Command Magazine #040

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BOARD G

WORLDW

Moscow 1941

Mustangs

Naval War

Omaha Beachhe

Operat ionM ercu

Operation Sealio

Operation Shoe

Over the Reich

Pacific War

Panzer Leader

Panzerblitz 2

Patton's Best

Poland '39

Pre lude t o Dis as

Race for Tunis

Red Parachutes

RIse of L uftwaffe

Road to Berlin

Rommel in the D

RUSSian Campai

RUSSian Front

Salvo 2

Seven Seas to V

Shell Shock

S the Bismarc

S thereens

$po "e

Squad Leader

Stahngrad Pocke

S arm OvrArnheTactiCS 2

Th"d Reich

Thunde ra t C as s

Tokyo Express

Tunisia

Turning Pt Stahn

Twilight War

Victory in Europe

Victory in Norma

Victory in Pacific

Victory in West F

Volga Front

WW2 Pacil ic The

War at Sea

War at Sea 2 Kit

West Front

Winter Storm

World Flames Ex

World Flames Ex

World Flames Ex

World Flames UpWorld in Flames

WAR

Air Superiority

Alamo

Axis & Allies

Battle of Alma

Black Death

Blood & Iron

Geronimo

High Ground

Kolin Fredr1< Defe

Lion of the North

Ouebec 1759

Roarks Drift

Supremacy 3rd E

Texas Revolution

The '45

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ThirtyYears War

Thundrin Guns

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NOVEMBER 1996 ISSUE 4

Features _

Richard A. Pfost War With Mexico!The Campaign in orthern lexica

G. P. Stokes War With Mexico!With Scott in Mexico

Ted S. Raicer The Sick BearRussia's Armed Forces Today

Tom Dworschak A Fleet SquanderedHitler's Surface Ships

2

3

5

6

Departments _

Short Rounds

I Remember•••

Art of War

Books & Videos

The PIReader Survey

8

8

8

9

9

Cover: A contemporary colored lithograpof the Battle ofBuena Vist

4 ISSUE 40 NOV 199



Available November 1996!!Send for a Free Catalog today.

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The advance toward Moscow has finally

resumed. Guderian's spearhead regrouped at

Orel for nearly a month. Now,the drivetowardTula and M oscow ha s b eg un ag ain.

There are snow flurries in the wind.

Leading th e advance is th e eli teGrossdeutschland Infantry Regiment and the

3rd and 4th PlI1Zer Divisions. Yrur tactical goalis to outmaneuver the Soviet troops guardingthe Zusha River and open the road to Moscow.It is not a mission for weak wills or minds.

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GD'41 comes with the latest Series Rules.Once learned, these rules allow players to pickup any of the other eight games in the ser iesand begin play at once. It also comes with fivescenarios examining in depth the actions infront of Mtzensk in late October 1941.Rounding out the package are 840 fuJI-colorplaying pieces and two 22x34 inch mapsheets.All of this gives you hours of fun using the realunits and the real terrain.



6

Editor-in-ChiefTy Bomba

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A Note From the Editor

Your feedback votes from issue no. 38 came in this way, rankefrom highest to lowest:

The Great War in the Near East 7.44

Issue No. 38 overall 7.38With Their Backs to the Wall (Pusan) 6.92Robert the Bruce 6.88Occupying the Balkans Then and Now 6.80Pilgrim Savagery 6.69Short Rounds 6.68Issue No. 38 Cover. 6.64Books & Videos 5.48Partnership for Peace 4.04

Forty-two percent said no. 38 was better than no. 37; eight percent claimed the opposite; 46 percent thought the two were of abouequal worth, and four percent couldn't express an opinion becausthey hadn't seen the earlier issue.

The big generator of written comment this time out was th"Robert the Bruce" article. And the tone and temper of most ofwas probably best summarized by the sub criber who wrote: "I

seems as if the real story of 13th and 14th century Scotland waevery bit as interesting, if not more so, than the appy, romanticizeversion put forth in the Braveheart mo ie. What" the matter witHollywood? Can't anyone there read a hi tory book and recognizetrue drama when they see it?"

Indeed, what is the matter with Holl wood when it comes to his

tory? I don't even pretend to know, but tho e who'd like more filmdebunking reading should get them el e a copy of Mark CCarnes' 1995 book, Past Imperfect: History According to th

Movies (New York, Henry Holt Co., ISB 0-8050-3759-4). It wapublished just a bit too soon for Carnes to be able to include a piecon Braveheart, but there are excellent chapters on what othemovies have done to distort the truth, and generate myth, abousuch historical figures and topics as: the Spartacus slave risingJulius Caesar, the Alamo, the charge of the Light Brigade, CusterGallipoli, Pearl Harbor, Patton, the atomic bomb, Vietnam, etc. It'a really worthwhile read.

Editor, Command Magazine

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ISSUE 40 NOV 1996



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Elite Beat. . .

Responding to the Threat

Despite i ts vas t oil reserves , theNear East has always been the poorstepchild of American defense establishment planning. In Europe since1945 the Army and Air Force havetraditionally maintained a strong

presence, and equipment purchaseshave reflected that emphasis. ThePacific, on the other hand, has always belonged to the Navy.

In the immediate aftermath of theSecond World War, that wasn't aproblem. Britain still maintained ast rong military presence in the earEast, so a strategic partnership developed: the United States defendedEurope and the Pacific, the UnitedKingdom the Near Eas t. But th eBritish withdrawal from east of Suezin 1968 changed that relationship.The US, then mired in Vietnam,

couldn't spare the forces needed toproperly cover the vast new area. Anew ally was needed in the region, soWashington turned to Tehran.

Thus, from 1968 to the fall of theShah, Iran received billions of dollarsworth of equipment and training.This included some of the mostsophisticated equipment then available, such as F-14 fighters and Cobraattack helicopters. But, again, the US

was free to cont inue to concent rateits own Army and Air Force on thedefense of Europe.

In 1979, however, the internation

al situation again changed dramatically. The Shah was overthrown andit s replacement Khomeini regimewas overtly hosti le to the UnitedStates. Fur ther , the Soviet Unionoccupied Afghanistan, putting theRed Army just 500 miles from theStraits of Hormuz.

Without strong allies in the region, the US was forced to commitits own ground units to the defenseof the Persian Gulf for the fi rst time.The response to thi s new requir ement was the creat ion of the RapidDeployment Force (RDF). The RDF

8

came to consist of the most mobilemilitary formations - the Army's82nd Airborne and 1Olst AirmobileDivisions and some Marine Corpsunits - reinforced by the 24th Mech-

anized Division and some Air Force

units.The RDF's biggest problem was

simply get ting to i ts distant theaterof a ss ignmen t. A Soviet thrustthrough I ran toward the St ra it s ofHormuz and the Persian Gulf wouldprobably have been accompanied byattacks into Western Europe and thePacific; so US military airlift assetswould have been stretched thin trying to support all three theater s. Itseems likely only a small percentageof the RDF units could have beenflown into the Near East. The res t,particularly the 24th Mech , would

have had to go by sea, and mightvery well have arrived too late toinfluence the fighting.

The Army, then, needed to develop a fighting unit with the mobilityand f irepower to meet a Sovietmechanized o r t ank division, butwas at the same time light enough tobe flown to the Persian Gulf in 1,000C-141 sorties. The first attempt atmeeting this requirement was thecreation of a motorized infantry division. The 9th Infantry Division wasgiven the mission of organizing andtest ing the new concept. At the time

(1980), the 9th was a (then) standardinfantry division, with a tank battalion, a mechanized infantry battalionand seven leg infantry battalions.The new division was to consist ofnine battalions: five heavy combinedarms battalions (CAB[HD, two l ightcombined arms battalions (CAB[LD,and two light attack battalions (LAB).

The CAB[H) would have one motorized infantry company, two antiarmor companies and a supportcompany, while the CAB[L) wouldhave two motorized infantry companies, an anti-armor company and a

combat support company. The morized infantry companies consiof three platoons, each with theight man squads and an eight mweapons squad. The anti-armor cpan ies had 20 anti-tank weapsystems divided into four platoon

I t was originally intendedmoto ri zed and ant i- armor unwould be equipped with complenew weapons systems. The forwere supposed to receive wheearmored personnel carriers, e

mounting a 30mm cannon anTOW anti-armor missile launchThe latter were to get the Armo

Gun System (AGS), essentially a ltank mounting a 105mm cannon.

But the Army's wheeled APCgram was canceled (though the Mines went ahead and purchawheeled APCs for their light assvehicle battalions). The AGS syswent through a checkered devement; it's actually only now befielded, some 10 years after i tfi rst to have been deployed. Becaneither of those programs were p

sued in a timely way, by 1985 itdecided to mount both the moized infantry and anti-armor unitHigh Mobility Multipurpose WheVehicles (HMMWVs - the nowendary "Humvees" of Desert Stfame).

In the 1985 configuration, theconsisted of three light attack cpanies, each divided into threet oons of three squads. Each sqconsisted of four personnel andHMMWVs, one armed with the TII and the other with a 40mm gade launcher. The LAB was inten

to opera te as a covering force fordivision, on the flanks, and if poble to infiltr ate into the opponerear areas to strike at his comm

and logistics facilities.In the early 80s the use of the

attack vehicle (FAV) by the LABs

also considered. The FAV was renothing more than a civil ian dbuggy, purchased off the shelf

modified by the addition of weapattachments fo r a 40mm grenlauncher and TOW II. In exercisethe Yakima Firing Center, the FAshowed there was no terrain t

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



IIIJ

9th Infantry Division

(Motorized)

are needed to maintain a LID onceit's deployed , so more aircraft areavailable to transport combat units.

In terms of tactical mobility, therare regions - parts of Korea, Norway, eastern Turkey and the ZagroMountains in Iran - where the terrain is so rugged mechanized unitare restricted almost ent irely toroads. In such environments the LIDwould actually be more maneuver

able and have greater firepower thanit s mechanized/motorized opponents . It should also be rememberedi t was a light infantry force that successfully defeated a mechanizedSoviet army in Afghanistan.The LID has proven to be much

more flexible than a regular Armydivision. A mechanized or armoreddivision (or even the motorized division) is primarily intended to meet ahigh-tech, heavily armored threatWith the collapse of the SovieUnion, encountering such a threat isincreasingly unlikely. But in situa

tions such as Somalia and Haiti theLID has shown itse lf capable of handling any mission given to it.There has been some criticism o

the deployment to Somalia, primarilycentering around the a rgument theLID was too light even for the mission assigned it there. That's partially true, but only in that the LID wasalways intended to be deployeda long with a few heavy supporunits . That the light infantry units inSomalia found themselves at timesoutgunned is the fault of senior decision makers who failed to deploy aheavy armor unit in support.

- Michael D. Blodget

II

18x155mm

(each)

9xMLRS

12x105mm

x

x

The light infantry division wasexactly that: lightly armed infantry.I t consisted of nine light infantrybattalions divided among three brigdes. The LID had no tanks or otherarmored vehicles. Divisional supportconsisted of an artillery brigade withthree 105mm battalions, and a combat aviation brigade with a reconnaissance battalion, attack helicopterbattalion and transport companies.

There is no question the LID hadproblems. Its sole heavy anti-armorcapability lay in the 44 TOW IIlaunchers spread among the ninemaneuver battalions and the attackhelicopter battalion. Maneuverabilitywas limited since all the division'smaneuver battalions walked.

Cri ti cs have argued th e LIDswould have been of small value inthe event of a Soviet attack in Europe. Likewise, given the amountsspen t on arms in the Third World,even their deployment against suchenemies as Iraq and Iran would have

shown the LIDs to be easily outgunned and outmaneuvered.While those are valid criticisms, it

should also be pointed out therewere - and still are - valid reasonsfo r th e emp loyment o f LIDs. Thefirst is their strategic mobility; it

takes only 500 C-141 sorties to movea LID. Secondly, there is the matterof logistical support. The LID stillrequires some petroleum, oil andlubricants (POL), but i ts needs arevastly smaller than a mechanized orinfantry division. Thus divisionalrequirements are basically food,ammunition and medical supplies.That means fewer transport aircraft

couldn't overcome. But their utilityas a combat vehicle was limited bytheir inability to carry sufficientammunition for deep penetrationraids.

Unlike most Army divisions,which used their a ttack helicopterunits as a divisional reserve, the 9thformed theirs into a separate maneuver brigade. The Cavalry Brigade (AirAttack), or CBAA, consisted of two

attack helicopter battalions, a combat aviation company equipped withUH-60 transport helicopters, and areconnaissance battalion. The CBAAwas used for two primary purposes:1) as a counterat tack force, with therecon battalion blocking enemy penet ra tions and the a tt ack helicopterbattalions striking at the flanks; and2) as a deep-strike force.

In field exe rci se s th e CBAAproved extraordinarily valuable. Itallowed the division commander tolaunch airmobile strikes to securevaluable terrain, seal off units being

attacked f rom reinforcement , andstrike at enemy second-echelon unitswell before they'd reached the mainbattle area.Divisional artillery support con

sisted of 54 155mm howitzers inthree 18 gun battalions, and a general support battalion with nine Mul-tiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS)and two batteries of 105mm guns.The 105mm batteries were specifically intended to support divisionalairmobile operations.Though the equipment, organiza

tion and tactics pioneered by the 9thMotorized Infantry Division were successful, the program as a whole wasa failure. The division was never ableto reach the 1,000 C-141 sortie plateau - th e c losest i t came was1,250. The cancellat ion of the assault gun and wheeled APC programs meant the 9th was never heavily enough armed to take on a Sov-iet division.Thus the motorized infantry divi

sion never came to be a standardunit within the modern US Army.The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized)was declared combat ready in 1986;however, four years later it was demobilized and it s assets reformedin to the 199th Infantry Brigade (Mot-orized). That unit was also later demobilized, to be replaced by the 9thInfantry Regiment, effectively endingthe Army's flirtation with motorizedcombat units.The failure of the motorized in

fantry program lef t the army back atsquare one. So commanders turnedto another formation t ha t had beenin t he p lann ing s tage fo r severalyears: th e l igh t infantry division

(LID).

COMMAND MAGAZINE 9



Historical Perspective. . .

Sudan's Secret InsurrectionIn one night during the winter of

1964-65, more than 5,000 AfricanChristians and animists were mercilessly hunted down, hacked to piecesand thrown into the Blue Nile where

it flows past Sudan's capital city ofKhartoum. The cold-blooded killingswere carried out by several battalions of Ansari warriors, militant disciples of AI Mahdi and followers ofthe Prophet Mohammed. The Muslimzealots made formidable foes: utterly fearless , totally dedicated to religious fundamentalism, and absolutely convinced death in battle guaranteed immediate entry into paradise.They were the successors of the

7th century Ansar who first acceptedIslam, and the forerunners of today'sIslamic Revolutionary Guards. Look

ing back, it's easy to see the grislyepisode heralded the resumption ofSudan's holy war.The rest of the world said and did

nothing. The brutal, senseless massacre went unreported, and doubtless the general public would neverhave heard about it if some of ushadn't been spared to tell the tale,albeit 30 years later. I was there wi th my family - working for theSudanese Ministry of Education. We

were post-independence employees,no t like the British civil servantswho'd recently thronged Khartoum,nor like the British military who'dformerly held sway.

Sudan's association with Britainwent back almost a century, to thedays when Europe first becameaware of the ex ten t of slave-tradingthere. Like most of its African neighbors, Sudan had been divided, subdivided, conquered and plundered, notjust by Westerne rs , but also byArabs who'd penetrated as far as theswampy grasslands that acted as thenatural barrier between the region'sarid north and fertile south.Given i ts proximity to Egypt and

the centrality of the Nile River, whichboth countries share, it's not surprising Egypt had a strong influence onnorthern Sudan's development byfostering Arabization and providinga ready market for its exports . At thepeak of its domination, in the early1800s, Egypt acquired some 30,000Sudanese slaves and t ra ined themfor duty in the Egyptian army.It was the fact so many of those

Nilotic people died in captivity thatfinally stirred European consciencesand l ed to attempts to stamp out theslave trade. The complet ion of the

10

French-engineered Suez Canal in1869, with i ts promise of enormousstrategic and economic advantages,gave not only France, but also Britain, the opportunity to demand a say

in Egyptian affairs. The French, however, soon dropped out, leaving theBritish to oversee Egypt's governanceof Sudan. In addition, it was the British who were called on to keep thepeace between the Muslim/Arabizednorth and t he Chr is tian/animis tt ribes of the south who, with theadvent of steamboats and firearms,were becoming increasingly vulnerable.To assist with the modernization

of their army and extend their rule,the Egyptians used both Union andConfederate veterans from America

as mercenaries . In an effor t to conciliate Sudan's southerners, theyappointed a British explorer, SirSamuel Baker, as governor of Equatoria Province. When he was succeeded in 1874 by Gen. Charles"Chinese" Gordon, the British gainedboth a vital s take in Sudan's futureand another means of safeguardingtheir own interests.Gordon lost no t ime in suppress

ing the slave trade, disarming orhanging many of those caught trafficking in human misery. But apartfrom ensuring access to the Suez

Canal, which had quickly become aneconomic lifeline to Ind ia and theFar East, Britain had no wish to getcaught up in Sudanese squabbles, soGordon was recal led to London in1880. It was soon after his departure

that fresh problems arose: a Muslimzealot declared himself "AI Mahdi alMuntazar" ("the Awaited Guide inthe Right Path"), rallying countless

northerners to his cause, which wasa return to the simplicity of earlyIslam.It seems to have been the Mahdi's

personal magnetism that persuaded

so many northern Sudanese to adopthis brand of fundamentalism, whichled to the revival of the Ansar, readyto defend Mahdism to the death.Thus, early in 1882, some 30,000Ansari, armed only with spears andswords, attacked a huge force ofEgyptians deployed south o f Khartoum. Four months later, still on thewarpath, those religious fanaticsdefeated an even larger force ofEgyptians sent to relieve the soldiersgarrisoned in and around Khartoum.

Alarmed at this upsurge of national and religious fervor, the Brit-

ish government reappointed Gas governor general and senback to Khartoum to supervis

evacuation of al l non-Sudatroops and officials. However,he reached the city in FebruaryGordon realized i t was alread

late to extricate those trappedHe called at once for reinforcembut by the time they arrived thsari had struck, slaughtering

toum's defenders, killing Gand delivering his head to thedi's headquarters in Omdurmantardy reinforcements, confrona scene of devastat ion when thally arrived, quickly turned aand went home.The Mahdi had only a short

to enjoy his victory; within mhe was dead and his Mahdiyainto the hands of the Khalifastrongest and most ruthless ofcontending successors. His firswere to get rid of many of thedi' s purely religious follower

pu t the Mahdiyah on an evenwarl ike footing, using the Acamel and horse-borne tribesma cavalry st rike force to con trprovinces.

The combination of dic taleadership and dedicated follproved almost invincible. B1895, Gen. Kitchener was orde

bring Sudanese aggression ucontrol ; Bri tain was to providmen and materiel, while Egypmised to f inance the venture .months o f preparation, the AEgyptian Expeditionary Force,included six battalions recruisouthern Sudan, finally se t onewly constructed railway, stain the far nor th a t Wadi HaIfathem some of the way, bu t fomost part they had to marchand fight their way south to Oman, where the Khalifa and hisdist followers made their last sOn 2 September 1898, the K

commi tted his army to a frontsault against the Anglo-Egy

force massed outside Omdujust across the Nile from KharThe outcome was never in d

largely because of superior Bfirepower. During the five houtl e about 11,000 Mahdistswhile Anglo-Egyptian losses amed to only a few hundred. Moup operations took several yearorganized resistance ended wiKhalifa's death in NovemberMany areas of the country, palarly those in the south, welcthe downfall of a regime th abrought Sudan nothing bu t fadisease, war and terror.

The country as a wholemuch better under subsequent

ISSUE 40 NOV



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Movers & Shakers. . .

Aerial Mercenaries in Mexico

lo-Egyptian rule, which lasted untilth e 1950s, when it was agreed theSudanese were ready to make thetransition to self-government. At thebeg inning of 1956, Sudan becameindependent. But if the first half ofthe century had been less than complete ly peaceful (there h ad b eeninter-tribal wars, banditry and re

volt), hostility between north andsouth increased even further during

the second half. The Ansar, held together by their loyalty to the Mahdi'sdescendants, took part in al l th emajor skirmishes, never losing sightof their dream of reestablishing oldtime Mahdism.

In 1964 their chance finally arrived. Following yea rs o f pol it icalturmoil, during which control of Sudan changed hands several times,there was an all-out effort by thenorthern and southern intelligentsia

The airplane came of ag e as aweapon of war during the later yearsof World War I. But just a few yearsearlier in the ski es over Mexico, agroup of daredevil mercenary pilotshelp ed p ioneer some of th e nowstandard concepts of a ir warfare :aerial reconnaissance, bombing anddogfighting.

In 1912 Mexico was in the throes

of civil war, t hi s time between thegovernment (federal) forces of Victoriano Huerta and a collection ofrebel fac tions led by Venus ti an Carranza, Pancho Villa and EmilianoZapata. Flying machines were s ti llsomething of a novel ty and the foreign aviators who demonstratedtheir craft in air shows greatly impressed Mexican officers. Farsightedleaders on both sides saw the military potential of the still-frail craftand sought ou t American pilots.

Among the gringo pilots to fly forthe federals was John Hector War

den. The Moisant company originallysent him to Mexico City as an exhibition pilot to demonstrate their aircraft . Once there, he quickly impressed the off icers of Huerta 's army,some of whom rec ru it ed h im as apilot with the rank of captain.Throughout 1912, Warden flew patrols and reconnaissance miss ionsagainst the rebels.

He returned to the US an expert inanti-guerrilla ai r war who stronglyadvocated the use of airplanes formilitary reconnaissance and counterinsurgency operations. He noted

12

to rep lace despotism with democracy. In the course of their so-called"October Revolution," a generalstrike spread across the count ry .Strike breakers joined leftist politicians and together they made common cause with a number of dissident army officers. After severaldays of rioting, resulting in manydea ths, t he current military ruleragreed to step down.

No sooner had he l eft t he count ryth an the Ansari, fearing they wouldlose ground in th e forthcomingstruggle fo r power, once again must ered the ir infan try a t Omdurman.Wearing their traditional uni form ofshort tunic, knee-length breechesand loosely wound turban with oneend dangling free, they drilled andprepared for the order to strike.

When it came they were ready .Crossing the Nile one Sunday even-

the problems Mexican federal forceshad with railroad sabotage and rebelambushes of their trains, and described how planes could "star t outahead of a train, fly over the track,and reconnoiter the threatened district and repor t in time for the trainto turn back," thus foiling anyplanned ambushesby the rebels. Healso commented on the role of aerial

bombing, though he also realizedpilots untrained in the particulars ofsuch work could no t be depended onto drop explosives with any accuracy.

The rebel f or ce s also recognizedthe advantages of aircraft, and in1913 sent two officers across theborder into California on a recruitingmission. They met a French-bornAmerican, Didier Masson, then aninstructor at the Glenn Martin FlyingSchool near Los Angeles. The adventurous p ilo t sig ned on for $300 amonth plus $50 for each r econ mis

sion and $250 fo r each bomb run.The rebels also purchased a $5,000Martin pusher plane for his use.

