Comparing the future: a critique of 2050 scenarios. Bertrand de Jouvenel ... Helmer and Gordon, Institute for the Future – Emerged from RAND to corporate strategy applications –

Comparing the future: a critique of 2050 scenarios

Nick Hughes, Imperial College LondonNeil Strachan, University College London

Dissemination Conference Royal Academy of Engineering

2 November 2010

What are scenarios?

What are scenarios?Descriptions of possible futures

What are scenarios?Descriptions of possible futuresSomething to do with uncertainty…?

What are scenarios?Descriptions of possible futuresSomething to do with uncertainty…?…not predictions…?


But what’s the point of them?


But what’s the point of them?Utopian visions…? Strategic conversations…? Stretching our preconceptions…?


But what’s the point of them?Utopian visions…? Strategic conversations…? Stretching our preconceptions…?Pierre Wack suggests:– ‘If the scenario process does not bring out strategic options

previously unconsidered by managers, then it has been sterile’


But what’s the point of them?Utopian visions…? Strategic conversations…? Stretching our preconceptions…?Pierre Wack suggests:– ‘If the scenario process does not bring out strategic options

previously unconsidered by managers, then it has been sterile’

Or – we do scenarios to improve the decisions we are making now

Michel Godet‘The future is an emerging landscape with unknown contours; the constraint is that despite the unknown horizons, we have to take decisions today that commit us for the future. Even if the information is degraded we have to place our bets now, to create the future rather than submit to it’

Scenarios and Strategic Management, 1987

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Michel Godet‘The future is an emerging landscape with unknown contours; the constraint is that despite the unknown horizons, we have to take decisions today that commit us for the future. Even if the information is degraded we have to place our bets now, to create the future rather than submit to it’

‘The plurality of the future and the scope for freedom of human action are mutually explanatory; the future has not been written, but remains to be created.’

Scenarios and Strategic Management, 1987

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Bertrand de Jouvenel‘The great problem of our age is that we want things to change more rapidly, and at the same time we want to have a better knowledge of things to come. I do not say that the reconciliation of these desires is impossible, but it does raise a problem.’

The Art of Conjecture, 1967

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Categorising the scenario literature

Themes include…

Probable – Possible – Preferable– Descriptive – Normative – Trend - Peripheral

Learning Process – Decision SupportQualitative – QuantitativeIntuitive – FormalSnapshot – ChainPanoramic – Focussed

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A brief history of scenarios (1)RAND founded 1946, US– Cold War Strategy– Intuitive and Formal approaches

Centre d’Etudes Philosophique, founded 1957, France– National Planning, ‘Scientific Utopias’ – La Prospective

Helmer and Gordon, Institute for the Future – Emerged from RAND to corporate strategy applications– Developed Delphi and Cross-Impact Matrix techniques

Kahn – Thinking About the Unthinkable, 1962– Responsibility to consider unpleasant outcomes– Intuitive and quantitative

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A brief history of scenarios (2)Pierre Wack, Shell 1972– The corporate actor preparing for changes in external environment– Intuitive and quantitative

1970s Broader Sweeps– Kahn, Limits to Growth, opposing social paradigms and the 2x2

matrixSecond Wave Prospective – Godet– Corporate applications– Formal tools - SMICProbExpert, MICMAC, etc

Adam Kahane, Mont Fleur Scenarios– Seeking consensus between diverse actors– Intuitive and quantitative

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Conclusions from review of scenarios since 1945 (1)

Some typological categories are not mutually exclusive

Many use both quantitative AND qualitative dataBoth the learning inherent in the process, and specific

decision support are important

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The balance between possible, probable and preferableScenarios can reduce uncertainty about the future

– a detailed consideration of the present – pre-determined and uncertain elements of the future

Some uncertain elements can be linked to the actions of identifiable actors

Possibility of occurrence linked to actor motivations (either intuitively or formally)

This might – highlight potential discontinuities (possible)– show high likelihood of some events if actor motivations unlikely to change

(probable) – or point out necessary preconditions for hoped for developments

(preferable)Different actors have different levels of agency within a given system –

this includes the ‘scenario user’ 17


Scenarios can inform three kinds of near-term action:– Protective decision making– Proactive decision making– Consensus building

Finding the balance depends on clear and realistic depiction of actor motivation and agency – including the scenario user

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Review of low carbon scenarios (Hughes and Strachan, 2010)SCENARIO EXERCISE AUTHORS, DATE SCOPE OF STUDY

Trend Driven Studies1 Special Report on Emissions Scenarios Nakicenovic et al (2000) Global, energy use and land use change

2 Foresight Scenarios Berkhout et al (1999) UK society

3 Socio-economic scenarios for climate change impact assessment

UKCIP(2000) UK society

4 Scenario Exercise on Moving Towards a Sustainable Energy Economy

IAF, Virginia (2004) UK energy and society

5 Transitions to a UK Hydrogen Economy Eames and McDowall (2006) UK energy system6 Electricity Network Scenarios for Great Britain in 2050 Elders et al (2006) UK electricity system

