Compartmentation and Fire Risk Survey ... - WhatDoTheyKnow

Compartmentation and Fire Risk Survey

Thetford Close

London

N13 6AT

Issue Date: 2 2 nd February 2020

Project Number 4001 Ridge Consultants / Homes for Haringey – Thetford Close

Tag Fire Safety Ltd Fire Compartmentation Survey. Rev 01 Page 2 of 29

Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5

2. Fire Safety Recommendations ................................................................................................. ....... 7

2.1 High Risk Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 7

2.2 Medium Risk Recommendations ................................................................................................. ... 8

3. Introduction and Fire Overview ...................................................................................................... 9

4. Building Details ............................................................................................................ ................. 11

5 Fire Safety Audit ............................................................................................................................ 12

6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. .................... 15

Appendix 1 - Photographs ..................................................................................................................... 16

Contents





Date Revision

No.

Comment

22.02.20 01 Initial issue date

Document Prepared by Signed Dated

D Morris BSc (Hons)

MIFSM MIFireE

20.02.20

Document Reviewed by Signed Dated

K Parsons BSc (Hons)

AIFireE

27.02.20

This report is a copyright of Tag Fire Safety Ltd. It applies only to the named project and must not be used in support of any other project. It may be distributed to third parties only with the permission of Tag Fire Safety and must be distributed in full and without amendment to content or presentation.

Additional fire safety measures may be necessary for insurance and other purposes. The detailed aspects of the design and construction are, unless explicitly stated otherwise in this report, to be in accordance with the recommendations of Approved Document B and the appropriate British Standards.

The validity of this report is dependent upon the recommendations being implemented in full and as described.

This report relates to a project that is subject to third party approval. It should be ensured that the contents of the report are agreed with all the relevant approval bodies prior to implementation.

Project Number 4001

Ridge Consultants / Homes for Haringey – Thetford Close


1.1 The site comprises a single detached structure, with 3 separate internal blocks over 3 floors. These were

believed to be constructed in the mid 1970’s.

1.2 Each of the flats is accessed directly off a single stairway. The common parts comprise the entrance

hallway, the stairway and the landings on each upper floor. All of the blocks have 6 flats (identified as

37-42, 43-48 and 49-54). All blocks were accessed at the time of the assessment via the use of a drop

key. Flats were accessed on a sample basis (identified later in the report).

1.3 Within the communal corridor there are riser cupboards located at the rear, adjacent to the flat entrance

doors. These house the electrical intakes for each flat. These were noted to be sealed at each floor

level, with a varying degree of deficiencies in fire stopping. In addition to this, there is a main electrical

intake for each block located within a central riser on the ground floor between the intakes.

1.4 The buildings are believed to have been built of traditional type ii masonry construction, with brick and

blockwork walls and a concrete floor slab and metal framed stairwell. Externally the ground floor is

brickwork with a UPVC cladding covering the first and second floor. The buildings have a pitched tiled roof.

1.5 The loft spaces were inspected via (non-fire rated) hatches in the communal stairwell (The hatch for block

43-48 was inaccessible). These areas were viewed at shoulder height from the top of a ladder. It was identified that compartmentation within this area is in the form of brickwork leading from around the

stairwell up to the roof apex. There are openings located in the far end of this brickwork however

these were not accessible, and as such further compartmentation within the loft space could not be

identified. There were also noted to be unsealed cable breaches leading through these fire

compartments.

1.6 The survey was undertaken in accordance with general fire safety auditing principles in order to identify

hazards that could contribute to injury of persons resorting to the building, against the requirements

of Building Regulations and applied enforcement criteria under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)

Order 2005.

1.7 The means of escape provision in terms of size, distance and time of travel is suitable for the identified risk

profiles, as they provide for persons resorting to the blocks to escape to a place of ‘relative’ or ‘ultimate’ safety.

1.8 As far as reasonable possible it was identified that the means for protecting the means of escape in terms

of fire separation and compartmentation is considered unsuitable and will not prevent the products

of combustion impacting on the means of escape or the safety of residents. This is recommended to

be ascertained with further intrusive inspections (locations identified later in the report).

