17th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference CWD 2014 4-6 June 2014 London, England

Conference Abstracts

The 17th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference

Welcome 5

Acknowledgements 7

Abstracts

Thursday 11- 24

Friday 25 - 40

Information on sponsors 43 - 46

Organiser’s information 50

Contact details 51

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Welcome to CWD 2014 On behalf of the organisers, we would like to welcome you all and thank you for your attendance and participation at the 17th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (CWD 2014) in London, England. In addition to providing technical updates this international event provides a great opportunity for exchange of knowledge and experiences. It also provides an excellent opportunity for building up new and existing relationships and strengthening collaborations. With your support, this series of CWD conferences has continued albeit in a more reduced way. Hopefully, this will not detract from the previous conferences where they have provided a wider depth and breadth to the work undertaken. The speakers will still discuss the nature of the challenges posed and how governments are adapting to overcome them. The vast knowledge and experience of the speakers and delegates should prompt some useful debate and expose a variety of views. We hope you will take the opportunity not only to network and meet with many high-profile personnel, but also to hear presentations from prominent speakers from various countries. The exchange of information will be invaluable as we strive to improve our knowledge and expertise in this area. The organisers would like to thank all those entities that have pledged support to the conferences past and present. We would also like to thank the speakers and session chairs for their participation and for giving us the benefit of their expertise. We look forward to your enthusiastic participation in the 17th conference of the series that will take place in the UK. Finally, a very sincere thank you to all the attendees for joining us at CWD 2014. We hope you have a productive and informative conference and a very enjoyable stay in London.

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Acknowledgements An international event of this kind could not have been accomplished without the engagement and support of many organizations and individuals. Special acknowledgements are due to the following organizations: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Ministry of Defence (UK) and in particular the Arms Control and Counter Proliferation Policy Department of Defense, Department of State, US Army Chemical Materials Agency and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Elimination of Chemical Weapons) Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) Office, Japan The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) The organisers would also like to express gratitude to the following for their generous financial contributions: Battelle Memorial Institute Bechtel Corporation Kobe Steel URS Corporation

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Abstracts

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Progress With Respect To The Destruction Of Chemical Weapons Mr. Henri de Croutte OPCW

CWSFs have been declared by eight (8) States Parties (Albania, A State Party, India, Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab

Republic, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America). As at 24 April 2014, the Secretariat had

verified the closure activities at 11 CWSFs out of 12 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. Additionally, currently

nine (9) CWSFs in four (4) States Parties (Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation and the United States of America)

remain subject to verification.

So far 96 CWPFs have been declared by 14 States Parties; this included 26 CWPFs declared by the Syrian Arab

Republic. Out of 96 declared CWPFs, 23 had been converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. The

verification of 12 facilities (three (3) in the United Kingdom, eight (8) in the Russian Federation and one (1) in ASP)

is proceeding according to the EC decision (EC-67/DEC.7) as those facilities were converted for more than 10 years

after the DG’s certification of completion of their conversion. The OPCW-UN Joint-Mission has verified the

destruction of CWPF equipment and buildings in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the destruction of remaining 12

CWPFs (pending the Executive Council decision) is expected to be completed by December 2014.

Eight States Parties (A State Party, Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the United States of America

and the Syrian Arab Republic) had declared the chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles. Albania, India, and ASP have

already completed the destruction of their declared stockpiles. As at 31 March 2014, the Secretariat has verified the

destruction of Category 1 CWs amounting to 58,152 MTs, or 83% of the declared amount; the destruction of

Category 2 CWs amounting to 920 MTs, or 45% of the declared amount; and the destruction of Category 3 CWs

amounting to 100% of the declared quantity.

With regards to the Russian Federation, currently the CW destruction operations are ongoing at five (5) CWDFs. In

accordance with the detailed plan by the Russian Federation for the destruction of its remaining CW, the destruction

of the remaining Category 1 CW is planned to be completed by December 2015.

Regarding Libya, currently the destruction of Category 1 CWs is heading towards completion; it is expected that all

declared Category 1 CW will be destroyed by mid-May 2014. Libya completed the destruction of all its declared

Category 3 CWs by May 2013. With regards to Category 2 CWs, Libya had destroyed 555.706 MTs or 40% of its

declared stockpiles; the remaining amount of Category 2 CWs is planned to be completed by December 2016 in

accordance with “Detailed Plan for the Destruction of CWs Remaining After the Final Extended Deadline of 29 April

2012” submitted by Libya.

In relation to United States of America, as at 31 March 2014, a total of 11 CWDFs in this State Party had

completed operations, while two others, at Pueblo and Blue Grass, are expected to start destruction in December

2015 and April 2020, respectively. In accordance with the detailed plan by the United States of America for the

destruction of remaining chemical weapons, this State Party plans that the destruction of its remaining Category 1

CW will be completed by September 2023.

Iraq continued to develop its plan for the destruction of the contents of Al-Muthana storage bunkers. It has

developed a draft of the detailed facility information for the Al-Muthana Destruction Project and submitted it to the

Secretariat in November 2013. The initial visit and final engineering review of the facility is tentatively planned for

2014 subject to safety and security conditions.

With regards to the destruction of CWs in the Syrian Arab Republic, as at 24 April 2014, the Secretariat had

verified the destruction of 100% of declared Category 3 CWs , 100% of the declared containers with residual

mustard agent, and 93% of declared quantity of isoprpanoal designated for destruction inside the Syrian Arab

Republic. Additionally, the OPCW has verified the removal of 92% of total priority 1 and 2 chemicals from the Syrian

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territory for their destruction outside Syria. These chemicals will be destroyed at Field Deployable Hydrolysis System

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility located at Cape Ray (US maritime shipping vessel), and at commercial

facilities in Finland, UK and USA. The hydrolysate generated following the neutralisation of mustard and DF at Cape

Ray will be further disposed in Germany and Finland respectively. These operations are expected to be completed

by December 2014??.

Since entry into force, 16 States Parties have declared Old Chemical Weapons (OCW).

Currently six (6) OCW sites in 6 States Parties are subject to inspection. They are located in: Belgium, Canada,

France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

New discoveries continue to be regularly made and related information is reported to the Secretariat.

With regards to Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW), the declared ACW sites include one (1) site in Italy, one (1)

site in Panama, one (1) site in the Syrian Arab Republic and 35 storage locations in China.

In China, preparations for ACW destruction operations at the third MDF location are ongoing at Wuhan, with

destruction related equipment having been moved to the site from Nanjing. Destruction operations at Wuhan are

anticipated to commence in 2014, with the Secretariat already having received site facility information. In relation to

the Haerbaling site, the manufacturing of the destruction units has been completed and they have been shipped to

China. Preparations for the construction of the destruction facility buildings and infrastructure have been completed.

Mr. Henri de Croutte is Director of the Verification Division of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since 1

September 2011. Before joining the Technical Secretariat, Mr. de Croutte was Energy and Environment Manager of the French

Chemical Industry Trade and Employers Association, where he was involved in coordinating relations within chemical industry

worldwide and with government representatives, and dealing with specific environmental matters. Mr. de Croutte has a distinguished

career in the French chemical industry, where he has been working, inter alia, as research engineer, production engineer and product

manager for the chemical company ARKEMA. Born in 1962, Mr. de Croutte is a graduate of the École Polytechnique in Palaiseau,

France. He holds a PhD in organic chemistry.

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Japan’s ACW Destruction Project in China

Mr. Kenichi Takahashi Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan

The Japanese Government is making efforts to destroy chemical weapons abandoned by the former Japanese

military forces in China in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Most abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) are highly corroded or deformed as they have remained under

soil or water for a long time; hence it requires extra caution and care throughout the entire process of

excavation, recovery and destruction. In addition, Japan has to implement the projects in a manner consistent

with the Chinese laws and regulations, and thus intensive communication as well as cooperation between the

two countries in every phase of the process is indispensable.

Since the first excavation and recovery operation in 2000, approximately 50,000 ACWs have been recovered

to date at various locations in China. In the destruction side, two sets of mobile destruction facilities are

currently being deployed in northern and southern parts of China, and, with these destruction facilities,

approximately 37,000 ACWs have been destroyed.

Besides, it is estimated that 300,000 to 400,000 ACWs have been buried in Haerbaling, Jilin Province, where a

full-fledged excavation and recovery operation started in 2012, and destruction operation is expected to start

once the on-going facility construction and the necessary preparatory works complete.