Getting the p lan e in to Mexicoposed a problem when, in t ry ing tosmuggle i t across the Arizona borderin a t ruck, Masson's mechanic was

detained by a suspicious local sheriff. They got the man out of that fixby bribing and then recruit ing thesheriff's deputy (who eventually roseto th e rank of major in the rebelarmy).

Once in Mexico, Masson's pusherwas christened th e "Sonora," and

ing, they assembled in the deses t reets surrounding the AnglCathedral. When we glimpsed ton ou r way home from services,were formed up in menacingly sranks. They soon struck withwarning, making for an outlyingtrict populated a lmos t ent irelChristian-animist Sudanese; tbutchered everyone they found.

Later, when we expatriate

vivors from the other side of ta sked why the massacre wasn'torted, we were told media silewas the price demanded for thetinued use of Sudanese airspaceoverflights by Western powers'veillance planes. It seems the varembassies decided we were al lpendable and thought it enougleave our fates in the hands of AThe Merciful.

- D.]. Co

rigged with a primitive bomb r

With it s 75 horsepower engincould carry a pilot, a bombardierthree 30 lb. bombs to a range ofmiles. Masson and his bombardobserver, Capt. Jouquin Alcabecame the pioneers of aerial bbardment.

The rebel forces were movingthe federal ba se at Guayamas onGulf of California. The port wastected by three gunboats, the Grero, More/os and Tampico, th ef rom which had repulsed every rassault to that time. Masson'sAlcalde's job was to bomb the

boats.On 30 t ay 1913, th e two m

took off to make history's first abomb attack on warships . Theora came in at 2,500 feet overGuerrero, flying through a haiineffective gunfire from the gunbBut the bombs were equally inetive; all missed, only splashing won the boat's deck. A second tryfollowing day a lso failed, buttime the fr ightened boat cjumped overboard . On the thirdthe Sonora crashed on take of fwas put out of action for sev

weeks while spare parts were smgled in f rom the States.

After making the repairs, anobombing attempt was made. Ttime Masson achieved a near misthe Guerrero. Then, on 4 August,pilot revised h is ta ct ics , goinlower at 2,000 feet with his mecic substituting as bombardier. Inmiddle of the bomb ru n the enquit. Masson j et ti soned the boand glided his s tr icken plane acthe bay to a landing behind frielines. There t hey d is cove redunexploded bomb, caught on

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



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Movers & Shakers. . .

The Unheralded Soldier Who

Saved the American Revolution

arming cord, had trailed behind the

plane a l ~ the way in.After that close call, and finding

the engine damaged beyond repair,

Masson turned in his resignation and

went home. Clearly, aerial bombing

techniques had a long way sti ll to go.At about t he same time another

American aviator joined the rebel

cause and soon participated in whatwas probably history's first aerial

dogfight. Dean Evan Lamb, a 27-yearold, had made his way south in1913, where he was hired on person

ally by Pancho Villa. Legend has it hepunched the famous bandito in the

mouth to prove he had the guts to

fly for him.Meanwhile a federal Christoffer

son biplane, flown by American mercenary, Phi l Rader , had been harassing rebel forces for two months.

Lamb, armed with a revolver, was

sent up after him in a Curtiss pusher

plane. Above the rebel town of Naco,though, it was Rade r who f irst spo t

ted Lamb. Coming in from above, heopened fire with his revolver, scoring a hit in Lamb's wing. Lamb pulled up and got off a shot just missing

Rader 's propeller . The two then flew

It was a bitterly cold night . Thewind, funnelling down the river valley from the north, turned the rain

into a driving sleet that stung exposed skin and forced a raw coldthrough the layers of clothing worn

by the men s truggl ing against the

river current. In the bow were two

soldiers of Coryell's Militia, musket

breeches wrapped against the wet.On the steer ing oar was Capt. John

Coryell himself, straining throughthe blackness to glimpse the light

from the Ferry Hotel that marked

their landing site on the New Jerseyshore opposite. Amidships, alone,

wrapped in a cloak against the elements, sa t George Washington.The year 1776 had not been good

to Washington's army. When th eSecond Continental Congress passed

th e Declara tion of Independence,King George III finally rea lized the

American colonies were seriousabout their rebellion, and he there

fore launched a highly trained andwell supplied force under Maj. Gen.William Howe against New York. Theplan was to seize that city and cut

14

closely side by side, exchanging pistol shots without effect.They pulled apart to reload, then

exchanged more shots. After another

reload and ineffectual exchange of

fire, they disengaged, their ammunition exhausted. Lamb returned to ahero's welcome from the rebel popu

lace who'd witnessed the his toricencounter from below. Rader never

reappeared there , choosing there

a ft er to fly only in unopposed skies.Thus Lamb won something of a s trategic victory in his tory 's f irst aerialdogfight.Early in 1914 the rebel air forces

achieved another first in aviation

history when they were joined by an

American engineer, Lester Barlow.He created what he called a "tacticalwar airplane unit." It was actually aportable airbase on rails, consisting

of a locomotive, boxcars, sleeping

cars and flatcars, etc. Together theyhoused American pilots, a machine

shop, a bomb magazine, and a num

ber o f aircraft and automobiles. Villades ignated i t the "Aviation Divisionof the Army of the North."The rebels used the Aviation Div

ision to good eff ec t, as it cam-

the colonies in two along the Hudson

River valley. On 27 August the Briti sh entered the city. By 16 November, after American defeats at WhitePlains and Fort Washington, all of

New Jersey lay open to the redcoats.

Retreating before a British/Hessian force of 6,000 commanded by

Howe's lieutenant, Maj. Gen. CharlesCornwallis, Washington went south,

crossing the Delaware River on 8December. He established a new defensive line intended to protect Philadelphia. Fearing Cornwallis would

pursue, Washington gathered all thebo ats on the J erse y side and hadthem moved to the opposite bank a t

a point south of the Trenton Ferry.That decision proved to be unfortu

nate and was the reason why, less

than a week later , the commander of

the Continental Army was recrossing

the river into enemy territory.Washington's defenses were con

centrated at t he four ferry crossings

within reach of Cornwallis' troops.

His right f lank was anchored on the

ferry opposite present day Bordentown, New Jersey. The main defen-

paigned its way along the rail

of northern Mexico. For the Aican mercenaries i t proved a haing, but surprisingly bloodles

venture. Only one pilot, Frank

actually suffered so much as awound in the leg from a federalet during one mission.

Those Americans also even

drifted homeward, many fed up

the hazards of both friendly

enemy fire, generally lousy ctions and arrears in pay. But th

el forces prevailed without t

Carranza captured Mexico C1914; Pancho Villa went on to

greater notoriety, and some o

American pilots went on todeadlier foes in the skies ovetorn Europe. Still, for all their

trations, those mercenaries op

the history of aerial warfare.- Hans von Stockh

SOURCES

Seagrave, Sterling. Soldiers otune. Alexandria, VA: Time

1981.Dupey, R. Ernest and Trevor M

Harper Encyclopedia of Mi

History, 4th ed. New York: H

Collins Pubs., 1993.

sive position was across from

ton, ew Jersey. The next cro

was eight miles nor th of Trent

Mckonkey's Ferry (now WashiCrossing, Pennsylvania) . Theflank, commanded by Lord Stiwas still farther north at Cor

Ferry (now New Hope, Pennsylva

Washington had visited Stirposition at Coryell's earlier thaI t was a strong redoubt on top

hill behind the local school hFrom it, Stirling cou ld con tro

ferry crossing; bu t if the Britishbarded from the heights acros

river, th e good people of Cor

would doubt less soon need aschool.

With boats unavailable to

British, Washington should havrelatively safe. The enemy cou

cr oss the riv er in force unlefroze completely, improbable

not unheard of) at t ha t time ofOf fa r greater concern was in

gence information that had rea

him earlier in the week from StiThat officer's men had captu

grenadier from the British InnisRegiment who to ld th em thaf rom res ting on his laurels, "Cwallis with about 6,000 men wPennington, New Jersey [north

of Trenton), waiting for pontoo

come up with which he meapass the river at Coryell's Ferry."Stirling's information made

Washington's position was in

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



treme peril. His forces numberedonly about 2,500, with that totalgrowing smaller each day as dispirited men deser ted the ranks. In addition, a considerable number of enlistments would expire on the firstof the year, further reducing hisforce unless he could persuade thosemen to continue the fight.

What Washington needed was avictory to inspire no t only his sol

diers bu t the politicians and businessmen who bankrolled the army.His opportunity came when helearned the Hessian cantonments atTrenton and Bordentown each held

about 1 ,500 men , a manageablenumber for the Americans to engage.More importantly, Washington alsodiscovered those garr isons wereunsupported by the main Britishforces a t Penington and Princeton,and tha t the Hessian commander atTrenton, Col. johann RaIl, scornedAmerican soldiers to the extent hedeclined to fortify the village.

With that, Washington conceivedthe plan of a surprise attack on theHessian garrisons with the hope of

reviving a cau se some historianshave described as being "all bu t lost"at tha t time. The scheme called for acrossing of the Delaware at McKon-

key's Ferry after dark on Christmasday, a fas t march to Trenton and asurpr ise a ttack before daylight.(McKonkey's was undefended, allowing for an orderly crossing.) However, Washington faced the sameproblem above Trenton as did Cornwallis - no boats. They were all tothe south, and he didn't dare movethem upriver for fear of revealing hisplan.

So it was that George Washingtonmet that night with one of the unsung and nearly unknown heroes ofthe American Revolution, Capt. Daniel Bray of the Kingswood Militia.(Kingswood Township, New jersey,was and is still today located a fewmiles north of the village on thejersey side of Coryell's Ferry, nowknown as Lambertsville .) Bray is

descr ibed in one of the few documents that exist about him as being"of striking appearance and dignified in hi s bearing ... a very largeman, no t very tall, but powerfullybuilt with a rather prominent noseand generous ears."

Those ears must have burnedwhen Washington assigned him themission of gathering the boats needed to ferry th e army across theDelaware.

Why Washington selected Bray isa matter of debate. Bray was scarcely24 years old. As a captain with theKingswood volunteer militia he had

seen action around New York, whereCOMMAND MAGAZINE

he may have made the personalacquaintance of the general. Somehistorians have suggested the twowere fraternally bound, both beingFree Masons.

Bray has also been described as a"farmer and a waterman," thoughnot much is known about his exploits on the Delaware. He camefrom hardy stock. His father, whosingle-handedly carved the Bray

farmstead from the wild country ofKingswood Township, was wellknown as the result of an encounterwith a black bear that took exceptionto his clearing weeds one day. Theelder Bray killed the bruin using onlya hoe. Apparently Daniel Bray wasequally well thought of as a manwho got things done and one familiar with the river. Washington hadconfidence the young man cou ldsteal sufficient boats from north ofCoryell 's Ferry to move an enti rearmy.

Bray would undertake the mission

with a force from Kingswood, allfamiliar with the river and boats. Hesplit his men into three groups, commanding one himself, the other twoled by Capts. j acob Gearhar t andThomas jones.

But the job was not nearly as simple as it might sound. After the earlier evacuation there were few boatsremaining in New jersey, so Bray hadto gather them from the Pennsylvania side. Obviously it was imperative the Christmas crossing be kept asecret; but the small r iver villagesnorth of Coryell's Ferry were knownto be thick with Loyalists who wouldquickly report unusual activity to theBritish. The road between Coryell'sand Easton, Pennsylvania (now StateRoute 32), which ran through thosevillages is much the same today as i t

was then - a narrow track along ther iver winding beneath rock palisades. It wasn't possible for Bray tomarch up that road without beingdiscovered. He struck inland abovethe palisades before moving north,sending his men down to the river atnight to make off with the neededboats.

Aside from the danger of encountering British patrols or unfriendly

Tories, th e trip was no pleasurejaunt. Bray was forced to move the60 miles or so on foot through densewoods, a landscape frequently cutthen and now by steep, rocky ravineswith swift, deep streams flowing atthe bot tom. In other places the treesthinned into great boulder strewnfields - rocks deposited in a maddening jumble by some prehistor icgeologic event.

The boats they sought were not

small and easily manageable, but

were the well known "Durhamboats" built to haul smelted irodown to Philadelphia from the furnaces Robert Durham located jussou th o f Easton. Measuring 60 feein length with an eight foot beamthey carried 20 tons bu t were designed with a shallow draft enablinthem to ply the river rapids. Theswere the size of boat needed texpeditiously ferry an army ac ros

the river.Bray's men were not typical coun

try bumpkins, bu t skilled boatmenThe river above Coryell's Ferry flowan average of seven miles per houTo guide t hem at night, b etweerocks and through rapids , was a dificult and hazardous task requirinconsiderable skill. The men accomplished their mission by 20 December, hiding at least 16 Durham boaand another 10 or so assorted crabehind Malta Island, just south oCoryell's. In those days that thicklwooded island lay between the mai

river channel and the jersey shoremaking the boats invisible to Britisscouts. Today the island is littlmore than a memory.

History doesn't record if Brahimself made the Christmas nighcrossing. New Englanders from Ma

blehead and local ferrymen manne

the boats . We know he was at thBattle of Trenton only because of aobscure document filed years lateby his wife, Mary, when she claimeher widow's pension from the government. In that document she at es ts her husband participated a

Trenton. I t' s also known Bray eventually attained the rank of generafighting at many Revolutionary Wabattles including Yorktown.

Bray's unsheathed sword was bitself of l it tle consequence amonthe thousands who fought at thBattle of Trenton, bu t this obscurhero, t rusted and challenged greatlon that dark and dangerous rivebefore the bat tl e, did indeed showhimself great. In so doing he wainstrumental in saving a cause andnation.

- Bernard E. GradSOURCES

Bray, Stacy B. A Sketch of Danie

Bray. Flemington, Nj: HunterdoCounty Historical Society, nd.

Deats, Hiram E. Unpublished notestwo volumes. Flemington, NjHunterdon County Historical Society, nd.

Snell, james P. History of Hunterdoand Somerset Counties, New Jersey. Philadelphia, 1881.

Swan, H. Kels. Senior Historic Preservation Specialist, WashingtoCrossing State Park, Titusville, N

(talks).15



. , . ....

16

**********************

required time to tool up forscale production. Thus Washiwas willing to purchase riflesvirtually any willing source

many unscrupulous speculatorentrepreneurs took advantagesituation to price gouge and de

As domestic stocks were exed, the Administration turnEurope as a source for weapon1862 over $10 million ha dspent there to purchase what tout to be a motley variety of700,000 rifles. Even that efforbungled as the government hacentralized or coordinated proment policy. Washington, as wthe various states and evenprivate arms brokers, all sent

own purchasing agents to EuThey o ft en compet ed andagainst each other (as well asfederate agents), needlessly dup prices.The Federal government m

an opportunity to secure theproduction of higWy prized Erifles (some 15,000 per month)the London Armory and Burmham Arms Companies. The USsul in London, F.H. Morse, arrathe deal, bu t the War Departstupidly refused it as he watheir officially authorized or rely appointed agent. Anotheagent, Col. George L. Schuyler,larly lost a contract for 35,00fields when Washington failsend the money in time. That aed Caleb Huse, a Confederate ato snap up the same contract.Due to the la ck o f oversig

shortage of trained inspectors,zealous purchasing agents andr ight fraud, some 20 percent o1,165,000 European rifles evenpurchased by th e United Sproved defective or inferior in

ty. (In truth, many of those weawere bought by US agents simpkeep them out of Rebel hands.)many European weapons fgained a bad reputation on thiof the Atlantic. By mid-1863Federal government discontithe purchase of foreign arms,by that time domestic sourcesbeen able to pick up the slack.The single most important

estic source remained the Fearmor at Springfield. In Augu1861 that facility had been pring a paltry 40 a rms pe r day.

month Gen. Ripley, believin

ISSUE 40 NOV 1

Behind the Lines. . .

I t's well known the material superiority of the Union dur in g th eAmerican Civil War contributedgreatly to the Northern victory. Less

well known are the logist ical andprocurement problems faced by theUnion Army Ordinance Bureau inbringing that superiority to bea r,especially in the area of small arms.To st ar t, many of the p roblems

encountered were internal. When thewar broke out, the Bureau was understaffed, lacking both qualified ordinance officers and trained inspectors . The newly appointed Chief ofOrdinance, Brig. Gen. James W. Ripley, was the respected , i f unimaginative and conservative, officer facedwith the formidable task of equip

ping the armies of the North withsmall arms.The f irst problem was simply a

shortage of suitable weapons. On theeve of the Civil War, th e Bureaureported some 600,000 shoulderarms i n Federa l arsenals. But ofthose only 35,000 were modern,first-class (.58 caliber) r if led muskets, while 42,000 were older ri fledmodels. The remaining weaponswere smoothbore muskets, perhapshalf of which were unserviceable.Over a third of the weapons werelocated in southern states, wherethey quickly fell into Confederatehands. The approximately 250,000serviceable weapons remaining tothe Union were woefully insufficientto equip the large volunteer forceauthorized by President Lincoln.When t hose volun teer s were

called, the state arsenals were almost immediately depleted, andresponsibility for equipping statetroops mustered into Federal servicewas then g iven to th e OrdinanceBureau. For some units taking thefield that year th e situation was

acute. For example, the 773men of

the 13th Illinois carried a mixed lotof 630 rifles and muskets amongthem, and fewer than half rated asserviceable.

To address the shor tage the government could only count on theFederal armory at Springfield, Massachusetts. The only other Federalmanufacturing facility, the armory_atHarper's Ferry, Virginia, had beendestroyed at the beginning of thewar. Initially Spr ingf ield was onlycapable of producing 1,200 rifles ayear and was no t tooled for rapid

expansion. Private factor ies also

Guns for the Union

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civilian superintendent there shouldbe replaced by an officer, appointed

the energe tic and capable Capt.Alexander B. Dyer to the posit ion.Under Dyer's management the armory rapidly expanded, and within ayear had doubled its output. Totalproduction for the period from thestart of the war to 30 June 1862 wasan impress ive 110,000 arms. The

annual capacity of the plant had

been expanded by that November to200,000.

Late in 1863 Congress approved

the funding needed to further expand the factory, increasing production to 500 rifles pe r shift. Whenthat expansion was completed thefollowing year, Springfield was actually shipping over 1,000 rifles perday in two 10-hour shif ts , some300,000 per year.

At that point the governmentbegan to be concerned that so much

weapons production was centered injust one location. In 1864 Congresstherefore authorized another armoryto be located at Rock Island, Illinois,t hough i t wasn't completed untilafter the war had ended.

Dyer had established what ineffect was a model factory for thosetimes, setting new standards for efficiency, cleanliness and safety.Springfie ld, in fact, became theworld' s largest armory, both interms of capacity and actual production. By the time of Lee's surrender,Springfield had shipp ed some802,000 rifles at the moderate costof $11.97 each. At the end of the warDyer was promoted to head the Ordinance Bureau.

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The Other Battles of

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The pass of Thermopylae ("HotSprings") is probably one of the

most renowned battlefields in all ofhistory. The heroic self-sacrifice ofKing Leonidas and his 300 Spartansagainst Xerxes' invading Persianarmy in 480 BC forms one of thegreat pivotal moments in the courseof Western history. But that famousclash was not the only one fought inthat narrow pass in ancient times.Two other important bat tles wereresolved in that defile on the coastroad to Athens.The first occasion on which two

armies struggled to cross the passafter Leonidas' stand was in the win

ter of 280-279 BC, during the Galatian invasion of Greece. That Celticpeople had spread over much of Europe during the 4th century BC, colliding a few times with the Romans(they sacked Rome in 390 or 386,we're not exactly sure when), and in280 a huge tribal confederat ion, ledby Chief Brennos, stormed over theBalkans and Macedonia towardsouthern Greece.

The Galatians h ad probably200,000 fighting men, about 60,000of them mounted. The opposingGreek confederation could musteronly some 24,000 infantry and 1,500cavalry. The three regions providingt he majori ty of the troops wereBoeotia, Aetolia and Phokia, bu t theywere commanded by an Athenian,Kallippos. The small force first triedto ho ld the invaders at the Spercheios River by destroying all thebridges, but they were soon outflanked and had to retreat to Thermopylae.The Celts stormed the pass in a

frontal assault , their traditional battle tactic, but suffered heavy casual

ties and had to withdraw under a

average cost made them lessbarga in , they were neverthessential to the Union war effosolved the early war arms short

- Hans von StockhSOURCES

Davis, Carle L. Arming the USmall Arms in the Union APort Washington, NY: KenPress, 1973.evins, Allan. The War for the U

The Improvised War, 1861-New York: Charles ScribSons, 1959.

shower of Greek arrows. Brethen dispatched part of his f

some 40,000 infantry and 800 hinto the Aetolian interior, promthe Aetolian troops to leaveallies to protect their homes.

The remaining Galatians fthe same mountain route thesians had used two centuries e40,000 of them charged out omorning mist, surprising thek ian p icke ts there. The Greekto abandon t he pass, retreatitheir various ci ties to make sbehind the walls.

The Cel ts thus won the seBattle of Thermopylae, but thesuffered heavily and proved uto exploit their success by captany Greek cities. After a few mthey withdrew entirely from Gto settle in Thrace, then crosseAsia Minor (Phrygia).Yet another Battle of Thermo

took place in 191 BC, during thephase of the Antiochean War, fbetween the Romans and the fof Antiochus III, one of the lastsuccessor-kings of AlexanderRomans entered northern Gwith a force of 20,000 infantr2,000 cavalry. Antiochus, with10,000 infantry and a few hunhorse in his expeditionary forcehe lacked the troops to meet ththe open.He therefore chose to ma

stand at Thermopylae. He blothe pass (perhaps 100 yardsbetween the steep mountainand the sea at that time) with awall and ditches. He also built apart and a few towers on whimounted some ballistae andstone-throwing artillery. His aimto break any Roman assault bef

could even reach the wall.ISSUE 40 NOV 1



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SOURCES

Appian, Syrian Wars, 17-20.Bar-Kochva, B. The Seleucid Army.

Cambridge, 1975.De Sanctis, G. Storia dei Romani.

Torino, 1916.Head, D. Armies of the Macedonian

and Punic Wars, 359 to 146 Be.Livy, XXXVI, 15-19.

Pausanias, X, 19-23.

Knowing there was at least oneflanking trail through the mountainsby which the Romans could reachhis rear, Antiochus sent 2,000 Aetolian light infantry to guard the rangeoverlooking the pass, dispos ed ontwo summits, Callidromus and Teichius. He sent another 2,000 Aetolians to his camp farther back, nearthe town of Heradea, to guard the

baggage and act as a final reserve.

The remainder of the army weredisposed in the pass. The phalanx ofAsian-Greeks, with their long sarissaspears such as had been used byAlexander's Macedonians, behind therampart. He pu t his light and medium infantry in front of it. His left, onthe slopes of the descending mountains , was defended by a few hundred archers and slingers, while tohis right, extending to the sea's edge,he placed the half-dozen war elephants and all his cavalry (under hispersonal command).

