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“Conduct of an Institutional Assessment and the Development a Strategic Plan for the Electoral Commission of Ghana”

UNDP/GHA/IC/2015/12

16 August 2015

Institutional Assessment Report

By Islam Yusufi & Theophilus Dowetin

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Contents List of acronyms ........................................................................................................... 3

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5

Background ............................................................................................................... 5

Objectives ................................................................................................................. 5

Structure of the Report .............................................................................................. 5

II. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 7

III. Findings ................................................................................................................ 10

1. Context, impact and the accountability ............................................................... 10

2. Constitutional mandates and outputs .................................................................. 15

3. Resources, inputs and capacities ....................................................................... 19

4. Communications ................................................................................................. 31

V. Proposed interventions .......................................................................................... 34

ANNEXES .................................................................................................................. 37

Annex 1: Documents Reviewed .............................................................................. 37

Annex 2: Persons/Institutions Interviewed .............................................................. 40

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List of acronyms ADB: Asian Development Bank CHRAJ: Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice CODEO: Coalition of Domestic Election Observers CSO: Civil society organization DANIDA: Danish International Development Agency DFID: Department for International Development EC: Electoral Commission of Ghana ECDPM: European Centre for Development Policy Management ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States EMB: Election Management Body ESGM: Elections Sub Group Meeting EU: European Union IDEA: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance INEC: Interim National Electoral Commission IPDC: Inter Party Dialogue Committee IPAC: Inter Party Advisory Committee NCCE: National Commission for Civic Education NDC: National Democratic Congress NMC: National Media Commission NPC: National Peace Council NPP: New Patriotic Party

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OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OMR: Optical Mark Reader PS Polling Station ToR: Terms of References UK: United Kingdom UNDP: United Nations Development Programme USAID: United States Agency for International Development

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I. INTRODUCTION Background This report provides institutional assessment of the Electoral Commission of Ghana (hereinafter EC). The assessment was conducted in the period of July-August 2015 under the UNDP-funded project “Conduct of an Institutional Assessment and the Development a Strategic Plan for the Electoral Commission of Ghana”. This Institutional Assessment report sets out the review of the institutional positioning of the EC. Specifically, the report includes the following:

Background, objectives, methodology and findings of the Institutional Assessment exercise and the proposed interventions.

Review of the laws, regulations, previous assessment reports, project documents and evaluations, practice and strategy notes on elections administration, previous training programmes and materials on elections in Ghana,

Review of corporate documents of the EC including existing or expired corporate plans and strategy documents,

Review of related assessment, evaluation and capacity development initiatives focusing on the EC,

Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of organisational structure, positions and roles and of the EC,

Assessment of the pros and cons of current corporate procedures and process of the EC, and

Assessment of the EC’s communication and external affairs with key stakeholders.

Objectives The overall objective of the assignment was to assess the EC in the execution of its mandate as the electoral management body of Ghana. This is expected to contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance in Ghana. Specifically, this assignment focused on evaluating the capacities, resources, processes, and procedures of the entire of the EC, which is expected to guide organizational changes that will result in a more organisational development focused orientation for the EC. Structure of the Report The institutional assessment’s findings look into four main areas of institutional work of the EC. Section I begins with an overview of the context in Ghana, with specific reference to how the context affects the work of the EC. It reviews trends in Ghana’s

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governance, and examines the nature of formal and informal institutions and prevalent norms of behaviour. Section II examines the work of the EC in fulfilling its constitutional mandates. Section III focuses on the human and material resources, while Section IV assesses communications capacities of the EC.

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II. METHODOLOGY Definition: What does “institutional assessment” mean? Institutional assessment serves as input in different processes. Assessing institutions is a central element of preparing and implementing any kind of strategy so as to effectively achieve the purpose of the existence of the institution. There are many different ways to assess institutional capacity, and there are numerous tools and instruments that can be used to diagnose different aspects of institutional capacity. Nevertheless, there is a set of issues that should be kept in mind when considering institutional assessments. Ownership is the best point of departure and in this light, this assessment has been made with the request of the EC. The assessment avoids focus only on identifying “capacity gaps” in order not to overlook the existing capacity assets. Looking beyond EC was important. “Institutional” goes beyond “organisational” assessments. It looks beyond single organisations. It was important not to stay only inside the EC, and see institutional issues from that view only. Key stakeholders, such as the government, political parties, oversight institutions and non-state actors shape and condition the dynamics of the work of the EC. Therefore, the institutional assessment of the EC does not only describe what is missing, but it also seeks to explain current strengths. This institutional assessment goes beyond “gap analyses” and identifies strengths. It aimed to measure the distance to a desired ideal and explains why the situation is as it is and identifies causes for this. It reviewed practices within the EC that affect the institution’s capacity to perform its functions in an impartial and accountable manner. The basis for the assessment: international standards The approach employed in this institutional assessment is inspired mainly by various tools for institutional assessment, including UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework, EU capacity assessment, ECDPM five capabilities approach, World Bank capacity development results framework, and ADB capacity development in a sector context. The first task of the institutional assessment is to identify international and widely accepted standards regarding areas of institutional development for an electoral management body such as the EC. These standards serve as a benchmark for assessing the actual situation regarding institutional policies of the EC. The institutional assessment draws on and reflects concepts and standards provided internationally. As pointed by the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework, a capacity assessment is an analysis of desired capacities against existing capacities; this

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generates an understanding of capacity assets and needs, which informs the formulation of a capacity development response. Assessment focus: the institutionalization of standards The task of the institutional assessment was to analyse to what width and depth the standards are institutionalised in the EC. The width refers to the areas of institution building, discussed below. The depth relates to the following three levels of institutionalisation:

1. The legal framework: to what extent the standards regarding the work of an electoral body such as the EC are reflected in Ghana’s legal acts?

2. The implementation of the standard: to what extent and how do the standards actually influence organisational arrangements, work practices and staffing patterns at the EC?

3. The internalisation of the standard: the perception of the EC officials concerning the extent to which the standards are known, accepted, and actually adhered to.

When there is a high level of fit between the three levels, i.e. when the legal framework reflects the desired standards and is supported by rule implementation and rule internalisation, institution-building policies are firmly rooted and effective. If, on the other hand a legal framework that is in conformity with the desired standards, deviates substantially from the norms held by people acting within an institution the risk is high that policies exist only on paper. The situation may be more promising if desired standards are internalised or supported by officials even if the implementation may be inadequate. The analysis of the width and depth of institution-building policies within the EC gives us a sufficient understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the EC and the kinds of measures that should be implemented to redress the situation. This report assesses the institutional work of the EC. The potential for successful institutional performance of the EC depends significantly on the understanding and vision on what institutional arrangements must be in place in public bodies such as the EC. Under the above elements, the assessment focuses on examining the checks and balances in the work of the EC, election operations of the EC, resources available to the EC, public procurement issues, human resources management, communications and consultation procedures. These areas are of particular importance for the EC. The procurement is important as EC is responsible for large and complex procurements. Flawed acquisition processes may lead to questionable decisions which, in serious cases, may spur apprehension and, ultimately, plummeting of

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confidence of the EC. The EC is one of the largest governmental agencies in Ghana in terms of number of staff (more than 1,300) and is responsible for a large number of temporary staff (more than 130,000) employed for an election day. Recruitment patterns for both permanent and temporary staff and also promotion practices for permanent staff members may lead to dysfunctional dependency relationships between managers and employees which can easily result into inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. Thus, the quality of its human resources is also central to the quality of performance of the EC. The normative basis regarding the domains analyzed is widely recognized international standards for sound governmental institutions. This normative basis served as a benchmark for assessing the actual situation regarding the policies and practices in the EC. The institutional assessment draws on and reflects contemporary concepts and standards. The normative basis mainly concerns general principles for promoting the quality of the work of the EC. The analysis of the fit is done between current arrangements covering the EC on the one hand and the international normative basis on the other. Areas of assessment

The institutional assessment studied existing arrangements and what institutional arrangements must be in place. In this direction, the institutional assessment looked to several main areas. For that, following assessment areas were taken into account:

1. Context, impact and accountability, 2. Constitutional mandates and outputs, 3. Resources, inputs and capacities, and 4. Communications.

