatefortheGarosbutnotGGL.However,thereisdifferenceofopinionamongthem.SomethinkthatitwillbeproperfortheGarostohaveaseparatestateforpoliticalprosperity.OthersareoftheviewthatitwillbeappropriatetokeepMeghalayaasoneunitedstateforitseconomicdevelopment(Group of youth, Shillong, dated September 2004)

TheKhasisaregenerallymoresilentwithregardtoGGL.TheydonotsharetheiropinionveryeasilywithanyonebutadiscussionwiththemindicatesthattheyarestronglyagainstgreaterGGL.Mostofthemthinkthatitisnotyettimetovoicetheiropinion,possiblybecauseuptonowitisseenasaproblemoftheundergroundandnotofthepublic.TheyalsoseemtothinkthatitispracticallynotpossiblefortheGarostogetaseparatestate.However,whiletalkingtoaKhasiyoungperson,theresearcherwasleftwiththeimpressionthattheHynniwtrepNationalLiberationCouncil(HNLC)maybeplanningtoaskforaSeparateKhasiState.Theauthenticityoftheinformationcouldnotbeverified.Besides,sinceGGLisaninitiativeof theGaros, theKhasis arewaiting tohear thedecisionof the


governmentatthecentre.TheGovernmentofIndiahassignedaceasefireandtalksareonwiththeANVC.

The youth organisations

ThemainyouthorganisationstoinfluencetheKhasiandGaropeoplearetheKSUandGSU.WhetheritistheReservationPolicyorGGL,theyplayavitalroleinmouldingpublicopinion.

khasi Students union (kSu)

TheKhasiStudentsUnion(KSU)wasformedprior totheintenseanti-foreignerstirof1979asaneffectivepressuregroup.Withtheforeignerissue,manystudentleaderswereplacedunderdetentionundertheMeghalayaPreventiveDetentionOrdinance(MPDO)ortheNationalSecurityAct(NSA).Theforeignerissuebrought in a lot of turmoil in the state in 1979-80 against theBangladeshimigrantsandin1987againsttheNepalis.

TheKSUConstitutionadoptedon18December1981,speltout inclear terms that itwould try to foster thespiritofunity,loveandmutualhelpamongthestudentsofMeghalaya, that itwould standfirm toprotect the fundamental rights, the specialplaceandfreedomofeachandeverymemberandthatitwouldnottakepartinpoliticsorreligiousmatters.IntheConstitutionasamendedon4April1993on theKhasiNationalAwakeningDay, the objectiveswere expanded to include demands fromtheGovernment for infrastructural facilities to uplift educationby setting up Government colleges, medical, engineeringand agricultural colleges. It alsowanted protection from theGovernmentthroughlawssothatthesonsofthesoilmaycontroltheeconomy,Governmentandland.ItalsowantedtoawakenintheKhasicommunityrespectfortheirlanguage,culture, traditionandallthatbelongstotheKhasination.Ofthenineobjectives,thelastonespokeclearlyaboutpeace.Itread:“ToachievepeaceintheKhasilandwithintheframeworkoftheIndianConstitutionbyplacingitonthesamelevelwithJammuandKashmir.”

Inthecourseofitsmovement, itdemandedphotoidentitycards, erection of awall along the international borderwithBangladesh,speedyactionontheResidentialPermitBillandtheextensionoftheAssamAccordtoMeghalaya,introductionoftheInnerLineRegulation,totalreservationinthestateassemblyfortheindigenouspeople,revivaloftheDurbarHimaandcurbingthesaleofmortgagedland,etc.Inrecentyears,ithastakenuptheissueofWorkPermittooutsidelabourers,scrappingthe40:40percentreservationfortheKhasisandGaros.On25September2001,itstartedthe“KSANRNGIEWMOVEMENT”whichhasnowspreadtothedifferentareasofthestate.

TheKSU is probably themost articulate and dynamic,mass-based group inMeghalayawith a variety of in-campusandoff-campus issues. It also adopted all knownpeaceful andnon-peaceful techniquesofprotests. It getsmostof its supportfromallindigenouspeopleincludingtheotherorganisationslikeTribalWomenWelfareandDevelopmentAssociation,Meghalaya(TWWADAM) now known asKWWADA, theKhasi JaintiaWelfareAssociation(KJWA)kalewduhKhasiPnarAssociation(KIKPA),kaSynjukKiRangbahShnong(SKS)tonameafew.Inearly2001,theUnionwideneditsterritorialjurisdictionbyformingunitsintheEasternmostpartofRiHynniewtrep,theJaintiaHillsDistrict. “Students pursuing their professional courses outsideMeghalayahaveorganisedthemselvesintostudentsassociations,and affiliated these associationswith theKSU.These includetheMeghalayaAgricultural Students’Association,Nagaland(MASAN),theKhasi-JaintiaStudents’Union,DibrugarhandtheMeghalayaAgriculturalStudents’Association,lmphal.TheKSUisaffiliatedtotheNorthEastStudents’Organisation(NESO),anumbrellabodyofthemajorStudentUnionsoftheregion.

Analysis and Interpretation

TheviewsoftheGarosandKhasisareexaminedherebasedonaquestionnaireandTablesshowingpercentages.Theinformationwasgatheredthroughgroupdiscussionandinterviews.


Table 2: Is There Tension between the Garos and khasis? Tribe Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 82.8% 68.8% 77.8% Working 80.0% 81.3% 80.8% Others 100.0% 100.0%100.0% GroupTotal 82.5% 76.5% 79.7%No Designation Student 6.9% 31.3% 15.6% Working 10.0% 12.5% 11.5% Others GroupTotal 7.5% 20.6% 13.5%NotSure Designation Student 10.3% 6.7% Working 10.0% 6.3% 7.7% Others GroupTotal 10.0% 2.9% 6.8%

The Respondents

Therewere77respondentsofthe15-35agegroup,41ofthemGarosand36Khasi,35malesand39females.3didnotmentiontheirgenderinthequestionnaire.Morethan50percentwerestudentsandtherestwereworking.AllareresidentsofShillongorTura.

SourcesofapprehensionbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis80percentoftherespondentsfromboththetribesfeelthatthereis tension between theGaros andKhasis. However a smallnumberofKhasistudents(31%)donotfeelthatthereistension.It canbe established from thedata that although there has notbeenanyviolence,thereisafeelingoftensionbetweenthesetwocommunities.

70percentoftheGarosand85percentoftheKhasisor77percentofthetotalrespondentsagreethatthereservationpolicyisaboneofcontention.Thisisonecommonpointonwhichthereisagreementamongthem.Itisasourceoftension.TheKhasislookatitasaproblembecauseGaros(8,62,473)areonlyalittle

morethan50percentoftheKhasis(14,43,596)butenjoythesamepercentageofreservations.Ontheotherhand,theGaroscomplaianthattheyhavealwaysbeendeprivedoftheirreservationsandthattheirshareisreducedto15-20percent(Table3).

Table 3: Does the Reservation Policy Create Tension?

Tribe Garos Khasis TotalYes DesignationStudent 79.3% 81.3% 80.0% Working 40.0% 87.5% 69.2% Others 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% GroupTotal 70.0% 85.3% 77.0%No DesignationStudent 6.9% 12.5% 89% Working 30.0% 12.5% 19.2% Others GroupTotal 12.5% 11.8% 12.2%NotSure DesignationStudent 27.6% 12.5% 22.2% Working 20.0% 7.7% Others 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 25.9% 8.8% 17.6%

40percent of theGaroyouthand69percentof theKhasis say that cultural diversity is amajor issue.TheKhasisagreeon itmore than theGarosdo.TheGaroshaveanalmostequalnumber(35%)ofthosewhoagreeanddisagreethatculturaldiversityisaproblem.Morethanhalf(53%)oftherespondentsagree and 30%disagree that cultural diversity is a source ofapprehensionbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis.(Table4)

Table 4: Is Cultural Diversity a Major Source of Apprehension? Tribe Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 41.4% 68.8% 51.1% Working 40.0% 68.8% 57.7%


Others 50.9% 33.3% GroupTotal 40.0% 67.6% 52.7%No Designation Student 31.0% 18.8% 26.7% Working 40.0% 31.3% 34.6% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 35.0% 23.5% 29.7%NotSure Designation Student 27.6% 12.5% 22.2% Working 20.0% 7.7% Others 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 25.0% 8.8% 17.6%

Table 5: Is Geographical Diversity a Source of Apprehension? Tribe Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 64.3% 50.0% 59.1% Working 20.0% 68.8% 50.0% Others 100.0%66.7% GroupTotal 51.3% 61.8% 56.2%No Designation Student 21.4% 18.8% 20.5% Working 70.0% 25.0% 42.3% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 35.9% 20.6% 28.8%NotSure Designation Student 14.3% 31.3% 20.5% Working 10.0% 6.3% 7.7% Others GroupTotal 12.8% 17.6% 15.1% 64percentoftheGarostudentsand20percentoftheGaroworkingyouth,50and69percentrespectivelyoftheKhasisaythatgeographicaldiversityisasourceoftension.Ofthetotal56percentsaythatitisamatteroftensionbut70percentoftheGaroworkingyouthdisagreewithit.ThebigdifferenceofopinionamongtheGarostudentsandworkingyouthmaybebecausethestudentsare

extensivetravellersandthejobholdersareconfinedtoabase.Thestudents travel toShillongvery frequently for interviews, jobs,forfillingforms,examsetc.andoftentheyfinditveryexpensive.TheKhasisseemtofeelthatgeographicaldiversityisasourceoftensionbecausetheweatherintheGarohillsdoesnotsuitthemsincetheycomefromacoldclimateandfindithardtosurvivetheheatandmalaria(Table5)

Table 06: Should the khasis Fear the Garos? Tribe Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 31.0% 12.5% 24.4% Working 10.0% 18.8% 15.4% Others GroupTotal 25.0% 14.7% 20.3%No Designation Student 31.0% 75.0% 46.7% Working 60.0% 75.0% 69.2% Others 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% GroupTotal 40.0% 76.5% 56.8%NotSureDesignation Student 37.9% 12.5% 28.9% Working 30.0% 6.3% 15.4% Others GroupTotal 35.0% 8.8% 23.0% Avery small number of the respondents feel that thereisareasonfortheKhasistofeartheGaros.TheKhasistudentsandtheworkinggroupsareequallystrongintheiropinion.75%ofthemthinkthattheyaresecureandhavenoreasontofeartheGaros.ThoughnotasstronglyastheKhasis,theGarostudents(31%)andworkingyouth(60%)tooareofthesameopinion.Ingeneral57%thinkthattheGarosarenothreattotheKhasisandabout23%arenotsure.Itisusefultonotethatwhile76.5%feelthattheKhasisneednotfeartheGaros,only40%oftheGaros


feelthesame(Table6).

Table No. 7 Should the Garos fear the khasis?

Tribe Garos Khasis G.TotalYes Designation Student 35.7% 18.8% 29.5% Working 10.0% 12.5% 11.5% Others GroupTotal 28.2% 14.7% 21.9%No Designation Student 32.1% 62.5% 43.2% Working 40.0% 81.3% 65.4% Others 100.0% 50.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 35.9% 70.6% 52.1%NotSure Designation Student 32.1% 18.8% 27.3% Working 50.0% 6.3% 23.1% Others 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 35.9% 14.7% 26.0%

TheGaroshavemixedfeelingstowardstheKhasis.28percentofthetotalsaythattheyfeartheKhasi,35percentopposeitand36percentarenotsure.Only15percentoftheKhasisthinkthattheGarosshouldfearthem,71percentopposeitand15percentarenotsure.AmajorityofbotheithersaythattheGarosshouldnotfeartheKhasisorarenotsure.ThefearfactorismoreamongtheGaro(Table7).

45percentoftheGarosand67percentoftheKhasisi.e.55percentofthetotaldonotfeelthattheKhasiswilldominatetheGaros.However,33of theGarosand21percentof theKhasisfeelthattheywilldoit.ThereasonforabiggernumbertheGaroshavingthisfearseemstobethattheliteracyrateamongthemismuchlower than thatof theKhasis.FieldnotesalsoshowthattheGarosfeelthattheydonothaveequalrepresentationinthegovernment,thattheKhasisarepoliticallymorepowerfulandthattheinfrastructureintheKhasiHillsismoreadvancedthanthat

oftheGaroHills.Asaresult,thehueandcryismorefromtheGarosthanKhasiswhoclaimthattheydonothaveanyintentiontobecomeathreattotheGaros(Table8).

