Conflict and development

Conflict andDevelopmentMany of the countries of the Western Balkans and Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS) during the past 15 yearshave had to respond to challenges of ‘transition’ in two keysenses: as loci of great political and economic transforma-tions, and as victims of costly military conflicts. Successfullynegotiating the economic and political transitions in thisregion has proven difficult enough, even in countries nottouched by military conflict. When military conflicts are pres-ent, the challenges facing policy makers and developmentpractitioners can acquire truly daunting proportions–under-scoring the importance of early warning and pre-emption ofviolent conflicts.

This issue of Development and Transition is devoted to thesequestions. It begins by reminding us that some potentialconflicts in this region have indeed been averted–so far. In aspecial focus on Crimea, Gwendolyn Sasse argues that acombination of bargaining in national and local politics,backed up by effective development-based interventionsby the international community, have forestalled thedoomsday scenarios that were frequently predicted for theregion in the early 1990s. The unresolved tensions associat-ed with the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars, however, casta long shadow over prospects for continued stability anddevelopment. As Sascha Graumann of UNDP’s Crimean Inte-gration and Development Programme points out, some ofthese tensions are intensifying, particularly in terms of legal,language, and land reform issues.

It is widely recognized that few countries in Europe have beenas blighted by conflict as Serbia. However, successes in crisisprevention and post-conflict recovery in South Serbia are notso well known. In explaining these successes and pointing tosome of their broader lessons, Tom Thorogood reminds usthat well-targeted, area-based development programming

based on consensus among all relevant stakeholders can playa critical role in averting a conflict escalation.

Kosovo is perhaps the region’s most complex challenge forstabilization, as some leading experts pointed out at an LSEforum earlier this year. Within the territory there are immensedifficulties with post-conflict recovery, equal rights, security,and development opportunities. Whatever the outcome ofthe negotiations on Kosovo’s final status, living conditions forKosovo residents will deteriorate if they are not accompaniedby institution-building efforts to improve governance on theground. The article by Lundrim Aliu reviewing Kosovo’s secu-rity sector illustrates the kinds of challenges facing policymakers in Kosovo.

Security sector reform issues go well beyond post-conflictdevelopment, as is evident in the analysis by Katrin Kinzel-bach and Amrei Müller. UNDP is joining growing numbers ofinternational organizations and NGOs that are helping tomake military and security institutions more modern, trans-parent, and accountable to civilian and parliamentary over-sight. In this way, countries in Europe and Central Asia canbenefit from experience with security sector reforms thathave been undertaken in other parts of the world. UNDP’sTransitional Justice Team suggests that the post-conflict coun-tries of this region–particularly the Western Balkans–can like-wise benefit from transitional justice initiatives, in order to rec-oncile the avoidance of collective guilt with the need for jus-tice and reconciliation.

The European Union is becoming a major actor in conflict pre-vention and post-conflict recovery. Stefan Wolff observes thatthis results in part from the EU’s growing prominence in theinternational development and security architecture, and alsoreflects the ‘soft power’ of prospective EU accession. The ‘Euro-pean anchor’ is a key conflict prevention tool for theregion–but its application is less feasible outside of Europewhere the prospect of eventual EU accession can not helpturn swords into ploughshares.

Ben Slay and James Hughes

APRIL 2007

Published by the United Nations Development Programme and the London School of Economics and Political Science

www.developmentandtransition.net

A l b a n i a A r m e n i a A z e r b a i j a n B e l a r u s B o s n i a a n d H e r z e g o v i n a B u l g a r i a C r o a t i a C y p r u s C z e c h R e p u b l i c F Y R M a c e d o n i a G e o r g i a H u n g a r y K a z a k h s t a n K o s o v o ( S e r b i a ) Ky r g y z s t a nL a t v i a L i t h u a n i a M a l t a M o l d o v a M o n t e n e g r o P o l a n d R o m a n i a R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n S e r b i a S l o v a k i a S l o v e n i a T a j i k i s t a n T u r k e y T u r k m e n i s t a n U k r a i n e U z b e k i s t a n

6DEVELOPMENTTRANSITION&

Crimea: Conflict-Prevention through Institution-Making Gwendolyn Sasse 2

Crimea: From Conflict Prevention to Development Sascha Graumann 4

The South Serbia Programme: Lessons in Conflict Prevention and Recovery Tom Thorogood 7

The Kosovo Precedent? Implications for Frozen Conflicts James Hughes, Florian Bieber, Bruno Coppieters 9

Kosovo’s Security Sector Review Lundrim Aliu 12

Enhancing Human Security through Civilian Oversight Katrin Kinzelbach & Amrei Müller 14

Transitional Justice in the Balkans UNDP Transitional Justice Team 16

EU Crisis Management in the Western Balkans Stefan Wolff 17

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APRIL 2007 | issue 6

Crimea: Conflict-Preventionthrough Institution-Making

Gwendolyn Sasse

Regional diversity is one of Ukraine’s most important char-acteristics. Regional diversity often embodies potential forfriction and conflict, in particular when it involves territori-alized ethnicity and divergent historical experiences. Polit-ical elites interested in stability and conflict-preventionmust find ways to accommodate or control this diversity.Crimea was Ukraine’s most immediate and most seriouscentre-periphery challenge at the fall of communism. Themultiethnic composition of Crimea, with a majority Russ-ian population and significant Ukrainian and CrimeanTatar minorities, created a widespread perception ofCrimea as ‘a fateful peninsula’ that was prone to conflict inthe early to mid-1990s.1 In July 1993, The Economist dra-matically warned of a “long-running, acrimonious, possiblybloody and conceivably nuclear, dispute over Crimea.”2

Alarmist comparisons were also drawn with the wars inthe former Yugoslavia and Kashmir.

Commentators pointed to a range of factors that aregenerally closely associated with the risk of conflict: thedifficulty of reconciling competing historical and cultur-al claims to territory, a multi-ethnic society, demands forregional autonomy, the capacity for secession due to aperipheral location, depressed socioeconomic condi-tions (a bankrupt military-industrial complex, a oncewell-developed Soviet tourism industry that collapsedtogether with the Soviet Union, and a lack of energy andwater resources), and the potentially destabilizing influ-ence of external actors. In particular, Russian nationalistschallenged the legality of Ukraine’s sovereignty overCrimea given that the region had been transferred fromthe jurisdiction of the RSFSR to Ukrainian SSR in 1954 bythe then Soviet leadership in a largely non-transparentprocess. Moreover, the issue of the division of the BlackSea Fleet, stationed off the coast of Sevastopol,increased the tension in Russian-Ukrainian relations.These risk factors were operating during a transitionperiod when institutions, power relations, and access toresources were undergoing a fundamental reordering.

A build-up of events in the early 1990s caused a spiral ofmounting tension: Crimea’s referendum on autonomy in1991, the establishment of an administrative autonomous

region in early 1991 at a time when other Soviet-eraautonomies were being dismantled in the context of thedisintegration of the USSR, the return of over 200,000Crimean Tatars to the region from which they had beendeported under Stalin in 1944, and the rise of a Russianseparatist movement in Crimea that peaked in 1994 andwas fuelled by the rhetoric of Russian politicians inMoscow.

However, predictions of conflict in Crimea did not mate-rialize. Incidents have been limited to a small number ofclashes between Crimean Tatars and the local authori-ties or Slav youths. Kyiv has managed to integrateCrimea into the new Ukrainian polity. How did this hap-pen, given the host of regional characteristics typicallyassociated with conflict and a complex post-communisttransition process?

The analysis of a widely expected conflict that did notoccur is not the usual approach in conflict studies. Howev-er, understanding why conflicts do not occur is as impor-tant as analysing those that do, especially if the conflictpotential includes the principal structural conditions thatare typically regarded as the main causes of conflict.

The key to conflict-prevention in Crimea was the processof negotiating and formulating the region’s autonomousstatus. Here the institutional process was more importantthan the final institutional outcome, the weakly empow-ered Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as enshrined in theUkrainian constitution of 1996 and the Crimean constitu-tion of 1998. Conflict has been avoided in Crimea not somuch because of the institution of autonomy as such, butbecause of the lengthy elite bargaining process involvingnational and regional elites that preceded the constitu-tional settlement. Elites at the national level kept openthe political space for Crimean autonomy to be institu-tionalized. The centre was unable to expunge the idea ofautonomy which had been supported broadly byCrimean political forces from the early 1990s.

Institutional linkages between central and regionalelites were also forged by participation in the democrat-ic transition. A total of 10 regional and national elec-tions, plus a regional and a national referendum, wereheld in the period 1991 - 2002. While these electionsshifted legitimacy back and forth between the regionaland the national level of government, they steadily andpeacefully secured Crimea’s gradual political integrationinto the Ukrainian polity.

Four key background conditions provided a favourableenvironment for resolving constitutional issues at the

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DEVELOPMENT &TRANSITION

national and regional level in Ukraine. First, Crimea’smulti-ethnicity has prevented a clear-cut ethnopoliticalpolarization. Even at its peak, the regional Russianmovement mobilized against the Ukrainian centre inKyiv rather than against ethnic Ukrainians (mostly Rus-sophones) living in Crimea. A territorial cleavage, conse-quently, was at the centre of political mobilization.

Second, Russian secessionist mobilization in Crimeaproved unsustainable because of the inability of themovement’s leadership to address the bread-and-butterissues of the region’s socioeconomic problems, its lack ofunity, and the vagueness of its goals. The “Russian idea”in Crimea has always been reflected in a plethora of“Russian” organizations. The intense political activity ofwell-organized Crimean Tatars presents a sharp counter-point to the fragmentation of the Russian movement.The experience of ethnocide and ethnic discriminationhas strengthened Crimean Tatar identity and united thecommunity across different social strata and politicaland economic interests, and has guaranteed them rep-resentation in the regional assembly in the absence ofelectoral quota arrangements. The Russian secessionistmovement, in contrast, was constructed around a con-fused Soviet-Russian identity with blurred politicalgoals. Crimean Russians have been broadly in favour ofimproved links or integration with Russia, but there is nostrong secessionist sentiment.