Data collection

The assessment was based on the following types of empirical evidence: a. Study of already available documents in order to assess the legal institutional

positioning of the EC, including legal frameworks (primary and secondary legislation, and review of internal regulations), governmental and non-governmental reports; and

b. Interviewing, including face to face meetings in Accra, Ghana, with key

stakeholders such as EC, relevant government agencies, political parties, media, academia, civil society, UNDP and other development agencies (see List of Interviews as Annex 2), in order to have a balanced picture of the state of the institutional situation as regards the EC. Interviewing used semi structured questions. Observations made during the interviewing phase also formed an important element for data collection. The consultants kept records of interviews and observations spanning the period of data collection. These

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interview and observational notes were analysed and incorporated in this assessment.

III. FINDINGS 1. Context, impact and the accountability This part allows for mapping the context of the existence and functioning of the EC. It reviews the environment within which the EC operates, taking into account recent political developments, the overall governance context, and the legal frameworks governing the EC and overall Ghana’s governance system. The performance of the EC in the electoral processes depends critically on adequate governance and accountability. This tool allows mapping of the existing governance set up. It also looks on the overall impact of the EC to the country’s democratic governance and on its accountability to external stakeholders. 1.1. The general context and impact Ghana has made significant democratic gains. Since 1992 when it opened its political system to multi-party competition, the country has made momentous advances in its democratic credentials. An opposition political party have been able, on two occasions, to unseat an incumbent political party through a democratic election process. The civic space has been opened up. Ghana in the international political freedom indexes stands as a free country in terms of the protection of civil liberties, respect for the rule of law and political freedoms. The 1992 Constitution established the EC, whose primary goal is the organization of elections. The EC handles the entire process of the conduct of elections, from delimitation of electoral boundaries, the registration of political parties to voter registration, the preparation and conduct of the elections, and the declaration of election results. The capacity of the EC, in principle, is reputed to be relatively strong, independent and well entrenched in the Constitution. The EC is independent and widely respected in the country and internationally. It has proved resilient enough to survive the intense competition of the 2000 and 2008 polls and produce the two electoral turnovers. Periodic elections are integral part of Ghana’s democratic system and the democratization process is inextricably interwoven with elections. The country has a notable track record of generally well-administered elections. Nevertheless, the elections stand as a principal trigger of various conflicts, which can erupt into ethnic violence. Ultimately, Ghana can only stabilize and deepen democracy through an electoral system, which will put results beyond dispute. Close elections in 2008 and in 2012, provided a test of the EC’s resilience. The country is currently at the point where the political atmosphere is gradually warming up for another major general elections in 2016.

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Against the backdrop of the closely contested 2012 polls and concerns about the voter register, the next presidential and parliamentary elections are prospectively scheduled for November 2016. As a developing democracy, the elections will provide yet another opportunity to further test Ghana’s democratic institutions. The EC and stakeholders are excited by the positive gains made in the electoral processes since the inception of the Fourth Republic; however, it is assessed that there is growing pessimism with respect to how EC stands currently considering the upcoming elections of 2016. Ghana faces challenges to its democratic system, including an increasingly expensive electoral process, weak accountability mechanisms, and a series of political challenges (UNDP, 2015). Significant gaps remain. The country’s political system exhibits several structural weaknesses as regards the electoral management processes. Significant deficits remain as regards democracy, protection of rights, and quality of governance and inclusiveness in the political processes. Moreover, the dividends of democracy are not readily visible to the people (IDEA, 2013). Despite the successes in organizing regular elections, democracy in Ghana has not lived up to the expectations of the wider population. It has been observed that there is a generally peaceful political and electoral environment in the lead-up to the elections of 2016. However, political and electoral tension will increase in some constituencies as major campaigns and election-day approach. In this pre-election phase, there is increased anxiety between the two main competing parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The current polls show that these two parties are head to head as the 2016 elections draw closer. Also, in spite of the positive image that the EC of Ghana has carved for itself as an institution, there are major challenges that need to be addressed. 1.2. Accountability The establishment of the EC is provided in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and Act 451 of 1993. The legislation does provide that the EC is autonomous and independent in the performance of its functions. The legislation further provides for how the members of the EC are appointed as well as their mandates and functions. Ghana’s electoral legal framework is assessed as good and is believed to provide a good basis for holding free and fair elections. However, the lack of further details in the legislation with regards to its organisational functioning, do not ensure adequate independence for the EC. There is also lack of details on the functioning of the professional secretariat of the EC which is the office for performing expert, administrative and technical activities of the EC. The role of the non-executive members of the Commission is not clearly defined. There are loopholes in the legislation and these shortcomings in the legal framework have hampered the work of the EC and leads to confusion about what rules apply. Moreover, the high number of legislative acts has led to a fragmented legal system which makes implementation and monitoring more difficult.

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Reforms internal to the EC are conditioned in a wider governance system existing in Ghana. The EC is embedded in its environment and is affected by the legal and administrative arrangements cutting across the existing system of public governance in Ghana. Some of the key challenges of the EC are located outside the EC itself and relate to wider questions of administrative capacity and political governance in Ghana. This is clearly the case, for instance, as series of general legal frameworks that are central to functioning of government institutions (such as human resources management, public procurement, audit) apply to EC as well. This state of affairs makes it difficult to provide for some changes in the work of the EC due to general weak legal and administrative arrangements in the country. While Ghana has made tremendous improvements in its electoral processes, Ghana’s democracy has not lived up to the expectations in the area of accountable governance in the work of the EC which can be a significant risks for the EC itself. The greater governance challenge is lack of governmental accountability. The Constitution establishes a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government, but the executive branch is dominant. Power is centralized in the hands of the President, the executive branch, i.e. the ruling party, thus severely undermining accountability. Presidential and parliamentary elections are the only posts for which a political party can compete. The district elections are not open for political party candidates. Also, the winner-take-all nature of Ghana’s electoral system has made the capture of the presidency the overwhelming objective of all political parties, as this comes with significant financial and political advantages. As a result, Ghanaian politics is a highly polarized, high-stakes game. The constitutional leverage granted to the EC to make instruments to regulate electoral processes has contributed significantly to the improvements in Ghana’s electoral governance. Arrangements for external oversight over the work of EC are vital to building accountable governance within EC for several reasons. Parliamentary oversight is one of the key democratic means of holding the EC to account for its actions as EC uses a substantial share of the state’s budget. The EC may operate more effectively if it is required to report to an oversight body, such as parliament. An oversight body with sufficient authority to review and report on EC may enhance EC’s credibility. Parliamentary oversight may enhance public awareness of the EC’s performance and thus improve the opportunities for an informed and open debate on electoral issues. In its work, the EC has partly depended on the overall political will of the Government as a whole to ensure free and fair elections. The EC’s functional independence as prescribed by law is incomplete without having financial independence from the executive arm of government. EC’s calendar of activities are contingent on the untimeliness with which government releases funds. This has a potential for making the EC vulnerable for regression.

