Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287

Communicating in a crisis: flight SQ 006

Joan C. Henderson*

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore

Received 25 July 2001; accepted 12 August 2002

Abstract

The tourism industry is prone to crisis and disaster which must be planned for and managed. The paper analyses the early

reactions of Singapore Airlines to the crisis caused by the first fatal crash in the history of the main company within the context of

crisis management theory. The accident is explained and company responses are reviewed, with emphasis on the communication

strategies adopted and media reporting. Some reference is also made to the wider role of national carriers and final conclusions

suggest the need for further research into crisis management and tourism with scope for collaboration between industry and the

academic community.

r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Aviation; Crisis management; Singapore

1. Introduction

Airline crashes and safety matters have become ahighly topical issue in the aftermath of the attack on theWorld Trade Center in September 2001 involving twohijacked Boeing 767 planes. The events exposedinadequacies in security systems and highlighted thevulnerability of civil aviation to terrorist activity.Although such incidents and more conventional airlineaccidents remain rare (IATA, 2002), the need for crisismanagement planning has acquired a new urgency andall carriers face the possibility of unexpected events withfatal consequences. This study is concerned with howSingapore Airlines (SIA) responded to the crash of oneof its planes due to human error in 2000 when 83passengers and crew died. It seeks to provide anunderstanding of the dynamics of such a crisis situationand the challenges of managing it. After a briefliterature review, the crash is explained and actionstaken by the company outlined with particular referenceto its communications strategy. Attention is also givento the symbolic function of a national carrier and howthis can contribute to image repair and recovery.

Unfortunately, official crisis management documentspertaining to SIA are confidential and a request for an

interview with airline representatives was denied. Never-theless, certain aspects of the corporate response to thecrash and communications policy are revealed throughan examination of material already in the publicdomain. The study is thus based on analysis of the 20company news releases issued in the days immediatelyfollowing the crash (SIA, 2000a), media briefings andSingapore press reports. Such an approach yieldssome useful insights, although the absence of aninsider perspective and other limitations must beacknowledged.

2. Disaster, crisis and tourism

It is possible to distinguish between a disaster and acrisis, depending on scale and origin. According toFaulkner (2001), crises are internally induced and can bepartially controlled while disasters are generated ex-ternally and more catastrophic in extent. Nevertheless,they share many features and are closely related so thatthe distinction is not always clear and disasters canevolve into crises for organisations; this is almostinevitable in air crashes and the term crisis is employedhere to describe the SQ 006 incident.

A substantial literature on the subject of crisismanagement in general has been developed since the1970s, summarised by Booth (1993) and Faulkner

*Tel: +65-790-6116; fax: +65-791-3697.

E-mail address: ahenderson@ntu.edu.sg (J.C. Henderson).

0261-5177/02/$ - see front matter r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 5 1 7 7 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 7 0 - 5

(2001). Authors are from a variety of areas within andoutside the management sciences and adopt differentapproaches, presenting mainly qualitative data andoften making use of case studies to illustrate good andbad practices (Lagadec, 1993; Levitt, 1997; Pauchant &Mitroff, 1992). Themes explored include definitions,causes, planning and decision-making, the part playedby the media, and internal and external impacts. Manytexts are designed to provide advice for practitioners,especially in the private sector, and stress the signifi-cance of effective communications in coping with thecircumstances of crisis (Ogrizek & Guillery, 1999).

Some research has been conducted into the specificcharacteristics of tourism crises and their handling,drawing on a wide range of examples. Attention is givento the implications of political unrest (Lehrman, 1986;Richter 1992; Richter and Waugh, 1986; Scott, 1988)and terrorist activity in particular locations such asNorthern Ireland (Witt & Moore, 1992) and Egypt(Aziz, 1995). The effects of perceptions of personalsafety at destinations are analysed by Brunt, Mawby,and Hambly (2000), one instance being the damage toFlorida’s tourism from visitor assaults in Miami (Greco,1994). The Asian financial crisis which adverselyaffected tourism in many countries of the region isanother concern (Prideaux, 1999) and the events of 11September 2001 seem likely to generate further studies(Pizam, 2002; WTO, 2002).