This presentation will provide overview and current status of the ACW Destruction Projects in China.

Mr Kenichi Takahashi is the Director-General for the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office, Minister’s Secretariat, the

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.

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ACWA Overview – Steady on the Course to Completion

Mr. Conrad Whyne, US Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives

Charged with the safe and environmentally compliant destruction of the remaining 10 percent of the original

U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, known as

ACWA, remains squarely focused on completing destruction of the last two chemical weapons stockpiles and

successfully closing the chapter on the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program. With those objectives in mind,

this top-level overview will describe the continuing systemization of Colorado’s Pueblo Chemical Agent-

Destruction Pilot Plant, while its Explosive Destruction System, or EDS, is readied for the start of its initial

chemical destruction operations later this year. The EDS will get a head start on main plant operations by

destroying overpacked weapons unsuited for automated processing. The presentation will also discuss

construction progress at Kentucky’s Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant, and the

implementation of its Static Detonation Chamber, or SDC. The SDC is slated to effectively destroy the entire

Blue Grass mustard stockpile, which was deemed unsuitable for automated processing after an X-ray

assessment showed significant agent solidification. Mr. Whyne will also share several of the program’s best

practices, including contingency planning in case technical difficulties arise with on-site secondary treatment

systems which could impede chemical weapons destruction, and an initiative to define, phase and establish

optimal and viable closure milestones and requirements.

Mr Conrad F. Whyne serves as the program executive officer, the civilian equivalent of a major general, for the U.S. Department of Defense’s Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program, a position to which he was assigned on Feb. 26, 2012. Previously, he served for more than four years as director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) where, among other duties, he oversaw the safe and successful destruction of 90 percent of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. As ACWA program executive officer, Mr. Whyne oversees all aspects of the safe elimination of the remaining 10 percent of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile stored at U.S. Army installations in Colorado and Kentucky. A native of Pennsylvania, Mr. Whyne holds a bachelor's degree in biology from the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, and a master's degree in biomedical engineering from Rutgers, The State University, Piscataway, N.J.

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Destruction of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons Discovered in China: Progress and Challenges Mr. Cheng Tang, Ministry of National Defence, People’s Republic of China

Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons (JACW) have been discovered at more than 90 sites in 17 provinces across China. In accordance with the provisions of the CWC, Japan is obliged to destroy JACW, with China providing appropriate cooperation. Since 1995, on-site Sino-Japan bilateral JACW investigations have been conducted at more than 170 sites – this has resulted in the recovery of nearly 50,000 items of JACW. Several new JACW sites have been uncovered since the second half of 2013. Haerbaling is the largest JACW burial site that has been discovered to date on Chinese territory, where an estimated 330,000 items of JACW are believed to be buried. The OPCW attaches great importance to the destruction of JACW in China. In September 2013, a delegation led by the deputy Chairman of the Executive Council and the Director General of OPCW, paid a visit to Haerbaling for the first time. Operation began on the first JACW Mobile Destruction Facility in October 2010 at Nanjing and was completed in June 2012. A total of 35,681 items of JACW stored in Nanjing and neighbouring cities were subsequently destroyed during the aforementioned campaign. The second JACW Mobile Destruction Facility at Shijiazhuan, began destruction activities in May 2013. Unfortunately, the destruction of JACW discovered in China was not finished within the timeframe specified by the CWC. An agreement on a revised JACW destruction program with new destruction deadlines has been bilaterally agreed upon, and confirmed, by the OPCW Executive Council. Many challenges still lie ahead, before the destruction of all JACW in China is fully completed.

Mr Cheng Tang is Dthe Deputy Chief of the Office for CWC Implementation and Disposal of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons (JACW) at the Ministry of National Defence of China. His responsibilities are to oversee relevant facilities under the supervision of the Ministry of National Defence, fully implement the provisions of the CWC, as well as to provide support to Japan for the destruction of JACW discovered in China. Mr. Tang is also a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW. From December 2013 to February 2014, he was seconded to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW– with a role in the Operation Planning Group concerning the movement and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. Prior to his current position, he served as a senior chemical demilitarization officer for seven years within the Verification Division of the OPCW Technical Secretariat. His responsibilities included CW related inspection planning and Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities. From early 1991 until the conclusion of the CWC negotiations in September 1992, Mr. Tang was an expert as part of the Chinese delegation to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva, where he participated in the end game negotiations of the CWC

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Destruction of Syrian Chemical Agents and the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System Raymond Diberado, Adam Baker Edgewood Chemical & Biological Center Robert Malone, Brian O’Donnel Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense

The comprehensive panel briefing will cover several topics associated with the destruction of the Syrian

Chemical Agent and pre-cursor materials stockpile to include:

Technology Selection;

FDHS Design, Fabrication, and System Attributes;

Constructing and Operating the FDHS on the Cape Ray; and

Returning Cape Ray to Service

The technology selection briefing will cover the initial problem set, the time line and limitations for destruction,

the methodology for evaluating technologies and the formulation of a complete solution set.

The FDHS design, fabrication, and system attributes briefing will describe the full design life cycle of the FDHS

from concept to the two systems now operational ready on the Cape Ray. The briefing will cover the changing

destruction paradigm over 2013 and how the FDHS modular design was adapted to suit the operational

environment and end state.

The briefing on constructing the FDHS on the Cape Ray will provide the process used to select the vessel, the

Cape Ray’s attributes for performing the mission, the experience of constructing the FDHS on the Cape Ray,

and challenges associated with constructing and operating on a vessel. Finally, the briefing will cover the

overall destruction plan for the compounds on the Cape Ray.

The Returning Cape Ray to Service briefing will describe the application of decades of decontamination and

closure methods from the former production facilities, stockpile destruction facilities and non-stockpile

equipment to the Cape Ray FDHS. Through the application of a comprehensive program for contamination

mapping, deconstruction and demobilization, decontamination, analytical sampling and unventilated monitoring

the Cape Ray will be returned to the Maritime Administration for unrestricted use.

Mr Dominique Anelli has worked as a Military officer, specialising in the Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical fields.

He has been involved in the field of disarmament and chemical defence since 1992. Mr Anelli has four years worth of

experiences in Iraq, where he was based twice in 1992, as well as 1996, and 1998 as Chief Inspector. He acted as an Adviser

in protection for Singaporean forces during 1997 and 1998 and has also been responsible for Human factors studies in Djibouti

and Guyana. Dominique has also worked in an international environment from 1996 to 2003 as Secretary of the NATO Working

group on Decontamination and as French Representative to the NATO Challenge Sub-group. His previous post as Military

Advisor to the French permanent Representation to the OPCW provided him with his current skills in diplomacy. Mr Anelli has

been working at the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW since February 2007.

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Syrian Arab Republic Mr. Dominique Anelli OPCW

In response to the “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons” (EC-M-33/NAT.1, dated 17

September 2013), which is a joint national paper by the Russian Federation and the United States of America,

the Executive Council issued its decision on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons (EC-M-33/DEC.1,

dated 27 September 2013). This decision directed the Technical Secretariat to initiate inspections of all

facilities identified by the Syrian Arab Republic in the information or declaration provided. Pursuant to this

decision and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), a Joint OPCW-UN Mission in the Syrian

Arab Republic was created. By 1 October 2013, joint team members had arrived in Damascus to assess,

plan, and carry out operations to render inoperable Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPFs)

including facilities designed for mixing and filling. This complex and hazardous task was completed by

November 2013, notwithstanding the fact that operations were conducted in an active conflict zone.

The Convention entered into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October 2013. In accordance with EC-

M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons

material and equipment in the first half of 2014. The intermediate timelines for the removal of chemical

weapons from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and their destruction were further established in the

“Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons

Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013).

In accordance with the Convention and EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted an initial

declaration declaring possession of chemical weapons and CWPFs, ACWs, other chemical weapons-related

facilities, and riot control agents. The general and detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons and

CWPFs were also submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic.

Pursuant to EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to destroy all declared unfilled munitions

(Category 3 chemical weapons) on its territory not later than 31 January 2014. The Secretariat had verified

the destruction of all unfilled munitions; these destruction operations were completed prior to the established

deadline of 31 January 2014. Pursuant to EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was also required to

destroy its declared stockpile of isopropanol and residual mustard agent in containers previously containing

mustard agent on its territory. So far, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of 100% of the containers

with residual mustard agent declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, and 93% of declared quantity of

isopropanol.

