Concord Review Final Draft for National Writing Board

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Slovak Nationalism and the Prague Spring: Dividing the Reform Movement

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The events of 1968 Czechoslovakia have been termed the Prague Spring, an exciting time

of change and renewal in which the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), led by

Alexander Dubek, appeared to relax its frozen grip on the masses. Yet the term itself Prague

Spring is somewhat a misnomer, offering a Czech-centric outlook of the event. The second part

of Czechoslovak society, the Slovaks, played just as remarkable a function, at times leading the

reforms and at times holding them back. To ignore the party played by Slovaks such as Gustv

Husk and Ladislav Mako is to do a great disservice to any analysis of the era.

This essay will attempt to discern the effect of Slovak nationalism upon the direction of the

Prague Spring and its aftermath. It will use scholar Paal Hildes definition of nationalism, a set

of demands made on behalf of a group of people characterized most often by a separate culture

(and language in particular),1 because he approaches the subject in the same manner this essay

does.

There have been several studies conducted on the Prague Spring. Of these, Gordon Skillings

work is perhaps the most distinguished; his study Czechoslovakias Interrupted Revolution is the

foremost authority on the Prague Spring. He views Slovak nationalism during the Prague Spring

as a distraction from the more important subject of democratization: The Slovaks, on the other

hand, had a kind of obsession with the overriding importance of federalism. 2 Vladimir Kusin is

even more emphatic on this point. One cannot help but feeling, when looking at the

development of Slovak aspirations in 1968, that they were largely motivated by national factors

as opposed to the political reform sought by Czechs, he writes. 3 Galia Golan, another notable

scholar, devotes much ofReform Rule in Czechoslovakia comparing Czech and Slovak reactions


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to the plight of the reform movement after the Soviet invasion. She finds the Slovaks generally

less willing to support the liberals.4

Unfortunately, few of the aforementioned studies concentrate solely on Slovaks and their role

in the Prague Spring; instead the subject is addressed as a secondary concern to Czech

developments. Vladimir Kusin, for example, allocates one chapter to nationalities; half of it

concentrates on minorities other than Slovaks. In addition, much analysis of the Prague Spring

focuses on the Kremlins point-of-view during 1968 or utilizes the Prague Spring as a model to

prove a point. These studies, such as Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, by Ji

Valenta

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, orThe Origins of Postcommunist Elites, by Gil Eyal

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, devote even less space toSlovakias role. Most problematically, no studies touch upon the fate of federalization after

Gustv Husk became First Secretary. Since federalization was the main initiative of Slovak

nationalists, the failure to mention its outcome is a major oversight.

This essay will attempt to amend these gaps in scholarship on the Prague Spring. It concludes

that on the whole, and especially during aftermath of the Soviet intervention, Slovaks played a

remarkably negative role. During the Prague Spring, Slovak nationalism became a dragging

anchor upon the liberalization movement, simply because Slovaks concentrated on federalization

rather than democratization. It conflicted with other forces, such as the faction advocating

economic reform; often Slovak nationalism took the less progressive side in the disputes. And

during the Soviet-enforced normalization era, conservatives, most notably Gustv Husk, used

the Slovak card to undermine the remaining liberal reformers. After the liberals were defeated,

they then betrayed the Slovak nationalist program by discontinuing the reforms it had

championed.


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The Czech-Slovak Experience

When Thomas Masaryk founded the union of Czechs and Slovaks from the ashes of Austria-

Hungary, he united a prosperous and advanced people (the Czechs) with an impoverished,

unindustrialized, and mostly uneducated people (the Slovaks). Naturally, the former group

dominated the First Republic, arousing resentment among the Slovaks who increasingly viewed

themselves as a distinct nation. This was not the desire of Masaryk, who attempted to avoid the

division; he sought to merge the Czechs and Slovaks into one people, to erase their differences. 7

But Slovaks had a separate culture, a separate history, and most importantly a separatelanguage. They inevitably found a separate Slovak consciousness.

Growing Slovak nationalism8 the so-called Slovak Question expressed itself in the

nationalist Slovak Peoples Party, which consistently won large minorities of the vote, and,

during the second world war, an independent Slovak nation in reality a puppet pulled by

German strings. After the war, with this in mind, President Edvard Bees of the reunited

Czechoslovak state granted the Slovaks autonomy under the post-war Koice Program.9

The 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia laid the dream of autonomy to rest. The

leading role of the party a vague and nebulous term essentially guaranteeing communist

dictatorship became enshrined in the constitution, and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

(CPCz) took control. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) was relegated to a

powerless national10 organ.

During these years, the regimes policy in relation to Slovak autonomy could best be

summed up by its official term democratic centralism. It held that peculiar Soviet

interpretation of these words (that is, the CPCz, pretended the adjective democratic did not


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exist). Slovak national government was thoroughly smashed by Pragues iron fist. Then-leader of

Slovakia, Alexander Dubek, wrote in his memoirs that it was impossible to propose any action

without express permission from Prague.11 Most grievously, high communist figures Gustv

Husk, Vladimr Clementis, poet Ladislav Novomesk were imprisoned or executed (in

Clementiss case) on charges of bourgeois nationalism.12

During this period, Czechoslovak politics was dominated by two-point apparatus consisting

of the official government and the unofficial party. For clarity, it is necessary to detail the

structure of both. In the government

13

, all major organizations were required to participatewithin the framework of a National Front. The legislative branch was the National Assembly

largely a rubber-stamp organ during the communist years. The executive composed of a

president (often the party leader), a prime minister, deputy prime ministers, a cabinet,

coordinating federal committees, and federal ministries, of which there were roughly a dozen.

All executive posts were controlled by the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

(CPCz), which held real power. The judiciary was composed of a Supreme Court, district and

regional courts, and an Office of the Prosecutor, or the procuracy. Finally, there was the local

government, the national committees, which the party used as the instruments of its penetration

into local politics. In Slovakia there was a separate communist party with separate government

bodies, including the executive Board of Commissioners and the legislative Slovak National

Council (SNC).

The structure of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) was as follows. 14 The

Central Committee (CC) was the ruling body of the CPCz and by law elected by a special

congress (e.g. the Twelfth Party Congress) which set out general policy for future years.


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Officially, it elected a Presidium (or Politburo, a term more familiar to Westerners), a First

Secretary, and a Secretariat as the executive. Under the Secretariat was the all-encompassing

apart, or bureaucracy, which held vast power. The Central Committee was also responsible for

implementing the decisions made at the special congress. In reality, the First Secretary was the

de facto dictator, who determined the composition of all the other party organs. The CC and

party congresses, in practice, functioned as rubber-stamps of the Presidium.

It is ironic, regarding Slovak nationalisms later character, to note that in these beginning

years Slovak nationalists in fact led the reform movement.

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The Slovak nationalist was incensedby the repressive conditions of democratic centralism16: he or she was humiliated by the lack of

national autonomy; offended by the behavior of President and First Secretary Antonn Novotn,

who knew practically nothing of Slovak affairs nor desired to amend this fault; and, most of all,

angered by both the failure to rehabilitate the so-called bourgeois nationalists and the continuing

presence of those high officials (Karol Baclek, Viliam irok, Bruno Khler, Josef Urvlek,

Pavol David, tefan Rais, and Novotn himself) who had orchestrated their trials.

Slovak writers were especially assertive, using their newspaper weeklyKultrny ivotas a

mouthpiece. They demanded full rehabilitation during the landmark 1963 Slovak Writers Union

Congress, which was followed by the equally combative congresses of the Czechoslovak writers

as a whole and of the Slovak journalists.

These reformers efforts yielded success in the Kolder Commission Report, which partially

rehabilitated Husk and others. Baclek, Khler, and Pavol David were demoted very much

against Novotns will to be replaced by Frantiek Penc, estmr Csa, and Alexander


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Dubek, liberals17 of a kind the CPCz had never experienced before. In December 1963, the

Barnabite Commission invalidated once-and-for-all the charges of bourgeois nationalism.18

In the meantime, to allay Slovak demands for autonomy, the party took a second look at the

castrated national government.19 It modestly expanded the SNCs executive and legislative

functions. In addition, the local government organs the National Committees were once more

placed under Slovak National Council (SNC) control, while the demoted Board of

Commissioners was strengthened.