Table 8: Will the khasis dominate the Garos? Tribe Garos Khasis G.TotalYes Designation Student 37.9% 18.8% 31.1% Working 20.0% 25.0% 23.1% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 32.5% 20.6% 27.0%No Designation Student 34.5% 62.5% 44.4% Working 70.0% 68.8% 69.2% Others 100.0% 100.0%100.0% GroupTotal 45.0% 67.6% 55.4%NotSure Designation Student 27.6% 18.8% 24.4% Working 10.0% 6.3% 7.7% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 22.5% 11.8% 17.6%

48 percent of theGaro students and 80 percent of theirworkingyouthfeelthattheGarosdonotdominatetheKhasis,sodo50perecentoftheKhasistudentsand81percentoftheirworkingyouth.Itcomesto61percentofalltherespondents.Workingyouthfromboththetribessayitmorestronglythandostudents.AbiggernumberofKhasisthanGarostakesthisstand(Table9).

Table 9: Will the Garos Dominate the khasis?

Tribe Garos Khasis G.TotalYes Designation Student 17.2% 25.0% 20.0% Working 20.0% 6.3% 11.5% Others 0 0 0


GroupTotal 17.5% 14.7% 16.2%No Designation Student 48.3% 50.0% 48.9% Working 80.0% 81.3% 80.8% Others 100.0% 50.0% 48.9% GroupTotal 57.5% 64.7% 60.8%NotSure Designation Student 34.5% 25.0% 31.1% Working 0 12.5% 7.7% Others 0 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 25.0% 20.6% 23.0%

Table 10: Does Cultural Consciousness Create Stress and Anxiety?

Tribe Garos Khasis G.TotalYes Designation Student 55.2% 73.3% 61.4% Working 70.0% 18.8% 38.8% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 57.5% 42.4% 50.7%No Designation Student 13.8% 0 9.1% Working 20.0% 31.3% 26.9% Others 100.0% 0 33.3% GroupTotal 17.5% 15.2% 16.4%NotSure Designation Student 31.0% 26.7% 29.5% Working 10.0% 50.0% 34.6% Others 100.0% 66.7% 0 GroupTotal 25.0% 42.4% 32.0% 55percentof theGaro studentsand70percentof theirworkingyouth(total57%)against73and19percentoftheKhasi(total42%)thinkthatculturaldiversitycreatesstressandanxiety.More thanhalf (51%)of all the respondents say that it createstension and only 33 percent are not sure.The big differencebetweentheKhasistudentsandworkingyouthcouldbebecausethestudentshavemoreaccesstopeopleindifferentpartsofthestateinacompactplacesuchasaschool,collegeoruniversity.

Incontrasttheworkingyouthareconfinedmoretoofficeswhereveryfewpeopleofdifferentculturalbackgroundswork.

Table 11: Does Political Consciousness Create Stress and Anxiety? Tribe Garos Khasis G.TotalYes Designation Student 62.1% 81.3% 68.9% Working 70.0% 75.0% 73.1% Others 100.0% 100.0%100.0% GroupTotal 65.0% 78.8% 71.2%No Designation Student 3.4% 0 2.2% Working 20.0% 6.3% 11.5% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 7.5% 3.0% 5.5%NotSure Designation Student 34.5% 18.8% 28.9% Working 10.0% 18.8% 15.4% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 27.5% 18.2% 23.3%

65percentoftheGarosand79percentoftheKhasis(71%of the total) say that political consciousness creates stress andanxietyand23percentarenotsure.TheKhasisseemtobemorepolitically conscious.Their demand to review the reservationpolicyonthebasisofthepopulation,isoneofitssigns.FromtheGaroperspectivetheKhasishavebeenmakingfulluseoftheirreservationquotawhiletheythemselveshavebeenlaggingbehind.Theyalsofeelthatduetolackofpoliticalawareness,theyhavenotbeenabletoestablishastrongpoliticalfrontforthemselvesbutarenowbecomingconscious(Table11).

Table 12: have the Church Leaders Tried to Improve the Relations between Communities? Tribe


Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 69.0% 62.5% 66.7% Working 30.0% 62.5% 50.0% Others 0 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 57.5% 64.7% 60.8% No Student 24.1% 12.5% 20.0% Working 20.0% 37.5% 30.8% Others 0 0 0 GroupToatal 22.5% 23.5% 23.0% NotSure Student 6.9% 25.0% 13.3% Working 50.0% 0 19.2% Others 100.0% 0 33.3% GroupTotal 20.0% 11.8% 16.2% 57percentoftheGarosand65percentoftheKhasis(61%ofthetotal),agreethattheChurchleadershavetriedtoimprovetherelationsbetweenthembut23percentdonotthinksoagainst16percentwhoarenotsure(Table12).

62percentoftheGarosandonly29percentoftheKhasis(47%ofthetotal)saythatthegovernmenthasbeenpartial.AlargepercentageoftheKhasis(47%)arenotsure.ThereasonwhyGaros,morethantheKhasis,feelitcouldbe,thatamajorityoftheministersareKhasi.Theyalsofeelthattheydonothaveequal representation. TheKhasis too, have suspicion of theGaros,thoughcomparativelyless.Basictoitislackoftrustandcompetitionbetweenthesetwocommunities(Table13).

Table 13: have Successive Governments Been Partial to one or the other Community? Tribe Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 62.1% 25.0% 48.9% Working 60.0% 37.5% 46.2% Others 100.0% 0 33.3% GroupTotal 62.5% 29.4% 47.3%

No Student 27.6% 37.5% 31.1% Working 0 12.5% 7.7% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 20.0% 23.5% 21.6% NotSure Student 10.3% 37.5% 20.0% Working 40.0% 50.0% 46.2% Others 0 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 17.5% 47.1% 31.1%

Table 14: has There Been Any Effort by khasi and Garo Leaders to Ease the Tension?

Tribe Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 41.4% 12.5% 31.1% Working 20.0% 56.3% 42.3% Others 50.0% 33.3% 0 GroupTotal 35.0% 35.3% 35.1% No Student 24.1% 25.0% 24.4% Working 30.0% 31.3% 30.8% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 25.0% 26.5% 25.7% NotSure Student 34.5% 62.5% 44.4% Working 50.0% 12.5% 26.9% Others 100.0% 50.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 40.0% 38.2% 39.2% 35percenteachoftheGaroandKhasifeelthattheirleaders“havemadeeffortstoeasethetensionbetweenthem.26percentofalltherespondentsfeelthattheyhavemadenoefforttoeasethetensionand40percentarenotsureaboutit.(Table14).

Table 15: If you were in a Position to Recruit Someone, Whom Would you Choose? CapablefromothercommunityNotcapablefromowncommunity


Tribe

Tibe

Garo

Khasi

GroupTotal

Garo

Khasi

GroupTotal

Designation

Student

70.8%

93.3%

79.5%

29.2%

6.7%

20.5%

Working

90.0%

87.5%

88.5%

10.0%

12.5%

11.5%

Others

50.0%

33.3%

100.0%

50.0%

66.7%

GroupTotal

74.3%

87.9%

80.9%

25.7%

12.1%

19.1%

74percentoftheGarosand88percentoftheKhasisarereadytochooseanyonecapablefrom

anothercom

munitytoworkwith.TheGaroseem

tobem

oretribeconsciousthantheK

hasisinchoosing

someonetoworkwith(Table15).

Tabl

e 16

: how

is th

e R

elat

ions

hip

Bet

wee

n th

e k

hasi

s and

Gar

os?

Cordial

Indifferent

Suspicious

Tribe

Tribe

Tribe

Garo

KhasiGroupTotalGaro

KhasiGroupTotalGaro

KhasiGroupTotal

Student44.8%25.0%

37.8%

13.8%37.5%

22.2%

41.4%37.5%

40.0%

Working4

4.4%

31.3%

36.0%

22.2%31.3%

28.0%

33.3%37.5%

36.0%

Others

100.0%

50.0%

66.7%

50.0%

33.3%

Total

46.2%29.4%

38.4%

15.4%32.4%

23.3%

38.5%38.2%

38.4%

46percentoftheGarosan

d29percentoftheKhasis(total38%

)feelthattherelationsbetweenthem

arecordial.15percentoftheGarosand32percentoftheKhasis(23%)feelthattheyareindifferent.38

percenteachoftheGarosandKhasisfeelthatthereissuspicionbetweenthem

.MoreGarosthanKhasis

feelth

atth

erelationsarecordial.M

oreKhasisthanGarosfeelthattherelationsbetweenthem

are

indifferent.Themainreasonforabiggernum

berofK

hasisspeakingofpoorrelationsisthe40percent

reservationsfortheGaroinsp

iteoftheirrelativelysm

allpopulation(Table16).

42percentoftheGarosan

d50percentoftheKhasis(total46%

)saythattheK

hasishavestereotyped

attitudesabouttheGaros.27percentoftheGarosand35percentoftheKhasis(31%)feelthatitisn

ot

true.23percentofthetotalarenotsu

re(Table17).

Tabl

e 17

: Do

kha

sis h

ave

a St

ereo

type

d A

ttitu

des a

bout

the

Gar

os?

Tribe

Garos

Khasis

GroupTotal

Yes

Student

51.7%

37.5%

46.7%

Working

20.0%

62.5%

46.2%

Others

50.0%

33.3%

GroupTotal

42.5%

50.0%

45.9%


No Student 20.7% 43.8% 28.9% Working 40.0% 25.0% 30.8% Others 100.0% 50.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 27.5% 35.3% 31.1% NotSure Student 27.6% 18.8% 24.4% Working 40.0% 12.5% 23.1% Others GroupTotal 30.0% 14.7% 23.0%

Table 18: Do Garos have Stereotyped Attitudes About khasis? Tribe Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 44.8% 43.8% 44.4% Working 30.0% 62.5% 50.0% Others 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 40.0% 55.9% 47.3% No Student 31.0% 18.8% 26.7% Working 40.0% 18.8% 26.9% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 35.0% 17.6% 27.0% NotSure Student 24.1% 37.5% 28.9% Working 30.0% 18.8% 23.1% Others GroupTotal 25.0% 26.5% 25.7% 40percentoftheGarosand56percentoftheKhasis(47%total)saythattheGaroshavestereotypedattitudesabouttheKhasis.27%ofalltherespondentsdisagreewithitand26percentarenotsure(Table18)

Table 19: has the Media Reinforced Stereotypes about khasis and Garos?

Tribe

Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 25.0% 20.0% 23.3% Working 40.0% 56.3% 50.0% Others 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 28.2% 42.4% 34.7% No Student 50.0% 13.3% 37.2% Working 40.0% 18.8% 26.9% Others GroupTotal 46.2% 15.2% 31.9% NotSure Student 25.0% 66.7% 39.5% Working 20.0% 25.0% 23.1% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 25.6% 42.4% 33.3%

35percentagree,32disagreeand33percentarenotsurethatthemediahasreinforcedstereotypesabouttheGarosandKhasis.MoreKhasis(42%)thanGaros(28%),andamongtheKhasi,theworkingyouth(56%)morethanstudentsfeelthatthemediahasreinforcedstereotypes.Thereisnotmuchdifferenceinthenumberssaying‘yes’,‘no’and‘notsure’(Table19). 77percentoftheGarosand35percentoftheKhasis(72%and50%respectivelyoratotof64%students)or58percentofthetotalrespondentsdonotthinkthattheGaroteachersarebiasedagainsttheKhasis.But50percentoftheKhasisarenotcertainthattheGaroteachersarenotbiased(Table20).

