Sibal v. Valdez

Facts: On 1923, Macondray & Co., Inc. bought 8 parcels of land at the auction held by thesheriff of the Province of Tarlac. On the same year, Leon Sibal, the judgment debtor, paidMacondray 2000php as the redemption price of said parcels of land, without specifying theparticular parcels to which it was to apply.

On 1924, Emilio J. Valdez bought parcels of land, where the sugar cane in questionis planted, at the auction held by the sheriff of Province of Tarlac. He bought all ofMacondray's rights and interest in the eight parcels of land it acquired. He also paidMacondray another 2000php for the redemption price Sibal paid.

Sibal alleged two causes of action (1) that Valdez has refused to accept Sibal's offerto redeem the sugar cane the latter planted and (2) that Valdez has harvested and attemptedto further harvest palay that belongs to Sibal. So Sibal prayed for a writ of injuction againstValdez to prevent the latter from possessing the subject property and from further possessingor harvesting the sugar cane and palay in said parcels of land. He also prayed to order Valdezto consent with the redemption of the sugar cane. However, Valdez argued that the sugarcane is his personal property and cannot be subject to redemption.

Issue:

1. WON the sugar cane in question is a personal property?2. WON the sugar cane in question is subject to sale?

Held:

1. Yes, sugar cane is classified under personal property so it cannot be subject ofredemption. Art. 334 of the Civil Code provides that trees, plants, and ungatheredproducts, while they are annexed to the land are real property. However, it hasbeen modified by the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sensethat, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of theChattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personalproperty.

2. Yes, a man may sell something which he potentially but not actually possesses. It isvalid to sell a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonablycertain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident ofsomething already in existence, provided that the thing can be specified andidentified. The thing sold must also belong to the vendor to begin with. The buyer'stitle to the thing will vest upon its existence. Moreover, crops, whether growing orstanding in the field ready to be harvested, when produced by annual cultivation,are not part of the realty. They can be sold.

Note: The immovability of growing crops are "only in abstract and without reference to rightson or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to which the crop isattached" but jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the growing crop." (Pointis crops can be immovable first but then they mature and become movable.)

SC decided that since the Sibal, in good faith, planted the palay in said parcels he is entitled tohalf of it.

Pichel v. Alonzo

Facts: Prudencio Alonzo was awarded a parcel of land by the PHHC. He leased it to Sua. Theboard of liquidators cancelled the award to Alonzo on Jan 27, 1965 because the land wasleased to someone, which is not allowed by RA 477. It was later reinstated in 1972. Alonzoexecuted a deed of sale for the coconut fruits (from Sept 15, 1968 to Jan 1, 1976) of the parcelof land awarded to him by PHHC by reason of RA 477. He executed this in favor of Luis Pichelin exchange for payment amounting to 4,200.00.

According to RA 477, the grantee is prohibited to sell, lease or encumber the landand the improvements therein within 10 years from the issuance of the title, if he does, thetransfer shall be considered null and void. The trial court held that the deed of sale was acontract of lease of the land itself and that it is null and void by virtue of RA 477. It orderedAlonzo to pay back the 4,200 that Pichel paid.

Issue:

1. WON Alonzo has the right to execute such deed of sale considering that the awardwas, at the time, cancelled by the Board of Liquidators?

2. WON the Deed of sale is the prohibited encumbrance contemplated in RA 477?

Held:

1. Yes. Cancellation of the award granted pursuant to RA 477 does not automaticallydivest the awardee of his rights to the land. No immediate reversion to the state.There should be an appropriate proceeding for reversion.