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EC alone has limited ability to make a meaningful difference if government or ruling party commitment to globally recognized democratic norms is missing. Even if EC is able to make notable improvements in professionalizing its work, there should be real changes in the enabling environment. Many of the problems relating to the elections are structural and stem from the peculiar nature of the political system of Ghana. The EC can make a substantial contribution when a reform-minded government is in place and sustaining electoral gains beyond the actual elections is difficult if sufficient change had not also been made to the broader environment. The enabling environment is assessed to be a critical factor in EC’s performance, but it is also found to be an indispensable element for sustainability and for institutionalization of democratic gains. The electoral process in Ghana is faced with a number of challenges such as electoral fraud, violence, bloated register, and intimidation of election officials. A number of state bodies are mandated to perform specific functions, which may be closely linked to the EC’s mandate and upon which the effectiveness of EC depends. The EC has adequate positioning within the institutional system; however, there are overlapping mandates with lack of institutionalised coordination and sanctions enforcement. The relations of the EC with police, NCCE, CHRAJ, NMC and other institutions are of great importance. The efforts of these bodies should be coordinated for complementarity, especially with regard to the elections. Any duplication of efforts with other institutions should be avoided. Mandate conflicts occur in the areas of voter education (with NCCE), citizen identification for voter registration (with National Identification Authority), media monitoring (with NMC), etc. Ideally the national governance system should allow for inter-institutional collaboration within a coherent institutional framework with effective coordination mechanisms in place. Cooperation among the ministries and other government agencies on the electoral matters in Ghana is based on established practice. There is no signed cooperation and coordination arrangements among relevant institutions to deal with processes that surround the electoral process. For example, there is no arrangement that would detail the cooperation of the EC with the police as regards the police’s involvement in safeguarding the polling stations on the elections day. Due to the fact that other state institutions have a role in the elections, there is a need to establish arrangements that will enhance coordination of the EC with other Ministries and Government agencies. An arrangement that would establish periodical meetings with focus on electoral processes and when attended by other relevant institutions could lead to exchange of information, a mutual understanding of respective duties and possibilities for elective collaboration, and to build a network of personal contacts to quickly transmit facts to relevant authorities.

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These related problems in the overall system of governance of Ghana need to be tackled in order to improve the role of the EC. While Ghana deserves all the praises in managing elections, it is important to move beyond the paradigm of whether it will become part of the club of electorally induced strife-torn countries in the West African sub-region. Efforts should therefore be made to ensure that the elections and their management by the EC sets new standards for democracy in Ghana. Prevention of electoral violence is crucial. There is increased trust and confidence in the neutrality and robustness of the election management system. The EC, which has scored higher points in the conduct of previous elections, has to continue to protect the image it has built for itself through the positive reforms that have been proposed. To achieve these goals, EC is in need of improving its internal processes, thus enhancing professionalism of the EC. The EC’s capacity to credibly manage elections that would be acceptable to Ghanaians and contesting parties in particular requires designing and implementing durable institutional reforms within the EC. Textbox 1: Summary of key events surrounding the work of the EC, 1990s-present 1992: Return to constitutional rule 1992: Parliamentary and Presidential elections 1992: Enactment of new Constitution of Ghana 1993: Establishment of the Electoral Commission 1994: Establishment of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee 1996: Parliamentary and Presidential elections 2000: Parliamentary and Presidential elections 2004: Parliamentary and Presidential elections 2008: Parliamentary and Presidential elections 2012: Parliamentary and Presidential elections 2014: Proposal for electoral reforms developed

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2. CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES AND OUTPUTS 2.1 Legal framework formulation

The Electoral Commission has always consulted intensively with political parties but not extensively with other stakeholders before it came out with many of its constitutional instruments. There exist a maze of electoral laws and the assessment revealed that many of the staff of the EC do not know all the legal framework governing the conduct elections in the country. The EC has made a compendium of these laws, which would facilitate any future efforts to train its staff on the electoral laws.

It is assessed that, the EC was not assertive and ceded part of its function to the political parties when the parties insisted on the “no verification, no vote” law before the 2012 elections. The implementation of such a law impacted negatively on the integrity of the 2012 general election. The EC has however regained its composure by refusing the same provision as part of the electoral reforms.

2.2. Boundary delimitation:

Over the years, the EC has created electoral boundaries out of government administrative districts after extensive consultation with relevant local stakeholders. The performance of this function has been without any protracted judicial review. However, the timing of the creation of new districts has not been favourable to political parties in other to allow them to search for quality parliamentary candidates and party agents when these constituencies are created in an election year. 2.3 Planning

The EC planning process has been more focused on the development of budget with tentative dates for activities except for general election date. The EC has no written work plan with related risk analysis. The Commission is anticipating a change in the election date for 2016 parliamentary elections from December to November but it has no existing plans spelling out how it intends to proceed with major activities leading up to the elections. The EC is unable to publish a calendar of activities a year ahead of election to enable other stakeholders to plan their activities to complement that of the EC.

2.4 Voter Registration

The EC had developed its capacity to conducted registration of voters using OMR until the introduction of biometric technology. The management of biometric database

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has been outsourced to STL who was expected to train and fully hand over the system to the IT Department of the EC before the 2012 elections. STL has not respected this component of the contract as at this assessment in August 2015. The implication is that the EC will be unable to conduct biometric registration without STL. STL has not been transparent with the officials of the IT department to enable the later to understand how the system functions even though STL officials are based in the IT Department of the EC.

Voter registration is conducted on a periodic bases and when it is expected to be continuous. A mechanism to enable political parties and CSO to observe a continuous registration would contribute to building confidence in the process.

Public education on registration, which is conducted usually between 2 to 3 days before registration, is considered inadequate.

The voters register used by the EC for the 2012 has been agreed to by all parties as bloated but while the opposition is requesting for a replacement, the party in government, NDC is of the opinion that its is credible to be used in 2016. It will be in the interest of public peace if the EC is not perceived to be aligned to the NDC viewpoint. An audit of the register could help establish to verify or refute the allegation of the opposition political parties. An acceptable voters register is a necessary ingredient for a credible electoral outcome. The unacceptability of a voters register is one of the major sources of election conflict since it creates the basis for political parties to reject the outcome of an election.

2.5 Voter Education

Voter education is one element of the broader area of civic education. It is to enable citizen take part effectively in an electoral process. In the 2012 general election, 251,720 rejected votes (2.3 per cent), were higher than the total votes secured by all the other presidential candidates, excluding those of the NDC and the NPP. A large number of spoilt ballots clearly affect the democratic choice of who becomes President or Member of Parliament. Voter Education forms a key part of the EC’s constitutional mandate (Article 46.2e) which is related to that of the NCCE as per Act 452, which in part, states that the NCCE shall “formulate, implement and over see programmes intended to inculcate in the citizens of Ghana awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people”. There is the understanding between the two institutions that the EC educates the public on “ how” to vote while the NCCE educates on “why” vote. The EC and the NCCE have produced common messages but has not collaborated in the joint use of resources. The EC has not had joint public education planning and there is no existing formally agreed framework for the conduct of this interrelated constitutional mandate among the two organisations. The two institutions would need to work harder together to improve on the situation during the 2016 elections.

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2.6 Regulation of political parties

The EC is mandated under the Political Parties Act 574 of 2000 to regulate the activities of the political parties. The EC has been involved in the election of political party candidates during party primaries but beyond that, it has not ensured that parties fully respect for the Political Parties Act, especially provision that requires a political party to be nation in character, have branches in all the regions and in addition, should be organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each region. Parties are also expected to render expenditure accounts to the Electoral Commission. However, the EC has not had the capacity to audit the financial statements of the political parties and also undertake any follow up that may be needed to ensure that the law is adhered to by the various political parties.

2.7: Voting, Counting & Results Management System

The EC has managed to introduce integrity measures into the voting process, enhanced transparency in the counting and election result management and has avoided delay in the declaration of results. Though the EC has conducted five successive general and local government elections, the calibre of the temporary staff needs to be improved. Highly qualified people are often not interested in temporary electoral work. Various political parties encourage their sympathizers get recruited as polling staff. Sometimes, district officers of the EC leave out some of the trained persons and rather use untrained persons who were not part of the recruitment process. The use of discretion and autonomy by the District Officials in this manner may adversely impact the credibility of the electoral outcome.

The problem is further compounded by the EC’s inability to publish the names of recruited polling officials for ten days and where the appointment of any official is challenged, the EC has not responded in the three days that it is required to do so.

