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Voting, identity and security threats in Ukraine: who supports the Radical FreedomParty? Lenka Bustikova School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, United States article info Article history: Available online 26 July 2015 Keywords: Svoboda party Radical right parties Ethnic minorities Ukraine abstract This article investigates voters and sympathizers of Ukraine's radical right party, Svoboda. Using an original survey conducted in 2010, it shows that support for Svoboda was rooted less in extreme levels of xenophobia vis- a-vis Russians, and more in concerns about the support that the Russian minority receives from the state, fear of losing Ukrainian sover- eignty, and economic anxiety. In contrast to the conventional view, the analysis suggests that support for Svoboda was not a function of inter-group ethnic hostilities; instead, it originated in perceived threats and anxieties about the character of the Ukrainian state. © 2015 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. The Euromaidan events catapulted the previously marginal radical right party, All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (the Freedom Party), to its short-lived prominence. Representatives of the Svoboda party have occupied cabinet posts in the interim government, which has increased anxietyamong pro-Russia leaders and citizens. Yet, in the October 2014 elections, Svoboda's electoral support was cut by half. By a narrow margin, the party failed to cross the ve percent threshold and to obtain seats in the parliament. It is yet to be seen, however, whether this merely represents a temporary setback or a more permanent failure of Ukrainian radical politics. The most recent electoral results do not diminish the fact that in 2012, Svoboda amassed over ten percent, which is an impressive electoral result for a radical right party (Bustikova, 2014). Scholars have attributed Svoboda's 2012 achievement in the parliamentary elections to a complex set of factors including: dissatisfaction with the major parties, protest voting against President Yanukovych, anxieties associated with the 2012 language law, resonance of anti-establishment appeals with the voters, disappointment with economic and political corruption, xenophobia, economic downturn and the re-emergence of pre-war legacies (Cantorovich, 2013; Kuzio, 2007; Likhachev, 2013; Moser, 2014; Polyakova, 2014; Shekovtsov, 2011a,b; Shekhovtsov, 2015; Umland, 2013; Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2013). 1 Although these explanations advance our understanding of Svoboda's recent electoral success, little is still known about the micro-level determinants of voter support for the Svoboda party, the role of inter-ethnic hostility and the specic anx- ieties that Svoboda voters hold. The data and the analysis presented in this article reect the state of the Ukrainian politics before the annexation of Crimea, the outbreak of violence in the East and polarizing events of Maidan. The turbulence associated with these drastic events will have a long lasting impact on Ukrainian politics. It is nevertheless useful to step back 1 The Svoboda party has been characterized as an ethno-centric and anti-Semitic party: Svoboda is a racist party promoting explicitly ethnocentric and anti-Semitic ideas. Its main programmatic points are Russo- and xenophobia as well as, more recently, a strict anti-immigration stance. It is an outspoken advocate of an uncritical heroization of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists e an interwar and World War II ultra-nationalist party tainted by its temporary collaboration with the Third Reich, as well as its members' participation in genocidal actions against Poles and Jews, in western Ukraine, during German occupation. Although Svoboda emphasizes the European character of the Ukrainian people, it is an anti-Western, anti-liberal, and anti-EU grouping(Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2010: 1). Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Communist and Post-Communist Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.011 0967-067X/© 2015 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256

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Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/postcomstud

Voting, identity and security threats in Ukraine: who supportsthe Radical ”Freedom“ Party?

Lenka BustikovaSchool of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 26 July 2015

Keywords:Svoboda partyRadical right partiesEthnic minoritiesUkraine

1 The Svoboda party has been characterized as ananti-Semitic ideas. Its main programmatic points areadvocate of an uncritical heroization of the Organiztemporary collaboration with the Third Reich, as weGerman occupation. Although Svoboda emphasizegrouping” (Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2010: 1).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.0110967-067X/© 2015 The Regents of the University of

a b s t r a c t

This article investigates voters and sympathizers of Ukraine's radical right party, Svoboda.Using an original survey conducted in 2010, it shows that support for Svoboda was rootedless in extreme levels of xenophobia vis-�a-vis Russians, and more in concerns about thesupport that the Russian minority receives from the state, fear of losing Ukrainian sover-eignty, and economic anxiety. In contrast to the conventional view, the analysis suggeststhat support for Svoboda was not a function of inter-group ethnic hostilities; instead, itoriginated in perceived threats and anxieties about the character of the Ukrainian state.

© 2015 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rightsreserved.

The Euromaidan events catapulted the previously marginal radical right party, All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (the“Freedom Party”), to its short-lived prominence. Representatives of the Svoboda party have occupied cabinet posts in theinterim government, which has increased anxiety among pro-Russia leaders and citizens. Yet, in the October 2014 elections,Svoboda's electoral support was cut by half. By a narrow margin, the party failed to cross the five percent threshold and toobtain seats in the parliament. It is yet to be seen, however, whether this merely represents a temporary setback or a morepermanent failure of Ukrainian radical politics.

The most recent electoral results do not diminish the fact that in 2012, Svoboda amassed over ten percent, which is animpressive electoral result for a radical right party (Bustikova, 2014). Scholars have attributed Svoboda's 2012 achievement inthe parliamentary elections to a complex set of factors including: dissatisfactionwith themajor parties, protest voting againstPresident Yanukovych, anxieties associated with the 2012 language law, resonance of anti-establishment appeals with thevoters, disappointment with economic and political corruption, xenophobia, economic downturn and the re-emergence ofpre-war legacies (Cantorovich, 2013; Kuzio, 2007; Likhachev, 2013; Moser, 2014; Polyakova, 2014; Shekovtsov, 2011a,b;Shekhovtsov, 2015; Umland, 2013; Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2013).1

Although these explanations advance our understanding of Svoboda's recent electoral success, little is still known aboutthe micro-level determinants of voter support for the Svoboda party, the role of inter-ethnic hostility and the specific anx-ieties that Svoboda voters hold. The data and the analysis presented in this article reflect the state of the Ukrainian politicsbefore the annexation of Crimea, the outbreak of violence in the East and polarizing events of Maidan. The turbulenceassociated with these drastic events will have a long lasting impact on Ukrainian politics. It is nevertheless useful to step back

ethno-centric and anti-Semitic party: “Svoboda is a racist party promoting explicitly ethnocentric andRusso- and xenophobia as well as, more recently, a strict anti-immigration stance. It is an outspokenation of Ukrainian Nationalists e an interwar and World War II ultra-nationalist party tainted by itsll as its members' participation in genocidal actions against Poles and Jews, in western Ukraine, durings the European character of the Ukrainian people, it is an anti-Western, anti-liberal, and anti-EU

California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256240

and examine the roots of a party that is often in the international spotlight and used as evidence that the rights and lives ofethnic minorities in Ukraine are endangered.

The objective of this article is thus to shed light on the electoral profile of Svoboda voters and sympathizers, and tocomplement the emerging scholarship on radical right parties in Ukraine. It argues that political sympathy towards Svobodais rooted less in extreme levels of xenophobia vis-�a-vis Russians, and more in concerns about the support that the Russianminority receives from the state, fears regarding the loss of sovereignty and economic anxiety. Using an original and na-tionally representative survey conducted in 2010 across all regions of Ukraine, the analysis shows that support for Svobodaoriginated in perceived threats and anxieties about the character of the Ukrainian state rather than inter-group ethnichostilities (Cantorovich, 2013; Olsza�nksi, 2011; Rudling, 2012; Rudling, 2013).2

Although many fringe radical right parties have emerged in Ukraine since the early 1990s, for example, KUN (KonhresUkrainskykh natsionalistiv), UNA (Ukrainska natsionalna asambleya), OUN (Orhanizatsiya ukrainskyh natsionalistiv) andrecent Pravyi Sektore their electoral support has rarely exceeded three percent of the popular vote (Birch, 2000; D'Anieri andKuzio, 2007; Kubicek, 1999; Kuzio, 1997; Shekhovtsov, 2011a,b; Solchanyk, 1999; Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2010; Wilson,1997).3 In March 2009, however, Svoboda obtained 35% of the popular vote in the western Ukrainian Ternopil regionalcouncil election (Shekhovtsov, 2011a,b).4

Ternopil was part of the second Polish republic during WWII, and is the site of the Huta Pieniacka village massacre of500e1000 ethnic Poles in 1944. Polish scholars have linked members of the patriotic Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to themassacre. In 1989, a controversial monument to themassacrewas built, then destroyed and then rebuilt in 2005. The Svobodaparty vehemently opposed themonument, and has been vocal in its opposition to PolisheUkrainian reconciliation since 2003(Olsza�nksi, 2011).5 In 2007, a newmonument was unveiled in the presence of the Polish consul in Lviv. Svoboda's leader, OlehTyahnybok, sent a note of protest. On February 28, 2009, Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, and Polish President, LechKaczynski, met to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the massacre.