2. No.a. The terms of the contract are controlling when there is no ambiguity.

No need to resort to statutory construction;

b. It is for the SALE of the FRUITS of the land and not lease of the land. Thesubject matter of the sale is the fruits of the land. Possession and use ofFruits is different from possession and use of land. Different rights. Thefirst one is of the accessories, the second of the principal. Right over theaccessories does not vest right over principal. The accessory merelyfollows the principal and not vice versa.

c. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which, though not yet in existence,is reasonably certain to come into existence as natural increment ofsomething in existence and the title will vest on the buyer when itcomes into existence. These are called things of potential existence.

d. A lease is where one party binds himself to give to another theenjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain for a period which maybe definite or indefinite and a sale is one where there is transfer ofownership upon delivery.

e. The purpose of the law is fulfilled, not violated when the fruits are sold.The grantee can be self sufficient and not fully reliant on thegovernment.

Manansala v. CA

Facts:

1. Fidela Manansala is the registered owner of a parcel of land in QC. She has been inpossession of the land since 1955 by virtue of conditional sale made in her favourby PHHC (now NHA). In 1960, however, the PHHC awarded the land to the spousesMercado who took possession of the land also in that year.

2. Manansala was able to successfully retrieve the land from the Mercado spouses byclaiming precedence not only in actual possession but also in the application for itspurchase. In 1984, Manansala paid the full price of the land and thereafter a deedof sale was executed in her favour in 1985.

3. Aranez brought this action for specific performance against Manansala to enforce adeed of sale covering the same lot entered into by her and Manansala in 1960. Thecontract stipulated that the land shall be transferred to Aranez within 30 days afterfull payment of the purchase price by Manansala to the PHHC. The deed wasnotarized by Atty. Lopez who was also her counsel against the Mercado spouses.

4. Manansala denies selling the land; alleging further that the deed was a forgery andthat her signature was secured through fraud. She also averred that the selling ofthe land was void because it was made in violation of the prohibition of the PHHCagainst subsequent disposition of the land within one year after the issuance ofthe title.

5. The RTC held the signature to be genuine but there was no perfected contractsince there was no intention to sell the land and because at the time of the sale,the petitioner was not yet the owner thereof.

6. The CA reversed the decision holding that there was meeting of the mindsbetween the party evidence by the signature of the petitioner in the deed of salewhich the NBI found to be genuine. Further, the CA held that the sale was valid inaccordance with ART 1461of the Civil Code which provides that things havingpotential existence may be the object of a contract of sale.

Issues:

1. W/N the CA erred in validating a contract in violation of law and public policy?2. W/N the challenged notarial document, apart from being contrary to law and

public policy, does not serve the presumption of regularity?

Held:

1. No, there was no evidence that the sale of the lot was made in violation of anyrules of the PHHC. Further, this contention although raised in the trial court wasnot pursued by Manansala. In her appeal to the CA, she also never argued this

point as she simply considered the issues raised by the RTC. Hence this point isconsidered waived and cant be urged as a ground to reverse the decision of theCA. (Conclusion of fact by a trial judge --- as affirmed by the CA--- is conclusiveupon the SC.)

2. The signature was found out to be genuine as per the report of the NBI. Further,Manasalas claim that her signature on the deed had been procured through fraudis contradicted by her allegation that the signature on the deed was not hers.

Pio Sian Melliza v. City of Iloilo, University of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals

Facts: Juliana Melliza owned Lot 2, Lot 5 and Lot 1214. She donated a part of Lot 1214 to theMunicipality of Iloilo to serve as the municipal hall. The donation was revoked by the partiessince the area donated was found inadequate to meet the requirements of the municipalitydevelopment plan called the Arellano Plan.

Lot 1214 was divided by into several lots, namely: 1214-A, 1214-B, 1214-C and1214-D. (See illustration below for reference)

Juliana executed an instrument which states that she assigns and transfers certainparts of Lot 1214 to the Municipal Govt of Iloilo. Juliana sold her remaining interest in Lot1214 to Remedios Sian Villanueva who in turn transferred her rights to said portion of land topetitioner Pio Sian Melliza. The City of Iloilo donated the city hall site together with thebuilding thereon to UP Iloilo, which consisted of Lots Nos 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D. Pio SianMelliza asked city authorities for payment of value of Lot 1214-B. No recovery was obtainedbecause the City did not have funds. Pio Sian Melliza filed in the CFI of Manila an action forrecovery of Lot 1214-B or its value against Iloilo City and UP.

