Commentary Moral Truisms, Empirical Evidence, And Foreign Policy

7/21/2019 Commentary Moral Truisms, Empirical Evidence, And Foreign Policy

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Commentary: moral truisms, empirical evidence, and

foreign policy

NOAM CHOMSKY

In a critical paper on my work, a philosopher friend once wrote, with a

touch of frustration, that I do not seem to believe in any ‘isms’ beyond

truism. He had a point. In his contribution, Mark Laey also points out,

correctly, that I think we should be ‘deadly serious about the use of

evidence’. !ood deal of work suers from failure to take evidence

seriously, or to consider basic moral truisms "the most obvious of

which is that the standards we apply to others we must also apply to

ourselves#. I will try to illustrate these conclusions with two closely

related topics of serious current concern that are su!!ested by theseessays$ the renewal of concern with terrorism, and the revival of

considerations of %ust war in that conte&t.

Te !Age of Terror"

fter '()) it was commonly alle!ed that we are enterin! an ‘!e of

*error’ ++ the title of a collection of academic essays published almost

at once) ++ and that nothin! would be the same as the - declares a

‘war on terror’, reorientin! the course of history. It is also widely held

that the term ‘terror’ is very dicult to de/ne.

*here are ocial - !overnment de/nitions, which seem to fall within

the ran!e of clarity of others considered unproblematic and commonly

used. n rmy Manual de/nes ‘terrorism’ as ‘the calculated use of

violence or threat of violence to attain !oals that are political, reli!ious,

or ideolo!ical in nature. *his is done throu!h intimidation, coercion, or

instillin! fear.’ *he - 0ode de/ned ‘act of terrorism’ to be ‘an activity

that ++ "# involves a violent act or an act dan!erous to human life that

is a violation of the criminal laws of the nited -tates or any -tate, or

that would be a criminal violation if committed within the %urisdiction of the nited -tates or of any -tate1 and "2# appears to be intended "i# to

intimidate or coerce a civilian population1 "ii# to in3uence the policy of

a !overnment by intimidation or coercion1 or "iii# to aect the conduct

of a !overnment by assassination or kidnappin!’.4

*hese are the de/nitions I have been usin! in writin! about the topic



since the 5ea!an administration came into oce declarin! that a ‘war

on terror’ would be a focus of its forei!n policy.6 *hey do not answer

every 7uestion precisely ++ they do not, for e&ample, draw a sharp

boundary between international terrorism and a!!ression, or between

terror and resistance.8 2ut they seem !ood enou!h for most practical

purposes, and are particularly appropriate because of the source and

the timin!$ the - !overnment as it declared the /rst phase of the ‘war

on terror’.

s for a sharp chan!e in the course of history after '()), that seemed

7uestion+able.9 Much the same was true, I think, when the 0old :ar

ended$ new prete&ts and rhetoric, tactics adapted to chan!ed

circumstances, but otherwise fundamental continuity in policies that

are rooted in stable institutions "see -tokes for an important

illustration#.;

*hat was, I think, a reasonable conclusion after '()). However, one

mi!ht ar!ue that the 2ush administration has chan!ed 7uantity into

7uality by the ways it used the occasion of the atrocities to carry

forward its domestic and international a!enda. :ithin a year, it

succeeded in turnin! overwhelmin! sympathy and support for the -

into fear of :ashin!ton as the !reatest dan!er to world peace, and to

distaste, even loathin!, for the political leadership.< *hat is an

achievement that should ful/l =sama bin Laden’s wildest dreams.

In the international arena, the >resident and a reactionary circle of

advisers pressed forward with plans that are novel at least in the

bra?en arro!ance with which they are proclaimed$ notably the doctrine

of preventive war, which accords them the ‘soverei!n ri!ht to take

military action’ at will to control the world and destroy any challen!e

they perceive.@ *he doctrine was enunciated in the Aational -ecurity

-trate!y of -eptember 4BB4, which aroused many shudders around

the world and within the forei!n policy elite at home.' *he declaration

coincided with a drumbeat of propa!anda for a war that would

establish the doctrine as a new ‘norm of international practice’ andeven law. *he drive for war elicited popular and elite protest with no