Third, the central elites in Kyiv chose a pragmaticapproach and opted to bargain over cultural and lin-guistic concerns in Crimea rather than pursue anuncompromising Ukrainization strategy. Once the Russ-ian separatist movement self-destructed in Crimea in1994, Kyiv took the advantage and stabilized the regionwith a policy of institutional compromise. The principleof autonomy was conceded but not elaborated. By thetime the status was finally inscribed in the constitutionsof 1996 and 1998, regionalist and separatist movementshad weakened and moved to the margins of politics.

Fourth, neither of the main external governmentalactors, Russia and Turkey, actively supported regionalpolitical mobilization in Crimea. Crimea’s status mayhave been an issue in Russian domestic politics, but ithas not been a major foreign policy concern, with theexception of the Black Sea Fleet issue. In any event, Rus-sia’s attention during the key period of Crimean seces-sionist mobilization in the mid-1990s lay elsewhere, dueto the military intervention in Chechnya. OSCE and UNmediation and integration programmes further interna-tionalized the Crimean issue. Western involvement,especially under the auspices of the first OSCE High

Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel,helped to maintain the momentum for a constitutionalsettlement and to overcome the frequent stalematesduring the protracted negotiations. Ukraine’s agree-ments with Russia, especially on Ukraine’s territorialintegrity and Russia’s leasing of the bases in Sevastopol,also helped to defuse differences over Crimea.

The Crimean case demonstrates that regional diversity,even when politicized, need not destabilize a state. It alsoshows that, in a regionally diverse country, ethnicity is justone cleavage among many others available for politicalmobilization. However, while the process of autonomy-making in Crimea has contributed to the prevention ofconflict, it has rendered the regional political economy oftransition more complicated. Political mobilization and theattempts to defuse it have diverted attention from region-al structural reforms and acted as a vehicle for the criminal-ization of Crimea’s economy. Moreover, the final autonomystatus has had little to offer in terms of the Crimean Tatars’demands for recognition and representation or effectiveparticipation in regional policy-making more generally.

In comparison with most other regional and ethnic con-flicts in post-communist transitions, in which coercionand military force have been the norm, Ukraine’s man-agement of the Crimean issue has had a distinct charac-ter. The Crimean experience supports the claim thatinstitutions and elites play significant roles in transitionand conflict prevention. We should be more cautious,however, about the role of institutional design: hasCrimean autonomy prevented conflict in the region, orhas autonomy resulted from the weakness of separatismand nationalism? This question is not easy to answer

Celebrating diversity: an ethnic Russian, Crimean Tatar,and Ukrainian in traditional dress.

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definitively. Crimea’s final autonomy status is symboli-cally significant but weak in terms of powers. It is part ofan asymmetric arrangement in Ukraine that de factoperforates the unitary state set out in the 1996 constitu-tion. Although there is a fair amount of scepticism aboutCrimean autonomy in Ukraine, there is a consensus thatthe removal of the region’s constitutionally guaranteedstatus would be destabilizing (as has been the case withthe de-institutionalization of autonomous regions in theCaucasus, for example). The Crimean experience under-scores the importance of regional and national constitu-tion-making processes, involving changing sets ofactors and institutional compromises, as key determi-nants of conflict-prevention, rather than the actual insti-tutional outcome per se. This finding should be of rele-vance to other pre-conflict situations as well as attemptsto manage hot conflict through institution-making.

However, the description of Crimea as a conflict that didnot happen needs to be qualified. To date, various con-flicts have been prevented in Crimea: a clash between

Ukraine and Russia, intraregional political conflict amongdifferent ethnopolitical groups, internecine conflictamong the Crimean Russian elites, and a centre-periph-ery conflict between Kyiv and Simferopol. A fourth poten-tial for conflict involving the Crimean Tatar minority hasonly temporarily and intermittently been stabilized. Thepolitical and social integration of the Crimean Tatars is farfrom complete and remains one of –if not the– key riskfactors for the future stability of Crimea.

Gwendolyn Sasse is a Senior Lecturer in ComparativeEuropean Politics at the London School of Economicsand Deputy Editor of Development and Transition. Sheis the author of The Crimea Question: Identity, Transi-tion, and Conflict, Harvard University Press, 2007(forthcoming).

1. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, Russians accounted for 58.3 percent of theCrimean population, Ukrainians for 24.3 percent, the Crimean Tatars for 12 percent, fol-lowed by about 80 other smaller national minorities (see http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/). By comparison, the last Soviet cen-sus in 1989 recorded 67 percent Russians, 25.8 percent Ukrainians and only 1.6 percentCrimean Tatars.

2. The Economist, 17 July 1993, p. 38.

Crimea: From Conflict Preventionto Development

Sascha Graumann

The largely peaceful return and resettlement of over260,000 Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups,which were deported by the Soviet government toCentral Asia and Siberia in 1944 for alleged collabora-tion with Nazi Germany, is a major achievement inrecent Crimean history. It attests to the capacity ofCrimean society to accommodate the views and inter-ests of different ethnic and religious groups,1 and is afoundation on which lasting stability in Crimea can bebuilt. However, a definitive solution to the challengesfacing Crimea will require continued commitmentfrom all stakeholders in Ukraine, as well as continuedexternal support. Ironically, because it has managedto avoid the escalating tensions that led to conflicts(now frozen) in Transdnistria, South Ossetia, andother CIS territories, Crimea has gradually lost inter-national attention since the early 1990s.

Since the late 1980s the deported people have beenreturning to an economically depressed region that

has been unprepared to handle such a large and rapidmigratory influx.2 Tensions over access to employ-ment, resources, and social services in Crimea haveplayed on negative stereotypes and prejudices con-cerning Crimean Tatars that were nurtured over sever-al generations.

Current situationAs Sasse points out in the companion article on pp. 2-4, the management of ethnic and other tensionsin Crimea has been quite successful on the whole.Recent trends, however, give cause for concern. Vio-lent clashes between some 800 people around a localmarket in Bakhchisaray in August 2006, a tripling inthe unauthorized occupation of land during the pastyear (from 19 to 53 sites), confrontations with sectari-an overtones in Feodosia and Alushta, and increasingnumbers of people (64 percent as compared with 21percent in 2002) who, according to public opinionpolls, feel that inter-ethnic relations are gettingworse–all this underscores the depth of social cleav-ages and perceived injustices in Crimea. Disillusion-ment with central governments, especially theOrange team, and particularly in terms of lack ofprogress on land distribution, language issues, therights of deported peoples, and unequal socio-eco-nomic development, has led to rising impatienceamong the Crimean Tatars. The radical elements with-in the Tatar and Russian communities are now grow-

5


ing.3 The radicals argue that dialogue has failed andmore forceful measures are needed.

Risk factorsMany of the Crimean Tatars’ problems are linked to per-ceptions of ethnic identity and of historical injustice.

Land disputes: Tensions over the administrative allo-cation of land under the Ukrainian land code havebecome more acute, exacerbating the incidence ofland squatting.4 On 13 December 2006, the UkrainianParliament amended the criminal code to prohibit theunauthorized occupation of land, making land-squat-ting punishable by up to 6 years’ imprisonment. Ten-sions also arise from the fact that Crimean Tatar landsquatting often occurs in areas in which they formerlylived, and which are now desirable and expensive partsof the Southern Coast and around Simferopol. In antic-ipation of this market value, Crimean Tatars intensifiedtheir land seizures, which now involve some 15,000people (up from 8,000 in April 2006). According to pro-nouncements by some Crimean Tatar groups, attemptsto enforce the ban on land squatting will be opposed

by ‘any available means’, including active resistance,demonstrations, and demands to legalize the owner-ship of houses that have already been constructed onthese lands. Crimean Tatar leaders have also threat-ened to escalate their demands to cover the restitutionof all property owned prior to their deportation, ratherthan simply the right to return to areas where theyused to live.5 (Thus far, the Crimean Tatar Mejlis6 haslimited its demands to ‘social justice’–understood as

equal opportunities for the deported people–ratherthan full property restitution). In the absence of a fullyfunctioning land registration system,7 it is difficult toascertain the correct number of Crimean Tatars that donot have access to land.

Two inter-related factors are behind these disputes:the lack of a properly functioning land administrationsystem (which allows the local authorities to allocateland in a quasi-arbitrary manner); and the willingnessof Tatars to engage in land-squatting in protestagainst their perceived exclusion from land allocationdecisions. According to the Mejlis, Crimean Tatars arebeing denied access to land in the places where theyused to live prior to deportation, including areas ofsymbolic importance in Tatar culture, while large land-holdings on the expensive Southern Coast are beingacquired by oligarchs from Russia or Ukraine (or theircompanies). The authorities in turn complain thattheir attempts to provide land to those in need arejeopardized by duplicitous land claims by some peo-ple (including squatters), who seek to acquire land indifferent places for speculative resale purposes.

Status: The fact that the status of being a ‘formerlydeported person’ (or a descendant of such a person) isnot legally defined has created difficulties in settingup clear rules for restoring what the Crimean Tatarleadership calls ‘social justice’. Attempts to pass legis-lation to clarify legal status or returnees’ social rights8

have failed. Most recently, national legislation (whichmany Crimean Tatars regard as far from adequate)was vetoed by President Leonid Kuchma in 2004; sim-ilar legislation has not made it out of parliament sincePresident Viktor Yushchenko’s inauguration in 2005.