Defendants answered claiming that Lot 1214-B was included in the publicinstrument executed by Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo municipality. Pio Sian Melliza claimsthat the public instrument is clear that only 1214-C and 1214-D is included and that the 2ndparagraph of said instrument was only to better identify the lots sold. Petitioner further claimsthat to hold that 1214-B is included in the sale would render the contract invalid because thelaw requires as an essential element of sale a determinate object.

CFI: dismissed the complaint, saying that instrument by Juliana included Lot 1214-B.

CA: affirmed CFI decision, and that the portion sold by Juliana necessarily includedwhatever was needed for construction of avenues, parks, city hall site.

Issues:

1. W/N the conveyance by Juliana Melliza to Iloilo municipality included Lot 1214-B?2. W/N the description of other lots in the 2nd paragraph of the instrument would be

legally insufficient, because the object would not be determinate as required bylaw (SALES issue)

Lot 1214

1214 A

1214 B

Lot 1214-B

Lot 1214-C

Lot 1214-D

Held:

1. YES. According to the SC, the public instrument describes four parcels of land, Lot2, Lot 5, Lot 1214-C and Lot 1214-D and further describes not only those but alsolots needed for the construction of the city hall site, avenues, parks, according tothe Arellano Plan. If the parties merely intended to cover the specified lots, therewould have been no need for the 2nd paragraph which describes other portions ofland contiguous to the four lots needed for the said Arellano Plan.

2. NO. The requirement of the law that a sale must have for its object a determinatething, is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object ofthe sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new orfurther agreement between the parties. (Art 1460 NCC.) The specific mention ofsome lots plus the statement that the lots object of the sale are the ones neededfor the Arellano Plan sufficiently provides a basis, as of the time of the execution ofthe contract, for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a new andfurther agreement of the parties.

The SC also noted that Pio Sian Melliza is the notary public of the public instrumentexecuted by Juliana. As such, he was aware of its terms. Said instrument was also registeredwith the Register of Deeds and such registration was annotated at the back of the TitleCertificate of Juliana. From these facts, Pio Sian Melliza knew of the terms or is chargeablewith knowledge of them and should have raised the proper objections with Iloilo City and UPspossession of Lot 1214-B. He is barred by the principles of civil law, as well as laches, estoppeland equity.

**For reference, this is how Lot 1214 was divided:

Atilano vs. Atilano (May 21, 1969)

Petitioners, plaintiffs- appelees: Heirs of Atilano IIRespondents, defendants- appellants: Ladislao Atilano and Gregorio Atilano

Facts: In, 1916 Eulogio Atilano I purchased a lot (Lot no. 535) of the municipality ofZamboanga. The lot was thereafter subdivided into 5 parts (LOT 535-A, LOT 535-B, LOT 535-C,LOT 535-D, LOT 535-E).

In the same year of subdivision, deed of sale covering LOT 535-E was executed inthe name of his brother, Eulogio Atilano II for P150.00 The other three lots was sold as well.The only one left for Atilano I was presumably covered by the title to LOT 535-A.

Atilano I died and title was passed to Ladislao Atilano, the defendant.

After the death of the wife of Atilano II, he and his children obtained title as to lot535-E and became co- owners. Years later, in order to end the co-ownership and to properlysubdivide the said lot, they had the lot resurveyed. It was here that they discovered that thelot they were occupying was identified as LOT 535-A and not LOT 535-E referred to in the deedof sale.

The heirs of Atilano II filed the present action in the Court of First Instance allegingthat they offered to surrender the possession of lot A and demanded in return the possessionof lot E.

The defendants refused to exchange.

Their insistence on getting the possession of lot E is understandable for the said lothas greater area compared to lot A they were occupying. (lot E = 2612 m2, lot A=1808 m2)

The defendants argue that:

1. Reference to lot E in the Deed of Sale is an involuntary error;2. Intention of the parties to the sale covers lot A; and3. Since 1916, Atilano I had been in possession. He even bought adjoining

lot to increase area.

