1
67 INESAP Information Bulletin No.26, June 2006 67 67 67 67 67 Satellite, Space News, April 22, 2005. 4 This is a preliminary conclusion; a Mishap Investigation Board was formed by NASA after the accident with a mandate to return a report within 75 days. Today, the report re- mains “under review” at NASA headquar- ters. Kim Newton, Marshall Flight Center, phone conversation, January 9, 2006. 5 Theresa Hitchens, Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Approach, Center for Defense Information, September 2004, p. 31. 6 Leonard David, Military Micro-Sat Explores Space Inspection, Servicing Technologies, Space.com, July 22, 2005; www.space.com/ businesstechnology/050722_XSS- 11_test.html. 7 Jeffrey Lewis, Autonomous Proximity Oper- ations: A Coming Collision in Orbit?, Uni- versity of Maryland, March 11, 2004. 8 Brian Berger, NASA Proposes $300 Million Tug To Deorbit Hubble, Space News, No- vember 24, 2003. 9 David Portree, Mir Hardware Heritage, NASA Reference Publication 1357, Johnson Space Center, March 1995, p. 3. 10 Automated Transfer Vehicle, European Space Agency, December 7, 2005; www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ATV/index.html. 11 Snap, Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd., http://zenit.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=47. 12 Jeffrey Lewis, op.cit. 13 Matt Bille, Robyn Kane, and Mel Nowlin, Military Microsatellites: Matching Require- ments and Technology, AIAA-2000-5186, September 19-21, 2000, p. 9. 14 For more on the concept of “space assur- ance” see Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Domi- nance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003. 15 Michael Krepon, Ground rules for Space, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005, p. 68. 16 Incidents at Sea Agreement, US State De- partment, Bureau of Arms Control; www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4791.htm. 17 The full text of the Model Code of Conduct can be found at www.stimson.org/space. 18 Space-Track.org, Air Force Space Com- mand at www.space-track.org and Theresa Hitchens, op.cit., p. 26. 19 J.-C. Liou and N.L. Johnson, Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris, Science, Vol. 311, January 20, 2006, p. 340. 20 Donald Kessler and Phillip D. Anz-Meador, Critical Number Of Spacecraft In Low Earth Orbit, presented at the Third Euro- pean Conference on Space Debris, March 2001; http://webpages.charter.net/dkessler/ files/CriticalNumberofSpacecraftinLow.pdf. 21 Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA Safety Standard 1740.14, August 1995. 22 Theresa Hitchens, op.cit., p. 33. 23 Code Of Conduct For Space Debris Mitiga- tion, CNES Press Release, December 1, 2004; www.cnes.fr/html/_455_465_3018 _.php. The text of the code can be found at www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/eurocode.pdf. 24 See A. Kato, Debris Mitigation activities in NASDA, Advances in Space Research, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 227-230, and IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC 02-01, Inter Agency Debris Coordination Committee, October 15, 2002. 25 For more on the ITU see www.itu.int/ITU-R/. 26 Currently, there is no agreed upon definition for a space weapon. For the purposes of the Model Code, the Stimson Center has adopt- ed one that defines space weapons as direct attacks on satellites from other satellites or from Earth, and attacks on earth from dedi- cated satellites in space. Implicitly absent from this definition is military equipment designed to jam communications between satellites and ground stations since these are attacks on the communications links as op- posed to the satellites themselves. For more on this definition, see Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, op.cit, p. 29. 27 For an analysis of how the main effect of any US space weapons plans would be an in- crease in proliferation, see Michael Krepon with Michael Katz-Hyman, Space Weapons and Proliferation, Nonproliferation Review, Monterey Institute for International Stud- ies, Volume 12, No. 2, 2005. Michael Katz-Hyman is a Research Assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washing- ton, DC; [email protected]. by Detlev Wolter As long as the US government is fun- damentally challenging international law, it appears hopeless to call for its and the peaceful use of outer space. With his comprehensive study Com- monSecurity in Outer Space and In- ternational Law, Detlev Wolter has created a compendium for interna- tional space law which facilitates the access to a wealth of literature and en- ters conceptual new ground. Wolter’s historical perspective shows that during the Eisenhower era in 1957, the USA submitted a memo- randum on arms control in space to the UN to ensure that outer space would be used exclusively for peace- ful purposes. Despite the Outer Space Treaty, the military use of space con- tinues until today but a weaponiza- tion of space can still be prevented. Against the imperatives of power and particular interests, Wolter’s focus is the “Common Heritage of Mankind.“ He emphasizes the appli- cation of the concept of “Common Security” developed by Egon Bahr and Dieter Lutz, then assesses alter- native proposals by governments and non-governmental organizations, in- cluding those for a space weapons ban by US and German scientists. The legal standards and criteria present the basis for an evaluation of the missile defense plans of the Bush Administration which contributed to the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. With the threat scenarios of a Pearl Harbor in space and the quest of the US Space Com- mand for space dominance, the Outer Space Treaty is at stake. As an alterna- tive, Wolter substantiates the common security interests as a chance for a co- operative strategy change which in- cludes: “the prohibition of active mili- tary uses of a destructive nature in the common space; a comprehensive package of confidence-building meas- ures with multilateral satellite moni- toring and verification systems as well as a protective regime for peaceful space objects based on immunity rules for satellites, such as a ‘rules of the road’ and a ‘code of conduct’.” He suggests the negotiation of a multi- lateral “Treaty on Common Security in Outer Space,” accompanied by the establishment of an International Or- ganisation which will monitor the im- plementation of the agreement. It is desirable that this approach finds its way into the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarma- ment on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space which has been blocked for many years. The general aims are shared by many states. Jürgen Scheffran United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, 2006, ISBN 9-789290-451778, US$ 32 Proximity Operations in Space Common Security in Outer Space and International Law

