Conflict assessment and the medium-term strategy

Presentation to DFID Nigeria, by Claire Hickson

21 November 2002

Presentation

• The process.

• Outputs

• The findings

• Implications for future work.

The conflict assessment: process

• Conducted by IPCR.• Supported by DFID, the World Bank,

USAID, and UNDP.• Increasing interest from others, e.g.

Canadians, EU, ADB.• Two phases: desk-based study and

fieldwork (six teams, one for each of the geopolitical zones).

SCA (1)• DFID methodology:

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT:

Analysis of:

Structures;Actors;Dynamics.

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSESMapping responses and assessing their impact on conflict and peace.

STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS:Identifying new options for responding to conflict.

Conflict Assessment: output

• Phase 1 report.• Six zonal fieldwork reports.• Draft consolidated/final report – still to be

finalised.• Immediate next steps: - Finalise report including further “stakeholder

workshop”?- Agree strategy for dissemination and follow-

up.

General findings• Escalating level of conflict since 1999.• Further escalation in run-up to elections.• Affecting new areas e.g. Plateau• Primary dividing line = ethnicity (often defined in

indigene/settler terms) – often reinforced by economic “divisions”.

• Religious divisions tend only to be relevant when they complement ethnic divisions (thought religion is itself is more politicised in the North).

• Incidences of “ethnic cleansing”.• Increase in IDPs – many in long-term exile. Settling in

new areas - potential source of further conflict in the future.

• Remaining gaps in hard data collection.

Findings: The main cause of conflict in Nigeria

• is…..

The political system(“Prebendal politics”/ political

corruption)

The fieldwork confirms the following diagram from phase 1:

Figure 1: Conflict in Nigeria and its background Ethnic Tension Indigene/Settler tensions International Economic Pressures Historical Factors Inequality Injustice

Political Crisis Resource Competition Political Violence Youth Alienation Religious Tension

Findings: the political system

• Prebendal politics. “…a self-justifying system which grants legitimacy to a pattern of persistent conflict, and since its modus operandi is to politicise ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, it serves to make the Nigerian polity a simmering cauldron of unresolvable tension over which a lid must regularly be clamped, and just as regularly removed.” (Quoted from Richard Joseph in CA report).

Findings: the political systemThis manifests itself in:

• Politicisation of ethnic and religious divisions.

• Elite manipulation of communal sentiment. Alienated youth are particularly susceptible.

• Fierce competition over political positions – elected and unelected, traditional as well as formal.

• Violent conflict over both access to (making a challenge) and maintenance of control (resisting challenges to dominance) over positions of power.

• Use of “political thuggery” in the run-up to elections.

• Political corruption – exacerbates the relationship between power and resources.

POLITICAL CONFLICT• boundary demarcation• ethnic competition over political positions• chieftancy rights• elections – candidate selection, primaries, polling• feelings of marginalisation/fear of domination• democracy = “politics of numbers”

Herder –cultivator

Land(farming/

oil/links to

political power)

Oil

Kinds of conflict in Nigeria (?)

Religiouscompetition

Other key findings• The failure of governance. a) the “privatisation” of

the state through corruption; b) the failure of all arms of the government to be inclusive, respond to and mediate grievances, and provide for the population’s basic needs.

• The incapacity of state to ensure security and justice for communities resulting in the “privatisation of security” (proliferation of small arms, vigilantes, mercenaries).

• National competition for resources. • Behaviour of transnational oil companies• HIV/AIDS – resulting in increased instability

already – “massive threat” in the future.

Other key findings

• Growing politicisation of religion (partic. North) /competition between religions.

• Competition over land.

• Need for economic diversification and promotion of private sector growth.

• Economic policies of IFIs and other development projects cause conflict.

Actors• Security forces; • Ex-servicemen • Mercenaries • Vigilantes & militias• Political Elite; • Government/State

governors; • Political parties and

internal factions; • Political thugs; • Traditional rulers and

aspirants; • TNCs;

• Labour organisations; • Herders and farmers; • Ethnic groups; • Religious leaders and

organisations; • Youth; • Students (cults); • CBOs, NGOs and

Community Development Associations.

• Media

Triggers, include• Elections/primaries/Candidate selection.• Boundary disputes.

Creation of local governments wards and districts;

• Individual political and chieftaincy appointments or challenges to established chieftaincy rights and means of succession by excluded groups;

• Individual disputes over land;

• Crop damage or theft or killing of cattle;

• Migration, notably concerning displaced persons;

• Development projects. • The use of political

thuggery and political assassinations;

Responses• The report is critical of all actors for failing to

address the root causes of conflict and being limited in their response. Not matched to causes.

• The government’s reliance on military force and panels of inquiry;

• Civil society’s limited focus on mediation and failing to engage on policy issues.

• The donors for failing to address conflict in their broader programmes.

• The report calls for improved coordination within and between these three “tracks”.

Our response

• Need to respond to recommendations to track 3 (broadening response, regulation of TNCs).

• Support improved responses from track 1 & 2.

• But… need to choose on basis of what we can best do and what others are doing.

• Needs to be complimentary to the work of other actors.

Responding to the recommendations to track 3:

• Whilst confirms many of our existing priorities: economic diversification; improving governance, anti-corruption, A2J, strategic defence review. Plus need for future programmes: drivers of change, demand side of reform, private sector.

• But still guilty as charged … “working around conflict” – separate activities.

• Need to address conflict more comprehensively throughout our programme.

How? What does mainstreaming mean?

• Need to accept that we work in a conflict-affected country – may get worse.

• Need to ensure we aren’t creating conflict.• Risks: selection of LGAs, target communities

for projects, are we advantaging better-off communities?

• Activities within programmes (as in Jewel)?• Drawing out and addressing specific links,

HIV and conflict, PRSP and conflict.• Influencing agenda?

Support to improving track 1 and 2 responses

• The demand side of security sector reform?• Support to tackling small arms?• Building the capacity of civil society to engage in

policy dialogue around conflict and to demand reform, possibly linked work with the media.

• Support to the development of early warning and preventative responses?

• Further work on strengthening structures for managing herder-farmer conflict? Land?

• Regulation of transnational companies – promoting transparency – links to PM’s Transparency in Extractive Industries initiative?

• Religion?

Other

• Continue and strengthen donor coordination.

• Support to improved coordination between tracks.

• Support to dissemination and follow-up to SCA – basis for shared understanding of conflict

Questions

• What do you think?

• How might we go about mainstreaming?

• About proposed activities?

• Next steps?

• What would be useful to people in terms of information at this stage?