Currently the EC publishes only constituency results. It has made efforts in the past, without success, to publish polling station (PS) results. Its ability to publish PS results will greatly enhance the credibility of the results management system since it would facilitate the ability of stakeholders to conduct parallel vote tabulation for purposes of verification.

Currently the EC uses a manual system (paper and pen) to collate election results. The tension, lateness and fatigue could increase the incidence of human error when results are collated in a stressful situation. Result collation centres could be furnished with 2 laptops (where 1 is a back up) and a projector to allow the public to verify.

The EC website (www.ec.gov.gh) is a major channel for publishing election results. The size of the bandwidth does not allow easy access for large traffic to the site during an elections declaration period thereby limiting public access to first hand

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information from the EC. The public resorts to other sources such as radios and television, which may be partisan and unreliable.

The EC intends to increase the number of PS from 26,910 to about 50,000 for the 2016. The reasons are as follows:

• To reduce the threshold to 500 per PS so voting, counting and results declaration can be completed in time so polling agents may not work late into night where the tendency of human error is higher when official are in a state of fatigue.

• To reduce the pressure on the BVDs to avoid the malfunctioning of the devices as happened in the 2012 elections

The EC’s intention needs to be rapidly translated into a workplan and to intensify its negotiations with the Parliamentary Special Budgets Committee and the Ministry of Finance to ensure that the EC would be able to begin procurement, at least, six months before election and complete the mapping and siting of polling station at least three (3) months before election. This would allow political parties and the general public to be conversant with the polling station locations.

2.8: Management of logistics

Currently EC has managed the printing of ballot paper in a transparent manner where political parties and security personnel have been allowed access to the printing houses. However the EC has experienced delays in the deployment of materials even in the capital where it has its head office. Some times these materials are inadequate. If this phenomenon continues, an increase in the number of PS would increase the cost of election but may not yield a generally desired outcome.

2.9 Electoral Security Management

The management of a national and sub-national security architecture for the management of security during elections which is headed by the Ghana Police who have worked closely with the EC. This relationship is not without challenges. The EC’s collaboration with the security agencies extends to activities such as voter registration, printing of electoral material, deployment of logistics and protection of materials, personnel and voters on Election Day and beyond. The EC has also benefited from intelligence provided by the Ghana Police on flash points and for the personal safety of certain EC officials.

Over the years, the security services benefitted from the EC’s early voting arrangements to make the agencies’ services available on Election Day. During the 2012 elections the EC was unable to make this facility available to all the security agencies. For this reason security officials who were expected to be on duty did not deploy to various polling stations because they insisted on exercising their franchise instead. The situation was only saved by the security agency’s back up plan. No

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formal institutional arrangement or MoU governs the relationship between the EC and the security agencies. There is a general feeling amongst the security agencies that the EC is yet to appreciate the essence of security. The security agencies also feel the need to be trained on the electoral processes and laws in order to know what constitutes an electoral offence.

There is the general perception that the EC does not follow up after an arrest to prosecute electoral offenders and therefore some political party members have neither fear of the law nor respect for election officials during election period.

2.10: Election Dispute Resolution

The EC has been too quick to ask the public to go to court when they receive a petition. With regards to the numerous losses of court cases it is important for the EC to have an alternative election dispute resolution mechanisms in place instead of resorting to court any time there is a disagreement. Any more loses by the EC in court would seriously dent its image which is currently at a very low level.

2.11 Post Election Review/Evaluation

The EC regularly conducts an in-house evaluation after each general election. This has been in a form of senior staff retreat. After the Supreme Court verdict, the EC has resorted to engaging a broad range of stakeholders to make proposals on the way forward. This is an indication of the EC’s openness to public discourse on its activities. This momentum would have to be sustained.

3. RESOURCES, INPUTS AND CAPACITIES

This section will review the human and financial resources and inputs of the EC. Various technical capacities are assessed as well. The capacity needs of the EC are short-term and there are major process issues to deal with within the EC. 3.1. Human resources management The EC stands as independent and professional public service body. This has been sustained over time, as there has been a strong national and public commitment to making this happen. However, some weaknesses remain in EC as regards the situation of its human resources management. The EC has abundance of human resources; however, it is constrained by inadequate human resource management system. Actually, there is weakness of many public sector bodies in Ghana, mostly induced by a recruitment policy that in practice is politically influenced rather than merit-based. It does not

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provide competitive compensation package, and does not implement continuous training and capacity building to its staff members. The large number of temporary personnel used during registration and election are trained by senior officials of the EC based on their knowledge of the electoral process. Having the electoral knowledge alone is not enough; senior officials should acquire the skills and technics in training

3.1.1. Permanent staff For executing the technical and administrative activities of the EC, professional secretariat exists that acts as the expert office of the EC. The EC has its own dedicated permanent staff for performing most of its electoral functions who work in the Headquarters in Accra, in Regional Offices and in the District Offices. The permanent employees of the EC, who currently number around 1361 (as of April 2015), out of whom 346 are in the head office in Accra, have the status of public servants. The public servants procedures apply for recruitment of permanent staff. The procedures with regards to recruitment of public servants, in principle, are open and transparent. However, there is heavy politicisation. Open competition is mandatory for all public servant positions at the EC, and it should have policy which guarantees principles such as equal access and equal conditions. Employment of public servants is in principle required to be conducted through a transparent process, on the basis of criteria of professionalism, and competency. When a public servant is required, the EC in consultation with the Public Service Commission and Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, publishes a vacancy on its website and in newspapers. The EC forms a committee for selection of the public servant. It is very rare that individuals who have no political support are employed through above-mentioned process. In practice the rules governing recruitment and selection of candidates do not prevent political interference. This is due to a great margin of arbitrariness and discretion given to the EC. The commissioners are involved in the human resource recruitment procedures. The EC is able to circumvent the legal provisions concerning the professional requirements that candidates must meet. The public servants recruitment at EC does not guarantee a transparent, merit-based selection, as it leaves too large a room for discretion. There is still some distance between the principles of merit and equal opportunities as laid down in the law and the reality of the recruitment processes. The result is the lack of staff members who are capable of implementing legislation and of conducting administrative procedures in a knowledgeable way, let alone proposing sound policy analysis and reform programmes. Vertical promotion is practiced in the EC; however, it is not based on objective evaluation of merit, experience or performance. The career progression procedure in

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the EC is also vulnerable to political influences. Political influences do play a role in career progression in the EC. There is no staff ethics code. There have been cases where places have been filled in with the people of limited experience. Also, several positions have been filled in the absence of appointment criteria. The relevant governmental institutions such as CHRAJ and non-governmental organisations observing the functioning of the EC have raised concerns with regards to recruitment and promotion arrangements and have raised their concerns for lack of application of merit-based principles in the EC. According to them, the EC’s recruitment practice is increasingly having elements of spoilt system and that recently the situation has deteriorated even further. There are regular complaints to the CHRAJ on the recruitment and promotion practices of the EC. Employment in the EC, in principle, is on the basis of permanence. The contracts provided are open-ended contracts. The law prohibits arbitrary dismissal of public servants. Dismissal is possible only in exceptional circumstances. However, in practice the protection system in place has some shortcomings that need to be resolved. The legislation recognises that public servants of the EC have the right to establish and be members of trade unions. However, overall, the social dialogue is underdeveloped. The Collective Bargaining Agreement is yet to be reviewed and revised. The salaries offered to the staff are considered low taking into account the important role played by the EC. The EC's professional staff members are bound by the public servant salary grades that are considered low. Although the EC has been able to exercise sound retention policies, the salaries do not prevent undesirable turnover of staff. As staff leave, no replacement is found thereafter due to restrictions imposed on the public sector employments. The Ministry of Finance keeps a tight control over the use of budgetary appropriations for personnel costs, including control of new recruitment, through its competences concerning the management of the state budget. It has been noted that the number of permanent staff members number has gone down from around 1500 to around 1350. As new electoral districts are established, the need for permanent employees will increase. While the salary system provides predictability and some modest performance incentives, it suffers from problems of discretion and favouritism. Even if performance reviews are applied, they struggle to guarantee the fair and equal treatment of the personnel. There is some evidence at this stage that the system has not been used to measure and encourage performance. Also performance evaluation is not done on an annual basis. In addition, there is also a lack of managerial capacity in the EC to implement the system. Understanding of the performance assessment process is still