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Page 1: Common Security in Outer Space and International · PDF file67 INESAP Information Bulletin No.26, June 2006 Satellite, Space News, April 22, 2005. 4 This is a preliminary conclusion;

67 INESAP Information Bulletin No.26, June 20066767676767

Satellite, Space News, April 22, 2005.4 This is a preliminary conclusion; a Mishap

Investigation Board was formed by NASAafter the accident with a mandate to return areport within 75 days. Today, the report re-mains “under review” at NASA headquar-ters. Kim Newton, Marshall Flight Center,phone conversation, January 9, 2006.

5 Theresa Hitchens, Future Security in Space:Charting a Cooperative Approach, Centerfor Defense Information, September 2004,p. 31.

6 Leonard David, Military Micro-Sat ExploresSpace Inspection, Servicing Technologies,Space.com, July 22, 2005; www.space.com/businesstechnology/050722_XSS-11_test.html.

7 Jeffrey Lewis, Autonomous Proximity Oper-ations: A Coming Collision in Orbit?, Uni-versity of Maryland, March 11, 2004.

8 Brian Berger, NASA Proposes $300 MillionTug To Deorbit Hubble, Space News, No-vember 24, 2003.

9 David Portree, Mir Hardware Heritage,NASA Reference Publication 1357, JohnsonSpace Center, March 1995, p. 3.

10 Automated Transfer Vehicle, EuropeanSpace Agency, December 7, 2005;www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ATV/index.html.

11 Snap, Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.,http://zenit.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=47.

12 Jeffrey Lewis, op.cit.13 Matt Bille, Robyn Kane, and Mel Nowlin,

Military Microsatellites: Matching Require-ments and Technology, AIAA-2000-5186,

September 19-21, 2000, p. 9.14 For more on the concept of “space assur-

ance” see Michael Krepon with ChristopherClary, Space Assurance or Space Domi-nance? The Case Against WeaponizingSpace, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003.

15 Michael Krepon, Ground rules for Space,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June2005, p. 68.

16 Incidents at Sea Agreement, US State De-partment, Bureau of Arms Control;www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4791.htm.

17 The full text of the Model Code of Conductcan be found at www.stimson.org/space.

18 Space-Track.org, Air Force Space Com-mand at www.space-track.org and TheresaHitchens, op.cit., p. 26.

19 J.-C. Liou and N.L. Johnson, Risks in Spacefrom Orbiting Debris, Science, Vol. 311,January 20, 2006, p. 340.

20 Donald Kessler and Phillip D. Anz-Meador,Critical Number Of Spacecraft In LowEarth Orbit, presented at the Third Euro-pean Conference on Space Debris, March2001; http://webpages.charter.net/dkessler/files/CriticalNumberofSpacecraftinLow.pdf.