It was not a bad deployment, but

events showed he, like the previousdefenders of the pass, had failed tomake sufficient provision to defendhis r ea r. The commanding RomanConsul, Manlius Glabrio, ordered twoof his tribunes, Marcus Cato (the future Censor) and Lucius Valerius,accompanied by perhaps 2,000 footsoldiers each, to drive the Aetoliansfrom their two fortified peaks.The two Roman officers assaulted

the summits with great fury. Luciuswas repulsed in his attempt on Mt.Teichius, bu t Cato surprised the Ae

tolians on Callidromus while theyslept and was able to conquer the

entire mountain with little effort.Meanwhile, Glabrio advanced on

Antiochus' main force in the pass.

They successfully resisted the efforts of the king's l ight troops to

break their lines, but they couldn'tpenetrate the phalanx, protected asit was by the rampart . If Cato hadn't

suddenly shown up with his forcebehind the Syrian line, the Romanswould have been held. But Cato's appearance decided the bat tle for theRomans, as Antiochus' army broke

and fled in panic. Only the king andhis caval ry escaped the resultantmassacre. Thus Rome was the victorin the third and final ancient battlefought at the historic pass.

- Roberto Chiavini

COMMAND MAGA%INE 19



l ~ U j ~ 1 1 l ~ U j l!lI[

m l ~ ! ~ 1 1TheCampailn inXarthernMexicaby Richard A. Pfoat

In the mid-1840's, America was energeticallyexpanding across the continent. That brought theyoung nation i nto con fl ic t w ith two powerfulempires. To the north, Britain controlled the trans

continental colony of Canada a nd coveted theOregon territory. Farther south, America had eyes

William Bliss, Taylor's military aide and future son-in-law, stand

ing beside his commander in this 1847 daguerrotype.

20

on the southwestern quar ter of th e continTexas, California and the lands between. Oowned entirely by Mexico, the area had beencult to administer given the distan ce from

Mexican heart land and the convulsions withingovernment the newly independent nation.

The road to the Mexican War led through TSince the 1820's, Texas had been settled by incing numbers of Americans. In 1835, dissatisfawith Mexican administration boiled over intolution. The defeat of the invading Mexican forcSan Jacinto gave Texas her independence .Mexico reasserted her claim to the area, resultia number of clashes between regular and irregtroops of both sides.

To gain security, Texas politicians discussednexation by the United States. This required tpre-requisites; 1) approval by the United Statesernment; 2) approval by the Republic of Texasernment; and 3) resolution of claims with theican government. A vote against annexation byUnited States Senate in 1838 killed an initiatempt. As a result, Texas initiated contact withBritish in 1843. The threat of pro-English Texasa British controlled Pacific orthwest caused imdiate concern i n t he Uni ted Sta tes. The rePresident John Tyler resumed the Texas annexprocess. However, in 1844 it was again voted dby the Senate, who feared war with Mexico.

In November of 1844, James K. Polk was elepresident on a platform that included the anntion of Texas. However, the "lame duck" Tylernot through. Based on concern that if Texas

not annexed soon t he Bri tish wou ld geneenough support in Texas to vote against entethe Union, he actively lobbied the American peCongress, the Texans, and the Mexican governmAnnexation came to frui tion with the passagejoint Congressional resolution on 1 March 1three days before Polk took office. I t remainedthe new president to see how Texas or Mewould react to the annexation.

As the new President had run his electionplatform encouraging the inclusion of Texasthe United States, he was not going to let MexicBritian get in the way. He also actively soughopportunity to obtain the New Mexico and Cornia territories if negotiation or purchase allo

Attempts to negotiate with Mexico were rebuffe

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



• Victoria

Taylor's Route

to Buena Vista

'N

21

• Encarnacion

tSaltillo

Buena Vista

Agua Nueva

oo

In Matamoros, Maj. Gen. Mariano Arista had5,000 men of the Mexican "Army of the North".Arista's force included the crack Tampico CoastGuard Battalion, 2nd Light Regiment, the 1st, 4th,6th and 10th Line Regiments, General Torrejon'slancers, consisting of the 7th and 8th Cavalry,Mexico City Line Cavalry Regiment, an<;l a battalionof Zapadores (Sappers). A major ity of thi s forcewere raw conscripts, inadequately trained andpoorly supplied.Taylor's supply line required constant patrolling,

and it was along this route the first hostil i tiesoccurred. On 24-25 April 1846, a 63-man patrol ofAmerican dragoons under Capt. Seth Thornton wastaken by 1,600 Mexican cavalry under Gen. Anastasio Torrejon, who had crossed the Rio GrandeRiver. Taylor immediately sent word to President

Polk and prepared for defensive operations.

War BeginsWith the initiation of hostilities and the return of

special peace envoy Slidell, President Polk requested Congress declare war on Mexico. Congressionalsupport was overwhelming - 173-14 in the House

cerra7vo c amargo

~ M a r i nI I / - :::

_ · _ - - < = ' ~ ~ v ( ) . ~

the unstable Paredes government. A critical unresolved problem was the unspecified location for thesouthern boundary of Texas; the Mexicans claimedit was the Nueces River, while the Texans held it

was 135 miles farther south at the Rio Grande. Tosuppo'rt the Texan claim, Polk ordered troops intothe disputed area.

Show of ForceIn April 1845, the US 3rd Infantry Regiment and

a portion of the US 4th Infantry Regiment were

ordered from Jefferson Barracks in Missouri downthe Mississippi River to Fort Jessup, Louisiana. Theywere joined there by elements of the US 2nd Dra-goons. This force was ti tl ed the "Corps of Observation" and commanded by Brevet Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor. His orders were to maintain his 1,200men ready to march "at short notice to any point inthe United States or Texas."In June, Taylor's corps was ordered into Texas to

protect it from Mexican reprisals, reaching CorpusChristi on the Neuces by August. Other units hadbeen added to the force, so that by mid-OctoberTaylor commanded the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8thInfantry Regiments, twelve companies of artilleryarmed as infantry, three light artillery batteries,

seven companies of the 2nd Dragoons, and a company of Texas Rangers. The 3,922 men assembledwere nearly half of the entire U.S. Army at the time;only four regiments were left to patrol the Canadian Border and the 1,500 mile Indian frontier.

It was the f ir st time in nine years whole regiments had been together as a single unit. They hadlittle experience as regimental sized units for drillor organization. The senior officers had little or noexperience handling larger formations, and all were"of age;" Taylor was 61, second-in-command Brig.Gen. Will iam] . Worth was 52, while br igade commanders and leading subordinates ranged from 55to 66.The Texas situation degenerated quickly toward

war. Understanding the security of American statehood, on 13 October 1845 the Texas Congress

voted to approve the annexation by the UnitedStates. Renewed diplomatic attempts were initiatedby the United States in hope of averting war withMexico. These were rebuffed in November when theMexican government refused to accept the American minister John Slidell. On 29 December 1845,Polk signed the law annexing Texas. On 3 February1846, Gen. Taylor and the Army of Observationwere ordered to the Rio Grande.

Initial ClashesTaylor arrived at the Rio Grande on 28 March.

Establishing his forces across the river from theMexican town of Matamoros. Initial contact wasmade with the Mexican authorities who maintainedthe American advance to the Rio Grande was aninvasion and would be dealt with mili tar i ly.Uncertain as to the nature or potential of a Mexicanresponse, Taylor se t about consolidating his position and establishing a line of supply back to theGulf at Point Isabel, 26 miles to the east.To demonstrate American resolve, he had an

earthwork fortification built across from Matamoros. Known initially as Fort Texas and l ater asFort Brown, the five sided fortification had walls 15feet thick and 9 feet high. A bastion was establ ished in each corner, each manned by an artillery

battery.

COMMAND MAGAZINE



of Representatives, 40-2 in the Senat e - and thewar was official on 11 May. It was general ly admitted th e Congr es sio na l vote d id not representapproval for the goals of the war but support forthe pres ident and the mil itary as hostilities hadalready begun. But the declarat ion had anotherimpact, shaking Britain into peaceful negotiation of

the Oregon territory problem. A treaty was signed

on 15 June 1846 establishing the US northernboundary along t he 49th parallel and ceding all ofVancouver I sland to the British.

Taylor remained concerned about protecting hissupply line to the coast. He received a false report

stating his supply depot at Point Isabel had been

attacked. Leaving the 7th Regiment ("Cotton Balers"from Battle of New Orleans) and two batteries atthe river under the command of Maj. Jacob Brown,he marched north with the bulk of his force on 1May to escort his 300 wagon supply t ra in f rom the

gulf to Matamoros. The American Army was ready

for a brawl, as the regulars were anxious to demonstrate their superior combat ability before the army

was diluted with volunteers.

Palo AltoOrder s f rom Mexico City directed Arista to

attack the Americans as Taylor had feared. Leavinga small force in Matamoros under Col. Meija, Aristaled approximately 3,700 men eas t before crossing

th e Rio Grande River. He planned to fl ank theAmericans, cut their supply line, and attack them

from the rear with superior numbers. He led a confident army, bu t one t ha t had a fatal cance r in its

command structure. Jealous of hi s commander,Gen. Ampudia spread rumor and discourse among

the t roops such tha t Arista never really consoed his command.

The American "foot cavalry" covered the n30 miles between the Rio Grande and Point Isabless than 24 hours. Relieved his base of supply

secure, Taylor se t about constructing another ework,"Fort Polk," to protect the port from Meattack. The next day, Taylor could hear the stath e bombardment a t Fort Texas. He sentWalker and hi s Texas Rangers back to th eGrande to see if the for t could hold. On the

Walker returned confirming the continuing rtance of the 7th Regiment. Two days late r, su

wagons full, Gen. Taylor commenced the return

with his 2,200 men.The following day, after marching 18 miles

army approached a pond and grove of trees kn

as Palo Alto. There they found Arista's army.posit ion chosen by Arista was generally flatscattered small ponds among areas of heavy carral . The roadway skirted to the southwest athe chaparral around an opening containing agrowth of grass four to five feet high. This alla full view of the American army as i t adva

along the roadway and out into the opening.Arista se t his army in a double line exten

across the road and to the east for nearly a miwas anchored on the west flank by swamp an

the east by a tree-covered hill . Deployed from

hill to th e road were a cavalry squadron,pounder cannon, the Zapadores, 2nd Light, CGuards, a battery of five 4 pounders, then the6th and 10th Line. Across the road to the sw

was the remainder of the Mexican cavalry.The Americans were a llowed to move of

TheAmerican ArmyINFANTRY

Until the second half of the 20th century, American

military policy had manfested an extreme distrust of alarge standing army, preferring to rely on militia, volunteers and a rapid e xp an sio n o f the regular army inwartime. Though small, the US Army was well trained at

the company level and generally well led: since May 1816,all vacant officer positions were to be filled with WestPoint graduates. But, as was brought to light during theSecond Seminole War in 1835, it was undermanned, poorly supplied, and distributed among more than 100 frontier and coastal forts. Units larger than a single company

rarely drilled together.In 1838, Congress ordered the Army rai sed to 12,500

men. Among these were eight infantrYTegiments, actuallysingle battal ions of 10 companies of 81 men each.

Following European practice, two of the companies were

designated light and grenadier, but in the field all weretrained and equipped identically.At the ini tiat ion of hostilit ies with Mexico, Congress

approved the raising of regular troop levels to 17,800. Afew of the new men were to increase company strength

to 100, but most of them wen t into new formations,including the 9th through 16th Infantry Regiments, and

the Regiment of Voltigeurs and Foot Riflemen. In the latter

unit, a foot rifleman was to be pai red with a dragoon,

with whom he would ride double between battles. In

practice, the unit fought as infantry. All the new un its

were to serve for the duration of hostilities only.With enlistments spurred by a $7.50 bonus and the

promise of f ree land, 42,857 joined the Regulars between

22

May 1846 and July 1848, of whom 30,954 madecombat. Of these, 930 died in combat, 4,899 due to

dent or disease; 2,745 received non-fatal wounds,2,554 were invalided out. Desertion accounted for aner 5,331.Most infantrymen were armed with e ither the M

1835 flintlock musket or the Model 1842 percusmusket. Both were .69 caliber smoothbore muzzle-l

ers 58 inches long and weighing 10 pounds. Stan

ammunition consisted of a roundball and two buck

inside a paper cartridge with an effective range of

100 yards. Some units carried the new Model 1841firing a .54 caliber round ball accurately to 500 yards

VOLUNTEERS

On 13 May 1846, the day the war was declared,requested 50,000 men from the states fo r eithemonth duty or for the durat ion. The state militias

also cal led up for sixc months. Six days later , theDepartment issued a more specific request to 10 s

for 17 regiments totalling 13,208 volunteers. The

ponse was overwhelming; some states, among tMississippi, protested because they had far more voteers than were requested, while Illinois supplied 14ments, ten more than her quota. The Army accepted

18 regiments, four battalions and 8 companies of voteer infantry.

The arms and uni fo rms o f the volunteers gene

matched t hose o f the regular s, w ith some excep tiJefferson Davis' Mississippians, for example, wore wcanvas pants, bright red shirts and broad brimmed s

hats. More importantly, they were a rmed with the

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



road and deploy with no interference. Their supplytrain was concentrated in the rear, guarded by twosquadrons of dragoons. Taylor pu t his infantry linewith the 8th Infantry on the east followed by the4th, 3rd, and 5th. The ox-drawn 18-pounders wereplaced on the road near the center of the line. Theflanks were op, bu t each was protected by a flyingbattery.

In the early afternoon, the nervous Americansbegan a slow advance into their first bat tle with aforeign army since the War of 1812. At approxi

mately 700 yards, the Mexican artillery opened fire.Tha t t riggered the American flying batteries tomove out front where they proceeded to pour murderous fire into the stationary Mexican line. Aristaordered Torrejon's 1,000 cavalry to attack aroundthe American eastern f lank. The US 5th Infantryquickly formed a square. With support from the

fast moving light batteries, and confusion in theMexican ranks caused by the scattered chaparral,Torrejon's attack was rebuffed.

Moving behind smoke from a grass fire to theirfront, the American west flank rotated forward. TheMexican line correspondingly rotated back in goodorder to maintain the distance. But that l eft theMexican east flank hanging, so the American flyingbatteries moved forward to rake the Mexicaninfantry. The American dragoons were ordered forward to exp lo it the art il le ry fire, but Mexican

artillery drove them back after accomplishing nothing. The fighting continued until 7:00 p.m., with

both s ides sleeping on their arms. The Mexicanarmy lost between 250 and 500 men, while theAmericans lost 55 killed and wounded. The following morning, leaving their wounded on the battle-

~ ~~ ~ \J c:J (j>~ 4~ ~ ~ .

( ) t Y ~ ~ 'o ~ b t P \

tP\Cl I' ~ I II -4 _10_6_1, 8 7 . . .

US Mex r - - - - - - - - - - . . L - - '. V #nfantry. - Battle of Palo A,'i Cavalry c:;;jjjjjjI COiiiI

, Ar t i l l e r y . 8 May, 1846

L j

field and with troops unfed , the Mexican armyretreated south.

Resaca de la PalmaArista's army covered half the seven miles from

Palo Alto to the Rio Grande River. Assuming the

Americans had been defeated the previous day, hethought they would rest and not press the largerMexican force. He was determined to keep his rmy

ranged 1841 rif le. The Volunteers were ini tial ly uni

formed by the states, with Federal reimbursement, butlater acquired regular army uniforms.

Though initially scorned by the army, with trainingand experience the volunteers became as effective as theRegulars. They certainly suffered as much: 711 died incombat, 6,256 more by accident or disease, while 7,200were wounded and 2,554 were invalided out. In onerespect they outperformed the Regulars: only 3,876

deserted.CAVALRY

There was no US Cavalry unt il the 1st Regiment ofDragoons was established in 1833. Three years later the2nd Dragoons was formed, though they were dismounted

in 1842 and re-mounted in 1844. With the outbreak ofthe war, the 3rd Dragoons and the Regiment ofMountedRifles (officially an infantry unit) were formed to serve forthe duration. Each regiment had 10 companies of 50 men

each.They were armed with a heavy cavalry sabre and eithera cut down musket or a 0.52 ca liber Model 1843 Hallbreechloading carbine. Most also carried one or two pistols, with the heavy 0.44 caliber Colt "Walker" revolversbeginning to replace single shot muzzleloaders.

Prior to the Mexican War, the dragoon regiments werewidely scattered among western outpost s, thoughStephen Kearny, commanding the 1s t Dragoons, alwayskept four companies under his direct command. Duringthe war, with few exceptions, this practice continued,

with dragoons limited to one or two company detachments for reconnaissance and screening duties. Theycould not provide the offensive punch of the large formations of Mexican lancers.

COMMAND MAGAZINE

The May 1846 call for volunteers included five regments of cavalry total ling 3,945 men. Again due to toverwhelming response, six regiments were accepte

Like the volunteer infantry, training and discipline wepoor at first, bu t unlike the infantry did no t markedimprove during the war. Their performance varied wileadership and experience.

One unique group of volun teer horsemen were thTexas Rangers. These fearless frontier lawmen, dressein buckskins and sporting Bowie knives, served with ditinction in all the major campaigns. During the BuenVista campaign, 61 Rangers provided Taylor his escorwhile the 27 men of Ben McCulloch's Spy Company prvided the army's eyes and ears.

ARTILLERY

At the s tar t o f the war, the artillery consisted of foregiments, each consisting of coastal defense batteriand field units scattered throughout American territor

The approximately 10 batteries in each regiment wereconsist of 42 privates, bu t generally had fewer.One bat tery per regiment was designated as eith

"Light Artillery" or "Horse Artillery" (and known colloqually as "Flying Batteries"), with a second organized aftthe war started. The artillerymen in the l ight batterirode mounted or on the gun caissons. The "horseartillerymen all rode on horseback. The remaining batteies in Mexico served as infantry.

Each battery generally consisted of six bronze smootbore 6-pounders, and incorporated captured guns whe

available. Though more lightly armed than the Mexicartillery, the mobility and aggressiveness displayed bthe "flying batteries" made them one of the decisive elments on every battlefield of the war.

2



between Taylor and Fort Texas in hope the bombardment would defea t the i so la ted Americansthere. In addit ion, he remained confident in his

ability to crush the smaller American relief force.Realizing the strength of the American artillery,

Arista chose a defensive posit ion that contained aflattened "u" shaped depression. This resaca was acut-off remnant of the Rio Grande. Approximately

200 feet wide, the 4-foot depression was treebrush lined. It was situated within an area ofchaparral separated by isolated patches ofground. The roadway entered the top of thfrom the northwest, bending south and exthrough the base. Arista had positioned hison both sides of the road in the front and rethe resaca.

TheMexican ArmyAfter the war of Independence in 1821, the Mexican

army was staffed by officers who had served the Spanishcrown. It was organized and led in a European style, bu tappointments to the officer corps reflected local politicalfavoritism. That was exacerbated by internal strife andrebellions. In the eleven years preceding 1847, the government changed leaders 25 times. It was common forbattalions of the regular army to fight each other duringthese power struggles.Its peasant soldiers were experienced, haVing fought

the War for Independence, local internal conflicts, anattempted overthrow by Spain in 1829, and the War forTexas Independence in 1835-36, and there were manyinstances of individual bravery and a tremendous capaci

ty for hardship. But the poorly t ra ined conscr ip ts, led bypolitical hacks, could not stand up to the well-trained,well-led armies they encountered in Texas and NorthernMexico.

INFANTRY

A major reorganization of the army was conducted in1839. The army now consisted of 12 line regiments andthree light infantry regiments, nine militia regiments, and14 Coast Guard bat ta lions. An infantry regiment was toconsist of two battalions of eight companies each: sixfusilier, one rifle and one grenadier company, of approximately 80 privates each.The threa t of war with the US led to the raising of

additional forces. The Active Commerce Regiment ofMexico, two battal ions of eight companies each, wasformed by businessmen in 1839. In 1841, the GrenadierGuard of the Supreme Powers was organized from a militia battalion into eight companies totalling 1,200 men.The Regular Standing Battalion of Mexico, also of eightcompanies, was formed later.As Mexico had no operating weapons factories, the

infantry was armed with a variety of imported muskets,obtained principally from outdated or discarded stocks.In 1839 there were 14,105 serviceable rifles, fusils, andpistols, with an additional 17,408 considered useless.Perhaps more importantly, the quality and quantity ofgunpowder available was always low, contributing to thefamously bad marksmanship.Most soldiers carried the antiquated smoothbore

British Brown Bess musket. Firing a .753 caliber roundball, i ts effective range was only 50 yards. A 17-inch bayonet could be attached. Soldiers in the rifle companieswere issued the Baker flintlock rifle, another Britishimport, which fired a patched roundball accurately to200 yards. However, accuracy degraded significantly ifused with poor powder and a lack of maintenance, bothendemic in the Mexican army.A new manual of instruction for the infantry was

issued in 1841 to replace the 1814 Spanish drill. Ideally,after initial contact with the light regiments , the heavierline regiments were to follow through and press theattack. The light reg imen ts would act in support alongthe flanks. In each regiment the rifle company would pinthe enemy, then fall back on each f lank to allow the

24

fusilier companies to press the attack. Due to tralimitations, this ideal was rarely achieved.

CAVALRY

Also reorganized in 1839, the cavalry consisted ofline regiments, five independent or heavy regimentsfour independent squadrons or companies. Therealso six regiments of active militia cavalry, plus addal squadrons and companies of irregular auxiliariregiment had eight companies, divided into four srons of two companies of approximately 80 men eac

The independent and heavy r eg iments hadfo rmed durin g th e 1840's. Among them wereTulancingo Cuirassiers and the Light Cavalry RegimMexico (a brother uni t to the Standing Battalion).

elite lancer units, the Guard Hussar Regiment anjalisco Lancers, served as escort for the president.Like the infantry, the line cavalry was armed w

variety of swords, sabers, carbines, pistols and laFrom 1837, only the f irst company of the line regimwere to be lancers, bu t th e lance was apparenfavored weapon and was reported in general use bcavalry, regardless of title. Another favorite weaespecially among the heavy cavalry, was a cu t d"Brown Bess" musketoon called an escopeta.The irregular cavalry units were formed after 184

state governors. They were generally organized, aand mounted by individual landowners.Like the infantry, the bravery of the individual tro

was compromised by poor leadership. The cav

showed skill maneuvering, bu t commonly did notthei r attacks. eithe r the American or Mexican inf

had much respect for them.ARTILLERY

The Mexican artil lery corps contained three fooone mounted brigade, plus five standing companisapper battalion was added to the corps in 1839.foot brigade nominally consisted of eight compaeach with 116 men. The six companies of the mou

brigade were to contain 92 officers and men. LikAmerican artillery, most artillerymen were utilizeinfantry during the war.The Mexican army was undergunned, having a to

only 140 s ta tic and mobile guns. At Buena Vista, SAna fielded a total of only 19 guns: th ree 24-pounthree 16-pounders , five 12-pounders and e igpounders.Officered largely by Mexican Military Academy g

ates, the artillery generally perfomed well once intion. However, the guns were hampered by poor carrand inadequate ammunition transport , so once empthey tended to remain there. That was inmarked conto the American flying batteries that played such arole in most of the battles.During the war, the Mexican artillery was reinforce

the San Patricio (St. Patrick) Battalion of American-deserters. The San Patricio was one of the most effeunits in Santa Ana's army, eventually being annihiwhile fighting as infantry in Mexico City.