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poor, and the capacity in the EC to implement it is low. In particular, there is still no fully functional human resource management unit at the EC. While human resource unit exists under the Human Resource and General Service Department, it deals exclusively with personnel issues and is under-equipped to handle training/performance appraisal issues. The unit, composed of 6 officers, is often side-lined in recruitment processes. No proper division of labour is exercised within the human resource department that would look separately to the issues of employee relations, compensations and performance appraisal. In a country where the unemployment rate is high, a job in the public service is valued highly. The state is able to provide a competitive and predictable and safe salary, which is not always the case in the private sector of Ghana. People see the EC as “wet” rather than a “dry” institution. There have been reports for people bribing in order to get employment in the EC. Rates of pay and pensions and allowances for the personnel of the EC are not openly published. However, they do receive their salaries and payments on time. Merit and bureaucratic professionalism are necessary underpinnings for an effective EC. Impartial EC, professionally competent and sufficiently independent to “speak truth”, is a cornerstone for the effective functioning of this electoral administration. However, the freedom of expression is limited within the EC as loyalty has become important aspect of the relationships with the hierarchy. There is growing fear and frustration among employees. Orientation and coaching as well as attention to the welfare of the employees is lacking. 3.1.2. Temporary staff The EC relies on temporary staff which amounts to more than 130.000 people and who are crucial for the registration and election processes. The EC for, instance, engaged the services of over 130,000 temporary staff to conduct the 2012 elections. Arguably, the effective conduct of elections depends to large extent on the calibre of temporary staff. The concerns raised as regards the temporary staff include the recruitment procedure of temporary staff and lack of adequate training provided to the temporary staff. If the connivance of some temporary staff in some of the elections is unchecked, it would has the propensity of derailing the credibility of the elections. The temporary staff require sufficient training on electoral rules and procedures. However, the EC is unable to equip its temporary staff with the needed skills and knowledge of the electoral rules thereby leading to problems at polling stations.

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3.1.3. Observers It has been noted by interviewees that obtaining accreditation from the EC as regards the observing the elections is challenging. There is no special unit in the EC dedicated to the accreditation of the observers and for the timely processing of accreditation tags to observers. Although there is a regulation on the elections observation, the EC is yet to produce a legally enforceable code of conduct for the observers. Independent observation, done in Ghana comprehensively by CODEO, and by international observation missions, has become a critical component of building trust in Ghana’s electoral processes. 3.1.4. Gender Although there is a clear upward trajectory on its gender work, EC cannot to date demonstrate a track record of gender impact, and there is inadequate evidence of gender mainstreaming. Ghana has ratified treaties to promote the participation of women in democratic processes. However, Ghana has not yet adopted gender equality legislation that would integrate the key principle of gender equality and non-discrimination into related laws. Gender balance among EC members and election staff at all levels is gaining greater attention. As of July 2015, a woman heads the EC and around half of EC staff members are women. Commitments to increase women’s participation in EC leadership positions, particularly at the directors’ and regional directors’ level, where the participation is 0 out of 7 and 2 out of 10, respectively, and attain a gender balance across all levels of the electoral administration system need to be implemented. There is a designated gender department headed by staff member as Gender Adviser who works for gender inclusion at the EC. The gender department, composed of 2 officers at the headquarters and 10 officers in regional directorates, has provided EC with the means to more systematically support efforts to mainstream gender within EC and to more effectively leverage in-house expertise in gender issues. Many of current EC electoral activities address different aspects of gender equity in the electoral processes. EC also supports efforts to enable the broad based political participation by women. Voter registration efforts served as a motivating factor for marginalized women to come out and register. However, gender perspective within EC remains at a deficit. No gender policy in place. The gender department remains a “wing” of the EC; it is not mainstreamed in the work of the EC. Also, the gender adviser lacks a seniority that would ensure that women can participate fully in all aspects of the EC’s work. There is no special programme with a mechanism that allows the EC to more systematically promote the empowerment of women throughout the electoral cycle.

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3.1.5. Youth Youth are marginalized in Ghana, although the youth in the age between 15-35 account for 42% of the population and 58% of the voters registered. The EC lacks special policy on engaging with the youth constituency and youth lack representation in the EC’s consultative bodies. There is no department at the EC responsible for youth constituency. There is also lack of reception to the youth issues in the EC. Elections and voter registration calendars do not take into account the schooling semesters of the youth. 3.1.6. Training The EC, in cooperation with other national institutions such as Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration and with freelance trainers, has conducted trainings to both its permanent and temporary staff members. The EC's budget does not allow for regular training. Efforts to organise regular training are funded by development partners. The EC has utilised donor financial assistance for providing training to its staff members. Although there is training plan, no systematic training is delivered to permanent staff members. Due to budget constraints, it is difficult to implement a training plan. In this regard, no training needs assessment has been done. It is noted that most demanded trainings are for IT and for documentation management. Regular training is in place for temporary staff members. Continuous training is needed for political party agents, CSOs, observers, security forces, judges and court staff. 3.2. Financial resources Another major issue that affects the EC’s capacity relates to its funding. The EC possesses necessary material resources to carry out its functions. The running of the EC involves substantial costs that are borne by the government. The expenses of the EC, as regards administrative expenses and as it relates to electoral processes, are covered by the Consolidated Fund, a central government budget. The funding arrangement is such that the EC presents a budget to the Ministry of Finance, which then pays money from the consolidated fund to the EC. The EC’s budget, which has a component for management expenses and a component for electoral services, is part of Government’s overall budget on electoral activities and is heavily scrutinised by the Ministry of Finance. Although the release of the funds is at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance, the Governments have shown their readiness to make funds available to the EC, but the actual amounts released always falls behind the budgeted amounts. There are frequent delays or reductions on budget funding received from the Ministry of Finance. The amount released is usually one third of the budgeted amount.

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Although the finances provided are limited, the EC relatively is well resourced financially. The majority of the funds go to electoral costs and for the salaries of the employees. The budget is not sufficient to cover other costs such as training and professional development. 3.2.1. International financing of EC International support to electoral processes in Ghana has played a critical role. A number of activities of the EC have been financed by Ghana’s development partners, which include by UNDP, DFID, EU, DANIDA, CIDA, and USAID. Supporting EC remains a priority for development partners of the country, as elections are seen as a precondition for more stable, peaceful and economically sustainable democracy in Ghana. However, the donor support is getting scarce and requirement for management of the assistance is getting more stringent. Although in principle the basic financial and audit mechanisms are in place in the EC, the EC may not be ready to attract new types of assistance such as budgetary support by development partners. Donors have expressed concerns about some project management and reporting issues. Recovery orders have been issued for some of the donor assistance. EC is in need increasingly for more efficient project management and delivery. 3.3. Procurement Ghana’s Procurement Act (Act 663 of 2004) and Public Procurement Manual is explicit on how the EC could procure equipment. The EC has its own Procurement Unit that is charged with ensuring that public procurement processes are carried out in the manner prescribed by the Procurement Act. According to the structure of EC, the Procurement Unit functions under the Finance Department, which reports to the Deputy Chair for Finance and Administration. The public procurement regime at the EC remains weak. Some reports and anecdotal evidence suggest continuing widespread abuse in the award of contracts. The framework for addressing irregularities in the procurement processes has significant gaps. In the meantime, Ghanaian democracy continues on its path of increasing clientelization. Political patronage pervades the culture and practice of public sector corporate governance. Primarily the CHRAJ and Police Intelligence and Professional Standards Bureau conduct anticorruption enforcement efforts, which face major challenges. There is practice within the EC to design an annual procurement plan, however, no publicity is provided for the annual procurement plans, and for the contract notices. Information about EC procurement is scarce. Normally it should be published widely, including on the EC’s website, which remains poor in content by all standards. The public procurement system within the EC is heavily criticized as one of the reasons for the worsening of the public trust to the EC. Values with regards to