21 Guidelines and Assessment Procedures forLimiting Orbital Debris, NASA SafetyStandard 1740.14, August 1995.

22 Theresa Hitchens, op.cit., p. 33.23 Code Of Conduct For Space Debris Mitiga-

tion, CNES Press Release, December 1,2004; www.cnes.fr/html/_455_465_3018_.php. The text of the code can be found atwww.stimson.org/wos/pdf/eurocode.pdf.

24 See A. Kato, Debris Mitigation activities inNASDA, Advances in Space Research, Vol.23, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 227-230, and IADCSpace Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC02-01, Inter Agency Debris CoordinationCommittee, October 15, 2002.

25 For more on the ITU see www.itu.int/ITU-R/.26 Currently, there is no agreed upon definition

for a space weapon. For the purposes of theModel Code, the Stimson Center has adopt-ed one that defines space weapons as directattacks on satellites from other satellites orfrom Earth, and attacks on earth from dedi-cated satellites in space. Implicitly absentfrom this definition is military equipmentdesigned to jam communications betweensatellites and ground stations since these areattacks on the communications links as op-posed to the satellites themselves. For moreon this definition, see Michael Krepon withChristopher Clary, op.cit, p. 29.

27 For an analysis of how the main effect ofany US space weapons plans would be an in-crease in proliferation, see Michael Kreponwith Michael Katz-Hyman, Space Weaponsand Proliferation, Nonproliferation Review,Monterey Institute for International Stud-ies, Volume 12, No. 2, 2005.

Michael Katz-Hyman is a Research Assistantat the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washing-ton, DC; [email protected].

by Detlev Wolter

As long as the US government is fun-damentally challenging internationallaw, it appears hopeless to call for itsand the peaceful use of outer space.With his comprehensive study Com-monSecurity in Outer Space and In-ternational Law, Detlev Wolter hascreated a compendium for interna-tional space law which facilitates theaccess to a wealth of literature and en-ters conceptual new ground.

Wolter’s historical perspectiveshows that during the Eisenhower erain 1957, the USA submitted a memo-randum on arms control in space tothe UN to ensure that outer spacewould be used exclusively for peace-ful purposes. Despite the Outer SpaceTreaty, the military use of space con-tinues until today but a weaponiza-tion of space can still be prevented.Against the imperatives of power andparticular interests, Wolter’s focus is

the “Common Heritage ofMankind.“ He emphasizes the appli-cation of the concept of “CommonSecurity” developed by Egon Bahrand Dieter Lutz, then assesses alter-native proposals by governments andnon-governmental organizations, in-cluding those for a space weapons banby US and German scientists.

The legal standards and criteriapresent the basis for an evaluation ofthe missile defense plans of the BushAdministration which contributed tothe abrogation of the Anti-BallisticMissile Treaty in 2002. With the threatscenarios of a Pearl Harbor in spaceand the quest of the US Space Com-mand for space dominance, the OuterSpace Treaty is at stake. As an alterna-tive, Wolter substantiates the commonsecurity interests as a chance for a co-operative strategy change which in-cludes: “the prohibition of active mili-tary uses of a destructive nature in thecommon space; a comprehensive

package of confidence-building meas-ures with multilateral satellite moni-toring and verification systems as wellas a protective regime for peacefulspace objects based on immunity rulesfor satellites, such as a ‘rules of theroad’ and a ‘code of conduct’.” Hesuggests the negotiation of a multi-lateral “Treaty on Common Securityin Outer Space,” accompanied by theestablishment of an International Or-ganisation which will monitor the im-plementation of the agreement.

It is desirable that this approachfinds its way into the negotiations atthe Geneva Conference on Disarma-ment on the Prevention of an ArmsRace in Space which has been blockedfor many years. The general aims areshared by many states.

Jürgen Scheffran

United Nations Institute for DisarmamentResearch (UNIDIR), Geneva, 2006, ISBN9-789290-451778, US$ 32

Proximity Operations in Space

Common Security in Outer Space and International Law