Less than a month later, in March 2009, Svoboda made its first major inroads into Ukrainian politics in the Ternopilregional election. Although Svoboda failed to gain national appeal in the presidential election in 2010, it has emerged as aserious political force in Western Ukraine. Svoboda's regional success in Ternopil has been attributed mostly to its ability toexploit battles over nationalist policies between the Party of Regions and the parties of the Orange bloc (Kudelia, 2011;Olsza�nski, 2011; Shekhovtsov, 2013; Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2010).6

As a testament to the importance of this “regional breakthrough” (Kitschelt and McGann,1995: 99e100), the second waveof Svoboda's success occurred in the national election in October 2012. In 2012, Svoboda was the first radical right party toindependently win seats in the parliament. Svoboda won 10.4% of the popular vote and 36 out of 450 seats. Its regionalbreakthrough in Western Ukraine and its success in national elections set the stage for its third success in the interimgovernment preceded by Svoboda's activism during the Maidan protests in Kyiv.7 In addition to holding 8% of the seats in theParliament in the 2012e2014 electoral cycle, Svoboda held four of the twenty posts in the interim government, which wasestablished after the ouster of President Yanukovych.

In the parliamentary elections of 2014, Svoboda did not cross the five percent threshold (by a narrow margin) and its voteshare dropped by half. Although this was not the result that the Svoboda leadership was hoping for, the loss of votes need notsignal that the party is becoming politically obscure. Even themost successful radical right parties, such as the Slovak NationalParty or the Freedom Party in Austria, occasionally fall out of favor only to bounce back after one or two electoral cycles. Mostradical right parties do not secure two digit vote shares on a regular basis; their marginal presence in the parliament is anaccomplishment in itself. Svoboda's 2014 defeat can be attributed to many factors, the most important being the split of voteswith Pravyi Sektor, the defeat of the former president Viktor Yanukovych e Svoboda's political adversary, the embarrassingperformance of Svoboda representatives in the interim government and the loss of monopoly on fervent patriotism(Shekhovtsov, 2015).

Using an original survey, this article explores the electoral base and supporters of the Svoboda party after the regionalbreakthrough of Svoboda in 2009 and before Svoboda took seats in the parliament in the electoral cycle of 2012e2014. The

2 The survey was conducted in twenty-six regions, including Crimea and the city of Kyiv: Ivano-Frankivs'ka, Volyns'ka, L'vivs'ka, Rivnens'ka, Ternopil's'ka,Chernigivs'ka, Kyivs'ka, city of. Kyiv, Cherkas'ka, Chernivets'ka, Zakarpats'ka, Lugans'ka, Vinnyts'ka, Dnipropetrovs'ka, Donets'ka, Zhytomyrs'ka, Zaporiz'ka,Kirovograds'ka, Mykolayivs'ka, Odes'ka, Poltavs'ka, Sums'ka, Kharkivs'ka, Khersons'ka, Khmel'nyts'ka oblasts and AR Crimea.

3 Other electoral blocks and movements that embraced a radical right ideology were the National Front (Natsionalnyi Front), Fewer Words bloc (Menshesliv) and Social-National Assembly with its recently established paramilitary wing, the Azov battalion.

4 The extremist Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), one of many Svoboda's ideological predecessors, ran under the platform of Yushchenko's “OurUkraine” (Kuzio, 1997). Between 2002 and 2006, once elected to Verkhovna Rada for the Lviv district, Andriy Shkil, (UNA leader), joined the YuliaTymoshenko bloc faction (Verchovnaya Rada, 2009; UNA-UNSO 2009).

5 Currently, however, Poland is one of the strongest supporters of Ukraine's territorial integrity in the European Union.6 Svoboda also benefited due to the support from V. Yushchenko and hostility toward Y. Tymoshenko/BYuT. The author would like to thank an anon-

ymous referee for this point.7 Although active in the Euromaidan events, other groups such as Pravyi Sector gained prominence as well. Svoboda organized busing of volunteers from

Lviv to Kyiv during the protests (Source: Interviews of the author with Svoboda activists, summer 2014, Lviv). Pravyi Sektor and the Social National As-sembly have surpassed Svoboda's activism by forming volunteer battalions fighting in the East.

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256 241

survey offers a uniquewindow into themindset of voters who declared that theywerewilling to vote for Svoboda, or harbor asympathetic view of the Svoboda party.8

Contrary to the perception that actual and potential Svoboda voters are exceptionally anti-Russian and xenophobic, theresults of the analysis offered in this article challenge this widespread perception. The analysis suggests that the distinctivefeature of Svoboda voters and sympathizers is not their hostility towards Russians, but rather their attitudes towards gov-ernment support for various ethnic groups and anxieties about external threats. Further, the analysis uncovers a great degreeof polarization related to economic insecurity and fears about the direction of the Ukrainian economy four years beforeEuromaidan. The article therefore provides a nuanced examination of the impact of various threats on support for the radicalright in Ukraine.9

The article is organized in five parts. The first part briefly outlines the four types of threat that drive support for Svoboda. Itdistinguishes policy threats, identity threats, sovereignty threats and economic threats. Second, the article discusses the dataand method and provides basic descriptive statistics from the survey about Svoboda voters and sympathizers. Third, it de-scribes the nature of perceived threats and their impact on Svoboda support. Fourth, it discusses the determinants of supportfor Svoboda in a multivariate analysis. The final part concludes and offers suggestions for further inquiry.

1. Hypotheses about the effect of threats on support for Svoboda

What roles do perceived threats play in determining who supports and sympathizes with the Svoboda party? Four majortypes of threats are considered here: policy threats, identity threats, security threats related to sovereignty and economicthreats. Policy threats are defined as an opposition to governmental spending on different ethnic groups: approval ordisapproval of governmental spending on different ethnic groups in Ukraine, including Ukrainians. It is hypothesized thatopposition to government spending on Russians should be a position widely held by Svoboda voters and sympathizers.10 Thesecond group of threats are identity threats that relate to group hostility. Given the history of anti-Semitic and anti-Russianstatements that the leader of the Svoboda party Tyahnybok has made, I hypothesize that innate group hostility againstminorities (Jews and Russians) is linked to the support for the Svoboda party.11

Security threats are defined as threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine. I distinguish three specific security threats: a sov-ereignty threat from Russia, from the European Union and a sovereignty threat from Russians living in Ukraine. I hypothesizethat Svoboda voters and sympathizers will perceive greater threats to Ukrainian sovereignty from Russia and from Russiansliving in Ukraine than other respondents.

Economic threats are defined as economic uncertainties and insecurities. In addition to generic economic insecurities, Ialso consider ethnic competition for labor as a source of threat. I expect that support and sympathy for Svoboda is driven byeconomic insecurities as well as fears of economic competitionwith the Russianminority. Before proceeding to the analysis ofthreats, I first provide some descriptive statistics of Svoboda voters and of those who sympathize with Svoboda.