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transparent procurement in the field of elections are still missing, and the EC suffers from a bad reputation in terms of financial transparency with public procurement. Given the huge volume of transactions and the number of persons involved in the work of the EC, public procurement procedures and management of the contracts is of important to the integrity of the EC. The EC’s public procurement procedure is the activity that is most vulnerable to mismanagement in the EC. Currently, arrangements for public procurement are deficient and as such they have diminished public confidence to the EC, and have undermined the public image of the EC. The public procurement practices within the EC is a serious problem. The institutional framework and measures taken remain ill-suited to effectively addressing this phenomenon. Particularly the EC’s contract with the company that manages voter registration and verification is of contentious nature. The use of derogations for single source procurements must be limited to clearly defined and exceptional cases. The EC lacks mechanisms for determining the quality of the procured goods and services and for taking special measures in the event that requirements are not met. The procurement unit also lacks complete and sufficiently detailed records – in paper and electronic form - of the procurement processes. Same is currently not available even for large contracts. Lack of documentation encourages challenges to the public trust in the EC. 3.4. Internal and external audit Arrangements for internal and external audit are vital to building integrity in the work of the EC. The audit ensures proper use of public money in terms of its legality, regularity and cost efficiency. The EC has internal audit unit and is externally audited. Its Internal Audit Unit, composed of 8 officers, exercises the internal audit function in the EC. Internal Audit Unit is organizationally and functionally independent and directly and solely responsible to the chair of the EC. The functional independence of Internal Audit Unit is provided through its organizational independence from other parts of the EC. Internal audit unit of the EC is subordinated to the chair of the EC which provides for its organisational independence. The Unit operates with internal auditors that possess necessary education and skills in the field of internal audit. However, it lacks functional independence as it does not have power to independently – based on risk assessments - choose the areas to be audited and the manner of auditing and reporting. Reports are confidential. There is very limited follow-up to recommendations provided by the internal audit. Internal audit in the EC focuses mainly on ensuring that transactions (not systems) follow the appropriate rules and regulations. In principle, the internal audit should cover all related aspects of internal auditing, including financial audit, compliance audit (regularity), audit on the internal control systems; performance audit

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(execution); and IT audit. However, no IT audit is carried out in practice, despite the fact that there is high vulnerability of the IT systems in the EC. The capacities of the internal auditors are still not sufficient. The acceptance of internal audit by the EC's management and the recognition of its role and objectives are not yet fully understood. Due to this, auditors are not fully exploited. The management in the EC often sees the audit as “providing assurance” and insufficiently perceives the benefits that internal auditors can bring by providing advice for improvement of the operations and to increase the effectiveness of the work processes in the organization. The external audit in the EC is managed by the Auditor-General (or Audit Service), whose the task is auditing the orderly and efficient use of public funds. It contracts the job to outside company that does only financial audit. External audits are conducted annually. No audit report is available to the public, although they are not confidential. There is limited follow-up to recommendations provided by the external audit. The levels of understanding of the technical concepts and requirements as well as the standards of the application generally appear to be limited among the EC's management. 3.5. Elections technology The EC has purchased substantial amount of IT equipment and it is apparent that it intends to inject more technology into Ghana’s electoral activities for 2016. The IT is expected to play critical role in 2016: from voter registration to voting. The EC approaches the use of IT technology in electoral processes, rightly, as a point to making electoral processes more efficient and increasing its effectiveness. In this direction, equipment for voter registration and verification has served the purpose. But there are growing concerns about the cost, maintenance of some of these systems and how they relate to IT capacities within the EC. The EC ability to shape IT related decision-making depends in large part on the strength and knowledge of the chair and the timeliness and quality of advice from the EC’s IT Department. Having the voters’ register database outsourced, but housed within the EC, eventual difficulties in the management of the IT systems, undermines the EC’s effectiveness. Outsourcing IT solutions leaves the EC with limited IT capacity. Some of IT solutions have been effective in that they have effectively improved short-term electoral event goals, but not development-effective in that some of the systems implemented are unsustainable without continued ownership by the EC’s IT department, which numbers 62 officers. IT skills, particularly in Oracle and Linux, are scarce among the IT staff members of the EC and vendors have become difficult to handle. It has been found that EC has been effective in procuring high-tech solutions for electoral processes, but no consideration has been given for

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its capacity to operate and/or maintain the purchased IT solutions. The EC does not have a developed IT policy. Lack of comprehensive IT policy presents the risk that the EC would not be able to properly safeguard its information or maintain its IT equipment. Also, the continuous high costs of high-tech solutions for voter registration raises questions on the efficacy of EC work on the part of the stakeholders. The public trust to EC has gone down from 80% in 2012 to 42% in 2014, as reported by Afrobarometer. The EC used to be the most trusted institution in the country; but not anymore. Substantial amount has been invested on the biometric registration and verification; however, there is still no reliable voter register. In large part, this is the result of the electoral event being prioritized over process sustainability. Sustainability also means that its IT department should be provided appropriate training, and ensuring maintenance capacity within the EC. The IT investments have helped for conduct of credible elections, however, there is not yet proper trust in IT; people would prefer handling manually the electoral processes. 3.6. Website The EC website is poor by all standards. Information available in its website is very limited. The management of the website is heavily centralized in the hands of the Public Relations department and it serves only for the purpose of the public communication rather than as a tool for sharing the info internally and externally. No internal documentation management system or intranet exists. 3.7. Organizational structure The internal organisation of the EC needs to be rethought to allow for improved delegation of decision-making competence. The current arrangement, whereby almost all decisions are taken by the top level (e.g. the chair and deputy chairs), is not only a major cause of the inefficient internal organisation, but also has an undesirable impact on the quality of administrative decisions and the accountability of public servants. The EC has a classical organisational structure, where functions are vertically designed. The organograms is old and it lacks job descriptions and skills attached to functions. IPAC has no place in the organogram. The organogram comes from two documents, the Scheme of Service and the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Both documents need to be reviewed and revised. There is no legal department that would ensure the legality and constitutionality of the work of the EC and advise on the implementation and interpretation of the legislation. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education and guidance to improve the quality of the EC systems in place. The EC is

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rich in content; however, it lacks capacities for delivery. The electoral cycle approach can address a major weakness of event-focused institutional structure of the EC: lack of follow-up and the consolidation of gains made during the process. Monitoring Department lacks capacities to follow-up the reviews of the elections. There are no written monitoring plans. Ending the work immediately following an electoral event often results in a loss of capacity and institutional memory, which in turn often results in the need to repeat the work in the next cycle of events. For example, the voter registration is supposed to be continuous, but in practice it is periodic. The chair of EC, serves as the EC’s chief executive. She has the final say in matters of finance and administration, and also on key aspects of the electoral process. Non-executive commissioners have no proper laid down responsibilities and functions. 3.8. Leadership transition The former Chairman of the EC retired in June 2015, after serving for over two decades. This raised concerns about the process of his replacement, succession planning and institutional memory. The new chair was inaugurated in July 2015, which ended the tenure of an era and brought new generation of leadership to the EC. As the new chair lacks the experience of the previous chair, she is in danger of being exposed to criticism and to be isolated by other commissioners. The EC as it stands now is that it has completed the “first generation leadership” that started work with the establishment of the EC, its structures and operations, leading to successful management of series of elections. The former leadership laid the basis of the principles for functioning of the EC. A key element of first generation was to provide the ground for functioning of the EC. However, the current environment requires more reforms than that of the first generation and these calls for the second-generation reforms, mainly internal institutional reforms, to be introduced under the new leadership. While external image of the EC is very strong, the internal functioning of the EC and administrative innovations has missed the attention of the previous leadership. Thus, a key element of the second-generation leadership is working on the internal processes within the EC, which will provide the ground for reforming, and professionalising the EC and that will guide the internal institutional reforms. 3.9. Premises and equipment The premises of the headquarters of the EC in Accra are adequate for the needs of the EC. That being said, equipment, IT systems and furniture are in need of an upgrade and regular maintenance. Infrastructure deficiencies are more apparent at the regional and district offices. Storage places are very limited. Asset value assessments are conducted and the government sets asset disposal policy. There are no disaster assessment and recovery plans.