The Executive Council also established timelines for the removal of Syrian chemical weapons for destruction

outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. In December 2013, the Director-General presented a

detailed plan to accomplish this objective, with the assistance of a number of States Parties. Generally, the

plan calls for the removal of the materials through the Syrian port of Latakia. In addition to financial contribution

provided by several States Parties, the Russian Federation, China, and UK provided naval security for cargo

ship, while Denmark and Norway provided vessels and military escorts to transport the Syrian chemicals to the

destruction/disposal locations. Finland also provided chemical weapons emergency-response capabilities in

support of the Danish/Norwegian contribution.

The Italian port of Gioia Tauro is the port that will be used for the transloding of some Priority 1 chemicals from

the Danish vessel to the Cape Ray (a US Maritime Administration vessel).

With regards to removal of chemical weapons from the territory of Syrian Arab Republic, so far the inspection

teams have verified the removal of 92% of total priority 1 and 2 chemicals from the Syrian territory for their

destruction outside Syria. These chemicals will be destroyed at Field Deployable Hydrolysis System Chemical

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Weapons Destruction Facility located at Cape Ray, and at commercial facilities in Finland, UK and USA. The

hydrolysate generated following the neutralisation of mustard and DF at Cape Ray will be further disposed in

Germany and Finland respectively. These operations are expected to be completed by December 2014.

In relation to Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities (CWSFs), out of 12 declared CWSFs, so far 11 have been

verified as closed by the inspection teams. The chemicals from one inaccessible site are still pending to be

removed due to security conditions.

The Syrian Arab Republic has declared 26 CWPFs. The Joint Mission personnel have visited several CWPFs

to verify the destruction of CWPF equipment and buildings and so far 12 CWPFs have been verified as

destroyed. The destruction of 12 CWPFs (seven “Hangars” and five “Tunnels”) is still pending due to the

Executive Council decision.

Mr Dominique Anelli has worked as a Military officer, specialising in the Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical fields.

He has been involved in the field of disarmament and chemical defence since 1992. Mr Anelli has four years’ worth of

experiences in Iraq, where he was based twice in 1992, as well as 1996, and 1998 as Chief Inspector. He acted as an Adviser

in protection for Singaporean forces during 1997 and 1998 and has also been responsible for Human factors studies in Djibouti

and Guyana. Dominique has also worked in an international environment from 1996 to 2003 as Secretary of the NATO Working

group on Decontamination and as French Representative to the NATO Challenge Sub-group. His previous post as Military

Advisor to the French permanent Representation to the OPCW provided him with his current skills in diplomacy. Mr Anelli has

been working at the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW since February 2007.

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Mad, LAD and dangerous to know Dr. Stephen Sales, MMIC EOD ltd.

An account of how cooperation, agility and anguish resulted in the production of LAD, the Large Access Device, a significant part of the UK’s contribution to Syrian CW destruction.

A short history of mmic.

Dealing with highly compressed deadlines – the timeline for LAD procurement.

LAD user requirements and mmic’s interpretation of them.

The importance of interpersonal relations when a Ministerial Department deals with a contractor.

Project management and risk taking in a small Company.

The final product – an outline of LAD and its capabilities.

Lessons learned - A small Company can be very flexible o If it has deep understanding of the requirements. o If it is prepared to take possibly fatal risks. o If it is willing to break established project management rules. o If its relationship with other customers is good enough for them to accept delays.

MMIC’s other unclassified CBRN equipment, what it does and where it has done it.

Monica – in CW, TIC and nuclear applications

Midas – for sampling

Dr Stephen Sales, Managing Director, MMIC EOD Ltd As founder and owner MMIC EOD, Dr Stephen Sales has considerable experience in the fields of CBRN and EOD technology. An unconventional background for such a role, Dr Sales completed his medical degree, subsequently specialising in cardiology. Despite his busy schedule Dr Sales has long been interested in explosive technology, with a particular focus on linear and focal point charges. The year 2000 saw Dr Sales take a new direction with the development of the ‘Monica’ benign case-entry system. Its success ultimately led to the formation of MMIC EOD and the development of a range of innovative CBRN and EOD equipment. Dr Sales has extensive hands-on experience with CB agents and conducted in-theatre training of UK forces in Iraq during Operation Telic. In the past 9 years he has travelled the world training and supporting military and civilian units. As well as working with EOD and CBRN units his expertise is much sought after in the development of equipment for Special Forces.

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The role of analytical chemistry in deterrence messaging Dr.James Riches, Dstl.

This presentation will discuss the role of analytical chemistry in support of demilitarisation. It will describe the work of the Designated Laboratory at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) at Porton Down. The role of chemical analysis within demilitarisation ranges from assisting investigations of suspected or alleged use of chemical warfare agents (CWAs), providing evidence of the existence of chemical weapons, helping verify stockpile destruction, evaluation of chemical destruction technologies, and analysis to support assistance and protection activities. This talk focuses mainly on methods to study the suspected or alleged use of chemicals, which can be extended to the other areas. Four case studies are provided to illustrate the central role of analytical chemistry:

a) Investigation of the use of chemicals during the First Gulf War b) Analysis of clothing from surviving casualties of the Moscow Theatre Siege that revealed the chemicals

used c) Field trials demonstrating the survivability of CWA signatures following decontamination and accelerant–

based fire d) The development of bioanalytical methods that were used to confirm exposure of humans to the nerve

agent sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic last year. The case studies show that the use of CWAs can be readily detected and that the techniques described have broader applications in demilitarisation.

Dr James Riches PhD FRSC has worked on the chemical analysis of chemical warfare agents and related threat chemicals for

thirteen years and is the technical lead for analytical chemistry at Dstl. James specialises on the environmental and biological

fate of classical and emerging chemical warfare agents. James has led Dstl’s Designated Laboratory to the Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) since 2007 achieving seven consecutive A grades. James has been awarded two

MoD Commendations for operational work. He chairs the Validation Group for the (OPCW); a group that evaluates

spectroscopic data for the OPCW’s databases and is one of the experts on the mass spectral interpretation sub-group.

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Explosive Destruction System Update

John Didlake, Brent Haroldsen and Kimberly Haulenbeek, Sandia National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories has designed and built several mobile Explosive Destruction Systems, EDS, to destroy

recovered chemical weapons both explosively and non-explosively configured munitions. Initially the processing of a

recovered munition containing mustard agent required two days but one day processing with steam has been

demonstrated in testing over the last two years. Currently Sandia is retrofitting an existing Phase 2 Explosive

Destruction System to incorporate many of the one day processing upgrades. Process upgrades have realized a

number of safety improvements in addition to a throughput increase. This Phase 2 Retrofit, designated as P2R, will

be deployed by the Joint Project Manager – Elimination(Provisional) and the Chemical Material Agency at the

Pueblo Chemical Depot to destroy leaking munitions that cannot be processed in the Pueblo Chemical Agent--

Destruction Pilot Plant. The leaking munitions include 4.2-inch mortars, 105 mm projectiles and 155 mm projectiles

filled with mustard agent. In addition, Sandia has been tasked to design and build a new Explosive Destruction

System, designated P2A, for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) Program Office. This P2A

system is also to be used at Pueblo. This presentation will review the results of recent testing demonstrating the one

day processing in the P2 Pilot system at Aberdeen Proving Grounds-Edgewood Area and will provide the of the one

day processing upgrades included in and the status of both the P2R and the P2A systems. A design update for the

larger sized P3 system will be included. In addition, improvements to explosive opening subsystem used in the EDS

will be highlighted. Explosive opening subsystem improvements include munition configurations to destroy up to 14

munitions at one time, preassembled copper linear shape charges and detonators assemblies, and operation

focused munition holder designs.

John Didlake has a Masters of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Mississippi State University and has been at Sandia

National Laboratories for 37 years. John joined the Explosive Destruction System team in 1999 as a lead engineer just as the

prototype system began testing in the UK. John served as the EDS Project Manager from 2002 to 2007 and continues to

support the EDS project. John’s previous Sandia assignments include lead design engineer and lead test engineer on Sandia

weapons programs and an assignment at DOE Headquarters in Washington, DC, for US Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition.