Language rights: The issue of language rights is asignificant mobilizing force in Crimean politics.According to public opinion surveys, 85 percent ofthe ethnic Russian population and 73 percent of theCrimean Tatar population are concerned aboutthreats to their respective language rights.9 On 18October 2006, the Crimean parliament adopted a res-olution requesting that the Ukrainian parliament con-duct a national referendum on making Russian a statelanguage.10 The Tatar Mejlis argues that, during thelast 15 years, only 15 Crimean Tatar schools and fiveUkrainian schools have been opened in Crimea, rep-resenting 3 percent and 1 percent (respectively) oftotal schools. By contrast, Tatars constitute some 12percent of the population, while Ukrainians consti-tute 24 percent. In short, the language issue, which

Courtesy LSE Design Unit

6


features prominently in the programme of nearlyevery political group in Crimea, is being used for eth-nic mobilization by all sides.

Socio-economic disparities: Land, legal, linguistic,and ethnic tensions are occurring against a back-ground of socio-economic difficulties, especially inrural areas. Crimea has some of the highest povertylevels in Ukraine,11 and suffers from socio-economiccleavages that interact in subtle but potentiallyexplosive ways with ethnic and other perceivedinequalities. Public opinion data indicate that 54 per-cent of Crimean Tatars feel that their living standardsare below those of other Crimeans (41 percent feel itis the same), whereas 66 percent of ethnic Russiansbelieve that Crimean Tatar living standards are higherthan theirs (23 percent feel it is the same).12 Thesedata reflect the widespread perception among theethnic Russian population that Crimean Tatars receiveundeserved preferential treatment from the Ukrain-ian government.

ActorsWhile the ARC government and the Crimean TatarMejlis have been engaging in dialogue to resolve inci-dents of tension and avoid their escalation, capacityfor developing more systematic solutions to theunderlying causes of ethnic tensions remains inade-quate. Moreover, while the Mejlis has thus far beenable to accommodate both radical and moderate fac-tions, recent developments point to growing popularsupport for more radical alternatives and a loss ofauthority by moderates. For example, only about halfof the Crimean Tatars followed the Mejlis’s voting rec-ommendations during Ukraine’s March 2006 parlia-mentary elections.13

The Crimea Integration and Development ProgrammeAs a joint initiative of the international donor commu-nity14, UNDP’s Crimea Integration and DevelopmentProgramme (CIDP) has since 1995 been responding tothese risk factors. Over 150,000 people have beenengaged in or benefited from CIDP projects that haveworked across ethnic lines to increase access to ruralwater and gas supply, health facilities, schools, andrural roads. Income generation and rural develop-ment projects also constitute a growing part of theCIDP portfolio. Wherever possible, CIDP projects areaccompanied by policy recommendations and advo-cacy in the areas of public service reform, strategicpublic sector planning, and public expenditure man-agement. At the request of the Crimean Human Secu-

rity Council,15 the CIDP has completed an extensiveassessment of the problems with land administrationand titling, and proposed measures to increase trans-parency in the land allocation process, avoid specula-tive land claims, and thereby reduce the frequency ofland-squatting. The CIDP is also supporting the devel-opment of bi-/tri-lingual education policies, based onexperience from dozens of rural school projects.

All in all, some $16 million have been invested in theCIDP, a sum that has been leveraged by growingamounts of co-financing from local communities,municipalities, and the Crimean government. Thistrack record allows the CIDP to engage in regular pol-icy dialogue with the Autonomous Republic ofCrimea and parliament. Beyond the concrete impactof the development assistance itself, CIDP activitiesfor many beneficiaries symbolize the internationalcommunity’s commitment to ensuring that Crimea’sconflict potential remains latent.

Sascha Graumann is International Programme Coordi-nator for UNDP’s Crimea Integration and Develop-ment Programme.

1. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, Russians accounted for 58.3 percent of theCrimean population, Ukrainians for 24.3 percent, the Crimean Tatars for 12 percent,followed by about 80 other smaller national minorities (see http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/).

2. Crimea has some of the highest poverty levels in Ukraine (cf. Ukraine PovertyAssessment, World Bank, December 2005: 10 et seq.). According to national andWorld Bank statistics, some 21.6 percent of the population of the Black Sea region(which includes Crimea) in 2003 was living below the poverty line, comparedwith 19 percent for Ukraine as a whole.

3. These include pro-Russian paramilitary Cossack units and allegedly fundamental-ist Islamic organizations such as Hizbu Tahir, and 'Wahabis'.

4. Ukraine’s Land Code (2001) recognizes “administrative land allocation” as a con-stitutional principle. According to this principle, all citizens are entitled to receiveland plots from the state free of charge. Responsibilities for transferring titles tospecific plots of land lie with local government bodies.

5. Report of Mustafa Jemilev, Mejlis Chairman, at the 5th session of the IVth Kurul-tai, 22 December 2006.

6. The Mejlis is an unofficial representative structure of the Crimean Tatars electedby the Kurultai, the Assembly of the Crimean Tatars.

7. Only 260,000 of the estimated 800,000 land owners in Crimea have registered titles.8. Law of Ukraine on the restoration of the rights of people deported based on their

ethnic background, June 2004.9. Crimean Human Security Monitoring System: Monitoring Report, September

2006. 10. Supporters often base their claims on the European Charter on Minority and

Regional Languages. However, the Council of Europe considers the provisions ofthe Charter inapplicable because the Charter only "obliges the state not to let thelanguage die", which is not the case with Russian.

11. Ukraine Poverty Assessment, World Bank, December 2005: 10 et sqq.12. Crimean Human Security Monitoring System: Monitoring Report, September

2005.13. The Mejlis usually aligns itself with President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party

during electoral campaigns, and recommends that Crimean Tatars vote accord-ingly. While in previous years the vast majority of Crimean Tatars followed thisrecommendation, only some 60,000 – 70,000 out of the 105,000 Tatar voters didso during the parliamentary elections in March 2006.

14. Currently supported by the governments of Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Nor-way, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

15. The Crimean Human Security Council was established in 2001 with support fromCIDP. Recently, it was formalized as an Advisory Council under the Speaker of theCrimean Parliament. The Council brings together key government officials, MPsand other political leaders representing Crimea’s different ethnic and politicalgroups.

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The South SerbiaProgramme: Lessons inConflict Prevention andRecovery

Tom Thorogood

On 21 January, Serbia went to the polls to elect a new par-liament in what is likely to be the first of several electionsin 2007. International attention focused largely on theseats won by various parties, and the implications for coali-tion governments and Serbia’s European integrationprospects. Less attention was paid to the fact that, for thefirst time since 1997, when large numbers of Albaniansvoted for the PVD,1 ethnic Albanians living in South Serbiaparticipated in national elections. This is a remarkableturnaround from the situation in late 2000 and early 2001,when a localized insurgency in the Presevo Valley seemedlikely to plunge much of South Serbia into conflict.Although many of the underlying causes have still to befully addressed, the successful management of this con-flict is largely due to the leadership of South Serbia’s localAlbanian communities, the Serbian government, and aquick and effective response by the international commu-nity. This article focuses on drawing some conclusionsfrom the South Serbia experience that could be appliedmore generally to area-based development programmingin conflict-affected regions.

The origins and course of the conflict in South SerbiaSouth Serbia’s Albanian population is concentrated in themunicipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac (where Albanianscomprise the majority) and Medvedja. Since the early1990s, ethnic Albanians were under-represented in stateadministration and enterprises that are the main employ-ers in the region, and were almost completely absent fromthe police and judiciary. This discrimination exacerbatedtensions associated with poverty and unemployment inSouth Serbia, particularly in rural areas.

Facing abuse and harassment from the Yugoslav securityforces and emboldened by the successes of the KosovoLiberation Army in neighbouring Kosovo, the UCPMB2

Albanian insurgents fought Yugoslav security forces in2000. The ensuing conflict lasted for some 18 months dur-ing 2000-2001 (after the Kosovo conflict, roughly simulta-neously with the Albanian insurgency in neighbouringMacedonia), and produced some 100 casualties. Attackson Yugoslav police and military patrols by small groups ofUCPMB fighters, who then took refuge in the ‘ground safe-

A chronology of the conflict in South Serbia andits immediate aftermath

• Mid-2000: The first armed clashes take place.• December 2000: The Serbian government estab-

lishes the Coordination Body for Presevo, Medved-ja, and Bujanovac (in Bujanovac), to address thesecurity situation in South Serbia.

• February 2001: A UNDP-led inter-agency UN mis-sion visits the region.

• May 2001: The Yugoslav army begins a phasedreoccupation of the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ).

• May 2001: The Konculj peace agreement is signed.• May 2001: The Covic plan is launched. (This is a detailed

blueprint for the development of Presevo, Bujanovacand Medvedja, written by the then Deputy Premier andPresident of the Coordination Body Nebojsa Covic. TheCoordination Body took the lead in coordinating theimplementation of the plan.)

• May 2001: UNDP establishes an office in the region.• August 2001: The first group of trained multi-ethnic

police becomes operational in the municipalities ofPresevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja.

• August 2002: An Albanian is elected mayor ofBujanovac (for the first time).

• February 2006: An Albanian judge is appointed tothe Bujanovac municipal court.

• November 2006: The municipalities of Bujanovac,Medvedja, and Presevo participate in the establish-ment of a regional development agency, along with10 other (non-Albanian) South Serbian municipalities.

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ty zone’ (GSZ) (an area inside Serbia but barred to Yugol-sav forces),3 were common. The signing of the Konculjpeace agreement in May 2001 essentially halted the fight-ing, though isolated incidents of violence continued untilthe end of 2004.

Lessons from South SerbiaWhile such conflicts in the Western Balkans are oftenportrayed as reflecting racial, ethnic, or religious cleav-ages, they can also result from tensions between an eth-nic minority and state institutions. This was the case inSouth Serbia. In contrast to other parts of the WesternBalkans, the conflict in South Serbia did not escalate tothe point in which Albanian and Serbian neighboursand communities took up arms against one another. Infact, relationships between local people remained rela-tively good throughout the conflict.