historical precedent that I can recall. If relentlessly pursued, the

policies mi!ht constitute a watershed in world aairs. Aonetheless, it is

important to reco!nise that there are precedents, both of doctrine and

implementation.)B



Cven apart from the 2ush administration initiatives, there is no doubt

that somethin! dramatically new and dierent did happen on '())$ for

the /rst time, an attack on the rich and powerful countries succeeded

on a scale that is, re!rettably, hardly unfamiliar in their traditional

domains. It is not surprisin! that alon!side the horror at the crimes

a!ainst humanity "as many ri!htly called them# and sympathy for the

victims, commentators outside the ranks of :estern privile!e often

responded with a ‘welcome to the club’. In a reaction that was not

unusual, the editors of the research %ournal of the Desuit niversity in

Mana!ua wrote that one mi!ht describe the '()) atrocities as

‘rma!eddon’, but Aicara!ua has ‘lived its own rma!eddon in

e&cruciatin! slow motion’ under - assault ‘and is now submer!ed in

its dismal aftermath’,)) while others fared far worse under the pla!ue

of violence and repression that swept throu!h the continent from the

early )';Bs, much of it traceable to :ashin!ton, as Latin mericansknow well.

=ne important stimulus was the decision of the Eennedy administration

in )';4 to chan!e the primary emphasis of the military assistance

pro!ramme in Latin merica from ‘hemispheric defense’ to ‘internal

security’.)4 mon! knowled!eable observers, perceptions were similar

in :ashin!ton and Latin merica. 0harles Maechlin!, who led counter+

insur!ency and internal defense plannin! from )';) to )';;,

described the )';4 decision as a shift from toleration ‘of the rapacity

and cruelty of the Latin merican military’ to ‘direct complicity’ in theircrimes, to - support for ‘the methods of Heinrich Himmler’s

e&termination s7uads’.)6 In 0olombia, where a )';4 Eennedy -pecial

Forces mission advised ‘paramilitary, sabota!e and(or terrorist

activities a!ainst known communist proponents’ "see -tokes#, the

respected president of the 0olombian >ermanent 0ommittee for

Human 5i!hts, former Minister of Forei!n airs lfredo Gs7ue?

0arri?osa, described the outcome in similar terms$ the Eennedy

administration, he wrote, ‘took !reat pains to transform our re!ular

armies into counterinsur!ency bri!ades, acceptin! the new strate!y of

the death s7uads’, usherin! in ‘what is known in Latin merica as the

Aational -ecurity octrine, . . . not defense a!ainst an e&ternal enemy,

but a way to make the military establishment the masters of the

!ame . . . JwithK the ri!ht to combat the internal enemy, as set forth in

the 2ra?ilian doctrine, the r!entine doctrine, the ru!uayan doctrine,

and the 0olombian doctrine$ it is the ri!ht to /!ht and to e&terminate



social workers, trade unionists, men and women who are not

supportive of the establishment, and who are assumed to be

communist e&tremists.’)8

*he !oal of the new Aational -ecurity -tates, Lars -choult? writes, was

‘to destroy permanently a perceived threat to the e&istin! structure ofsocioeconomic privile!e by eliminatin! the political participation of the

numerical ma%ority . . .’, the ‘popular classes’.)9 *he dominoes be!an

fallin! with a military coup in 2ra?il in )';8, with Eennedy initiatives

and stron!ly supported by :ashin!ton as atrocities mounted.); It was

followed by a series of others in -outh merica. *he Aational -ecurity

octrine reached 0entral merica in the )'@Bs, with !rim

conse7uences that are well+known. Cl -alvador became the leadin!

recipient of - military aid by the mid+)'@Bs. -ometimes 0on!ress

hampered direct military aid and trainin! by imposin! human ri!hts

conditions, as in uatemala after hu!e atrocities. In such cases -

clients served as a surro!ate, includin! r!entina under military rule,

*aiwan, and Israel.)<

*he facts are easily overlooked in the :est, but the victims do not so

7uickly for!et. 5eactions to '()) of the kind cited from Desuit

intellectuals were by no means uncommon.

*hat somethin! like '()) mi!ht happen was not une&pected. It had

been reco!nised for some time that the industrial powers would

probably lose their virtual monopoly of violence, retainin! only an

enormous preponderance. :ell before '()), technical studies had

concluded that ‘a well+planned operation to smu!!le :M into the

nited -tates would have at least a 'B per cent probability of success

++ much hi!her than I02M delivery even in the absence of JAational

Missile efenseK’. *hat has become ‘merica’s chilles Heel’, a study

with that title concluded several years a!o. *he dan!ers have been

evident since the )''6 attempt to blow up the :orld *rade 0enter,

which mi!ht have killed tens of thousands of people with better

plannin!, the buildin! en!ineers reported.)@

*he horrendous success of anticipated terrorist atrocities a!ainst the

powerful does not seriously chan!e risk assessments. nd surely no

one could doubt that it would have si!ni/cant policy conse7uences.