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



leaving 4,700 volunteers to maintain the 400-mileriver supply line to Matamoros . The Americansreached Monterrey on 19 September.They were faced by a rejuvinated Mexican army

of 7,000 regulars and 3,000 volunteers under Gen.Pedro de Ampud ia. Informed of the Americanmovements by his cavalry, Ampudia decided toawait the American attack in the defensive posit ions his army had constructed over the last threemonths.Situated on the north side of the Santa Catar ina

River, Monterrey was the junction for three majorroads from the north and the Saltillo road f rom thewest. The defenses were based on a series of fortscommanding the approaches. Located between thenorthern roads were the dark stone walls of thecitadel, known as the "Black Fort." The easternapproaches were guarded by three redoubt s,including La Teneria (The Tannery) and EI Rinconde l Diablo ( the Devil 's Corne r) . The westernapproaches to the city were dominated by Independencia Hill nor th of the Saltillo road and FederacionHill south of the road. The river ran parallel to theroad between the two forti fied hills. South of thecity was the river and steep terrain that generallyprohibited movement.

21 September 1846Taylor's f irst move was to trap Ampudia' s army

by cutting the Saltillo road. He dispatched Gen.Worth with 2,000 men and two flying bat teries totake the two hills guarding the road. After a wideflank march, Worth's command reached the Saltilloroad just after dawn. There they were met by 1,500Mexican lancers, who were beaten back after ashort, vicious fight. The Americans crossed theriver and attacked Federacion Hill f rom the south-

After laagering their supply train with supporting heavy artillery and taking a vote of his officers,Taylor pursued the enemy forces. In the early afternoon on 9 May, the Mexican position was discovered. Taylor organized his infantry with two regiments on each side of the road. Based upon theprevious day's experience, one of the flying batteries was moved forward to blast its way down theroad. But Mexican units in the thick chaparral alongthe road forced i t to retreat. A company of dragoons under Capt. Charles May charged the center

of the Mexican position. After initially taking several bat ter ies, they were also forced to retreat givingup the prized guns. The US 8th Infantry was then

ordered by Taylor to a ttack and take the guns in

the center.Arista, no t anticipating a general engagement,

belatedly became aware his forces were involved incombat along the entire line. Rushing to the criticalcenter of his army, he immediately attempted toorganize a counterattack with a group of lancersbut was turned back. Neither commander was ableto coordinate his army in the thick chaparral; thefighting was carried on by indivdual uni ts , often

hand to hand. Gradually the small unit leadershipand abili ties of the American soldier broke the

Mexican spirit. Poorly led and treated, the morale ofthe Mexican soldier snapped and a retreat eruptedinto a rout. The Mexican army headed for the RioGrande River. According to Arista's official report,he lost 160 dead, 228 wounded and 159 missing.The Americans reported the capture of 14 officersand eight guns while losing 33 killed and 89

wounded.Ft. Texas had been bes ieged for the enti re week

Taylor was gone. Surrounded by a reported 1,000Mexican troops, they were under constant bom-bardment. The Mexicans, believing the fort wouldbe starved out, never mounted a major assault. TheAmericans had hunkered down such that th eMexican fire had little effect, though Maj. Brownwas killed during the bombardment. But the rout ofthe Mexicans at Resaca de la Palma broke the siege.In honor o f the fallen commander, the name waschanged to Ft. Brown; today it is known as Brownsville.There was no follow-up attack on Arista's army.

Taylor was satisfied to consolidate his victory andrest in preparation for th e invasion of Mexico'snorthern provinces. But a tt ack or no, Arista hadhad enough and retreated to Monterrey.

MonterreyTaylor's consolidation lasted nearly two months,

giving him time to establ ish a proper supply baseand incorporate reinforcements, including the firststate volunteer unit s and Texas Rangers, into hisarmy. His orders were to cross the "Rio Grande andtake the high road to Mexico City." He planned tomove up the Rio Grande to Mier, then down the SanJuan River through Camargo and China to Monterrey, capital of Nuevo Leon. From there, he wouldcross the Sierra Madre Mountains to Saltillo, capitalof Coahuila. With northern Mexico secured, hewould move south through San Luis Potosi toMexico City. While integration of the volunteers wasprogressing, he used his cavalry and Texas Rangersto reconnoiter the proposed avenues of march.In la te July the army began the two-week march

to to Camargo. On 6 September, Taylor led 3,200

regulars and 3,000 volunteers toward Monterrey,COMMAND MAGAZINE

US

I n f an t r y .

C a v a l r y ~::: ::::: = Art i l l e ry .

Battle of

Resaca de la Palma8 May, 1846

o Yds

j - --Meters1 _ --2



Monterrey, from Independence Hill, in the Rear of the Bishop's Palace. As it appeared on 23rd September, 1846. Hcolored lithograph by Frederick Swi

26

west. Dismounted Texas Rangers and artillerymensupported by the 7th Infantry attacked the redoubtat the southwest end of the hil l while the 5thInfantry attacked El Soldado fort at the other end.Both were t aken after very heavy hand-to-handcombat.

To distract the Mexicans from the main Amer

ican attack to the west, the Citadel was bombardedby three American heavy batteries guarded by several units of volunteers. Little was accomplishedexcept to expose many of the inexperienced troopsto death. Meanwhile, a feint was made against theeastern flank of the city by the divisions of Garlandand Butler.

The main effort was made by Garland (lst and3rd Infantry and the Baltimore Battalion). Forminginto a line of battle 500 yards from the city, theattack quickly came under fire from the citadel, theTannery and El Diablo. When the units neared thefor tif ied suburbs , they were subjected to fire fromthe roofs an d holed e xterior walls. The linesbecame confused and the attack stalled with heavy

losses. Braxton Bragg's flying battery and the 4thInfantry were brought up, but the artillery had littleeffect on the heavy walls and was pulled back.

To recover the momentum, Taylor ordered Quit-man's Brigade to attack the Tannery in support ofthe 1st Infantry, who were fighting in the buildingsnear the redoubt. Quitman's volunteer Tennesseeand Mississippi regiments sustained heavy losses,but the Mexicans gave up the redoubt. Takingadvantage of the Mexican retreat, Taylor sent anOhio regiment into the action. Led by Gen. Butler,they drove for "El Diablo" but were resolutelyrebuffed. The Americans consolidated their position that night around the Tannery. Having lost hisexterior redoubts, Ampudia abandoned El Diablo

and retreated to the highly defensible built uption of Monterrey.

22 September 1846While both sides licked their wounds ea

Monterrey, Worth's troops commenced their aon Independencia Hill. A storming party steal

moved up the west end of the hill, which wastured in a sudden rush.The r ea l defensive position, however ,

Bishop's Palace at the lower east end. A 12-phowitzer was brought up went to work onPalace gate. The storming party was reinforcethe 5th Infantry and a company of Louisiana vteers, but before they could attack part of theman garrison, led by Lieut. Col. Francisco Bsortied. Devastated by American fire, Berra'sretreated in disorder to Monterrey. Soon thewas destroyed and the infantry made their assThe two flying batteries were brought into thepound and it s capture was assured by late anoon.

The next morning, Taylor ordered a reconsance in force on the eastern side of the city.Jefferson Davis' Mississippians in the lead,man's Brigade advanced into town. Taylor ordthe 3rd Infantry, 4th Infantry, 2nd Texas Volunand Bragg's battery in support. Using houshouse fighting techniques learned from the TeQuitman's men methodically moved to withinblocks of the central plaza, though they withto the fortified suburbs that night.

On the other side of the city, acting witorders, Worth assaulted the city in the afternFighting to within two blocks of the east fforces, Worth consolidated his position and stlaying mortar fire into the central plaza.

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



One mortar round hit the cathedral; it did no tignite the Mexican ammunition store, bu t it unnerved Ampudia. Demoralized by the inability of

his forces to defeat the Americans and concernedfor the welfare of the citizens, he asked for a truceto permit the evacuation of the women and children. Taylor refused.

24-25 September 1846Early in the morning of the 24th, American

preparations for another assault were pu t on hold;

Ampudia had opened negotiations for the surrender of Monterrey. A complex set of demands and

counterdemands negot ia ted at several locations

around the city resul ted in a final surrender on the25th. The Mexican army was allowed to move eastunmolested. They were to leave all artillery exceptone bat tery . The Americans would no t follow foreight weeks or until their respective governmentsissued further orders.

American losses were never officially reported.Taylor later admitted to 488 killed and wounded,but o ther e stima te s r an as high as 1,000, withabout 300 killed or mortally wounded. As the tiredAmericans occupied the city and began to refit, thedirection of the war took a dramatic turn.

New CommandersA political storm had broken in Mexico City. In

late July, President Paredes, having lost the confidence of the government, abdicated in favor of VicePresident Nicholas Bravo. But Bravo's term of officewas short lived: Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana

returned from his two-year Cuban exile. On his

arrival in Mexico City on 15 September, Gen. ]. M.

Salas was named acting president and Santa Anabecame commander of all Mexican forces.

In Washington, Polk had given Gen. WinfieldScott field command of all forces involved in thewar against Mexico. In place of Taylor's advancefrom the north, Scott proposed an invasion of central Mexico through the port of Vera Cruz, followedby a direct march on Mexico City. But little hap-pened that fall; desultory peace negotiations continued until 15 November, when Polk rejected the

latest Mexican ini ti at ive and terminated th eprocess.

In northern Mexico, Taylor's army had grown to12,000 men and would soon be joined by Gen. JohnE. Wool with 2,500 volunteers and newly raised regulars. As soon as the peace negotiations ended,Taylor moved forward and occupied Saltillo andParras. Elements of the army moved southeast tooccupy Victoria and support the Navy's seizure ofTampico. He was preparing to continue his advancesouth when Scott arrived in January.

But Taylor's part in the invasion of Mexico wasabout to end. Polk was extremely unhappy with himover the te rms o f the Monterrey surrender , andundoubtedly recognized the potential political risk

if Taylor gained any more success. Polk's backing ofScott 's Vera Cruz plan thus was not based exclusively on military reasoning.

Shortly after his arrival in northern Mexico, Scottdeparted, taking with him 9,000 of Taylor's men,including most of the regulars and experienced volunteers. To hold the conquered provinces, Taylorwas left with only about 6,000 men, mostly untried

Battle ofMonterrey19-24 September, 1846eters 2000

- - - . ~ US advances 21 Sept.- - ~ . ~ US advances 22 Sept.

- - - . ~ US advances 23 Sept.Yds 2000

f

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COMMAND MAGAZINE 2



TheCivilWar Connection

At least 44 men who fought for the United States in oraround Buena Vista went on to serve as general officersor in high poli tical office for either the Confederacy orthe Union during the Civil War.

Capt. HemyW. Benham - Adjutant of the Corp of Engineers during the Battle at Buena Vista. Top of his class at West Point in1837. During the Civil War, this breveted Brigadier Generalhad a less than successful career. He was a a successful engineer who did not make the transition to line officer. He saw

action at Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Appomattox. Heretired from the army as a Colonel in 1882.

Capt. Braxton Bragg - Commander of a "flying battery" at Battleof Buena Vista. Under the supervision of General Taylor, hisbattery broke the Mexican assault late in the battle. Duringthe Civil War, he commanded the art il lery firing on For t

Sumter to begin the conflict before moving quickly to Armycommander. He was one of eight Confederates to reached therank of full general. His abrasive command style was only tolera ted due to the staunch support he received from PresidentJefferson Davis, another Buena Vista veteran.

Lt. Abraham Buford - This West Point class of 1841 graduate,served with the 1st Dragoons. He maintained his neutralityuntil Bragg invaded Kentucky in 1862. He then joined theConfederate army where he commanded a cavalry brigade. He

fought at Murfreesboro, Champion Hill, and Jackson. Made adivision commander, he fought at Brice's Crossroads, Tupelo,and others before being wounded. Buford weighed approximately 320 pounds.

Capt. James H. Carleton - 1st Dragoons. He remained in the cavalry until the Civil War when he was posted to the WestCoast. Breveted a Brigadier General, he served in Californiaand New Mexico until the end of the war. He died a Lt. Col. ofthe 4th Cavalry in 1873.

Capt. Robert H. Chilton - 1st Dragoons, West Point 1837. A staffofficer with the Army of Northern Virginia from Seven Daysthrough Gettysburg. He eventually transferred to Richmond,where he served out the war.

Col. Sylvester Churchill - He enlisted into the artillery during theWar of 1812. Af ter a short stint as inspector general, hereturned to the artillery. By the s ta rt o f the Mexican War, he

was an inspector general on the staff of General Taylor. Dueto his actions he was breveted to brigadier general after thebattle. He remained in the army until his ret irement at thebeginning of the Civil War at the rank of brigadier general.

Capt. Cassius Marcellus Clay - Company commander in the 1stKentucky Cavalry. After the war, he was an early supporter ofthe Republican Party. Named Minister to Russia by Lincoln in

1861, his departure was delayed due to the need to organizea defense of Washington. He was made a major general bu tdeclined to return to America during the war as he wasunhappy with continuation of slavery. He remained in Russiauntil 1872. He died a recluse in 1903.

Capt. Douglas H. Cooper - Captain in the Mississippi Rifles.Previously a U.S. representative to the Five Civilized Tribes,he served in a similar post with the Confederacy. Made a

brigadier general after raising the 1st Choctaw and ChickasawMounted Rifles. By then end of the war, he commanded allthe Indians in the Trans-Mississippi Region. After the war, heserved as a legal agent for the Indians until his death in 1879.

1st Lt. Darius N. Couch - With the 4th Artillery;West Point 1846.He started the Civil War as a regiment commander before

working up to senior corps commander under General

Hooker. His refusal to serve any longer under Hooker resulted in his posting to obscure militia positions before becoming a division commander in the west. He resigned as a majorgeneral in 1865. Died in 1897.

Lt. Col. Hemy K. Craig - Representative of the ordinance department on Taylor's staff. By the start of the Civil War, he commanded the entire ordinance department. He retired from the

army in 1863, and named a brigadier general due to his longservice in the army which extended back to the War of 1812.

28

Col. Jefferson Davis - Commander of 1st Mississippi, Wes1828, in the a rmy unt il 1835 when he eloped with ZTaylor's daughter (who died shortly thereafter). Hedown a commission as a brigadier general a fter theenter the U.S. Senate, remaining there until resign

January 1861. Elected as the first (only) Confederatedent in November of 1861. After the war, he was imprfor two years before being released. Living without cship, he died in 1889. His citizenship was finally reinby President Carter.

1st Lt. Abner Doubleday - With the 1st Artillery in the Sgarrison, West Point 1842. He saw extensive action wUnion army during the Civil War beginning at Fort Swhere he was the executive off icer . He commanded

brigade, division, and corps level before being servWashington D.C. after Gettysburg. He ret ired from thein 1873 as a major general.

Maj. Amos B. Eaton - This 1926 West Point graduate serthe commissary department for his entire career excepshort stint in the infantry. He served with Generalthrough the Mexican War. During the Civil War he serthe commissary department as a brigadier general , sthere until he resigned in 1874 .

1s t Lt. William B. Franklin - Member of the e li te Co

Topographical Engineers on Taylor's staff, top of the

Point class of 1843. During the Civil War, he worked hup from brigade to corps commander, fighting at 1

Run, Fredericksburg, Seven Days, Antietam and SabineHe resigned from the army in 1866.

Capt. Samuel G. French - Battery commander (woundedArtillery, West Point 1843. After the war served wi

Quartermaster Department until he resigned in 1856.Civil War he commanded a Confederate brigade, then cdepartments in North Carolina, Virginia and Mississipsaw action as a division commander with Hood in Tenbefore giving up command due to illness. He served o

remainder of the war in the Mobile area.Maj. Robert S. Garnett - Battery commander, 4th Artillery

Point 1841. He r emained in the army unt il 1861 wh

resigned to join the Confederacy. Commanding an aWest Virginia, he had the "honor" of being the first g

officer to die during the war. He was a cousin of ConfeGeneral Richard B. Garnett who died during Pickett's Ch

Maj. William A. Gorman - Major of Indiana Volunteers, hecompanies against Ampudia's light troops. After the wentered politics, going to Congress and serving a termr itor ia l governor of Minnesota. During the Civil Wserved at regimental, brigade, corps and departmen

commands. He l ef t the army in 1864 to return to hpractice.

Richard Griffith - Adjutant, Mississippi Rifles. Between thehe served as a teacher and banker. Led the 12th MississVirginia and was elevated from colonel to brigadier gHe commanded a brigade were he became embroileddispute between Gen. Joe Johnston and Davis regardiposting of Mississippi troops. Mortally wounded duri

Seven Days.Thomas Harrison - Mississippi Rifles. Between the wars, heticed law in Texas. A Texas cavalry captain at the start

Civil War, he eventually made brigadier general. FouShiloh, Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickam

Knoxville, Atlanta and Savannah. His brother wasConfederate general.

Maj. David Hunter - Taylor 's paymaster , West Point 182tween the wars he became a friend of Abraham Lincolescorted the president on his inaugural trip to WashiDuring the war, he commanded regiment, brigade, dicorps and department, reaching major general in 186was wounded at Bull Run, later serving in the west andthe coast. He roused the sou th by burning the ShenaValley, Virginia Military Institute and the governor'

dence. He later escorted Lincoln's body back to Illinois.

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



Nathan Kimball - Doctor with the Indiana Brigade. Start ing as acolonel of Indiana volunteers, his Civil War service includedbrigade, division and corps command. He fought at Kernstown, Port Republic, Antietam, and Fredericksburg where hewas wounded. He later fought at Franklin and Nashville. Heended the war as a major general.

Prvt. William ]. Landram - A private with the Kentucky cavalry, hestarted the Civil War as a colonel of volunteers. A brigade and

divis ion commander, he served in the Yazoo, Vicksburg,jackson, and Red River campaigns. He ended the war as acolonel, bu t 7 weeks later was breveted a brigadier general.

Gen. joseph Lane - Commander, Indiana Brigade. After the war,he served as the terri tor ia l governor of Oregon. Staying ou t

wes t, h e eventually became a U.S. senator. A pro-slav

ery/secession senator, he ran for vice president on the sameticket with john C. Breckinridge. He died in 1891.

Col. joseph K. Mansfield - Commanded the Corps of Engineersdetachment under Taylor. After commands in Washington and

along the Virginia coast early in the Civil War, he became acorps commander under McClellan. Mortally wounded a t

Antietam, posthumously made a major general.Col. Humphrey Marshall - Commander, 1s t Kentucky Cavalry,West Point 1832. After the war he served in the Congress and

as an ambassador to China. In 1861, he joined the Confederacy, acting as a brigade and department commander in theKentucky region before resigning to enter the ConfederateCongress. After the war, he returned to his law practice.

Capt . Ben McCullough - "Spy Company." This famous TexasRanger fought in both the War for Texas Independence and

the Mexican War. Taylor valued McCullough highly, developinga close working relationship. In the Civil War, he offered hisservices to the state of Texas. He commanded of several

departments in the Indian Territory and Trans-Mississippiareas. Killed at Pea Ridge.

Capt. Irwin McDowell - Aide on Wool's staff, West Point 1838.During the Civil War, he led the unprepared Union forces at

the Battle of Bull Run, later commanding a division and corpsbefore being pu t in charge of the West Coast. He retired amajor general in 1882.

First Sergeant Evander McNair - First sergeant, 1st Mississippi. Ledan Arkansas battalion, then a brigade along the MississippiRiver. Appointed a brigadier general after being wounded atChickamauga, he returned to Arkansas to command another

brigade.Capt. Albert Pike - Captain, 1st Arkansas Cavalry. After the war,this lawyer became successful defending the Indian tribes inthe Trans-Mississippi region. With the Civil War, he was a representative of the Confederacy to the major tribes. Appointeda brigadier general, he led a mixed group of Indians at PeaRidge. He resigned in 1862, and returned home.

Capt. john Pope - Topographical Engineers on Taylor's staff,West Point 1842. After success as a Union army commanderon the Mississippi, he made a disastrous showing during hte

Second Bull Run Campaign. Relegated to Indian Fighting forthe rest of the Civil War, he made major general after heretired in 1866.

1st Lt. Carnot Posey - 1st Mississippi, wounded. Posey returned toMississippi, where he became a lawyer. He led a company at

the start of Civil War, subsequently commanded a brigade. Hefought in jackson's Valley Campaign, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. He died as the result of a wound

received from artillery fire in October, 1863.Capt. Benjamin Prentiss - Company commander, 1st Illinois. Afterthe war, he returned to Illinois an became a lawyer. With thebeginning of the Civil War, he entered the volunteers where headvanced quickly from regimental commander to major general in charge of both a corps and regional district, due inlarge part to (probably undeserved) acclaim from his stand inthe "Sunken Road" at Shiloh.

Capt. john F. Reynolds - With a Flying Battery, West Point 1841.Staying in the army after the war, he served as commandantof the Military Academy. Working his way up from brigade to

corps commander (and after turning down army command),he was killed on the first day of Gettysburg.

COMMAND MAGAZINE

1st Lt. james B. Ricketts - With the 1st Artillery in the Saltillo grison. Commanded a Union battery at 1st Bull Run befo

moving up to brigade, division, and corps command. He wwounded 3 times during this conflict. He retired a major geeral in 1867.

Col. john S. Roane - Second-in-command, 1st Arkansas Cavaltook over when Yell was killed at Buena Vista. After the whe entered politics, becoming governor of Arkansas. He resied secession of Arkansas for over a year before offer ing hservices to the South. Made a brigadier general, he commaned at the brigade, division and for a short time, the TranMississippi Military District. He served at a number of othpositions until the end of the war.

Capt. David H. Rucker - 1s t Dragoons. Transferred to t

Quartermaster Corps in 1849, remaining the re through t

Civil War under Montgomery Meigs. In 1882 made a brigadgeneral and given command the Quartermaster's Departmen

Maj. Thomas W. Sherman - "Flying" Battery commander, WPoint 1836. Remaining with the Union during the Civil War,continued his aggressive style. He was involved in actio

along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, eventually commandingdivision of infantry. After he lost a leg during the assaultPort Hudson, and later commanded New Orleans. He retirfrom the army as a major general in 1870.

2nd Lt. Samuel D. Sturgis - 1st Dragoons, West Point 184Remaining a cavalry officer, he entered the Civil War on tside of the Union. He commanded a brigade, division an

corps. Fought at 2nd Bull Run, South Mountain and AntietaBy the end of the war, he was a Brigadier General.

Richard Taylor - Taylor's (his father) military secretary, onlyat Buena Vista. He was also jefferson Davis's brother-in-laBetween the wars, he resided in Louisiana as a planter .supported secession. After commanding a brigade, he was evated to major general in 1862 and given command of a mtary distr ic t in Louisiana. A lieutenant general in 1864,commanded a multi-state military department and eventuathe Army of Tennessee.