In the aftermath of these reforms and concessions, Slovak pressure subsided somewhat, only

to be reignited by the controversies of First Secretary and President Antonn Novotn. Alreadywidely disliked for both his role in the bourgeois nationalist trials and his repeated denunciations

of greater Slovak autonomy (the wrong side on both issues), he embarked in August, 1967 on a

disastrous trip to Slovakia, where he insulted the national symbol of Slovakia, the Matica

Slovensk20 a national cultural institution for lovers of Slovak life and nation which had

been relegated to a library under communist rule.

Slovaks, especially the writers community, quickly fell behind the liberal cause of the

moment, the return ofLiterrn noviny.21 This was the magazine of Czechoslovak Writers

Union, and a political crackdown had transferred control of the weekly to the security elements.

Then, at the October plenum (meeting) of the Czechoslovak partys ruling body, the Central

Committee (CC), Dubek began an attack Novotn.22 His speech, although couched in standard

communist rhetoric, brought the Slovak Question into the open. He stated:

we must make a substantial contribution to consolidate the unity of our peopleand of Czechoslovak statehood in view of relations between the nationalities[Czechs and Slovaks]The policy of leveling out discrepancies and of creatingequal conditions for the work and life of people in all parts of our CzechoslovakRepublic [parity], as laid down by the party, remains the primary way tostrengthen this unityWhere Slovakia is concerned, this requires more so than


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in the recent past the rectification ofthe partys perception of our revolutionarynational past [bourgeois nationalism].23

Slovak politicians lined up behind Dubek, their nationalist sentiment aroused when Novotn

labeled him a bourgeois nationalist, with its direct link to the purges that had deprived Slovakiaof its most respected leaders. Party members at a Prague conference fully backed Dubek, the

Slovak Central Committee offered up support, and the majority of the Slovak Presidium

supported the call for Novotns resignation.

Under pressure, Novotn relinquished his post to Alexander Dubek on January 5, 1968. He

in turn appointed Vasil Bilak to the now vacant post of CPS First Secretary a critical

development, of which more will be said later. Thus, Slovak nationalist anger, stoked by the ill-

timed remarks of Novotn, played a crucial role in his replacement by Dubek, along with other

factors propitious economic decline, the Fourth Czechoslovak Writers Union Congress, the

controversy overLiterrn noviny, and anger over police brutality during the student Strahov

protest. Its role in the forthcoming months, however, would undergo a drastic refinement.

Slovakia and the Prague Spring Proper

The advent of Dubek marked the beginning of the Prague Spring. A varied and eclectic mix

of reforms was proposed, varying from the idea of working peoples councils to a revived role

for the National Assembly, the state legislature. The overarching theme was democratization.

Mass organizations were no longer to be transmission belts of the Presidiums will but

independent interest groups for the people they represented. Old practices the frowning on

intra-party dissent, the ban on pluralism were questioned and revised. Public opinion became a

major influence on government decisions and, with the ending of censorship, it was free to be


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expressed by the increasingly active press. An extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, which

would replace the previous CC, was to be convened, most likely tilting the party in a much more

liberal direction. All this was advanced in the dark backdrop of growing Soviet displeasure,

finding expression in the Warsaw letter (a condemnation of the spring by the U.S.S.R., East

Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary), extended military exercises next to Czechoslovakia,

polemics in MoscowPravda, bilateral Soviet-Czech conferences at ierna nad Tisou and

Bratislava, personal calls and letters from Brezhnev to Dubek, and when all the above proved

insufficient invasion. Finally, of course, there was the Slovak Question. Slovaks demanded

federalization, a program that would become a near synonym for Slovak nationalism.Throughout the Prague Spring, the masses in Slovakia insisted on the nationalist program,

placing a continual pressure upon the powers-that-be. The people did not visibly express

themselves there were few marches or strikes during the period, because the politicians were

already in full-throttled support of Slovak nationalism. But the power they wielded was very real.

Without the streets presence the CPCz would not have listened when the Slovak intelligentsia

urged that federalization be enacted faster or that nationality demands be rejected or that Slovak

nationalism be satisfied in some other manner. The intelligentsia articulated the will of the

Slovak people during the post-January days. Meanwhile, the streets opinions remained in the

background, present and influential but rarely observable, throughout the entire period save the

week of Soviet invasion.

Slovak nationalism expressed itself through federalization, an attempt to resolve the Slovak

Question.24 Slovaks posited that, under the existing asymmetrical system, in which national

Slovak organs did not have corresponding Czech organs, Czech interests had been instead


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represented at the state level dominated as it was by Czechs to the detriment of Slovaks

everywhere. For example, whilst Slovak interests were embodied by the Slovak Communist

Party (CPS), there was no Czech Communist Party to embody Czech interests. Instead, the

Czechs dominated the general Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), and because the

CPCz had authority over both Czechs and Slovaks, Slovak interests were always put second to

Czech ones. Creating symmetrical Czech organs and ensuring Slovak influence at the state level

was the solution to this dilemma. Thus, federalization.

This subject had long been quietly discussed among Slovak thinkers and theorists, notably

economist Viktor Pavlenda and historian Daniel Rapant. By the time Novotn had fallen, therewas a general consensus that federalization was necessary to reform Czech-Slovak relations. The

Law Faculty of Komensk University in Bratislava openly broached the idea in mid-March. All

government organs including the party and mass organizations would divide into Czech and

existing Slovak sub-organs, united by a greater Czechoslovak main organ. The division of

competence (government authority) was to be tilted in favor of the nations. To safeguard Slovak

interests in state government, a variety of changes were suggested: Slovak veto power in the

National Assembly, a Slovak branch of the Supreme Court, and Slovak state secretaries. All this

was to be embodied in a rewritten constitution to officially incorporate the changes.

The proposal quickly gained the approval of the Slovak public, which supported

federalization versus improved asymmetry at a 4:1 margin.25 The Slovak party was also

enthusiastic; the SNC approved the program and previously resistant First Secretary Vasil Bilak

commented that the Slovak CC would be a co-creator, equal in rights, or all-state

conceptions.26 The party set a deadline of June to draft the law and October 28, 1968 to adopt it.


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In the meantime, the powerful state organizations the trade unions, the Union of Youth, and the

Union of Writers began the process of federalization.

The CPCz was more hesitant than the CPS. As late as April, the Presidium called for

fulfilling, without residue, the possibilities of the asymmetrical model.27 Nevertheless, the all-

important Action Program stated:

Let it be stressed that the very asymmetrical arrangement was unsuited by its verycharacter to express the relations between two independent nations. Thedifference was mainly in the fact that the Czech national bodies were identicalwith the central one which, having jurisdiction over all the state, were superior tothe Slovak national bodies. This prevented the Slovak nation, to all intents andpurposes, from taking an equal share in the creation and realization of a country-

wide policy.

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Belatedly, official steps were taken. A government commission was appointed in late May to

draft the law, with an expert sub-committee headed by the rehabilitated Husk, who had become

chief proponent of federalization. Preparations for the Fourteenth Congress proceeded with the

understanding that the constitution would be amended to reflect federalization. In early July, a

Czech National Council was formed by the National Assembly to parallel the existing Slovak

National Council.

The formation of Czech national organizations met with Czech surprise. Many Czechs, while

vaguely supportive of federalization insofar as it was a Slovak-only affair, were ignorant of its

requirement of Czech organs. Thus a major reformer like Frantiek Kriegel could express favor

of federalization but in the same interview repudiate its main proposal of Czech organizations as

our own concern.29 This reflected Czech attitudes in general to Slovak nationalism embodied

in demands for federalization, characterized as disinterested in a purely Slovak affair.30Nevertheless, there were some Czechs knowledgeable about the topic, and their view stressed

a greater role for the central government. Its conflict with Slovak emphasis on local power found


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greatest play in Husks sub-committee of experts. Czech proponents Grospi and Jinsk

proposed a closed federation, focused on strong state powers. To counter, Slovaks offered a

so-called compromise which really was pure Slovak advocacy.

In general, Slovaks pushed for greater local government powers, whereas Czechs pushed for

a stronger central government. That this was so gives credence to the Slovak critique of the

asymmetrical system. Czechs, whatever their pretenses, recognized that they were best off with

the central system they so dominated. Keeping as much authority as possible in its hands was a

tacit acknowledgement of this fact the de facto Czech rule of Slovakia under the asymmetrical

system. On the other hand, the Slovak concept of federalization, which envisioned practically aconfederacy, was inefficient at best and unworkable at worst.