Corporate performance after transport accidents,both air (Ray, 1999; Regester & Larkin, 1998; StrategicDirection, 2002) and surface (Regester & Larkin, 1998;Simms, 1998; Simpson & Noulton, 1998), have beenassessed and questions of destination management andmarketing during and following natural disasters suchas floods (Durocher, 1994), hurricanes (Faulkner &Vikulov, 2001) and earthquakes (Huang & Min, 2002)also addressed. Several of these accounts evaluaterecovery strategies at company and destination leveland offer guidelines to follow for those responsible(Barton, 1994; Pottorff & Neal, 1994; Sonmez, Aposto-lopoulos, & Tarlow, 1999; WTO, 1996, 1998). Servicefailure recovery is a related theme discussed in servicesmarketing with use made of critical incident analysis(Bitner, Booms, & Tetreault, 1990; Hinkin, 1995),although illustrations are usually relatively minorcompared to the seriousness of an airline crash.

The range of topics suggests tourism’s vulnerability todiverse types of crisis and disaster (Santana, 2001),partly a result of its sensitivity to internal and exogenouschange. Laws, Faulkner, and Moscardo (1998, p. 5)maintain that tourism is marked by ‘dynamic chaos’ andturbulence, quoting Faulkner and Russell (1997) whoapply theories of chaos and complexity to tourism. Theyargue that the dynamism of tourism cannot be explainedby traditional concepts and stable and orderly systems,but requires new paradigms which accommodate con-

stant change. Change is manifested in natural hazards,social unrest, political instability and economic uncer-tainty, all of which influence tourism alongside shifts indemand and continuous product innovation in supply.There is also a constant threat of travel disruption andaccidents, including those involving aircraft, due to thenature of the operating environment. Airline crashesmay be due to technical and human failure, forces ofnature such as weather, or a combination of these.Whatever the causes, they are a subject of popular andmedia interest worldwide and pose a severe test for theairline and its management, demanding hurried deci-sions in an atmosphere of intense public scrutiny.

3. Singapore Airlines and flight SQ 006

SIA is a leading medium-sized world airline (EIU,2000) and prides itself on the calibre of its staff, servicedelivery and modern equipment (Chang, Yeong, & Loh,1996). The airline’s achievements are demonstrated byits award winning record (SIA, 2000b) and status as atourist icon, represented by the ‘Singapore Girl’stewardesses in their batik uniforms. Although a planeof a wholly owned subsidiary (SilkAir) had crashed in1997 with the loss of life of everyone on board, itsseparate identity enabled the parent company to retainan untarnished safety record. However, the crash offlight SQ 006 meant that the main company had to dealwith a serious accident and its repercussions for the firsttime.

The 2-year old Boeing 747-400 arrived in Taipei fromSingapore on 31 October and was scheduled to continueits journey to Los Angeles with 159 passengers and 20crew. Despite strong winds and heavy rain due to atyphoon crossing the South China Sea, clearance to takeoff from Chiang Kai-Shek Airport was given at 2315and the plane was airborne 2minutes later. It then hitthe ground, disintegrating into three sections andcatching fire. There were 82 fatalities, including fourcrew, and one passenger died later due to injuriessustained. Others required medical treatment and anumber on board were unharmed. It was establishedlater that the plane left the taxiway too early, turningonto a runway, which was closed where it hit machinery.Mistakes by the pilots were quickly cited as a possiblereason for the crash, but doubts were also raisedabout airport facilities and air traffic control. Thecorrect runway was not properly lit and markings toindicate the closure of the one actually used wereunclear. Air traffic controllers did not observe setprocedures of providing taxiing instructions in condi-tions of poor visibility and also gave clearance for takeoff, even though they could no longer see the plane andfailed to inform the pilots of this. Exact causes and

J.C. Henderson / Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287280

responsibilities, however, were to be determined by anofficial enquiry.