*he tar!et was not 0uba, or Aicara!ua, or Lebanon, or 0hechnya, or

one of the other traditional victims of lar!e+scale international



terrorism "or worse#,)' but a state with enormous power to shape the

future. Aevertheless, I think Eenneth :alt? was ri!ht to predict that

'()) is likely ‘to further trends already in motion’. =ne conse7uence,

he su!!ests, may be proliferation of :M "and probably terror# by

countries who ‘know that the nited -tates can be held at bay only by

deterrence’.4B

s was also predicted at once, repressive states saw '()) as a window

of opportunity to step up harsh and brutal practices under the !uise of

a war on terror and with at least tacit authorisation from the rei!nin!

superpower$ 5ussia in 0hechnya, 0hina in its :estern provinces, Israel

in the occupied territories, and so on. =thers, ran!in! from the harsh

dictatorships of 0entral sia to the more democratic societies, adopted

measures to discipline their own populations and pursue unpopular

pro!rammes. In the -, ‘literally before the dust had settled’ over the

:orld *rade 0enter ruins, economist >aul Eru!man reported, in3uential

5epublicans si!nalled that they were ‘determined to use terrorism as

an e&cuse to pursue a radical ri!ht+win! a!enda’.4) He and others

have been documentin! how they have pursued this a!enda

relentlessly since, often brandishin! -addam Hussein as the most

fri!htenin! embodiment of the terrorist threat. *he strate!y proved

eective for the 4BB4 con!ressional elections, and it is hard to doubt

that the 4BB8 presidential campai!n is a factor in the timin! of the

drive to war, in pursuit of lon!+standin! !oals for which '()) served as

a useful prete&t$ amon! them, to re!ain control of Ira7’s enormousener!y resources, a central component of the ulf resources that the

-tate epartment, in )'89, reco!nised to be a ‘stupendous source of

strate!ic power, and one of the !reatest material pri?es of world

history’.44

natol Lieven observes that plans for the invasion of Ira7 conform to

‘the classic modern strate!y of an endan!ered ri!ht+win! oli!archy,

which is to divert mass discontent into nationalism’, fannin! fear of

enemies about to destroy us.46 *hat strate!y is essential if the ‘radical

nationalists’ settin! policy in :ashin!ton hope to advance theirannounced plan for ‘unilateral world domination throu!h absolute

military superiority’,48 while conductin! a ma%or assault a!ainst the

interests of the lar!e ma%ority of the domestic population.49 Lieven

apparently speaks for many in the world when he describes the - as

‘a menace to itself and to mankind’, as lon! as policy proceeds on its

present course.



s noted, the ocial !overnment de/nitions of ‘terrorism’ seem fairly

satisfactory. *hese de/nitions, however, were never used within

mainstream discussion "and have since been ocially revised4;#. *he

reasons seem clear enou!h. *he ocial de/nitions of ‘terror’ were

similar to the de/nition of ocial - policy, called ‘counter+terror’ "Low

Intensity 0on3ict, counterinsur!ency# ++ not, of course, a - innovation1

terror is commonly termed ‘counter+terror’ by more powerful a!ents.4<

More troublesome still, application of the ocial de/nition leads

une7uivocally to the conclusion that the - is a leadin! practitioner of

international terrorism, and that in the prime areas where the ‘war on

terror’ was declared "0entral merica and the Middle

Cast(Mediterranean re!ion#, the 5ea!an+2ush administrations compiled

a record of international terrorism far e&ceedin! anythin! that could be

char!ed to their enemies.4@

-uch conclusions, however, are unacceptable. *he e&tensive work on

these topics by many authors is virtually unmentionable, and further

-+E support for state terror and atrocities throu!h the )''Bs,

includin! some of the worst crimes of that !risly decade, has been

eaced in the !low of self+praise about alle!ed ‘new norms of

humanitarian intervention’ ++ which have been familiar for )9B years,

and not very !loriously.4'

*he practice of avoidance continued when the ‘war on terror’ was

redeclared on )) -eptember 4BB), with much the same rhetoric asbefore, and many of the same people in leadin! positions. Clementary

rationality dictates that we undertake serious in7uiry into the /rst

phase of the ‘war on terror’ if we hope to !ain some understandin! of

the renewal. 2ut in the vast recent literature on the topic, the rational

approach is sub%ect to what anthropolo!ists call ‘ritual avoidance’.6B

*he occasional mentions in the scholarly literature commonly evade or

distort even the most crucial and obvious facts.6) ll of this is a most

remarkable commentary on the !eneral intellectual culture ++ not %ust

the media, as Herrin!+5obinson ri!htly observe.