The conflict over economics illustrated this difficulty. Here, a number of Czech reformers,

led by economist Ota ik, had proposed market-oriented reforms for as long as Slovaks had

endorsed rehabilitation. These two currents of reform collided: the Slovak demand for economic

autonomy was understood by the economists (correctly) as a prelude to backslide in Slovakia

from economic reforms. Czechs were concerned by the possibility of chaos resulting from

Slovak proposals for, most disturbingly, separate currencies, independent taxation and trade

policy, and separate budgets. It was practically impossible to encourage economic growth and

implement reform if the two nations adopted opposite economic policies.

Slovaks responded defensively. Viktor Pavlenda, perhaps the best-known economist in favor

of federalization, countered that the Czechs wanted excessive centralization.31 The Slovak

Planning Committee stated:

It is not possible as some prominent Czech economists and officials of centralorgans in Prague are doing to demand in one breath high relative independence


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for individual enterprises and the integrated grouping of enterprises according tothe work they do, and to deny the right of relatively independent policy of [theCzech and Slovak] nations.32

It was eventually accepted that control of the main powers at issue would be placed in a group of

common affairs, divided in competence between the state and nation. This did not really solve

the problem; the exact division of control was not defined, and the conflict was still unresolved

when the Soviets invaded.

The second area of contention was the degree of Slovak influence at the state level, or the

issue of parity. Slovaks aimed to prevent majorizcia, a Slovak term loosely translating todomination by the majority. Czechs, on the other hand, believed that parity as a principle was

undemocratic a happy coincidence given their far superior population. To this, Slovak Ji

Brabec responded, Among nations, only one arithmetic is valid: one nation, one vote. 33

The general outlines of the coming law on the issue of parity were more reflective of

moderate Czech opinions than radical Slovak elements. The National Assembly was to be

divided into two; a Chamber of the People would be elected proportional to the population,

whereas a Chamber of Nations would have equal Czech and Slovak members. The executive

would include state secretaries, but no other concessions were made in this branch. Finally, the

issue of parity in the judicial system was left essentially open, awaiting later consideration,

although it was agreed that a supreme Constitutional Court with parity should exist.

With this, the expert commission submitted its report in mid-August and prepared a draft law

to be put forward on October 28, the CPS deadline. The draft did not differ significantly from

what has been mentioned above. Both the committees draft and submission, however, did not

plan for parity in the topmost organs of the CPCz, namely the CC, Presidium, and Secretariat.


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This was of utmost importance, for even in the quasi-democracy that was 1968 Czechoslovakia,

these organs held nearly all power in the country. To apply federalization to everything except

what really mattered was not to apply federalization at all.

It is apparent, reading through the multiple writings of the Slovak reformists, that there is too

much the dreamer and too little the realist in them. Slovaks will be given autonomy, but their

interests will always coincide with greater Czechoslovak needs, so the two will never conflict.

Federalization will be applied to the National Assembly and executive ministries but not the all-

important Presidium or Secretariat.This problem extends to many intellectuals of the wider Prague Spring, who did not seem to

see or refused to see potential problems implementing their carefully conceived plans.

Pluralism was sanctioned, but the reestablishment of the only party the Social Democrats that

could truly challenge the communists and command mass support was prohibited. The desires of

workers and managers naturally diverged, but the working peoples councils would supposedly

fix this unsolvable problem. Constant Soviet displeasure would disappear if only they could

understand that the reforms really werent anti-Soviet (they were, and the Soviets understood this

perfectly, better than the CPCz did). Dubek would convince them this time. This belief

prevailed in President Ludvk Svoboda even as Soviet tanks were rolling into Prague.34

The most prominent supporter of federalization, however, was more than a mere dreamer.

From the very beginning Gustv Husk used Slovak nationalism for his political gain and the

ultimate loss of Czechoslovakia. Husk was a true believer in Slovak autonomy he had gone to

prison for it, after all but he was also an adept politician willing to denounce his previous


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beliefs before his purge. 35 This self-criticism, in the parlance of communist literature, had of

course proven futile, as all self-criticism was in the party, and Husk was locked up for nearly a

decade. After Dubeks rise, however, his star was rising and that of his jailors had fallen. The

forthcoming Fourteenth Congress would be of paramount importance for the future of

federalism, and with it Husk could unseat Vasil Bilak as First Secretary of the CPS, if he

played his cards correctly.

Vasil Bilak was a neo-conservative (a pre-January liberal who had turned against what he

saw as the excesses of the Prague Spring) and paranoid to the extreme, afraid that a revolutionary

mob might one day lynch him.

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He frequently made statements against anti-socialist orcounterrevolutionary forces and eventually signed a secret letter inviting Soviet troops to crush

the Prague Spring.37

Unsurprisingly, Bilak had not been a pioneer of federalization 38 and it was on this issue that

Husk pressed him. He appealed to the party for an extraordinary Slovak Party Congress before

the general one, in order to present a unified Slovak platform there. This was a signal attack

against Bilak, who had consistently supported a Slovak congress after the general one, and it

met with much enthusiasm. The Bratislava municipal conference at which he had spoken

approved Husks recommendation, followed by the West Slovak and Central Slovak regional

conferences. Only the East Slovak conference held to Bilaks line, but with two-thirds of the

party against him, he was forced to concede on July 18.39

Husk followed up his victory with attacks on the lack of democratization in Slovakia, as

contrasted to Bohemia or Moravia. Because of Bilaks conservative sycophants, the country had

stopped at mid-course.40 Bilak, his position increasingly weakened, was forced to self-

criticize never a good sign for ones position in a communist country. Whether Husk could


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ultimately have toppled his opponent this way will never be known, however, for a few days

later the Soviets invaded.

It can not be concluded, as Husk charged, that the presence of conservative leaders in

Slovakia caused the generally more conservative climate, rather than vice versa. In the liberal

Czech region conservatives such as Alois Indra and Drahomr Kolder retained high positions.

Rud prvo had conservative Oldich vestka as editor-in-chief, yet its positions were frequently

more liberal than that of the party, despite being its official newspaper. During the turbulent

months of the Prague Spring, the masses directly influenced the government; public opinion,considering democratization secondary to federalization and, by extension, nationalism, led the

CPS to consider democratization secondary to federalization.

Nevertheless, Husk was correct in that Slovakia had fallen behind. The most obvious

manifestation was that there was a debate at all over the lack of progress. Bilaks defense that

Slovakia had started reforming in 1963, whereas the Czechs had begun only in January 1968, did

not hold much water in the face of overwhelming evidence pointing to Husks standpoint.

One did not have to look far to find Slovak conservatism. No radical KAN or K 231 existed

in Slovakia.41 The former club had the potential to become a powerful political party; the latter

organization consisted of former political prisoners lobbying for unconditional release of all

remaining persons in jail; both were powerful in Czech regions. When demand for an

extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress mounted in Czech lands, not one regional Slovak

conference lent support.42 While the Czech League of Human Rights was granted a license, its

Slovak counterpart was denied this privilege.43 Most revealingly, the CPS CCs response to the

Warsaw letter, a condemnation of the Prague Spring by Moscow and four allies (Bulgaria, East


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Germany, Hungary and Poland), referred to anti-socialist elements to be rebuffed and

suppressed44 not mentioned in the answer of the general CPCz. That answer was a courageous

rebuttal renowned in the Prague Springs annals.

Thus, the situation in Slovakia was indeed one in which extreme radical [liberal] elements

were largely absent, in the words of Gordon Skilling. 45 In large part this was due to the pursuit

of federalization above all else. One poll found that Slovaks considered democratization as

second in importance to national equality; Czechs considered it as paramount. 46 Another

indicated that Slovaks felt that, out of eleven choices, the deepening of democracy was of least

import; Czechs placed it third, excluding economic issues.