The trial court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs on the sole ground that the lot E wasregistered under Land Registration Act. They cannot acquire the property throughprescription.

Issue: W/N the object of the sale is lot 535-E thus, allowing such exchange of possession?

Held: No.

1. When one sells or buys real property, one sells or buys property as he sees it, in itsactual setting and by its physical metes and bounds and not by the mere lotnumber assigned to it in the certificate of title.

a. Atilano II constructed his resident therein even before sale in his favouridentified as lot A.

b. Atilano I on the other hand had his house on lot E and even purchasedadjoining lot.

2. The real issue is not adverse possession but the intention of the parties at the timeof sale.

3. From the facts and circumstances, the object of the sale as intended by the partiesis lot A where Atilano II resided , reconstructed his house at the end of the war andwhere the heirs continued to reside thereafter.

4. The designation of lot E in the deed of sale was a simple mistake in the drafting.The mistake did not vitiate the consent of the parties nor affected the validity andbinding effect of the contract.

5. Reformation of the instrument is no longer needed for the parties have alreadyretained possession in conformity with the real intention of the parties.

6. All they should do is to execute mutual deeds of conveyance.____________________________________________________________________________

Shorter narration of facts:

1. Atilano I subdivided his lot into 5 parts. He thereafter sold the 4 parts. What wasleft for him was presumably covered by title to lot 535-A.

2. The sale with his brother, Atilano II, is the subject of the case. The deed of saleexecuted covered lot 535-E. Years later, when Atilano II and his children had the lotE resurveyed, they discovered that the lot was identified as lot 535-A.

3. Thus, the they offered to surrender the possession of lot A in exchange of the lot Eoccupied by Ladislao Atilano, successor of Atilano I after he died. (Apparently, lot Ahas greater area than lot B). However, Ladislao refused.

4. Thus, the heirs of Atilano I filed a complaint before the CFI.5. The defendants argue that:

a. Reference to lot E in the Deed of Sale is an involuntary errorb. Intention of the parties to the sale covers lot Ac. Since 1916, Atilano I had been in possession. He even bought adjoining

lot to increase area.

Yu Tek & Co v. Basilio Gonzales

Facts: Yu Tek and Co obliged Mr. Basilio Gonzales to deliver 600 piculs of sugar of the 1st and2nd grade. For this service, he will receive compensation of P3, 000, as evidence in a receipt.He will deliver the 600 piculs of sugar at any place in Santa Rosa. The service contract also hasa 3-month period stipulation. The contract also states that Mr. Gonzales shall return the P3,000 and give P1,200 by way of indemnity in case the contract is rescinded. Mr. Gonzales failedto deliver. He was also unable to return the P3000 and payP1200 indemnity. For his defense,Mr. Gonzales contends that the contract was limited to sugar he might raise upon his ownplantation; that the contract represented a perfected sale; and that by failure of his crop hewas relieved from complying with his undertaking by the loss of the thing due (i.e dry seasonin his hacienda, he could not produce and deliver any sugar).

Issue: Whether or not there was perfected contract of sale?

Held: No, there is no perfected contract of sale. The SC ruled that there is a perfected salewith regard to the thing whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from allthe other articles. In the case at bar, there was no appropriation of any particular lot ofsugar. Thus, there was only an executor agreement and a promise of a sale. It is clear that Art.1452, 1096 and 1182 are not applicable. Yu Tek and Co is entitled to receive P3,000.

Ratio: Requisites of a contract, consideration. A contract of sale is not perfected until theparties have agreed upon the price and the thing sold. A contract whereby a party obligateshimself to sell for a price a certain specified quantity of sugar of a given quality, withoutdesignating any particular lot of sugar, is not perfected until the quantity agreed upon hasbeen selected and is capable of being physically designated and distinguished from all theother sugar.

National Grains Authority and William Cabal v. IAC and Leon Soriano

Facts: In 1979, private respondent Leon Soriano offered to sell palay grains to the NFA(National Food Authority, which was previously called the National Grains Authority), throughone of its provincial managers, William Cabal.