General theories of crisis management assume thatevents move through a series of stages with actionsometimes possible to avert a final crisis. Turner (1976)identifies seven such phases and Fink (1986) four, butthese can be summarised as three broad positions of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. The movement is essentiallycyclical, beginning with normality and eventuallyreturning to it, although the organisation and indivi-duals may have been deeply affected by the experience.Faulkner (2001) presents a tourism disaster manage-ment framework, which incorporates response elementsand strategy ingredients related to pre-event, prodromal,emergency, intermediate, long term/recovery and reso-lution stages. The conceptualisation would appearappropriate for tourism organisations in crisis otherthan destination authorities, although some modifica-tions to the crisis process within the context of airlinecrashes are proposed in Fig. 1.

Crises do not always follow the clearly delineatedpattern of theoretical models because of their unpredict-ability and the speed at which they unfold; this isapparent in airline crashes which precipitate an im-mediate crisis with no time for avoidance. A pre-eventstage when preventive measures can be implementeddoes not strictly apply given that regulations to ensuremaximum safety and security should be ongoingstandard practice in civil aviation. It may also be

impossible to predict certain forms of mechanical andhuman breakdown with risks always present, airlinestherefore permanently on the verge of crisis. Aprodromal stage, where crisis becomes inevitable, islikely to be very brief in an accident and the firstthree steps in Faulkner’s framework have been com-pressed into a single component of the event phase ofthe crash.

The focus here is on this opening and subsequentintermediate period, but progress towards recovery isworth noting. Financial results and operating statisticscontained in the first post-crash Annual Report (SIA,2001) revealed little commercial impact and the releaseof the report by the Taiwanese authorities in April 2002was another advance, marking the end of the officialenquiry procedure. It concluded that pilot error wasthe principal cause of the crash while recognising alsothe role of airport deficiencies, findings disputed bySingapore’s Transport Ministry which argued greateremphasis should have been given to the latter (Koh,2002). The possibility of the pilots being prosecuted fornegligence by Taiwan’s judiciary was also lifted in June2002, soon after they had conveyed their sympathies tofamilies of victims in newspaper advertisements.

The lengthy interlude between the crash and thesedevelopments indicates the extended duration of recov-ery, and resolution has yet to be attained. There are over100 lawsuits being conducted in the USA, which, it isestimated, will take about another 5 years to settle, andthe company has to deal with the surviving crew. Asense of the continuing effect of the accident wasconveyed by the Chairman (SIA, 2001, p. 6–7) whodescribed it as the company’s ‘darkest hour’ when its‘proud accident-free record came to an end’. Whilepledging to ‘recover and emerge an even better andstronger airline’, the memory of ‘this horrific accident,and those who passed away, will always remain with us’.Corporate culture may thus have been fundamentallyaltered and a reorientation necessary to secure resolu-tion. However, there may never be a complete resolutionif, for example, the causes of the accident andcompensation cannot be determined to the satisfactionof all parties and repercussions continue to reverberatewithin the company.

Resolution, even if only partial, provides an oppor-tunity for review and reflection leading to reforms inpursuit of improvements in structures and systems and aheightened preparedness for future crises. Learning thusconcludes the sequence in Fig. 1 on the assumption thatSIA’s management conducted such an exercise, whetherformally or informally. Each crisis component thereforediffers in its nature and time frame with the swiftness ofthe event followed by a prolonged period of adjustmentand potential for overlap between separate phases,irregularities which are difficult to capture in staticmodels.

PRE-EVENT PRODROMAL EMERGENCY

INTERMEDIATE

LONG TERMRECOVERY

RESOLUTION

EVENT/CRASH

LEARNING

Fig. 1. Stages in airline crisis management.