47

The malaise was strong (if not stronger) in the intellectual community. In particular, an

Appeal to Czechs and Slovaks assaulted old Czechoslovakist centralist spiritwhich

sometimes affected the consideration of federalization.48 The timing of the document, on which

the signatures of prominent Slovak spokesmen could be found, was striking, occurring at the

hour of a critical Czechoslovak-Soviet meeting at ierna. Unity was essential: the Soviets would

exploit any divisions amongst Czechoslovaks, and yet the divisive Appeal was released at that

very time.

Most famously there was the split of Slovak writers.49 The pretext was a trip by well-known

writer Ladislav Mako, who had traveled to Israel in protest of the regimes anti-Israeli policy

a Soviet-ordered stand against the grain of many in the intelligentsia. In punishment, Mako

had been exiled, causing much consternation amongst his colleagues. The continued progressive

voiceKultrny ivotdefended Mako on March 15.

Apparently a number of writers did not feel the same way about him. Their ranks included

Kultrny ivoteditorial board chairman Ladislav Novomesk and editors Miroslav Valk and


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Vojtech Mihlik. They resigned from the journal in protest and aired their view in a contentious

writers conference, dated April 30. The protestors then joined the cultural weekly Predvoj, to be

renamedNov slovo in honor of a WWII newspaper of the same name under Husk. It would

soon take on a staunchly nationalist line that placed other concerns, including democratization,

second. When these subjects were addressed, the commentary was noticeably more conservative

than onKultrny ivot.

Here was the issue behind the scenes leading to the split: the importance of federalization in

contrast to democratization. The so-called federalists, or nationalists, had a difference of

world outlook compared with the liberals.

50

Indeed, Slovak nationalism was a strong factor inthe Mako controversy itself it was not completely a pretext for traditionally Slovak

nationalists had been anti-Semitic, and so Slovak nationalists were loath to support Israel. This

was especially true when Mako asserted that anti-Semitism foreshadowed a return to the 1950s

purges51; in doing so he indirectly insulted Slovak nationalism.

Husks influence in the chain of events was readily discerned, first and foremost by the

origin of the nameNov slovo. Then too, there was his deep and abiding friendship with

Novomesk, leader of the rebelling writers. Both would support (in Husks case, orchestrate)

the normalization era of renewed communist dictatorship after the invasion. Novomesk said

as much during the fireworks of the writers conference. Kultrny ivothad given space to non-

Communist view. It was far too liberal. Novomesk did not wish to be present at the

liquidation of socialism.52

Slovak nationalism had led Novomesk and his comrades to jump ship. In doing so, it

severely retarded the reform movement in Slovakia. Post-January Czechoslovakia had been the

child of the writing community more than any other, and a schism among the main proponents of


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reform dealt lasting damage.

Several voices evidently had recognized the danger nationalism posed. The Slovak Economic

Society was disquieted by the democratization process in Slovakia being one-sidedly geared

toward federalization.53 The Slovak Film and Television Artists Union announced:

Both the Czech and the Slovak cultural communities feel that Slovakiascontribution to the current movement in this country is less than fullWe declarethat we are not at all indifferent to what measure of democracy will obtain under afederal arrangement. We reject the so-called minimum program, i.e. federationwithout consistent democratization. Quite the contrary, we maintain thatfederalization isbut a part of the principal objective i.e. consistentdemocratization.54

All this is not to say, however, that Slovaks were a monolithic entity obsessed withfederalization and nationalism to the detriment of democratization. Slovak society itself was

often split in opinion regarding the topic. The very existence of the above statement pointed to

the conflict. Although Novomesk led a dissenting group to split from theKultrny ivot, the

remaining writers continued to propagate liberal themes. For every Viktor Pavlenda demanding a

closed economy (although careful to avoid that offensive phrase), there was an Even Lbl

elaborating the merits of iks independent market economy.

Even the most radical nationalist voices did not expressly campaign in favor of secession,

save as a threat if federalization should fail. When a Slovak nationalist such as Rolncke noviny

editor Marian Sklenka offered the possibility of separation and foundation of an independent

socialist state, he was careful to add the caveat that this could only occur in the event of

federalizations delay.55


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Throughout the Prague Spring, Slovak nationalism did not express itself solely through

federalization. Although to specify every single incident is beyond this studys purview, many

other fields detected a nationalist element.

Slovaks lobbied for a president of their own nationality, either Husk or Novomesk; the

eventual nominee was Svoboda.56 They supported Slovak reformers above Czech reformers in

public opinion polls.57 Dubek was especially popular.

Matica Slovensk was reborn.58 Previously a core of both scientific research and Slovak

culture, and also a center for Slovak migrs, the Matica had been relegated to a library after the

communist takeover.

59

Slovaks, however, had not forgotten the Maticas glory days, and theystill regarded it as a national symbol of pride.

Economically, Slovakia was still behind Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech provinces. 60

Slovak nationalisms main theme, therefore, was protectionalism. The advent of a more market-

oriented economy was feared as potentially damaging Slovakias more inefficient, state-

subsidized industries. Thus a group of economists, led by Viktor Pavlenda and Hvezdo

Kotch, stressed special Slovak conditions. A second group containing Pavol Turan, Jn

Ferianc, and Even Lbl emphatically rejected a closed economy. Their presence provided

evidence that Slovaks were not all of one opinion.

Slovak nationalism heralded a return of anti-Semitism, traditional in eastern European

nationalism. This had a major role in the Mako affair. But Jews were not persecuted; their

position actually improved as a result of the 1968 reforms, despite Slovak grumbles.

There were also several proponents of confederation, including writer Vojtech Mihlik, part

of Novomesks cohort.61 Generally, this was not taken into serious consideration. Instead, most

Slovak nationalists aimed at a federalized state that bore strong resemblance to a confederation.


21/41

21

Most notably, and most negatively, Slovaks reacted angrily to demands for a tri-partite

federation and political rights for minorities. Indeed, it is ironic to view the extent to which

nationalist Slovaks were willing to deny to others the same gifts they so earnestly sought from

the Czechs, lest Slovak rule in Slovakia be weakened.

The alternative of a tri-partite federation originated from south Moravia, and in many aspects

it envisioned the same type of federation as did the Slovaks, such as in the division of

competence between state and nation.62 Despite its favorable content, however, the proposal was

under immediate attack by Slovaks. After all, Moravia was Czech. Its people were the same asthose who had suppressed Slovakia for decades. More than anything else, Slovaks feared a two-

to-one Czech majority in the national level. With such opposition, tri-partite federation never

entered into serious consideration. Moravian demands for autonomy were left as another

unfulfilled dream of the post-January era.

The various nationalities of Czechoslovakia lobbied for increased political rights throughout

the Prague Spring, and these attempts were also met with stiff resistance. 63

Ukrainian activity centered on the Cultural Union of the Ukrainian Working People (KSUT)

and the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union. Most demands simply reiterated the

more expansive Hungarian program, although a request for reestablishment of the Uniate/Greek

Catholic Church was uniquely Ukrainian. A Slovak backlash took place in the form of numerous

press articles belittling Ukrainian requests, leading to a complaint by the KSUT.

Slovak retaliation was far more explosive in the case of the Hungarians, the minority most

active in Czechoslovakia 1968. History provided the fuse for the Slovak explosion, which was

inescapably linked with nationalism. It had been the Hungarians who had oppressed Slovaks


22/41

22

during the years of Austrian-Hungarian rule, and the Slovaks had not forgotten. In 1968 the

Hungarians, 565,000 strong, were by far the largest minority in the country. And they had a

lengthy list of demands. The Cultural Association of the Hungarian Working People in

Czechoslovakia (Csemadok) authored a Proposal for the Solution of the Nationality Question.

Csemadok declared that nations [Czechs and Slovaks] and nationalities were equal in the state

and that the Constitution ought to recognize the Hungarian minority as a political agent with the

same rights as the Czech and Slovak national groups. 64

This declaration was the foundation upon which all subsequent nationality proposals were

based upon. It was Csemadok that created the detailed proposals such as minority nationalcouncils at the core of other programs. Their cultural plan was the most expansive of all the

others.65

Slovaks granted several concessions. The CPCz allowed nationality departments on the state

level, and the Slovak Action Program accepted a nationality organ in several government

institutions, including the SNC.