2. Data and method

In order to understand who votes for the Svoboda party, and who sympathizes with it, I designed a survey instrument,which was implemented by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in June 2010.12 The sample developed for thesurvey is representative of the entire adult population of Ukraine. It included over two-thousand respondents and employed astratified, multi-stage area probability sample (KIIS, 2010). The target populationwas defined as the resident adult populationage 18 and older. The sample of households fromwhich sample persons were selectedwas based on randomly sampled postaldistricts within proportionally sampled settlements. In the first stage, 110 primary sampling units were selected withprobability proportional to size from cities, villages and rural counties. Urban and rural populations in this sample wererepresented proportionally of all twenty-four oblasts and Crimea. In the second stage, a sample of postal districts was chosenrandomly from the list of residential postal districts within 110 primary sampling units. In the third stage, a randomized-

8 The scope of the paper is solely focused on demand side factors, such as the ideational and socio-demographic determinants of Svoboda support.Although Ukrainian party system is highly volatile and programmatic structuration is weaker than in the West, Ukrainian electorate is polarized on issues ofethnicity, poverty and the process of nation building. Regional polarization between east and west has historical and cultural roots (Arel, 1995; Beissinger2013; Darden, 2014; Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Fournier, 2002; Peisakhin, 2013; Shevel, 2002 but cf. Frye, 2015).

9 A more holistic study of Svoboda would also include supply side factors determining Svoboda's success, such as party finances and corruption of someSvoboda representatives in public office. For example, Svoboda has been accused of obtaining funds both from the organized crime in Lviv and fromoligarchs who have used Svoboda as a scarecrow to ramp up support for the Party of Regions controlled by V. Yanukovych. The author would like to thankan anonymous referee for this point.10 Russians are considered a national minority but are a linguistic majority in some regions. According to the Ukrainian census of 2001, over seventeenpercent of Ukrainians self-identified as ethnic Russians and almost thirty percent as Russian speakers. The number of Russians and Russian speakersgeographically varies. In the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, the percentage of ethnic Russians was close to forty percent and Russian speakerswere in a majority (seventy percent). In Crimea, Russians and Russian speakers were also a majority at the time of the survey and writing thisarticle (Source: Ukrainian census, 2001.)11 Anti-Semitism is associated with Svoboda ideology (Cantorovich, 2013; Kersten and Hankel, 2013).12 Funding for the survey was provided by Duke University.

Table 1Voters and sympathizers of Svoboda party.

Votersa Would cast second ballot for Svobodab (Svoboda sympathizers)

% N % Yes Yes No

N N

All-ukrainian community Svoboda (O. Tyagnybock) 2.56% 52Anatolіy Hrytsenko's Bloc “Gromadjans'ka pozicіja” .99% 20 33.33% 6 12Arseniy Yatseniuk's Bloc “Front zmіn” 3.75% 76 22.06% 15 53Bloc of Vіtalі Klitschko 1.33% 27 23.81% 5 16Volodimir Litvin's Bloc 1.18% 24 14.29% 3 18Bloc “Narodna samooborona” (Y. Lutcenko) .20% 4 66.67% 2 1Julіya Timoshenko's Bloc 11.09% 225 30.95% 65 145Communіst party of Ukraine (P. Simonenko) 2.71% 55 1.96% 1 50Narodniy Ruh of Ukraine (B. Tarasyuk) .10% 2 .00% 0 2Party of Regions (V. Yanukovych) 38.91% 789 1.50% 11 720Party “Our Ukraine” (V. Yuschenko) .69% 14 53.85% 7 6Party “Strong Ukraine” (S. Tіgіpko) 7.10% 144 5.43% 7 122Progressive socialist party of Ukraine (N. Vіtrenko) .10% 2 .00% 0 2Socialist party of Ukraine (O. Moroz) .20% 4 25.00% 1 3Ukrainian People's Party (Y. Kostenko) .10% 2 100.00% 2 0Another party/bloc .10% 2 .00% 0 2I would vote against them all 7.64% 155 3.57% 5 135I would abstain from voting 9.27% 188 4.12% 7 163Difficult to say 11.98% 243 8.06% 17 194

Total 100% 2028 154 1644

a The question reads: “If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were to take place on the nearest Sunday, would you vote? What choice would youmake?”.

b The question reads: “Hypothetically, if you had a chance to cast a second ballot in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the nearest Sunday,would you ever consider voting for: All-ukrainian community Svoboda (O. Tyagnybock)?” (Yes).Source: Bustikova (2010).

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256242

number rule was used to select the street, household and apartment that the interviewer was to visit (KIIS MethodologyReport, KIIS, 2010).

Table 1 shows the distribution of voters in the survey by political party. Since the purpose of the survey was to determinethe appeal of the Svoboda party among a broader electorate, I included a question about a hypothetical vote to identifypotential Svoboda sympathizers.

13 Cura threshand 200percent

Hypothetically, if you had a chance to cast a second ballot in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on thenearest Sunday, would you ever consider voting for: All-Ukrainian community Svoboda (O. Tyagnybock)?” (Svobodasympathizer: Yes; Svoboda opponent: No)

Most respondents (1644) declared that theywould not consider voting for Svoboda if they had an additional vote. I refer tothese respondents as Svoboda opponents. Over 200 respondents declared that they would either vote for (referred to as justvoters in future), or consider casting a second, hypothetical, vote for Svoboda. 177 respondents did not answer or wereundecided. Table 1 summarizes voters, sympathizers and opponents by party affiliation.

Whereas about two and half percent of voters in the survey declared that they would have casted their vote for Svoboda,the number of “Svoboda sympathizers” was roughly three times larger. Jointly, voters and sympathizers constituted roughlynine percent of the sample. This is approximately consistent with the electoral results from the national elections of 2012 inwhich the Svoboda party received ten percent of the vote and subsequently obtained eight percent of the seats in theparliament.13 However, this is not consistent with the post-Maidan elections (2014), in which Svoboda lost all of its seats.

According to the survey, Svoboda sympathizers are concentrated in Tymoshenko's Bloc. About one third of Tymoshenko'svoters would be willing to cast a second vote for Svoboda. Ideologically, Svoboda's position on the status of the Ukrainian andRussian languages is closest to the former political allies of the Orange bloc, represented by Tymoshenko and Yushchenko.Conversely, voters of the Yanukovych's Party of Regions, Orange bloc's ideological opposite, constitute the least likely pool forpotential Svoboda voters (Table 1).

Although we might expect that Svoboda sympathizers would be located exclusively in ideologically affiliated parties, thesecond largest pool of sympathizers is found among ideologically footloose voters, followed by Vitali Klitschko bloc voters.Nineteen percent of sympathizers come from those who would either vote against all parties, abstain from voting or areundecided about their party affiliation.

rently, Ukraine has a mixed semi-proportional electoral system, which combines single member districts and nationwide proportional system withold. After independence, Ukraine adopted a presidential system, shifted to a presidential-parliamentary form of government in 1996. Between 19972 Ukraine adopted a semi-proportional electoral law with a four percent threshold. After 2002, Ukraine adopted a proportional systemwith a threethreshold, which was lifted to five percent for the elections in 2012 (Christensen et al., 2005).

Table 2Regional distribution of Svoboda Voters and Sympathizers.

Svoboda voters Svoboda sympathizers

Region (oblast) N % Out of all respondents from the region Region (oblast) N % Out of all respondents from the region

L'vivs'ka 19 18.81% Ivano-Frankivs'ka 25 45.45%Ternopil's'ka 7 15.22% Volyns'ka 16 37.21%Ivano-Frankivs'ka 8 14.55% L'vivs'ka 28 27.72%Rivnens'ka 3 6.67% Rivnens'ka 9 20.00%Volyns'ka 2 4.65% Ternopil's'ka 9 19.57%Khersons'ka 2 4.17% Chernigivs'ka 8 14.81%Cherkas'ka 2 3.33% Kyivs'ka 11 14.47%Vinnyts'ka 2 2.70% c. Kyiva 11 9.48%Chernivets'ka 1 2.70% Cherkas'ka 5 8.33%c. Kyiv 3 2.59% Chernivets'ka 3 8.11%Kirovograds'ka 1 2.08% Zakarpats'ka 3 6.52%Zaporiz'ka 1 1.19% Lugans'ka 6 5.45%Dnipropetrovs'ka 1 .66% Vinnyts'ka 4 5.41%

All other regionsb 16

Total 52 Total 154

a Middle class voters from Kyiv and the Kyiv region do not fit the electoral profile of a typical Svoboda supporter who is poorer and resides in smallertowns. Svoboda sympathizers from Kyiv and Kyiv oblast switched to Samopomych, led by a mayor of Lviv, in 2014. The author would like to thank to ananonymous referee for this observation.

b All other regions include all Svoboda sympathizers from one of the following regions: Dnipropetrovs'ka, Donets'ka, Zhytomyrs'ka, Zaporiz'ka, Kir-ovograds'ka, Mykolayivs'ka, Odes'ka, Poltavs'ka, Sums'ka, Kharkivs'ka, Khersons'ka, Khmel'nyts'ka oblasts and AR Crimea.Source: Bustikova (2010).