1.9 The means for raising the alarm of fire is considered unacceptable in design and conformity to British

Standard 5839. In consideration of the provided compartmentation between flats and between

communal areas, the limited fire alarm provision within flats and communal area is inadequate to

inform persons of a fire in the early stages of combustion to facilitate an evacuation to be carried out.

1.10 The block had been designed on the ‘stay put’ principle, and, consequently, there was no intention for a communal fire alarm system. As such, it met not only the original design standard, but also the current

benchmark. An additional fire alarm system is provided within the communal area in the form

1. Executive Summary

Project Number 4001



of wireless detection heads, with a controller located by the main entrance door of each block. It is

unknown when this system was installed and it is believed to have been provided as a temporary

measure in order to provide an additional fire safety system until either the compartment deficiencies

are rectified, or a full compliant fire alarm system is put in place along with a simultaneous evacuation policy. The system has been identified as an Ei650i – Optical Battery Smoke Alarm, by EI Electronics.

This system is inadequate for use within this type of premises on a permanent basis as it does not

conform to British Standard 5839-1.

1.11 The employed fire plan is identified via the associated FANs (Fire Action Notices). These were noted to

show a ‘simultaneous evacuation’ policy. Ideally the blocks should be brought back to their intended ‘stay put’ policy, via rectification of the compartmentation issues. Should this prove to be cost

prohibitive, then the simultaneous evacuation should be kept in place with a permanent fire alarm

system fitted within the communal area (identified later in the report), with FANs changed to show

this and all residents made aware of the procedures.

1.12 Following the survey it is determined that the fire safety provisions and means of escape strategies are not fully compliant with applied enforcement criteria, but if the recommendations detailed in this

report are carried out, all blocks will be considered to be meeting a compliant and safe condition.

1.13 The front entrance doors to flats were found to be upgraded door sets. These are of an unknown fire

rating, without the designated fire rated stamp identified on the hinges (further investigation is

required in order to ascertain the fire resistance of these door sets). It is also recommended that the

architrave is removed from a sample door in order to ascertain if they have been installed correctly.

1.14 The fire doors to the riser cupboards are mostly original (with some alterations). These are likely to have

met the standards at the time of the build but would not meet current fire regulations.

1.15 Internally within the communal area, the corridors have been heavily painted over the years, meaning

that the surface lining is unlikely to pass a scratch test with a Class O rated spread of flame. Whilst this

is non-compliant with current legislation, it is not identified as providing a significant risk as additional flammable linings are limited.

1.16 Lobby protection is provided to the flats on the ground and first floors only (the second is open from the

flats to the stairwell). This is constructed of timber frames and Georgian wired glazing. This is sufficient to meet the required standards at the time of the build.

1.17 Manual ventilation of the stairwells is provided via windows that are hand operated on each level.

1.18 Fire detection in the individual flats (that could be inspected), is deemed to be suitable for the applied

risks. The flats that could be accessed at the time of the assessment were provided with a British

Standard 5839 Part 6: Type LD2 systems, with heads located in the hallway and kitchen (and in addition

some are located in the front room). Each flat regardless of residency should be provided with a

minimum of a British standard 5839 Part 6: Type LD2 system, comprising of an interlinked smoke detector in the flat entrance hallway and a heat detector in the kitchen.

1.19 It is unknown if emergency lighting is provided within the escape routes and communal areas to assist

escape in the event of a fire. If it is provided, it could not be confirmed if the level of illumination from the system provides the minimum of 1 lux at floor level as an illumination test was not carried out, but

it would appear from the location of the lighting that if they could be confirmed as Emergency Lighting,

that sufficient illumination is provided to assist escape.

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2.0.1 This section sets out the fire safety recommendations necessary to meet the appropriate fire safety

standards for the building use, occupancy and risk profiles. The measures are those considered by the

Consultant to be necessary to meet a ‘reasonable standard’ of general fire precautions in the premises

in accordance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and applied enforcement criteria for the type and use of building.

5.

2.0.2 This Fire Safety Survey is not a Fire Risk Assessment therefore timescale for completion of the

recommendations is not given.