Maj. George H. Thomas - "Flying" Battery commander, West Po1840 and a veteran of the Seminole War. After the war, taugat the Military Academy before joining the cavalry. A Virginiwho remained loyal to the Union, he commanded a brigaddivision, corps, army and eventually a military departmen

Thomas was one of 13 officers who received the Thanks

Congress. He would become famous as "The Rock of Chickmauga" for his stand at this battle. A major general who diin 1870 while in command of the Department of the Pacific.

William H. 1.. Wallace - Adjutant, 1st Illinois. In the Civil War,raised and led a regiment for the Union, advancing to leaddivision at Shiloh. Severely wounded in the "Sunken Road,"died three days later in his wife's arms.

Private Thomas Welsh - A private with the Kentucky cavalwounded at Buena Vista. He entered the regular army inuneately after the war as a second lieutenant, only to be muster

out with the down-sizing of the army. Fighting for the Uniohe re-entered the army as a captain, later reaching brigadgeneral. He served as both brigade and division commandwith Armies of the Potomac, Ohio and Tennessee. He sa

action at Antietam, South Mountain, Fredricksburg, Vicksbu

and jackson. He died of malaria in August of 1863.2nd Lt. Thomas]. Wood - 2nd Dragoons, West Point in 1845. Hcommanded a brigade, division, and corps during the CiWar, fighting at Shiloh, Perryville, Chickamagua, ChattanoogAtlanta and Franklin. He ret ired in 1868 as a Major GenerUnfortunately, probably best known for leaving a hole in tUnion line at Chickamauga, leading to the Federal rout there

Maj. General john E. Wool - Veteran of the War of 1812 and seond-in-command under Gen. Taylor, he was acting battlefiecommander who chose the excellent defensive position

Buena Vista. Wool remained in army until 1863 when

retired after holding regional Department level position

During the war he commanded Fortress Monroe and helpcalm New York after the draft riots.

2



Battle of Buena Vista, a hand painted lithographcenter foreground. All that stands between himthe far left the 1st Mississippi Rifles and the 3rd

Uncertain of the American pos it ion, Santamoved directly toward Saltillo through Agua NuHe detached Gen. Miiion's cavalry division to Slo by an alternate route, hoping to cut the Amesupply line. Taylor had lost several cavalry pa

to the south, so he detailed a small de tachmenTexas Rangers under Ben McCulloch to findMexican army and determine i ts s tr ength. Mwhile Lt. Col. May and 400 dragoons movedwhere they learned of Miiion's flanking maneuv

Taylor moved north to guard his supply roGen. Wool, with the main body of nearly 5,000 mwas ordered to establish a defensive posit ionthe Hacienda of San Juan de la Buena Vista. Ttook Davis' Mississippi Rifles and a battery the ational five miles to Saltillo to protect his supplyfrom Miiion's cavalry.

Wool chose his position well. The main roadthrough a narrow valley between impassable mtain sides. East of the road a wide pla teau cu

deep ravines extended to the base of the mounTo the west the ground was dominated by a dtangled canyon. The roadway itself narrowed tfeet between the canyon and the base of theteau.

There, at the Narrows, Wool placed a batsupported by two infantry regiments . On theteau were three more infantry regiments andbatteries, screened by the cavalry. To the wWool placed a single regiment and two battebehind the canyon. Taylor's column joined the mbody during the day, though Taylor remainedcerned about Miiion.

Wool's move north had been so rapid it encaged Santa Ana to believe the Americans wer

ISSUE 40 NOV 1

Meters 750i

t::J:::J),. us encampment

__ Gullies, dry river beds

Ii< irrigation canals

Yd, 750i

Buena

volunteers. Those he concentrated south of Saltillo,where he could best intercept any Mexican force

sent against him, and f rom where he could resumehis offensive to the south.

Santa Ana had not been idle in the interveningmonths - the peace negotiations were primarilyaimed at gaining time. Ampudia was ordered tobring his remnants to San Luis Potosi, where theywere consolida ted into the new National Army ofnearly 23,000 men. With a large army in place andhis political base secure, Santa Ana wai ted for anopportunity to strike back.

That occurred in dramatic fashion on 13 January1847, when an American courier was lassoed andkilled. The dispatches he carr ied detai led the proposed operations of Taylor and Scott, including theforces in their respective commands. Santa Anarealized he could defeat the much smaller andwidely separated American armies in detail ; firstTaylor's at Saltillo, then Scott's on the coast. On 28January 1847 the Mexican army moved north.

To Buena VistaThe 200-mile march of the Mexican army from

San Luis Potosi to La Encarnacion was an exercise inmisery. Traversing broken hills and desert for threeweeks, the undisciplined troops jettisoned theirprovisions to save carrying them. The weather varied from hot and dry in the desert to below freezing in the mountains. Death, sickness and desertionreduced Santa Ana's army to 15,000 by 19 February.

30

/

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Battle ofBuena Vista23 February, 1847

Morning



1stKy(305)

Col.Marshall

Taylor's Arat Buena V23 February 1

C:J::,.t:,. us encampment-- Gullies, dry r iver beds& irrigation canals

o Yds 750I r

o Meters,


Afternoon

Fortunately, Taylor had just returned with hi s

hard-marching Mississippians. Posit ioned near

Buena Vista to defend the supp ly train, their riflefire tore into ]uvera's cavalry. Assaulted by thereorganized American cavalry, the Mexican ridersrouted back to their original positions.

Back on the main plateau, the thin American linewas on the verge of collapse. Again in the nick oftime, the 2nd Kentucky and its supporting batteriesmoved f rom the quiet f ront west o f the road to theplateau. Their firepower was enough to f inish offthe battered Mexican columns.

But Santa Ana was not done yet. One of his staffofficers, Gen. Perez, formed a new assault columnout of the Regiment of Engineers, Torrejon's cavalry

flight. Reaching the valley on 22 February, he wassurprised to find t hem in battl e formation. Whilehis troops deployed, he sent Taylor a demand ofsurrender that was politely refused.

The Mexican deployment took most of the day,

with Santa Ana himself deploying the cumbersomeartillery. In the late afternoon the fighting startedwith a feint across the canyon to the west. Meanwhile, the army's light infantry comapnies underGen. Ampudia moved onto the mountainside alongthe e ast flank. They were met by dismountedAmerican cavalry. The skirmishing continued untildarkness, with both sides sleeping on their armsacross the exposed mountainside. Taylor, satisfiedthe pos it ion was secure for the night, again led hiscolumn north to Saltillo.

The fighting picked up where it had lef t off theday before. Reinforced during the night, Ampudia'stroops successfully pushed the Americans off thehigh ground. Down on the roadway, the elite Mex-

ican Regiment of Engineers charged into the teethof the American pos it ion a t the Narrows. It wasstopped cold by the concentra ted fire of Washington's battery.

Meanwhile, the Mexican main body had beenwending its way up through the deep ravines. In thecenter of the plateau, two huge infantry divisions,under Gens. Lombardini and Pach-eco, formed in deep columns for theassault. The Americans gave groundgrudgingly after causing heavy loss- Brig. Gen.

J. Lanees. Farther east, a combined infantry-cavalry assau lt under Ortega and]uvera drove the American cavalryback to the hacienda.

an-Baptiste-Bayot. General Taylor and his staffare in then Army are the guns ofCaptains O'Brien and Bragg. Atto fill the weak point.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 31



xxCorona

(600)

3rd7th8th(mixed) Lt. Mexico,OaxacaAct., Mtd.Cazadores

x

Ideal OrganizationRegiment = 2 Battalions =

16 Companies1Company = 102 men

x

5th9thTulancingo Cuir.(mixed) Morelia,

Mex. City Lagos Act. GuanajuatoAct.,4th Line &San Luis Reg.

Guadalajara(mixed) Santa Ana Btn,Queretaro Act.,CalayaAct.,AquacalientesAct.

only 10 months he had built an army fromground up, marched over 700 miles into a hocountry, and virtually destroyed two Mexicanarmies, winning every major engagement he foin the process. His army also provided the coScott's expedition. Less than two years later, heelected president.

SourcesBarcena, Jose Maria Roa. Recuerdos de la Inva

Norte America (1846-1848). Mexico, Edit

Porrua, SA, 1947.Bauer, K. Jack. The Mexican War, 1846 - 1Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1874.

Brooks, N. C. A Complete His tory of the MexWar: It's Causes, Conduct, and Consequences.Rio Grande Press, Inc.,Chicago, 1849, repri1965.

Carleton, James Hemy. The Battle of Buenawith Operations of the "Army of OccupationOne Month. Harper and Brothers, New Y1848.

Connor, Seymour V. and Odie B. Faulk. NAmerica Divided: The Mexican War, 1846 - 1Oxford University Press, New York, 1971.

Eisenhower, John S. D. So Far From God: The

War with Mexico 1846-1848. Doubleday Pubing, New York, 1989.

James, Garry. The Mississippi Rifle. 1984 DixieWorks Blackpowder Annual. Pioneer Press, UCity, Tennessee, 1984.

Katcher, Philip R. . The Mexican-American

1846 - 1848. Osprey, London, 1976, Repr1990.

Layman, George. Mexican War Veterans. 1992Gun Works Blackpowder Annual. Pioneer PUnion City, Tennessee, 1992.

Nieto-Brown-Hefter, Editions. The Mexican So1837 -1847. Apartado 517 Mexico, 1958.

Ramsey, Albert C. (trans. and ed. by Burt FranThe Other Side or Notes for the His tory o

War between Mexico and the United States.York,1848.

Sandweiss, M. A., R. Stewart and B.W. HuseEyewitness to War: Prints and Daguerreotypthe Mexican War, 1846-1848. Amon CaMuseum, Fort Worth, Texas, 1989.

Smith, Justin H. The War with Mexico, (2 vols.).Macmillian Company, Gloucester, Mass., 191

Wilkins, Fredrick. The Highly Irregular IrreguTexas Rangers in the Mexican War. Eakin P1990.

Act. =ActivosPuebla12th Line

LeonAct.GuanajuatoAct.

San Luis Act.MoreliaAct.

xx


Evening

11th LineHidalgo

1st Line3rd Line

5th Line10th Line

2 / ( , .. . . .

xx

Mexican Forcesat Buena Vista

AftermathBuena Vista was the last fighting of consequencein Northern Mexico. Taylor would shortly relinquishcommand to Wool, leaVing it to him to occupy ahostile territory in the face of Mexican irregularswaging a guerilla campaign.Taylor had completed a remarkable campaign. In

and remnants of the three infantry divisions. The

tired American infantry began to give ground, bu tthe firepower of the flying batteries halted this lastgasp charge. The fighting petered out and was finished with the on-se t of a late afternoon rainBoth armies had been badly mauled, with Amer

i can losses o f 665 against 3,533 Mexicans (abouthalf of them missing); bu t the Americans remainedfirmly in control of the battlefield. The Mexicanarmy, exhausted by the grueling approach marchand a hard fight, was a spent force. It retreated toAugua ueva during the night, and continued ontoward Mexico City on the 25th. Though unmolested by the Americans only 11,000 reached San LuisPotosi.

/ ' I

32 ISSUE 40 NOV 1



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English language. To gatherinformation on high ranking Russian

naval officers requires searching inmany places. This book attempts tofill the gap for the period 1917-1996.For those readers completely unacquainted with the Russian Navy, itincludes a short history. It also contains a chronology of important datesin Russian naval history for the 19171996 period, plus a chronological listing of Russian Navy commanders forthe same period.

When you read the biographies ofsome of the admirals you learn that ahigh position is also a dangerous position in the days of Lenin and Stalin.

Some commanders were in the job foronly a few months. Some were in for along time as in the case of AdmiralGorshkov, who had the job for nineteen years. One held the job twice Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov. OnceStalin replaced his commander with aDeputy Chief of the Secret Police(NKVD). In more recent times, severaladmirals were summarily removed forbacking the wrong side in the August1991 coup attempt in Moscow.

This is a good reference book formilitary history buffs and veterans ofthe "cold war."

'"

COMMAND MAGAZINE 3



l ~ U j ~ ~ l ~ U j I ! I [

m ! I ! I ~ 1 1With Scott in Mexicoby G. Stakes

On 19 November 1846, US President James K.Polk appointed Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott to command the expedition that was to seize the port ofVera Cruz and then advance from there to captureMexico City. At the time of his appointment, Scottwas 60-years-old and had been a general officer

since the War of 1812.Born in 1786 to a wealthy Virginia family, Scottwas commissioned a captain of light artillery in1809. After a brief return to civilian life, he reentered the Army as a l ieutenant colonel at the outbreak of the War of 1812. In the ragtag AmericanArmy of that day, led mainly by political appointeesand incompetents, Scott, a self-educated student of

Portrait ofGeneral Winfield Scott.

34

war, and his well-drilled command performewell that by March 1814 he'd become a brigageneral.On 4 July of tha t year, Scott 's brigade cha

and routed two regular British regiments atBattle of Chippewa. Though hardly more th

skirmish, it ended a depressing succession odefeats at the hands of the Anglo-Canadians,Scott emerged as a national hero. Later, follothe Battle of Lundy's Lane, where he was sevwounded, Scott was brevetted a major general.After the War of 1812, Scott elected to rema

the Army, which was reduced to a few thoumen stationed in small posts along the frontierthe coasta l defenses on the eastern seaboarman of independent means with a keen interehis profession, he spent 1815-16 in Europe visthe battlefields of the Napoleonic Wars and iviewing many of the participants.Though known for his delight in showy unif

and military pomp, "Old Fuss and Feathers"

also an excellent administrator and tactician, wlibrary reflected his vast knowledge of militarytory. Service in the Seminole War and alongfrontier gave him a practical knowledge of cpaigning under severe conditions and s tood h igood stead in Mexico.Made commanding general of the Army in 1

Scott hastened to incorporate the mos t readvances in artillery. By improving the des iglimbers and carriages, he ensured mobile batteranging from rocket launchers to massive lO-mortars and 24-pounder siege guns, would be aable to the commanders in the field.Perhaps his greatest contribution was his d

opment of so-called "flying batteries." Detac

one company from each of the artillery regimmanning the coastal fortresses, he formed tinto the horse-drawn six-pounder batterieswould be used with such telling effect at Palo AReseca de Palma and, later, during his own advon Mexico City.

Toward Vera CruzOn 28 November 1846, while Scott was in

Orleans en route to a conference with Gen. ZacTaylor, he received unexpected good news. Sthe beginning of hosti li ti es , Commodore DConner, commander of the Home Squadron, thoshort of both ships and men, had managed to mtain an effective blockade of the principal Mex

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



>oint Homos

anchored off the landing area, their 32-poundersready to sweep the beach with grapeshot. But toScott's surprise, during the six hours spent placing

the force of 8,600 men ashore the landing was unopposed.Mexican Brig. Gen. Juan Morales, who command

ed the 3,800 man Vera Cruz garrison, had chosento keep his men behind the massive walls of the

city along which over 200 guns were mounted.During its long history, Vera Cruz, the main Mex-ican seaport on the Gulf, had successfully repelledmany attempts to capture it.With the landing completed, Scott moved rapidly

to encircle the city. By the 12th, after Quitman's

brigade arrived, all roads leading into Vera Cruz

had been cut and the city isolated. But stormyweather and high surf prevented the landing of thesiege batteries for several more days. During the

Scott's Route toMexico City

~ " ' _ .......~ - - .po rts on the Gulf coast. Though Conner's smallforce lacked the vessels necessary for an amphibious landing, dur ing the month of October, SantaAnna, fearing an attack on the lightly defended portof Tampico, had withdrawn its garrison, demolished its defenses, and sen t i ts coastal batteriesinland rather than r isk their capture. Learning of

the withdrawal, Conner occupied the port withoutresistance, garrisoning it with 450 men sent downfrom Port Isabel.

When Scott learned of Tampico 's seizure , he

immediately modified his own plans. By using thatport and i ts adjacent coastl ine as a point of departure, instead of a base as the mouth of the RioGrande, the distance the Americans had to go toreach Vera Cruz was more than halved. Isla Lobos,an island off the coat 60 miles sou th o f Tampico,with adequate water and a good anchorage, wasse lected as the new forward base from which theexpedition would sail to attack Vera Cruz, 170

miles farther south.As recruiting and training new men for the expe

dition would take months, Scott, with the approvalof Polk, decided much of his force had to be drawnfrom Taylor's army. Though Taylor complained bitterly, Scott took Brig. Gen. William Worth's and

Brig. Gen. David E. Twiggs' regular divisions, as wellas Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's division of volunteers, a total of 9,000 men.Lack of troop transports delayed the arrival of

troops at Lobos, and it wasn't unt il 2 March 1847the expedition, still short of supplies and ammunition, sai led for Anton Lizardo, an anchorage 20miles south of Vera Cruz.On 6 March, after the transports had arrived and

were off-loading their flat-bottomed landing craft,Scott and his staff conducted a reconnaissance ofpossible landing sites nearer the city aboard a smallsteamer. At Conner's suggestion Scott selected Col-lada, a beach accessible for troops disembarkingfrom landing craft in shallow water . Collada, 2.5miles south of the city walls, was also out of rangeof the heavy batteries of the Castle San Juan de Ull-oa, which guarded the harbor of Vera Cruz.Scott organized his command into three brig

ades. Worth's was composed of four regular infantry regiments supplemented by two companies ofvolunteers and two artillery regiments. Twiggs'brigade was made up of four regular infantry, andtwo artillery regiments (fighting as infantry), plusone of mounted riflemen (which, lacking mounts,ended up fighting on foot).Patterson's division of volunteers was composed

of three brigades commanded by Brig. Gens. JamesShields, John Quitman and]. Pillow, though only

the latter's five regiments of volunteers arrived intime to participate in the landing.The few companies of the 1st and 2nd Dragoons

and the Tennessee Mounted, a little over 500 troopers, constituted the expedition's entire cavalry forceand were commanded by Lt. Col. William S. Harney.

The LandingLate in the afternoon of 9 March 1847, the firs t

wave of landing craft , crewed by navy oarsmen,

formed a line 450 yards from the beach and sweptforward. Mexican cavalry were visible on the beach,but they rode off without firing a shot as the firstboats grounded and the men, wai st high in thewater, waded the rest of the way ashore. In antici

pation ofMexican resistance, a line of warships had

COMMAND MAGAZINE 3



YellawFever S StrategyTwenty-six March 1847 found Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott

in a strangely anxious mood. His army had successfullylanded, then invested, the Mexican por t ofVera Cruz. Hisdecision to lay siege to the city - then the most heavilyfortified in the western hemisphere - rather than stormit was criticized by some, but the constant Americanbombardment was star ting to have the intended effect.Morale inside the walls was collapsing and it was clearlyonly a matter of time before the defenders capitulated.

The cause of Scott' s anxiety, in fact, had little to dowith the actual military situation. His eye was on the calendar and the steady march of days. Already two monthsoff his original timetable due to incompetence in the WarDepartment, Scott 's nerves were on edge because ofreports from his medical officers of disease in the ranks.It was the same disease that had dictated the entire strategy and timing of his assault, and now i t looked as ifevery day was bringing it more in contact with his forces.

The Mexicans called it La Vomito. A fifth of those whodeveloped it were doomed to die. Victims were rackedwith headache, fever, chills and vomiting. Their skin tookon a pronounced yellow color as their liver was damagedthen failed. Splotches of blue and black appeared on theskin as blood vessels ruptured and hemorrhaged into the

surrounding tissue. Inside the body the same process cutoff the blood supply to major organs. Blood seeping fromdamaged arteries and veins filled the lungs and the victim began to drown in his own fluids. In the severelystricken, the vomit took on the consistency and color ofcoffee grounds - in reality coagulated blood - as theyliterally began bringing up their own life blood.

La Vomito frightened Scott more than the Mexicans.Santa Ana's force he knew he could defeat, but this disease - yellow fever - was an opponent he felt helplessagainst. Nineteenth century physicians knew neither itscause nor how it was transmitted. All they could do wasprovide clinical support for a vict im' s symptoms andhope for the best. Scott 's only workable s trategy was toavoid the disease. But it was getting too close to the La

Vomito season to suit the American commander.Yellow fever, then popularly called "Yellow jack,"because i t was a common cause for quarant ining ships,and such ships must fly a yellow flag or "jack," was andis one of the world's most dreaded epidemic diseases.Yellow fever is in fact the only disease today for whichvaccination is required in order to enter some countries,depending on the point of origin or transit of the traveler, under International Health Regulations.

YELLOW FEVER IN THE NEW WORLD

A viral illness, yellow fever is transmitted to man by

Yellow Fever Zone in MexicoDuring the Mexican-American War

Elevation (feet)

• Over 6560

3280-6560

o Miles-Km

36

the bi te of the Aedes aegypti mosquito. It was iminto the New World as the resul t of the Africantrade, which itself had been necessitated by theimportation of European-based diseases that haded in the d ie -off of about 80 percent of theAmerican population in the span of two generaAedes aegypti. appears to have arrived as larvalaways traveling in the water casks on the same shthe slaves. Shipboard outbreaks could wipe out

crews and their human cargo.Between 1693 and the s ta rt o f this century, 95rate yellow fever epidemics ravaged the US, inf500,000 persons and killing 100,000. Philadelphstruck 11 times, with one outbreak in 1793 killing 1cent of that city's population. Boston and New Yoreach h it seven times dur ing the per iod. The doccurred regularly in Charleston, Mobile, Norfolkmore, New Orleans and other cities along the AtlanGulf coasts.

Yellow fever had a number of effects on Newhistory. Its presence effectively closed the Amazonto European explora t ion and colonizat ion. InNapoleon sent a French army to suppress the Hrebellion of Toussaint l'Ouverture. No sooner ha

force landed than the men were attacked by yellowOf an army of 25,000 only 3,000 survived to retFrance. Napoleon thereby lost interest in any effcreate a New World French Empire. He called

American commissioners james Monroe and RLivingston, who'd been seeking to purchase New Oand surpr ised them by offering to sell them allvast Louisiana Territory for little more than they'prepared to pay for the city alone.

Together with malaria, yellow fever would defeattempts of Ferdinand de Lesseps to build a canalthe Isthmus of Panama. De Lesseps, fresh from hisbuilding success at Suez, planned a canal to crokilometers of swamp and mountains. In 1884 he bin 500 French engineers to supervise construction

new waterway, which he thought would take threeto complete. None of them lived to draw the imonth's pay. In September the entire crew of a vBritish warship died of the disease. After losing a ttheir entire European work force of 20,000, de Labandoned the project. The construction rights werto the US.

Because of the new understanding of the role oquitoes in the transmission of the disease, and theof Walter Reed and William Gorgas, the Panamawas finally completed in 1904. Even t hen it was athing. An outbreak of La Vomito that year caused cto accumulate at the project's railway stations fastethey could be removed. Panic seized the workeonly a heroic anti-mosquito campaign saved the

from collapse.VERA CRUZ - PlANNING

As 1846 drew to a close, the Mexican-Americacould be seen to have gone well for the US to thaMaj. Gen. Zachary Taylor's successes in the northerican territories and the conquest of California werees for national jubilation. But the goal of a Mexicarender hadn't yet been achieved and the political n"conquer a peace" was growing acute. President jamPolk and his military advisors decided in order to fMexican capitulation further offensives would besary.