Table 20 : Are the Garo teachers biased towards the khasis ? Tribe Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 6.9% 6.3% 6.7% Working 18.8% 11.5% Others 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 5.0% 14.7% 9.5%


No Student 72.4% 50.0% 64.4% Working 90.0% 25.0% 50.0% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 77.5% 35.3% 58.1% NotSure Student 20.7% 43.8% 28.9% Working 10.0% 56.3% 38.5% Others 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 17.5% 50.0% 32.4%

Table 21: Are the khasi teachers biased towards the Garos? Tribe Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 17.2% 11.1% Working 6.3% 3.8% Others 50.0% 33.0% GroupTotal 12.5% 5.9% 9.5% No Student 51.7% 62.5% 55.6% Working 90.0% 50.0% 65.4% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 62.5% 52.9% 58.1% NotSure Student 31.0% 37.5% 33.3% Working 10.0% 43.8% 30.8% Others 50.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 25.0% 41.2% 32.4%

Similarly,62percentoftheGarosand53percentoftheKhasis(total58%)donotthinkthattheKhasiteachersarebiasedagainsttheGaros.Ofthisnumber56percentarestudents,including52percentGaro62percentKhasistudents.25percentoftheGaroand41percentoftheKhasiarenotsure(Table21).

Table no. 22 : Can khasis and Garos prosper within the same state ?

Tribe Garos Khasis GroupTotal Yes Student 41.4% 62.5% 48.9% Working 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% Others 100.0% 33.3% GroupTotal 45% 52.9% 48.6% No Student 24.1% 15.6% Working 20.0% 31.3% 26.9% Others 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 22.5% 20.6% 21.6% NotSure Student 34.5% 37.5% 35.6% Working 30.0% 18.8% 23.1% Others GroupTotal 32.5% 26.5% 29.7%

Ifprejudiceisnotasstrongasitismadeouttobe,thenonehadtofindoutwhethertheycouldliveinthesameStateandprosper.Thatwasthenextquestion.45percentoftheGarosand53percentoftheKhasis(total49%)thinkthatitispossible.Only22percentthinkthatitisnotpossibleand30percentarenotsure.

The Main Conclusions from the Data

TheTablesgivebarefacts.Theyshowthat80percentoftheGaroandKhasi,bothstudentsandthosewhoareworking,feelthattensionbetweenthemishigh.77percentattributeitmainlytothereservationpolicy.NotsurprisinglyabiggernumberofKhasis(85%)thanGaro(70%)feelitbecauseoftheperceptionthatitbenefitsmainlytheGaro.OntheGarosidetheKSUdemandforitsrevisionisthemainproblemwhileontheKhasisideitisthepolicyitself.Culturaldifferencesbetweenthemdocausetensionbetweenthem.Theyfeelthatexceptfortheirmatrilinealbackground,therenocommonalitybetweenthemButitislessthanreservations.

Theremainingfactorssuchasgreaterculturalandpoliticalconsciousnessaddtothetension.71percentthinkthatpolitical

consciousnesshasaddedtothetension.Onecanalsoarguethattheprotestsagainstthereservationpolicyresultfromgreaterpoliticalconsciousness.Ifthatisthecase,dealingonlywiththereservationpolicymaynotbethesolution.Theyouth(51%)fromboththecommunitiesfeelthatthenewculturethatincludesthemoderntrends and a fast lifestylemakes themmore consciousof eachother’spresence.Culturalconsciousnessbecomesstrongerwiththeirfastgrowingpoliticalconsciousness.Thisconsciousnesshasmadetheyouthverifytheirownbackgroundandhistoryandthatoftheother.Eachtribelooksforitsownbenefits.

Itisalsopossiblethatthegovernmentdidnottakecaretounderstandtheimportanceofprovidingequalopportunitiestoboththecommunities.ThefeelingthattheStatewaspartialisstrongeramongtheGaros(62%)thanKhasis(29%).TheGarothinkthatitisthemainreasonfortheirslowerdevelopment.TheyfeelthattheKhasisalwaysgotabiggersharethantheydidandresentthefactthattheKhasisaretryingtotakeawayfromthemthe40%reservationswhichistheonlybenefittheyhavegot.TheKhasisdonothavesuchaproblemsofewerofthemblametheState.

Inspiteofculturalandotherdifferencesalargenumberofthemdonotthinkthattheyareathreattoeachother.Around23percent see a threat and a similar number is not certain.Thus,the threat perception is not absent completely but is not thepredominantone.OnemayaddthatmoreKhasissaythattheGaroarenotathreattothemthantheGarowhosaythesameabouttheKhasi.ItsreasonseemstobetheKSUdemandforachangeinthereservationpolicy.TheythinkthattheKhasisarepoliticallymorepowerfulastheyhavemorerepresentationinthelegislatureandbureaucracy.AmajorityoftheGarodonotseeathreatbut25percentfeelitandasimilarproportionisnotcertain.

Stereotypesabouteachothercontinue.But58percentoftherespodentsfeelthatthetension,culturaldifferencesandstereotypeshavenotaffectedtheteacher-studentrelationship.Theyfeelthat

theteachersremainneutral.MoreGarosthanKhasisareconfidentabout good student-teacher relations irrespective of their tribe.Tables20and21showthatmoreKhasisthanGarosarenotsurethat the teachersarebiasedagainst the students from theothertribe.However,thereisastrongtendencyamongtherespondentsfromboththecommunitiestosidewiththeirowntribe,beitontheissueofteachers,domination,thefearfactororculturalaffinity(Tables5to8).

Whiletheyrecogniselackofbiasonthesideoftheteachers,therespondentsalsostatethattherelationshipbetweentheGaroandKhasi students is not cordial. 62 percent say that there issuspicion or at best indifference among the students of theircommunities.TheKhasisseemtobe lesscomfortablewith theGarothantheGaroarewiththeKhasi.ItsmainreasonseemstobethattherearemoreGarosinShillongthanthereareKhasisinTura.Besides,interviewsleaveonewiththeimpressionthattheKhasistakeprideinbeinglocals.ThatmakesthemfeellesscomfortablenotmerelywiththeGarosbutalsowithotherswhoareconsideredoutsiderstoShillong.

Despitethetensionaroundthereservationpolicy,asmanyas81percentwouldbereadytoappointacapablepersonforajob,irrespectiveofhis/hercommunity(Table15).ThereisabiggernumberofKhasis (88%) thanGaros (74%)among them.Onlyasmallnumberwouldchoosesomeoneoftheirowncommunityirrespectiveoftheperson’scapabilities.Inspiteofthedifferences,49percentoftherespondents(45%Garo,53%Khasi)thinkthatthesetwotribescanprosperwithinthesamestate.TherehasbeenademandforaGreaterGaroLandbutthatdoesnotseemtobeapriority.Forthetimebeingidentityanddevelopmentalissuesaremoredivisivethanterritorialones.

TheseTablesshowthatthebreakbetweentheGaroandKhasiis not complete.There is a possibility of solving the problemsthroughadialogue.Thenegativesideofitisthattheleadershave


donenothingtoeasethetension.MostrespondentsareoftheviewthatonlytheChurchleadershaveattemptedtobringthetwosidestogetherandthattheyshouldcontinuetomakeacontribution.Onemayadd that though there isno recordofcommunalviolence,theReservationPolicyhasdamagedtheGaro-Khasirelationship.Linkedtoitareculturalandotherproblems.IfthereisatalkofaStateamongtheGaros,itislinkedtothisfactor.SomeofthemthinkthataseparateStateisthebestwayofputtinganendtothedebate around theReservations.TheState toohas failed in itsduty.However,ifmeasuresarenottakensoon,thesituationcandeteriorate.

An Analytical Look

Now that thefindingshavebeen summarised they canbeanalysedundertheDNHandotherframeworks.

Do No harm Framework

TheDoNoHarm (DNH) frameworkunderwhich all thefindings are explained helps one to check any unintentionalor unrealised harm by an agency in carrying out its worksin a particular place. For example, the agencies involved indevelopmentmayplantodogoodbutwithoutintendingit,mayalsocausenegativeeffects.Theyarealsoknownasunintendednegativeeffects.TheDNHframeworkhassixmajorsteps.Steponeistoidentifythestakeholdersorpartiesandtheprocessthroughwhichtheyareinvolvedinaproblem.Steptwoistoidentifyandanalysethedividersthatcancauseviolencebetweengroups.Stepthreeistoidentifyandanalyseconnectorsthatmayhelpbringpeacebetweenthepartiesinconflict.Stepfouristoseethemethodsofprovidingaid.Stepfiveistoanalysetheimpactoftheprogrammesonthedividersandconnectors.Withitonecanconsidertheprogrammeoptionsandpresentsomepeacebuildingmeasures.

Step I: The Stakeholders in the Garo-khasi Tension

Thestudentleaders(GSUandKSU)andthemilitantgroups

HNVCandANVCrespectivelyfortheKhasisandGarosaretheprimarystakeholdersinrelationtotheGaro-Khasitension.ThesecondarypartiesaretheJaintiasandothertribalandthenon-tribalpopulationofMeghalaya.TheGarosingenerallookattheKhasisasatribethathasalwaysenjoyedthefavourofthegovernment.Theyfeelthattheythemselveshavebeenbeendeprivedoftheir40%reservationquota.TheKSUdemandtoreviewthereservationpolicyaddstotheirfeelingofinjustice.ANVCfeelsthatanumberofGaro populated villages outsideMeghalaya are deprivedofeducationandotherfacilitiesandthattheyshouldbeincludedintheproposedGaroLandforthedevelopmentoftheGarosunderoneautonomousstate.SomeGarosfeelthattheyandtheKhasiscanprospertogetherbutothersthinkthatalltension,includingthereservationpolicy,wouldcometoanendwithGGL.

TheKhasisbelievethatthereservationpolicyisnotrealisticandhastobereviewed.TheGarosweregiven40%ofreservationbecause theywere educationally backwardbut now they thinkitistimetohaveequalshare.TheKhasisdidnotstoptheGarosfromutilising their quotabut their own incompetencehasbeenanimpedimentfortheirgrowthanddevelopment.WithregardtoANVC’sdemandforGGL,someKhasisfeelthatthepresentGaroHillscouldbecomeaseparatestatebutnopartoftheKhasilandshouldbeincludedinit.AconsiderablenumberofKhasisalsofeelthattheGarosandKhasiscanprospertogether.

The Process of Garo and khasi tension

At the foundation ofMeghalaya, the leaders decidedunanimouslytohaveaninternalreservationspolicy.TheGarosandtheKhasiswereallotted40percenteach.However,theriseinnewculturalandpoliticalconsciousnessandthefactthattheKhasiandthesub-tribesunderthemhaveapopulationofnearlydoublethatoftheGarobuthaveaquotaofonly40percent,haveledtotension.ItledKSUtothinkintermsofreviewingthereservationpolicybasedonthesizeofthepopulationorraisingthereservations


from80to90percentfortheKhasi,JaintiaandGarotogether,tobeenjoyedonthebasisofmerit.ThatiswhentheGSUrealisedthat the40%peservationswerenot implemented.Theystudiedthepastandrightlyorwronglycametotheconclusionthattheyhavebeengettingonlly15-20%insteadof40%.ThusbegantheunendingGaro-Khasistruggle.

ThustheReservationPolicyof1971istherootcauseofallproblems.AlsotheGarodemandforaGreaterNagalandisoldbutwasrevivedbytheANVC.SoitisarepetitionofthehistoryinMeghalaya.ThoughtheANVCbecameactivefrom1995,thedemandforaseparateGarolandwasalreadyinthementionedinamemorandumtotheIndianGovernmentatindependence.(Idea derived form the ANVC Memorandum 1999, Pg. 6)

The Location of offices

TheGarosaddalsoissuessuchasthelocationofallmajorgovernmentofficesinShillong,unequaldistributionineducationalfacilities, failure to hold theWinter Session of the legislativeassemblyinTura,thecontroversiesovertheMeghalayaBoardofSecondaryEducation(MBOSE)etc.Thus, thereareallegationsandcounter-allegationsincludingHSLCquestionpapersleaking.Mostoftheseeventsaresignsofalackoftrustbetweenthem.Theseproblemsarealsorelatedtolackofdevelopment,GaroHillsbeinglessdevelopedthanKhasiHills.

TheKhasishaveadifferentperspectiveontheseissues.TheironlypriorityistheReservationPolicyandthedemandforequaldistributionbasedontheproportionofthepopulationineachtribe.Theyfeelthattheyhavetosharetheirquotaof40percentwithmanysub-tribesunderthemwhereastheGarosareofonetribeandcomparativelysmallerpopulationthantheKhasis.