Hardly a day passes without e&amples. *hus, a front+pa!e story in the

national press warns that the threat of l+aeda is increasin!, as it is

turnin! from tar!ets that are ‘well protected . . . to so+called soft

tar!ets, like resorts’.64 nyone who takes truism and fact seriously will

instantly reco!nise the pattern. *ake one strikin! and hi!hly relevant

case.



In Dune )'@;, the I0D condemned :ashin!ton for ‘the unlawful use of

force’ in its attack on Aicara!ua, orderin! the - to terminate these

acts of international terrorism and pay substantial reparations.66

:ashin!ton had already re%ected I0D %urisdiction on the !rounds that

most of the world ‘often opposes the nited -tates on important

international 7uestions’ so that we must ‘reserve to ourselves the

power to determine’ how we will act and which matters fall ‘essentially

within the domestic %urisdiction of the nited -tates, as determined by

the nited -tates’ ++ one of the many precedents for the preventive

war doctrine of -eptember 4BB4.68 -ecurity 0ouncil resolution

supportin! the I0D %ud!ment and callin! on all states to observe

international law was vetoed by :ashin!ton "2ritain abstainin!#. :ith

bipartisan support, the 5ea!an administration reacted to the decisions

of the hi!hest international institutions by escalatin! the attack

sharply, also issuin! ocial orders to its contra forces to ‘J!oK after softtar!ets . . . not JtryK to duke it out with the -andinistas directly.’69 *he

contras were able to follow the orders thanks to - control of

Aicara!ua’s airspace and the advanced communication e7uipment

provided to the pro&y forces attackin! from - bases in Honduras. *he

-tate epartment con/rmed the orders in words that ‘would do credit

to eor!e =rwell’s Ministry of *ruth’, mericas :atch wrote bitterly,

earnin! a reprimand from Michael Einsley, a leadin! representative of

‘the left’ in national media.6; He e&plained to the human ri!hts

or!anisations that a ‘sensible policy must meet the test of cost+bene/t

analysis’, comparin! ‘the amount of blood and misery that will be

poured in, and the likelihood that democracy will emer!e at the other

end’1 the - !overnment will be the arbiter of ‘democracy’, perhaps in

reco!nition of its record in promotin! democracy in the re!ion over

many years.6<

:hether attackin! ‘soft tar!ets’ is ri!ht or wron!, terrorism or a noble

cause, depends on who is the a!ent, at least if moral truisms are

deemed irrelevant, alon! with unwanted facts that have been

‘disappeared’.

Einsley was breakin! no new !round. t the critical end of the

spectrum of elite discussion, doves opposed terror because it was

failin! and ur!ed :ashin!ton to adopt more ecient means to return

Aicara!ua to ‘the 0entral merican mode’ and compel it to observe

‘re!ional standards’$ the standards of :ashin!ton’s terror states Cl

-alvador and uatemala, then en!a!ed in lar!e+scale slau!hter,



torture, and destruction.

ll of this passed without comment within the mainstream. Is there

even a remote possibility that it mi!ht be recalled as the ‘war on terror’

is redeclared, alon! with the virtual destruction of Aicara!ua and much

of the rest of 0entral merica durin! the /rst phase’N 0ould anyoneeven recall who the enemy was in 0entral mericaN *o their credit,

some do$ the -chool of the mericas "since renamed#, which trains

Latin merican ocers, proudly proclaims that ‘liberation theolo!y’ in

Latin merica ‘was defeated with the assistance of the .-. rmy’.6@

*he chillin! reference will be understood at once by those who care

about moral truism and fact.

Herrin! and 5obinson 7uote aniel Hallin’s statement that there was ‘a

real political contest over the framin! of the 0entral merica story’ in

the media. s they observe, the crucial 7uestion is how the contestwas framed. *he matter has been studied.6' *here was a rou!hly even

split between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, all a!reein! that the ‘0entral

merican mode’ must be supported and that Aicara!ua must be

compelled to adhere to it, but dierin! on the means. *he doves I have

%ust cited.