The South Serbia experience also underscores theimportance of the willingness of the 'warring parties' tonegotiate with one another, and of a rapid, effectiveresponse by the international community. This included:

A quick response that yields visible, tangible ben-efits for some of the main conflict protagonists. Bythe end of 2001, the UN had established an inter-agency office in South Serbia, and the implementa-tion of the South Serbia Municipal Improvement andRecovery Programme (SSMIRP) and the RapidEmployment Programme (REP) had begun. The REPprovided temporary public works employment forsome 6,000 former fighters and the long-term unem-ployed during an 18-month period. The SSMIRPfocused on such longer term issues as the expansionof the non-governmental organizations (NGOs)needed for conflict resolution, civil society develop-ment, sustainable employment creation, and betterlocal governance. This included the establishment ofsmall funds administered by municipalities thatdelivered grants to NGOs from the region. Anotherimportant activity was work on the development offarmers groups and cooperatives.

Appropriate UN support. The UNDP-led inter-agency mission to South Serbia in February 2001 pre-pared the groundwork for future fund raising andgathered the background knowledge needed for ini-tial programme design and implementation. This wasfollowed by the recruitment of a former UN residentcoordinator–an experienced, respected individual–asthe manager of UNDP’s South Serbia programme,who provided strategic leadership during the pro-gramme’s crucial initial phase. Timely financial and

technical assistance was also provided by UNDP’sBureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. This sup-port was combined with extensive operational auton-omy, allowing the South Serbia programme to flexiblyrespond to changing circumstances on the ground.

Extensive local visibility. The UN’s presence andvisibility, especially in some of South Serbia’s moreremote rural areas, reassured many local communi-ties, helping to reduce fears and tensions.

Impartiality. By working broadly across the regionand among all parties to the conflict, instead of justfocusing on the municipalities most directly affectedby the conflict, the South Serbia programme helpedlocal stakeholders to effectively combine conflictprevention and post-conflict recovery activities. Thismay well seem obvious; however, it has not oftenbeen the case. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo are allexamples of places where the development commu-nity, at least initially, supported one side in post con-flict/conflict situations.

Employing and investing in local staff from dif-ferent ethnic communities. In addition to reinforc-ing the programme’s impartiality, such personnelpolicies helped promote local ownership of theSouth Serbia programme. (Programme offices inpost-conflict regions often have many local staffwho are not from the region itself, or who have beenparachuted in from headquarters.)

Effective international coordination. The South Ser-bia programme has benefited from an effective divi-sion of labour among the international agencies activein the region. Whereas UNDP has focused on program-ming in governance, civil society and (to a lesserdegree) local economic development, OSCE has takena leading role on judicial and police reform. Likewise,the monitoring of the security situation has fallenunder the mandate of the European Monitoring Mis-sion (EUMM). While areas of overlap have been present(among other things between UNDP- and USAID-fund-ed initiatives), these overlaps were increasingly man-aged in a coordinated manner. The strong donor sup-port enjoyed by the various UNDP-implemented initia-tives in South Serbia have resulted in the delivery of10.5 million euros through the European Union and$3.5 million through other donors such as the WorldBank, UNDP, and the governments of the Netherlands,Luxembourg, and Sweden during the period 2001 -2005. The MIR24 programme that began in December2005 has a portfolio of 10.2 million euros and is sup-ported by a consortium made up of the European

9


The Kosovo Precedent?Implications for FrozenConflictsA panel discussion was held at the London School ofEconomics, 22 January 2007, with Dr. Florian Bieber,University of Kent, and Prof. Bruno Coppieters, VrijeUniversiteit Brussels, chair Dr. James Hughes, London

School of Economics/Editor of Development and Tran-sition. Summary provided by Dr. Hughes.

One day after the Serb elections and in the run-up tothe release of the UN report on the future status ofKosovo, two experts on post-communist conflicts dis-cussed the implications of what was widely expectedto be the main conclusion of the report: some form of‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo, with continuedinternational involvement.

Union through the European Agency for Reconstruc-tion, the Swedish government, the Norwegian govern-ment, the Austrian government and the Serbian gov-ernment. There have also been large contributions bylocal stakeholders in many of the initiatives that by theend of 2005 totalled another $2 million. The coordina-tion among donors has helped ensure funding conti-nuity since 2001, and prevented the appearance of seri-ous funding gaps.

From recovery to development. External evaluationshave been performed at key points in the programmecycle, helping to identify problems and make neces-sary adjustments. These evaluations led to the 2003decision to merge the REP and SSMIRP programmesinto the Municipal Improvement and Revival pro-gramme which covers all municipalities in South Ser-bia,5 and is now in its second phase. They also facilitat-ed a gradual shift in the South Serbia programme’sfocus towards local governance and local economicdevelopment, away from conflict resolution (whichnonetheless remains a cross-cutting issue).

Signs of success . . . and remaining challengesThese activities have clearly helped to reduce tensions inSouth Serbia, thus helping the region to move fromrecovery to development. Tangible examples of thesechanges include the establishment of a multi-ethnicpolice force (2001), the election of an Albanian mayor(2002), the appointment of an Albanian judge (2006) inBujanovac, and the participation of the Bujanovac,Medvedja, and Presevo municipalities in the establish-ment of a regional development agency, along with 10other (non-Albanian) municipalities, in November 2006.The region’s infrastructure has visibly improved since theconflict ended with many of the schools having beenrebuilt and refurbished, significant improvement in theroads of the region, development of economic infrastruc-ture such as livestock and green markets in many of thetowns in the region and a considerable investment in lessvisible infrastructure such as sewage and water supply.

However, many of the issues that originally precipitatedthe conflict have still not been fully addressed. Unemploy-ment remains a particular concern: official data reportunemployment rates as high as 40 percent in some partsof South Serbia. Along with the uncertainties surroundingthe future of neighbouring Kosovo and internecine con-flict amongst Albanian politicians (reflected in a politicalstruggle between the moderates who argue for engage-ment and continued dialogue with the Belgrade govern-ment and the extremists who call for making the munici-palities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja part of Koso-vo), South Serbia’s conflict potential suggests that theinvolvement of UNDP and other international organiza-tions will be needed for the foreseeable future.

Tom Thorogood is Programme Manager for the Munici-pal Improvement and Revival Programme Phase II inSouth Serbia.

1. Partia për veprim demokratik (The Party for Democratic Action).2. The Movement for the Liberation of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac.3. This is a five-kilometre strip of land on the border with Kosovo. Serbian security forces

were not permitted to cross this zone under the terms of the 1999 ceasefire agreementthat ended the fighting in Kosovo.

4. Municipal Improvement and Revival Programme Phase II.5. This consists of the municipalities of Bojnik, Crna Trava, Lebane, Leskovac, Medvedja

and Vlasotince, which make up Jablanica district, and the municipalities of Bosilegrad,Bujanovac, Presevo, Surdulica, Trgoviste, Vladicin Han and Vranje, which make up Pcin-ja District. Together these two districts make up South Serbia.

10


The chair, Dr. James Hughes, introduced the debate byreminding the audience that the current Kosovo ques-tion has its origins in the compromise included in theagreement to end the war between NATO and what wasthen the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999,whereby Kosovo was placed under UN administrationwhile the Security Council reaffirmed the sovereigntyand territorial integrity of the FRY. Negotiations to deter-mine the final status of Kosovo reached a climax in 2006,under the auspices of the UN Secretary General’s specialenvoy Martti Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari’s recommendationswere presented shortly after the panel discussion; noagreement between the parties has yet emerged.

Kosovo’s status as a territory under UN administrationis very unusual in that, until 1999, such territories weregenerally very underdeveloped and located outsideEurope. Indeterminate and other kinds of special sta-tus are not so unusual for disputed territories, and areassociated with the most protracted conflicts. By con-trast, the international system only rarely recognizessecessions resulting from conflict without the consentof the sovereign state power. However, the break-upof Yugoslavia in the early 1990s offered a series of suchcases and Kosovo is certainly, if belatedly, a member ofthis group.

International lawyers increasingly recognize thatsecession without consent under certain conditions(e.g., to escape systemic human rights violations) maybe desirable. However, most political science expertson conflict are deeply sceptical about whether seces-sion can usefully end problems of ‘stateness’ and eth-nic conflict. As Donald Horowitz put it “secession isalmost never an answer to such problems and…is like-ly to make them worse” (Horowitz, 2003: 5).

The EU and United States are leading the push forKosovo’s independence, with or without the consentof Serbia (the leading FRY successor state). Westerndiplomats frame the issue as one that is ‘sui generis’and without implications for other conflicts. Russiaand some other states involved in the ‘frozen conflicts’of the former Soviet Union, however, believe that theresolution in Kosovo will set a precedent for theseconflicts. President Putin has repeatedly stated thatthe outcome in Kosovo will establish ‘common princi-ples’ for dealing with ‘frozen conflicts’.

Dr. Bieber began by questioning the concept of ‘condi-tional independence’ itself, asking whether a politicalentity could be ‘a little independent’ rather than fullyindependent. He observed that many countries areactually interdependent and operate under forms of‘conditional sovereignty’. Moreover, ‘conditional inde-pendence’ for Kosovo would not be unusual within theregion itself: in the notable example of Bosnia-Herze-govina, institutional arrangements are guaranteed byexternal powers and the Office of the High Represen-tative (OHR) has many governmental and law-makingpowers. Given the political sensitivities of the issue,one outcome might be that the term ‘independence’ isnot employed in Ahtisaari’s report. Whatever term isemployed, Bieber noted, the intent would be toremove Kosovo from Serbian sovereignty.