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Explosive Energy Equivalency Comparison in Impulsively Loaded Pressure Vessel

Lee Clemon, Brent Haroldsen and Jerry Stofleth, Sandia National Laboratories

The concept of TNT equivalence is commonly used for comparing the potential effective work available to damage a

target across different explosive materials. Many methods are used to derive TNT equivalency including chemical

energy available through oxidation or reduction, hydrodynamic work calculated through computer codes, comparison

of pressure at some given distance, comparison of impulse at some given distance, etc. However, these metrics do

not contain any information about the pressure-time history of a detonating explosive and how the work is coupled to

the specific target. This is difficult to capture in a single metric. The response of an impulsively loaded vessel to an

internal detonation is a complicated function of many variables. Consequently, questions have been raised about

how well the response of an impulsively loaded vessel correlates with traditional TNT equivalency estimates. To this

end, comparable instrumented tests were done in an Explosive Destruction System (EDS) vessel using both

Composition C-4 and TNT.

The container for the test is V26 procured by the Program Manager, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel for use on P2

Explosive Destruction Systems. The vessel was fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code. These tests serve to explore the equivalence factor for C-4 to TNT and examine the V26 at 9 lbs of C-

4 loading. Bare charge test weights of 9 lbs of TNT, 7.2 lbs of C-4, and 9 lbs of C-4 were examined. Each explosive

maintained a constant diameter and thus radial standoff from the containment structure wall. A divider disk was

placed at the midpoint of each bare charge to reduce radial spray at the center. A distributed configuration of 7.2 lbs

of C-4 is included for additional insight. High speed video and external strain data were collected for each test. All

tests were conducted within 6 weeks beginning with the largest explosive weight and ending with the distributed load

configuration. Actual strain growth follows the predicted trends. Strain measurements reveal a conservative model

for predicting vessel growth. The V26 containment vessel strain remained within the Code Case limits. The results of

C-4 and TNT equivalent net explosive weight comparison are nuanced.

Lee Clemon graduated from the University of Kansas with a Bachelor’s in Mechanical Engineering. There he studied smart grid

and electric vehicle infrastructure leading a team to Honorable Mention in the Environmental Protection Agency’s P3

competition. Lee garnered the David L. Boren Scholarship and spent a year in Beijing, China at the Beijing Institute of

Education. Lee was hired into the Critical Skills Master’s Program by Sandia National Laboratories in June 2011. Lee studied

advanced manufacturing at the University of California at Berkeley graduating with a Master’s Degree in Mechanical

Engineering. His thesis explored the resource utilization and environmental impacts of additive manufacturing. Since joining

Sandia, he has worked on logistics, treaty verification, and the Explosive Destruction System. Outside of Sandia, Lee trains

university students and young professionals for the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in various professional skills

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Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) Program use if Explosive Destruction Technologies Mr. Scott E. Susman, Program Executive Office Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives

The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program is responsible for safely disposing of the unitary stocks of chemical weapons stored at the Pueblo Chemical Depot near Pueblo, Colorado, and at the Blue Grass Army Depot near Lexington, Kentucky. To augment the capabilities of the main demilitarization plants, the ACWA program has chosen to use explosive destruction technologies to destroy problematic munitions and contaminated energetic components. This presentation will describe the decision making process for the selection of these explosive destruction technologies and review how these technologies will be used to address the unique challenges faced by both the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant and the Blue Grass Chemical-Agent Destruction Pilot Plant.

Mr. Scott E. Susman is the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant representative within the Systems Engineering & Operations Directorate of the Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program. In 2010, he served as acting Site Project Manager for the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant in Colorado. As such, he was the lead government engineer responsible for management of the pilot plant's field office and oversight of the systems contractor for the design, construction, systemization, pilot testing, operation and closing of the plant. A native of San Diego, California. Scott attended the University of Maryland, College Park, where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering in 1984. He has been an engineer with the ACWA program since 1997, when he was responsible for the test and evaluation of alternative technologies to incineration for the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles in Pueblo, Colorado, and Richmond, Kentucky. His work with the ACWA program continued through technology selection and implementation of neutralization followed by biotreatment in Colorado and neutralization followed by Supercritical Water Oxidation in Kentucky. Prior to joining the ACWA program, Scott worked at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, developing smoke munitions and delivery systems, as well as pyrotechnics.

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Static Detonation Chamber and Off Gas Treatment Lessons Learned from Anniston Destruction Operations

Mr Charlie Diggs, Dynasafe

The Dynasafe Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) has been in operations at the Anniston Chemical Weapons Facility for the last three and a half years. The unit completed processing over 45,000 conventional munitions and 2,737 chemical munitions of various types. Chemical weapons destruction was completed in September of 2011, went through a complete decontamination to the general population limit, and then started a Throughput, Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (TRAM) study that continues today. During this time, there were several lessons learned that led to process improvements, some of which were included in future designs of the SDC units. The TRAM study began on April 6, 2012 and is still ongoing. The SDC unit process approximately 28 days and then a partial or full system shutdown is performed to gather data for the study. The different system areas are inspected, photographs and measurements are taken, and various other maintenance activities are performed. The data is then summarized in a monthly report that includes utilization numbers, challenges, lessons learned and inspection results. The following improvements were made to the system during the TRAM study following the chemical operation:

A vibrator was installed on the bag house system to prevent bridging

A clean out system was installed for the bypass line between the loading chamber one and the detonation chamber

An additional process water tank was installed to facilitate higher processing rates of the OGT

A bypass valve was installed around the orifice to aid the agent migration and off gas pipe cooling

A venting system was installed to vent the gases from loading chamber one and loading chamber 2 to the thermal oxidizer

These process improvements and upgrades to the system were collaboratively worked by both the ANCDF team and Dynasafe. This helped to increase the availability and reliability of the SDC during operations. These improvements were also taken into consideration for future design of SDC and OGT units and are helping to improve reliability of future units.

Charlie Diggs has been in the Chemical Weapon Demilitarization industry since 2003. He has worked for the last 11 years in Anniston, Alabama at the Aniston Chemical Demilitarization Facility (ANCDF). He worked in various capacities to help eliminate the entire chemical weapon stockpile at that location. Charlie managed and operated a Dynasafe Static Detonation Chamber 2000 unit with attached Off Gas Treatment system his last four years at ANCDF. Prior to ANCDF, he served in the United States Navy in the Nuclear Engineering Program. Charlie has recently joined the Dynasafe team as the North American Sales Manager.

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Destruction of WP Munitions by DAVINCH

Mr. Atsushi Sugiyama, Mr. Masaya Ueda, Mr. Koichi Hayashi, Mr. Noriyuki Takahashi, Kobe Steel, Ltd.

Some of WP munitions were manufactured by filling WP in common shells used for mustard munitions during World

War II. When they are recovered with surface corrosion, identification of WP or mustard by color of bands may be

difficult and destruction of WP due to miss-identification as mustard may happen.

As WP munition contains a lot of Phosphorous, it may have environmental problem at open burning/open detonation

(OB/OD) or may cause operational problems by entrainment of WP to an off-gas system in case of using

incineration system.

The authors have developed safe detonation process of WP munitions by DAVINCH.

Through the series of experimental tests, they confirmed that quantity of WP transfer to the off-gas system by

entrainment with detonation product gas is less 0.1% of the total WP detonated and over 99.9% of WP remaining in

the chamber can be safely, removed from the chamber in the form of Oxidized Phosphorous or Phosphorous.

Photo 1 and 2 show the Simulated Equipment Test Hardware (SETH) with filler of WP and detonation chamber used

for the test.

Detailed test results will be presented at CWD2014.

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Field Deployable DAVINCH lite Mr. Masahiko Sugimoto, Mr Koichi Hayashi, Kobe Steel, Ltd.

At the CWD2013, the authors made a presentation of mobile DAVINCH lite System, describing design philosophy and hardware being finished manufacturing, followed by the test plan for demonstration, to be executed. This presentation describes mainly the following two major topics based on the executed test. Easily Transportable (smaller, lighter) Quick Installation (1 week)

Through the series of the test, the author expects DAVINCH lite to be one of the best solutions for immediate response to increasing demand of destruction of Non-stockpiles for the future.

