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TRADUIRE LA RECHERCHE EN ACTION
1
Condi&onal Cash Transfers in Morocco: Program « Tayssir » (facilitate)
27th April 2011 End-‐of GAP Technical Symposium
Rebekka Grun, World Bank
Concept, Results & Success Factors
Background: issues with schooling and women’s empowerment in rural areas
Large rural-‐urban gap in primary schooling, especially for girls: • Rural Morocco only achieves 85% primary enrollment (and 82% for girls),
compared to 94% in urban areas • Drop-‐out rates are high: 4.9% per year in general, and 5.8% for girls • The drop-‐out rate increases with higher school years
Rural women’s control over decisions in their household is limited: Respondents of the program’s baseline survey express views concerning adult women: • Only about 20% affirms that women can take public transportaNon alone to go
outside the village
• Two thirds agree with women visiNng alone family or friends living in the same village
• One third affirms that women can decide alone on equipment or inputs needed for producNve acNviNes.
• One fourth affirms that women can decide alone on the sales of products from producNve acNviNes (this goes up to two fiQhs when there is an emergency and the household head is not present).
The tayssir program
Concept • First pilot group will benefit from uncondiNonal transfers for each child, whether registered in school or not. • In three other pilot groups the Government will administer condi+onal cash transfers to the parents, provided the child is aUending school. • The benefit amount will rise with the school level.
Implementa&on • Program started in 2008; randomized pilot targeted 260 primary school sectors. • Moroccan Ministry of NaNonal EducaNon (MNE) disbursed transfers through postal network. • MNE, supervisory body CNE, Poste Maroc and Ministry of Interior cooperated Nghtly. • EvaluaNon design has been implemented and supervised by IPA/J-‐PAL since 2008. • Technical assistance and evaluaNon finance provided by the World Bank, co-‐financed by GAP.
Beneficiaries • Parents of primary school-‐age children in poor rural areas • Groups where father benefits are rigorously compared with groups where mother benefits
Innova&ve Features • In order to experiment with various levels of monitoring aUendance, the three condiNonal sub-‐groups will include: (i) ‘Light-‐handed’ monitoring will confirm aUendance from the teacher’s presence register; (ii) ‘Intensive Monitoring’ will include monthly surprise visits from inspectors; (iii) ‘Full monitoring’ will conNnuously monitor with an electronic finger Nps device. • All transfer delivery will be randomized between fathers and mothers, to test for gender effects.
Challenges and -‐> soluNons • Extreme rurality:
– Some households and schools not accessible by roads, or in inclement weather -‐> SUVs necessary for inspectors & surveyors
– More Nme for surveys + weak dollar + SUVs + fuel price crisis = 30% higher costs than esNmated
– LiUle tracNon of media and many public services (except schools) in remote areas -‐> intense hands-‐on informaNon campaign through local schools
• Low density of postal and bank networks – Poorest and most remote communiNes did not have easy access to a post office – -‐> Town postal agent would drive to villages on Saturdays and disburse cash payments in
the local school • Unacceptability of subs&tute agents such as loXery agencies in Muslim countries
– Work with postal network – Agree convenNon MNE -‐ Poste Maroc that supports addiNonal resources needed for
postal network • Public involvement and empowerment of women new
– Many female beneficiaries (and some male beneficiaries) did not have IDs -‐> Short term improvised and intense campaign by the Ministry of Interior who drove to countryside with caravan photo lab and provided all missing beneficiaries with original IDs
– Some communiNes were surprised by women as beneficiaries -‐> strong involvement of men as supporters and organizers led to acceptance of program design. No refusal of women beneficiaries in any instance.
Results I: girls’ drop-‐out reduced
7.8% 7.1%
6.3%
9.2%
3.1% 3.4% 2.9% 3.9%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
Filles*** Garçons*** Ecole mère*** Satellite***
Contrôle Treatment
0.000 0.018 -‐0.017
0.262
-‐0.302
0.244 0.167
0.331 0.319
0.162
-‐0.400
-‐0.300
-‐0.200
-‐0.100
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
Score total Filles Garçons* Ecole mère Satellite***
• ReducNon of 4.7 percentage points for girls and of 3.7 points for boys.
• ReducNon of 5.3 percentage points in satellite schools and 3.4 points in center schools (écoles mères).
• Impact is significant in the satellite schools, and bigger for boys.
• Impact does not differ with condiNonality.
Drop-‐out rates between June 2008 and April 2010
Learning achievement of children between 6 and 15 years, June 2008: difference compared to mean score of control group (unit: standard deviaHon of control score)
Source: Duflo et al. (2010) “The Impact of CondiNonal Cash Transfers on Schooling and Learning: Preliminary Evidence from the Tayssir Pilot in Morocco”, JPAL
Results II: it maUers when mothers receive the cash
7.4%
4.4%
9.0%
14.8%
3.1% 2.0%
3.5% 5.9%
2.7% 1.4%
2.9%
5.5%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
Niveaux 1-‐4 Niveaux 1-‐2** Niveau 3 Niveau 4
Contrôle Père Mère
45.9% 50.0% 42.1% 45.5% 46.4%
56.8% 57.7% 55.8% 59.6% 50.5%
65.4% 67.2% 63.1% 64.5% 63.9%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
Niveaux 1-‐4** Filles** Garcons Ecole mere Satellite**
Contrôle Père Mère
The effect of the cash transfers on school drop-‐out is slightly stronger at the lower grades if mothers received the transfer (green bars are lower than red)
The effect of the cash transfers on reintegraNon in school is stronger if mothers received the transfer (green bars)
Percentage of children dropped out of school end of academic year 2007/08 and who re-‐integrated before April 2010
Drop-‐out rates between June 2008 and April 2010
Source: Duflo et al. (2010) “The Impact of CondiNonal Cash Transfers on Schooling and Learning: Preliminary Evidence from the Tayssir Pilot in Morocco”, JPAL
Policy implicaNons
• Direct implicaNons: – Program was scaled up naNonwide (to eligible poor regions)
– Impact evaluaNon findings were incorporated: • as condiNonality did not maUer, it will be handled lightly (e.g. quarterly aUendance check)
• transfer most likely goes to mothers – Strengthening of verNcal partnership between different actors within the Ministry of EducaNon at central and de-‐central level
• Indirect implicaNons: – Success of CCT has caused interest for the mechanism in other sectors, e.g. health
Success factors – condiNons for replicaNon
• Experience can serve as prototype of CondiNonal Cash Transfers in the region; overcoming barriers of
extreme rurality,
low density postal and bank networks, and unacceptability of subsNtute financial agents
• Success factors: start small but start and don't get insNtuNonal set-‐up perfect
learning by doing good MIS team (in Ministry of EducaNon)
poliNcal will and ownership at the highest levels
MERCI.
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