6.

2.0.3 Each Recommendation is given a ‘Priority Rating” based on the impact on the safety of persons

resorting to the building in the event of a fire.

7.

2.0.4 The Responsible Person should consider the recommendations of this report and determine suitable

timescales for completion of the necessary upgrades.

2.0.5 The Recommendations below are rated ‘high, medium and low’ based on the risk to persons who will

occupy the building. High risk relates to the risk of serious injury or death, Medium risk relates to an

identified risk of injury and Low risk relates to a relevant standard for regulatory compliance.

2.0.6 If the provided Recommendations are carried out it is the considered opinion of the Consultant that the

building will provide adequate fire safety provisions for the identified risk profiles.

2.1.1 The compartmentation between individual dwellings or to the communal escape routes does not provide

60 minutes fire separation to facilitate a ‘stay-put’ fire policy be employed. To this end, an automatic

fire detection and alarm system should be provided in the communal areas to ensure all occupiers of the building are alerted to the fire to allow a total evacuation of the building and a ‘simultaneous

evacuation’ policy being put in place.

Presently a wireless detection system is provided within the communal area (type mentioned previously in

the report). This is inadequate for the block and is believed to have been installed as a temporary

measure only. The system should comply with British Standard 5839 Part 1 comprising of smoke

detection in the communal escape routes interlinked with a heat detector sited in each flat hallway. The system should be zoned to take into account compartmentation and party walls between blocks.

2.1.2 It was identified during the survey that the stairwell was being used to store residents belongings and

waste materials. This increases the fire loading within an area that should be deemed sterile as it is

the only means of the escape from the premises. It is recommended that the residents be informed

not to use this area for storage of any kind.

2.1.3 The front entrance doors to flats were found to be upgraded door sets of an unknown fire rating.

Certification should be obtained which confirms all flat doors are of a FD30 standard. If the door

specification cannot be confirmed as FD30 standard rated, they should be replaced in order to meet

the standards mentioned in 2.2.3.

2. Fire Safety Recommendations

2. 1 High Risk Recommendations

Project Number 4001



2.1.4 Internally within the flats it was noted that a cupboard next to the front entrance door had open

pipework leading through each floor level. These were believed to be part of an old service system

and have been left in place since it was removed. This pipework should either be removed or

appropriately fire stopped, ensuring fire / smoke spread could not travel between levels.

2.2.1 It was not possible to identify whether waste pipes in bathrooms run in an open vertical riser or run

between all floors with no fire separation between storeys. The shaft should be sealed at each storey

level. Pipework passing through the storey levels should be appropriately fire stopped and fitted with a fire collar. Alternatively the shaft should be sealed at the bottom and top and smoke detection

provided in the shaft which is interfaced to the block fire alarm system. Further intrusive inspections

are recommended to identify whether these measures are in place.

2.2.2 Within the communal stairwell, the electrical intake seems to pass through a riser which appears to run

the height of the building. The void should be sealed at each storey level, with pipework or ducting passing through the storey levels being appropriately fire stopped (plastic pipes should be fitted with

a fire collar). Alternatively the void should be sealed at the bottom and top and smoke detection

provided in the riser which is interfaced to the block fire alarm. The electrical intake should be suitably

fire stopped where it enters the riser. In this case, the intake was noted to have been sealed with an

unknown board (possibly asbestos), but beneath slab level, and as such the open vent leads directly into the shaft above the batt.

2.2.3 It was identified in all blocks that the door to the service riser was of an unknown fire rating (not believed

to be fire rated). The doors that open onto the corridor (means of escape) should be fire doors fitted

with a serviceable self-closing device and an intumescent strip / cold smoke seal with a 30 minute fire

rating. These should either be locked shut or have a serviceable self-closing device and an intumescent

strip / cold smoke seal with a 30 minute fire rating installed into either the door edge or doorframe, conforming to BS 476 part 20:22 and BS476 part 31:1. BS 476 - Fire doors and doorframe, BS EN 1154

– Self-closers, BS EN 1154 – Hinges, BS EN 1906 and BS EN 12209 – Door handles and locks. The fire

doors must be repaired / installed and maintained in accordance with BS 8214:1990.