By and large, however, Slovak opinion, buffeted by nationalism and historical Slovak-

Hungarian tensions, was uniformly negative. The very same Action Program specifically noted

that the purpose of the Csemadok (and Ukrainian KSUT) was cultural-educational, not

political.66 Slovak media refused to print the Csemadok resolution for months. Even the liberal

Kultrny ivottoed the official and popular policy, speaking of the chauvinism of the

Hungarians.67 Ivan Hargas, reflecting widely held public views, argued that Hungarians in 1968

Slovakia were better-off than those in authoritarian Hungary. One letter published in trade union

dailyPrca expanded this complaint: if they dont feel their rights are respected here they

should leave for Hungary.68 Slovak students marched to southern Slovakia (where most


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23

Hungarians lived) to facilitate the awakening of national pride.69 Clubs of the friends of

Matica Slovensk sprouted, located near southern Slovakia in particular, as a counter to

Cse

s it accepted

ere essentially the same as those already embodied in the Slovak Action Program.

Invasion and Aftermath: Normalization

t they had also

tho

to

echs

and .

n one

ium, demanding firm stands in

upcomi

madok.

Against all the Slovak resistance, the demands of nationalities proved futile. Czech

politicians did not wish to antagonize the second half of the country. A new nationality law was

agreed to, but the expert commission, undoubtedly influenced by Slovak lobbying, determined

that nationalities were inferior to the Czech and Slovak nations. The only concession

w

Slovaks had always maintained themselves as a separate people, and ye

ught themselves Czechoslovaks, despite all their renewed nationalism.

When the Soviets began commanding the leaders of Czechoslovakia to undo the Prague

Spring, therefore, Czechs and Slovaks stood united in opposition. In large part this was due

Slovak support of the Prague Spring and its head Dubek a Slovak. Polls provided ample

evidence: 92.9% had a positive opinion of the Action Program 70, 86% trusted the CPCz71, and

only 8% disapproved the ending of censorship.72 Nationalism in this case actually united: Cz

Slovaks were under a foreign menace, and the common reaction was unified resistance

Certainly this was true as Soviet pressure ramped up, especially in the response to the

Warsaw Letter, the most recognized Soviet polemic against the Prague Spring. 73 More tha

million signed the Message from the Citizens to the Presid

ng Czech-Soviet negotiations. It famously stated:


24/41

24

It is your responsibility to convince the leading representatives of the CPSU[Communist Party of the Soviet Union] that the revival process in our countrmust be brou

yght to a successful conclusion in accordance with the interests of our

commo

striving for can be summed up in the words: SocialismAllianc

mbers and] Comrades Barbrik, Bilak, ernk, Dubek,Kolder ,

erations in ourpatiently awaiting your news. We are thinking

s than

t.

ed

rty, angered by official

dela

ion

ny Novotn-era

offi

r,

n fatherland as well as with the interests of progressive forces on allcontinents.

Everything we areeSovereigntyFreedom [Czech and Slovak: SocialismusSpojenectvSuverenita Svoboda]

[Presidium me, Kriegel, Piller, Rigo, Smrkovsk, paek, vestka, and Comrades Kapek

Lenrt, and imonGo to the meetings and explain things, but do so in unity; and defend the

road on which we have all set out, a road we will not abandon as long as we live.Over the next few days we will anxiously follow your delib

thoughts, hour by hour. We are imof you. Think of us! [Czech: Myslme na Vs. Myslete na ns!] 74

Moreover the entire Slovak populace passively resisted the Soviets during the late August

occupation.75 Here too Slovak nationalism favored radical measures. One often neglected factor

in Slovak resistance includes the occupation of Slovakia by Hungarian troops; with the les

harmonious history between the two peoples, this was bound to anger any Slovak patrio

Protests in Bratislava began on the first day and did not end. 76 Illegal radio broadcasts,

overflowing with anti-Soviet rhetoric, filled the homes of the population. They were maintain

by Slovak volunteers throughout the country. The local Bratislava pa

y in condemning the invasion, even threatened to take power. 77

This official paralysis was the result of two conflicting tendencies: innate conservatism

among high officials, including Bilak himself, against enormous pressure from the masses

rallying against the Soviets. It was here that the nationalisms damage to Slovak democratizat

began to be felt. Because the focus on federalization had been so intense, ma

cials had been able to stay in power by appealing to Slovak nationalism.

The result was a series of conflicted and contradictory moves taken by different party

institutions in Slovakia. Whilst Czech organs, which had fewer old-line politicians still in powe


25/41

25

unanimously denounced the invasion from the beginning, Slovak initial statements were more

conservative. As time passed on and the unpopularity of the occupation became obvious, the

Slovak bodies became progressively more radical. Perhaps Slovakia would have ap

proached

Cze

C)

lidarity,

agr

s

s in

el

resistance, and the Soviets wanted more than any other immediate goal to render it illegitimate.

ak

y opposed force Soviet-enforced

no

ch levels of resistance after the invasion week if Husk had not taken control.

The changing reaction of the SNC demonstrates this. 78 On the day of the invasion August

21 the SNC did not condemn the invasion or respond to the Czech National Councils (CN

call for unity. But by the 23rd, the SNC had reversed its stance on Czech-Slovak so

eeing to a meeting with the CNC. There the two demanded Soviet withdrawal.

At the same time Slovak official announcements were growing ever more radical, the Sovietdid not ruthlessly rack down on dissent as they could have lest their actions generate further

outrage. They focused their efforts on the Czechoslovak leaders confined in deep discussion

the Kremlin, and these efforts largely yielded success. Every leader save Frantiek Krieg

signed the secret Moscow Protocol, the death-knell of the Prague Spring. Among other

concessions the reinstitution of censorship, for one it invalidated an emergency Fourteenth

Party Congress.79This congress the Vysoany Congress was a critical element of the passive

It was in this situation that the ambitious Gustv Husk returned to Czechoslovakia. The

Prague Spring had proven good for his political fortune. Husk had ridden the wave of Slov

nationalism to effective leader of the CPS after he, not Bilak, had been picked to go to the

Moscow negotiations. Now he would use a diametricall

rmalization to become ruler of Czechoslovakia.


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26

The role of Slovak nationalism, highly progressive during the era of Novotn and still

modestly progressive by August 1968, underwent a drastic refinement. It became a hammer

under the hands of those who, using a purportedly reformist slogan, wished to smash apart the

reforms of 1968. The ominous seeds back then the lingering conservatism of Bilak and the

CPS, the writers split, the emphasis on federalism over democratization now fully sprouted

and bore their bitter fruit. Far sooner than in Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia slid back in

grasp of communist dictatorship. After August 1968, the Soviets saw Slovak autonomy,

to the

on

which they had frowned in 1945, 1948, and even 1967, as a means of weakening, if not

def

e secret Moscow negotiations, had already been approved by other

par

egates made it

to P

any

ion.

s an all-state leading organ of the

eating, the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. Husk was to be their pointman.

80

Husk began on August 29, invalidating the Vysoany Congress by using the Slovak card.81

The initial action, part of th

ty leaders, including Dubek. It took place at the extraordinary Slovak party congress, which

had recognized Vysoany.

At Vysoany itself, only around fifty Slovak delegates out of a total 1,500 del

rague and the Fourteenth Party Congress without Soviet disruption. To maintain Slovak

influence, they had been given the power to veto any decision by the congress. 82

Husk, however, had found his excuse to annul Vysoany. After meeting secretly with the

presidium of the Slovak congress (presumably convincing it to reject Vysoany), he made a

report, to the congress at large, about the ongoing Moscow talks. There he attacked the Vyso

Congress as initiated without Slovak knowledge and as lacking adequate Slovak representat

His appeal to Slovak pride met with success: the Slovaks officially declared that Vysoanys

result a new, ultra-liberal CC cannot be considered a


27/41

27

par

e

rak,

were why they and others signed a proclamation against Vysoany. And it

was rst

y the

use of the nationalist bludgeon, Slovakia

fell long before Bohemia and Moravia, which resisted normalization until the Dubeks sack, of

whi

It was a convenient base,

ty.83 In effect, by playing the Slovak card and appealing to Slovak pride, Husk convinced

Slovaks to render the Vysoany Congress null and void.