J.C. Henderson / Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287 281

4. Company action and communications

While other tourism organisations have displayed areluctance to anticipate and prepare for crisis (Cassedy,1991), all airlines must plan for accidents in view of thecharacteristics of the civil aviation industry (IATA,1998). Crisis management analysts stress the necessity ofestablishing a task force, recognising potential areas ofcrisis, devising preventive measures and formulatingcoping policies for situations when these fail and actualcrises take place. Guidelines related to a detailed actionplan and the allocation of responsibilities should berecorded in a manual setting out the procedures formanaging the crisis, with particular attention given to aneffective communications machinery (Bland, 1998;Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1998; ten Berg, 1990).Despite the absence of corporate data, SIA’s actionsseemed to be in accordance with the dictates of such aplan and reveal an awareness of the central function ofcommunications.

Ray (1999) classifies the five different communicationstrategies open to organisations in times of crises asdenying responsibility, hedging responsibility, ingratia-tion, making amends and eliciting sympathy. SIA’sreactions are summarised in Fig. 2 which shows thatthese approaches are not mutually exclusive and can beemployed in combination and evolve over time. Thereare also additional options to consider such as theacceptance of responsibility and looking ahead, both ofwhich were chosen by SIA.

In terms of denial and hedging, initial public state-ments about SQ 006 were strictly factual and avoidedquestions of responsibility, although the Chairman didsay in an early morning press conference the day afterthe crash that ‘my personal feeling is that it was anaccident’ (The Straits Times Interactive, 2000). Afterspeculation at a media briefing about the plane not usingthe proper runway, the Vice President of Public Affairssaid there was no evidence of this and ‘an experiencedpilot should not have made the mistake of using thewrong runway’ (The Straits Times, 2000a). On thesecond day after the accident, the Deputy Chairman

made a statement in Taipei claiming that ‘It is importantthat we stick to the facts. Speculation and theoriescannot do anything to help anyone’ (News ReleaseNumber 8).

After the primary cause of the crash was confirmed,the Deputy Chairman did not dispute the findings. Herecognised on November 3 that ‘as unlikely as it seemedat first, the plane was on the wrong runway. We acceptthis finding y We fully accept our responsibility to ourpassengers, our crew and their families’ (News ReleaseNumber 13). Acceptance of responsibility was thusrapidly forthcoming and is an important additionalstrategic choice, unavoidable in certain instances,although one that has serious legal implications.Agreement about wider responsibilities may vary,however, with different interpretations regarding thoserelated to the care and comfort of surviving passengersand relatives as well as staff. Ogrizek and Guillery (1999,p. 60) recognise that such a commitment is essential to‘victim management’ which itself is a key aspect indealing successfully with crises.

Following the acknowledgement of responsibility, theairline expressed its distress, sorrow and regret andsought to make amends. A minute of silence was sharedby employees, and the company flags flew at half-mastaround the world as a mark of respect for those who hadlost their lives. A memorial service later took place inTaipei attended by senior officials and over 300 staff.The Deputy Chairman and SIA staff were present atfunerals in Singapore, subject to the approval ofrelatives, and the company advertising halted in orderto comply with the 100 days of mourning demanded byChinese tradition. With regard to more practical steps,families were flown to the site on the day following thecrash and a buddy system was implemented wherebyrelatives were attached to a staff member trained ingiving emotional counselling and aid. A total of 150support staff from Singapore were stationed at Taipei.Immediate assistance of US$5000 for survivors andUS$25,000 for the next of kin of those who died wasannounced on 2 November and US$400,000 compensa-tion proposed on 4 November to the latter.

HEDGINGRESPONSIBILITY

ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY

MAKING AMENDS

OFFERING REASSURANCES

LOOKING AHEAD

Fig. 2. SIA’s communications strategies.