Aicara!ua was of course not the /rst tar!et of - terror aimed at

‘re!ime chan!e’. nother well+known and instructive e&ample is 0uba.

From the declassi/ed record, we learn that plans for re!ime chan!e

were in the works within months after 0astro took power in Danuary

)'9', and were formally adopted in secret in March )';B, with full

awareness of the stron! 0uban support for the tar!eted !overnment

and the virtual irrelevance, at the time, of meanin!ful 0old :ar

issues.8B 2y then, - terrorist operations were already underway. In

May )'9', the 0I be!an armin! anti+0astro !uerrillas inside 0uba.8)

‘urin! the :inter of )'9'O)';B, there was a si!ni/cant increase in

0I+supervised bombin! and incendiary raids piloted by e&iled 0ubans’

based in the -.84

0uba provided e&tensive details of such attacks to the -ecurity 0ouncil

in Duly )';B, thou!h no action was taken in the face of vi!orous -

denials ++ falsehoods, as the internal record now reveals.86 *he

international terrorist pro!ramme was sharply escalated by Eennedy.

fter the 2ay of >i!s invasion was beaten back, Eennedy ‘asked his

brother, ttorney+eneral 5obert Eennedy, to lead the top+level



intera!ency !roup that oversaw =peration Mon!oose, a pro!ramme of

paramilitary operations, economic warfare, and sabota!e he launched

in late )';) to visit the Pterrors of the earthQ on Fidel 0astro and, more

prosaically, to topple him’.88

*he reasons are e&plained in the internal record. :ashin!ton plannerswarned in early )';8 that ‘the very e&istence of J0astro’sK re!ime . . .

represents a successful de/ance of the -, a ne!ation of our whole

hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half’ ++ based on

subordination to - will.89 *hree years earlier the 0I had concluded

that ‘*he e&tensive in3uence of P0astroismQ is not a function of 0uban

power’1 ‘0astro’s shadow looms lar!e because social and economic

conditions throu!hout Latin merica invite opposition to rulin!

authority and encoura!e a!itation for radical chan!e.’8; -hortly

before, Eennedy adviser rthur -chlesin!er had transmitted to the

incomin! >resident the report of his Latin merican Mission, which

warned of ‘the spread of the 0astro idea of takin! matters into one’s

own hands’. *hat is a !rave dan!er, -chlesin!er elaborated shortly

after, when ‘*he distribution of land and other forms of national wealth

!reatly favors the propertied classes . . . JandK *he poor and

underprivile!ed, stimulated by the e&ample of the 0uban revolution,

are now demandin! opportunities for a decent livin!.’ 5ussia was

mentioned$ as a source of economic aid and a model of rapid

industrialisation.8<

similar pattern is commonly found when ‘public diplomacy’ is

discounted and the internal plannin! record e&amined$ uatemala in

)'98, to take an e&ample then prominently in the minds of planners.

Eennedy’s terrorist pro!ramme was intensi/ed in u!ustO-eptember

)';4, includin! speedboat stra/n! attacks on a 0uban seaside hotel

‘where -oviet military technicians were known to con!re!ate, killin! a

score of 5ussians and 0ubans’1 attacks on 2ritish and 0uban car!o

ships1 contaminatin! su!ar shipments1 and other atrocities and

sabota!e, mostly carried out by 0uban e&ile or!anisations permitted tooperate freely in Florida with e&tensive 0I support, sometimes direct

participation.8@ *hese actions were a si!ni/cant, perhaps primary,

factor leadin! to the missile crisis.8' Eennedy resumed the

international terrorist operations after the crisis ended1 ten days before

his assassination, he authorised new actions.9B *errorist operations

peaked in the late )'<Bs, and continued from - soil into the late



)''Bs.9)

0uba’s crimes became still more immense when it served as the

instrument of the --5’s crusade to dominate the world in )'<9,

:ashin!ton proclaimed. ‘If -oviet necolonialism succeeds’ in n!ola,

A mbassador aniel >atrick Moynihan thundered, ‘the world will notbe the same in the aftermath. Curope’s oil routes will be under -oviet