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3.10. Records Management The practice of archiving documentation is limited within the EC. Archiving is kept only in hard-copy. There are no electronic records. Archiving is done only for limited documentation. There are no archive of the minutes from the meetings of the Commission. There are no clear archiving, disposal and/or destruction plans. It is reported that 60% of the communication of the EC is confidential. No vetting policy is in place. 3.11. Freedom to access public information Public access to EC information is available; however, the regime is very restrictive. 3.12. Whistleblowing The Whistleblowers Protection Act was passed in 2006. It includes obligation to public employees to report illegal acts (whistleblowing). Public employees when they consider that there is violation of the laws, they are obliged to report to a competent body, CHRAJ and other relevant bodies. The whistleblowing for malpractices does exist and there have been whistleblowing to CHRAJ for malpractices in the EC. However, the EC does not have a hotline for reporting anti-corruption concerns in the EC. Corruption is mounting in the country and if it is not properly checked, it can damage the peace and stability that the country has enjoyed for a long time.

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4. COMMUNICATIONS Communication in an institution/organisation if often said to be the lifeline to the galvanizing an organization. This assessment considered both Internal and external communication at the EC where it reviewed communication between the various departments, subnational offices as well as the EC’s communication with other key stakeholders namely voters, political parties, security, media and CSO.

4.1 Internal Communication

4.1.1 Communication among the Members of the Commission

In July 2015 a new chairperson of the Commission was appointed to replace a former Chair who was the personification of the EC and who has used his interpersonal relations and intellectual capacity to relate to fellow Commissioner, stakeholders and diffused tension. The existing commissioners may be used to his management and communication style. As at this assessment, the individual members of the Commission were yet to bond as a team and information is yet to flow freely amongst the Commission members. Effective communication among the commission members will facilitate effective collective decision-making.

4.1.2 Communication among various Departments within the EC (Inter-department)

It was assessed that the middle level staff of the EC feel information sharing among different departments is not satisfactory. It is not uncommon that staff in one department have no knowledge of the activities in another department. To achieve organizational effectives all departments need communicate in order to complement each other to deliver on the Commission’s mandate. The IT Department manages the EC website, it needs information from the Public Affairs Department which also needs information from the Elections Department.

It was also assessed that it takes a long time for information to be relayed from the Head office through the regional offices to the district offices of the EC and vice versa.

Until the creation of additional districts in June 2012 which brings the total to 216 districts, the EC has been able to establish offices in all the then 170 districts. The Commission is yet to have district officers stationed in all the districts in the country. The presence of some officers in the head office having the responsibility over newly created districts has enabled the EC to begin planning its operations in the new districts. However, district officers need to be present at all districts to enable them familiarize themselves with the existing dynamics of their area of responsibility

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4.1.3 Intra-departmental Communication within the EC

Currently heads of departments of the EC hold planning meetings to discuss policies and activities initiated at the Commissioners level. Information generated at these meetings do not trickle down to the other staff members of the department.

4.2 External Communication

4.2.1 Communication between the EC and political parties

The EC has considered political parties as its main stakeholders and has establish the interparty advisory committee (IPAC), which has been a forum for discussion EC’s decisions before it is put into a policy. Even though the IPAC has no legal backing, it has cumulatively contributed to the enhancement of the performance of EC’s functions. Beyond EC’s interaction with Political Parties at IPAC level, political parties are of the opinion that they, on one hand, respond quickly to correspondence from the EC but the EC, on the other hand, does not do likewise when they send correspondence to the Commission.

4.2.2 Communication between EC and the Public

The EC is under no obligation to produce activity reports which should be published on the website for the public to appreciate its work thereby engendering public confidence and trust. In the absence of such regular reports the Electoral Commission has also invariably been unable to communicate its constraints to the public.

Over the years the Public Affairs Department of the EC has been reactionary rather than being proactive. It should be more forthright coming out with information before political parties come up with allegations in the public domain.

One crucial issue for the EC to resolve timeously before the 2016 election is the acceptability of the current Voter Register. The Commission is yet to explain adequately its intension on the issue and the fact that the NDC is responding quickly to the issue on many platforms gives the public the impression that the NDC is serving as the mouthpiece of the EC, a situation that is dangerous.

4.2.3 Communication between EC and Civil society

The Electoral Commission’s interaction with Civil Society has been limited to a few occasions where proposals for electoral reforms was requested from the EC in 2014. Civil Society would have wished to be an integral part of IPAC discussions where it

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can provide non-partisan and technical input to enrich the discussions. The IPAC is a limited binary model of stakeholder consultation. The EC needs a multi-actor approach with more technical think tanks to be part of its consultation process

4.2.4 Communication with the media

Currently the EC has limited interaction with the media though the Public Affaires Department has good relations with the media. The EC could establish a media advisory committee (IMAC), which would bring together senior editors of the various media houses. This would contribute to image building of the EC, professionalism of the media and voter education opportunities.

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V. PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS 1. Intersectoral coordination arrangements: In order to enhance inter-sectoral

coordination as regards electoral processes, the EC should initiate signing of a protocol or memorandum of understanding with other government ministries and institutions to contribute to better organisation of the elections. Similar arrangement should be considered with oversight bodies such as Parliament, CHRAJ, NMC, NCCE, Auditor-General, Ghana Police and other bodies for institutional reforms within the EC. The coordination arrangements should regulate the manner of cooperation, coordination and implementation of joint activities particularly with regards to exchange of information, and coordination of actions.

2. Reporting: As part of its accountability, the EC should initiate preparation of an

annual report on its activities performed during a calendar year and make the same available to the wider public.

3. Ex-officio measures: EC should start tackling the electoral irregularities and not

leave everything to be tackled by the courts. 4. Post-election review process: The EC should conduct post-election review after

each election is held. Election related civil society organisation may be invited to provided input. Post-election review process offers a window of opportunity to identify and analyse the strengths and weaknesses.

5. Recruitment and promotion: Improvements to the key procedures are necessary

in order to ensure that the principles of transparent, apolitical, merit-based recruitments and promotions are embedded in the EC. A distinction may be made between recruitment to: Entry positions; and higher positions (directors and assistant directors). Whereas the merit principle should apply fully in the first case, appointment to directorial positions should at least balance elements of the merit principle with political requirements and realities in the country.

6. Temporary staff: The EC must examine recruitment and training of its temporal

staff. The training should take a little longer to enable them acquire the much needed skills and knowledge so that they are able to discharge their functions creditably. The issue of recruitment and training of the temporary staff should be addressed thoroughly and comprehensively. It is important that the EC invest sufficient time and resources to train them on their election-day duties and tasks. Temporary staff should be adequately trained for at least a three-month period, spread over a year before elections. The EC needs to devise appropriate strategies to promote the effective use of temporary staff. These can include:

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timely recruitment processes; standardized trainings organized for the needs of the temporary staff; and measures to maintain contact with temporary staff between electoral events, such as databases or rosters. Such measures can be particularly appropriate for the EC. Furthermore, the EC can introduce an enforceable code of conduct signed by its temporary staff during elections. The EC should consider collaborating with the NCCE and other professional training bodies to design its training manuals and to train its field officials on electoral laws and election administration.