J.C. Henderson / Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287282

The offer of reassurance might be considered as aform of making amends, but the action is directed at thepublic as a whole in addition to individuals caught up inthe crisis and represents a distinct strategy. Reassur-ances were given by SIA about preventing furtheraccidents and assertions made that no effort would bespared to uncover the full circumstances of the crash,examining issues of human factors and making airportssafer. In the words of the Deputy Chairman, ‘once theanswers are established, we will take whatever actionis necessary to ensure that this tragic accident doesnot happen again. There are lessons to be learned—weneed to understand what they are’ (News ReleaseNumber 13).

There are some parallels with a 1985 JAL crash inwhich 520 died when the airline adopted an ‘elaborateprotocol to atone’ (Regester & Larkin, 1998, p. 146)including personal apologies by the company president,memorial services, financial assistance and help by stafffor relatives. The president offered to resign, afteraccepting responsibility, and the head of maintenancecommitted suicide. While there are contrasting culturalexpectations of corporate behaviour, the decisions madeby JAL allowed it to emerge from the crisis in agenerally favourable light. Elsewhere in Asia, the headand founder of Korean Air stepped down in 1999 due toa series of fatal events and the Chairman and sevenBoard members of Taiwan’s China Airlines profferedtheir resignations in 2001 after the airline’s fourth fatalcrash since 1994. These moves alone, however, were

insufficient to prevent negative media publicity aboutsafety standards and public outrage in the Taiwanesecase (BBC News, 1999; CNN.com, 2001).

With regard to eliciting sympathy and ingratiation,there were few signs of this strategy being implementeddirectly by SIA. Nevertheless, some local newspaperreports did present the accident as a test of the airline’smaturity and sensibility, as well as its commercial skills,forcing it to ‘grow up quicklyyfrom boys to menovernight’ (The Straits Times, 2000b). Another journal-ist wrote that ‘SIA must now do its most difficult workwith its famed efficiency and vision. To that we addcompassion and a newfound experience, gained terribly’(Gwee, 2000). While still struggling to come to termswith the crash during recovery, there was evidence of ashift in communications and attempts to focus on newinitiatives for the future; this was to become moremarked as time passed. The last strategy in Fig. 2 is thusthat of looking ahead as the company moved into a newsituation of post-crisis communications.

5. Audiences for the communications message

The ways in which selected strategies are implementedmay depend on who is being addressed, and an airline’snumerous publics or groups with an interest in the crisisare recorded in Fig. 3. Each of these has its ownperspective and concerns that affect how messages arereceived and interpreted. Another factor shaping the

AN AIRLINE'S PUBLICS

RESIDENT POPULATION

MEDIA

CUSTOMERS

TRAVEL INDUSTRY

REGULATORY AGENCIES

GOVERNMENT

SURVIVORS AND NEXT OF KIN

STAFF

SHAREHOLDERS

Fig. 3. An airline’s publics.

J.C. Henderson / Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287 283

form and transmission of corporate communications isthat audiences are both national and international, withproblems of control and the possibility of misunder-standing due to cultural and linguistic differences. It isnot possible to comment on communications betweenthe company and every group, but some observationscan be made about relations with those personallyaffected, the media and the Singapore population.

Amongst next of kin, there was frustration about thetime taken after the crash to contact relatives and clarifythe fate of those on board. Their trauma wasdramatically expressed on 2 November when a dis-traught figure evaded police guards to interrupt a pressconference in Singapore being broadcast live on nationaltelevision. The man spoke of his anger at finding outabout the death of his brother from a television reportand the lack of definite facts from SIA. The airlinerepresentatives allowed him to talk for 15 minutes, afterwhich the Vice President of Public Affairs put his armsaround the man to comfort him in a gesture latercommended by the press.