The issue of GG L

TheANVCwasbornoutofwhattheGarosperceivedastheirneglectafterthecreationofMeghalaya.Theyhavebeenbringing

thisneglecttotheforeinrecentyears.Forexample,theyhighlighteditduringtherecentpassageoftheRabhaHasongAutonomousBillin1995bytheAssamlegislature.TheANVCusedthefollowingargumentsandgrievancesintheirmemorandum:

AsregardsthecreationofMeghalayaState,wecannotpresumethatthegovernmenthasdonewell,satisfyingtheneedsandaspirationsoftheGaropeople.Oneofthegreatestblundersthatwecanbecitedisthebifurcationof the same linguistic, culture and ethnically singlecommunity intomany perplexing sections, havingnoregard toourculturaland linguisticaffinities.TheindependentIndiabroughtusnothingbutonlyamanysidedbifurcationofour tribeandcommunitymakingustoremaininastateof“DivideandRule.”WehavebeendividedintotheGarosofGarohillsandKhasiHillswithintheMeghalayastateitself;theGarosofAssamandMeghalayaintheaNationallevel;theGarosofIndiaandBangladeshintheInternationallevel.....(ANYC)Pg.8TherecentpassageoftheRabhaHasongAutonomousCouncil Bill on 1995 by theAssamGovernment,grantingautonomyoftheRabhaCommunitylivinginGoalparaandKamrupdistrictsofAssam,isaglaringsymbolofnegligenceandpartialitytowardstheGaroslivinginthesetwodistricts.(Ibid)pg.9

TheGarosfeelthatitisallrighttopractisethesamefaith,geteducationfromthesameinstitutionbutitisimportanttohaveaseparatepoliticalidentity.SchoolsintheGarodominatedareasofAssamaredeprivedofbasicfundsfrombothAssamandMeghalayaGovernment.KhasisseemtobesatisfiedwithwhattheyhavebutGarosarestilltoreachthatstateandasaresult,thereisthedemandforaSeparateGaroState.TheGaroStudentsUnion(GSU)alsosupportsthedemandforGreaterGaroLand.

TheissueofGGLaffectsKhasipopulationlivingintheKhasiHills. In their response theKhasis have said that theyhaveno


objectiontoaseparateGaroLandbutnotatthecostofanypartthatbelongstotheKhasiHills.TheyfeelthatthegovernmentofMeghalayaisnotpartialagainsttheGaros.Itgivesequalfacilitiesandopportunitiestoboth.

Implications of a Separate Garo state and GGL

A separateGaro State (notGGL) alongwithmore anddirectfundscomingfromthecentralgovernmentwillbringmoredevelopment opportunities, jobs and education to the people.Itwould, however, demand greater responsibility of theGaroleadersfortheprogressoftheGaropeople.Anewstatewouldrequire leaderswho can give it efficient administration.Withgrowthanddevelopmenttherewillalsobemoreopportunitiesforcorruption.DemandsoftheminorityandinfiltrationfromAssamandBangladeshwouldalsobeimportantconcernsofthestate.

ThesituationcanturnmoredestructiveinGreaterGaroLand,especiallyinthebordervillageswhereGarosandKhasiswillhavetolivesidebyside.ItwillcallformuchhigherresponsibilityoftheGaroleaderstoruntheadministrationofthenewstate.

The Dividers in the Conflict

ThefirstdividerintheconflictisthestrainedrelationsbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis.Fromthatfollowspoorcommunicationthatisfosteringsuspicionandtensionbetweenthem.Toitonemayaddtheeducationalandeconomicgapthatpavesthewayforasocialchasmbetweenthem.DifferentlanguagesandculturesareanothersignificantfactordividingtheGarosandtheKhasis.ThecallforaGreaterGaroLandisyetanotherhurdle.“Theboundarydisputemayturnouttobemorecomplexthanitseemstobeasthereisnoproperdemarcationoftheboundarybutonlyavaguedescription.” (Dr. M Sangma, Tura, dated November 30, 2004)

ItisalsoclearthatintheperceptionoftheKhasisthemost

importantdivideristheReservationPolicy.OntheGaroside,themostimportantdivideriswhattheyperceiveasKhasidominationovertheGaros.KSUandGSUaresustainingthesedividerswithnoeffortmadetogetovertheproblems.ThesetwoorganisationsclaimtospeakonbehalfofthecommonpeopleontheReservationPolicyandtheSeparateGaroLandissue.Theyareverystrongwithintheirowncommunitiesandmouldpublicopinion.Theybecomedividersbytryingtoupholdtheinterestsoftheircommunityaloneatthecostofothers.Theythusturnapoliticalproblemintoasocialproblem.Themediaaddtoitbystrengtheningthestereotypesofeachother.Thestudents’unionsandthemediarepresentativeskeepintouchwitheachotherasbothfindthislinkproductive.Buttheytendtoservetheinterestsofonecommunityalonethoughtheycanbeausefulinbringingthegroupsinconflicttogether.

The Connectors in the Conflict

Whilethedividerskeeppeopleawayfromeachother,therearealsoconnectorsthatcanbringpeopletogether.AmongthemaresomeinstitutionssuchastheChurches,women’sorganisationsandschoolsandcolleges,wheremembersofboththecommunitiesmeet.Womenwerelessaggressivethanmenduringhisinteraction.thepresentwriterfoundgreatpotentialforpeaceamongwomen.Mostofthemweremuchlessaggressivethanmenwhentheyspokeofrelationswiththeothertribe.Forexamle,whenaskedaboutaseparatestate,mostGarowomensaidthatoneshouldcontinuetolookformeasurestokeepthestateofMeghalayaundivided.TheGarosandtheKhasismustlearntolivetogether.

The churches bring their adherents from different tribestogetherunderthesameroofforSundayworshipandotherservices.Amajorityofboth thecommunitiesareChristians thoughtheybelongtodifferentdenominations.TheyalsorunalargenumberofschoolsandcollegesnotmerelyinShillongandTurabutalsoinsmalloertowns.Thatcreatesintheseinstitutionsthepotentialtobringthetwotribestogether.


Themost important connectors are probably the ordinaryGaros and theKhasis.They share the same rich experience offightingforthestatehoodofMeghalaya.Besides,therecannotbepeacewithoutthesupportofordinaryGarosandKhasis.ThefactthatordinarypersonsfromthetwotribesarenotreallybotheredaboutissuessuchasthereservationpolicyandGGLandthefactthatsomeofthemarenotevenawareoftensionbetweenthetwoisagoodconnector.

Peace Building Measures

OnehastobaseoneselfonthesedividersandconnectorsintheinterventionsonemakestopromotepeacebetweentheKhasisand theGaros.Despite some tension, the relationshipbetweenthemishealthierthanthemaindividersarereadytoaccept.Ontheotherside,someofthemediaagentsandthegrowingculturalandpoliticalconsciousnesshaveanegativeeffectonthepeople.Culturalandpoliticalconsciousnessisgoodinitself.Itacquiresanegativedimensionwhenpersonswithulteriormotivesmanipulateit for their selfish interests.The institutions such aswomen’sorganisationsandChurchesthatareactiveatthegrassrootslevelorhaveamassbaseneedtocountertheforcesthatcausetension.They can spread awareness especially among the students, theyouthandwomenaboutthepotentialforpeacewithjustice.

An appropritewayof reaching themicro level is throughseminars, peace rallies, peace education for villagers, families,youthandyouthleaders.Atthemacro-levelthestategovernmentcanbeaskedtotakepeaceinitiativesthrougheducationinschoolsandcollegesandthroughschemesaimedatsolvingtheproblemofunemploymentandculturalalienation.TheseinstitutionscantaketheinitiativeinevaluatingtheStategovernmentpoliciesandprogrammefromthepointofviewoftheirimpactonunitybetweenvariousethnicgroups.Theycanalsolookattheirimplementationtoseewhethertheirbenefitsreachthemassesandwhethertheyserveallthecommunitiesequally.Decentralisationofeducation

andequaldistributionofeconomicandeducationalresourcescandefinitelyreducetensionbeweenthesetribes.

EncroachmentonlandbythosewhoinfiltratefromAssamandBangladeshcausesfurthershortageofresourcesandincreasestension.Thedemandscomenotmerelyfromnon-tribalsbutalsofromtheGarosresidinginAssam.TheyfeeldiscriminatedagainstinAssamsotheydemandtheirrightofbeingGarosinMeghalaya.InsomestraycasestheGarosfromAssamhavecausedproblemsinShillongandtheconsequencesoftheiractionsarebornebytheGarocommunityof theGaroHills.Theorganisations thathavenetworksinAssamcanusetheirlinkstobringtheproblemstheAssamGarosfacetothepublicdomainandpressurisetheStateauthorities to solve the problem.Unless that is done, even theformationofGGLwillnotbeofmuchusesinceinfiltrationwillcontinuetocausetensioninthenewState.

Equallyimportantisthefightagainstcorruptionparticularlyduringtheelections.Thereisaneedtospreadawarenessamongthemassesaboutthemannerinwhichelectionsareconducted.Lackofawarenessoftheseprocessesamongthemassesencouragescorruptpractices.Themedia too canplay a role in removingpeople’sapprehensionsabouteachother.Civilsocietygroupshavetoplayaroleinfindingpeacefulsolutionsparticularlywhenthereisdirectconflict.

Economicsolutionstooarerequired.MostjobsinMeghalayaareinthebureaucracyorintheservicesector.Theycannotproducethenumberofjobsrequiredbythegrowingpopulationandthenumberofyoungpersonscomingoutofschoolsandcolleges.TheStateandinstitutionslikeself-helpgroups,women’sorganisationsandthechurcheshavetojoinhandstocreatelow-costcreativeemployment.They need to get involved in skill developmentespeciallyamongtheyouth.Onedoesnotrefertotechnicalskillsalone but also analytical skills. For examplewomen’s groupssupport peace processes but political awareness is low among


them.Wayshavetobefoundof improvingtheiranalyticalandnegotiatingskillsinordertosupporttheirpeaceinitiatives.TheycanthusbettertacklesomepointsoftensionsuchasthedemandforaGaroStatebeforetheygetoutofcontrol.ThereisamixedfeelingamongtheGarosonthisissue.Ifacompromisebasedonjusticetoallisnotfoundatanearlystage,itcanbecomeamassdemand and polarise the communities.A solution can preventpolarisation.

Encouragingthetypeofpoliticalawarenessthatcandeliverpeacewithjustivewouldbetheideal.MostGarosarepeace-loving.Developmentthatresultsinthemassesacquiringtheirrighttoalifewithdignityisamajorsteptowardspeacewithjustice.ComparedtotheKhasistheywereeducationallybackwardtillnow.Buttodaytheyrealisethevalueofeducation.SomeGaroandKhasileadersseetheimportanceofeducationforsocialharmony.Someyouthandwomenleadershavestartedquestioningtheirownleaders.Oneconsidersitthefirststeptowardsdevelopmentandpeace.

InordertopromotepeaceandharmonybetweentheGarosandtheKhasisandinstilinthemthehopeofdevelopinginunity,itwillbenecessarytostrengthencommonplatformsliketheFederationofKhasi,JaintiaandGaroPeople(FKJGP)andMeghalayaStudents’Federation (MSF).These organisations can alsowork againstperceivedor realdiscrimination thatcause tensionbetween thetribes.

Conclusion

Tribalpeopleareknownfortheirhospitality.TheGarosandKhasisaretwomajortribalgroupswhokeeptothistradition.Forexample,theGaroslivinginShillongfacenodiscriminationanddonotconsiderthemselvesvictimsofsocialprejudices.ThesameistrueoftheKhasislivingintheGaroHills.Therecertainlyaresomestrayincidentsbuttheyareexceptions,nottherule.Thesetwo tribes do not have awritten history but they have shared

theexperienceofacommonStatesinceitsinceptionin1972.Itisintrinsictotheirhistoryanditisimportanttobuildonitandworktowardsacorruptionfreeadministrationthatcanensurethedevelopmentofallthetribeslivingwithinitsboundaries.

Itisequallyimportanttoensurethattheadministrationisnotbiasedinfavourofanyofthethreetribes.Suchagovernmentcanwinthetrustofallthreeandcanbeamajorstepinfreeingthemfromthesuspicionofeachother.SuchanatmosphereoftrustcanalsobeofhelpindealingwiththeReservationPolicythatwasawelfaremeasure but has todaybecome a boneof contentionbetween theGaroandKhasi.Becauseof the tension it causes,government and other social leaders have failed to take anyinitiativetosolveit.