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256 243

Consistent with the results of local and national elections, Svoboda's support is regionally concentrated. The survey showsa strong regional pattern with support concentrated in Western Ukraine (Table 2). According to the survey, which wasconducted when Svoboda was still marginal at the national level, Svoboda attracted almost nineteen percent of all re-spondents in its regional stronghold: Lviv. Fifteen percent of Svoboda's voters came from the neighboring Ternopilska andIvano-Frankivska regions. The vast majority of Svoboda's support comes from regions inWestern Ukraine that became part ofthe Soviet Union after the onset of World War II.14 In three Svoboda strongholds in Western Ukraine e Ivano-Frankivska,Volynska, Lvivska oblast e the proportion of Svoboda sympathizers ranged between thirty to forty five percent of all re-spondents (Table 2).

Identity cleavages in Ukraine are defined both by nationality and language. Ninety percent of Russian nationals in thesurvey speak Russian. Respondents of Ukrainian nationality are split roughly in half, and the rest speak a mix of the twolanguages (Table 3). Not surprisingly, Ukrainian nationals exclusively support the Svoboda party, but did the nationality splittranslate into covert support for Svoboda among the sympathizers? Ninety four percent of Svoboda sympathizers areUkrainian, yetmost Ukrainians do not sympathizewith Svoboda. Seventy five percent of thosewhowould never cast a secondballot for Svoboda are of Ukrainian nationality and seventeen percent are Russian. Ninety percent of respondents whoidentified themselves as Russian also answered that they would never vote for Svoboda had they had the chance (Table 4).

The polarizing effect of the linguistic divide is even more evident when we look at the distribution of Svoboda sympa-thizers and opponents by language (Table 5). While seventy-eight percent of Svoboda sympathizers speak Ukrainian, onlythirty percent of Svoboda opponents speak Ukrainian. The majority of Svoboda opponents (fifty seven percent) speak Russian(Table 5). When Svoboda sympathizers and voters are combined, ninety five percent are of Ukrainian nationality and seventy-nine percent of them speak Ukrainian. In sum, Svoboda sympathizers reflect the ethnic and linguistic divisions in Ukraine, butsupport for Svoboda, both open and covert, is quite limited in the broader population.

3. Policy threats

Having identified the major ethnic and language determinants of support for Svoboda, the analysis now evaluates the roleof threats in driving support, open and latent, for the Svoboda party. Policy threats reflect dissatisfaction with governmentalspending on minorities. Identity threats echo group hostility. Security threats reflect fears over sovereignty issues. Economicthreats are tied to economic insecurities.

Policy threats are defined as the degree of support or opposition to spending on ethnic minorities. The policy threat re-flects the opposition to governmental fiscal support for minorities. Since opposition to governmental spending on minoritiesis not related to the degree of group hostility, it is possible to independently evaluate the effect of policy threats and identity

14 According to Polyakova Svoboda's success in Lviv can be explained by its ability to recruit students and infiltrate or create civic groups (Polyakova,2014). The number of Svoboda party members is estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000 but can be as high as 40,000 (Polyakova, 2014;Shekhovtsov, 2011a,b: 224).

Table 3Respondents by nationality and language.

Nationality Respondent speaks

Ukrainian Mix of Ukrainian and Russian Russian

Ukrainian 685 224 652 1561Russian 19 12 274 305Ukrainian and Russian 7 10 44 61All other nationalities 7 3 72 82

Total 718 249 1042 2009

Source: Bustikova (2010).

Table 4Svoboda sympathizers and opponents by nationality.

Nationality Total

Ukrainian Ukrainian & Russian Russian All othera

Would cast a second ballot for Svoboda 144 2 5 3 15493.51% 1.30% 3.25% 1.95% 100%

Would not cast a second ballot for Svoboda 1236 59 274 75 164475.18% 3.59% 16.67% 4.56% 100%

a Note: All other nationalities are all non-Ukrainian and no-Russian nationalities combined.Source: Bustikova (2010).

Table 5Svoboda sympathizers and opponents by language.

Language Total

Ukrainian Mixa Russian

Would cast a second ballot for Svoboda (Percentage of Svoboda sympathizers by language) 117 (78.00%) 8 (5.33%) 25 (16.67%) 150 (100%)Would not cast a second ballot for Svoboda (Percentage of Svoboda opponents by language) 485 (29.72%) 221 (13.54%) 926 (56.74%) 1632 (100%)

a Note: Mix refers to the mix of Ukrainian and Russian languages.Source: Bustikova (2010).

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threats on support for the Svoboda party. The survey asked about governmental spending on four ethnic groups, the majoritygroup (Ukrainians) and three minorities. Respondents could support more or less spending on Ukrainians, Russians, CrimeanTatars and Roma on a four-point scale:

Do you think that government should spend much more, more, less or much less on: UkrainiansDo you think that government should spend much more, more, less or much less on: RussiansDo you think that government should spend much more, more, less or much less on: RomaDo you think that government should spend much more, more, less or much less on: Crimean Tatars

Overall, respondents were leaning towards more government spending on everybody.15

They strongly supported an increase in governmental spending across all groups and political affiliations, but this view ismost prominent when it comes to the titular majority: most respondents would prefer more spending on Ukrainians. Ingeneral, support for governmental spending on Ukrainians is high. Only four percent of non-Ukrainians, almost all of whomdeclared that they would never vote for Svoboda, support spending less on Ukrainians.

Svoboda voters, in particular, lean towards more government spending on Ukrainians as well. The proportion of Svobodavoters that support “spending a lot more” on Ukrainians was sixty-three percent, compared to fifty percent among voters of

15 The Spearman rank correlation between questions on support for government spending on Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars and Roma (N ¼ 1883)is as following:

Ukrainians Russians Crimean TatarsRussians .42Crimean Tatars .04 .50Roma �.01 .46 .84

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all other parties and blocs, which represents a statistically significant difference. However, when we combine respondentswho support more and a lot more spending on Ukrainians, the distinction between voters, sympathizers and opponentsdisappeared, since all respondents favored more spending.

As opposed to relatively consistent support for spending on Ukrainians among all respondents, support for governmentalspending on minorities and especially policy threats related to Russians, was different among respondents. The major dif-ference between Svoboda voters, sympathizers and opponents came from support for more government spending on Rus-sians. The most distinctive feature of radical right voters in Ukraine was their opposition towards spending on a politicallyorganized minority, that is, Russians, rather than support for more spending on Ukrainians, since that was similar across allgroups (Fig. 1).

Fourteen percent of Svoboda voters and six percent of Svoboda sympathizers wanted the government to spend a lotless on Russians. Twenty seven percent of Svoboda voters and thirty-two percent of Svoboda sympathizers wanted tospend less on Russians (Fig. 1). This is in stark contrast to the Svoboda opponents: only three percent wanted to spendless on Russians. Strong opposition towards governmental spending on Russians unites Svoboda voters with its sym-pathizers and distinguished them from Svoboda opponents, as opposed to generic support for more spending onUkrainians.

Radical right parties have to attract voters who oppose the accommodation of a politically organized minority (not anyminority) in order to be electorally successful at the national level (Bustikova, 2014). The survey allows us to test thisconjecture by examining responses to questions on governmental spending towards Roma and Crimean Tatars. Consistentwith this expectation, attitudes towards governmental spending on Roma and Crimean Tatars did not systematicallypolarize voters of different parties and blocs to the extent that attitudes towards the Russian minority did (Fig. 2).