Another member of the same family demanded at aconference in Taipei why SIA had been slow inproviding news about the victims. In answer, the DeputyChairman spoke of the ‘need to balance the need forinformation, the need for accuracy and also the need tobe considerate of the feelings of the people concerned’(The Straits Times, 2000c). The media was criticised forreleasing names before the next of kin had beeninformed which had ‘caused undue stress, alarm andconfusionythe airline chose not to release the namesimmediately because we felt the relatives should bementally prepared first before we take steps to leteveryone else know’ (The Straits Times, 2000d). Perhapsnot all were placated by these arguments, but thecompany was acknowledged to have acted sympatheti-cally and with speed in transporting relatives to the siteand arranging buddies. There was also little delay inannouncements of compensation, although some dis-satisfaction with the amounts was reported.

This scenario underlines how crucial the media are tothe communications process, acting as both a targetaudience and a channel of news distribution. Journalistscommunicate information about events, their storieshelping to determine popular attitudes towards andopinions about the actions and responses of theprotagonists. Airlines in crisis may try to convey positiveimages through the media, but they will also besubjected to difficult and demanding questioning in anatmosphere of doubt and tension. Media exclusion ornon-cooperation is rarely advised because it impliesevasion and may result in unfavourable coverage. Forexample, Pan Am made a ‘conscious decision tominimise communications with the press’ in an attemptto ‘somehow distance Pan Am’s name from the tragicconsequences’ of the Lockerbie crash, a policy which

proved misguided (Regester & Larkin, 1998, p. 145).There are also dangers of conflicting accounts emanat-ing from a variety of staff, with a need for an identifiablespokesperson to represent the airline. Such individualsstill have to be circumspect in their public statements,especially over potentially contentious matters such asthe apportioning of blame.

SIA sought to take the lead in its dealings with themedia and direct the amount and flow of information.Its first news release was ready at 0200 on 1 Novemberafter a crisis management centre had been installed atChangi Airport, the airline’s base, with others in Taipeiand stations overseas. Out of 19 news releases in theperiod up until 10 November, seven were issued thatday; these summarised steps being taken by SIA andcontained updated details about crash survivors andthose injured. There was frequent contact with themedia at briefings and press conferences in Singaporeand Taipei, the Vice President of Public Affairs acting asprincipal spokesperson in the former location andthe Deputy Chairman in the latter. Senior officials werethus prominent and spoke openly and with apparentsincerity.

There were delays, however, in clarifying andconfirming news from Taipei and journalists in LosAngeles were originally told that there had been nofatalities. News Release Number 7 at 1800 on 1November listed the names of those hospitalised orwho had received outpatient treatment and thoseunaccounted for. On the second day after the accident,a statement at 0900 explained that the next of kin ofmore than 70% of passengers had been contacted,identification had started and the names of thoseidentified would be made public progressively. A furtherstatement at 1530 noted that there had been 81 fatalitiesand that identification was underway, but complicatedby the need for DNA testing. Amended lists ofpassengers and crew and their status were provided at1030 on 4 and 5 November and final figures, accountingfor all passengers and crew, were available at 1745 on 6November. It is debatable whether and how thisoperation could have been accelerated, but public andmedia impatience as well as company irritation at thelatter’s haste to make public passenger names havealready been described.

The resident population is the third group to considerand includes those from other publics in Fig. 3 such ascustomers, staff, shareholders, official agencies andprivate businesses who will be exposed to othercommunications in accordance with these roles. InSingapore, SIA was assisted in its attempts to deal withthe crisis by the government, which voiced its supportfor the airline. The local media was also supportive, aswas the regional trade press (Travel Asia, 2000).Singapore’s principal newspapers devoted much spaceto the crash in the days immediately following the

J.C. Henderson / Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287284

accident, covering actual events and possible causes.Many articles described the fate of the Singaporeanpassengers and crew and their personal stories as well asthe anguish of relatives. Accounts of passengers andrelatives satisfied with their treatment at the hands of thecompany were also featured (The Straits Times, 2000e).Two reports specifically addressed the company’sperformance and quoted positive opinions from externalanalysts (The Straits Times, 2000f, b). While recognisingproblems of information dissemination and confirma-tion, these stressed the urgency with which SIA actedoverall, its prompt acceptance of responsibility and thepart played by the Vice President of Public Affairs as thepublic face of the airline.