2.2.4 The riser cupboards located throughout each block were noted to be of insufficient fire resistance and a

majority were being used as storage. There were multiple unsealed penetrations leading into them, as well as having non-compliant foam used throughout.

2.2.5 Fire detection in the individual flats varies. On the whole it is believed to be suitable for the applied risks

(based on a sample survey of the flats). These flats are provided with a British Standard 5839 Part 6:

Type LD2 system, comprising an interlinked smoke detector in the flat entrance hallway and a heat

detector in the kitchen. Each flat regardless of residency should be provided with a minimum of a British standard 5839 Part 6: Type LD2 system. Not all of the flats were inspected at the time of the

assessment and so compliance throughout is only assumed. It is recommended that all flats are

inspected to identify the level of detection coverage.

2.2.6 Intrusive inspections are recommended to identify if there are fire breaks provided behind the UPVC

cladding and also the surrounds for the flues that penetrate this space.

2.2.7 It is unknown if emergency lighting is provided within the escape routes and communal areas to assist escape in the event of a fire. If it is provided, it could not be confirmed if the level of illumination from

the system provides the minimum of 1 lux at floor level as an illumination test was not carried out, but



2. 2 Medium Risk Recommendations

Project Number 4001



2.2.8 The loft spaces were inspected via (non-fire rated) hatches in the communal stairwell (The hatch for block

43-48 was inaccessible and so it is recommended that this is inspected). There are openings located in

the far end of this brickwork however these were not accessible, and as such further

compartmentation within the loft space could not be identified. There were also noted to be unsealed

cable breaches leading through these fire compartments that should be sealed with relevant fire

stopping material.

3.1 This fire safety survey was commissioned by Homes for Haringey to assess the existing fire safety provisions in terms of compartmentation against applied enforcement criteria and to source a

strategic fire safety solution for the blocks to deliver conformity with the Regulatory Reform (Fire

Safety) Order 2005 and Building Regulations.

3.2 For the purpose of the audit, the Consultant assessed the fire safety provisions against the functional

requirements of Building Regulations Approved Document ‘B’ with particular emphasis on the following elements:

Means of warning and escape

Internal fire spread (linings)

Internal fire spread (structure)

3.3 In assessing the suitability of the Building Regulations functional requirements, the following fire safety

provisions were audited:

The means of escape

The means for protecting the means of escape (compartmentation)

The means for raising the alarm of fire

Fire evacuation strategies

Statutory Legislation and Codes of Practice used for the purpose of fire safety audit

3.4 With effect from 1 October 2006 the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 became the Fire Safety

Legislation with the repeal of the previous main and subsidiary Acts relating to the communal areas

of flats built in a block. Single private dwellings do not fall under the requirements of the Regulatory

Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

A) Building Regulations 2000 Approved Document “B”

B) British Standard 5839: Part 1: 2002 (2013) Fire Detection & Alarm Systems

C) British Standard 5266: Part 1 and 6: 2005 (2011) Emergency Lighting

D) British Standard ISO 3864: Part 1: 2011 Fire Safety Signs

E) British Standard 9991: Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings

F) British Standard 9991: Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of residential

buildings

G) British Standard ISO 23932:2009 Fire Safety Engineering: general principles

H) British Standard 476-10:2009 – Fire tests on building materials and structures. Guide to the principles,

selection, role and application of fire testing and their outputs

I) British Standard 6266:2011 Code of practice for fire protection for electronic equipment installations

J) British Standard 7671:2008+A1: 2011 Requirements for electrical installations.

3.5 The audit was undertaken in accordance with general fire safety auditing principles in order to identify hazards that could contribute to ignition, fire growth and propagation.

3. Introduction and Fire Overview

Project Number 4001



3.6 Under the Building Regulations the ‘responsible person’ is required to provide an adequate

level of life safety to the building by providing suitable means of escape, means of warning

occupants of a fire and limiting internal fire spread. This can be achieved by the adoption of

standard guidance as documented within British Standard 9999 and 9991 respectively.