Private respondent Soriano eventually submitted to the NFA several documentsrequired for the sale of palay. In the Farmer's Information Sheet, the maximum number ofcavans of palay that Soriano may sell to the NFA was indicated 2640 cavans.

A day after submitting the required documents, Soriano delivered 630 cavans ofpalay to the NFA warehouse. The palay delivered during these two days were notrebagged, classified and weighed.

Soriano demanded payment of the 630 cavans of palay. However, Cabal wrote toSoriano stating that NFA cannot legally accept the said delivery because a certain NapoleonCallangan certified that Soriano is not a bona fide farmer. Asserting that there was no validcontract of sale, Cabal advised Soriano to withdraw from theNFA warehouse the 630 cavans previously delivered.

Instead of withdrawing the 630 cavans of palay, private respondent Sorianoinsisted that the palay grains delivered be paid. He then filed a complaint for specificperformance and/or collection of money with damages against the NFA and Mr. WilliamCabal. Both the RTC and the Intermediate Appellate Court decided in favor of privaterespondent Soriano.

Issue: W/N there was a contract of sale in the case at bar?

Held: YES, there was a contract of sale.

In the case at bar, when the NFA accepted the offer by noting in Soriano'sFarmer's Information Sheet a quota of 2,640 cavans, there was already a meeting of the mindsbetween the parties. Sale is a consensual contract wherein the mutual consent of the partiesshall lead to the perfection of the contract.

Regarding the validity of the subject matter of the contract, the fact that the exactnumber of cavans of palay to be delivered was not specified does not affect the perfection ofthe contract.

Because Article 1349 states that: The fact that the quantity is notdeterminate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it ispossible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between theparties."

In this case, there was no need for NFA and Soriano to enter into a newcontract to determine the exact number of cavans of palay to be sold. Soriano candeliver so much of his produce as long as it does not exceed 2,640 cavans.

The reason why NFA initially refused acceptance of the 630 cavans of palaydelivered by Soriano is that NFA alleges that Soriano is not a bona fide farmer. The trial courtand the appellate court found that Soriano was a bona fide farmer and therefore, he wasqualified to sell palay grains to NFA.

Johannes Schuback & Sons Phil. Trading Corp. v. CA

Facts:

1. In 1981, SJ industrial contacted with Schuback to purchase bus spare parts fromGermany.

2. SJ Industrial also gave a list of bus spare parts that it would like to purchase.3. Schuback then communicated with its German office to provide an estimate of

costs.

4. After this, Shuback provided SJ Industrial its formal offer, containing a list of prices,item number, quantity, part number and description to SJ industrial.

5. SJ Industrial then informed Schuback of its desire to purchase and submitted apurchase order containing the item number, part number and description.

6. It also promised to follow up in the purchase order the quantity of units it wouldlike to purchase.

7. SJ Industrial eventually submitted the quantity of units it would like to purchase,along with the inscription this will serve as our initial purchase order.

8. Schuback then ordered the parts from its German Office.9. Schuback issued an invoice so that SJ Industrial can apply for a letter of credit in

favour of Shuback.

10. After some time, Schuback reminded SJ of its obligation to open a letter of credit,SJ responded by stating that it I encountering difficulties in doing so.

11. Schuback then wrote again, demanding that SJ either open a letter of credit andproceed with the order or pay the cancellation fee.

12. SJ Industrial failed to do either. Schuback sued for damages.

Issue: W/N there was a perfected contract of sale?

Held: Yes.

1. Contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon thething which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

2. Article 1319 of the Civil Code states: "Consent is manifested by the meeting of theoffer and acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute thecontract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualifiedacceptance constitutes a counter offer." The facts indicate that consent on bothsides has been manifested.

3. The act of SJ Industrial in informing Schuback of its desire to purchase afterreceiving a formal offer constitutes a meeting of the minds.