Mexico City was the obvious target. As well asthe political, financial and military capital of the cthere was still another reason to take it: it s tood

ISSUE 40 NOV



'Most accidental deaths were due to explodingcanno

11,155

Disease

362

US Military

Mexican-American War

Deaths by Cause

0-1...----........---ccidental< Died of Killed inWounds Action

In s ide 12,000

Vera Cruzthe citizen-ry was sub- 10,000

jected to ademoraliz- 8,000

ing bombardmentfrom th e 6,000

warsh ipsgathered in 4,000

the harbor.Fu r th e r 2,000

lowering ofc i v i l i a nmorale followed theAmericang r o und -investiture. Depressing the inhabitants even more, nrelief appeared from the direction of Mexico City. In factroops from the upland provinces of Mexico refused

venture into the coastal region for fear of La Vomitwhose season they knew to be rapidly approaching.

As time passed, Scott resolved to finally take VeCruz by storm. He couldn' t afford to be in the low coutry when the yellow fever season hit - around 15 Ap- and though he estimated US losses would be close2,000 if such an assault were conducted, he saw the movas inescapable.

On 25 March a brief cease-fire was sought by thMexicans. The foreign consuls inside the city asked thebe allowed to evacuate their civilians. Scott rejected threquest. Dismayed, the Mexicans realized nothing wouend the constant bombardment. Chaos was already widspread and morale had sunk to a nonexistent level. A laNorther struck that night and worked to break the lastwhat psychological strength remained to the defenderOn the 27th, after a day of negotiations, the city and ifortress of Viua surrendered to Scott. Two days later tMexican garrison was allowed to march out to stack theweapons and then continue westward. By noon Scottforces were in sole possession of Vera Cruz.

Scott couldn't afford to dally, and he began to advanalong the National Highway toward Mexico City onApril . At Cerro Gordo a motley collection of Mexicatroops, the so-called "Army of the East," attempted

halt the American advance. On the 18th Scott's forcwon a crushing victory against them. He continuedadvance along the highway higher in to the mountain

passing the city of Jalapa and the fortress of Perote. Bhe could finally breathe a sigh of rel ief as he crossed thSierra Madres range. He'd passed the yellow fever linwhich meant only one enemy, no longer two, remained.

THE COST

While the American Army in Mexico never sufferedmajor yellow fever epidemic, disease did extract a terribtoll. In addition to La Vomito, diarrhea, dysentery antyphoid claimed lives amid the poor sanitat ion of thcamps. And st il l other diseases - measles, smallpomumps, syphilis, gonorrhea and cholera - claimed livin lesser numbers.

In totaling all deaths among American soldiers in thMexican-American War, we find 1,192 were killedaction, 529 died of wounds received in bat tle, 362 sufered accidental deaths, and a staggering 11,155 sucumbed to disease. Thus illness took a toll seven timegreater than that of Mexican weapons. Small wonder thethat in preparing his campaign Scott had sought to avoadding to the count of victims for his unseen enemies.

-David

W Tschan

site of the ancient Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan, and wasthus also of great symbolic value to the Mexican nat ionas a whole. Capturing it would convince them of theircomplete defeat.

The immediate problem for the Americans was how toget there. An approach by Taylor 's forces from the northwas ruled out since he would have to cross too muchdeser t and the supply problems would be insurmountable. Instead, Polk decided on a landing at Vera Cruz.Once that great city had fallen, the American army, following the same path as Cortes had centuries earlier,

would march on the Mexican capital and end the war.Gen. Scott's plan, supported by Commodore David

Conner, the naval commander, called for an invasionbefore the end of January. Conner wanted to avoid theterrible "Northers," the s torms that annually wreakedhavoc with Gulf weather and could threaten the invasionforce with sinking. Those same Northers also cleansedthe swamps of mosquitos and eliminated yellow fever inthe area for a few weeks following. By April, however, thewinds would disappear and the spring rains would bringforth a new generation of disease-bearing insects.

Those biological interactions, of course, were unknown

to Scott. All he knew was taking Vera Cruz would not beeasy and he wanted to be in the high country o f t heSierra Madres by spring, before La Vomito could whittle

away his army. The best t ime to attack, Conner and Scotttherefore agreed, was in late January. But both men failedto anticipate the ineptitude of the War Department.

It's doubtful the War Department could have servedthe American cause any worse i f the men running it hadbeen in the pay of the Mexican government. In comicopera fashion they sent ships to the wrong ports , assigned t roops to the wrong locations and failed to deliverequipment where it was needed. Elements of the Armyand Navy arrived at the designated assembly point, theIsland of Lobos, about 75 miles east of Tampico, in dribsand drabs. It was maddening to Scott, whose attention todetail had earned h im the n ickname "Old Fuss andFeathers," as the entire month of February slipped awayamid the confusion. As if to remind him of what diseasecould do, an outbreak of smallpox caused the entire 2nd

Pennsylvania Regiment to be quarantined on Lobos.THE LANDING

Finally, on 9 March 1847, two months behind schedule, Scott launched the first amphibious invasion inAmerican mil itary his tory . It was a roaring success. Inless than five hours 10,000 men had landed without asingle casualty. Scott and his soldiers besieged Vera Cruzand maneuvered to completely invest it while the avyblockaded and bombarded it.

Siege life was miserable for both the besiegers and thebesieged. Mexican skirmishers kept the American sentries wary and trigger happy. Sand was everywhere and inevery thing. Happily living in that sand were sand fleas all of them hungry. Battling them took on almost thesame impor tance as fighting the Mexicans, with someunusual results. Young Lt. Robert E. Lee and a colleaguehit on the idea of covering themselves with pork greaseto keep the pesky creatures from feast ing on them. Thesmelly experiment had no impact on the fleas, but costLee some of his friends for a time. Others tried to dealwith the fleas by enclosing themselves completely in theircanvas sleeping bags, bu t that usually only resulted inthe complete encasement of the bag by an even largernumber of fleas.

More ominously, cases of La Vomito began to occur insmall numbers almost as soon as the Americans landed,though no t in epidemic strength. Scott knew, though, itwas only a matter of time before an epidemic that would

cripple his army would occur.COMMAND MAGAZINE 3



Bombardment of Vera Cruz, hand colored lithograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste B

38

delay several of his commanders pressed for an allout assault on the city gates, as the arrival of therainy season in April would be accompanied by La

Vomito, yellow fever (see sidebar), which might decimate the army i f they were still in the marshy low

lands at that time. But Scott refused, stating he preferred to take the place by "headwork, the slow scientific process," rathe r than by storming it withheavy losses to his troops and the civilians inside.When the weather abated, the expedition's heavy

artillery was l anded and sited behind field works1,000 yards south of the city. On 22 March the

bombardment began. Though Scott 's lO-inch mortars caused enormous damage within Vera Cruz,neither they nor his 24-pounder batteries werecapable of destroying the thick walls.At Scott's request, Commodore Matthew C. Perry,

who'd relieved Conner, landed three 68-poundershell guns and three 32-pounder solid shot guns.That naval battery, served by crews from the HomeSquadron's ships, opened fire on the 24th. Theeffect was devastating. As the southern wall beganto crumble under the impact, overtures for a ceasef ire were made by the consuls of England, Spainand Prussia. But Scott refused, demanding the surrender of the city and its garrison.On 29 March, with all his batteries along the

south wall destroyed, Morales resigned his command and his successor agreed to Scott's terms.Unwilling to hold the garrison as prisoners , Scottallowed them to march out of the city after receiving their parole not to take up arms against the US

again. He had taken the city at a cost of only 19dead and 57 wounded. Isolated, the gar ri son inUlloa surrendered the same day.

Though Scott was anxious to leave the cbefore the advent of La Vomito, he still lackedtransport needed to support his a rmy durin260 mile march to Mexico City. Because of cosion in the Quartermaster Department in Wash

ton and the loss of many draft animals whenships carrying them foundered, his requisition800 wagons and 7,000 horses and mules remaonly partially filled.Polk mistakenly thought Scott could make up

deficiencies by the seizure and purchase of Mexstock. But though some horses were roundedfrom adjacent estancias, the expedit ion remashort of the number required to properly outfiarmy. Finally, rather than risk his command tolow fever, on 8 April Scott ordered Twiggs tothe road to Jalapa. Worth's and Patterson's brigfollowed the next day.

Cerro GordoJalapa, 74 miles inland, was located in fe

country 4,680 feet above the coastal feverScott planned to base his army there before ping on to the Mexican capital along the NatiHighway, the same route Cortes had taken.Santa Anna, who'd returned to the capita l aleading his army back from Buena Vista, corranticipated the American commander's intentDetermined to keep the Yanquis from climbingof the fever belt, he placed a newly rai sed arm12,000, including several hundred of the receparoled Vera Cruz garrison, at Cerro Gordomiles east of Jalapa.

There the National Highway threaded i tsbetween the deep gorge of the Rio del Plan to

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



south and EI Telegrafo, a 500 foot hill, to the north.The pos it ion was a strong one, forcing an attack up

the Nat ional Highway into a narrow corr idorbetween the river and hill. The Mexican left restedon La Atalaya, a second hill 1,000 yards northeastof EI Telegrafo. Beyond La Atalaya lay deeplyravined terrain Santa Anna judged to be impassible.

Anticipating the Americans would make thei rattack up the road, Santa Anna placed three batteries, totall ing 19 guns and 1,800 men, between theRio del Plan and the National Highway. Confident

the rough ter rain would prevent an attack on hisleft , he pu t only a single battery of four-poundersand 100 men on EI Telegrafo, and only a few lookouts on La Atalaya. The bulk of his force he kept incamp near the village of Cerro Gordo, ready to bedeployed against the enemy as they came up thehighway.

Twiggs' advance guard made contact with agroup of Mexican lancers on 11 April; the followingday a reconnaissance in force revealed the enemy'spositions. But Twiggs' order for an immediateattack straight up the highway was countermanded

by Patterson, his senior, who elected to wait forScott's arrival on the 14th. After surveying thestrong Mexican position commanding the road,

Scott ordered his engineers to find a way aroundthe ir left. Under Capt. Robert E. Lee's direction apath was found nor th of La Atalaya, and during the16th it was made passable for infantry and, withdifficulty, even for artil lery. Late that night Scottordered Twiggs to move around the Mexican leftand cut through to the National Highway behindtheir batteries the following morning.Twiggs' advance remained undiscovered until

about noon, when lookouts on La Atalaya spotted

them and opened fire. Without orders, Lt. FrankGardner charged up the hill leading a company ofthe 7th Infantry Regiment. Realizing his attempt toswing back on the highway was now compromised,Twiggs sent the men of the 1st Artillery, acting as

infantry under command of Lt . Col. William S.Harney, to support Gardner's effort. La Atalaya fell,but the follow on attempt against El Telegrafo wasrepelled.Alerted by the appearance of Americans on his

left, Santa Anna, though sti ll convinced the mainassault would come up the highway, reinforced ElTelegrafo with additional artillery and two infantryregiments.Scott, realiZing his plan was unraveling, ordered

a general assault for the 18th. Early that morning,

after an artillery duel between the Mexican guns onEI Telegrafo and a battery of 24-pounders just manhandled onto La Atalaya, the Americans advancedin th ree columns. Shields swung wide to comedown on the Mexican camp from the north , whileBrig. Gen. Bennett Riley's brigade cut its way downto the highway to join Shields in his attack on thecamp. At the same time, Harney, leading PersiforSmith's brigade, drove the enemy off EI Telegrafo.Fearful of having their retreat cut off, the Mexicanregiments at Cerro Gordo began to disintegrate,their men scattering into the countryside.The only flaw was Pillow's mishandling of his

brigade. Ordered to attack the three batteriesbetween the gorge and the highway, he was la te in

forming his regiments and then mistakenly broughthis men within close range of the Mexican batteries.Within minu tes the lead regiment in the column,the 2nd Tennessee, had taken 80 casualties. Pillow,paralyzed by indecision, then failed to bring up hisother regiments to support them. Fortunately, when

the Mexican battery commanders saw the roadbehind them had been cut, they surrendered andPillow's units were spared further losses.

By 10:00 a.m. organized Mexican resistance hadcollapsed. American losses amounted to 63 menkilled and 367 wounded out of the 8,500 involved.Over 3,000 Mexicans, including five generals, werecaptured along with 40 guns, while al l t he res t,including Santa Anna, were forced to flee westward.

The Battle ofCerro Gordo

17-18 April , 1847

COMMAND MAGAZINE

US MexI n f an t r y . _

CavaIry[;jjjjjjl [;jjjjjjI

Ar t i l l e r y .

o Yas "1000

o Met IS

3



ButHe Didn't Stay BouKht

In 1846, after Gen. Zachary Taylor's victories at PaloAlto and Reseca de Palma during May, President James K.

Polk anticipated an early end to hostilities with Mexico.The campaign along the Rio Grande, regarded as the primary theater of war, was going well, and when the thousands of volunteers pouring into his camps had beenadequately trained, Taylor would move south into the theMexican province of Nuevo Leon. With much of northernMexico thus controlled by Taylor's army, and the mouth

of the Rio Grande and the coastal cities of Tampico andVera Cruz blockaded by the US Navy, Polk was confidentthe government in Mexico City would agree to a negotiated peace. To further increase the pressure, Polk also continued to pursue the war in the far west.

With his desire for the annexation of California uppermost in his mind, Polk, on 31 October 1845, the day warwas declared, had ordered Col. Stephen W. Kearney, then

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to take Santa Fe in theMexican province of New Mexico. From there, Kearneywas to proceed to the province of Upper California andcomplete its conquest in conjunction with Capt. John C.

Fremont, of the Topograph ical Eng ineers , who wasalready fomenting revolt against the Mexican authoritiesin that region. To further those designs, Polk also dis

patched Marine Lt. Archibald Gillespie to California withorders to assist Fremont. Those act ions were all takenduring the four months before Taylor moved south fromCorpus Christi.

Polk also fished in the troubled waters of Mexican polit ics to achieve his goal of incorporating the northern tierof Mexican provinces in to the United States. On 13February 1846 an agen t of Santa Anna (who'd beendeposed as pres ident o f Mexico and was then living inexile in Havana), Col. Alejandro Jose Atocha, visited theWhite House. The colonel brought with him a surprisingoffer from Santa Anna: for $30 million EI Generalissimo,upon returning to Mexico and regaining power there,

would <;ede to the US all of New Mexico and northernCalifornia.

The money, the ex-dictator claimed, would be used to"stabilize" the Mexican government and rebuild the army.However, a show of force by the Americans on the RioGrande and the continued blockade of Mexico's Caribbean ports would also be necessary to make the Mexicansbelieve Santa Anna had no option bu t to negotiate.

The meeting ended inconclusively, but a ft er theAmerican triumphs at Palo Alto and Reseca de Palma,Polk concluded Santa Anna's convoluted proposal might

have merit. On 13 Mayhe sent a message to

Commodore David E.Conner, whose squad-

ron was blockadingVera Cruz, to permit

Santa Anna to pass unhindered i f he chose toreturn from his exile onCuba.

But as the summerof 1846 wore on, Polkbecame increasinglyimpatient. The newsfrom the fa r west wasgood, with Monterey,

California, f all ing to

Commodore John B.Sloat early in July, andSanta Fe surrendering

President James K. Polk. to Kearney in August.

40

Taylor, though, who by that time was (unfairly) b

called "General Delay" by an increasingly hostile pr

continued to remain on the Rio Grande, preoccupiedt raining and assimilating the thousands of voluntinto his army.

On 16 August, Conner informed Polk that Santa Ahad arrived on a merchant ship of f Vera Cruz and

been permitted to go ashore. The same letter also inced the bad news Santa Anna, having assured himse

support among the factions plott ing against the incbent President Paredes, was now declaring he intende

lead his countrymen to victory over the hated YanAll hope Santa Anna was going to be amenable to a pin which territorial concessions would be madexchange for dollars vanished with the arrival of the cmodore's letter.

Still reluctant to broaden the scope of the war by sing an army deep in to southern Mexico, Polk hoTaylor's advance on the capital of Nuevo Leon mightlead to peace. On 11 October, news of Taylor's vicover Gen. Pedro de Ampudia at Monterey, in Nuevo Lreached Washington. But in contrast to the wild enthasm with which the fall of the Mexican city was greby the American public, Polk received the news co

For, in violation of what the president claimed wereexpress orders, Taylor had permitted Ampudia to lthe city with his army intac t. As Polk remarked tocabinet: "If Taylor had made prisoners of Ampudarmy it would probably have ended the war in Mexico

With Santa Anna raising a new army, and all hopenegotiated peace gone, Polk and his advisors realonly a campaign deep in to the hea rt of Mexico w

bring an end to the war.The conquest of the enemy capital by a move so

from the Rio Grande was briefly considered, butquickly discarded when it was realized the logisticalport needed to maintain an army over 700 miles of sinhospitable terrain simply wasn't available. Maj.Winfield Scott, who'd commanded the US Army s

1841, offered an alternative plan: the seizure of theof Vera Cruz, followed by an advance on Mexico CThough Polk, a highly partisan Democrat, dislikeddistrusted Scott, an ardent Whig, he was persuadedhis advisors the plan was feasible.

Taylor, also a Whig, was proposed as the leader ofnew expedition. But the President, suspicious of thateral's presidential aspirations, rejected the idea. ThatScott himself as th enext most logicalchoice. But thoughhe'd worked tirelesslyin support of the war

effort, Polk remainedconvinced Scott was

too hostile to his administration and mightalso become a dangerous political opponentafter th e war. Onlywhen Secretary of WarWilliam 1. Marcy pointed ou t there were noDemocratic generalswho could matchScott's demonstratedability was he g iv encommand of the expedition on 19 November General Antonio Lopez de S1846. An

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



Though there were several points along the National Highway west of Cerro Gordo where the Mex-icans could have made another stand, Santa Anna,his army now lit tle more than a mob, chose to withdraw all the way to the capital. The following dayScott occupied Jalapa with Patterson's and Twiggs'brigades, while Worth pushed on to take Perote.

Cutting LooseLogistics now became the primary American con

cern. The continuing shortage of t ransport , the

losses inflicted by guerrilla raids on the supplytrains, combined with the need to support the garrisons stationed along the National Highway inorder to protect the line of communication as theymoved deeper into Mexico, al l hampered th eadvance. Though comba t lo sses had been light,many men were falling victim to "diarrhea blue," avirulent form of dysentery that either kil led a manwithin days or reduced him to an invalid too weakto march.

Late in April, the men in seven of the volunteerregiments whose enlistments were to expire duringMay and June were polled as to their will ingness toreenlist. To Scott 's chagrin, only four officers and64 soldiers volunteered out of 3,000. Rather than

hold them to the end of their enlistments and thusexpose them to yellow fever when they embarked atVera Cruz for transportation back to the US, Scottgranted them early discharge.

Patterson accompanied the departing uni ts , astheir withdrawal left him without a command commensurate with his rank. He played no further partin the campaign. Pillow, who'd been slightly wounded at Cerro Gordo, took advantage of his disabledstatus to return home too . Once back there, hemanaged to get a promotion to major general fromPresident Polk, his old law partner, much to the disgust of those who'd witnessed his incompetence atCerro Gordo.

With his army thus reduced to 7,113 effectives,

Scott, after leaving garrisons at Jalapa and Perote toprotect his lengthening line of communication, continued westward. On 15 May, Worth, after defeatingan attack on his supply train by 3,000 Mexican cavalry, occupied Puebla, just 70 miles from MexicoCity, without opposition. Scott joined him there onthe 28th, with Twiggs arriving a few days later. Bythis point, though, the garrison detachments andlosses due to illness had left the commanding general with lit tle more than 5,000 men - too few tocontinue the advance.

On 31 May, Scott consolidated his army by ordering the garrisons at Jalapa and Perote to come toPuebla. Though strongly protected convoys couldstill fight their way through the guerrilla bands that

prowled the at ional Highway, the American armywas effectively cut off from the coast. Fortunatelyfor the invaders, the fertile country around Pueblaprovided food and forage enough to enable them to

Battle of Cerro Gordo, hand colored lithograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste Bayot.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 4



42

Lake

Texcoco

remain self-sufficient. During this halt, Scott alsokept his men busy with training, repairing gun carriages and supply wagons, and breaking the halfwild horses taken from the nearby estancias for useby Harney's understrength cavalry brigade.

As the summer passed, reinforcements arrivedfrom the coast. Pillow, returning from the US,brought 2,000 men with him. Thus by 8 July, Scott'soverall strength was over 10,000, though some2,000 remained incapacitated by sickness orwounds . Anxious to close with Santa Anna beforehe could further improve the defenses of MexicoCity, Scott continued to delay until Brig. Gen.Franklin Pierce arrived with another 2,500 men,

including the Provisional Marine Battalion of 300men under Lt. Col. Samuel E. Watson, along withsome additional guns for the siege train.

Following the arrivals of Pillow and Shields, Scottreorganized his army into four divisions and a 500strong cavalry brigade. Harney commanded the cavalry, now composed of squadrons f rom the 1st, 2ndand 3rd Dragoons. The two brigades of TWiggs'division were commanded by Brig. Gen. Persifor F.Smith and Col. Bennett Riley. In Worth's divis ionthe brigades were led by Lt. Col. John Garland and

Col. Newman S. Clarke. Each of those brigades consisted of three regiments. Quitman's division,smaller than the others, had one brigade of two volunteer regiments commanded by Brig. Gen. James

Lake

Chalco ' . )

o

Shields, and a second under Lt. Col. Watson, m

up of the Marines and yet another volunteerment. In Pillow's division, Brig. Gen. George Cadader commanded two recently recruited regimof regulars and the Voltigeur Regiment. (Trainelight infantry, those men were uniformed inins tead of the regulation Army blue.) Brig.Franklin Pierce commanded Pillow's secbrigade, also of two regiments.

The American infantry were armed with pesion rifle muskets , super ior to the Mexican flocks in both ra nge a nd rate of fire. The

pounder flying batteries were assigned to thesions on an as-needed basis, while Maj. Benj

Huger, of the Ordnance Corps, continued inmand of the 24-pounders and 10-inch mormaking up the siege train.

Outside the army proper, Scott 's inspector gal, Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a scholarlymana talent for intrigue, created a network of spiesinformers. Drawing on the services of foreignchants residing in Mexico city, along with the pcal enemies of Santa Anna, he managed toScott informed of the defenders' efforts. Hitchalso recruited Manuel Dominquez, a notoriousdit, a long with 200 of his followers, to acguides, courier s and spies. Possessing anmatched knowledge of the country, they sefaithfully through the remainder of the campaig

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



On 7 August 1847, then, with no fu rther reinforcements expected and nothing more to beaccomplished through reorganization, Scott movedwes t f rom Puebla with 10,738 men, headed forMexico City. In his typically flamboyant style hewrote to the secretary of war: "We had to throwaway the scabbard and advance with the nakedsword in hand!"

The decision to cut loose from his line of communications was greeted with unanimous condemnation by military authorities around the western

world. President Polk reacted by saying it was "agreat military error." British newspapers scoffedthat, l ike Napoleon in Russia, the Yankee generalhad over-reached himself. The Duke of Wellingtonexclaimed: "Scott is lost! He cannot capture the cityand he cannot fall back on his base!"