However, British Standard 9999 and 9991 recognise that alternative solutions may provide a

more appropriate design.

3.7 It is acknowledged that the blocks were not constructed to meet the requirements of current

Building

Regulations. It is recognised however that it is not always possible or practical without major

Project Number 4001



reconstruction works being undertaken to meet the exact requirements of current Building

Regulations, therefore the general principle is that in order to evidence compliance, standards of fire

safety must be relevant for the identified risks and persons resorting to the respective building.

3.8 The information, limitations and assumptions used in the preparation of this report are noted below:

3.8.1 The consultant was not provided with any building or fire safety equipment drawings or past planning

applications or submissions, therefore the information contained within this report was obtained

during the site survey and from information obtained from residents.

3.9 This audit did not include areas below normal floor level or above false ceilings unless these areas were readily accessible and no ‘intrusive’ or ‘destructive’ inspections of equipment or

services were carried out.

3.10 This report considers, as a guide, the requirements of British Standard 9999 Code of practice

for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings and British Standard 9991

Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of residential buildings to assess the means of escape and compartmentation provision as the ‘Standard’ works on the

principles of the buildings applied fire risks (risk profiling).

3.11 In assessing the means of escape and compartmentation provision to meet the requirements

of this audit, the following factors have been considered:

A) The anticipated probability of a fire occurring.

B) The anticipated fire severity.

C) The ability of the structure to resist the spread of fire and smoke.

D) The consequential danger to persons in and around the building.

3.12 Fires do not normally start in two different places in a building at the same time. Initially, a fire will create

a hazard only in the part in which it starts and is unlikely, at this stage to involve a large area. The fire

may subsequently spread to other parts of the building, usually along the circulation routes. The

items that are first to be ignited are often furnishings and other items not controlled or regulated by British Standard 9999. It is less likely that the fire will originate in the structure of the building itself

and the risk of it originating accidentally in circulation areas is limited, provided that the combustible

content of such areas is restricted.

4.1 In establishing the fire safety audit principles, the Fire Safety Consultant took into account the

nature and design of the building, the occupants, including potential vulnerable occupants,

the fire protection afforded and observed at the time of the audit.

4.2 The site comprises a single detached structure, with 3 separate internal blocks over 3 floors.

These were believed to be constructed in the mid 1970’s.

4.3 The buildings are believed to have been built of traditional type ii masonry construction, with

brick and blockwork walls and a concrete floor slab and metal framed stairwell. Externally the

ground floor is brickwork with a UPVC cladding covering the first and second floor. The

buildings have a pitched tiled roof.

4. Building Details

Project Number 4001



4.4 Each of the flats is accessed directly off a single stairway. The common parts comprise the

entrance hallway, the stairway and the landings on each upper floor. All of the blocks have 6

flats (identified as 37-42, 43-48 and 49-54). All blocks were accessed at the time of the assessment via the use of a drop key. Flats were accessed on a sample basis (identified later

in the report).

4.5 The loft spaces were inspected via (non-fire rated) hatches in the communal stairwell (The hatch for block 43-48 was inaccessible). These areas were viewed at shoulder height from the

top of a ladder. It was identified that compartmentation within this area is in the form of

brickwork leading from around the stairwell up to the roof apex. There are openings located

in the far end of this brickwork however these were not accessible, and as such further

compartmentation within the loft space could not be identified. There were also noted to be unsealed cable breaches leading through these fire compartments.

4.6 Individual flats are provided with brick, blockwork and stud partition walls as noted within the

flats that could be inspected.

4.7 In general it is determined that the construction of all the blocks is sound and does not present

a significant fire risk through their design or use.

5.1 In order to assess the suitability of the fire compartmentation all accessible areas and potential fire risks in the communal spaces of each block were assessed against applied enforcement

criteria and risk profiles.