7. Training: There is the need for establishment of a systematic training system that

would provide regular training to the EC staff members as well as to police and judges responsible to handle election related disputes. EC needs to acquire the skills in training and has to ensure that all election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, are well trained by skilled trainers and have the necessary skills to apply high professional standards in their technical work. A BRIDGE Train the Facilitator course could be organised for EC senior staff. (BRIDGE: Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections. www.bridge-project.org )

8. The EC has to enhance its capacity in modern and professional logistics

management system for efficient deployment and tracking of election materials to avoid delay and shortages.

9. A review of the EC’s provision for early voting should be undertaken to avoid a

situation where security officials and other persons needed on election day are unavailable at post.

10. Gender policy: Although the national gender equality legislation is not yet in place,

the EC should establish elements of gender equality and mainstreaming in its work. It is important to ensure that women are fully represented at all levels of the EC secretariat and in its temporary election staff—as polling station staff and managers. New chair of EC, who is a woman, should be able to make significant gains. The new EC chair should ensure that EC gender adviser is part of the electoral processes so that a gender perspective would be factored into the design of the EC activities. In order to ensure that women can participate fully in all aspects of the work of the EC and in all electoral cycles, the EC should consider adopting an internal gender policy, with a gender audit that would map gender related past and future activities of the EC. The EC should also consider designating senior staff member who oversees gender inclusion within the EC and wider in the electoral processes.

11. Youth: A department should be assigned responsibility for engaging with youth

constituency.

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12. Management of donor funds: The EC should consider establishing sound financial and audit mechanisms for channelling large-scale donor contributions to electoral processes. The EC should build capacities in project management to be able manage larger funds and be able to receive budgetary support.

13. Procurement: The EC should develop a procurement plan detailing the items to

be procured, the budget available, the persons responsible and the deadlines for the implementation of the plan. In order to secure transparency it is advisable that these procurement plans are published.

14. Internal Audit: In order to strengthen the audit function, the EC should consider

elevating the function of the Internal Audit by establishing an Internal Audit Department, composed of two units: Financial Audit Unit and System Audit Unit. Also, the internal audit should be performed on the basis of a strategic plan that is valid for more than one year to three years period, an annual plan, and an individual plan for each audit to be conducted.

15. A unit within the EC should be assigned and equipped to monitor political party

activities and verify the political parties expenditure.

16. IT: The EC must provide adequate protection to the biometric registration and verification equipment to prevent equipment breakdown. The IT Department should, as a matter of urgency should work toward taking over fully the management of the biometric system.

17. Fire: The EC must make provision for fire protection of its premises and assets at

both the national and subnational offices. 18. EC should consider conducting an audit of the existing voters register.

19. Organizational framework: The EC should consider reorganising itself into a

structure that would deliver under the electoral cycle approach and be fit for purpose. The EC’s work needs not be voting day bound and restricted to voting phase.

20. Communication: The EC should develop a communication strategy to guide its

intra-departmental and interdepartmental relations as well as communication with its stakeholders.

21. Legal department: The EC is in need of establishing a legal department that

would ensure the legality in the work of the EC and advise the EC effectively in law reform processes.

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22. Tackling corruption allegations: The EC should assign a person who can be contacted for corruption allegations. People, from inside and outside, should be able to report bribery and anti-corruption concerns by telephone and/or electronically to the EC.

23. Efforts should be made to build the Commission members to a strong team. ANNEXES Annex 1: Documents Reviewed Legislation Constitution (Articles 43-46), 1992 District Assembly Elections Act (473), 1994 Electoral Commission Act (451), 1993 Electoral Commission (Amendment) Act (Act 655), 2003 Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003. Political Parties Law Act (574), 2000 Public Elections Regulations (CI 75), 2012 Public Procurement Act (663), 2003 Whistleblowers Act (720), 2006 Books, Papers, Reports African Union Election Observer. (2012). 2012 general elections in the Republic of Ghana. Afrobarometer. (2008). Popular Attitudes to Democracy in Ghana. Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and Electoral Politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, Critical Perspectives No. 18, Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development, CDD-Ghana. CHRAJ. (2009-2014). Annual Reports. Accra.

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COFFEY. (2013). Evaluation of the Ghana Electoral Support Programme. Final Evaluation Report. DCP Ghana 524. Debrah, E. et al. (2010). “A Study of Ghana’s Electoral Commission,” (Dakar, Senegal: Consortium for Development Partnerships, Governance and Institution-Building in Africa, CODESRIA). Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Brobbey, V. (2012). Countries at the Crossroads: Ghana. Hounkpe, M., and Fall, I.M. (2011). Electoral Commissions in West Africa: A Comparative Study, 2nd ed., Abuja: Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

IDEA. (2014). Electoral Law Reform in Africa. IDEA. (2014). Electoral Management Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. IDEA. (2012). Electoral Management during Transition Challenges and Opportunities. Kissi, E. A. (2012). Electoral Commission and Election Management in Ghana (1993-2008). University of Ghana. Mozaffar, S. (2002). “Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa’s Emerging Democracies”, International Political Science Review, vol. 23. No. 1, pp. 85-101. OECD. (2014). Principles for international electoral assistance. Open Society Foundations. (2011). Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy. Oquaye, M. (2012). Strengthening Ghana's Electoral System: a Precondition for Stability and Development. Institute of Economic Affairs. Osafo-Danso, R. (2015). Beyond Elections: Ghana's Democracy from the Perspective of the Citizenry. Walden University. Smith, D.A. (2011). “The Re-demarcation and Reapportionment of Parliamentary Constituencies in Ghana”, Briefing Paper, Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), October (10:2). UNDP-European Commission. Partnership for Electoral Assistance. UNDP. (2015). Conduct of an Institutional Assessment and the Development a Strategic Plan for the Electoral Commission of Ghana. Terms of References. Ghana.

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USAID. (2014). Public Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework - Ghana Electoral Commission. USAID. (2011). Ghana democracy and governance assessment.

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Annex 2: Persons/Institutions Interviewed David Appiah, Governance Adviser, UNDP, 27 July 2015, Accra Dominic Sam, Country Director, UNDP, 27 July 2015, Accra Charlotte A. Osei, Chairperson, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Amadu Sulley, Commissioner, Deputy Chairperson, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Georgina Opoku Amankwaa, Commissioner, Deputy Chairperson, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Director, Training, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Director, Human Resource and General Services, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Director, Research, Monitoring and Evaluation, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Director, Elections, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Director, Public Affairs, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Assistant Director, Human Resource and General Services, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Hamid Kodie Fisa, Donor coordination, EC, 28 July 2015, Accra Director, Finance, EC, 29 July 2015, Accra Gender and Disability; Elections, Internal Audit; Asset Management; Supply; Accounts; Treasury; and Registry departments/units, EC, 29 July 2015, Accra Assistant Director, IT, EC, 29 July 2015, Accra IT Department, EC, 29 July 2015, Accra Francesco Torcoli, EU Delegation, 29 July 2015, Accra Director for Public Affairs, NCCE, 30 July 2015, Accra Ghana Centre for Democratic Development / Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), 30 July 2015, Accra

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Youth Bridge Foundation, 31 July 2015, Accra USAID, 3 August 2015, Accra Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, 3 August 2015, Accra New Patriotic Party, 4 August 2015, Accra Institute for Democratic Governance, 4 August 2015, Accra UK High Commission, 5 August 2015, Accra National Democratic Congress, 5 August 2015, Accra ABANTU for Development, 5 August 2015, Accra Institute of Economic Affairs, 6 August 2015, Accra National Media Commission, 6 August 2015, Accra National Peace Council, 6 August 2015, Accra Ministry of Interior, 7 August 2015, Accra