Bieber then explored the issue from four perspectives:what would it mean for Kosovo, Serbia, the region, andfor secession more broadly? He pointed out that inde-pendence would most likely result in a further outflowof the ethnic Serb minority population, currently num-bering around 5-6 percent of Kosovo’s total. The ethnicSerbs are fragmented into Northern and Centralenclaves. He saw the major questions for the internalgovernment of Kosovo as being how to ensure therewas no further outflow of Serbs, and how the Serbminority can be integrated. There were a number ofoptions, ranging from the most probable – includinginstitutional forms of autonomy and power-sharing –to the least likely, a ‘secession within a secession’ orsome form of partition. He surmised that the contin-ued international presence in Kosovo might be mod-elled on the EU presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, withan OHR functional equivalent, but the model wouldnot be simply transplanted. Over recent months therehad been a concerted effort by the UN and EU to‘deflate’ the Kosovar independence ‘myth’ and to pre-pare the ground for an outcome that was in the nearterm far short of outright independence.

Bieber suggested that the Serbian response would behostile, but would be characterized by ‘rhetorical resist-ance’. Kosovo was only a third- or fourth-ranking issuein Serbia’s parliamentary elections in January, whichwere dominated by socio-economic issues. Somesmaller parties, such as the Liberals (LDP), which wonabout 5 percent of the vote, openly accept the inde-pendence of Kosovo. It was almost universally recog-nized inside and outside Serbia that Kosovo’s inde-pendence would not have any ‘domino’ effect on Prese-vo, or Vojvodina. In terms of the region as a whole,Bieber considered that independence for Kosovowould assist with broader stabilization. It would be a

The Secretary-General’s Special Envoyfor Kosovo’s future status process,Martti Ahtisaari, holds a press confer-ence at UNMIK Headquarters in Pristina(Photo: UNMIK/DPI).

11


useful way to close off any further territorial questionsor separations, especially in Macedonia and RepublikaSrpska. The main lesson he drew from the Kosovoexperience was that functioning state institutions can-not be built in the absence of a status decision, andthat the international community had made a seriousmistake by delaying the decision for many years.

Prof. Coppieters broadened the discussion beyond theWestern Balkan context. He deconstructed the notionof Kosovo being a ‘unique’ case for secession. Thequestion of the status of Kosovo is a direct result ofNATO’s unilateral military intervention in 1999 withoutthe approval of the UN Security Council. This kind ofaction in support of a secessionist entity is not sounusual historically. There have been other notablecases of attempts to alter states by outside and unilat-eral military intervention. What is unique about theKosovo case is that Western states appear to be suc-cessfully asserting their power to secure secession.

What is further distinctive about Kosovo is the officialWestern position that federalism is not appropriate toresolve the consequences of such a violent conflict. Incontrast many Western states advocate federalism asan ‘internal’ solution in other post-communist ‘frozenconflicts’ in Georgia or Moldova. This preference hadbeen sustained despite the fact that the federalismsolutions on the table often do not provide the inter-national security guarantees required in the aftermathof violent conflict. Thus, while federalism had so farfailed to convince the conflicting parties in otherdivided post-communist states, and the legacy ofsocialist-era federalism further limited the attractive-ness of this type of conflict-management, the idea ofsecession was being employed for Kosovo.

Unlike Bieber, Coppieters argued that Kosovo’s inde-pendence would have ‘far-reaching’, and not necessar-ily stabilizing consequences for other secessionistconflicts. This was widely recognized within theregion. The Georgian president, for example, hadasked Javier Solana to take the implications for Geor-gia into consideration when making a decision onKosovo, fearful that it would act as a precedent. Cop-pieters reminded the audience that the principle atstake in Kosovo was not sui generis. The argumentsbeing used to justify independence in Kosovo centreon ‘just cause’ (i.e. secession is the only way to rectifyand prevent serious injustice). Yet the same argumentscan be used in other ‘frozen conflicts’, especially inAbkhazia and South Ossetia, where many Westerncountries prefer federal solutions. The precedent thatan independent Kosovo might establish is that in

secessionist conflicts implying massive human rightsviolations and where ‘just cause’ arguments are atstake, only secession guarantees sovereignty and mayalso reasonably guarantee ‘hard security’, thus avoid-ing a repetition of injustice.

The ‘just cause’ approach is one of the two differentlogics informing secession: the other being the‘choice’ approach. From a legal point of view, it is eas-ier to build a case for secession by a ‘just cause’ argu-ment where unilateral secession is legitimized on thefree choice of the population. However, Coppietersreiterated that this argument did not apply only toKosovo (the seceding territory). The ‘choice’ approachmakes the status decision primarily dependent on ademocratic decision, for example through a referen-dum, a scenario for which so far no provision hadbeen made in Kosovo on the assumption that therewould be overwhelming support. But this raises thequestion of the legitimate territorial unit for makingsuch a decision. In cases of secessionism, such asScotland, Quebec, or Flanders, a ‘just cause’ argumentfor secession taken by the secessionist movementsthemselves had gradually been transformed into anacceptance of the logic of ‘choice’. These casesdemonstrate the need and scope for the transforma-tion of the language surrounding a conflict. The logicof the ‘choice’ approach is to create more realisticopenings for democratic means of conflict-manage-ment, such as federalism, minority rights and eco-nomic justice. Coppieters pointed to one frozen con-flict in the former Soviet Union – Transdnistria –where the language had shifted from ‘just cause’ to‘choice’ and a referendum in September 2006approved the right to ‘nationhood’ and to making adecision on independence. Secessionist movementsusing ‘choice’ arguments do not primarily argue thatindependence is the only way to correct or to preventserious injustices, but that independence is the legit-imate choice of a population. For secessionist move-ments using ‘choice’ arguments, such as in Scotland,Quebec, Flanders, but also Transdnistria, Kosovo cantherefore not be used as precedent.

It is difficult to achieve acceptance for federal modelsin post-conflict countries based on 'just cause' argu-ments, due to the lack of federal experience in solvinghard security problems in post-war settings. Sover-eignty seems to offer far better security guaranteesthan non-sovereign federal institutions. Internationalsecurity organizations such as the UN, the OSCE orNATO, for instance, are only open to sovereign states. Itmay therefore be easier to find acceptance for federalsolutions in secessionist conflicts where ‘choice’ argu-

12


ments are used and where populations do not feelthreatened by the central government. Some seces-sionist movements have made a gradual shift from theuse of ‘just cause’ to the use of ‘choice’ arguments. Thisis the case for Quebec and Flanders. But such a shiftpresupposes that there is no strong fear about arenewal of a violent conflict, political discrimination orother forms of severe injustices. In the case of Georgia,it is the responsibility of the government to create theconditions for such a shift in the attitude of the popu-lation of the secessionist entities. Once there is no fearof the use of force by the central government, thequestion of secession may be discussed on the basis of‘choice’ rather than on ‘just cause’ arguments. This maygive federalism a chance. This will need time, and along process of confidence building.

The discussion following the initial remarks by thespeakers covered a wide range of legal and politicalquestions. It was recognized that a decision on Kosovo’sindependence that ignored Serbia’s wishes would breakwith the international legal norm of consent in cases ofsecession. There was some debate as to whether such adecision would mark a shift in international legal normstowards the prioritization of ‘universal’ human rightsconcerns over ‘territorial borders’, thus overriding statesovereignty. Coppieters noted that massive abuses ofhuman rights could delegitimize the right of a state torule a particular territory. However, human rights issuesand security are also salient in other ‘frozen conflicts’, yetsecession is not proposed in these cases, suggestingthat Western states do not have a coherent view of howto solve such conflicts.

Bieber suggested that implicit in the notion of consentwas a visible commitment to resolving a conflict oraccommodating diversity, and the international com-munity was likely to argue that such a commitment waslacking in Serbia, as for example demonstrated by theexclusion of the Albanian electorate from the electorallist for the referendum on the constitution of Serbia. On

the other hand, the Albanians in Presevo had beenencouraged to participate in the January 2007 parlia-mentary election in Serbia. He further stressed that adiscussion about federal-type solutions was hypotheti-cal at this stage. Apart from a decision on independence,the only other options in his view were the partition ofKosovo, an issue nobody was keen on re-opening, andthe continuation of an ambiguous status, which mightincrease instability.

Bieber accepted that the steady out-migration ofSerbs from Kosovo would continue after ‘conditional’or full independence, resulting in an increasinghomogenization of Kosovo. Both speakers agreed thattoo little attention had been paid by the internationalcommunity to Kosovo’s internal institutions andarrangements for securing minority rights, protec-tions, and security issues. Any future internationalinvolvement in Kosovo would have to focus on theseinternal dynamics.

In conclusion, both speakers reflected upon thenotion of the ‘precedent’. The case of Chechnya’sattempted secession was mentioned, but both speak-ers considered it unlikely to be affected by the deci-sion on Kosovo. Much depends on what outcome isdelivered by Ahtisaari. Bieber believed that no prece-dent was at stake and that Russia would follow Serbia’s‘rhetorical resistance’ and probably abstain in a Securi-ty Council vote, rather than use its veto. Coppietersconsidered it likely that Russia might use its veto inthe Security Council against anything but a reworkedversion of the status quo, with continued UN adminis-tration being reformulated. In sum, the speakers dis-agreed as to whether a strongly worded proposal for‘conditional independence’ would be taken by Russiaas a precedent for other ‘frozen conflicts’.

Reference:Donald Horowitz (2003). “The Cracked Foundations ofthe Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy 14 (2) 5-17.

Kosovo’s SecuritySector Review

Lundrim Aliu

The years since the 1999 military and humanitarianintervention in Kosovo have seen a growing con-sensus in the international development commu-nity that security is both a basic human need and a

prerequisite for sustainable development. Theprospective resolution of Kosovo’s future status, inwhich significant security responsibilities couldpass from international to local institutions, under-scores the need for a review of security provisionin Kosovo. Such a review1 was performed for thefirst time in Kosovo in 2006 under UNDP auspices,2

on the basis of a methodology recommended bythe UK government’s Security Sector DevelopmentAdvisory Team.3 The Kosovo Internal Security Sec-

13


tor Review (ISSR) was conducted in eight stages,each of them influencing the final recommenda-tions of the report. Stages 1 and 2 produced athreat analysis. In stages 3 and 4 a detailed institu-tional analysis of Kosovo’s security-related institu-tions was carried out, as well as an extensive con-sultation and public outreach campaign. Stages 5and 6 identified gaps in addressing threats to secu-rity. Stage 7 reviewed budget requirements andStage 8 provided overall strategies to address theidentified threats.