ThistensioniscausedalsobythefactthattheKhasishavehad better access to education than theGaros did because theeducational revolution came to Shillongmuch earlier than itcametoTura.Thegovernmentneverrealisedtheimportanceofdecentralisingeducation.SomeGaroparentsarenotyetconvincedoftheneedtosendtheirwardstoschool.Theydonotwanttheirsonsanddaughterstogetinvolvedinpolitics.BecauseofitandsincetheinhabitantsofShillongenjoyedbetterfacilitiesthanthoseintheremainingdistrictsofMeghalaya,asocialgaphasdevelopedbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis.Tosomeextentithasalsogivenrisetoasuperiorityandinferioritycomplexbetweenthesetribes.

TheGGLissuetoocannotbeignored.ArecentsurveybytheANVCintheGarodominatedvillagesofAssamandKhasihillsshowsthattheGaroslivingtherewishtobeonewiththeGreaterGaroLand.However,theANVCisnotverysureofhowlongtheywillbeabletosupporttheminthisdemandsinceanystruggleforitwillresultinhardships.TheANVCsaysthatitwilldoitsbesttoavoidbloodshedintheirstruggleforthisdemandthoughtheyfeelthattheGaroslivingoutsidetheGaroHillsaremorethaneagertobeincludedinGreaterGaroLand.


Dr.MiltonSangmareflectstheviewsofmanyotherswhenhesaysthatGGLisanidealbutnotpractical.TheANVCmaybespeakingofanattainableobjectiveifitdemandsaSeparateGaroStatecomprisingthepresentGaroHillsandtheSixthSchedulefortheGarodominatedvillagesoutsidetheGaroHills.

ThecontributionoftheChurchtotheGarosandKhasisiscommendable.However,theChurchestakecareoftheirgeneralwelfarebutnotfromtheperspectiveofGaro-Khasiharmony.Boththetribesenjoythefruitsofthepastoral,educationalandmedicalworktheChurcheshavedone.However,theyhavenotgonebeyonditthoughtheseinputscanbeusedasmeetingpointsforallthetribes,notmerelytheGarosandKhasis.TheChurchesalonearecapableofbecomingbridgebuildersbetweenthem.Itcanusethesetoolstobuildupawarenessamongthemabouttheissuesthatdividethemandthosethatcanbringthemtogether.Theycandoitwithoutgettinginvolvedinpoliticsinthenarrowsenseoftheterm.

Inalltheseefforts,onehasalsotobeawarethatallthetribeshavetheirtraditionalpeacemakingandreconciliationsystems.Byandlargetheyareinthehandsofwomen.Itisimportantforthe agenciesworking for peace notmerely inMeghalaya butalsointheremainingStates,tostudythesesystemsandupdatethemtosuittoday’sneeds.Newtensionscanbeovercomeonlythroughnewandcourageousinitiatives.

BIBLIoGRAPhy

PakemB.ed,Nationality, Etnicity and Cultural Identity in Northeast,OmsonsPublications,NewDelhi.Verghese,B.G.,India’s Northeast Resurgent,KonarkPublishersPvt.Ltd.1996.Syiemlieh,D.R.,British Administration in Meghalaya,HeritagePublishers,NewDelhi,1989.Aggarwal,KailashS.,ed,Dynamics of Identity and Intergroup Relations in Northeast India,IndianInstituteofAdvanceStudy,1999.

Sinha,Kamleshwar,Meghalaya, Triumph of the Tribal Genius,NationalHerald,NewDelhi,(PublicationDivision,Delhi)Lyngdoh,R.S.,Government and Politics in Meghalaya,SancharPublishingHouse,NewDelhi.Sen,Sipra.,The Tribes of Meghalaya,MittalPublications,Delhi.Sarma, Siddheswar,Meghalaya - The Land of Forest,Geophil PublishingHouse,Guwahati.Shreeranjan,Perspective of Development in Meghalaya,ApublicationofStateInstituteofRuralDevelopment(SIRD)Meghalaya,2001.

www.khasistudentsunion.org



ThE GARo-khASI TENSIoN: IMPLICATIoNS FoR ThE youTh AND

WoMEN

Sarah Maria Bang

Meghalaya that became an autonomous state on 2ndApril1970andafull-fledgedstateon21stJanuary1972hasasex-ratioof974.Therelativelyhighsexratiomaybeattributedtothefactofallthreeofitsmajortribesi.e.theGaro,JaintiaandKhasibeingmatrilineal.Theyfollowthistraditionoffemaleinheritancebutsocialpowerisinthehandsofmen.Theircustomarylawshavedefined the roles ofmen andwomen.Menwerewarriors andprotectors,tillers,huntersandadministrators.Theirroleisinthedomain outside the home.Women aremothers, housekeepers,custodiansoffamilyproperty,helpersinthefieldsandgroves.AllthreecommunitieshaveincreasinglyadoptedChristianitybutallthreehavemovementsthattrytorevivetheirtraditionalcustomsandfestivalsandkeeptheoldfaithandvaluesalive.KhasiandGaroaretheprincipallanguages,withEnglishastheofficiallanguage.However,culturallytheybelongtotwodifferentstrains.TheGarosareoftheBodo-TibetoBurmanstockandhavesettledintheGaroHillsforthepast400years.TheKhasisandtheJaintiasbelongtotheMon-Khmergroup.

About This Study

Thatethnicidentityismostprecioustothetribesoftheregionbecamemore apparent in themovement for hill states in theundividedAssam.Eachethnicgroupsought itsown interestandpower(Madav1998).BecauseofthedifferentidentitiesofthetribesthatwonMeghalaya,thereareinternalconflictsinthedistributionofreservationsforGovernmentjobsandseatsforeducationamongtheKhasis,JaintiasandGaros.ThereisalsodisparityinthedistributionofeducationalfacilitiesandmajorGovernmentinstitutions.

ThatleadstothedemandofseparatestateswithinMeghalayaonethnicandgeographicallines.Therehasbeenanundercurrentoftensionbetweenthesetwoforalongtime,withthestudentunionsplayinganactiverole.Thisstudytakesacloserlookandtriestogainaspealinsightintotheroleplayedbytheyouthandandtheroleofwomeninparticular.ThestudywhichlimitsitselftotheGaro-Khasitensionwilltrytounderstandwomen’srolebothintheconflictandinapossiblesolution.Ithasthefollowingobjectives:

1.TogainanunderstandingoftheKhasi-Garotensionanditsimpactonthecivilsocietyandyouthinparticular.

2.Toidentifyfactorsthatleadtotheconflict.

3.Tostudytheroleofyouthorganisationsinthisconflictsituation.

4.Theroleofwomeninthecontextofethnictension.

5.Tosuggestappropriateinterventionmeasurestobeadoptedbyyouthministry,governmentandcivilsociety.

ThisstudyonthecausesoftheconflictsandofmethodsonpreventingviolenceisanurgentneedinthepresentscenarioofgrowingKhasi-Garo tension. Such a study has not been donetilltodaybyanypersonsororganisations.Theresearcherhopesthat itwill contribute toanunderstandingby thepeopleof theconsequences of the conflict.The suggestions for interventioncanhelp thecommunities, theChurchandyouthandwomen’sorganisationstofindwaysofpeacefulco-existenceandacommonapproachtothedevelopmentoftheState.

Background of the Conflict ThereisagrowingconcernintheacademiccirclesabouttheGaro-KhasitensioninMeghalaya.Thoughliteraturedealingwiththetopicperseisverylittle,anumberoffactorscontributingtoithavebeenidentified.Literaturegatheredhereisbasedmainlyfromprimarydata.Ithasbeencategorisedunderthefollowingheads.

Socio- geographical and political background

InMeghalaya, the state is sodiverse,yet interrelated in itsgeological,physiographic, ecologicalandclimaticaspects.TheKhasisandJaintiasknownasthe‘Hynniewtrep’occupymainlythehillsinEasternMeghalaya.TheGarosor‘Achiks’livemainlyinwesternMeghalaya.Therearemoresimilaritiesbetween theKhasisandtheJaintiasthanbetweentheKhasisandtheGaros.TheKhasisandtheJaintiashavethesameoriginandaresociallyand linguistically linked to the largerMon-KhmergroupwhiletheGarosbelongtotheBodofamilyoftheTibetan-Burmanrace.Theircommonalityisthattheyarematrilineal(Verghese1996:98).Politically,theGaroandtheKhasi-Jaintiapeoplecametogetherin1969underthepoliticalplatformoftheAllPartyHillLeaders’Conference(APHLC),demandingthecreationofaseparatestateforthehillareas.On30thDecember1971,theIndianparliamentpassed theNorthEasternAreas (Re-Organization)Act 1971,conferringfullStatehoodonMeghalaya.ItbecameafuIlfledgedstateon21stJanuary1972(Shreeranjan2001:12-13).

Reservation Policy

Indianconstitution limits thepercentageof reservations foraparticulartribeto40%.ThethenChiefMinisterCapt.WilliamSangmadecidedtoadheretoitbygranting40%eachtotheKhasi-JaintiasandtheGaros.(Varghese1996:202).

TheKSUnowdemandsthatthereservationpolicyberevisedasaccordingtothe2001census,theKhasipopulationis14,43,596,ascomparedtotheGaropopulationof8,62,473(KSUPamphlets).ItwantsthecombinedKhasi-Jaintia-Garoquotatoberaisedto90%.TheGarosresistitastheyfeelthatthebettereducatedKhasiswillmakeinroadsintotheirentitlement.Garorecruitmenttothehigherechelonsofgovernmentislessthantheirnumberswarrant.

The Separate Garo State

ThisisamongthefactorsthatledtheGaroNationalCouncil,todemandaseparateGaroState(Ray1994). As a Garosocialactivist said, ‘Wheninafamilythechildrenhavegrownupitiswiseonthepartoftheparentstogivethemtheirsharesothatthechildrenlivehappilyintheirownnewhome.ThatshouldalsobethecasewiththeGarosandKhasis”.ManybothamongtheKhasisandtheGarosfeelthattheycannotlivetogetherinonepoliticalunit.ManyGarosclaimthattheirownleadersfailedtopresenttheirneeds,dreamsandaspirationstothestategovernment.Thus,aseparatestateismoreaneedoftheGarosthantheKhasis.Theyconsideritanendtoallsuspicion,misunderstandingsandaccusationbetweentheGarosandKhasis.(Extract from the group discussions)

The Role of Government, Educational Institutions and the Churches

Shillong being the State capital, hasmost Governmentinstitutionsandeducationalsetup,exceptTheMeghalayaBoardofSecondaryEducation(MBOSE)thatissituatedinWestGaroHills.ShillonghasformanyyearscateredtotheeducationalneedsofthestudentsfromallovertheNortheast.TheeducationalrevolutioncametoShillongmuchearlierthanitcametotheGarohills;asaresultthepeopleofShillongunderstoodtheneedforeducationandhavebeenenjoyingthebenefitsofmostGovernmentaswellas private schools and colleges.TheState did not realise theimportanceofdecentralisingeducation.ThathascreatedasocialgapbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis.MotivationisstilllackingamongtheGarosinthefieldofeducation.(Extractfrom the group discussion)

ThepeopleofGarohillsfeelthatifthewintersessionoftheStateAssemblyisheldinTuraitwouldbringmoredevelopment

Garo-Khasi Implication for Women 251 252 Conflict Mapping in NEI

totheGaroHills.PeoplerecallthetimewhenthegovernorvisitedTura.Thegarbagewascleared,drainswerecleanedandthetownworeanewlookmanydaysbeforethegovernor’sarrival.Ifthiswashowitlookedinoneshortvisitofthegovernor,howmuchmoreitwouldbeifthewintersessionoftheassemblywereheldintheGaroHills.Thecouncilofministersandlegislatorswouldfloodthetown.ButithasonlyremainedadreamofthepeopleofTura(Extract from an interview with a social activist from Garo hills). Meghalayahasavibrantchurchthathasestablishedvariousinstitutions throughout the state. Itworks primarily througheducationandplaysasignificantroleinpubliclife,indevelopingsocial,politicalandeconomicconsciousnessamongthepeople.Thoughitsinfluenceisfeltinmanyspheres,theChurcheslimitthemselvestotheeducationalandspiritualspheresandhavenotplayedanactiveroleinreducingtheGaro-Khasitension

Accordingtothereservationpolicyof1971jobsandseatsineducationaredistributedequallyi.e.40%eachbetweentheGaroandtheKhasiwhoincludethesub-tribesand20%forothers.The

The khasi Students’ union (kSu)

TheKhasiStudents’Union(KSU)whichisaleadingstudentorganisationinMeghalayawasformedonMarch20,1978.ItwasassociatedbythestudentsoftwelvecollegesundertheNortheasternHillUniversityandthosestudyingattheUniversityitself.Atitsinception, themottowas“For theWelfareof theStateand theCommunity”.Later itwas changed to “MainShaprangKhlurKaRi”(StriveForwardChildrenof theSoil).TheConstitutionof theKSUadoptedonDecember18,1981, said that itwouldfosterthespiritofunity,loveandmutualhelpamongthestudentsofMeghalaya. It also stated that itwould standfirm toprotectthe fundamental rights, the special place and freedomof eachandeverymemberandthatitwouldnottakepartinpoliticsor

religiousmatters. In theConstitution as amended onApril 4,1993attheKhasiNationalAwakeningDay,theobjectiveswerefurtherexpanded to includedemandsfromtheGovernment forinfrastructural facilities to uplift education to suit the timesbysetting upGovernmentmedical, engineering and agriculturalcolleges.Italsowantedlegalprotectiontohelpthechildrenofthesoiltocontroltheeconomy,governmentandlandofMeghalaya.Italsowanted toawakenin theKhasicommunityrespect theirlanguage,culture,traditionandallthatbelongstotheKhasination.Ofthenineobjectives,thelastspokeclearlyaboutpeace.Itread“ToachievepeaceintheKhasilandwithintheframeworkoftheIndianConstitutionbyplacingitonparwithJammuandKashmir”.