There was a sense of profound shock in the Republicafter the crash, which was seen as something of anational disaster and a challenge to be overcome. TheSenior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, hailed as the architectof modern Singapore, said when consulted that thecountry should ‘learn from the SIA tragedy’ and ‘presson’, while the Deputy Prime Minister observed ‘I thinkwe can still be the best, and it is a matter of pride that weprove it’ (The Straits Times, 2000g). Popular opinionappeared sympathetic and there were frequent expres-sions of undiminished faith in SIA. It can be argued thatthe airline is an embodiment of the state and symbolisesits success and ambitions regarding international recog-nition, serving as a truly national carrier. Such a statusand the sentiments underlying it were of advantage tothe company, at least in Singapore, as it strove to regaincredibility and restore its image.

Overseas reporting may have had a different emphasisand agenda, suggested by a preliminary comparison ofthe accident’s portrayal by the Taiwanese media, andthis is an area for continued exploration. Althoughlargely beyond the influence of the airline, internationalpress attention to a crash will contribute to shapingperceptions of the company in overseas markets.Awareness of this coverage through careful monitoringcan assist in decisions about communications strategiesand marketing activity aimed at repairing damage andreturning to normality.

6. Conclusion

The crash of flight SQ 006 led to SIA facing anunprecedented crisis and its response has been sum-marised in this study which has followed progressthrough the early stages of a sequence leading toresolution and learning. Special attention has beengiven to communications strategies adopted in the eventand intermediate periods, with some reference to longerterm actions. The company is shown to have movedfrom avoiding questions of responsibility to acceptingresponsibility, making amends and offering reassur-

ances, before looking ahead. These strategies re-quired communications with many interested partiesthrough provision of news to the media and individualsaffected, demonstrations of concern for survivors andrelatives, and a display of confidence and belief in thefuture. While the airline was praised for its lack ofhesitation in admitting responsibility once the factsemerged and extending this to a degree of care forpassengers and next of kin, it also met criticismover delays in contacting relatives and confirming detailswith an initial reluctance to admit that the pilotsmight have been at fault. Overall, however, managementdid appear to have learnt from the Silkair accidentby acting with greater speed and dealing more sym-pathetically with the victims, highlighting the impor-tance of learning as a critical outcome of the experienceof crisis.

Research is continuing into the implications of the SQ006 crash and questions of company communicationsand press reporting at home and overseas. To date, thefindings suggest that airline crashes are a distinctive typeof crisis, characterised by the absence of a pre-crisiswarning and the suddenness and fatal consequences ofthe triggering event. The service failure is one of thegreatest gravity, leading to death and injury andphysical and emotional suffering, and the companyhas obligations regarding the well being of victims andtheir next of kin. Completing the cycle of crisis may be along affair and a restoration of the status quo perhapsunattainable with the need for readjustment in manage-ment and marketing philosophies. The exceptionalpublicity given to air accidents in which lives are lostalso means that the media are especially critical torecovery and resolution. Finally, while there do seem tobe broad processes at work and common principles ofmanagement, it should be recognised that every crisis isunique and must be studied within its specific contextand industry sector.

Despite the limitations of these observations, it can beconcluded that crisis management in tourism in generaland communications strategies in particular are subjectsof relevance to both academics and practitioners thatmerit further examination. Airline crashes represent aparticularly acute form of crisis and their analysisilluminates the dilemmas and difficulties confrontingthose responsible, affording examples of good and badpractice. The academic community has an importantcontribution to make in exploring the causes andconsequences of crisis and undertaking comparativestudies, with some scope for collaboration between itand industry in pursuit of an increased understanding.Such knowledge can be used to improve tools andtechniques for dealing with conditions of crisis, therebyassisting in the evolution of effective strategies for theirmanagement and adding to the wider literature on crisismanagement.

J.C. Henderson / Tourism Management 24 (2003) 279–287 285

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