4. The inscription this will serve as our initial purchase order proves further theacceptance of the offer.

5. The Trial Court is correct in stating that there was a perfected contract of sale. Iterred however, when it said that the perfection only occurred when the quantity tobe purchased was submitted by SJ Industrial.

6. Perfection occurred when the initial purchase order was issued even if the quantityto be purchased was not yet available as quantity is not a material to perfection.

7. What is of importance is the meeting of the minds as to the object and cause.8. The omission to open a letter of credit does not prevent the perfection of the

contract between the parties, for the opening of the letter of credit is not to bedeemed a suspensive condition.

9. Schuback, in its dealings with SJ Industrial, did not incorporate any provisiondeclaring their contract of sale without effect until after the fulfillment of the act ofopening a letterof credit.

Nool v. CA

Facts: Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute and litigated upon here. The plaintiff spouses,Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera, now the appellants, seek recovery of theaforementioned parcels of land from the defendants, Anacleto Nool (Conchitas youngerbrother) and Emilia Nebre, now the appellees.

Conchita and her husband bought the two parcels of land from her two brothersVictorino Nool (1 hectare) and Francisco Nool (3 hectares). As they were in dire need ofmoney, they obtained a loan from the Ilagan Branch of the DBP, in Ilagan, Isabela, secured by areal estate mortgage on said parcels of land, which were still registered in the names ofVictorino Nool and Francisco Nool, at the time, and for the failure of plaintiffs to pay the saidloan, including interest and surcharges, totaling P56,000.00, the mortgage was foreclosed.

The one year redemption period for the foreclosed parcels of land was from March16, 1982 to March 15, 1983 but the mortgagors right of redemption was not exercised by theplaintiff spouses.

Because they were unable to redeem the property, Conchita asked her brotherAnacleto Nool to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP, which the latter did; and as aresult, the titles of the two (2) parcels of land in question were transferred to Anacleto Nool.

Defendant Anacleto having been made to believe, then, that his sister, Conchita,still had the right to redeem the said properties had agreement with Conchita to purchase thetwo (2) parcels of land for a total price of P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which price was paid toConchita, and upon payment of the balance of P14,000.00, plaintiffs (Conchita) were to regainpossession of the two (2) hectares of land, which amounts defendants (Anacleto) failed to pay,and the same day the said arrangement was made; another covenant was entered into by theparties, whereby Anacleto agreed to return to Conchita the lands in question, at anytime thelatter have the necessary amount (the repurchase agreement); that Conchita asked theAnacleto to return the same but despite the intervention of the Barangay Captain of theirplace, Anacleto refused to return the said parcels of land to Conchita.

Anacleto theorized that they acquired the lands in question from the DevelopmentBank of the Philippines, through negotiated sale, and were misled by Conchita whendefendant Anacleto Nool signed the private writing, agreeing to return subject lands whenplaintiffs have the money to redeem the same.

Issues and Held:

1. Was the sale of Conchita to Anacleto valid?

NO. At the time Conchita offered to Anacleto the purchase of the parcels of landshe no longer had ownership of them as they were already foreclosed and she didnot exercise the mortgagors right to redeem them within a year. DBP was alreadythe absolute owner of the parcels of the land at that time, thus Conchita had noobject to sell. The sale was UTTERLY VOID AND INEXISTENT.

2. Does Conchita have a right to enforce the repurchase agreement?

NO. One repurchases only what one has previously sold. In other words, the rightto repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties.Undisputedly, respondents (Anacleto) acquired title to the property from DBP andnot from petitioners (Conchita).

Note: If this is hard to understand try reading the actual case kasi mas magulo. Basta in short,Conchita was selling to her brother Anacleto land that she no longer owns because she wasbeyond the 1 year redemption period and had no chance to redeem her land from DBP. Andbecause Anacleto was made to believe that Conchita still had the right to redeem theproperties from DBP he agreed to her offer of selling him the land. Kumbaga maloko din to siConchita na binebenta nya pa kay Anacleto ang lupa na nabili na mismo ni Anacleto sa DBP.