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Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles, 6/E William Stallings

Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

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Page 1: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Computer Security

Patricia RoyManatee Community College, Venice,

FL©2008, Prentice Hall

Chapters 14 and 15

Operating Systems:Internals and Design Principles, 6/E

William Stallings

Page 2: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Computer Security Concepts

• Confidentiality– Data confidentiality– Privacy

• Integrity– Data integrity– System integrity

• Availability

Page 3: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

The Security Requirements Triad

Page 4: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Additional Concepts

• Authenticity: verification, trusted source

• Accountability: e.g., trace security breach to a responsible party

Page 5: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Disclosure

Page 6: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Deception

Page 7: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Disruption

Page 8: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Usurpation

Page 9: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Scope of System Security

Page 10: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Assets

Page 11: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Intruders

• Masquerader: non-authorized user exploiting authorized user’s account

• Misfeasor: legitimate user - non-authorized access to resources

• Clandestine user: seizing supervisory control for evasion

Page 12: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Hacker

Page 13: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Criminals

Page 14: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Insiders

Page 15: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Malware

• Parasitic (needs host – virus, logic bomb, backdoor) or self-contained (worm, bot)

• Replicate (virus, worm) or do not (activated by trigger – logic bomb, backdoor, bot)

Page 16: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Backdoor

• Trapdoor

• Secret entry point to avoid usual security access procedure

• Useful for programmers debugging – maintenance hook

Page 17: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Logic Bomb

• Embedded into legitimate program

• Explodes when certain conditions are met– Presence or absence of certain files– Particular day of the week– Particular user running application

Page 18: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Trojan Horse

• Useful program that contains hidden code that when invoked performs some unwanted or harmful function

• Can be used to accomplish functions indirectly that an unauthorized user could not accomplish directly– User may set file permission so everyone has

access– login

Page 19: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Mobile Code

• Transmitted from remote system to local system

• Executed on local system without the user’s explicit instruction

Page 20: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Multiple-Threat Malware

• Multipartite virus infects in multiple ways

• Blended attack uses multiple methods

• Ex: Nimda has worm, virus, and mobile code characteristics

Page 21: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Parts of Virus

• Infection mechanism

• Trigger

• Payload

Page 22: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Stages

• Dormant phase– Virus is idle

• Propagation phase– Virus places an identical copy of itself into

other programs or into certain system areas on the disk

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Page 23: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Stages

• Triggering phase– Virus is activated to perform the function for

which it was intended– Caused by a variety of system events

• Execution phase– Function is performed

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Page 24: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Simple Virus

Page 25: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Compression Virus

Page 26: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Classification by Target

• Boot sector infector: spreads when booting

• File infector: infects executable files

• Macro virus: Platform independent– Most infect Microsoft Word documents– Infect documents, not executable portions of

code– Easily spread– File system access controls are of limited use

in preventing spread

Page 27: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Classification by Concealment Strategy

• Encrypted virus– Random encryption key encrypts remainder of

virus

• Stealth virus– Hides itself from detection of antivirus

software, e.g., by compression

Page 28: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Classification by Concealment Strategy (2)

• Polymorphic virus– Mutates with every infection– Conceals ``signature’’

• Metamorphic virus– Mutates with every infection– Rewrites itself completely after every iteration– Might change behavior

Page 29: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

E-Mail Viruses

• Attachment

• Open e-mail

• Uses e-mail software to replicate

Page 30: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Worms

• Use network connections to spread form system to system

• Electronic mail facility– A worm mails a copy of itself to other systems

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Page 31: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Worms

• Remote execution capability– A worm executes a copy of itself on another

system

• Remote log-in capability– A worm logs on to a remote system as a user

and then uses commands to copy itself from one system to the other

Page 32: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Bots

• Zombie or drone

• Program secretly takes of another Internet-attached computer

• Launch attacks that are difficult to trace to bot’s creator

• Collection of bots is a botnet

• Spamming, sniffing traffic, keylogging, manipulating polls, distributed denial-of-service

Page 33: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Rootkit

• Set of programs installed on a system to maintain administrator (or root) access to that system

• Hides its existence

Page 34: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

System Call Table Modification by Rootkit

Page 35: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Authentication

• Basis for most type of access control and accountability

• Identification step

• Verification step

Page 36: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Password-Based Authentication

• ID– Determines if use authorized to access

system– Determines privileges for user– Discretionary access control

Page 37: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

UNIX Password Scheme

Page 38: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

UNIX Password Scheme

Page 39: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Famous Security Flaws

The TENEX – password problem

(a) (b) (c)

Page 40: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Token-Based Authentication

• User posses object

• Memory cards

• Smart cards

Page 41: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Biometrics - Cost versus Accuracy

Page 42: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Access Control

• Discretionary access control– Based on identity of requestor, might enable

other entity to access resource

• Mandatory access control– Based on comparing security labels with

security clearances

• Role-based access control– Based on roles user has in system

Page 43: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Extended Access Control Matrix

Page 44: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Organization of the Access Control Function

Page 45: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Users, Roles, and Resources

Page 46: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Access Control Matrix Representation of RBAC

Page 47: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Access Control Matrix Representation of RBAC

Page 48: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Intrusion Detection

• Classification: Host-based and Network-based

• Components:– Sensors: Collect data– Analyzers– User interface

Page 49: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Profiles of Behavior of Intruders and Authorized Users

Page 50: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Host-Based IDSs

• Anomaly detection– Collection of data relating to behavior of

legitimated users over time

• Signature detection– Define set of rules or attack patters

Page 51: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Audit Records

• Native audit records– Operating system accounting software

• Detection-specific audit records– Generate audit records required by the IDS

Page 52: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Antivirus Approaches

• Detection

• Identification

• Removal

Page 53: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Antivirus and Anti-Antivirus Techniques

(a) A program(b) Infected program(c) Compressed infected program(d) Encrypted virus(e) Compressed virus with encrypted compression code

Page 54: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Generic Decryption

• CPU emulator

• Virus signature scanner

• Emulation control module

Page 55: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Digital Immune System

Page 56: Computer Security Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Chapters 14 and 15 Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Behavior-Blocking Software Operation