Ukrainian respondents were polarized by attitudes toward spending on the Russian minority. When compared with thevoters of the mainstream Region bloc and the Communists, Svoboda voters and mainstream Orange bloc voters supportedsignificantly less government spending on Russians (Fig. 2). In general, however, most voters were very sympathetic to moregovernmental spending on the Russian minority. Only Svoboda voters and voters of the Hrytsenko's Bloc overwhelminglyopposed spending on Russians (Fig. 2). The general level of policy hostility towards Russians in 2010 was low, but polarizationon the issue was high.

4. Identity threats

Support for radical right parties is generally anchored among voters with elevated xenophobic attitudes (Eatwell, 2003;Mudde, 2007). However, a strategy that exclusively attracts voters who exhibit high levels of group hostility against anyminority group is not always a winning formula for a national level success (Art, 2011; Rydgren, 2008).

Since Russian and Jewish minorities are the main targets of anti-minority sentiments among Svoboda leaders and sup-porters, I now turn to assessing the effect of identity threats on support for Svoboda. It is often assumed that Svoboda votersmust possess higher levels of group hostility against minorities when compared to voters for other parties. This implies thatvoting for a party that exhibits strong xenophobic statements must attract a disproportionately xenophobic electorate. But isthe level of group hostility both high and unique among Svoboda supporters? In other to measure identity threats, I created acomposite index of hostility. Inter-group hostility between Russians and Ukrainians and group hostility against Jews is anadditive index based on two questions:

Interethnic group hostility index:Group hostility towards Russians/[Ukrainians]

To have a Russian/[Ukrainian] as a neighbor seems to me very attractive, somewhat attractive, somewhat unattractive,very unattractive.To have a Russian/[Ukrainian] as a life partner seems to me very attractive, somewhat attractive, somewhat unat-tractive, very unattractive.

Group hostility index: JewsTo have a Jew as a neighbor seems to me very attractive, somewhat attractive, somewhat unattractive, veryunattractive.To have a Jew as a life partner seems to me very attractive, somewhat attractive, somewhat unattractive, veryunattractive.

Fig. 3a shows inter-group hostility between Ukrainians and Russians and towards Jews by political parties. The moststriking finding is that Svoboda voters do not display higher levels of group hostility towards Russians than the voters of theformer Orange bloc. Svoboda voters' hostility towards Russians is neither exceptionally high, nor is it unique. Group hostilitytowards Jews, however, is a distinct feature of Svoboda voters in this descriptive analysis.

Svoboda voters do not stand out as uniquely Russo-phobic or as extremely Russo-phobic. Svoboda voters exhibit similarlevels of group hostility towards Russians as voters of these other parties: Tymoshenko's Bloc, Party “Our Ukraine”(Yuschenko), Bloc of Vitali Klitschko and Yatseniuk's Bloc “Front zmіn” (Fig. 3a). When considered together, voters of theseparties display a higher level of group hostility toward Russians when compared to themore Russophile parties: Party “Strong

Fig. 1. Support for government spending on Russians by Svoboda's voters, sympathizers, and opponents.Source: Bustikova (2010).

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Ukraine” (Tіgіpko), Party of Regions (Yanukovych) and the Communist Party of Ukraine (Symonenko). Although the generallevel of group hostility towards Russians was low in 2010, it already had the potential to polarize the voting public.16

Based on the group hostility index, which measures social distance towards Jews, Svoboda voters exhibit high levels ofgroup hostility towards Jewswhen compared to all respondents, to voters of other parties, and to voters of the former politicalallies of the Orange bloc. Svoboda's emphasis on historical grievances in western Ukraine e such as opposition towardsUkrainianePolish reconciliation, defense of inter-war anti-Semitic Ukrainian nationalists and the revival of issues from the1920s between Ukrainians and Russians e suggest that an ideological message of anti-Semitism should resonate with Svo-boda voters.17 In the next section, however, once we control for other factors, such as economic insecurities, the analysisdemonstrates that the predictive impact of group hostility towards Jews on support for Svoboda disappears.

According to the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress that monitors anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union, physical attacks onJews and anti-Semitic vandalism are at very low levels in Ukraine when compared to both Russia and Western Europe(Likhachev, 2015). Based on Likhachev and Bezruk (2014, 5), Fig. 3b shows that hate crimes in Ukraine have not exceededthirty cases per year in the most recent two years. This statistic is based on the analysis of news reports about crimes.Although anti-Semitism is present in political rhetoric, and Svoboda's leader has occasionally embraced it, it has a veryshallow root in terms of its physicality among the Ukrainian public. Since its independence, Ukraine's roughly 100,000 Jewshave never witnessed attacks comparable to shootings in the Jewish museum in Belgium or recent attacks on a Kosher su-permarket in France, both perpetrated by criminals of Muslim faith.

5. Sovereignty threats

Another set of important threats affecting the Svoboda voters, concerns sovereignty. Sovereignty threats are defined asfears that: “these days … Ukrainian sovereignty is threatened.” The survey addresses three types of specific security threats:sovereignty threat by Russia, by the European Union and by Russians in Ukraine. The questions are as follows:

These days, I am afraid that Ukrainian sovereignty is threatenedThese days, I am afraid that Ukrainian sovereignty is threatened by Russians (Russians in Ukraine)These days, I am afraid that Ukrainian sovereignty is threatened by RussiaThese days, I am afraid that Ukrainian sovereignty is threatened by the European Union(Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.)

The results have shown that the Ukrainian society was highly polarized on the issue of sovereignty threats already in 2010(Fig. 4). The survey also showed substantial differences between the sources of sovereignty threats. Sovereignty threat fromRussia polarized the respondents to a much greater degree than sovereignty threats from Russians in Ukraine. Fig. 4 dis-aggregates sovereignty threats into three specific sources of threats, two from abroad and one domestic. The European Unionis not feared at all: all respondents agree that the EU is not a danger to the Ukrainian sovereignty and this position holds for alltypes of political attachments.

The sovereignty threat from Russia is a highly polarizing issue that splits respondents into two even blocs. The fear ofRussia divides respondents with different party affinities in the following way: voters for Svoboda and for the Hrytsenko,

16 This finding suggests that the general level of hostility towards Russians and Russian speakers was low, which explains why many fighters in the Eastwho support Ukrainian sovereignty are Russian speakers and Russians. Similarly, Ukrainians blame the current crisis on Putin and not on the Russianminority. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for this point.17 I found no evidence in the survey, that voting for Svoboda is driven by attitudes towards corruption, satisfaction with the health care or the educationalsystem.

Fig. 2. Policy hostility by parties.Source: Bustikova (2010).

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Yuschenko, Yatseniuk, Tymoshenko and Klitschko blocs lean towards the position that Russia is to be feared. Voters of theCommunist party, Party or Regions, Party of Tigipko, Litvin's bloc and the majority of undecided voters do not feel that Russiais an existential threat to Ukraine's sovereignty. The sovereignty threat from Russia is the most polarizing issue for the re-spondents, far more polarizing than general sovereignty fears, fears of the European Union or fears of the Russian ethnic inUkraine.

Svoboda voters fear Russia and fear Russians in Ukraine. They also express the highest fear of general sovereignty threats.Svoboda, Yatseniuk's bloc and Yuschenko's Our Ukraine all fear Russians in Ukraine. Voters of other parties either do not fearethnic Russians or are split on the issue. Svoboda voters' general fears and fears of Russians are of an equal magnitude to othervoters from at least two parties. However, heightened fears of Russia clearly separate Svoboda voters from all other voters(Fig. 4). Svoboda voters are unique in their view of Russia as a sovereignty threat, but they are not extreme in viewing Russiancitizens of Ukraine as a source of threat. Among Svoboda voters, fear of Russia is high and unique, while their fear of Russiansin Ukraine is high, but not unique. The sovereignty threat from Russia is more polarizing than the sovereignty threat fromRussians in Ukraine. Fear of sovereignty threats was already high, at least among half of the parties, in 2010.

6. Economic threats

Exposure to economic threats is the last threat to be considered in order to parse out the distinct features of Svobodavoters (Shekhovtsov, 2011a,b). I included four questions about economic insecurities in the survey. The survey has askedquestions related to pocket-book, sociotropic, prospective and retrospective evaluations of economic insecurity. The ques-tions were as follows:

In general, do you think that you and your family are better off, worse off, or about the same financially comparedwith twoyears ago?