The Valley of MexicoLeaving Puebla, Scott kept his divisions within a

half-day's march of each other. They slowly climbedthe 10,000 foot Rio Frio Pass where, at i ts highestpoint , the highway became only a narrow defile.Surprised to find that natural strongpoint undefended, the Americans began their descent into theValley of Mexico, actually a high plateau surround

ed by even higher mountain ranges. Mexico City,with its 200,000 inhabitants, lay in the center.

Since much of the area around the capital wasmarsh land, access to the city was l imited to causeways rai sed above the wa ter soaked ground. Eachcauseway had an elevated aqueduct running downi ts center to provide the city with water. Whereeach causeway entered the city there was a garita, afortified customs house. Easily defended, MexicoCity had not fallen to an invader since Cortes' time.And behind those defenses waited Santa Anna with25,000 men and 104 cannon. His corps of lancersand dragoons alone was half the size of the entireinvading army.

Anticipating Scott would continue to advance

toward the capital along the National Highway, Santa Anna fortified El Penon, a 450 foot hill overlooking the road, with 30 guns and a 7,000 man garrison. To strike at Scott's left and rea r when he t ri edto force his way past El Penon, the dictator stationed Maj. Gen. Gabriel Valencia with another7,000 men south of the highway, along with Maj.Gen. Juan Alvarez's cavalry brigade.

After the US vanguard reached Ayotla on 12August, Scott paused to send forward Lee and otherengineers to reconnoiter. They reported El Penoncould be taken, but at a heavy price. An approach

along the road bordering the north side of LakeXochimilco, through the town of Mexicalzingo, wasthen considered. But other surveys revealed that

place was also heavily fortified and manned by alarge garrison.

Scott decided to flank those st rongly held positions and assau lt the city f rom the sou th , leavingTwiggs in front of El Penon to mask the movement.He took a rough but serviceable road that ran southof Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco to establish a newbase at San Augustin. Marching in a long column,the American divisions presented Alvarez's cavalrya fine opportunity to attack. But the Mexican cavalry commander was slow to react, confining himselfto harassing Twiggs' division when it finally tookthe Chalco road to rejoin the re st of the force. By18 August the four divisions were reconcentratedat San Augustin.

COMMAND MAGAZINE

Learning of the enemy flank move, Santa Anna,who had the advantage of interior lines, movedquickly, placing a strong force at San Antonio, twomiles north of Scott 's new position. He then ordered Valencia, with 4,000 men and 23 pieces of artillery, to occupy San Angel, on the Contreras road.Between those two positions lay the Pedregal, anapparently impassible wasteland of volcanic rock.

Unwilling to attack San Antonio directly, Scottdecided to turn the Mexican position by placing twodivisions on the Contreras road south of San Angel

and sending his engineers to find a way across thePedregal. During the even ing of the 18 th, Leereturned with the information a rough t rack didindeed run across the southern edge of the lavabed.

Earlier that day Santa Anna had ordered Valenciato retire to a point midway between San Antonioand San Angel, f rom where his brigade would be ina pos it ion to ei ther support the garrison at the former place or block an American advance up theContreras road. But Valencia, confident he couldstop any attempt to cross the was te land to theContreras road with his battery of 23 guns, choseinstead to move his brigade two miles south of SanAngel to a hill overlooking the southwest t ip of the

Pedregal.On the morning of 19 September, Pillow's van

guard, wi th orders to widen the path discovered byLee for the passage of artillery, appeared in front ofalencia's position, a rancho a t Padierna, where

they were immediately brought under cannon fire.Supported by only one six-pounder battery and afew mountain howitzers, Pillow was forced to withdraw. However, while the Mexicans were distracted,Riley's brigade, followed by Persifor Smith's andCadwalader's units, crossed the Contreras road onemile nor th of Valencia's position. They then movedinto a ravine just northwest of the Mexicans.

Late in the afternoon, Santa Anna, alerted by thesound of gunfire, arrived with over 4,000 men at

San Angel, which thus pu t three US brigades bet-

The Battle ofContreras

19-20 August, 1847

//

4



Assault at Contreras, hand colored lithograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste B

44

ween two larger Mexican forces. But Santa Anna, instead of attacking, ordered Valencia to spike his

guns and retire to San Angel, slipping past theAmericans in the dark. But again Valencia dis-

obeyed his chief, sending him word the Yanquis infront of him were already beaten and that he wouldfinish destroying them the next morning.

That night, as Valencia's men prematurely celebrated their anticipated victo ry by carousing intheir bivouac, scouts sent out by Smith, who commanded the three-brigade US force, found a route

to the west of the Mexican defenses. At 3:00 a.m.the Americans, now reinforced by Shield's brigade,quietly worked their way to the rea r of the unsuspecting enemy. As they prepared to attack, Leereached Scott with a request from Smith for a diversionary move in f ront of Valencia's position tomask the effort about to begin to his rear. Quick torespond to his subordinate's initiative, Scott order

ed Pierce to demonstrate in front of the Mexicans atdaybreak.

Just at dawn, as the Mexican sentries were beingdistracted by the sudden appearance of Pierce'smen east of their camp, Smith's brigades hit theirbivouac from the rear. First they fired a volley thencharged with bayonets f ixed. Within 17 minutesValencia's command was shattered, with 700 killed,over 800 taken prisoner and the rest fleeing northward on the Contreras road. The Americans lostonly 60 killed or wounded and, to their delight, thesix-pounders lost at Buena Vista were found to beamong the captured artillery.

At San Angel, Santa Anna, after stepping into theroad to slash furiously at the retreating soldiers

with his riding crop, ordered Maj. Gen. NicBravo, at San Antonio, and Brig. Gen. AntoGanoa, at Mexicalzingo, to withdraw beforewere flanked by the Americans now pressing up

Contreras road. To cover their retreat, Maj.Manuel Rincon was directed to hold Churubuscthe juncture of the San Antonio and Mexicalzroads.

ChurubuscoThe right flank of the Churubusco position

ed on the Convent of San Mateo, which wasrounded by a garden wall and earthworks piefor s even guns. I t was defended by 1,800 mincluding the San Patricio Battalion of foreignunteers . Many of the 204 San Patricio soldiers win fact deserters from Zachary Taylor 's army,immigrants who'd accepted Mexican offers ofland and the opportunity to serve in a Cath

army. Trained artillerymen, they also serveinfantry and were regarded as elite t roops. Asstood an excellent chance of being hung iftured, they could be counted on to fight to the l

Some 300 yards to the east of the convent,bridge over the Churubusco River was defende

a fortified bridgehead in which Santa Anna plone of his best regiments. Two others l inednorth bank of the river from the convent to sevhundred yards east of the bridgehead. To preve

flank attack left of Churubusco, infantrydeployed along the road leading northward toSan Antonio garita.

As Bravo began his withdrawal from San Anio, Worth sent Clarke's brigade through the bo

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



deployed in ditches behind the road stopped the USbrigades cold with their accurate fire. By 3:00 p.m.,though all of Scott's divisions except for Quitman'sat San Augustin had been committed, the Mexicanlines remained unbroken.

But then Santa Anna, fearing Shields was aboutto overrun the regiments defending the highway,

of the Pedregal paralleling the route of the retreating Mexicans, and ordered Garland's brigade to proceed up the road from San Augustin. When theysaw Clarke's men threatening their left, the rawmilitia tha t had been left i n San Antonio to coverthe retreat spiked their guns and fled north, mingling with Bravo's baggage train. To add to the confusion, when the head of Bravo's column reachedthe bridge it collided with the rearguard coveringthe retreat from San Angel. Observing the mass offleeing Mexicans struggling to cross the bridge,

Scott ordered Twiggs to take the convent to clearthe way for an attack on wha t was lef t of Bravo'scommand.

Confident the Mexicans were demoralized aftertheir earl ie r defea ts , Twiggs' regiments wereadvancing through the tall corn surrounding theconvent when, suddenly, Rincon opened up with asalvo from his battery. For nearly three hoursRincon's men, firing from behind the convent garden walls, beat off repeated American charges. EvenTaylor's recaptured six-pounders were bested in theartillery duel with the San Patricios and were forcedto withdraw after losing 24 gunners.

While the struggle for the convent continued,Worth 's two brigades reached the fortified bridge

head on the south side of the Rio Churubusco.Again a spirited defense checked the Americancharges, while marshy ground and ditches prevented Duncan's battery f rom going into action. On theAmerican left an attack by Shields and Pierce waslaunched against the road leading north fromChurubusco. But 2,200 Mexican infantrymen

o

o 1000

1000

The BattleChurubus20 Augus t 18

Garlalld

Battle at Churubusco, hand colored l i thograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste Bayot.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 45



0't:,= _ - = = : : : : : J I _ c : : : ~ Y d " s - = = = - - = = ......000° Meters 1000I

ArmisticeEarly the next morning Brig. Gen. Igancio Mo

Villamil entered the American camp under a flatruce, carrying a request from Mexican Foreignister Francisco Pacheco for negotiations. NicholT ri st , a US diplomat accompanying Scott's hquarters who'd been authorized by Polk to neate with the Mexican government, made the sug

t ion for a short armistice to allow for peace talkTrist 's objective was to secure a treaty in w

the Mexicans officially ceded the ter ri tory thalready los t to American arms. But both ScottTrist were naive in bel ieving the wily Santa Aactually intended to reach an agreement. The teof the armistice, signed on 23 August, permithe Mexicans to bring supplies into the beleagucity while also allOWing Scott's quartermasterpurchase food and other provisions there. Astipulation was that neither side would reinforcstrengthen its positions during the stand down.

Trist 's meetings with the Mexican negotia

between 27 August and 6 September produnothing bu t peremptory demands on the pa

the latter for the return of California andMexico. In the meantime, Santa Anna was ordeall the soldiers within 30 leagues of Mexico Cijoin his army, whi le also working fur ious lstrengthen the capital 's garitas with earthwand artillery. On 3 September he banned fursales to Scott 's quartermasters and expelled tf rom the city. Three days later, Scott, whose swere keeping him informed of the Mexican bup , denounced the a rmis tice and prepareresume the offensive.

On the evening of 7 September, at Tacubwhere the Americans were now concentrated, Sand his four division chiefs met to considerbest approach into the city. One of Hitchco

---------I--- - G - - - · ~ ~ ~-

reinforced t hem by taking a detachment from theregiment deployed along the Churubusco River eastof the bridgehead. That enabled Garland's brigadeto out flank the shortened Mexican line and cross

the river. Alarmed at the appearance of Americansmoving toward the highway behind them, some ofthe defenders of the bridgehead fled north. As firefrom th e bridgehead slackened, Clarke's mencrossed the ditch in f ront of it and, scrambling over

the parapet with bayonets fixed, took it.The roll up of the Mexican defense accelerated.With the ir lef t threatened, the regiments betweenthe convent and the bridge los t heart and retreated

toward the city. That enabled Duncan to place twosix-pounders west of the convent and take it underfire. In response to that new threat, Rincon shifteda gun from the south end of the parapets encirclingthe convent. But it s withdrawal weakened those

defenses, enabling the 3rd Infantry Regiment toforce its way into the convent grounds.

There followed several minutes of hand-to-handfighting before the garrison abandoned its gunsand ret reated to make a last stand inside the convent. But the Americans, following them closely,

also surged inside, still thrusting with their bayonets. Three times the Mexican commander raised awhite flag and each time the San Patricios, fighting·desperate ly, pulled i t down. Finally, Capt. ].M.Smith of the 3rd Infantry raised a white handkerchie f to signal a halt to what was becoming aslaughter. The garrison, still containing 1,200 effectives, 85 of them San Patricios, surrendered.

As the convent fell, Shields ral lied his men andagain attacked the infantry deployed along theroad. At first they resisted stubbornly, bu t whenWorth's men appeared to their rear they joined thelong column of Santa Anna 's men fleeing intoMexico City. With the entire Mexican army in disordered retreat, the van of Worth's division linked

with Shields' and pursued them for two milesbefore halting. In one disastrous day Santa Annahad lost about 10,000 men, a third of his command,with the remainder scattered and disorganized.

Critics of Scott maintain he should have beenable to seize the cap it al that same day. But his8,497 t roops, who'd been marching and fightingsince first light, had lost 273 killed and 865 wounded. Ammunition was low and there was s ti ll theprospect of a five mile march and a night actionthrough the streets of a city of over 200,000.Confident the battered Mexicans would sue forpeace, Scott brought up his siege guns and orderedhis t ired regiments to camp on the ground they'd

just taken.

US Mex

Infantry• •avaJryc::;;iiiiil c::;;iiiiiI

Ar t i l l e r y .

--...,, ,, ,,, '"

- ' ,," j !,

"e:--

arez

46 ISSUE 40 NOV I



informants arrived to report church bel ls werebeing melted and cas t into cannon in El Molino delRey. El Molino, actually a 200 yard long line of connected buildings along the western boundary of thewalled park of Chapultepec, housed a foundry andflour mill. Concerned the newly made guns werebeing added to Mexico City's defenses, Scott ordered Worth to attack the complex that night and,after destroying the foundry works and guns, retireagain. But Worth persuaded him to delay the st rikeuntil the following morning.

Well aware of Scott's concentration at Tacubaya,Santa Anna had placed two brigades in and aroundMolino del Rey, and a th ird, supported by sevenguns, along a cactus lined ditch running 100 yardsin front of the Casa Mata, a large stone building

500 yards west of El Molino bu t extending eastwardto it. He'd also garrisoned Casa Mata with 1,500infantry, and placed Gen. Juan Alvarez, with 4,000cavalrymen, west of it with orders to str ike the leftof any force moving against the complex.

EI MolinoThe next morning, after Capt. James L. Mason

had scouted the foundry before sunrise and reported i t appeared to be abandoned, Worth ordered

Huger's 24-pounders to open fire. When there wasno return fire, he cut short Huger's bombardmentand precipitately sent forward his division and oneof Pillow's brigades. On the right, Garland's brigadewas to strike the south and eas t sides of El Molino,

while 500 men were to assault from the wes t.Clarke's brigade, temporarily being led by Col.James S. McIntosh, was ordered to overrun theMexican defenses along the ditch and attack CasaMata. Maj. Edward V. Sumner, with three squadronsof dragoons, was placed on the left to block anyenemy cavalry attack.

Expecting only light opposit ion, the Americanshad advanced to within rifle shot when the batteries at El Molino and those along the ditch suddenlyopened up. Wright's command took the brunt of

the Mexican fire, losing 11 of i ts 14 officers withinminutes. As his men fell back in confusion, theywere attacked by a regiment coming from Chapultepee, whose soldiers cut the throats of the wounded Americans left behind during the ret reat . At thesame time, McIntosh's brigade, after haVing beenchecked by fire from the Casa Mata garrison andthe infantry and ar til lery along the ditch, was driven back by a counterattack.

The American effort was more successful on theright. There Garland's men reached the east side ofEl 10lino, and pressing close to its walls for shelter,worked their way around to the south end wherethey forced open a door, then, a few minutes later,gained a second opening at the northwest corner.

Joined by battalions from Cadwalader's brigade,and one of light infantry commanded by Capt.Ephraim K. Smith, they fought their way from roomto room in a lmos t t ot al d arknes s, driving th eMexicans from the foundry.

Molino del Rey - Attack upon the Molino, hand colored lithograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste Bayot. Looming at the farleft is the Castle of Chapultepec.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 4



The Assault onChapultepec II13 September, 1847

With McIntosh's brigade still checked in front ofCasa Mata, Alvarez's 4,000 cavalry advanced on theAmerican left. Outnumbered nearly 10 to one,Sumner's three squadrons charged, losing 44 troopers in a vain effort to check the enemy horse.

Alvarez, with a golden opportunity to roll up theAmerican left, came on . But when Col. JamesDuncan, whose six-pounders had been coveringMclntosh's retreat, swung his bat tery around andput a few rounds into their ranks, the Mexicanhorsemen fell back, contenting themselves thereafter by merely observing the fighting at a distance.

Duncan then redirected his fire on Casa Mata,setting it ablaze. Its commander, seeing £1 Molinowas about to fall, ordered the garrison to retreat .Shortly afterward the powder magazine exploded,killing six Americans who'd entered Casa Mata insearch of plunder. By 1:00 p.m., after two counterattacks f rom Chapultepec had been turned back,the battle was over.

Though Scott's men took 683 prisoners andkilled or wounded an estimated 2,000 more, they'dlost over 700 killed and wounded. Hitchcock'sinformant had misled them. Only a few unused gunmolds were found in £1 Molino. After ordering thebuilding complex destroyed, Scott withdrew hismen. For the overconfident Americans the frontalassault on £1 Molino, based on poor intelligence,was a pyrrhic victory, one which the dWindlingarmy could ill afford. Gloom fell over the Americancamp as the wounded were being loaded on wagonsand taken back to Tacubaya, where Scott's exhausted surgeons worked throughout the night.

ChapultepecWith his army reduced to l itt le over 7,000, Scott

and his division commanders realized to furtherdelay the assault on Mexico City was to invite theirown ultimate defeat. Within hours after the destruction of £1 Molino, Lee and other engineers weresurveying the approaches to the city. The San

Antonio garita, 1,000 yards south of the city proper, appeared to be vulnerable because of its isolatedposition. But when Scott personally surveyed thethree southern approaches on 9 September, he sawthe strengthened defenses there now included aline of entrenchments connecting the San Antonioand Nino Perdido garitas.At a council of war on the 11th, Scott's division

commanders, with the exception of Twiggs, advo-

Molino

del Rey

48

oi

oI

Yd,

Meters

500I

500I

cated an attack up one of the three southern causways. But Lt. Pierre G.T. Beauregard, an enginescout, argued the water logged land petween thocauseways would severely hamper the movementbatteries and troops. On the other hand, he pointout, the seizure of Chapultepec could be made ovsolid ground from the ruins of £1 Molino and, oni t fell, Mexico City could be entered by either t

Belen or San Cosme causeways. Scott, possibinfluenced by the fact the ruined foundry lay on1,000 yards west of Chapultepec, adopted Beau

gard's proposal.The defenses of Chapultepec were centered onCastillo, a large building that housed the Mexicnational military academy. Located on a 200 fohill, £1 Castillo and several smaller buildings wprotected by 15 foot high parapets encircling tacademy grounds. Steep banks made any attafrom the north or east impractical; however, to tsouth a road ran from the base of the hill toCastillo. A redan, an angled field work, defendedat i ts base, while a second redan was located whethe road turned half way up the hill. An assaufrom the west could be launched from £1 Molinfrom which the attacking force, after workingway through a cypress grove, had to drive t

Mexicans from a redoubt located half way up thportion of the hill before reaching the parapeUnknown to the Americans, an extensive minefieof buried, powder-filled canvas tubes had beplanted in front of the parapets.During the daylight hours of 12 September, Sc

ordered Quitman's division to make a demonsttion at Piedad, in order to fix the enemy's attention the southern causeways. Later, under coverdarkness, Quitman was to move to join Worth's aPillow's divisions and Persifor Smith's brigadeTacubaya, leaving only Twiggs' and Riley's brigadand two bat teries of six-pounders to secure t

right.In the meantime, Huger placed four bat teries

heavy guns, including two eight-inch howitzers aa 16-pounder, near £1 Molino and opened fire froth er e on Chapultepec. Originally built to be tsummer residence of the Spanish colonial viceroand not as a fort, £1 Castillo's thin walls were so

heavily damaged.During the early hours of that same day San

Anna had inspected the defenses of ChapultepBravo, who commanded the gar ri son, a sked freinforcements as his 1,000 infantry and artillermen were too few to properly man the parapeBut £1 Generalissimo, misled by Quitman's demostration, refused. Later, after it became apparentCastillo was the real American objective, heavy ffrom Scott's siege guns prevented all bu t a few

the reinforcements belatedly dispatched by SanAnna from reaching the garrison.

Indeed, Scott hoped the bombardment alomight drive Bravo's men from atop the hill. Butsp ired by the resolute behavior of the cadet s frothe military college, the garrison stil l held as darness fell.

That evening Pillow was ordered to attack twestern parapets of Chapultepec f rom £1 Molithe following morning; while Quitman's divisioreinforced by Persifor Smith's brigade, was to figits way up the southern road. Quitman was alsokeep the Mexicans f rom reinforcing the gar,risfrom the two causeways that converged ~ a s tChapultepec.

ISSUE 40 NOV I 99



Once El Castillo fell, Worth, whose divisionwould be in reserve during the initial assault , wasto take the San Cosme garita. Scott had selectedthat garita because Santa Anna, believing the Yanquis would use a more southern approach, had alsofailed to reinforce it. Though the distance to theBelen garita was shorter, it s garrison had beenincreased and a llocated three guns. I t also layunder the protection of the 18 guns of the Ciudadela, a fortress 300 yards to the northeast . Quitmanwas ordered to make a feint at the Belen garita dur

ing Worth's advance to conceal as long as possibleScott's true objective. Only Riley's brigade, south ofthe city, remained uncommitted.

Early the next morning the siege guns resumedtheir battering of Chapultepec with solid shot fortwo hours before shi ft ing to canister to clearsnipers from the area between El Molino and thewest face of the fortress. Promptly at 8:00 a.m.,Scott 's art il lery checked fire as Pillow's brigadesurged out of the ruins of El Molino. Dodging fromtree to tree, the 9th and 15th Infantry Regiments,covered to the south by four companies of lightinfantry, cleared the grove of the last snipers , overran the breastworks half way up the hill and rushedto the base of the parapets.

Watson's brigade, ordered by Quitman to blockany attempts to reinforce the Chapultepec garrison,was at first checked by a well handled Mexican battery at the junc tu re of the San Cosme and Belen

causeways. However, Persifor Smith's commandswung wide around that posit ion and, aided by twosix-pounders, thwarted an attempt by Gen. JoaquinRangel to reinforce Chapultepec. In the meantime,Shields' brigade swung left, forcing its way past thetwo r edans on the southern road to join Pillow'smen beneath the parapets. Shortly afterward,Clarke's brigade also came up, sent by Worth inresponse to Pillow's request for reinforcements.

Unfortunately, Pillow had entrusted the scalingladders to recruits who, unaccustomed to the

sound and violence of a battlefield, lagged farbehind the assault infant ry. For 15 long minutesthe attackers, jammed into a di tch at the base ofthe wall, under fire f rom the parapets above, waited. It was only by luck one soldier spotted the canvas tube leading to the mines and cut i t before itcould be ignited.

Finally the tardy ladder bearers arrived to a chorus of curses from the impatient infantry. The firstladders put against the parapets were toppled backward by Bravo's undermanned garrison. But then,as f ir st one, and then another, remained upright,the Americans began to swarm over the walls, forcing the defenders back into El Castillo. Closely following, the Americans fought their way inside, then

up, floor by floor, until those left in the garrisonsurrendered. The cadets, some only 13-years-old,held out to the last. The las t six of them to die havesince become immortalized in Mexican national

Storming of Chapultepec - Pillow's Attack, hand colored lithograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste Bayot.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 4



50

memory as Los Ninos Heroicos (the heroic children).Nevertheless, by mid-morning the s tars and stripesflew over Chapultepec.