control as will the strate!ic -outh tlantic, with the ne&t tar!et on the

Eremlin’s list bein! 2ra?il.’ :ashin!ton’s fury was caused by another

0uban act of ‘successful de/ance’. :hen a -+backed -outh frican

invasion was comin! close to con7uerin! newly+independent n!ola,

0uba sent troops on its own initiative, scarcely even notifyin! 5ussia,

and beat back the invaders. In reaction, >iero lei%eses observes,

‘Eissin!er did his best to smash the one movement that represented

any hope for the future of n!ola,’ the M>L. nd thou!h the M>L

‘bears a !rave responsibility for its country’s pli!ht’ in later years, it

was ‘the relentless hostility of the nited -tates JthatK forced it into an

unhealthy dependence on the -oviet bloc and encoura!ed -outh frica

to launch devastatin! military raids in the )'@Bs’, which reversed the

!ains in the early years of independence and drove the country to ruin,

alon! with Mo?ambi7ue, another remarkable illustration of

international terrorism ++ if not worse ++ relyin! on the crucial support of

those who are now wa!in! the second phase of the ‘war on terror’.94

*he terrorist attacks a!ainst 0uba have been devastatin! to a poorsociety in the shadow of the dominant superpower, particularly when

combined with the eects of economic warfare ++ which became even

harsher after the collapse of the -oviet prete&t. ll of this is another

illustration of the continuity that -tokes discusses.96

In =ctober 4BB4, a summit meetin! took place in Havana on the

fortieth anniversary of the 0uban missile crisis, attended by key

participants from 5ussia, the -, and 0uba. -tartlin! information was

revealed$ the world was saved from possibly terminal nuclear war by a

5ussian submarine commander who countermanded an order to /renuclear+armed missiles when the subs were under attack by -

destroyers at the tensest moment of the missile crisis ++ ‘the most

dan!erous moment in human history’, rthur -chlesin!er observed,

realistically. *he current Ira7 crisis ‘was a recurrent theme at the

meetin!’, the press reported, ‘with many participants accusin! 2ush of

i!norin! history . . . Jsayin!K they had come to make sure it does not



happen a!ain, and to oer lessons for today’s crises, most notably

>resident eor!e :. 2ush’s deliberations about whether to strike

Ira7.’98

*he ‘a!e of terror’, ‘international terrorism’, and ‘re!ime chan!e’ were

the leadin! themes of the day as the summit took place. *he shockin!revelations were scarcely reported1 the back!round entirely i!nored.

-imilarly, the record of those currently at the helm in :ashin!ton ++

mostly recycled from the 5ea!an+2ush administrations ++ is re!ularly

i!nored. *hat is remarkable$ whatever one’s attitude towards the ‘a!e

of terror,’ elementary sanity would seem to dictate that the record of

those leadin! the ‘war on terror’ durin! its /rst phase should be a

prominent concern. =ccasional allusions to the record are either

i!nored or lead to interestin! reactions, amon! them, attribution of

idiotic claims either to an anonymous ‘left’ or to enemies chosen in themanner that Herrin! and 5obinson describe.

*he practice is so routine that illustrations can be selected virtually at

random. *o take one illustration from a serious source at the liberal+left

e&treme, 2en%amin 2arber writes that ‘unless we are willin! to %oin the

merica+bashin! ?anies who see no dierence between the nited

-tates and Ira7, who insist merica, too, is a PterroristQ state, we must

acknowled!e the president’s preemptive unilateralism as our own.’99

>erhaps there is someone in the world who sees no dierence between

the - and Ira7. *hose who reco!nise that merica is a terrorist state

"not a ‘terrorist’ state# are simply repeatin! well+established truths that

do not vanish because they are doctrinally inadmissible9;1 the familiar

cases %ust noted, for e&ample.

0onsider the idea that ‘we must acknowled!e the president’s

preemptive unilateralism as our own’1 more accurately, preventive

unilateralism, since no credible threat is considered necessary under

the proclaimed doctrine. Must others do so for themselves as wellN If

so, what happens to the worldN If not, why notN If raised, the 7uestion

receives a simple answer$ what we do is ri!ht and %ust, a refrain not

unfamiliar in history.