Central to Husks success was his prestige as a Slovak nationalist. It was Husk who had

been imprisoned by conservatives for his nationalism. It was Husk who had led the movement

against arch-conservatives Novotn and Bilak. It was Husk who headed the expert committe

on federalization. It was Husk who was the third-most popular leader in Slovakia, after Dubek

and President Ludvk Svoboda.84 This was the person whom prominent liberals Josef Z

Anton ak, Viktor Pavlenda, Pavol tevek, Hvezdo Kotch, B. Graca, and others trusted

when he promised another extraordinary congress (never held) to replace Vysoany. His

nationalist credentials

his reputation that ensured Husk both a spot in the CPCz Presidium and the title of Fi

Secretary of the CPS.

As head of Slovakia, Husk attempted to consolidate the situation, to reestablish the

communist stranglehold, and he largely succeeded in silencing the nation. His selection b

extraordinary Slovak Party Congress gave him the moral authority to take dictatorial measures

which would have raised massive resistance under Bilak. Moreover, Husks continued

nationalist credentials were of much assistance, especially when Novomesks group gave him a

ready-made base within the writers community. Beca

ch Husk and his Slovak card played his part too.

A large number of new members had been admitted into the CC after the invasion. Many

were Slovak, and Husk took personal responsibility for each one.85


28/41

28

prim

nted its man at the top87 and because Smrkovsk was not a Slovak, he had to go.

The l

r

airman of the Federal Assembly; a terrible blow to liberalism had been

dealt; a left to

write in

llow his nationalism, on thesurface his demand was justified. It put me in a particularly difficult position: it

of support in SlovakiaHusks stab in the back was the worst of all the

ed by feelings of Slovak solidarity and nationalism. From it, Husk quickly formed a

separate faction in the party, which he termed the realist coalition.

On December 13, having secured his power, Husk made an important move. 86 Partly out of

genuine nationalist fervor, but mostly to please the Soviets, Husk demanded that liberal

reformer Josef Smrkovsk not be chosen as chairman of the newly created parliamentary Federal

Assembly but rather that a Slovak head the legislature, which would replace the National

Assembly. Smrkovsk had been chairman of the National Assembly through the Prague Spring,

and the dismissal of such a highly regarded progressive would set an ominous precedent. To

justify the demotion, Husk once again played the Slovak card, resorting to nationalist rhetoric.Slovakia wa

two other Slovaks in the Presidium agreed immediately. Slovak nationalism proved usefu

once again.

The ploy raised uproar amongst Czechs. Notably, the students and Czech Metalworkers

Union threatened to (but did not) strike in unity. But Slovaks did not follow the Czech lead. The

Slovak media, under Husks directive, launched a campaign against Smrkovsk, the Soviets

made it clear they stood behind Husk, and Smrkovsk buckled under the pressure. Slovak Pete

Colotka was named ch

nd Dubek, a Smrkovsk supporter, had his authority vastly diminished. He was

his memoirs:

Husks skullduggery was exemplary. However ho

was politically impossible for me to refute his argument without losing my base

betrayals between August 1968 and April 1969.88


29/41

29

Next the final blow to Dubek: a Soviet-manufactured crisis, after Czechoslovaks celebrated

two ice hockey victories over a Soviet team. The Soviets then put forth their full strength agains

Dubek, and it proved more than sufficient. Dubek moved to put ernk as head, but the

Kremlin proved faster: it insisted on Husk, and by then Dubek was too weak to resist. T

were practically no protests of his fall. Slovaks mayhap would have been angered if the Slo

Dubek was to have been replaced by a Czech, but this was not the case. Instead, Husks

selection was accepted overwhelmingly.

t

here

vak

ons lingering

rem ants. After Husk took power, Czechoslovakia had turned full circle: from repression tofree society

his use of the Slovak Question to undo 1968.

His

nce

had directed popular sentiment

towards nationalism and away from democratization, a force that would have ended in their

pur Naturally,

89 Czechs, too, were eager to avoid insulting

Slovaks.90 Thus, Slovak nationalism was employed to crush democratizati

ndom back to repression. Slovak nationalism had catalyzed both cycles. Czechoslovak

fell into a discontented slumber, from which it would only awake in 1989.

A fascinating footnote involves the attitude of the Slovak street to Husks growing

conservatism. Evidently, they did not appreciate

popular support fell precipitously; in March 1969, when asked to name trusted public figure,

only 24% of Slovaks mentioned Husk, in stark contrast to a similar survey nine months earlier.

Then 64% of Slovaks had mentioned Husk. 91

By this time, however, the streets power was diminished. Public opinion had little influe

on official decision-making, unlike the heady days between January and August. The levers of

power reverted to the intelligentsia and the politicians, men who

ge. Slovak autonomy was far dearer to these people than to the common Slovak.

therefore, the Soviets courted them with the federalization law.


30/41

30

The statute, more centrist than originally planned, was not innately flawed; the

imp

tional states, each with the right of self-determination.93 Major portions of the 1960

con

on

idence).

How al affairs

tion.95

d

tter had the better

par

lementation was the problem, subject to two devastating developments.92 A product of a

series of hastily arranged deals, the final law on federalization hinted at continuous Slovak and

Czech tension.

The bill, signed on October 30, 1968, recognized Czechoslovakia as a voluntary union of

equal na

stitution, which had enshrined democratic centralism, were scrapped. Competence between

the nations and state was divided into three categories: national affairs, state affairs, and commaffairs.

The National Assembly was renamed the Federal Assembly and divided into a half-Slovak

Chamber of Nations and a Chamber of the People. Measures against majorizcia were taken;

these did not completely prevent majorizcia but represented some improvement. Several

legislative actions could not be taken without Slovak acquiescence (e.g. votes of conf

ever, the state legislature was given great authority: competence over many nation

and those matters necessary for the unity of the legal order, 94 a clause easy to abuse.

Moreover, the Presidency of the executive branch was made into a quite powerful posi

In the judicial branch, the law created a federal Constitutional Court as a check on

government action, an arbitrar on constitutional matters (e.g. clout between state and nation), an

an advisor on legislative action. Half the court was to be Czech; half was to be Slovak.

With regard to the economic dispute between Slovaks and Czechs, the la

t of the day. Articles 10 to 26 in the law gave much competence to the federal government,


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31

which could set general principles and guarantee coordination.96 On the other hand, the

Czech and Slovak nations were spelled out as economically autonomous.

The direction was more mixed with regard to parity in the central government. While it had

been applied to the legislative and judicial organs (puppet branches in Novotns day and puppe

branches in Husks day), the cont

t

rolling executive branch did not have parity applied to it. State

sec

came

t, in the context of

n

nd

(prices, technical and

inv

l

ship was established, only to be revoked in 1971. Brno was designated an independent

terr orial-administrative entity and given its own national committee.97 The CNC created

seventeen local committees; the SNC created fifteen. Slovaks abolished the national committee

retaries, the oft-suggested compromise, were appointed to all ministries, but it was not

specified that they must be of the opposite nation to the nation in charge of the ministry. As with

so many other matters, two opposite interpretations could be drawn from the statute; the actual

practice of the law was to be key.Finally, the law reserved for later the formation of new federal ministries, federal committees

with parity, courts other than the Constitutional Court, and the procuracy. The first two be

the battlefield for another struggle between federal and local power. This figh

a growing conservative climate, resulted in a clear Czech victory. On December 1968, seve

federal ministries (foreign affairs, national defense, interior, planning, finance, foreign trade, a

labor and social affairs) and seven coordinating federal committees

estment development, industry, agriculture and food, transport, posts and

telecommunications, and press and information) were created, the latter to be headed by a

minster-chairman and a deputy chairman of another nationality. The statute increased centra

power to an extent greater than originally expected by the Slovaks.

There were some short-lived measures to fulfill the actual spirit of federalization. Dual

citizen

it


32/41

32

sys

ply

e

This fact was recognized by Brezhnev himself, who, meeting with

er

e

d

e.99 When

tem, which had been used to propagate centralism, only to find them reinstated in December

1970.