5.2 A ‘sample’ number of flats were also assessed to determine if the fire compartmentation

between the flats and between the flats and the communal areas (escape routes) is sufficient

to facilitate the fire emergency plan employed. The following flats were assessed during the

survey:

Flat 37

Flat 43

Flat 48

Flat 54

Flat 50

5.3 It was identified that the fire compartmentation appears to conform to the requirements of

Building Regulations at the time of construction but over the years a number of refurbishments have been made to communal systems and power supplies which have

perforated compartment walls which have not been appropriately fire stopped. Within the

flat’s perforations or fittings in the internal walls have no impact on fire spread throughout

the building, the key features in preventing fire spread are the walls, ceilings, floors and fittings

between flats and the walls and fittings between flats and the communal areas.

5.4 All building work and refurbishments should have been ‘signed off’ and approved by either a

Local Authority Building Control Officer or an Approved Building Inspector; therefore

5 Fire Safety Audit

Project Number 4001



compartmentation should be to an appropriate standard. This could not be confirmed, as

approvals were not available for audit at the time of the survey.

5.5 As part of the survey, building services risers within the communal areas were assessed for

compliance of compartmentation. All of the risers in the sub-divided blocks are believed to have services running between levels and into flats which should be appropriately fire

stopped. Further intrusive investigations are required to ascertain this.

5.6 Providing the recommendations of this report are followed, the compartmentation and means

of escape provisions will be acceptable and as detailed in British Standard 9999 and 9991 and

therefore considered suitable for the identified risk profiles.

Means of Escape Provision

5.7 As part of the survey process the building occupancy levels, were assessed against the suitability of the

provided means of escape.

5.8 In determining the suitability of the means of escape, the consultant assessed the staircase provision, exit

routes and exit doors to ensure that the building occupants can safely evacuate the building in the

event of a fire.

5.9 It is the considered opinion of the consultant that the staircase provision and exit widths are suitable in

number and design to facilitate the evacuation policy to be implemented and are fully compliant with the accepted guidance of British Standards.

Emergency Exit Routes and Exits

5.10 All of the emergency exit routes, and final exit doors were assessed for suitability in regard to numbers, widths and location. It was identified that the emergency exit routes and exits in the main were

suitable for the identified risk profiles to facilitate the applied evacuation procedure.

Travel Distances

5.11 It was identified that the travel distances to a place of ‘ultimate’ or ‘relative safety’ from within the

individual flats is within the guideline for the identified risk profiles.

Staircases

5.12 During the audit the staircase provision was surveyed to determine the suitability as an element of the

means of escape provision. Building Regulations recommend that a single staircase in a residential

building over 3 storeys should have a staircase constructed of materials of ‘limited combustibility’.

Based on the survey it was identified that the staircase provision appears to be designed and constructed in accordance with Building Regulations Approved Document ‘K’ and is therefore suitable

as an element of the escape strategy, even though the block is not over 3 storeys in height.

Evacuation Procedures

5.13 The employed fire plan is identified via the associated FANs (Fire Action Notices). These were noted to

show a ‘simultaneous evacuation’ policy. Ideally the blocks should be brought back to their intended

‘stay put’ policy, via rectification of the compartmentation issues. Should this prove to be cost

prohibitive, then the simultaneous evacuation should be kept in place with a permanent fire alarm

system fitted within the communal area (identified later in the report), with FANs changed to show this and all residents made aware of the procedures.

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Compartmentation

5.14 It was identified that the fire compartmentation appears to conform to the requirements of Building

Regulations at the time of construction although no destructive or intrusive surveys were carried out

of wall voids, under fixed flooring or in ceiling voids.

5.15 All building work and refurbishments should have been ‘signed off’ and approved by either a Local

Authority Building Control Officer or an Approved Building Inspector; therefore, compartmentation

should be to an appropriate standard. This could not be confirmed, as approvals were not available for audit at the time of the survey.

5.16 In assessing the compartmentation the consultant surveyed for holes, cracks, and perforations of visible

walls, ceilings and floors within the escape routes, service risers and all available areas. A survey of a

’sample’ number of flats was also carried out.

5.17 During this survey no intrusive or destructive surveys were carried out.

5.18 In assessment of the visible and accessible fire stopping it is believed that it does not meet the

requirements and guidance of British Standard 476 (integrity, stability and insulation). Refer to

Recommendations.