TheKSUwhichwasformedpriortotheintenseanti-foreignerstirof1979,becameaneffectivepressuregroupduringit.ManystudentleaderswereplacedunderdetentionundertheMeghalayaPreventiveDetentionOrdinance(MPDO)ortheNationalSecurityAct(NSA).Thisissuebroughtinalotofturmoilinthestatein1979-80and1987.ThefirstphasewasagainsttheillegalmigrantsfromBangladeshandthesecondagainsttheNepalis.Inthecourseofthemovement,KSUdemandedphotoidentitycards,erectionofawallalongtheinternationalborderwithBangladesh,speedyactionontheResidentialPermitBill,theextensionoftheAssamAccordtoMeghalaya,introductionoftheInnerLineRegulation,totalreservationinthestateassemblyfortheindigenouspeople,revivalof theDurbarHimaandcurbing the saleofmortgagedland.Inrecentyears,ithastakenuptheissueofWorkPermittooutside labourers and scrapping the 40:40percent reservationsfortheKhasisandtheGaros.OnSeptember25,2001itstartedthe“KsanRngiewMovement”whichhasnowspreadtodifferentareasofthestate.TheKSUisaffiliatedtotheNorthEastStudents’Organization (NESO), an umbrella body of themajor studentUnionsoftheregion.

TheKSU is probably themost articulate, dynamic,mass-based group inMeghalaya taking up a variety of in-campusandoff-campus issues. It also adopted all knownpeaceful and


other techniques of protests.By and large, its uupport base isall indigenous people including the organisations likeTribalWomen’sWelfare andDevelopmentAssociationofMeghalaya(TWWADAM) now known asKWWADA, theKhasi-JaintiaWelfareAssociation(KJWA)kaIewduhKhasisPnarsAssociation(KIKPA),kaSynjukKiRangbahShnong(SKS)tonameafew.Early in 2001, theUnionwidened its territorial jurisdictionbyformingunits in theEasternmost parts ofRiHynfiiewtrep, theJaintiaHillsDistrict.

StudentspursuingtheirprofessionalcoursesoutsideMeghalayahaveorganisedthemselvesintostudentsassociationsandaffiliatedthese associations to theKSU.They include theMeghalayaAgricultural Students’Association,Nagaland (MASAN), theKhasi-Jaintia Students’Union,Dibrugarh and theMeghalayaAgriculturalStudents’Association,Imphal.

Women’s role

Withallthreetribesbeingmatrilineal,women’sstatusisbetterthanthatofotherwomenincludingtribalselsewhere.However,malescontinuetodominatethepoliticalscene.Womenarebarredfromparticipatingevenintheirtraditionalgrassrootsinstitutionsandhavenosayinrunningthevillageaffairs.Buttheyareassignedaroleinthewomen’sorganisations(SengKynthei)thataredirectlyunder the village council.Within this organisationwomen areallowedtotakeupwelfareactivitieswhichdonotimpingeuponthepowerofthevillagecouncil.Theyhavenorighttocriticisethecouncilor raise issues thatarepoliticallysensitive.For theKhasis,politicsisanexclusivelymaledomain(The Telegraph,30November,2004).TheKhasitraditionreferstoawomanwhotakespartinpoliticsas“ahenthatcrowsandwouldbringbadomen”.Withthispsychologicalburden,womenhaveshunnedpoliticsandparticipateonlyassupportersandcampaigners.

Mother’sUnionisstrongamongthem

asw

ellastheGaros.TheGarowom

en’sgroupmediatedthe

surrendero

ftheALM

A,amilitantgroupinGaroHills.Wom

enparticipateandplayasignificantrole

inbothadministrativeandsocialactivitiesforthewelfareofthestate.W

ithregardstotheGaro-Khasi

tension,wom

endonothaveanyfeelingofrivalrytowardseachother.H

owever,theirrelationsareslightly

strainedbuttheyarereluctanttodiscussitprobablybecausetheydonotw

anttodisrupttheequilibrium.

Tabl

e 1:

Is T

here

Ten

sion

bet

wee

n th

e G

aros

and

kha

sis?

(by

Trib

e an

d Se

x)

Male

Female

Tribe

Tribe

Garo

Khas

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Yes

Count

20

10

30

14

17

31

%withinTribe

90.9%

76.9%

85.7%

82.4%

77.3%

79.5%

No

Count

23

51

45

%withinTribe

9.1%

23.1%

14.3%

5.9%

18.2%

12.8%

NotSure

Count

00

02

13

%withinTribe

11.8%

4.5%

7.7%

Total

Count

22

13

35

17

22

39

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0

100.0%

100.0%

100.0

Ana

lysi

s and

Iter

pret

atio

n


Inordertounderstandtheissues,wegatheredtheopinionof76youngpersonsaged15to35,41ofthemGaroand35Khasi.Halfofthemweremenandhalfwomen.Therespondentshadanequalnumberofstudentsandworkingyouth.AllofthemarefromShillongandTura.

ThefirstquestionconcernedGaro-Khasitension.MoreGaros(82.5%)thanKhasis(76.5%)areawareoftheGaro-Khasitension.20.6%Khasisagainst7.5%Garos feel that there isno tension.2.9%oftheKhasisarenotsureagainst10%oftheGaros.MoreGaro(90.9%)thanKhasimales(76.9%)feelthatthereistensionbetweenthem.9.1%ofGaroagainst23.1%ofKhasimenfeelthatthereisnotension.Thesamedifferenceexistsamongfemaleswith82.4%oftheGaroagainst77.3%oftheKhasifeelingthatthereistension.5.9%oftheGarofemalesand18.2%oftheKhasidonotfeelthetension.

Thus,Table1showsthatamajorityoftheGaroaswellasKhasirespondentsareawareofthetensionalthoughtherehasbeennoviolence.However,moremalethanfemalerespondentsofbothareawareofitprobablybecauseitisprimarilyapoliticalissueandmenareinvolveddirectlyinpoliticalaffairswhilewomensupportthem.However,thefactthatamajorityofthewomentooareawareofthetensionshowsthattheyaresuckedintotheseissuesthoughdecisionsaretakenbymen.

MoreKhasi(69.2%)thanGaromales(45.5%)feelthattheKhasisdonotfeartheGaro.36.4%Garoagainst7.7%Khasimalesarenotsure.MoreKhasi(81.8%)thanGarofemales(41.2%)feel thatKhasisdonot fear theGarosbut9.1%Khasisagainst29.4%GarofemalesarenotsurethattheKhasisfeartheGaros.

Table 2: Should the khasis Fear the Garos?

Male

Female

Tribe

Tribe

Garo

Khasi

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Yes

Count

43

75

27

%withinTribe

18.2%

23.1%

20.0%

29.4%

9.1%

17.9%

No

Count

10

919

718

25

%withinTribe

45.5%

69.2%

54.3%

41.2%

81.8%

64.1%

NotSure

Count

81

95

27

%withinTribe

36.4%

7.7%

25.7%

29.4%

9.1%

17.9%

Total

Count

22

13

35

17

22

39

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

ThusmoreGarothanKhasisofallcategoriesthinkthatKhasishavereasontofeartheGaros.To

checkwhetherthatthinkingisbasedonsomestereotypesweaskedtherespondentswhethertheGaros

havereasontofeartheK

hasis.Thecontrastco

ntinuedalsointhisfield.MoreK

hasis(76.5%)thanGaros

(40%

)feelthattheKhasisd

onotfeartheGarosBut35%

oftheGarosan

d8.8%

oftheKhasisarenotsure.M

ore

Khasis(62.5%)thanGaros(32.1%

)feelthattheGarosdonotfeartheKhasi.

Tabl

e 3:

Do

the

Gar

os h

ave

Rea

son

to F

ear

the

kha

sis?

(by

Trib

e &

Sex

)

Male

Female


Tribe

Tribe

Garo

Khasi

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Yes

Count

84

12

41

5

%withinTribe

36.4%

30.8%

34.3%

25.0%

4.5%

13.2%

No

Count

77

14

618

24

%withinTribe

31.8%

53.8%

40.0%

37.5%

81.8%

63.2%

NotSure

Count

72

96

39

%withinTribe

31.8%

15.4%

25.7%

37.5%

13.6%

23.7%

Total

Count

22

13

35

16

22

38

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Itisthusclearthatthereistensionbetweenthem

butthereisdifferenceofopiniononitsextent.

TheGarosseemtofeelitmorethantheKhasisdo.M

oreKhasi(53.8%

)thanGaromales(31.8%

)feel

thattheGarosshouldnotfeartheKhasis.Similarm

oreKhasi(81.8%

)thanGaro(63.2%

)fem

alesfeel

stronglythattheGarosshouldnotfeartheKhasis.Thus,eventheperceptionoffearistribespecificbut

existsinbothofthem

.D

omin

atio

n of

one

ove

r th

e o

ther

Animportantfearinthisinteractionisthatonewilldom

inatetheother.Sowebeganbyaskingthe

respondentsw

hetherintheirperceptiontheK

hasisw

illdom

inatetheGaros.Theresponsesshowthatsuch

afearexistsbutnotasmuchasintheissuesthathavepreceded.FewerKhasis(67.6%)thanGaros(45%)feelthattherewillnotbesuchdominationbutevenamongtheGarostheproportionofthosewhofeelthattheywillnotdominateissubstantial.Infact,onlyaminorityoftheGaros(32.5%)aswellasKhasis(20%)feelthattheKhasiswilldominatetheGaros.

Table 4: Will the Garos Dominate the khasis?

Garos Khasis Total Yes Designation Student 17.2% 25.0% 20.0% Working 20.0% 6.3% 11.5% Others Group 17.5% 14.7% 16.2% Total No Designation Student 48.3% 50.0% 48.9% Working 80.0% 81.3% 80.8%

Dominating theothergroupisamajor threatanditcancreatetension.Thatiswhythefactthat,onlyaminorityinboththe tribes feels this threat gives an opening towards a betterunderstandingamongthem.Therecertainlyisfearbutitseemstobemoreaboutsharingofbenefitsthanaboutdomination.Inotherwords,fearofdominationismainlypolitical.Togetoveritonemayhavetofocusonsocialandeconomicissuessuchaseducationand jobsand thenmoveonpolitical issuesof representation inthelegislature.IftheGaroaccesstothesebenefitsremainslow,thefearofpoliticalandsocialdominationcangrow.Thatiswhyitisimportanttoknowthatamajorityofbothfeelsthattheycanprosperwithinthesamestate.Onehastobuildonthispositiveaspect. MoreKhasis (64.7%) than theGaros (57.5%) feel that theGaroswill not dominate theKhasis.That took us to the nextquestionofongoingrelationshipbetweenthetwotribes.WeaskedtherespondentswhethertheyfeltthattheGarosandKhasiscan


prosperw

ithinthesameState.Table5givesonlythedivisionbysexandom

itstheT

ablebystudentand

workingclassdivision.Inthoseresponses4

5%oftheGarosand52.9%

oftheKhasissaythattheycan

prosperw

ithinthesamestate.32.5%

oftheGarosand26.5%

oftheKhasisarenotsu

re.