Mr Masahiko Sugimoto 1991 Graduated from Tokyo Institute of Technology (Mechanical engineering) 1991 Joined KOBE STEEL. 1991-1994 Electronics technology Research Laboratory (Super conducting magnet development) 1995-2003 Nuclear Engineering Division (Radioactive waste treatment facility design) 2003-2005 CWD Engineering Division

(Kanda project phase I II; Chemical weapon destruction facility design and operation) 2005- 2006 Nuclear and CWD Engineering division

(Radio waste treatment facility site work and commissioning) 2007 Project Manager for Hamanako Project (Chemical agent drum recovery) 2008-2009 Shinko Engineering & Maintenance (Head quarter; planning section) 2011~ Project Manager for Davinch Lite development project

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Evaluation of Destruction Performance Test of DAVINCH lite Mr Koichi Hayashi, Mr Masaya Ueda, Mr Noriyuki Takahashi, Kobe Steel, Ltd.

Destruction performance test of DAVINCH lite was executed following to the Explosion test to be presented separately by Dr. R. Nickell. Simulated Equipment Test Hardware (SETH) of M55 nerve agent rocket was used, filled with DMMP (Dimethyl Methylphosphate) and Malathion as a surrogate of GB and VX respectively. With regard to burster and propellant, explosives with similar composition, available in the market were used. Destruction Efficiency (DE) confirmed in the off-gas is over 99.9999. Surrogate in the recovered debris was confirmed by Head Space Air Monitoring (HSAM) that the level is low enough for safe handling and disposal.

Mr. Koichi Hayashi graduated from Tokyo University (Mechanical engineering) and joined Kobe Steel, Ltd. (KSL) in 1977. He has engaged in the Chemical Weapon Destruction (CWD) project from 2008. He specially engaged in the DAVINCH CWD project as the General Project Manager at Tooele UTAH USA from 2009 to 2012. He was responsible for KSL overall activities such as marketing, development, design, manufacturing, construction, risk analysis, permitting, and systemization of this project, and he played role to design DAVINCH chamber in accordance with ASME pressure vessel code and execute the DDESB test and obtain the permit both for DDESB and environment of this project. He had engaged in marketing, design, manufacturing, and systemization of the nuclear equipments such as spent fuel casks and heat exchangers from 2000 to 2007. He had also the experience of the development, design, manufacture, and quality assurance of the high pressure vessel, heat exchanger and nuclear equipments according to ASME code and other high pressure vessel code at Takasago chemical equipment plant where DAVINCH pressure vessels have been built from 1977 to 1999.

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DAVINCH lite Chamber Design Verification by Analysis and Full-Scale Testing Dr. Robert E Nickell, Applied Science & Technology Mr Takao Shirakura, Transnuclear, Ltd Mr Koichi Hayashi, Kobe Steel,Ltd

The semi-portable version of the controlled detonation chamber Detonation of Ammunition in Vacuum INtegrated

CHamber (DAVINCH), hereinafter referred to as DAVINCH Lite, has been designed by Kobe Steel, Ltd. (KSL), for

application in multiple and geographically separated locations by constraining the dimensions of the chamber while,

at the same time, continuing to ensure the efficiency and safety of destruction operations for chemical weapons and

other munitions. The dimensional constraints place significant demands upon operational safety in at least two ways

– the closer proximity of the destructive explosive charges to the chamber containment boundary walls and the

relatively thinner containment boundary wall dimensions that contribute to chamber transportability. These two

considerations have led KSL to undertake a three-stage design verification program for the DAVINCH Lite chamber,

beginning with detailed finite element analysis of the design, followed by two sets of the prototypic full-scale system

tests, with a sufficient time lapse between the two sets of tests to permit any essential modifications to the prototypic

design to meet subsequent test objectives.

In this presentation we briefly describe the results of the dynamic finite element analysis results for the DAVINCH Lite chamber, which were completed and reviewed in early 2013, and then describe the development and results for the first set of tests, which were carried out in the May-June 2013 time frame. This first set of full-scale tests, which included explosive tests up to and 125% beyond the chamber explosive design basis, led to several critical changes to the prototypic design, including stiffening of the closure clamp system. Then, in December 2013, the second set of full-scale tests were completed successfully, including demonstration tests on actual munitions of interest. As a consequence of the combination of detailed analysis, together with the design-adaptation learning sequence engendered by the double series of full-scale tests, the semi-portable DAVINCH Lite controlled detonation system has been verified to meet its design and operational requirements. This presentation will focus on the December 2013 test program and the implications of those tests results on potential applications.

Dr Robert E. Nickell is the President of Applied Science & Technology, providing engineering consultant service to private industry and government. He received his BS, MS, and PhD degrees in Engineering Science from the University of California at Berkeley, with the doctorate awarded in 1967. He is a member of ASCE, ANS, and ASTM, and is a Fellow of ASME International and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He was elected to The National Academy of Engineering in 2007, and was elected as the 118th President of ASME International, serving during the 1999-2000 year. He has been active in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code activities for the past 36 years, and is currently the Chair, Task Group on Impulsively Loaded Vessels, reporting to the Subgroup (SG) on High Pressure Vessels of Section VIII of the ASME Code. He was the 1972 recipient of the Office of Naval Research/American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (ONR/AIAA) Naval Structural Mechanics Award. He was selected to present the Robert D. Wylie Memorial Lecture at the 9th International Conference of Pressure Vessel Technology in April 2000, and has authored or co-authored more than 80 papers in refereed journals

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Biological Treatment (Pseudomonas Aerioginosia) for Portland Concrete to Decrease the Permeability of Gases Through the Concrete Porous Mr. Basil A. Mohamed, Mr Estabriq H. Kadhum, Ministry of Science & Technology

The purpose of this research is encapsulation of Bunkers contains remnants of chemical weapons and hazardous

chemicals. In order to decrease the permeability of pollutant gases through the Portland concrete and increase the

compressive strength, we used the specific type of bacteria cultured on specific type of media prepared from

digestions beef protein and groups of vitamins extracted from yeast with addition of milk casein within pH (1.5) and

sterilized at (111 C) and (1.2 bar).

Addition of bacteria broth to the concrete mixture as upper layer with thickness between (20 -30) cm in order to achieve two purpose firstly, to fill the concrete porous with the bacteria filament and CaCO3 to decrease the leaching of hazardous gases to environmental, secondly; increase the compressive strength the upper layer of Portland concrete from (20 MPa) to (36.5 MPa).

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Design Unit for Treatment and Destruction of Hazardous Wastes

Mr. Khalid M. Saleh, Dr. Mohammed A. Kassim, Ministry of Science and Technology

The challenges represented by the hazardous chemical materials and chemical weapons which have been stored in

closed Bunkers since 1991 lead us to make, a design of assessment, treatment and disposal for the remnant of chemical

weapon stored in Al-Muthana bunkers.

In this unit the treatment of solid wastes (toxic chemical, precursors, parts of former incinerator pipes, soil, munitions, barrel contains heels of MG) has been done by using incinerating in shuttle kiln at temperature (800 - 1000 C) and the outlet gases will be treated in off gas unit (1200 C). The liquid waste pulled from barrels contained (hazardous liquids) will be treated in hydrolysis unit while the liquid remnant will be sent to the liquid incinerator at temp. (1000 C) and the outlet gases will be treated in the off gas unit. The hazardous gases resulted from vaporization and reaction inside the bunker of hazardous chemical materials pollutant (Gases, HCl, Alcohol, CO, CO2) will be pulled from bunker and mixed with the gases outleted from the treatment of solid and liquid wastes. These mixed gases will be treated in off gas unit which consists of gases incinerator for decomposing these gases at (1200 C), cooling unit by (water and air), and scrubbing unit that is used for treatment the decomposed gases by NaOH at concentration (8 %). Then the gases pass through scrubbing unit which use NaOCl at concentration (8 %), after that the outlet gases will be treated by using the adsorption columns contained (Active carbon and Silica gel) to treat the remnant of hazardous gases. During all the process stages, the unit consist of sensors to measure concentration of pollutants gases, temperature, pressure, flow, level and humidity. All these sensors are connected with SCADA unit for monitoring and controlling process efficiently

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Category 2 Chemical Weapons (precursors) Universal destruction technology Mr. Yaugen Ryzhykau. Hotzone Solutions Group