Input for the identification of perceived securitythreats came from several sources. Input wasreceived from across Kosovo in town-hall meetingswhere over 800 people took part. Kosovars couldgive their input by telephone, email, or post. Inaddition, the ISSR research team completed morethan 70 interviews with local and internationalofficials. It also conducted an extensive documentreview that included international and local insti-tutional reports and official documents. Institu-tional governance was analysed based on UNDPand World Bank methodology, while developmentwas analysed based on OECD methodology. TheEU ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ for accession served asthe overall political benchmark.

The review focused also on issues such as privatesecurity companies, small arms and light weapons,gender, and freedom of movement. Much of thework was performed by a small ISSR team, com-prised of international and local experts based inthe prime minister’s office. The team was support-ed by the Kosovo Institute for Research and Devel-opment, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Controlof Armed Forces (DCAF), and the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The review4 found that, while the security environ-ment in Kosovo has improved significantly sincethe NATO intervention of 1999, it has also becomemore complicated. High unemployment and eco-nomic development issues (including infrastruc-ture and access to electricity) are the main sourcesof insecurity for people in Kosovo, regardless ofethnicity. Issues of ethnic violence, corruption, andcrime are often linked to these economic prob-lems. The review emphasized the need to improvethe education and health systems to promote eco-nomic growth, and found that the judiciary – wide-ly perceived as inefficient, and not sufficiently

capable or independent – is a source of growingmistrust in institutions and political leaders. Exter-nally, Kosovo faces such threats as trans-nationalorganized crime and the possible renewal of polit-ical violence. The study concludes that Kosovo’srelationship with its neighbours – Serbia in partic-ular – is not stable, and requires further attentionby the Government of Kosovo and the internation-al community, which is administering and super-vising Kosovo.

Although these findings are not directly related toKosovo’s status, they do have some importantimplications for its future. The report recommendsthe creation of new security institutions such as anexecutive Kosovo Security Council, a Ministry ofDefence, a Kosovo Defence Force, and a SecurityService – if Kosovo assumes responsibility for itsown security institutions after the resolution of itsstatus. It also recommends strong internationalinvolvement, mainly by NATO, in building thesenew security structures.

The review was a useful means of analysing insti-tutional development needs in the security sector,and in calling attention to the depth and breadthof the human security challenges in Kosovo. Sinceinternal state security structures have not yetdeveloped in Kosovo beyond some policing andjudiciary functions, the report’s findings may helpprevent security sector problems when theseinstitutions are set up and running. Kosovo’s secu-rity sector review can also serve as a template forreviews in other post-conflict locations, in particu-lar in those where international institution ornation-building efforts will take place.

Until January Lundrim Aliu was Public Communi-cations Consultant for the Internal Security SectorReview (ISSR). Now he is National Political AffairsOfficer for the Special Representative of the Sec-retary-General at the UN Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK).

1. See ISSR, http://www.issrkosovo.org.2. See UNDP, http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,3&argroup=6.3. See UK Ministry of Defence

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelli-gence/SSDAT/. The review was overseen by a committee on which the United NationsMission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo’s provisional institutions of self-governmentwere represented.

4. Cleland Welch, A.; Kondi, S.; Stinson, D.; Von Tangen Page M; (eds) 2006. Internal Secu-rity Sector Review Kosovo. Pristina: UNDP.

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Enhancing HumanSecurity throughCivilian Oversight

Katrin Kinzelbach & Amrei Müller

The international community’s traditional distinctionbetween development and security has increasinglybeen challenged since the end of the Cold War. UNDP’s1994 Human Development Report encapsulates a discus-sion on the concept of security and highlights the link-ages between human security, human development, andthe promotion and protection of human rights. It arguesthat the traditional concept of security must change tobecome more people-centred.1 Human security calls forsecurity policies that protect people from a broad rangeof threats that prevent them from living freely and effec-tively exercising their choices.2 Today, the United Nationsand other international organizations increasingly pro-mote security as a public good, provided by state author-ities that are accountable to citizens. Fostering humansecurity, therefore, requires that security sector agenciesare not only placed under the direct control of democrat-ically elected civilian governments, and subjected tooversight by parliaments and other civilian agencies suchas independent ombudsman institutions, but also thattheir conduct is guided by principles such as the rule oflaw (including human rights law), transparency, equity,accountability, and participation.

At a 2004 High Level Meeting of the OECD’s Develop-ment Advisory Committee, the development communi-ty endorsed a guidance note on security sector reformand suggested inter alia that security sector-related pro-gramming be integrated into existing development ini-tiatives, no longer leaving security issues to militaryactors.3 In June 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe declared that security sector over-sight was an important element for strengtheningdemocracy in its member states, which include severalcountries from the former Soviet Union.4

The establishment of accountable and transparentsecurity sector agencies remains challenging for manypost-communist countries, where legacies of strongexecutive control and restrictions on political free-doms, including those implemented in the context ofthe ‘war on terrorism’, have led to high levels of publicanxiety and mistrust of the state security apparatus.Polling data available on one of the security services,namely the police, are instructive in this respect. Data

from Western Europe shows that on average 30 per-cent of respondents do not trust the police.5 The levelsof distrust in the police expressed in a recent poll con-ducted in countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS wasnotably higher. According to this study, the lowest lev-els of trust were found in Russia (65 percent) andUkraine (75 percent).6 The data do not clearly indicate ifpeople are fearful of the police or simply do not feelsufficiently protected by the police from threats suchas organized crime. However, the data can be interpret-ed as a sign of weak civilian oversight – if an effectiveoversight mechanism were in place, it would help toguarantee that the police serve the interest and securi-ty needs of the taxpayers and thus improve levels oftrust.

Parliaments, ombudsmen, and security sectors inEastern Europe and the CIS Despite calls for programming to integrate security anddevelopment, security assistance extended to countriesfrom the former Soviet Union today still focuses primari-ly on military-to-military assistance. Even developmentactors that are actively engaged in human securityissues still fail to effectively foster accountability mecha-nisms, especially those that extend beyond executive tolegislative oversight and to other oversight mechanismslike ombudsman institutions.

Survey data collected from parliamentarians7 andombudsman institutions8 by UNDP and the Geneva Cen-tre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)during 2005-2006, and then discussed and validated inregional roundtable consultations, indicate a pro-nounced need for more development assistance forcapacity development in the area of security sector

Percent of ombudsman caseloads involving complaints against security services

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Latv

ia

Uzb

ekis

tan

Kaza

khst

an

Arm

enia

Lith

uani

a

Aze

rbai

jan

Mol

dova

Kyrg

yzst

an

Russ

ia

Geo

rgia

15


oversight in Eastern Europe and the CIS.9 Although inGeorgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, to some extent, inArmenia parliaments have taken steps towards creatingthe framework of laws and democratic institutionsneeded to implement democratic oversight, consider-able obstacles to full scrutiny still exist in these coun-tries. Azerbaijani parliamentarians did not identify dis-cernible or meaningful parliamentary oversight of thesecurity sector either in scrutiny of laws or policy. Out-side of some limited parliamentary oversight of security-related questions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respons-es of Central Asian parliamentarians generally revealedthat security sectors in Central Asia remain accountablealmost solely to the executive.10 Given the general weak-ness of the legislature in these countries, the findingsare hardly surprising. So while it is important tostrengthen the legislature, it is equally important toidentify alternative entry-points for security oversight.

Misconduct by security agencies frequently results inviolations of human rights. Ombudsman institutionshave a mandate to promote and protect human rightswhich endows them with critical responsibilities forcivilian monitoring and investigation of the securitysector. The UNDP/ DCAF data indicate that securityservices and their personnel account for significantshares of ombudsman institution caseloads12 (see thechart below). It is important to note, however, that thedata on complaints received by the ombudsman insti-tution do not reflect the actual number of humanrights violations committed in the respective countries,since they may be underreported for various reasons,and ombudsman institutions’ capacity to deal withcomplaints may vary. What the data do confirm is, first-ly, that security services in these countries can be athreat to human security; secondly, that citizens viewnational human rights institutions as a suitable mecha-nism to hold duty bearers responsible for their actionsand to seek restoration and better protection of theirrights.

The UNDP/ DCAF research also revealed that ombuds-man institutions in Eastern Europe and the CIS frequent-ly encounter difficulties while investigating claims ofhuman rights abuses committed by security services.These difficulties are generally not jurisdictional innature, since most ombudsman institutions have rela-tively broad formal mandates for security sector over-sight. Problems instead take the form of inadequatecooperation by the security sector agencies themselves.In particular:

• Security sector personnel often possess inadequateknowledge and understanding of ombudsman insti-

tutions and relevant national and international legalconventions and norms.

• Security services are often reluctant to admit tocommitting human rights violations, and are unwill-ing to implement recommendations from theombudsman institution. They typically only offershort, formal replies to ombudsman queries that donot adequately address the concerns articulated bycomplainants.

• Ombudsman institutions often face particular diffi-culties obtaining reliable and objective informationconcerning alleged violations of the human rights ofmembers of the agency itself (e.g., the hazing of mil-itary conscripts).

• Although most ombudsman institutions have theright to enter security sector facilities freely, someservices are reluctant to recognize that theombudsperson him/herself can delegate this rightto other staff members.