By then, the two greatest faults of federalization had fully bore their bitter fruit. The first was

the gradual disintegration of the reform movement and democratization. Without liberalization,

true federalization was simply impossible. Conservatives would interpret the already ambiguous

federalization law to their own ends and implement it in their own fashion. Or they would sim

reject the stipulations of federalization they did not like, most notably when failing to federalize

the true wielder of power in Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party. Instead, to save face, partyleaders proposed a bureau for the Czech region. The impact of this was to effectively render

federalization void; it became a symbolic change with no real substance. At the point the party

and the government were one and the same, and at the point federalization extended only to th

latter, it became a farce.

nk and Dubek in Moscow, prohibited party federalization because it would wittingly or

unwittingly overwhelm the less prominent parties, which could lead to unhealthy feeling of a

nationalist character.98

Intertwined with the partys inability to federalize was an even more serious problem th

sheer impracticality of federalization. Simply put, federalization did not work. All the writings

and fine theories of the Slovak nationalists came to nothing in its actual practice. Their ideals

violated the fundamental law of governing: centralized power is always more efficient, and

efficiency was of paramount importance in a communist system. When the economy continued

to slide after the Prague Spring and urgent reform was necessitated, taking quick action prove

far more cumbersome under the symmetrical system than under the asymmetrical on


33/41

33

the

e

,

ent to

ational laws was drawn up. After the passage of the law,

fficials commonly occupied corresponding positions in national and federal organs which had

o be antagonistic; this prevented the expression of local (Slovak) interests which the

stem had been designed in mind for.

nged

re

CPCz federalized the secret police, it became clear that the previous arrangement provided

better coordination and effectiveness.100 When Czechoslovakia tried federalization a second

time, after 1989, the resulting mess was so immense that the country split in two. 101

Certainly the innate ineffectiveness of federalization provided a ready excuse and a tru

one for the conservatives to slice away the components of Slovak autonomy one salami piece

after another.102 As previously noted, the dual citizenship law was repealed and the Slovak

national committees reinstated. On May 1970, the Czech bureau disappeared from official

documents, never to be mentioned again. The state secretaries were unconstitutionally abolished

and once more nationalism became a dirty word in party ideology. Finally, an amendmfederalization, passed on January 1, 1971, destroyed its last leftovers. Control over common

affairs was fully placed in the hands of the federal ministries, previously federalized economic

and security organs were put under the central governments competence, and most

importantly federal veto power over n

o

been meant t

sy

Conclusion

Slovak nationalism played a decisive role during the Prague Spring. In the main, its effect

was negative, assisting conservative forces that sought to undo the reforms.

Although it had been progressive element before Dubek gained power, this quickly cha

with the advent of the Prague Spring proper. Then the masses gained political power. They we


34/41

34

mainly nationalist, supporting Slovak leaders such as Gustv Husk, and they urged that

autonomy be granted in the form of federalization. Slovaks considered federalization more

imp

ation.

uggested

n. Proposals for minority political rights were likewise unacceptable, especially when

adv ,

,

tionalism became the tool of a Husk-led realist faction determined to

gain

ongress and

Two major flaws a failure of democracy and a failure of practicality rendered the

ortant than democratization, leading to a more conservative political climate in Slovakia.

This was symbolized by the schism of Slovak writers into nationalist and democratic sides.

Slovak nationalism thus proved a distraction from the more important task of liberaliz

Federation was not the exclusive outlet for Slovak nationalism. Slovaks also revived the

national pride Matica Slovensk and considered erecting protectionist measures. Some s

confederation; others attempted to wash out the lingering stain surrounding the label

nationalist. While Slovaks desired autonomy for themselves, they were not willing to grant theright to others. Proposals for tri-partitism awakened nationalist fears of renewed Czech

dominatio

anced by Hungarians, who traditionally were at odds with Slovaks. These cases, in particular

illustrate the degree in which many outlets of Slovak nationalism revealed its conservative

leaning.

During the invasion week, Slovak nationalisms full consequences became evident. Official

bodies, composed of conservatives who had clung to power by appealing to Slovak nationalism

delayed any condemnation of the invasion until popular pressure forced their hand. Then, after

the occupation, Slovak na

power. Husk used his reputation as a nationalist to normalize Slovakia and oust Dubek.

Notably, he played the Slovak card to advance Soviet ends regarding the Vysoany C

Smrkovsk controversy.

In return for Husks services, the Soviets supported a purely symbolic federalization law.


35/41

35

implementation ineffective. Thus, to describe Czechoslovak government after the Prague Sprin

as based upon federalization was as accurate as describing it before the Prague Spring as based

g

upo

ationalism, party propaganda notwithstanding. The very being

of f

latest in a long string of

broken pledges promising Slovak autonomy. Under such circumstances, Slovak nationalism in

the

d the

ised

conservatives could and would warp even the most carefully written law. In other words, it

n democratic centralism. Federalization was a sham, a farce, ineffective and an insult to

Slovak demands, no different from the previous situation. Federalization was purely symbolic.

And yet the symbol was there. A federalized government was recognition of Slovaks and

implicitly a justification of their n

ederalization was progress, albeit heavily distorted and retarded. When the communist regime

fell, it was waiting in the wings.

That post-1989 federalization failed is partly a testament to Husks success at using Slovaknationalism to destroy the liberals. Czech never forgot that Slovaks sacrificed democracy for

federalization after the Prague Spring, as they had sacrificed Czech freedom for independence

after Munich. For their part, Slovaks remembered federalization as the

Prague Spring contributed to the eventual division of the country.

In the end, the weakness with Slovak nationalist demands was that they misunderstoo

fundamental cause of diminished Slovak authority. Slovak scholars proposed that the structure of

the system the asymmetrical model was at fault. But when federalization took hold,

conservatives were able to manipulate the new system and strengthen central authority with just

as much ease as they had under the tenure of the 1948 Koice program, which too had prom

autonomy. The core problem was not the structure of the old system; it was the system itself. It

was the iron grip of the dogmatists who undertook to strangle the will of the people. These


36/41

36

was the lack of democratization at fault, democratization which Czechs had consistently placed

as their first priority, democratization which Slovaks had just as consistently and tragically

placed as their second priority.


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37

Velvet Divorce http://www.jstor.org/stable/153565

Endnotes

1

Paal Hilde, Slovak Nationalism and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 51,No. 4 (June 1999), under (accessed September 27,2008

slovakias Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1976

n the Czechoslovak Reform Movement(New York: ColumbiaUni

m and Slovakia,Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubek Era 1968--196

, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: JohnHop

a

he Slovaks are Czechs, although they use their dialect as a written language., Relations Between Czechs and Slovaks, in Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia:

The

rbel, 218-20.

oslovak state as a whole, as per scholarship in thissubj

pe Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubek, trans. Jiri Hochman(New

lovakia(For

), 649.2 H. Gordon Skilling, Czecho), 489.

3 Vladimir V. Kusin,Political Grouping iversity Press, 1972), 148-61.4 Galia Golan, Political refor9 (Cambridge: University Press, 1973).5 Ji Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakiakins University Press, 1979).6 Gil Eyal, The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovaki

(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2003).7 Oskar Krej, Geopolitics of the Central European Region: The View from Prague and Bratislava,

trans. Martin C. Styan (Bratislava: VEDA Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2005),241. Masaryk once stated, T

8 See Josef KorbelMeanings of Its History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 85-111 for a detailed analysis

of early Slovak nationalism.9 Ko10 In this essay, the tern national refers to government in the Czech and Slovak nations, whereas

the term state refers to government in the Czechect.11 Alexander Dubek,Ho

York: Kodansha International, 1993), 108.12 Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis 1962-1968 (Cambridge:

University Press, 1971), 21.13 See Cathleen A. Campbell, Government and Politics, inA Country Study: Czechosmer) in the Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cstoc.html(Accessed August 16, 2008)

for a detailed analysis on Czechoslovak government.

lovakdisc

pring:lopment of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), 29.

liberal is synonymous with reformer and does not refer to the political left, as it iscom ne againstrefo

g, 50.

gerov,Reportr, March 3-10, 1968 and P. Vongrej,RP, March 17, 1968. Referenced inSkilm

d Golan,Reform Rule, 186-199 for adeta eoretical underpinning, public reaction, official steps toprepare the law, and conflicts over economics and parity.