Tabl

e 5:

Can

kha

sis a

nd G

aros

Pro

sper

with

in th

e Sa

me

Stat

e?

Male

Female

Tribe

Tribe

Garo

Khasi

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Yes

Count

12

820

610

16

%withinTribe

54.5%

61.5%

57.1%

35.3%

45.5%41.0%

No

Count

43

74

48

%withinTribe

18.2%

23.1%

20.0%

23.5%

18.2%20.5%

NotSure

Count

62

87

815

%withinTribe

27.3%

15.4%

22.9%

41.2%

36.4%38.5%

Total

Count

22

13

35

17

22

39

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Table5show

sthat57.1%

ofthemaleand41.0%ofthefemalerespondentsbelievethattheycan

prosperw

ithinthesamestate.Majorityoftheyoungpeople,particularlythestudentsfeelthatinspite

ofallthedifference,theycanliveandprospertogether,heretoothereisapositivefeelingthatboththe

communitiescanlivetogetherinonestate.H

owever,m

en(5

7.1%

)aremoreconvincedofitthanare

wom

en.Thatcanbecom

eadivisivefactorbecausewom

enarethemainsocialisersofchildren.Ifmostof

them

arenotconvincedofthisn

eed,theprocesso

fthetw

ocomingtogethermaynotgettheimportance

itdeserves.

Tabl

e 6:

Do

you

Thi

nk th

at th

e R

eser

vatio

n Po

licy

has C

reat

ed T

ensi

on?

Male

Female

Tribe

Tribe

Garo

Khasi

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Yes

Count

17

13

30

11

17

28

%withinTribe

77.3%

100.0%

85.7%

64.7%

77.3%

71.8%

No

Count

2

22

46

%withinTribe

9.1%

5.7%

11.8%

18.2%

15.4%

NotSure

Count

3

34

15

%withinTribe

13.6%

8.6%

23.5%

4.5%

12.8%

Total

Count

22

13

35

17

22

39

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Sour

ce o

f Ten

sion

Afterhearingfrom

amajoritythattheywouldliketolivetogetherwithinthesam

eState,w

eexplored

thecausesoftensiononceagain.B

oththetribesattributeitto

thereservationpolicybutfromtw

o


differentperspectives.Soweasked themwhether the jobsandseatsineducationalinstitutionsshouldbereservedaccordingtothepopulationofeachcommunity.

Table 7: Do you Think that Geographical Diversity is a Major Problem?

Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 64.3% 50.0% 59.1% Working 20.0% 68.8% 50.0% Others 0 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 51.3% 61.8% 56.2%No Designation Student 21.4% 18.8% 20.5% Working 70.0% 25.0% 42.3% Others 100.0% 0 33.3% GroupTotal 35.9% 20.6% 28.8%NotSure Designation Student 14.3% 31.3% 20.5% Working 10.0% 6.3% 7.7% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 12.8% 17.6% 15.1%

MoreKhasis (85%) thanGaros (70%) agree that thereservationpolicyhascausedtension.Infact,100%Khasimalesand71.8%Garomalesgivethisasthemainsourceoftension.MoreKhasi youth (68.8%Students andworking) thanGaros(40%)saythatculturaldiversityisoneofthemajorfactorsinthetension.However,theGarostudentsgivegreaterimportancetogeographicaldiversitysince theyhaveoften to travela longdistancetoShillongwheremostentranceandotherexamsandjobrelatedinterviewsareheld.SomeKhasiworkingyoungpersonssaythatgeographicaldiversityisasourceoftensionbecausethosewhoarepostedintheGaroHillsfinditdifficulttobeartheweather.64.3%oftheGarosand50%oftheKhasistudentsfindaproblemingeographicaldiversity,sodo68.8%oftheKhasisand20%oftheGaroworkingyouth(Table7).

Whatcreatesaproblemisnotculturaldiversityassuchbutitsconsciousness.Inordertotestthishypothesis,weaskedtherespondentswhethertheyfeltthatculturalconsciousnessdividesthem from the other tribes.Table 8 shows that 73.3%of theKhasisand55.2%oftheGarostudentsfeelthatitisnotprimarilyculturaldiversitybutgreaterconsciousnessofitinthetwotribesthatcreatesstressandanxiety.70%oftheGaroand18.8%oftheKhasiworkingyouththinkthesame.Thebigdifferenceofopinionbetweenthestudentsandtheworkingyouthcouldbebecausethestudentshavetomixmorewithpeopleindifferentpartsof thestatethantheworkinggroupdoes.

Table 8: Do you Think that Cultural consciousness Creates Tension? Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 55.2% 73.3% 61.4% Working 70.0% 18.8% 38.5% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 57.5% 42.4% 50.7%No Designation Student 13.8% 0 9.1% Working 20.0% 31.3% 26.9% Others 100.0% 0 33.3% GroupTotal 17.5% 15.2% 16.4%NotSure Designation Student 31.0% 26.7% 29.5% Working 10.0% 50.0% 34.6% Others 0 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 25.0% 42.4% 32.9%

Whatissaidofculturalconsciousnessisequallytrueofpoliticalconsciousness. In otherwords, it is not culture or politicalawareness that creates problem but the exclusive natire ofconsciousness.78.8%oftheKhasisand65%oftheGarossaythat political consciousness creates stress and anxiety. ThereaonsmaybethattheKhasisaremorepoliticallyconscious


thantheGaros.Infact,duringgroupdiscussionmanyGarossaidthattheyhavenotbeenabletogoforwardmainlybecauseofpoliticalawarenessandastrongfrontforprogress(Table9).

Table 9: Does Political Consciousness Create Stress? Garos Khasis TotalYes Designation Student 62.1% 81.3% 68.9% Working 70.0% 75.0% 73.1% Other 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% GroupTotal 65.0% 78.8% 71.2%No Designation Student 3.4% 0 2.2% Working 20.0% 6.3% 11.5% Other 0 0 0 GroupTotal 7.5% 3.0% 5.5%NotSure Designation Student 34.5% 18.8% 28.9% Working 10.0% 18.8% 15.4% Other 0 0 0 GroupTotal 27.5% 18.2% 23.3%

The answers to the next question onwhether successivegovernmentshavebeenpartial tooneor theother tribearenotdifferentfromwhathasalreadybeenreportedinchapter7.SoweshallnotrepeatthemhereorgiveaTable.Sufficeittostatethat62.1%oftheGaroand25%oftheKhasirespondentsfeelthattheGovernmenthasbeenpartialtooneortotheothercommunity.Partialityofgovernmentstopeoplesharingdifferentculturaltraitsis not unusual and that comes out in the responses.However,a bigger number ofGaros thanKhasis feel that the successivegovernmentshavebeenpartial. In that sense, this response tooseemstocontinuethefeelingofdeprivationthatonehasnoticedamongtheGarosintheanswersthathavepreceded.Besides,moreGaro(71.4%)thanKhasi(46.2%)malesspeakofthisenvironment

ofdiscrimination.However,only35.9%ofthefemalerespondentsi.e.52.9%oftheGaroand22.7%oftheKhasiagreewithit.Itmaybebecausemanywomenaremoreopentorelationswithothersthanaremen.Itmayalsobecontinuationofwhathasbeensaidinthelastchapteraboutthembeinglessanalyticalintheirresponsesorpossiblyacombinationofthesetwo.

Teachersareanothergroupthatcanmakeadiffrenceinapeaceprocess. In this casemoreGaros (72.4%) thanKhasi students(50%)feelthattheGaroteachersareunbiasedtowardtheKhasis.Notsurprisingly,asmanyas62.5%oftheKhasisstatedthattheKhasiteachersarenotbiasedagainsttheGarosagainstonly17.2%of theGaroswho said that theywerenotbiased.On theotherside,only6.8%oftheKhasisfeltthatKhasiteacherswerebiasedagainstalittleover15%oftheGaros.Thus,theKhasisseemtobemoredissatisfiedinthisrespectabouttheGarosthantheGarosareabouttheKhasis.Byandlargeonegetstheimpressionthatbothtrusttheirteacherswhatevertribetheybelongto.Thatisagoodopeningforpeacebuilding.

Alsotheresponsetothequestiononwhetherthetwotribeshadstereotypesattitudestowhatonehasseeninthelastchapter.SotheTableswillnotberepeatedhere.SufficeittostatethatmoreKhasis(55.9%)thanGaros(40%)feelthattheGaroshavestereotypedattitudestowardstheKhasis.Similarly,moreKhasis(50%)thanGaros (42.5%) feel that theKhasis have a stereotyped attitudetowardstheGaros.Oneisoftentoldthatwomenareprotectorsofthecultureofatribe,assuchpolarisationisgreaterattheirlevel.However,46.2%oftheKhasiand31.8%oftheGaromalesfeelthattheKhasishaveastereotypedattitudeabouttheGaros.Thisstatementwasmadebyonly25.6%of theGaro and28.2%oftheKhasifemalerespondents.Theoppositeis thecasewhenitcomestoGarostereotypedattitudestowardstheKhasis.40.9%oftheGaroand23.1%oftheKhasimalesfeelthattheGaroshavesuchanattitude.However,only29.4%of theGaroand13.6%of theKhasi female respondents feel that theGaroshave such


anattitudetowardstheKhasis.Thus,afarilybignumberspeaksofastereotypedattitudebuttheirnumberisnotasbigasthatofpersonswhodisagreewithit.

Table 10: Do the Media Reinforce Stereotypes about khasis and Garos?

Garos Khasis Total Yes Students 25.0% 20.0% 23.3% Working 40.0% 56.3% 50.0% Others 0 100.0% 66.7% GroupTotal 28.2% 42.4% 34.7% No Students 50.0% 13.3% 37.2% Working 40.0% 18.8% 26.9% Others 0 0 0 GroupTotal 46.2% 15.2% 31.9% NotSure Students 25.0% 66.7% 39.5% Working 20.0% 25.0% 23.1% Others 100.0% 0 33.3% GroupTotal 25.6% 42.4% 33.3%

Chapter7showsthattheMediathatcanbeaunitingfactoroftenbecomesdivisiveandreinforcesthestereotypesaboutoneanother.Sowequestionedtherespondentsonceagainonthesameissue.Table10showsthatmoreKhasis(42.4%)thanGaros(28.2%)feelthatthemediareenforcesstereotypes.

Table l1: Do you feel that Church Leaders have Tried to Improve Relations?

MaleFemale TribeTribe

Garo

Khasi

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Yes

Count

10

616

12

16

28

%withinTribe

45.5%

46.2%

45.7%

70.6%72.7%

71.8%

No

Count

65

11

33

6

%withinTribe

27.3%

38.5%

31.4%

17.6%13.6%

15.4%

NotSure

Count

62

82

35

%withinTribe

27.3%

15.4%

22.9%

11.8%13.6%

12.8%

Total

Count

22

13

35

17

22

39

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%100.0%

ThechurchisanothergroupthatcanbeaunitingfactorbecauseamajorityoftheGarosand

KhasisareChristiansthoughbelongingtodifferentdenominations.T

heKhasisaredividedmainly

amongPresbyteriansan

dCatholicsw

hiletheG

arosarem

ostlyBaptistsan

dCatholics.Theresponsesare

somew

hatdifferentfromwhatonehasseeninch

apter7.M

ostindividualrespondentsseem

tosaythatthe

churcheshaveplayedaroleintryingtobrin

gthetribestogether.How

ever,thefeedbackduringgroup

discussionwasdifferent.Asubstantialnum

beroftheparticipantsfeltthatthoughtheChurchleaders

havetriedtobringcordialrelationsbetweenthetribe,byandlargetheyarebusywiththeirspiritualand

pastoralministry.T

heymayattemptcordialrelationsbetweenthetribesbutdonotm

akemucheffort

tobringaboutreconciliationintimesofethnicconflicts.Thus,thoughthereisdifferenceofopinionon

theroleofthechurch,manyleadersfeelthatthechurchleaderscanplayanimportantroleinbridging


thegapbetweentheKhasisandGaros.M

oreKhasis(64.7%

)thanGaros(5

7.5%

)feelthatthechurch

leadersh

avetriedtobuildabetterrelationshipbetweenthem

.71.8%

ofthefemalerespondentsfeltthat

thechurchhastriedtoim

provetherelationsbetweenthetwotribes(Table11).