• Many security services have strong internal net-works that protect the position and interests of secu-rity officials.13

Despite these difficulties, ombudsman institutions canmake a difference. The Georgian Public Defender’sOffice, for example, established a system for the regularmonitoring of police stations throughout the country,which it claims contributed to a considerable drop inincidents of torture in police stations and pre-trial cellssince December 2004.14 At the same time, it is clear thatthe mandate of ombudsman institutions, which essen-tially allows for the issuance of reports, statements andrecommendations but not binding decisions, limitstheir influence. While they can identify problems andrecommend solutions, action is required by the execu-tive, judiciary, and legislative. This also explains whypublic trust in a specific security sector agency can below even where the ombudsman institution reportsthat a comparatively high percentage of its cases con-cern the security sector, such as for example in the caseof Russia.

Towards more accountable and transparent securitysector agenciesThe findings presented here affirm that there remains asignificant potential to strengthen security sector over-sight in the region. The legacies of the Soviet securityapparatus have created conditions that are far fromideal. Political resistance to the democratization of thesecurity sector persist. At the same time, there are sever-

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Transitional Justice inthe Balkans

UNDP Transitional Justice Team

The legacy of gross violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law during the conflicts of1991-1999 in the former Yugoslavia has had a lastingimpact on the region. Cooperation has been difficultamong the new states that emerged out of the formerYugoslavia. Only by democratizing and strengtheningthe rule of law will the region move forward towardssustainable peace and development. The democraticprocesses that commenced after 2000 in most of thecountries of the region have bolstered their fragileinstitutions and enhanced their security and stability.At the same time, efforts have gathered pace tostrengthen legal processes and bring the perpetratorsof war crimes to justice.

Early transitional justice initiatives were mostly driven byinternational actors, for example as in the creation in1993 by the UN of the International Criminal Tribunal forthe former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an ad hoc court responsi-ble for trying high-ranking perpetrators of war crimes.The ICTY process was essential for encouraging domes-tic prosecutions by local courts, thereby promoting

truth and responsibility in the region. Civil societyorganizations have also played a vital role in advocacy,education, and documentation.

However, transitional justice initiatives have lackedstronger governmental support, and political will hasremained an obstacle to their implementation. Dealingwith the past in the countries of the region remains asensitive issue, and governments are reluctant toapproach these problems. Unresolved issues remainthroughout the region such as judicial reform, the con-tinued impunity of war crimes perpetrators, the limitednumber of war crimes trials conducted, the lack of trans-parency on the part of governments, and the lack of civil

al political factors that support reform-minded groups,including the conditionality related to membership andassociation negotiations with the European Union aswell as with NATO. To enhance human security in the for-mer Soviet Union, however, it is imperative to lookbeyond the budgets, structures, and capacities of thesecurity forces and to increase development assistancethat strengthens the work of oversight bodies.

Katrin Kinzelbach is a Peace and Security Specialist/Pro-ject Manager at UNDP’s Bratislava Regional Centre andAmrei Müller is a Carlo-Schmid trainee at the RegionalCentre.

1. UNDP: Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1994,available at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/.

2. For more details on the concept of human security see: Commission on Human Secu-rity, Final Report: Human Security Now, 2003, available at: www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/.

3. In 2005, this policy guidance was formally published in book format. See OECD: DACGuidelines and Reference Series, Security System Reform and Governance. Policy andGood Practice, OECD Publications Service, Paris, 2005, particularly: pp. 46-48; availableat: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf.

4. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly: Doc. Nr. 10567, Strasbourg, 2005, availableat: http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1713.htm.

5. See Standard Eurobarometer 61 (May 2004):http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf.

6. The countries covered included Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. See:�онд “общественныйвердикт” (Public Verdict Foundation): �риватизация полиции, 2006, available at:http://www.publicverdict.org/ru/articles/research/ppl.html.

7. The questionnaire was filled out by parliamentarians from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Geor-gia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

8. Ombudsman institutions from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Uzbekistan filled out the questionnaire.

9. The term ‘security sector’ employed in the surveys includes all state services and agen-cies that have the legitimate authority to use force, to order the use of force, or tothreaten the use of force.

10. For a more detailed summary of the results from the parliamentary questionnaire,please see: Cole, Eden, “The Status of Current Security Sector Governance in the CISand its Relevance to Parliamentarians”, in: Cole, Eden and Kinzelbach, Katrin (eds):Democratising Security in Transition States, UNDP/ DCAF, Bratislava, 2006, pp. 17-37,available at:http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&content_id=FA6ED584-F203-1EE9-B801763FDED0CFF6.

11. Specifically, the following are covered by the questionnaire data: the police, pre-trialdetention centers, correction facilities (including prisons), the border guard, military,and para-military forces.

12. ‘Overall caseload’ is defined as the number of cases acted upon by the ombudsmaninstitution (including written complaints, oral requests, and other contacts).

13. For more on the results from the questionnaire addressed to ombudsman institu-tions, see Müller, Amrei, “Ombudsman Institutions and Security Sector Oversight:Results of a Questionnaire Survey from the former Soviet Union”, in Cole, Eden andKinzelbach, Katrin, Monitoring and Investigating the Security Sector, UNDP/ DCAF,Bratislava, 2007, pp. 16-35, available at:http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&content_id=534782C7-F203-1EE9-B2425905D7F71BB9.

14. See the 2004 Annual Report of the Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, availableat: http://www.ombudsman.ge/download/annrep04E.pdf as well as a 2006 report pub-lished by the same office: “Review of the Situation of Human Rights in Georgia and theDevelopment of Human Rights Protection Institutions” (on file with UNDP Bratislava).

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control of security forces. These problems are often cou-pled with lingering nationalist attitudes.

UNDP Serbia launched the Transitional Justice Pro-gramme (TJP) in January 2005 with the aim of increasingcooperation between governments, civil society organi-zations, and judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia. The TJPemphasizes regional mechanisms as the best and mostefficient ones for dealing with transitional justice issues,and regional programming to achieve long-term peaceand stability. The programme is run by the UNDP coun-try offices in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,Kosovo and Montenegro.

During the preparatory phase of the TJP, an Assess-ment Survey (AS) of transitional justice conditions inthe region was published. Based on extensive researchand interviews with local civil society organizations,government officials, and members of the judiciary,the report provides the first regional assessment ofpractices and conditions in transitional justice. Theresults and recommendations of the AS were present-ed at an international conference held in June 2006 inBelgrade, “Building regional partnerships for transi-tional justice initiatives”. Over 200 participants fromthe region, including members of the judiciary, gov-ernment officials, civil society organizations and themedia gathered to discuss transitional justice mecha-nisms and their feasibility at the local, national, andregional levels. Regardless of the sensitivity of theissues discussed, and the novelty of the regionalapproach in this field, the event resulted in a consensuson several topics and a number of partnership con-cepts were offered. In sum, participants stressed theimportance of regional cooperation. Judicial represen-tatives1 offered a joint proposal that would establish aregional expert commission to examine the harmo-nization of penal policies in order to facilitate the trans-fer of cases from one national court to another. Partici-pants also concluded that the governments in theregion should assume a greater role in ensuring thatwar crimes trials are properly conducted, truth seeking

mechanisms are implemented, and reparations andinstitutional reforms are addressed.

In August 2006, encouraged by this broad support fornational ownership of transitional justice, UNDP organ-ized a series of learning workshops in Montenegro forover 100 parliamentarians and representatives of judici-aries from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,Montenegro, and Serbia. The event was unique in that itwas the first time that members of parliaments fromBosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbiaattended a training on transitional justice. MPs stronglysupported the regional initiative, requested the continu-ation of such training programmes, and offered to hostmeetings to continue the inter-parliamentary dialogueon establishing national and regional transitional jus-tice-related policies and mechanisms.

Thus far, the programme has had substantial success inorganizing and implementing regional activities. Thisapproach has been validated by a statistical survey ofparticipants at the international conference in Belgradein 2006. Seventy-five percent of them considered itessential to conduct regional transitional justice activi-ties over national or local ones.

There are unresolved issues that could influence the tran-sitional justice processes in the region, including the deter-mination of Kosovo’s final status and the pending verdictin the case before the ICTY for breach of the GenocideConvention. These issues could impede regional coopera-tion and must be carefully considered in future program-ming. In order to address these risks, the TJP has beendeveloping complementary national and regional inter-ventions to make sure that development gains are not lost.

This article was written by the Transitional Justice Pro-gramme Team from UNDP country offices in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.

1. Ms. Meddzida Kreso, President of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina andMr. Sinisa Vazic, President of the War Crimes Chamber of Belgrade District Courtoffered this proposal.

EU Crisis Managementin the Western Balkans

Stefan Wolff

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the countries of theformer Yugoslavia have experienced a series of violent

conflicts leading to the break-up of a country that hadbeen praised as a model for the management of ethnicdiversity. On top of that, the self-determination claimsthat were at the heart of the conflicts in the 1990s con-tinue to strain relations between ethnic groups withinand beyond the region. Kosovo may be the most obvi-ous case at the moment, but there are latent tensions inBosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Southern Serbia,Sandjak, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and it is unclear

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what impact the resolution of Kosovo’s final status willhave on them.

Against this complex background the EuropeanUnion, and its predecessor the European Community,sought to assert its emerging political and economicpower in the management and resolution of theregion’s various overlapping conflicts. But despiteattempts from the early 1990s onwards to broker asettlement that would have prevented the violencethat ensued in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, muchof the Union’s engagement with the region duringthe last decade of the twentieth century was any-thing but a success. The policy of conditional recog-nition of new states was unable to influence actionson the ground, while various EU-sponsored and co-sponsored peace deals for Bosnia and Herzegovina,such as the Lisbon Plan (1992), the Vance-Owen Plan(1992-1993), and the 'principles for future constitu-tional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina'(1993-1994), floundered. It was only after the DaytonAccords of 1995, and even more so after the NATOintervention over Kosovo in 1999 that the EU beganto play an increasingly important and successful roleas regional peace maker and mediator of conflicts inthe Western Balkans. No matter which perspectiveone takes on the Union’s crisis management policy, itremains the largest donor (with over €6 billion spentin the region since 1992) and the organisation withthe biggest presence throughout this region. The sta-bilization thus achieved over the past years, partly incooperation with third parties, is no least a result ofthe EU’s ability and willingness to offer credibleprospects of association and eventually membershipto all countries of the region.