14 See ibid for a detailed analysis on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz).15 See Skilling, 49-53 and the entirety of Golan,Reform Movementfor a detailed analysis on Sontent.16 Kusin,Political Grouping, 68 and Vladimir V. Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague S

The Deve17 In this essay,monly used in the United States. In comparison, conservative is synonymous with orm.18 Skillin19 See Golan,Reform Movement, 205-08 for a detailed analysis on the 1964 reforms.20

T. Goldberling, 53.21K, November 3, 1967 and Svedectvi, VIII-IX,32-33 (1967), 113-14. Referenced in Golan,Refor

Movement, 252.22 See Skilling, 165-79 for the immediate events surrounding Novotns downfall.23 Jaromr Navrtil, ed., The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader

(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 13.24 See Skilling, Federalism and the Slovak Problem, 451-489 aniled analysis of federalization, covering its th


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38

ch stedn vbor Komunistick stranaes

25ivot strany, no. 19, May 7, 1969. Referenced in Skilling, 455.26BP, April 27, 1968. Quoted in ibid., 460.27Rok edast osm v usnesench a dokumente

koslovenska(RO), 45. Quoted in ibid., 457.28RP, April 10, 1968. Quoted in Dubek, 305.

Sciences, Institute for Public Opinion Research), no. 68-2 (F

mbridge: Cambridge UniversityPres oboda is quoted as saying, I think that Brezhnev does not have full information. If hehear nd saw the occupation of Prague, he would stop this.

, 280-82 for a detailed analysis on Husks attack against Bilak., 1968 during a visit to iar nad Hronom. Quoted in ibid., 382.

rm Rule, 82.

Quoted in ibid, 322.il, as does Golan,Reform Rule, 106-08 and Kusin,

Poli

eform Rule, 93.g, 247 and Kusin,Political

Gro

68. Quoted in ibid.

vey Conducted During the Dubcek Era (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 253.litical Grouping, 147-48 for a detailed analysis on Matica

Slov

of the economic sphere.

detailedanal

tute, a

ungarians, easier

29

Milan Hbl, interview byPredvoj, Czechoslovakia 18 April 1968. Quoted in Golan,Reform Rule,194.30SAV, vzkum (Czechoslovak Academy ofebruary, 1968), 17, 24, 34, 38. Referenced in Skilling, 536.31BP, July 6, 13, 1968. Quoted in ibid., 468.32BP, May 19, 1968. Quoted in Golan,Reform Rule, 50-51.33 Party cultural weeklyNS, July 11, 1968. Quoted in Skilling, 481.34 Leonid Shinkarev, Byl mesiats avgust,Izvestiia, August 14, 1991. Referenced in Kieran Williams,

The Prague Spring and its aftermath: Czechoslovak politics 1968-1970 (Cas, 1997), 135. Svd this shooting a35 Williams, 49.36 Ibid., 50.37 Navrtil, 324.38 Skilling, 453.39 See Skilling40BP, August 2141 Ibid., 244.42 Skilling, 244.43 Golan,Refo44BP, July 19. Quoted in Skilling, 292.45 Ibid., 495.46RP, May 5, 1968. Referenced in ibid., 243.47Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, vzkum, 17, 24, 34, 38. Referenced in ibid., 535-36.48NS, August 1, 1968.49 Ibid., 244-48 covers this controversy in detatical Grouping, 77-8.50BP, May 7, 1968. Quoted in Skilling, 246.51 Golan,R52 This occurred in aBP, May 7, 1968 article. Referenced in Skillinuping, 77.53RP, March 31, 1968. Quoted in Kusin,Political Grouping, 145.54RP, March 30, 1955Rolncke noviny, April 20, 1968. Quoted in Golan,Reform Rule, 194.56 Williams, 15.57 Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz,Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968-69: Results and

Analysis of Sur58 See Skilling, 609-10 and Kusin,Poensk.59 Kusin,Political Grouping, 147.60

See Golan,Reform Rule, 48-9 and Skilling, 429-33 for a detailed analysis61Predvoj, 18 April 1968. Referenced in Golan,Reform Rule, 187.62 See Skilling, 470-74 for a detailed analysis on tri-partite federation.63 See ibid., 603-10; Golan,Reform Rule, 94-103; and Kusin,Political Grouping, 149-61 for aysis on nationality demands. All facts and figures below derive from these sources.64BP, May 24 1968, part of the Csemadok CC resolution. Quoted in Golan,Reform Rule, 9.65 Along with Csemadok, j Sz proposed more Hungarian schools, a Hungarian Scientific Insti

Hungarian national library, a Hungarian theater at Bratislava and Koice, a Hungarian publishing house,Hungarian television, a Hungarian youth association, autonomous journalist and writers unions forHungarians, parity in leading government posts for Hungarians, affirmative action for H


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39

stud n cultural-political weekly, rehabilitationof H

Rule, 100.pril 19, 1968 and 12 April 1968. Quoted in ibid., 99.

. Quoted in ibid., 98.

13, 1968. Quoted in ibid, 98.icz, 14.

The Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, The CzechBlac h

datalogued; draft analysis of activity of radio in Slovakia after January 1968] a

AVRefe 37.

86 and Williams, 137 for a detailed analysis on the SNCs response to the invasion.n the invalidation of the Vysoany Congress.

., Tanky proti sjezdu (Vienna, 1970), 45-6, 108. Referenced in ibid., 766-67.

for

K KPSS (Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

SoviQuo

86 and Golan,Reform Rule, 254-56 for a detailed analysis on Smrkovsks fall.02/6, a.j. (archive number) 2, b. 3. Quoted in Williams, 184.

, 235.

. Trella, SSR: Federatvny socialistick tt(Cze ibid., 869.

in ibid.

TsK KPSS, obshchii otdel, pervyi sector, no. P1679 [Zapis besedy t.t.Brez

Dean, Economy, in Three Years of Czechoslovak Federation, Open Society Archives,http ldings/300/8/3/text/21-3-152.shtml

ent travel to Hungary, a second Hungarian daily, a Hungariaungarians victimized in the purges, and the official annulment of re-Slovakization.66BP, May 29, 1968. Quoted in Golan,Reform67 Michal Gafrik and Rudolf Olinsk,K, A68Prca, May 21, 196869

Prca, May70 Piekalkiew71 Ibid., 146.72 Ibid., 84.73 See Skilling, 301-03 for a detailed analysis of the response to the Warsaw Letter.74 Navrtil, 280.75 Historians are in unanimous agreement on this point. See Skilling, Resistance and Capitulation,

759-810; Golan, Crisis and invasion,Reform Rule, 218-246; Williams, The failure of OperationDanube, 112-143; and

k Book, trans. Robert Littell (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) for a detailed analysis on Czecand Slovak resistance.

76 Jan Mlynrik, Slovci proti okupace (Slovakia against occupation),Lidov noviny, August 24,1991. Referenced in Williams, 136.

77 AV KSC (Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), fon(collection) G. Husk [unc nd

KSS (Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia), fond. 03, ar.j. 6.renced in ibid., 178 See Skilling, 779 Navrtil, 477.80 Dubek, 220.81 See Skilling, 792-96 for a detailed analysis o82 Ji Pelikn, ed83BP, August 29, 1968. Quoted in ibid., 795.84 Williams, 48.85 A KV SFR, Z/S (Archive of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Government Commission

Analysis of the Events of 1967-1970, Materials provided to the Czechoslovak Commission by BorisYeltsin in 4/92, 7/92) (ATs

et Union) obshchii otdel, pervi sector, no. P1679 [ernk to Soviet leaders, 10 September 1968]).ted in Williams, 153.86 See ibid., 184-87 A V KS, fond88 Dubek89 Williams., 208.90 Ibid.91 Piekalkiewicz, 256 and 265.92 See Skilling, 858-75 for a detailed analysis on the federalization law.93Sbrka zkon, no. 143/1968. Quoted in ibid., 867.94 J. Chovanec, L. Ker, S. Matouek, and Rchoslovak Socialist Federation) (Bratislava, 1969),47-48. Referenced in95RP, November 8, 1968. Quoted96

Chovanec, et al., 66 andRP, October 28, 1968. Quoted in ibid., 868.97Sbrka zkon, no. 175/196898 A KV SFR, ZS (Ahneva, Kosygina, i Podgornogo s t.t. Chernikom i F. Gamouzam v Kremle 10 sentiabria 1968 goda].

Quoted in Williams, 159.99 Robert W.://files.osa.ceu.hu/ho (accessed August 17, 2008), 23-29.

101Hilde, 647-665.

102 See Dean, 1-31 for a detailed analysis on federalizations aftermath.

100 Ibid., 22.


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ze . Translated by

ea

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