#ust $ar teory

Let us turn to %ust war theory, recently revived in the conte&t of

international terrorism. 0onsider the stron!est case that is put forth$



the bombin! of f!hanistan, a paradi!m e&ample of %ust war accordin!

to the :estern consensus. *he respected moral+political philosopher

Dean 2ethke Clshtain summarises received opinion fairly accurately

when she writes that ‘Aearly everyone, with the e&ception of absolute

paci/sts and those who seem to think we should let ourselves be

slau!htered with impunity because so many people out there PhateQ

us, a!rees’ that the war was clearly %ust.9<

Aote a!ain the techni7ue of concoctin! ridiculous opponents. *here

are, however, real people who opposed the resort to military force, who

escape notice. *hat apparently includes the lar!e ma%ority of world

opinion "overwhelmin!ly so in Latin merica, which has by far the most

intimate e&perience of - intervention#, and also leadin! f!han

opponents of the *aliban. -ome of the most respected of them bitterly

condemned the - bombin!, which, they char!ed, was underminin!

their eorts to overthrow the hated *aliban re!ime from within and was

undertaken only because the - wanted to ‘show its muscle, score a

victory and scare everyone in the world’.9@

*here were a !reat many more, also pretty hard to miss. mon! them

were the ma%or aid and relief a!encies, includin! those of the nited

Aations and charitable and development or!anisations, who pleaded

for termination of bombin! because of their concern over the likely

eect on the population, millions of whom were on the brink of

starvation even before '()). *heir concerns were understandable when:ashin!ton demanded a few days after '()) that >akistan eliminate

‘truck convoys that provide much of the food and other supplies to

f!hanistan’s civilian population’, a report that elicited no noticeable

reaction within mainstream commentary. *heir strenuous protests

mounted as the threat of bombin! caused the withdrawal of aid

workers and a severe reduction in food supplies, followed by bombin!

with still more severe eects, leavin! ‘millions of f!hans...at !rave

risk of starvation’, Harvard niversity’s leadin! specialist on

f!hanistan reported.9' fter a few weeks of bombin!, estimated

numbers of those at risk rose 9B per cent, from 9 to <.9 million.;B

In brief, there were real critics of the ‘%ust war’, but they remained

lar!ely invisible, alon! with hi!hly relevant current history.

separate matter is the e&tent to which the fears were realised. bout

that, we know little. s predicted at once, the matter has not been



seriously investi!ated. 0rimes of enemies are sub%ected to laser+like

scrutiny, but it is conventional to evade one’s own. Cven in the case of

massive atrocities such as the - invasion of -outh Gietnam, then all of

Indochina, estimates of deaths are casual, with a ran!e of several

million, and such matters as the lon!+term eects of - chemical

herbicidal warfare in -outh Gietnam, thou!h known to be severe, are

scarcely discussed "apart from the eect on - soldiers, serious but of

course minor in conte&t#.;)

More strikin! than the usual evasion in the present case is the

abandonment of elementary moral principles. It is the merest truism

that acts are evaluated in terms of possible conse7uences. Cven if the

‘!rave risk of starvation of millions of people’ reported in International

-ecurity was fortunately not realised, that would in no way aect the

assessment of the acts taken in the face of that dan!er. :e apply this

truism to others without hesitation. =n the 8Bth anniversary of the

missile crisis, we recall vividly, and correctly, the criminal lunacy of

Ehrushchev’s decision to place nuclear+armed missiles in 0uba, which

mi!ht have led to destruction of much of the world. It did not happen.

nuclear war was barely avoided, and an anticipated invasion of 0uba

did not take place, only continued - terrorism and economic warfare.

2ut we do not sin! praises to Ehrushchev1 we condemn him harshly for

takin! the risk. For ourselves, however, such considerations appear to

be incomprehensible.

Let us turn now to the most elementary principles of %ust war theory.

=ne fundamental principle, so obvious that it is rarely even mentioned,

is universality$ we are sub%ect to the standards we apply to others.

*hose who cannot accept this truism should have the decency to keep

silent about matters of ri!ht and wron!, or %ust war.

If we can accept this principle, some obvious 7uestions arise$ for

e&ample, have 0uba and Aicara!ua been entitled to set o bombs in

:ashin!ton, Aew Rork, and Miami in self+defence a!ainst on!oin!

terrorist attackN >articularly so when the perpetrators are well+knownand act with complete impunity, often in bra?en de/ance of the

hi!hest international authoritiesN If not, why notN 0ertainly one cannot

appeal to scale of crimes to %ustify such a stand1 the merest look at the

factual record bars that move, matters well understood outside

privile!ed :estern circles. If the 7uestions are not answered, we know

that the ‘%ust war’ pronouncements cannot be taken seriously1 still



more so if the 7uestions are not even raised. I have yet to discover a

case where the 7uestion is even raised in the contemporary revival.

*he conclusions may not be attractive, but they merit serious

attention, self+e&amination, and concern.