Current EU capabilities appear to be sufficient to takeon tasks of the kind required in the WesternBalkans–limited peace-keeping operations in Bosniaand Herzegovina and Macedonia, and police supportand training missions in these two countries. In addi-tion, the EU has a significant military and police pres-ence in the region and is a major player in the Koso-vo final status negotiations under the auspices of theUN. The EU has been able to mobilize the personnel,hardware and funds needed to sustain these variousmissions. It has put in place the institutional frame-work and instruments required to make the neces-sary decisions and proved itself capable of coopera-tion and coordination within its own structures aswell as with third parties. It is equally important inthis context to bear in mind that since the failure ofcrisis management in the early and mid-1990s, the

Union’s capabilities have improved significantly,enabling it now to undertake both civilian and mili-tary operations. In contrast to the early 1990s, the EUis now much better able to back up its diplomaticefforts with credible threats of force where necessary.

This relatively positive assessment of EU crisis man-agement capabilities in the Western Balkans after1999, however, must not be taken as a general indica-tion of the readiness of the Union to manage criseselsewhere with similar degrees of success. While it isundoubtedly true that the Union’s Common Foreignand Security Policy has improved in its coherence,this does not necessarily translate into significantincreases in effectiveness. In Macedonia, for example,it could be argued that early-stage crisis manage-ment, despite the mobilization of significantresources, failed, and that it was only after violentconflict had erupted that crisis management suc-ceeded in brokering a deal–and even then only withthe backing of NATO, precisely because the EU’s mili-tary capabilities at that time were not yet operationaland it had to rely on NATO for credible back-up. Like-wise, the EU’s more recent relative successes in theWestern Balkans do not reflect only improved crisismanagement capabilities. The EU’s policy condition-alities are much more effective vis-à-vis countries forwhich the promise of closer association with, andpotentially accession to, the EU is credible, and wherepolitical elites and publics are ready to make compro-mises in order to facilitate accession.

In other words, the success of EU crisis managementin the Western Balkans must be seen in a broadercontext, in which crisis management is only one ele-ment in a comprehensive approach to a region.Without a clear long-term commitment of the EU tothe Western Balkans, the incentives for cooperationby political elites and the various ethnic groups theyrepresent would be less powerful. Without this com-mitment the Union’s ability to elicit short- and long-term compliance with its goals, which has been amajor factor in the success of its crisis managementoperations so far, would be seriously diminished.

The commitments to build effective crisis manage-ment capabilities made by EU member states onpaper have not yet been tested to the full. The twopolice missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mace-donia are operating with only about 10 percent of thetotal number of police officers committed by EUmember states, and the two military operations inthese two countries similarly are operating with only

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around 12 percent of the total troops promised. Atthe same time, the EU is now, for better or worse,locked into a framework of cooperation with NATOwhich will perpetuate its dependency on NATOresources. This may significantly reduce the Union’scapabilities for autonomous action in situationswhere NATO resources are stretched, or where dis-agreement within NATO prevents the use of certainresources by the EU.

A final factor limiting the generalizability of the rela-tive success of recent EU crisis management opera-tions in the Western Balkans is at the same time oneof the very reasons for the EU’s success there–famil-iarity with, and sensitivity towards, the situation inthe region and the countries concerned, long-stand-ing networks of information sources, and previousexperience in dealing with the political elites andpopulations in the area.

Nevertheless, even the limited crisis managementoperations that the EU is currently conducting in theWestern Balkans are very valuable for the Union’sfuture role as a serious international actor. While itmight be too early to proclaim the overall success ofEU conflict management in the region of the formerYugoslavia, there are some indicators suggesting thatsuccess might not elude the Union on this occasion.First of all, institutional reforms within the Union(such as the revisions to the Common EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy by the 1997 AmsterdamTreaty, the agreement, and gradual implementationof the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, the establish-ment of a rapid reaction funding mechanism, andinstitutionalized cooperation with NATO on sharingassets and information) have furthered the develop-ment of credible crisis management policies andinstruments. Second, the EU’s overall approach to theconduct of international affairs–combining multilat-eralism (both within and outside the EU), capacitiesfor short-term crisis management with long-termstructural conflict prevention, and appropriate bal-ance between civilian and military strategies–hasbeen shown to be effective. Third, by highlighting theremaining deficiencies in EU crisis managementcapabilities, the Union’s experiences in the WesternBalkans offer lessons for the future that should beconsidered before engaging in more ambitious anddemanding operations elsewhere in the world.

Yet, there are also some important global lessons tobe drawn from the EU's crisis management experi-ence in the Western Balkans. First among them is the

necessary recognition that crisis management with-out credible military back-up is likely to fail in theface of adversaries on the ground determined to real-ize their maximum goals by military means. Second,and equally importantly, coercive diplomacy, andmilitary intervention, alone are unable to offer long-term peace and stability. What is needed additionallyis a strategy for post-conflict reconstruction andpeace building that, while it may still rely on militaryenforcement mechanisms, also provides incentives toerstwhile adversaries to engage constructively withone another and with the international community. Athird lesson extends to the need for multilateralcooperation. The resources, skills, and knowledgethat the international community collectively bringsto the table are invaluable for successful crisis man-agement and conflict resolution. Influence on localactors, knowledge of particularities of specific con-flicts, and intelligence on the intentions of variousfactions are as important as the military hardwareand diplomatic personnel necessary to succeed in cri-sis management and conflict resolution.

The microcosm of the Western Balkans thus can beseen almost as a laboratory of crisis management andconflict resolution. The policies developed andemployed here since the 1990s may not be directlytransferable to other conflict-ridden regions such asthe Caucasus, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn ofAfrica or the Middle East, but they offer valuable les-sons from failures and successes that the crisis man-agers of the future will ignore at their peril.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of Nottingham.

The European Union makes its presence felt in theWestern Balkans (Photo: European Commission).

WTO Accession Regional Workshop. The event will takeplace on 1-2 April 2007 in Yverdon, Switzerland. UNDP’sBratislava Regional Centre is organizing this event togeth-er with other UN agencies such as the United Nations Con-ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Interna-tional Trade Commission (ITC), the United Nations Econom-ic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the World TradeOrganization (WTO). This two-day workshop will providean opportunity for trade policy makers and negotiatorsfrom the Commonwealth of Independent States toexchange views on lessons learned from the WTO acces-sion process. Participants will discuss the challenges andopportunities of WTO accession from a human develop-ment perspective with specific case studies, and to explorepotential for cooperation with the WTO on accessionissues. For further information please contact Gina Volyn-sky, Trade and Economic Development Policy Advisor([email protected]), or Juneyoung Lee, Trade PolicyConsultant ([email protected]).

Association for the Study of Nationalities 2007 AnnualConvention, sponsored by the Harriman Institute, will beheld at Columbia University, New York, 12-14 April 2007.The preliminary programme can now be downloaded athttp://www.nationalities.org/ASN_2007_prelim_pro-gram.pdf. There will be 110 panels, and more than 340papers on the Balkans, Central Europe, Russia, Ukraine, theCaucasus, Central Asia, Turkey, China, and NationalismStudies. Those interested in attending the convention areinvited to register in advance by accessing a registrationform at http://www.nationalities.org/ASN_2007_prereg_form.pdf and sending it to Convention Assistant DirectorTennie Olney by attachment ([email protected]) orby postal mail to the Harriman Institute, Columbia Univer-sity, 420 W 118th St., New York, NY 10027, United States (tel.212 854 8487). Only registration with payment will beaccepted.

The London School of Economics (LSE), together withUNDP, is hosting a Roundtable at LSE to discuss the ques-tions raised in this issue of the newsletter on conflict anddevelopment. Participants will include LSE scholars, seniorUNDP representatives, as well as a keynote speaker. The

event will take place on 1 May 2007. For more informationplease contact Denisa Papayova ([email protected]).

The LSE Schapiro Lecture Series presents: “Watchdogs ofWar: the Media and NGOs in Russia – in memory ofAnna Politkovskaya”. This event, chaired by Prof. MargotLight, will feature Vaughan Smith, Jonathan Steele, andThomas de Waal as speakers. Margot Light is professoremeritus of International Relations at LSE. Vaughan Smithis director of Frontline. Jonathan Steele is a columnist forThe Guardian and roving foreign correspondent. Thomasde Waal is project coordinator and editor at the Institute forWar and Peace reporting. This roundtable will discuss themedia coverage of the war in Chechnya and the role ofNGOs in Russia. The event will take place on 2 May 2007,6.30 p.m., Hong Kong Theatre, LSE Clement House, GroundFloor. The roundtable is free and open to all with no ticketrequired. For enquiries please visit www.lse.ac.uk/events oremail [email protected].

UNDP's initiative in Cyprus, Action for Cooperation andTrust, is hosting the first International Civil Society Fair,“Open Voices–Active Citizens”, which will be held inNicosia, Cyprus from 3 – 5 May 2007. The aim of this eventis to raise the levels of active participation in Cypriot CivilSociety through the strengthening and formation of localand international partnerships and networks around thethemes of Corporate Social Responsibility, ResourceMobilization, Networking and Volunteerism. The fairwill consist of three inter-related elements including anexhibition area, workshops/presentations and panel dis-cussions, and an entertainment programme. For furtherinformation please contact Nilgun Arif ([email protected]) or Marina Vasilara ([email protected]).Tel: +357 22 874 777. www.undp-act.org.

Forthcoming issues of Development and Transitionwill focus on:

'The post-communist private sector and povertyreduction' (July 2007)

'Gender issues in the region' (November 2007)

The editors welcome contributions. If you wish tosubmit an article please follow the guidelines atwww.developmentandtransition.net.

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APRIL 2007 | issue 6DEVELOPMENT &TRANSITION

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