5.19 In partition walls between flats, where socket outlets are provided these should be adequately fire

stopped in the wall cavity to prevent spread of the products of combustion into the cavity or from flat to flat.

Fire Doors

5.20 The front entrance doors to flats were found to be upgraded door sets. These are of an unknown fire rating, without the designated fire rated stamp identified on the hinges (further investigation is

required in order to ascertain the fire resistance of these door sets). It is also recommended that the

architrave is removed from a sample door in order to ascertain if they have been installed correctly.

5.21 The fire doors to the riser cupboards are mostly original (with some alterations). These are likely to have

met the standards at the time of the build but would not meet current fire regulations.

Service Risers

5.23 The riser cupboards located throughout each block were noted to be of insufficient fire resistance and a

majority were being used as storage. There were multiple unsealed penetrations leading into them, as well as having non-compliant foam used throughout.

Surface Linings

5.24 Internally within the communal area, the corridors have been heavily painted over the years, meaning that the surface lining is unlikely to pass a scratch test with a Class O rated spread of flame.

Fire Loading

5.25 The applied fire loading and potential growth and propagation of fire were assessed to ensure an ignited fire could not spread uncontrollably with serious impacts on the means of escape. It was identified

that the fire loading in escape routes and communal areas is low and well managed, with the exception

of the riser cupboards that have poor compartmentation values.

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Emergency Lighting

5.26 It is unknown if emergency lighting is provided within the escape routes and communal areas to assist

escape in the event of a fire. If it is provided, it could not be confirmed if the level of illumination from

the system provides the minimum of 1 lux at floor level as an illumination test was not carried out, but



Fire Alarm System

5.27 There is a temporary fire alarm provision in the escape routes via wireless detection heads, with a

controller located by the main entrance doors. It is unknown when this system was installed but is

believed to be only of a temporary nature. The system has been identified as an Ei650i – Optical Battery Smoke Alarm, by EI Electronics. This system is inadequate for use within this type of premises on a

permanent basis as it does not conform to British Standard 5839-1. Individual flats that were able to

be inspected are mostly provided with a British Standard 5839 Part 6 LD2 system provided and

managed by the Landlord, comprising of an interlinked smoke detector in the flat entrance hallway

and a heat detector in the kitchen. However, flat 33 didn’t have detection. The means for raising the alarm of fire is not considered suitable for the identified risks (refer to Recommendations).

6.1 In overall assessment of the blocks it is identified that the blocks were built in accordance with the

functional requirements of Building Regulations in force at the time of construction.

6.2 Over the years a number of refurbishments have been carried out on services and equipment which has

resulted in compartment walls, floor and ceiling slabs being perforated.

6.3 It is recognised that it is not always possible or practical without major reconstruction works being

undertaken to meet the exact requirements of current Building Regulations, therefore the general

6 Conclusion

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principle is that in order to evidence compliance, standards of fire safety must be relevant for the

identified risks and persons resorting to the respective building.

6.4 With this in mind, it is recommended that the compartmentation breeches and other fire safety issues

identified and detailed in the recommendations be rectified, or an interlinked British Standard 5839

Part 1 fire alarm system be provided in the communal areas and a Part 6 fire alarm system be provided

in all flats which will compensate for the minor compartmentation breaches in the flats, by giving an early warning of fire within the building.

6.5 It is the considered opinion of the Consultant that following the completion of the issues detailed in the

‘Recommendations’ that all blocks will meet the functional requirements of Building Regulations, British Standard 9999 and 9991 and be compliant to a minimum from the Regulatory Reform (Fire

Safety) Order 2005.