*o brin! in some additional relevant facts, when bdul Ha7 and otherleadin! f!han opponents of the *aliban were condemnin! the -

bombin!, alon! with the ma%or aid and relief a!encies and others, its

ocial motive was to force the *aliban to hand over people that the -

suspected of involvement in the crimes of '())1 removin! the *aliban

re!ime was an afterthou!ht, added several weeks later.;4 *he *aliban

made some tentative moves towards e&tradition, re7uestin! evidence.

:e do not know whether the moves were serious, since the -

re%ected them with contempt, and presumably would have done so

even if it had had credible evidence. pparently :ashin!ton had only

"hi!hly plausible# suspicions. *hat remained true even ei!ht months

later, as 7uietly conceded. F2I director 5obert Mueller testi/ed before

0on!ress that ‘investi!ators believe the idea of the -ept. )) attacks on

the :orld *rade 0enter and >enta!on came from al aeda leaders in

f!hanistan, the actual plottin! was done in ermany, and the

/nancin! came throu!h the nited rab Cmirates from sources in

f!hanistan’.;6

t the time when *aliban reluctance to hand over suspects without

evidence was the lead story of the day, arousin! much fury, Haitirenewed its re7uest for e&tradition of Cmmanuel 0onstant, leader of

the paramilitary forces that had primary responsibility for the brutal

murder of thousands of Haitians durin! the early )''Bs, when the

military %unta was supported, not so tacitly, by the /rst 2ush and

0linton administrations.;8 *he re7uest apparently did not even merit a

response, or more than the barest report. 0onstant has been

sentenced in absentia in Haiti1 it is widely assumed that the - is

concerned that if he testi/es, he may reveal contacts between the

state terrorists and :ashin!ton.;9 oes Haiti therefore have the ri!ht

to set o bombs in :ashin!tonN =r to try to kidnap or kill 0onstant inAew Rork, where he lives, one of the many murderous state terrorists

who en%oy safe haven in the -N If not, why notN nd why is the

7uestion considered too absurd even to raiseN

=ne way to evade the issues is to dismiss moral truisms as absurdities.

*hat is the stance adopted by Michael lennon in hi!hly+re!arded



work.;; respected /!ure in the /eld of international law, his views

merit serious attention, particularly because they are oered to

establish a conclusion that is comin! to be ocial policy$ the

framework of international law and treaties that has laboriously been

constructed over many bitter years should be abandoned in favour of

the new doctrine that the self+declared ‘enli!htened states’ may resort

to force as they see /t ++ always for the most beni!n reasons,

apparently by de/nition, since no ar!ument is !iven, either historical or

conceptual. It is hardly a new doctrine1 rather, a venerable one, with a

rich history that should need no review,;< but appears to be irrelevant,

for une&plained reasons.

*o establish his thesis, lennon dismisses ‘ob%ectivist philosophies’

because they do not have /rm foundations. *hat is correct$ another

truism is that there are no /rm foundations for elementary moral

principles. *hat includes the moral truism that arouses his ire "7uotin!

me#$ that ‘people are primarily responsible for the likely conse7uences

of their own action, or inaction’, and that responsibilities mount with

!reater opportunity and more clearly anticipated eects. 5e%ectin! this

truism, lennon ar!ues that the ‘ob%ectivist ar!ument’ that A*=

shares responsibility for the atrocities that followed its bombin! of

-erbia, e&actly as it anticipated "the case in 7uestion# ++ ‘is easily

turned on its head’ to yield ‘a conclusion opposite the one’ that he

falsely attributes to me$ that A*= bears sole responsibility. His

counter+ ar!ument is that by the same moral principle, we canconclude ‘It was the -erbs who are responsible’. His conclusion follows

only if we adopt his tacit assumption that responsibility cannot be

shared. *he reader can discover that the other ar!uments 7uickly

collapse when such reasonin! is discarded.

Conclusion

*his is a tiny sample of what we discover if we pay some attention to

moral truism and elementary fact. I would like to end with a stron!

endorsement of the /nal words of Herrin! and 5obinson’s essay. *heirin%unction follows directly, I think, if we a!ree to enter the moral arena$

to apply to ourselves the standards we impose on others, and to

reco!nise the obli!ation to help suerin! people as best we can, a

responsibility that naturally accrues to privile!e. It is not pleasant to

speculate about the likely conse7uences if concentrated power

continues on its present course, protected from proper scrutiny in the



manner described in the essays !athered here.

Documents

Commentary Moral Truisms, Empirical Evidence, And Foreign Policy