7 Electricity Network Scenarios for Great Britain in 2050 (LENS project)

Ault et al (2008) UK electricity system

Technical Feasibility Studies8 The Changing Climate RCEP (2000) UK energy system9 Decarbonising the UK Anderson et al (2005) UK energy system10 The Balance of Power- Reducing CO2 Emissions from

the UK Power SectorILEX (2006) UK electricity system

11 Decentralising UK Energy WADE (2006) UK heat and electricity12 A Bright Future: Friends of the Earth's Electricity Sector

Model for 2030FOE (2006) UK electricity sector

13 Powering London into the 21st Century PB Power (2006) London, heat and power from buildings

14 Technical Feasibility of CO2 emissions reductions in the UK housing stock

Johnston et al (2005) UK, energy demands from domestic buildings

15 40% House Boardman et al (2005) UK, energy demands from domestic buildings

Modelling Studies16 UK MARKAL (Energy White Paper etc) Strachan et al (2007) UK energy system

17 Energy 2050 UKERC (2009) UK energy system18 Japan Scenarios and Actions Towards Low Carbon

SocietiesFujino et al (2008) Japan energy system

19 World Energy Outlook IEA (2008a) Global energy systems20 Energy Technology Perspectives IEA (2008b) Global energy systems21 World Energy Technology Outlook European Commission (2005) Global energy systems

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Trend driven studiesExtrapolations or amplifications of presently evident trends or currents, views or paradigms

– E.g: consumerism vs. community; regionalisation vs. globalisation

Use of 2x2 axis to present contrasting paradigmsHelpful for envisaging major social changesOverly polarised, homogenousLinks of broad trends to specific technologies hard to justifyPre-determined, fatalistic outcome

– circular logic: trend is both the generator and justifier of events

Human actions and choices appear peripheral to the process of change

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Technical feasibility studiesUsually relatively uncomplex accounting process of balancing supply and demand, often in customised spreadsheet based toolCan achieve technical detail (including at sectoral level) and show feasibility of given emissions targetLess complex than optimisation models but more open to illustrative ‘storytelling’

– Demand and supply data easily manipulated to try out ‘what if..?’s– E.g. no to technology x; every home is well insulated; we work from home

and reduce transport demand; etcHowever these ‘what if...?’s are usually not clearly linked to social context or to identifiable actor actionsOver reliance on broad brush justifications such as ‘strong policy’ or ‘growth in environmental attitudes’User imposed emissions target creates artificial inevitability

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Modelling studiesTechnical detail across energy system Cross-sectoral interactions, resource trade offsEconomic information: GDP loss / gain; change in net social welfareKey drivers:

– Costs of technologies and resources, AND– Economic policies – incentives, taxes, AND / OR– System-wide emissions constraint

‘What if..?’ assumptions – but hard to link to actor actionsEnd point pre-determined – influence of the exogenously imposed constraint cannot be linked to actor action

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Summary of review of low carbon scenarios

Low carbon scenarios have been successful in demonstrating the technical feasibility of a low carbon future and economic costs and benefits

– However technical focus is strongly on supply-demand balancing and less on network issues, supply chains, skills

They have had impacts on policy debate, e.g. 60% and 80% targets, and questions surrounding need or otherwise of contentious technologiesThey have begun to establish ‘visions’ of ‘desirable’ futures

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Critiques of LCS in comparison to wider scenarios literature (1)

Quantitative and qualitative information – not integrated but consecutive, e.g:

– a pre-defined social condition (strong environmental values) explains a technological assumption (lots of renewables);or,

– a pre-defined technological condition (lots of renewables) explained by a broad social or policy assumption (strong environmental values / strong policy)

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This is a linear view of the relationship between policy, society and technology (Fig 1)

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Figure 1: Linear model





This is a linear view of the relationship between policy, society and technology (Fig 1)Insights from socio-technical transitions literature show an iterative or co-evolving pattern is a more accurate model (Fig 2)

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Figure 1: Linear model Figure 2: Co-evolving model


Lack of actor depiction – drivers are:– Broad, extrapolative, high-level social trends; or,– Exogenous control of the modelled technical system

Descriptions of particular actors having motivations, interacting with other actors, causing things to happen – less presentThis tends to deliver scenarios based on presuppositions of states of the world but without a strong link to strategic information regarding:

– Protective decisions– Proactive decisions– Consensus building

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Tendency to be drawn towards the long term target year – 2050Lock-in, path dependency is potentially critical for energy systemsReal need for focus on near term questions but still informed by the context of the longer term strategy –identify ‘branching points’

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ConclusionsLow carbon scenarios are required because:

– There are uncertainties about the future, but also opportunities contingent upon actions of key system actors

We need to think: – protectively about possible external uncertainties – proactively about opportunities which can be seized by internal system

actors– towards a consensus where such opportunities depend on the cooperation

of multiple actors

To achieve this low carbon scenarios require– Technical detail – Economic detail– Social detail– Actor specific detail – motivations and resulting actions– Grounding in the present – early part of the transition is crucial – looking

for branching points29

Thank you for your [email protected]

Documents

Comparing the future: a critique of 2050 scenarios. Bertrand de Jouvenel ... Helmer and Gordon, Institute for the Future – Emerged from RAND to corporate strategy applications –