Fig. 3. a): Group Hostility towards Russians and Jews by Party. b): Hate Crimes in Ukraine.

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Fig. 4. Sovereignty threats by parties.Source: Bustikova (2010).

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256 249

Looking ahead, do you think that two years from now, you will be better off financially, worse off, or just about the same asnow?Looking ahead, do you expect that the economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same in the next two years?Now let's talk about the country as a whole. Would you say that most families in Ukraine are better off, worse off, or aboutthe same financially compared with two years ago?(Scale recoded as better off, the same, worse off)

Is Svoboda support driven by economic anxieties? The results unequivocally show that Svoboda voters fear economicthreats (Fig. 5). Svoboda voters stand out in two aspects: the are distinct in agreeing that their family is worse off than twoyears before, and, together with voters from the Hrytsenko bloc, that all Ukrainian families are worse off than two yearsearlier. Together with voters from the Yuschenko, Hrytsenko and Tymoshenko blocs/parties, they also expect that theeconomy will get worse in the next two years. At a personal level, Svoboda voters expect to be worse off in the future (Fig. 5).

Fifty-six percent of Svoboda voters thought that their family was worse off financially compared to two years earlier andforty-six percent thought that their family financial situation was the same. Among Svoboda sympathizers, the degree ofeconomic anxiety was much lower. Thirty percent thought that their family was worse off and fifty percent thought that theirfamily was financially the same as two years earlier. The financial anxiety of Svoboda supporters was also considerably higherwhen compared to all other voters. Thirty-six percent thought that their family was worse off and almost half (forty-sixpercent) felt that, financially, their family was about the same. The sense of economic depravity among the Svoboda voters

Fig. 5. Economic threat perception by parties.Source: Bustikova (2010).

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was profound: there was a twenty percent gap between Svoboda voters and all other respondents in their perception thattheir family financial situation has recently deteriorated.

We can conclude that the support for Svoboda is driven by policy threats and fears of collective economic threats. Re-sponses to questions about economic threats indicate that Svoboda voters come from a pool of voters who deeply fearexposure to economic insecurity at the personal, familial and societal level (Fig. 5). If support for Svoboda was driven in partby economic anxieties, we could expect that a deteriorating Ukrainian economy should expand the voting base for the radicalright, all else equal.

7. Determinants of support

Having considered four sources of threats at the descriptive level, I will now discuss the determinants of voter support forSvoboda in a multivariate setting. This section evaluates the impact of both domestic and external sources on Svoboda

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support. It first considers a model assessing domestic threats: the effect of policy hostility threats. Second, it analyzes theimpact of external sources of fearsesovereignty threats on support for Svoboda. Party choice is modeled using a multinomiallogistic regression. Table 6 presents the determinants of voter support for Svoboda, Svoboda sympathizers and Svobodaopponents based on domestic policy threats. The baseline in the model represents the respondents who were neither voters/sympathizers nor opponents.18

Are policy hostility and economic fears themost distinct features of Svoboda supporters? In the domestic threats model, asone wants to spend less on the Russian minority and as the level of inter-group hostility increases, the probability of beingboth a Svoboda voter and a sympathizer increases (Table 6). However, despite the fact that an increase in opposition tospending on Russians increases the probability that a respondent is a sympathizer, the effect of policy threat on Svobodasympathetic support disappears once we control for interethnic group hostility. Support for Svoboda increases as grouphostility towards Russians increases, but e for the sympathizers e the effect of opposition to governmental spending onRussians disappears once inter-group hostility is taken into account. Opposition to governmental spending on Russians, evenonce interethnic group hostility is taken into account, therefore represents a unique factor in determiningwho is likely to votefor Svoboda.19

The second important distinction between Svoboda voters and sympathizers is the role of economic vulnerability.Exposure to economic fears is measured using income levels (Table 6). As the income of the respondent decreases, theprobability of voting for Svoboda increases. Poor voters are more likely to vote for Svoboda, but they are not more likely tosympathize with the Svoboda party.

Svoboda voters' attitudes could be described as a unique combination of policy hostility towards Russians, group hostilityagainst Russians and a high degree of economic anxiety. Policy favoritism towards Ukrainians increases the probability ofvoting and sympathizing for Svoboda as well, but is a considerably weaker predictor. Inter-group hostility is a strong predictorof Svoboda support, yet it increases the probability of both voting and sympathizing with Svoboda, and thus is not unique toSvoboda voters. The pool of voters available to be mobilized exclusively on xenophobia is larger than the pool of Svobodavoters. When compared to Svoboda sympathizers, Svoboda voters are distinct in only two respects. First, opposition to morespending on Russians significantly increases the probability of actually voting for Svoboda, even if we control for xenophobia.This is not the case for Svoboda sympathizers. Second, economic anxiety strongly increases the probability of voting forSvoboda, since its voters are poorer than the Svoboda sympathizers.20

Having considered the effect of domestic threats, I will now examine the effect of sovereignty threats (Table 7) using amultinomial logit analysis and controlling for basic personal traits as nationality, age and a language preference. Similarly tothe results from the domestic threats model, the effect of various sovereignty threats has a differential impact on theprobability of being a voter, a sympathizer and an opponent. Changes in the animosity levels towards Russians amongUkrainians, defined here as intergroup hostility, can predict support and opposition to Svoboda. This finding is consistent withthe results from the domestic model.

Table 7 shows that the most robust effect on the probability of voting for Svoboda is the perception of sovereignty threatfrom Russia, but this is not unique to them. Svoboda sympathizers were fearful of Russia as well. In the context of the 2010survey, fears that sovereignty was threatened were most likely not associated with the annexation of Crimea and the loss ofterritorial control in the Eastdthat is, an invasion. Instead, respondents were most likely expressing anxiety about thecharacter of the Ukrainian state and its foreign policy orientation.

In October 2014, Svobodawas not perceived as a political force sufficiently competent to address the danger of themilitarythreat. The serious security crisis drew the Ukrainian electorate to more hawkish characters, such as Oleh Lyashko and hisRadical Party, which contributed to the loss of votes for Svoboda. Although voters concerned with sovereignty threats aresympathetic to Svoboda, they did not believe that the party had the requiredmilitary muscle and political competence to dealwith issues of national safety. If future sovereignty threats again return to the issue of language supremacy (after the war),Svoboda might yet get another chance at the ballot. As long as the war drags on, their electoral prospects are likely to remaindim.

The survey also allows us to discern whether Russians living in Ukraine were viewed as a sovereignty threat to Ukraine.Svoboda voters and sympathizers differ in this important respect. An increased fear of Russians in Ukraine increases theprobability of voting for Svoboda, but not sympathizing with Svoboda (Table 7). This suggests that an increased fear ofRussians at home does not account for whowas a Svoboda sympathizer. Sympathizers fear Russia (as do Svoboda voters), butnot Russians at home. Similarly, the pool of voters that fear Russia is greater than the actual support for Svoboda. The pool ofvoters who fear Russians, on the contrary, was uniquely in favor of Svoboda.

18 I included a measure of national pride as a control variable in all models. National pride, which can be used as a proxy for patriotism and nativism(Mudde, 2007) is a parsimonious distinctive feature of radical right voters. The respondents were asked if they were “… very proud, fairly proud, not veryproud, not at all proud to be a citizen of Ukraine”.19 As one might expect, Svoboda voters and sympathizers are not recruited from Russian language speakers, while the language affiliation is irrelevant forthe opponents. The noticeable feature of the Svoboda opponents is age: the older the respondent is, the more likely s/he opposes even a hypothetical votefor Svoboda.20 Support for more spending on Crimean Tatars increases the probability of voting and sympathizing with Svoboda. Following the logic that the enemy ofmy enemy is a friend, the Ukrainian radical right has formed an unusual political alliance with Crimean Tatars, threatened by Russian expansionism (Shevel,2001).

Table 6Determinants of support for Svoboda voters, sympathizers and opponents e policy threat.