Tabl

e 12

: how

do

you

defin

e th

e re

latio

nshi

p be

twee

n k

hasi

s and

Gar

os (c

ross

tabu

latio

n)

Male

Female

Tribe

Tribe

Garo

Khasi

Total

Garo

Khasi

Total

Cordial

Count

10

21

27

815

%withinTribe

47.6%

15.4%

35.3%

41.2%36.4%

38.5%

Indifferent

Count

32

53

912

%withinTribe

14.3%

15.4%

14.7%

17.6%40.9%

30.8%

Suspicious

Count

89

17

75

12

%withinTribe

38.1%

69.2%

50.0%

41.2%22.7%

30.8%

Total

Count

21

13

34

17

22

39

%withinTribe

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%100.0%

Alsoresponsestothequestiononwhetherifacapablepersonfrom

anothertribeisavailablethey

wouldbereadytoallowthatpersontofillthevacancyifapersonfrom

theirowntribeisnotavailable

tofillapostreservedforit.M

oreKhasis(93.3%

)thanGaros(70.8%)saythattheywouldchooseto

workwithonecapablefrornanothercom

munity.ThoughtheGarosarefewerthantheKhasis,theyare

morethantwothirdsoftherespondents.Thatisahopefulsignthatthecrucialissueofreservationscanbedealtwiththroughnegotiations.Despitealltheaprehensionsandtensionbetweenthetwocommunities,theKhasiandGarorespondentsarewillingtoworkwitha‘capable’personfromtheothercommunity.TheKhasisseemtobemoreopentotheideabecausethesenseofdeprivationislessamongthemthanamongtheGaros.Inspiteofit,morethan70%oftheGarosareopentoit. . ThencamethefinalquestionontheGaro-Khasirelations.Theresponsesarenotmuchdifferentfromwhatonehasseeninthelastchapter.46%oftheGarosand29%oftheKhasisfeelthattherelationsarecordialagainst15.4%and32.4%respectivelywhofeelthattheyareindifferent.However,theTableisgivenaboveinordertoshowthediffrenceinmaleandfemaleattitudes.Unlikein other issues, themale-female difference on this question isminimal.35.3%ofthemalesand38.5%ofthefemalesfeelthattheyarecordial.However,moreGaro(47.6%)thanKhasi(15.4%)malesfeelthattherelationshipiscordialagainst40.9%and17.6%Khasi andGaro females.Thus,moreGaro thanKhasi seem tothinkthattherelationshipiscordial.Bothalsohaveabignumberthatissuspiciousofeachother.Therearemoremales(50%)thanfemales(30%)inthiscategory.

Summary of Findings and Suggestions

AnaspectthatstandsoutoftheabovedataisthattheGaro-Khasitensionismorepoliticalthansocial.Culturalconsciousnessaddstoitbutpoliticalvestedinterestsexploitthesenseofresentmentinboththetribestotheirownadvantage.ThereservationpolicyisthesourceofresentmentamongtheKhasiwhilethefeelingofdeprivationisthemainsourceoftensionamongtheGaro.ThisfeelingmakestheGarodemandGreaterGaroLand.Thatcausesmore resentmentamong theKhasiswho feel threatenedby thedemandthattheGaroinhabitedareasintheKhasiHillsbeincludedinGGL.Theinferiorityandsuperioritycomplexesaddtothesenseofdiscriminationor resentment.However,withall the tension,apprehensionandfearmostrespondentsofboththegroupsfeel


that theGaro-Khasi relations are either cordial or canbecomesuch.Inordertosearchforasolutionbasedonthisattitude,thefindingsofthestudyarepresentedthroughtheDoNoHarm(DNH)framework,whichidentifiesthepeople,themainproblemsandtheprocessesesinvolvedinthetension.The People Involved Thepeople involved in this tensionare theKhasi (KSU)andGaro (GSU) student leaders, themilitant groupsANVCandHNVC and the political parties. The reservation policywasraisedbytheKSUthatdemandeditsrevision.TheGSUopposedthisdemand.Thus,thereservationpolicyhasbeentheboneofcontentionbetweentheKhasisandtheGaros.Thefeelingofdiscriminationanddisparityaddstothistension.Thepoliticalpartiesuse theGaro-Khasi tension togainpoliticalmileagebyblamingeachotherandincreasingtheconflict. OnecanaddthatthereservationpolicythatledtotheGaro-Khasitensionisitselfapoliticalproblem.ThedemandforGreaterGaroLand adds t o it because geographically, the boundarybetweentheGaroHillsandKhasiHillsisnotwelldemarcated.Sociallythereislackoftrustandunderstandingbetweenthetwocommunities andpsychologically there is a feelingof fear andsuspicionofeachother.ManyKhasisaccepttheideaofaseparateGaroStateinthepresentMeghalayaStatebutnotGGL.Ontheotherside,amajorityoftherespondentsfeelthatthetwotribescanlivetogetheranddevelopinthesameState.Inotherwords,thetensiononthispointhasnotreachedthepointofnoreturn.Theconflictismuchgreateraroundthereservationpolicy.Inordertounderstandapossiblewayoutofthistension,weshallnotstudythedividersandconnectors. The dividers and Connectors TheissuesoftheReservationPolicyandthedemandforGreaterGaroLandarethemaindividersbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis.Toitshouldbeaddedthesuspicionofeachother,thestereotypes,

culturaldifferencesandlanguages,allofthemexploitedbythepoliticalvestedinterests. Thattakesonetotheconnectors.PrincipalamongthemaretheinstitutionsandorganisationssuchastheChurch,schools,collegesandwomen’sorganisationsthatbringmembersofboththetribestogetheratthefunctionallevel.TheycanfunctionasconnectorsintheGaro-Khasitension.TheChurchisanimportantorganisationthathasservedboththecommunitiesforafairlylongtimeandthestudyshowsthatmostmembersofthesetwotribeshavefaithinitsleadersandinstitutions.Childrenandyouthfromboththecommunities go to the same schools and colleges.With someeffortacommonbondcandevelopamongthemasitdidamongtheNagatribesintheearly20thcentury.ItresultedinthegrowthofacommonNagaidentity. TheGaros and theKhasis haveworked together for thestatehoodofMeghalaya.Theyhave thuscreateda stake in thehill State.Differences have arisen after its creationbecauseoftheneed for theeconomicandotherbenefitsaccruing from itscreation.Becauseofthiscommonfoundation,amajorityoftheyouth,particularlystudentsfeelthatinspiteofallthedifferencestheycanliveandprospertogether.Suggestions for intervention PeacebuildingprogrammefortheKhasisandtheGaroshavetobebasedonthefoundationoftheseconnectors.Atthemicrolevel,itwouldbeappropriatetohavepoliticalawarenessprogrammes,seminars,peacerallies,peaceeducationforthestudentleaders,theyouthandthewomen.Anewleadershipamongthemcommittedtopeacecanworkagainstmanipulationbythosewithavestedinterestindivisionamongthem.Atthemacrolevel,thestategovernmentcanintroducepeaceeducationinschoolsandcolleges.Itisequallyimportanttodecentralisetheeducationalresources.Thereisalsoaneedtoevaluateallgovernmentpoliciesandprogrammesregularly. TheChurchisanotherorganisationwhommostmembersofboththetribestrust.Inordertoplayitsroleasapeacemaker,the


ChurchneedstobemoresensitivetothepresentscenarioandtakestepstohelpinimprovingtheGaro-Khasirelations.ItsservicecanreducethegapbetweentheGarosandtheKhasis.TheChurchescanalsotrainteachertoimpartthevaluesofpeacebasedonjustice,thusre-enforcingtheconstructiveattitudesamongthepersonsfromthetwotribeswhowanttofindcommondevelopmentwithinthesameState.TheChurchisalsoaplatformthatcanfacilitatedialoguebetweentheleadersofthetwotribesononesideandbetweenthegovernmentandpressuregroupsontheother.IssuesaroundtheReservationpolicyneedtobesolvedthroughcompromisesthattheChurchescanfacilitate.TheycangetthecooperationoftheNGOsinpromotinghealthierrelationshipandinrestoringpeace. AlltheTableshowthatwomencanplayamajorroleinpeacebuilding.Asmothersandcustodiansofreligionandpropertytheyarealsothesocialisersoftheirchildren.Theyneedtobehelpedtodevelopananalyticalmindontheseissuesinordertohelptheirchildrenandpeerstodevelopnewattitudesthatcanbehelpfulinpeacebuilding.Inordertoensureitherstatusastheprotectorofthetribesvaluesneedtostrengthenedwhileaddingtoitthetypeofdecision-makingpowerintheirsocietythatcangiveher thestatusrequiredfornegotiationsforpeacebuilding.Todaysheisnolongerregardedjustasakinswomanoraclan-woman.Herstatusisdependentonherownsocialpositionandthatofherhusband.TheformationoftheStateWomen’sCommissionshowsthattheStateisfeelingthepressurefromwomenforequality.Theresponsetothispressurewaslimitedbutoneneedstobuildonitbybuildingupsimilarpressureontheirsocietiesforsocialandpoliticalequality.

Conclusion MeghalayaisoneofthelesstroubledstatesintheNortheast.Despiteitsrichnaturalresourcesitsuffersfromeconomicstagnationwhich accentuates its socio-political and ethnic problems.Thestatehasdiverse ethnic and cultural groups, eachwith its owntraditionalculturalsystems.Buttheyareinconflicttoday.Theyhavehadtraditionalindigenousknowledgeandpracticesofconflict

management.ButthesesystemshavenotbeenusedinthepresentGaro-Khasiconflict.ThemainissuearoundwhichtensionexistshavebeenidentifiedastheReservationPolicy.ThedemandforGreaterGaroLand adds to the tension that is accentuated bysuspicionandstereotypesabouteachother. Onlyafewofthemareareasofrealconflict.Atpresentthereis tensionaroundother issuesassuchtheyhaveapotential forconflicts.Thecommonpeopleparticularlywomengroupsfeelthatinmostcasestheproblemisstilldormant.Whiletheconflictcanbeavoided,manyofthemdonotwanttointerveneforthefearofdisruptingtheequilibrium.Butitisclearthattheyouthfeelthatthetensionisgrowingbetweenthesetwotribes.TheDNHanalyticalframeworkhashelpedinidentifyingthepeopleinvolvedandtheprocessoftheirinvolvement.ItalsoshowsthattheGaro-KhasitensionisamajorchallengeinMeghalayatoday.Thereisaneedtosearchforaconstructive intervention toavoidviolence.TheState,theChurchgroups,women’sorganisationsandNGOshavetocometogethertoaccepttheresponsibilityoffindingasolutiontotheproblemthatcanleadtopeacebasedonjustice.

BIBLIoGRAPhy

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KusumandP.M.Bakshi,Customary Law and Justice in the Tribal Areas of Meghalaya,M.N.TripathiPvt.Ltd,Bombay,1982.Kyndiah,P.R.,Khasis : Yesterday and Today. Meghalaya : Yesterday and Today,Han-AnandPub,NewDelhi,1990.Malngiang, P,Students and Politics in Meghalaya, SevenHutsEnterprise,Shillong,1979.Shreeranjan, Perspectives on Development in Meghalaya, State InstituteofRuralDevelopment,Meghalaya,2001.Singh,K.S., People of India-People of Meghalaya, Vol. XXXII,SeagullPublica-tions,Calcutta,1994.Syiemlieh,P.B.,The Khasis and Their Matrilineal System, RiKhasiPress,Shillong,1994.Varghese,B.G.,India’s Northeast Resurgent,KonarkPublications,NewDelhi,1996.Yogi,A.K., Development of the Northeast Region, Problems and Prospects,SpectrumPublications,Guwahati,1991.

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