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Tag Fire Safety Ltd Fire Compartmentation Survey. Rev 01 Page 17

of 29

Pic. 5 – Example front entrance Pic. 6 – Lobby protection Pic. 7 – Ground floor lobby door Pic. 8 – Ground floor lobby door

door doesn’t close flush into frame due excessive gaps

Appendix 1 - Photographs

Thetford – Block 37 to 42

Pic. 1 – Front view of Thetford blocks

Pic. 2 – Side view of Thetford blocks Pic. 3 – Rear view of Thetford blocks Pic. 4 – Example fire action notice

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of 29

to added metal insert

exposed core

38

Pic. 13 – Inadequate compartmentation in intake by flat

Pic. 14 – Intake by flat 37 being used as storage

Pic. 15 – Unsealed penetration in intake by flat 37


Pic. 9 – Second floor landing is being used for storage

Pic. 10 – Vent duct on central riser

Pic. 11 – Intake door by flat 38 missing locking mechanism leaving


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of 29

Pic. 21 – Breaches in loft compartmentation

Pic. 22 – Breaches in loft compartmentation

Pic. 23 – Example of flat entrance door hinges

Pic. 24 – Example of flat entrance door plug

Pic. 17 – Intake by flat 39 being used as storage






Pic. 25 – Unsealed pipe in

cupboard by flat entrance door

(Flat 37)

Pic. 29 – Central riser cupboard

with unsealed penetrations

Pic. 26 – Unsealed pipework from

old gas meter (Flat 37)

Pic. 30 – Central riser cupboard with unsealed penetrations

Pic. 27 – Example of bathroom Pic. 28 – Central riser cupboard

extract with unsealed penetrations and

possible asbestos pipe

with

unsealed

penetrations

Pic. 31 – Central riser cupboard



Thetford – Block 43 to 48

Pic. 1 – Front view of block Pic. 2 – Unsealed pipe in cupboard Pic. 3 – Unsealed pipe in cupboard Pic. 4 – Cupboard within landing

by flat entrance door (Flat 43)

by flat entrance door (Flat 43) ( Flat 43)

Pic. 5 – Unknown fire detection type within hallway

Pic. 6 – Example of bathroom extract

Pic. 7 – Items being left in ground floor hallway

Pic. 8 – Ground floor lobby door doesn’t close flush into frame



43)

45) 48) 47)

Pic. 9 – Unsealed cable in cupboard by flat entrance door (Flat 44)

Pic. 10 – Unsealed cable in cupboard by flat entrance door (Flat

Pic. 11 – Items being stored in lobby Pic. 12 – Locking mechanism added to lobby door

Pic. 13 – Items being stored in intake cupboard (Flat 44)






pipework

Pic. 21 – Central riser with unsealed pipe penetrations

Pic. 17 – Items being stored on stairwell

Pic. 18 – Unsealed penetration in intake flat ( 48)

Pic. 19 – Intake cupboard being used as storage (flat 47)

Pic. 20 – Central riser with unsealed penetratio ns and potential asbestos



Thetford – Block 59-54

Pic. 1 – Front view of block Pic. 2 – Ground floor lobby door, Pic. 3 – Unsealed cable in cupboard Pic. 4 – Intake cupboard being used

hinges missing screws, excessive by flat entrance door (Flat 50) as storage (Flat 50)

door gaps and warped



Pic. 7 – First floor lobby door warped

Pic. 8 – Flat entrance door damaged ( Flat 52)



53) 53)





51)

54) 53)

Pic. 13 – Intake cupboard being used as storage (Flat 53)



Pic. 16 – Loft compartmentation



compartmentation compartmentation

Pic. 21 – Unsealed cable

penetration in loft

compartmentation

Pic. 22 – Unsealed cable Pic. 23 – Unsealed pipe in cupboard Pic. 24 – Unsealed and possible

penetration in loft by front entrance door (Flat 54) asbestos pipe in flat cupboard

compartmentation

Pic. 17 – Openings in loft compartmentation

Pic. 18 – Loft compartmentation to roof apex

Pic. 19 – Unsealed cable penetration in loft

Pic. 20 – Unsealed cable penetration in loft



Pic. 25 – Example of extract in Pic. 26 – Boiler in outside cupboard Pic. 27 – Central riser on ground Pic. 28 – Central riser on ground

bathroom (Flat 50) on balcony (Flat 50) floor with unsealed pipe floor with possible

asbestos penetrations pipework



Documents

Compartmentation and Fire Risk Survey ... - WhatDoTheyKnow