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the development, production , stockpiling, transfer , and use of chemical arms, is the first treaty to prohibit an entire category of "weapons of mass destruction" under strict international verification. State parties - CW possessors cannot destroy chemical weapons in any way that they like. First of all, the principles and methods for the destruction of chemical weapons have to strictly follow the obligations of the CWC outlined in paragraphs 12- 14 of Part TV (A) of the Verification Annex . On the second hand , the Convention stipulates that the destruction process cannot harm people or the environment. Accordingly, the countries that possess chemical weapons are required to use safe technologies for their destruction, as well as, chemical weapons destruction facilities shall be constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this Convention. The mature large-scale Category 1 CW destruction technologies are divided in two mam groups: high temperature destruction technologies like incineration and low-temperature destruction technologies like hydrolysis and technologies which utilised high energy explosion followed by post -treatment of the generated reaction masses to destroy all spectrum of chemical warfare agents declared. However , most of Category 2 CW (precursors and/or initial chemicals for the precursors synthesis) are not required such sophisticated and complicated technologies and safety features as it used for the Category I CW. There are dozens of technologies which could be used for destruction of precursors and/or initial chemicals, however , in case of remote location and big varieties of organic and inorganic chemicals and different waste to use of multiple technological approaches for each group of chemicals is not practical and very expensive. Simple, save, and relatively cheap movable universal equipment is an optimal way to solve the issue of Category 2 CW destruction in case of big varieties of organic and inorganic chemicals and different wastes. Such technology might be high energy plasma, followed by off gases treatment and brine reduction/evaporation systems. The purpose of this presentation is to review several versions high energy plasma technology which have been used for different environment protection tasks and possible application such technology for of precursors and/or initial chemicals destruction.

Dr Yaugen Ryzhykau was educated at the Military Academy of NBC Defense in Moscow. He graduated with a master of sciences (MS) degree in nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance and protection, as a military officer, and also in chemistry and technology of special organic synthesis, as a chemical technologist. He served in the army for 23 years, 15 of which as a senior military officer in the NBC related research and development institute in Russia and one year as Head of Scientific and Analytical Centre with the military unit attached which titled as Monitoring and Evaluation Centre for determining of consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) used, MOD, Minsk, Belarus. He obtained his PhD in Technical Science (Physical Chemistry) and academic degree of Senior Scientific Fellow on systems for evaluation and testing of arms and military equipment, Supreme Certifying Commission, Council of Ministers of the former USSR in 1990. His professional background includes 18 years with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), where he acted as Senior Chemical demilitarization Officer of the Verification Division. He has more than 70 scientific publications and 8 inventions/patents. For the last few years he has been serving in the OPCW as Consultant in Verification Division.

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Site Closure Planning, Implementation and Progress at ANCDF Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, USA Mr. Timothy Garrett, Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility

The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) completed the destruction of the 661,529 chemical weapons stockpile stored at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) on September 22, 2011. Post-operative inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) were completed on October 5, 2011. From that point to present, the ANCDF has been in the Closure Phase of the project. This presentation will focus on ANCDF’s approach to successful closure and clean closure of project related buildings under the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Resource and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit. Details regarding the approach taken for decontamination and monitoring of the Munitions Demilitarization Building (MDB) will be discussed as well as the implementation of lessons learned applicable to the closure process. Some examples to be discussed include permit closure requirements, the conduct of an occluded space survey and remediation, concrete removal and processing, monitoring techniques, and decontamination techniques. Also, details will be discussed regarding the methods for demolition of the MDB and the Pollution Abatement System while maintaining effective cost control.

Mr. Timothy K. Garrett, an Alabama native, was named the Site Project Manager for the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) in early 2000. The facility was designed and constructed to safely and efficiently destroy 2,254 tons of chemical agents (GB, VX, and Mustard) in munitions stored at Anniston Army Depot. The ANCDF has been operational since August 2003. Since then, the team of government and contractor employees at the ANCDF who Mr. Garrett has managed and mentored for 11+ years, has safely demilitarized more than 661,529 munitions (100% of the Anniston stockpile), which consisted of nerve and mustard agent. The GB nerve agent campaign concluded in March 2006. The VX nerve agent campaign concluded in December 2008, and mustard campaign concluded in September 2011. Mr. Garrett’s Federal career began in 1987 as a Chemical Engineer in the Environmental Management Division, Anniston Army Depot. He subsequently became Chief of the Environmental Engineering Branch and then Chief, Environmental Control and Engineering Division. Mr. Garrett is a member of the US Army Acquisition Corps. Mr. Garrett, a licensed Professional Engineer who grew up in Cullman, Ala., has a Bachelor of Science Degree (1983) in Chemical Engineering from The University of Alabama and a Master of Science Degree (1994) in Environmental Engineering, also from The University of Alabama.

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Saving More Lives: Modelling that Estimates Chemical and Biological Hazards from Moving Sources Ms. Madhu Beriwal, IEM

The ability to model chemical and biological releases that emit from a single, static release point has been available for many years. Releases having a moving source point are more complex and less commonly included in atmospheric dispersion models. Examples of moving release sources include containers leaking vapor while in transit, containers leaking liquid onto the surface to form a puddle that evaporates, or sprayers mounted on surface vehicles or crop dusters. These types of release scenarios are highly plausible, as chemical munitions may need to be transported long distances for disposal as is done in the recovery and disposal of abandoned chemical weapons. They are also plausible in the context of terrorist-driven chemical or biological events seeking to cause as much damage as possible across an area. WebPuff is an integrated Web-based emergency management decision support and coordination system developed for the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA). Designed to help officials keep people safe around chemical stockpile sites, the newest version of WebPuff (version 5.3) now includes modeling algorithms that enable it to model sources that move, displaying the associated plume and affected areas over time. This incremental capability enhancement to the fixed-point source WebPuff dispersion model can be used to predict plume propagation from moving sources in both planning and response modes. The new capability gives public officials a clearer picture of such events, enabling them to make better decisions to protect public health and lives.

Ms Madhu Beriwal is Founder, President, and CEO of IEM, a global security consulting firm with more than 28 years of experience in homeland security, emergency management, and defense. IEM works closely with government agencies to improve preparedness for natural and technological hazards and adversarial threats. Ms. Beriwal has been providing technical support to the U.S. Army and FEMA for chemical weapons demilitarization since 1992. She was one of the first to develop and apply quantitative performance measures to public protection and has led development of decision support tools that help public officials save lives during disasters. Her vision for a safer world has guided the development of simulation-based acquisition tools for chemical-biological defense programs and frameworks for terrorism prevention as well as analysis and mitigation of insurgent actions overseas. Ms. Beriwal is a former member of the Army Science Board and the Defense Science Board’s Task Force for Intelligence Needs on Homeland Defense. She is currently a guest lecturer at the Homeland Security Executive Leadership Program at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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Sea-dumped CW and Technology Challenges? – The role of the International Technology Advisory Board under IDUM Dr. Thomas Stock, Dynasafe Germany GmbH

Sea-dumped chemical weapons (CW) continue to receive growing attention with respect to health, safety and environmental aspects. Besides the fact that Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) does not provide a platform for a final solution on sea-dumped CW, including final destruction, there is increasing international awareness regarding the danger these materials are posing. This results in more public demands for measures to be taken to neutralize these special chemical weapons. More and more stakeholders are challenged to cope with this particular category of sea-dumped munitions and questions are asked about the availability of relevant technologies for dealing with all the aspects of sea-dumped CW - from detection until final disposal. The last few years have shown an increasing political and scientific interest and awareness for sea-dumped CW. The presentation will discuss, starting from the CWC as a point of departure, the different activities and initiatives so-far performed in the recent past years and the inevitable need for institutionalization of stakeholder’s efforts and requirements with the goal to demonstrate the technologies available are applicable. In particular, the presentation will focus on the goals of the International Technology Advisory Board (ITAB) under the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions (IDUM), which under establishment. Hereby the discussion will focus on ITAB’s main mission – be a focal point for exchange of information, expertise, knowledge and know-how between different potential stakeholders, such as governments, communities, organizations, scientific experts and industry. In particular ITAB is to provide: (1) a platform for networking, (2) a platform for information sharing, (3) a platform for evaluation of emerging technologies to be suitable for underwater-munitions clearance and (4) a platform for raising awareness on technologies.