Parties Variable names Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Svoboda Government Spending: Russians 1.187*** 1.173*** .770**(1 ¼ spend much more) (.251) (.323) (.342)

Government Spending: Ukrainians �.882** �.496 �.313(1 ¼ spend much more) (.395) (.391) (.414)

Government Spending: Crimean Tatar �.891** �.774** �.076**(1 ¼ spend much more) (.238) (.321) (.321)

Nation .212 .209 �1.808***(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ else) (.434) (.497) (.407)

National Pride �2.185*** �2.223***(1 ¼ very proud) (.645) (.694)

Language 1.181*** 1.110* .784(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ Ukrainian) (.332) (.592) (.604)

Income �.267** �.231** �.185**(1 ¼ Low) (.116) (.098) (.091)

Education Level .139 .282* .320(1 ¼ Low) (.160) (.166) (.206)

Age .0007 .0099 .0112(Years) (.011) (.010) (.011)

Gender 1.640*** 1.674***(0 ¼ Female) (.430) (.428)

Settlement Size .135 .156(1 ¼ Village) (.135) (.115)

Hostility towards Russians (index) .651***(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.175)

Svoboda Sympathizers Government Spending: Russians .072*** .851*** .409(1 ¼ spend much more) (.251) (.266) (.262)

Government Spending: Ukrainians �.506** �.447* �.324(1 ¼ spend much more) (.218) (.237) (.297)

Government Spending: Crimean Tatar �.455*** �.0396* �.324(1 ¼ spend much more) (.171) (.218) (.213)

Nation .332 .255 �1.102***(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ else) (.309) (.408) (.359)

National Pride �.702*** �.895***(1 ¼ very proud) (.189) (.225)

Language 1.131*** .676* .468*(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ Ukrainian) (.251) (.349) (.284)

Income �.0409 .0948 .123*(1 ¼ Low) (.068) (.071) (.075)

Education Level �.00424 .0657 .0774(1 ¼ Low) (.115) (.130) (.108)

Age .00937 �.00307 �.00244(Years) (.0063) (.0074) (.0072)

Gender .708*** .841**(0 ¼ Female) (.269) (.428)

Settlement Size �.202*** �.187***(1 ¼ Village) (.070) (.072)

Hostility towards Russians (index) .579***(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.124)

Svoboda Opponents Government Spending: Russians .093 .183 .085(1 ¼ spend much more) (.179) (.174) (.171)

Government Spending: Ukrainians .200 .163 .178(1 ¼ spend much more) (.148) (.165) (.207)

Government Spending: Crimean Tatar .082 .086 .053(1 ¼ spend much more) (.110) (.114) (.132)

Nation .303 .306 �.026(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ else) (.215) (.274) (.337)

National Pride �.076 �.130(1 ¼ very proud) (.119) (.104)

Language �.180 �.435** �.523**(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ Ukrainian) (.198) (.194) (.212)

Income .040 .085 .101*(1 ¼ Low) (.046) (.053) (.053)

Education Level .099 .109 .119(1 ¼ Low) (.079) (.079) (.092)

Age .015*** .018*** .015***(Years) (.005) (.005) (.006)

Gender .666*** .784**(0 ¼ Female) (.233) (.314)

Settlement Size �.147*** �.168***(1 ¼ Village) (.052) (.064)

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Table 6 (continued )

Parties Variable names Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Interethnic Group Hostility (index) .261***(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.087)

N 1416 1414 1208Log-likelihood �915.2 �868.6 �747.7AIC 1878.4 1803.3 1567.4

Note: Cell entries are multinomial logit coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 replications). ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05. Thebase outcome is respondents who did not answer if they would cast a second vote for Svoboda. Constants are omitted from the table.Source: Bustikova (2010).

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Given the prominent impact of economic anxiety on Svoboda support, both measures of economic insecurity and eco-nomic threats coupled with ethnicity are included in the survey as well. Insecurity is measured as a retrospective economicthreat to the wellbeing of the respondent's family. More economic threat, either perceived or objective, increases the chancesof voting for Svoboda in both models that consider domestic and external threats. Svoboda voters are very receptive toeconomic threats, even after we control for security threats, group hostility towards Russians and Jews and individual levelcharacteristics. The lack of an economic threat perception effect on the probability of sympathizing with Svoboda is a sys-tematic and distinct feature that allows us to parse out voters from less economically anxious Svoboda sympathizers (Table 7).

Fear of Russians has been so far explored as relating to either group hostility, policy hostility or sovereignty threats. I alsoconsider one last source of animosity between Ukrainians and Russians: inter-ethnic economic competition threat, whichwasmeasured as follows:

Inter-Ethnic Economic Competition Threat: I am afraid that my economic prospects will get worse because of Russians/Ukrainians

Despite the fact that Svoboda voters display higher levels of economic anxiety, lean slightly against Russians as a group,and view Russians as a sovereignty threat, the probability of voting for Svoboda is not related to an increase in the perceptionthat Russians pose a direct, personal, economic threat (Table 7). Svoboda sympathizers, on the contrary, fear personal eco-nomic competition from Russians. This is revealed in the interaction term between nationality and attitudes towards inter-ethnic economic competition. An increase in the perception of Russians as a competing economic threat increases the chanceof sympathizing with Svoboda.

One reason for this difference might be that Svoboda voters, unlike sympathizers, live in areas that are predominantlycomposed of Ukrainian nationals and thus do not fear (or experience) economic competition from Russians living imme-diately next to them. Sympathizers, although also concentrated in the Western territories, are more regionally diverse, andthus more likely to be subject to direct economic competition with the Russian minority. This conjecture deserves furtherattention however, since it presumes that these attitudes are formed on the basis of everyday contact. Testing this assumptionis beyond the scope of this paper.

A second puzzling finding from the multivariate analysis relates to anti-Semitism. Group hostility against Jews is not apredictor of whether the respondent will vote for Svoboda. This finding is contradictory, since we presented evidence in theearlier sections of the paper that Svoboda voters exhibit high levels of anti-Jewish sentiment and that those high levels weredistinct when compared to supporters of other parties and respondents without political allegiances. Since the multivariateanalysis controls for basic socio-demographic factors as well as economic anxieties, this finding suggests that the effect ofanti-Semitism is mediated by these factors. A separate studywould be required to tap into the sources of anti-Jewish attitudesin Ukraine. These findings suggest that the relationship between anti-Semitism and support for Svoboda is not a direct one.

The analysis shows that identity threats are a relatively weak factor in determining who supports Svoboda, which isconsistent with our previous findings. Chances that someone is a Svoboda voter is driven by a mix of attitudes, namely,opposition to state's support for the Russian minority, fear of threats to statehood and economic anxiety. These factors eandnot group hostility ewere unique to Svoboda voters, and distinguished them from potential Svoboda voters, as well as othervoters, in 2010.

8. Conclusion

Who are the Svoboda voters, and who can be swayed to support the Svoboda party? This article offers insights into theparty's electoral base as well its potential pool of sympathizers in 2010. In doing so, it sheds light on the determinants ofsupport for political extremism in Ukraine after Svoboda's success in the 2009 regional elections and before their electoralbreakthrough in 2012, a critical moment in Svoboda's trajectory, which was interrupted in 2014 . The main finding is thatsupport for Svoboda party was not driven by uniquely high levels of xenophobia vis-�a-vis Russians, but by opposition to thegovernmental support for the Russian minority. The analysis shows that concerns about the state's policies and fears aboutsovereignty threats trumped identity animosities, and this becomes obvious when we parse out what made Svoboda votersunique. Although an increase in hostility against Russians slightly increased the probability of supporting Svoboda, the levelsof hostility, both among voters and sympathizers, were very moderate. Economic insecurity was strongly associated with

Table 7Determinants of support for Svoboda voters, sympathizers and opponents e sovereignty threat.