Dr Thomas Stock has PhD in chemistry. Trained as analytical chemist with background in chemical toxicology. Since 1985 working in the field of chemical disarmament and arms control. Between 1988 and 1996 Project Leader and Program Manager of the CBW Research Programme at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Work focussed on: chemical weapons, old and abandoned chemical weapons, destruction technologies, environmental aspects, waste disposal technologies, and verification techniques and technologies. After 1996 with private industry in different positions, such as Project Leader and Sales Manager. Since 2002 with DYNASAFE, Swedish born company, as Sales Manager and Project Manager and now Mnagaing Director of Dynasafe Germany. Performing several CW related projects. Expertise in: chemical warfare agents, old and abandoned chemical weapons, destruction of explosives, thermal off-gas treatment and other waste treatment processes, analytical chemistry, toxicology, arms control and disarmament, chemical disarmament and project management.

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Improving the Performance of a Mature Air Monitoring System Dr. Gary Sides, Walter Waybright, Battelle Memorial Institute

The gas-chromatography-based Miniature Automatic Continuous Air Monitoring System (MINICAMS(R) equipped with a Halogen Specific Detector (XSD) has been used successfully to monitor for agent mustard [bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide] at its 15-min short-term exposure limit (0.003 mg/m3) at agent-disposal sites and at other facilities for more than 15 years. The primary use of this equipment has been to sound an alarm any time the concentration of agent mustard (HD) exceeds a preset alarm level. In this application, the response of the XSD has always been assumed to be linear, and data quality objectives based on this assumption were usually met with relative ease. During recent precision-and-accuracy (P&A) studies at the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Disposal Pilot Plant (PCAPP), however, the following observations were made: 1) P&A studies passed required statistical criteria, but results were often marginal; 2) limits of quantification (LOQ) were relatively high; and 3) accuracies of the reported (found) concentrations versus target concentrations were less than optimum. Upon further investigation, it was determined that the response of the XSD is, in fact, non-linear, as evidenced by: 1) challenges of 14 different MINICAMS units; 2) a review of the theory of operation of the XSD presented in the manufacturer’s literature; and 3) a review of challenge data generated by the manufacturer of the MINICAMS and at other sites. As a result of this investigation, it was determined that a single operating parameter within the MINICAMS could be adjusted to account for the non-linearity of the XSD. Subsequent P&A studies yielded: 1) results that easily passed required statistical criteria; 2) greatly reduced LOQs; and 3) greatly improved agreement between reported concentrations and target concentrations. Thus, even after more than 15 years of successful use, the performance of the XSD MINICAMS was improved significantly as a result of the effort at PCAPP. MINICAMS is a registered trademark of OICO CMS Field Products, Pelham, Alabama.

Dr. Gary Sides has more than 30 years of experience in the development and manufacture of automated, near-real-time (NRT) monitoring systems for chemical agents and related instrumentation. Dr. Sides’ accomplishments include the development and manufacture of small quantities of the ACAMS (1978-1987), the NRT monitoring system for GB, VX, and HD that was used at the first operational US demilitarization site (JACADS) to dispose of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and at the four US baseline demilitarization sites (ANCDF, PBCDF, TOCDF, and UMCDF). He also founded CMS Research Corporation in 1986, now a division of OICO, and developed and manufactured the MINICAMS and numerous monitoring accessory products from 1986-1998. Dr. Sides now serves as Chief Scientist for Battelle’s Demilitarization Business Unit.

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Cutting the Mustard: Evidence of VX nerve agent use from contaminated white mustard plants Mr. Matthew J. Baker, University of Central Lancashire Mr. Matthew Gravett, Farrha Hopkins, Adam Self, Andrew Webb, Christopher Timperley, Dstl

The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by Member States. Verification of compliance or investigations into allegations of use requires accurate detection of chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and their degradation products. Detection of CWAs such as organophosphorus nerve agents in the environment relies mainly upon the analysis of soil. We now present a method for the detection of the nerve agent VX and its hydrolysis products by gas chromatography- and liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC- and LC-MS) of ethanol extracts of contaminated white mustard plants (Sinapis alba) which retained the compounds of interest for up to 45 days. Providing a simpler sampling strategy and protection against environmental loss (e.g. leaching) of CWAs Sinapis alba was grown in VX, MPA and EMPA spiked (250 µg ml-1) clay, loam or sandy soil. The different soils moderated the rate of initial uptake of VX but not the longer term uptake: the duration the VX was detectable (to sub 1 ng of VX per plant) in the plant was the same regardless of the soil type. In addition, the plants metabolised the VX to EMPA and MPA and interestingly the MPA found in the plants increased when they were grown in VX-spiked clay. When Sinapis alba was grown in EMPA spiked loam no EMPA was detected. The MPA profile in plants grown in MPA-spiked loam matched the MPA profile in plants grown in VX-spiked loam suggesting a selective uptake of alkyl methylphosphonic acids. VX, EMPA and MPA were detected in the plants for up to 45 days after sowing the white mustard seeds. The data suggest that the EMPA found in the plants grown in soil contaminated with VX originated from metabolism of VX demonstrating a possible use for bioremediation of contaminated land. The method described for detecting nerve agent residues in the environment will help the OPCW and CWC Member States confirm their presence in future. The use of localized samples and simple extraction procedure will increase the probability of discovering nerve agent use. The ability of plants such as Sinapis alba to absorb nerve agents and sufficient marker compounds protects against the removal of evidence of use, as chemical warfare agents can leach from soil over time. It also suggests that green manures might be useful for remediating nerve agent-polluted sites.

Dr Matthew J Baker obtained his PhD from the Department of Chemical Engineering and Analytical Science, University of Manchester performing his research in the Manchester Interdisciplinary Biocentre. Following his PhD he was awarded an EPSRC Postdoctoral Fellowship conducting research at The University of Manchester, Robert Koch Institute Berlin, Harvard Medical School, Boston and Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston. He was then a Project Manager, Senior Scientist and Research Fellow for Dstl conducting research into the detection of chemical and biological warfare agents. He is currently Senior Lecturer in Chemistry at the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan) and leads the Bioanalytical Sciences Research Group.

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Transportation of Chemical Weapons Holger Weigel, Dynasafe International AB

For 20 years Dynasafe provides gastight explosion containment systems for the safe storage, disassembly and transportation of chemical warfare material. Systems have been delivered United States, France, Germany, Japan and China. This presentation will discuss the following aspects of designing and building of a gas tight explosion containment systems: - Chemical weapons transportation challenges - Design aspects (resilience against gas pressure, fragments, shock load, reliability etc.) - Solutions (mention X10, IES and EBC) - Testing setup (dig into the EBC test setup) - Outcome predictions with simulations (shock, gas, fragments) - Testing outcome (pictures and comparisons)

Holger Weigel born in 1966 is a chemical engineer with a summa cum laude degree by Gerhard Mercator University, Duisburg. He started his career as a project engineer in the German plant construction company Mannesmann Anlagenbau in 1991. Involved in the building of the Munster II facility, a plant for the destruction of chemical warfare agent contaminated soil and dunnage material he became the responsible project director of the same plant in 1997. Besides his job as a Project Manager for a chemical weapon destruction plant he was appointed as the responsible manager for the department “Thermal Processes” within the Mannesmann organisation responsible for high temperature incineration, pyrolysis process and rotary kilns incinerators. After acquisition of Mannesmann Anlagenbau by the French Technip Group he became part of the management for environmental technology within Technip Germany responsible for Munitions destruction facilities, Thermal processes and Soil Remediation systems. In 2002 Holger Weigel changed to Dynasafe founded Dynasafe Germany and became the Managing Director of the German Dynasafe subsidiary. Between 2003 and 2006 he was the responsible project manager for the construction of the central German facility for the destruction of chemical warfare munitions. Between 2009 and 2010 he was the responsible Dynasafe PM for the construction of the Anniston SDC system. Holger Weigel has been involved into chemical Weapon subjects of different type – mainly old CW agents WW I and WWII in more than 25 projects during his working life. Besides he was involved in numerous projects for destruction of explosives material of all kind. Since 2012 Holger Weigel is the COO of the Dynasafe group and responsible for the Business Unit Demilitarization in Dynasafe.