Variable Names by Parties Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8

Svoboda VotersSovereignty Threat: Russians in Ukraine �.924* �1.077** �.856 �1.131** �1.030**(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.535) (.468) (.528) (.533) (.454)Sovereignty Threat: Russia �2.643*** �2.631*** �2.350*** �2.185*** �2.130*** �1.357***(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.585) (.519) (.611) (.480) (.468) (.412)Sovereignty Threat: EU .505** .373 .605** .650* .686***(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.23) (.304) (.296) (.39) (.259)Economic Threat: Ethnic Competition .170 .0824 .371 .261 .254 .340 �1.359 1.09(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.334) (.403) (.367) (.426) (.361) (.98) (1.551) (1.097)Language �.131 �.212 �.352 �.760 �.846 �.082 �.116 �.588(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ Ukrainian) (.601) (.726) (.860) (.968) (.675) (.715) (3.168) (.790)Nationality �.659 �.703 �3.842*** �2.287 �3.462 �2.761 �5.411* �3.246*(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ else) (.808) (.686) (1.467) (2.071) (2.902) (2.052) (2.908) (1.958)Age .0254* .0197 .0293** .0296** .0352** .0351*** .0419*** .0366**(Year) (.0132) (.0133) (.0119) (.012) (.0147) (.0119) (.0122) (.0148)Hostility towards Jews (index) .133 .0867 .130 .0971(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.183) (.206) (.182) (.200)Hostility towards Russians (index) .422* .494** .507*** .731*** .715*** .621***(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.239) (.252) (.178) (.218) (.224) (.222)National Pride �1.788 �1.848 �1.909*** �2.033 �1.637***(1 ¼ Very Proud) (2.273) (3.182) (.570) (2.195) (.557)Economic Anxiety .739* 1.255** .949**(1 ¼ family better off) (.394) (.535) (.374)Interaction: Nationality* �.374 1.38 �.352Economic Threat: Russians in Ukraine (1.103) (1.592) (1.078)

Svoboda SympathizersSovereignty Threat: Russians in Ukraine .584 .619* .342 .508 .493(1 ¼ agree strongly) (.409) (.373) (.383) (.478) (.423)Sovereignty Threat: Russia �1.738*** �1.707*** �1.426*** �1.329*** �1.357*** �.910***(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.404) (.348) (.335) (.377) (.368) (.286)Sovereignty Threat: EU .430** .304* .456* .490** .580**(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.201) (.181) (.236) (.215) (.261)Economic Threat: Ethnic Competition .380 .353 .698** .650* .650** 5.769** 5.480* 6.418**(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.289) (.334) (.319) (.334) (.256) (2.715) (2.957) (2.704)Language .990** .908** .773 .468 .408 .914* .803** .605(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ Ukrainian) (.504) (.410) (.506) (.540) (.514) (.521) (.402) (.582)Nationality �.296 �.366 �3.558*** �2.556** �3.119** �2.667** �3.865*** �2.438(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ else) (.585) (.592) (1.165) (1.021) (1.356) (1.248) (1.334) (1.783)Age �.003 �.003 .007 .009 .008 .012 .013 .008(Year) (.0101) (.0108) (.00925) (.00969) (.0106) (.0103) (.0103) (.00964)Hostility towards Jews (index) .094 �.077 �.047 �.063(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.0977) (.145) (.121) (.172)Hostility towards Russians (index) .629*** .686*** .638*** .805*** .755*** .689***(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.193) (.184) (.142) (.187) (.125) (.174)National Pride �1.166*** �1.209*** �1.298*** �1.381*** �1.139***(1 ¼ Very Proud) (.315) (.297) (.242) (.290) (.259)Economic Anxiety .241 .533* .313(1 ¼ family better off) (.292) (.293) (.323)Interaction: Nationality* �5.469** �5.149* �5.541**Economic Threat: Russians in Ukraine (2.765) (2.929) (2.744)

Svoboda OpponentsSovereignty Threat: Russians in Ukraine .446 .433 .197 .231 .226(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.335) (.350) (.297) (.301) (.341)Sovereignty Threat: Russia �.367 �.390 �.208 �.191 �.133 .116(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.309) (.334) (.239) (.260) (.320) (.203)Sovereignty Threat: EU .224* .194 .348** .348*** .360**(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.127) (.141) (.145) (.121) (.169)Economic Threat: Ethnic Competition .326* .356* .599** .577** .534** 6.812*** 6.614*** 6.486***(1 ¼ Strongly Agree) (.194) (.208) (.253) (.243) (.214) (.710) (.697) (.733)Language �.294 �.321 �.398 �.541 �.652* �.540* �.644** �.582**(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ Ukrainian) (.286) (.309) (.352) (.357) (.336) (.282) (.324) (.270)Nationality �.187 �.219 �2.493** �1.882*** �2.722*** �.638 �1.559* �1.659*(0 ¼ Russian, 1 ¼ else) (.333) (.369) (1.013) (.670) (.941) (.715) (.890) (.869)Age .0135** .0142** .0210*** .0216*** .0202** .0187** .0184** .0172**(Year) (.00622) (.00617) (.00615) (.00749) (.00882) (.00881) (.0079) (.00685)Hostility towards Jews (index) .029 �.005 �.004 �.0004(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.0796) (.0845) (.0859) (.0942)

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256254

Table 7 (continued )

Variable Names by Parties Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8

Interethnic Group Hostility (index) .359*** .391*** .355*** .367*** .343*** .363***(8 ¼ High Hostility) (.138) (.125) (.132) (.133) (.106) (.114)National Pride �.384** �.447*** �.426** �.457*** �.468***(1 ¼ Very Proud) (.152) (.164) (.172) (.145) (.147)Economic Anxiety .518** .494** .462**(1 ¼ family better off) (.216) (.229) (.211)Interaction: Nationality* �6.178*** �5.960*** �5.894***Economic Threat: Russians in Ukraine (.708) (.728) (.740)N 984 969 825 824 830 830 836 835Log-likelihood �513 �501 �444 �429 �431 �466 �469 �443AIC 1068 1050 943 919 922 980 987 940

Note: Cell entries are multinomial logit coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 replications). ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05. Thebase outcome is respondents who did not answer if they would cast a second vote for Svoboda. Constants are omitted from the table.Source: Bustikova (2010).

L. Bustikova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 239e256 255

voting for Svoboda. Fears of economic threats are strong predictors of Svoboda vote even when other factors are taken intoaccount.

The analysis also reveals that both Svoboda voters and sympathizers perceived a disproportionately high level of securitythreat from Russia already in 2010 before the Maidan protests that erupted in December 2013. Individuals who fear Russiamore were more likely both to vote for and to sympathize with Svoboda. Fear of Ukrainian Russians was unique to Svobodavoters, therefore, we could easily expect that, during peaceful times the Russian “fifth column” had a strong potential toradicalize the radical right electorate. In light of the turbulent events, parties that demonstrate military competence and theability to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity have an upper hand and have siphoned Svoboda's supporters away. In timesof crisis, physical security issues force the electorate to coalesce behind strong-armed leaders, not parties with a niche appeal.

These findings should provide pause to claims that, at the core of Svoboda support, is a disproportionately high level ofanimosity against other ethnic groups in Ukraine, and that Svoboda represents an extreme xenophobic and “fascist” force inUkraine. The analysis of Svoboda voters and Svoboda sympathizers does not support such a claim. However, it does reveal thata heightened level of polarization on identity and security issues in Ukraine, has already existed in 2010. Although the levels ofinter-group hostility were very moderate, the fact that they polarized the political system contributed to the escalation ofperceived identity threats.

Further research into the sources of support for radical right parties and movements in Ukraine is essential. This articleaims to temper some sweeping generalizations about Svoboda support and its potentially devastating impact on domesticpolitics in Ukraine. Svoboda voters are driven by a combination of fears, not by blind hatred of other ethnic groups. This isconsistent with what we know about voters of radical right parties in other countries.

Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank David Siroky, Petra Guasti, Mark von Hagen, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Andreas Umland, ValeryDzutsati and an anonymous referee for help and valuable comments.

This research was supported by IARO/IREX program, Title VIII, the US Department of State.

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Further reading

Svoboda, 2012. “Свобода” впевнено дола 35% бар’ 3р на шляху до Верховноï Ради. March 6. Official Svoboa party site. Available at: http://www.tyahnybok.info/diyalnist/novyny/028299/.