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Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Project Achievements Mr. Reza Karimi, Battelle Memorial Institute

The mission of chemical weapons destruction has been safely accomplished at the world’s largest declared single stockpile of chemical warfare agent: Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF). The last agent of this stockpile (consisting of the five different basic agents GB, VX, HD, GA, and L in 17 different munition/storage container configurations) was destroyed in January of 2012, ahead of the international treaty deadline, ending the 18-year operational phase of the project. Tucked in a high desert valley of western Utah and nestled between peaks over 11,000 feet (3,350 meters) tall on the western flanks of the Rocky Mountains, the Deseret Chemical Depot (DCD) once housed nearly half of the United States (U.S.) Army’s stockpile of chemical weapons left over from the Cold War. The remaining U.S. chemical weapons were stored in eight other depots around the country. Not only was this stockpile completely destroyed, but the safety record is impressive, with more than 17 million hours worked without a “case-with-days-away” injury. This is a current National Safety Council record in the United States. This presentation includes a general summary of all of the nine U.S. storage sites, followed by details regarding the accomplishments at the TOCDF site. Accomplishments in the areas of monitoring and analytical analysis are covered, including air, waste, and emissions technologies utilized. Primary and confirmatory agent monitoring methods are covered. Auditing agencies and frequencies are discussed. Environmental and safety considerations including ISO 14001 certification and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) Star achievement are also discussed. The combination of innovative technologies, environmental responsibility, and a focus on safety has allowed the TOCDF site to successfully complete its mission before the international treaty deadline.

Dr. Reza Karimi has over thirty years of extensive analytical chemistry laboratory and teaching experience that includes 25 years of management experience in research and development, environmental, radiological, pharmaceutical, and agricultural analytical laboratories. Dr. Karimi has served as senior technical consultant for the development of new methods for organic and inorganic analyses, he has overseen the development and implementation of streamlined laboratory organizational structures and procedures designed to increase the efficiency of the laboratory. His research and development activities resulted in several journal publications, paper presentation and talks at national and international conferences. He directed and managed several multidisciplinary projects for DoD, DoE, other governmental agencies, and commercial clients. He also has designed several mobile laboratories for special projects. In his current position at Battelle, Dr. Karimi manages more than 375 chemists, scientists, engineers, and technicians at Tooele Chemical Facility in Utah and Anniston Chemical facility in Alabama with an annual revenue of more than $53M. Dr. Karimi is a member of the Environmental Laboratory Advisory Board (ELAB), a federally appointed board to advise the EPA on issues related to environmental laboratories. Past board member of IATEL organization, member of American Chemical Society, and past member of American Society of Military Engineers (San Antonio chapter), member of The NELAC Institute (TNI). Recipient of the highest safety award from Utah Safety council for “Individual Achievement in Safety” in 2012

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The AIR ALERT(TM)—A New Air Monitoring System

Dr. Gary Sides, Battelle Memorial Institute

Battelle’s Chemical Demilitarization Business Unit has recently developed a new air monitoring system, known as the Air Alert(TM). This system is available with a flame photometric detector (FPD) for the detection of sulfur- and phosphorus-containing organic chemicals and will soon be available with a chlorine selective detector (CSD) for the detection of chlorine-containing organic chemicals. The Air Alert is based on sampling and analytical technology well proven during over 30 years of use in the field. The Air Alert is simpler in design, and, thus, easier to operate and maintain and is less costly than its predecessors. The Air Alert is based on lessons learned during Battelle’s nearly 20 years of experience in air monitoring at chemical agent disposal sites.

Dr. Gary Sides has more than 30 years of experience in the development and manufacture of automated, near-real-time (NRT) monitoring systems for chemical agents and related instrumentation. Dr. Sides’ accomplishments include the development and manufacture of small quantities of the ACAMS (1978-1987), the NRT monitoring system for GB, VX, and HD that was used at the first operational US demilitarization site (JACADS) to dispose of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and at the four US baseline demilitarization sites (ANCDF, PBCDF, TOCDF, and UMCDF). He also founded CMS Research Corporation in 1986, now a division of OICO, and developed and manufactured the MINICAMS and numerous monitoring accessory products from 1986-1998. Dr. Sides now serves as Chief Scientist for Battelle’s Demilitarization Business Unit.

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Handling Ignited Interest in Chemical Demilitarization after the Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack: Best Practices in Adapting to a Changing World Environment Katherine B. DeWeese, US Department of Defense, Program Executive Office, ACWA

Although chemical demilitarization has been an on-going program in the U.S. for nearly three decades, few

of the estimated 300 million Americans pay attention to the effort of destroying these obsolete weapons of

mass destruction. Generally, the only people who closely follow chemical demilitarization are those who

work on the disposal sites, live near the stockpiles, govern those areas or oversee regulatory compliance

on the projects themselves. But when chemical weapons were used against Syrian citizens in 2013, the

American public reawakened to the horrors of chemical warfare, and the news media scrambled to find

ways of localizing this international event by focusing on the remaining U.S. chemical stockpile awaiting

destruction. Citizens around the globe suddenly became aware of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a

treaty that previously drew little media attention. Shortly thereafter, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to

the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons further ignited interest in chemical

demilitarization, resulting in the generation of unprecedented media attention to the chemical weapons

destruction projects under way in Colorado and Kentucky, as well as U.S. chemical defense in general.

This presentation will discuss the best practices the Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical

Weapons Alternatives (PEO ACWA) utilized at a time when it was important to remain detached from the

international story that was unfolding and focus instead on the homeland chemical stockpile destruction

mission, its technical sophistication and its unprecedented safety record. Working closely with its Army

chemical materiel partners at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, PEO ACWA was able to adapt its

information platforms to educate new national and international audiences on the positive aspects of U.S.

chemical weapons stockpile destruction without becoming negatively linked to the parallel Syrian story.

Katherine DeWeese is the public affairs officer for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program, known as ACWA, headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. With more than 25 years of Army public affairs experience in chemical matters, she has managed ACWA’s public affairs program since 2002. In this capacity, she serves as the chief spokesperson managing a strategic public outreach and involvement program focused on international, national, and community stakeholders in locations where ACWA will fulfil its mission to destroy stockpiled chemical weapons. A member of the International Association for Public Participation, DeWeese holds a bachelor of science degree from the University of Maryland and is a Distinguished Honor Graduate of the U.S. Defense Information School. She has twice received the Department of the Army’s Superior Civilian Service Award.

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Sponsors

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Kobe Steel

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Battelle Memorial Institute

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Bechtel

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URS Corporation

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Organisers

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Dstl The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) leads the defence science and technology sector’s response to the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) current operations and future defence strategy. Dstl maximises the impact of science and technology (S&T) for defence and security requirements, working with industry and academia to deliver battle-winning technologies. It identifies real S&T advances and works to pull ideas rapidly in to service. In addition Dstl works with other government departments, exploiting its expertise and knowledge to improve the safety and security of UK citizens. More than 3,700 of the nation’s most talented and creative scientists, technologists and engineers work for Dstl at its three main sites: Porton Down, near Salisbury, Portsdown West, near Portsmouth, and Fort Halstead, near Sevenoaks. The 7000 acre Porton Down Range is the UK’s strategic field test and evaluation facility designed to support research and equipment acquisition programmes particularly for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Explosive aspects. Dstl maintains the only licensed chemical munitions disposal capability in the UK and it also houses a Designated Laboratory with the ability to carry out analysis for chemical relevance to the Convention, which is a key feature of the verification regime. Special teams are available to provide support on contaminated land legacy, which is an important environmental and political issue for MoD. Dstl has a long history of international collaboration and regularly trains overseas operators in munitions disposal as well as offering advice to other nations on best practice. These services help to prepare people to work safely in toxic and hazardous environments. Specialists from Dstl have also been involved in the Chemical Weapons Convention for many years, providing technical advice to the UK negotiators. Contact: Mr. Navsharan Gabri

Detection Department Room B49 Building 6b Dstl Porton Down Salisbury Wiltshire, SP4 0JQ, UK

Phone: +44 (0)1980 613359 Email: nsgabri@dstl.gov.uk Web: http://www.dstl.gov.uk

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Contact Information

UK: On behalf of Ministry of Defence Conference Manager Mr. Navsharan Gabri Detection Department Room B49 Building 6b Dstl Porton Down Salisbury Wiltshire, SP4 0JQ, UK Phone: +44 (0)1980 613359 Email: nsgabri@dstl.gov.uk

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Published 2014 by: Dstl Environmental Sciences Crescent Road Alverstoke Gosport Hampshire, P012 2DL Dstl is part of the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) © Crown Copyright Dstl 2014