At Mixocoa, two miles away, 30 captured San

Patricios, who'd been sentenced to death for desertion in time of war, sa t on mule-drawn wagonsbeneath a long gallows, their arms bound and nooses around their necks. Hard bitten men, they spent

their last minutes on earth berating Col. Harney,their executioner. When in the distance the Amer

ican flag suddenly appeared atop El Castillo,Harney sent the wagons lurching forward and thePatricios swung silently under the gallows.

But even before El Castillo fell, Scott, determinedto maintain the momentum of the assault, orderedCol. William Trousdale to clear the road along thenorth side of Chapul tepec for the rest of Worth'scolumn, using two infantry regiments and a sectionof guns under Lt. Thomas]. Jackson. With Rangelretreating in front of them, Worth 's force wentnorth on the Veronica causeway, augmented byCadwalader's brigade, two six-pounder batteriesand the dragoons. As it neared the junction withthe San Cosme causeway, Worth halted to clear twosmall field works and turn back a half-hearted

attack by 1,500 cavalrymen before he turned easttoward the San Cosme garita.

When he saw Worth's men take the Veronica

causeway, Santa Anna hastily sent three battalionsand th re e guns to that garita. Later, as Rangelpassed the garita during his withdrawal, he threwup a r edoubt and pos ted sha rp shoo te rs on thehousetops overlooking the northern side of the

road.As it neared the garita, Worth's column found

itself checked by accurate fire f rom the redoubt .

But then Garland's brigade began to inch forward,dodging among the arches supporting the aqueductin the middle of the causeway for cover. North ofth e causeway sappers in the van of C larke's

The Assault onMexico City13 September, 1847

Yds 2000

Meters 2000

Mexico

Garita

brigade, after battering an entrance in the awall of the first house they reached, began torow f rom one bui ld ing to t he next with pickand crowbars, while the infantry cleared the snfrom the roof tops. Lt. Ulysses S. Grant enlisteaid of the men of the 4th Infantry Regiment toa short-barreled mountain howitzer to the topchurch tower to take the garita under fire.

By 6:00 p.rn. the sappers had tunneled theirpast the Mexican defenses. Unaware the Yanwere to their rear, the defenders were stun

whenLt.

George Terrett and a par ty of Marinesdenly appeared on a housetop behind the gaLaying down a deadly fire, those Americans enated the remaining Mexican gunners andcharged out of the house with fixed bayonetsas Garland's brigade reached the redoubt.

Caught between two fires, the Mexicanslapsed, the garrison fleeing into Mexico City.darkness approaching, however, Worth halted

advance, ordering his men to bed down in the hes they'd just taken. Later that night he had Hlob five lO-inch mortar shells into the Grand Pto give the city's defenders a harbinger of whanext day would bring.

While Worth was reforming his column, Q

man, ignoring Scott's order to merely feint indirection of the Belen garita, gathered most otroops that had just taken Chapultepec and pudown that causeway. A fiery campaigner, Quitwho'd chafed at having been relegated earlier tduty of gua rd ing the a rmy's suppl ie s atAugustin while the other division commanwere fighting at Contreras and Churubusco,

determined to gain his share of glory.Placing himself at the head of his imprOV

command, he led those men toward the Belenta. Scott had accurately judged the strength oMexican position there. A battery in a redan aup the road held Quitman for an hour before ohis guns silenced it. Then, as they neared the g

itself, Quitman's men came under heavy firwasn't until an 18-pounder gun and a 24-pouhowitzer were brought up to shower the defenwith spl in ters f rom the shattered masonry o

walls that the Mexicans lost heart and withdrethe Ciudadela to the northeast.

Quitman's moment of triumph was brief. Forest of the day, while his men were pinned dowthe ruins of the garita, his guns were forced inunequal duel with the Ciudadela's battery. Tweight gunners became casualties, and almost aQuitman's officers were wounded. Low on ammtion, the Americans had to turn back several ct erat tacks f rom the Ciudadela's garrison bespending an uneasy night with little water an

food. Later Scott was critical of Quitman's impous advance, though he praised the soldiersmade it.

Though the Americans had by this time peneed the city's defenses at two points, in dointhey'd lost another 159 killed or missing and

wounded. The Mexicans had lost about 3,000but Santa Anna still held the Ciudadela with 5and had about 7,000 other reliable troops

where in the city.

The EndBut the city officials had enough. Possibly i

enced by the shells tha t had exploded in fro

the Presidential Palace, they called on Santa A

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



Genl. Scott's Entrance into Mexico, hand colored lithograph by Adolphe-jean-Baptiste Bayot.

to leave, declaring the capital an open city. Shakenby the success of the Yanqui assaults, El Generalissimo, declaring honor had been satisfied, agreed towithdraw. Shortly after midnight he and his beatenarmy retreated to Guadalupe Hidalgo, a village tothe north.Just before dawn on 14 September, Mexico City's

mayor and three aldermen waited on Scott at hisheadquarters near Chapultepec and formally surrendered the city. Quitman, after occupying theCiudadela, was the first to march into the GrandPlaza. Moments later Worth's division entered withScott, escorted by Harney's dragoons, at i ts head.Then, as the mounted band of the dragoons played"Yankee Doodle," Scott 's ragged army cheeredthemselves hoarse as their gray haired commander,resplendent in a dress uniform with gleamingepaulets and an abundance of gold braid, raised hisha t in acknowledgement.In the following month Scott reopened the road

to Vera Cruz, enabling supplies and reinforcements

to reach the army. Santa Anna, after being soundlybeaten in an attempt to seize Puebla, resigned thepresidency and no longer threatened the Americanoccupation. Faced with t he prospect of furtherdefeats at the hands of Scott's reinforced army, theMexican public tired of war and, long before theTreaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo officially terminatedhostilities on 2 February 1848, all effective resistance to the invaders had ended.Except for the poorly executed frontal attack at

El Molino, Scott had always employed flankingmovements to defeat his opponents. Cerro Gordo,the avoidance of a frontal assau lt on El Penon,Crontreras, Churubusco, and the attack on the SanCosme garita, all succeeded because of his ability

to outmaneuver his adversaries, who in contras t

COMMAND MAGAZINE

relied almost exclusively on static defenses and fortified positions.For sheer audacity, Scott's push into the heart of

Mexico, and his capture there of the enemy capital,is regarded by many US military historians as equalto MacArthur's Inchon/Seoul campaign of 1950.Wellington, who had at first predicted his defeat,

later wrote: "His campaign is unsurpassed in military annals. He is the greatest living soldier." 0

SourcesAnderson, Robert. A n A rt il le r y Officer in th eMexican War, 1846-7: Letters of Robert Anderson,Captain, 3r d Artillery, United States Army. NewYork: Putnam, 1911.

Bauer, K. Jack. The Mexican War, 1846-1848. NewYork: MacMillan, 1974.

Elliot, Charles. Winfield Scott: The Soldier an d theMan. New York: MacMillan, 1937.

Eisenhower, John S. So Far From God: The US Warwith Mexico, 1846-1848. New York: RandomHouse, 1989.

Katcher, Philip and G.A. Embleton. The MexicanAmerican War, 1846-1848. Osprey Men at ArmsSeries, No. 56. London: Osprey, 1976.

Leckie, Robert. From Sea to Shining Sea: From theWar of 1812 to the Mexican War: The Saga ofAmerica's Expansion. New York: Harper Collins,1993.

Miller, Robert Ryal. Shamrock an d Sword: The SaintP a tr i ck ' s B a t ta l i on in th e US-Mexican War.Norman, OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

Scott, Winfield. Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Scott, 2 vols.New York: Sheldon & Co., 1864.

Smith, Arthur D. Howden. Old Fuss an d Feathers:The Life an d Exploits of Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott.

New York: Greystone, 1937.



R u s s i a ' s A r l D l ! d F o r c l ! s T o d a yby T e d !i. R a i c e r

End of EmpireWhile the end of the Cold War has brought about

a reduction in the size of the US armed forces, thecollapse of the USSR has led to the near-implosionof that empire's once mighty military machine.

When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December1991, attempts to form a unified defense commandamong the emerging Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were thwarted by Ukraine, whichfeared Russian domination. As a result the Sovietarmed forces were soon divided among the RussianFederation and the 14 newly independent formerSoviet Republics.

Ironically, Soviet officers, especially veterans ofthe war in Afghanistan, had been among the strongest supporters of Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts toreform the Communist system. Recognizing theSoviet Union was falling rapidly behind the wes t

technologically, the military leadership had acceed serious reduct ions in the size of the Red Arto. free funds for military research and develment.

Instead, Gorbachev, who never served inarmed forces, sought ever increasing savings in mi tary spending. The so-called "Metal Eaters'l iance" (the Soviet term for their own "militaindustrial complex") was eating up 15 percentthe economy by the late 80s, stifling economgrowth. Gorbachev was wary of cutting funds frthe Interior Ministry (the MVD) and the KGB, afocused instead on making reductions in the d

ense budget.Even worse f rom the mili tary standpoint,

once unassai lable Red Army became the objectharshly critical public scrutiny. Under Perestrotales of drunkenness, brutality, corruption a

T h e l \ I e a r A b r o a d and th e CIS - Armenia

POPULATION: 3,700,000CAPITAL: YEREVAN

Armenia declared its independence from the USSR inAugust 1990, bu t didn't achieve it until September 1991.In December of tha t year Armenia joined the CIS. Since1987, Christian Armenia has been in conflict with it s

Islamic neighbor Azerbaijan over theArmenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabach. In a 1991 referendum the peopleof Karabach voted to unite with Armenia, bu t Yerevan has denied plans toannex th e region. Because Armeniainsists the struggle is between Karabach and Azerbaijan, th e Karabachdefense forces (20,000 men), thoughsupplied by Armenia, have remainedunder local command.

In 1992 Armenian regular armyforces seized the Lachin corridor between Karabach and Armenia, bu t were

unable to prevent an Azeri offensivef rom overrunning almost hal f of Karabach. In November of 1993, however,Armenian and Karabach troops drove theMoslem forces out and also occupied adjacent areas of Azerbaijan territory. Since thenthe Armenians have maintained the upperhand in sporadic fighting.Armenia's success in battling its more popu-

lous neighbor has been a remarkable achievement.Though six Armenian divisions fought in the RedArmy in World War II, Armenia has not had a nation-al army since the destruction of the short-livedArmenian Republic in 1920. The first modern Armenianunits were militias formed to defend Karabach in 1987

89. Not until January 1992, after Moscow decided to dis-

52

band the 7th All Anris Army based in Yerevan, did Aenia create a minis try of defense. Two months laterf irst Armenian mil itary uni t, the 1st Airborne Assa

Regiment, was formed.Currently the army has a strength of 35 ,000 m

organized into two motorized infantry and two tank dsions, supported by fou r a rt il lebrigades. The armored divisions conof two regiments, each regiment wfewer than 30 tanks (mostly T-55s aT-72s). The infantry divisions each ctain up to six motorized regiments.·The government also controls th

regiments of border troops (3,000 meand can call upon some 25,000 paramtary forces belonging to an organizatcalled Erkrlilph (Guardians of the Homland). Erkra'ph soldiers have been invoed both in the f ighting over Karaband in suppressing religious minori

within Armenia.The Armenian ai r force has 1,0men, along with 100 combat planes asome 50 armed helicopters. The Arenians lost six helicopters to Azerbaianti-aircraft guns in 1993, bu t the Rsians apparently made good these losin 1994.The greatest threat to Armenia is

possibility of Turkish military intervtion, either directly or by supportiAzerbaijan. For this reason, Yerevanallowed Moscow to station a motorizinfantry division (7,000 t roops andtanks) inside Armenia to protect "R

sian and Armenian interests."

ISSUE 40 NO V 1 9



Russian Mobile Forces Today

Spetsnazlall air-Iransport

2nd14th22n67th

Assault·Landing Units

11th, 13th,21st, 36th,37th, 56th Gds,83rd

7th Gds76th Gds98th Gds104th Gds106th Gds242nd Training

Airborne Units

general staff, army Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, butmostly because of the increasing loss of confidencein Grachev throughout the armed forces and thegovernment. A respected combat officer, Grachevhas shown himself to be an inept administrator.More importantly, he has been unable to protectthe defense budget from the predations of the MVDand Federal Security Service (FSB-the successor tothe KGB).either has his popularity been improved by his

handling of the Chechen crisis. Before interventionhe alternated between opposing the use of force

and blustering he could take Grozny with one airborne brigade. In the end he was outflanked by theheads of the MVD and FSB, who went so far as tonegotiate with local army commanders behind hisback to organize and launch the December 1994invasion.Despite those and other failures, Grachev has

continued in office because of the lack of an obvious uccessor. Kolesnikov seems to prefer his more

incompetence became a staple of press reports.Morale in the armed forces was shattered by thissudden change in public attitudes. Gorbachev'sdefense minister, Dimitri Yazov, complained bitterly of "irresponsible elements" in the press . Hisgrowing disillusionment with reform eventually ledhim to support the August 1991 coup.While some senior officers joined in the attempt

to oust Gorbachev, Pavel Grachev, commander ofthe elite Soviet Airborne Forces, and his deputyAlexander Lebed held their paratroopers aloof from

the coup. They refused bo th to attack BorisYeltsin's followers at the White House (the Russianparliament) or to def end Yeltsin from possibleassault by other military units.When Yeltsin emerged victorious, however,

Grachev managed to make his studied neutralityappear as loyal support for the cause of democracy.He was rewarded in April 1992 with the post ofdefense minister in the Russian Federation. In contrast, Lebed made his own distaste for both democracy and Yeltsin clear, temporarily ending his ownchance for higher command.The new Russian army was formed by presiden

tial decree on 7 May 1992. At the top of the chainof command is the current Russian President, Boris

Yeltsin. Under him responsibi li ty for the armedforces belongs to Pavel Grachev and the generalstaff, the historic brain t rust of the Russian armedforces.The influence of the general staff declined in the

late Gorbachev era, but has revived under Yeltsin,who in 1995 made them subordinate to the Russianpresident rather than the defense minister. Thatwas partly due to the abilities of the chief of the

o Miles 1000,-----Krn 2000, - - - - -

-, -II

,Olekmins(

•

Members of Commonwealthof Independent States

Recent Soviet Satellites notmembers of CIS

-<.

~ ..... Angara~ J

I /Tal"sk Bratsk

K r a s l \ ~ y a r s k

Current Russian Military Districts

~ .' / ~ ' - i I , s o nderma /

"J (-< ,

Salek a i' "1 "& RU/S 5 I AI

ra ,. . ..-.--..

Mzhnyaya Tunguska

be

COMMAND MAGAZINE 5



The l \ Iear Abroad and th e CIS - Azerbai jan

POPULATION: 7,500,000

CAPITAL: BAKU

Since declaring its independence in December 1991,Azerbaijan has been plagued by political instability. Itsfirst president, Ayaz Mutalibov, was ousted in a coup inMay 1992. His successor, Abulfaz Elchibey, was forcedfrom power the following year. Azerbaijan's currentruler, Heidar Aliev, has survived two attempts to overthrow him.

All three presidents lost popularitybecause of their inabili ty to win the warwith Armenia over Nagorno-Karabach.Despite a considerable superiority inmanpower, the Azeri army has beenout fought by i ts Armenian opponent.Since May of 1994 a Russian-sponsored truce has generally been observed, bu t has left 20 percent of Azeri territory under Armenian control.The Azeri Ground Defense Force has

50,000 men. In theory the army ismade up of 50 percent volunteers, butmany are youths forcibly rounded upfrom the s tree ts of Baku. Defeat has

added to morale problems, and desertion and draft evasion are common.The army is organized into 10 mech

anized brigades (two battalions each),three motorized rifle brigades, an airassault brigade, two training brigadesand two mountain infantry regiments.The army has 280 T-72 tanks in service

and another 70 in storage. There are also a number of oT-55/54 tanks in use.

The Azeri a ir fo rce (7,000 men) is limited by thConventional Forces in Europe Treaty to 100 combat acraft and 50 attack helicopters. Sixty of the Azeri waplanes are L29/39 trainers. The Azeris have los t mothan a dozen helicopters and several combat plan(including one MiG-21) over Karabach.

Azerbaijan has a naval flotilla on th

Caspian Sea. It consists of two frigatand three fas t a ttack missile boats. Tnavy is used in an anti- smuggling roand has played no part in the war wiArmenia.

There are also nearly 50,000 poliand several thousand border and secuty troops. Many of those units have beemployed in the fight for Karabach, bthey've also taken part in the s tr ingcoups and attempted coups in BakAliev was forced to disband severpolice formations after they attemptto overthrow him in 1994.With Armenia receiving Russian su

por t, there is little chance for an Azemilitary victory. But though Baku neepeace, so far Aliev has been unableunwilling to purchase it at the priceconceding Karabach. The current reltive peace in the region is one of exhaution and mus t be considered fragilebest.

politically neutral niche, while the other candidatesrepresent competing factions that would exacerbaterather than resolve the tensions within the armedforces.

The ArmyThose tensions are most keenly felt in th eRussian army. Though the largest and most prestigious of the armed services, the army has also suffered the greatest dislocation since the fall of theSoviet empire.

The army currently has a strength of 1,000,00On paper there are 60 motorized rifle divisions,tank divisions and 14 artillery divisions. But manof the rifle divisions are mere cadres, with on1,500 men. That's barely adequate to guard an

maintain equipment in serviceable condition. Evmany active divisions are greatly understrength, tresult of widespread draft evasion and desertion.Morale among those who do serve is low. Ru

sia's best and brightest avoid the draft, and thquality of conscripts has fallen to the point whe

The l \ Iear Abroad and th e CIS - Belaru!i

POPUlATION: 11,000,000

CAPITAL: MINSK

At the time of the USSR's collapse, the highest concentration of Soviet military power was located in Belarus.Two tank armies, an all arms army and

an air army were based in White Russia,for a total of over 170 ,000 men. Tha twas a force fa r beyond what the newBelarus government either needed orcould afford, and by early 1995 he rarmed forces had been reduced by morethan half, to 80,000.The army (50,000) currently consists

of four divisions: two motorized rifle, onetank and one airborne, along with threemechanized brigades and a field artillerydivision. They are organized into two corps

(5th and 28th), with a third cadre corps headquarters (65th) to be activated at full mobilization. There are 300,000 trained reserves.

54

The air force (30,000) has approximately 150 MiG a

craft (primarily MiG-25 interceptors), but lack of fuel anspare parts has limited pilots to 40 hours flying timeyear, one-third that of their NATO counterparts.

The governmen t o f Belarus ha

maintained the closes t ties to Moscoof any former republic, and in Mar1996 the president of Belarus joinewith Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in aeffort to lower e conomic barrieamong those three former Soviet lanand Russia. At the same time Belarhas agreed to join Russia in a "UnionTwo Republics," in which Belarwould give up much of its indepedence in economic and foreign policThe exact effects of the Union Treaon the armed forces remains unclearthis time.

ISSUE 40 NOV I 99



The Near Abroad and th e [ ] ! i - Georgia

Batumi


CAPITAL: TBIUSI

Georgia began to break away f rom the Soviet Union asearly as 1989, when dozens were killed demonstrating

fo r independence. Since becoming independent th enation has been torn by a multi-sided civil war betweenTbilisi and the non-Georgian peoples of

South Ossetia (in the north central partof Georgia) Abkhazia (in the northwest

along the Black Sea), and Adjara (in thesouthwest bordering Turkey).Ziviad Gamsakhurdia , Georgia' s

leader from October 1990 to January

1992, was a fierce nationalist whose hostility to Russia led him to opposeGeorgia's joining the CIS. The Russians

in turn provided arms, training and "vol-unteer" military forces to the Ossetianand Abkhazian rebels.Gamsakhurdia's successor, former

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, has adopted a more cooperativepolicy toward Russia. In July 1992, CISpeacekeeping forces were introduced into

South Ossetia. When the Russians intervened in Chechnya in 1994, Shevardnadzeendorsed Moscow's action. The Russiansthen withdrew their backing for the Abkhaz-ian rebels, who've nevertheless maintained theirindependence from Tibilisi.

The Georgian defense force consists of 25,000ground t roops organized into si x motorized

infantry brigades and one armor regiment. There are twcorps headquarters, 1st and 2nd, the latter commandinthe Georgian forces that fought in Abkhazia in 1992-93

The 2nd Corps suffered heavy losses during that perioand was finally withdrawn. The Georgian air force hafewer than fifty serviceable aircraft, and the Georgia

navy, based at Poti, has only 16 small vessels.The Sou th Ossetians' Secessionist Militia Guard ha

some 3,000 men, while the Abkhazian rebels have 4,00

nat ive f ighters, a long with an additional 4,000 troopfrom outside Georgia. The rebels have no air force, budo have a handful of tanks and armored personnel carrers.The Russian a rmy has some 20,000 "peacekeepers

inside Georgia, including a motorized rifle div is ion,helicopter regiment, an airborne regiment and an aiassault battalion. The presence of those forces haended large scale fighting.

Shevardnadze must walk a f ine l ine; hneeds Russian support , or a t least neutralityin his s tr uggl e wit h t he rebels. At th

same time, his embrace of Yeltsin ha

alienated extreme Georgian nationalistwhich led to an attempt by some of hi

own security forces to assassinate him iAugust 1995. Unwilling to grant Abkhazian independence, Tbilisi currently lackthe military might needed to enforce itwill. Thanks to Scheverdnadze's diplo

matic maneuvers and Russian interven

tion, Georgia has regained some stabilitybu t its future remains uncertain.

20 percent of all recruits have criminal records atthe time of their entry into service. Discipl ine isoften both brutal and lax, as off icers bul ly recruitsbut fail to maintain order in the established ranks.It's estimated one in 20 soldiers will be the victim

of rape from his fellows in uniform.Matters are lit tle better among the officer corps.

Roughly 180,000 officers, along with their families,are homeless. Pay remains low, and is often monthsin arrears . Under such conditions corruption ha s

flourished, with officers selling the weapons undertheir command to criminals and foreigners. Thereare even rumors, which the Kremlin denies, that as

many a 23 nuclear warheads are now unaccounted

for.

ElitesConditions are somewhat better among the air

borne forces, which have retained their status ast he c ream of the army. The paratroop force now

consists of five airborne divisions (reduced fromsix in 1989), no t including the division-sized 242nd

Training Center at Omsk. There are a lso seven helicopter ai r assault brigades, though they havealways been looked down upon by the parat roop

ers.

The Near Abroad and th e CI!i - Kazakhstan


CAPITAL: ALMATV

With a land area of over a million square miles,

Kazakhstan is the largest CIS country apart from Russia.Ruled by President ursultanNazarbayev (who recently had himself confirmed in office until theyear 2000), a former first secretaryof the communist party. Kazakhstan has sought to strengthen tieswith Russia while finnly maintain

ing it s independence.The Kazakh army (the former

Soviet 40th Army) has 45,000 men:one motorized rifle division, onetank division, an anti-tank brigade,a special purpose (Spetsnaz) brigadeand two art il lery brigades. The

COMMAND MAGAZINE

army has 2,700 tanks, including 2,180 T-72s, and on

regiment of attack helicopters.Kazakh military doctrine is defensive, with the larg

size of the nation dictating a policy of mobile response tareas under threa t. There is a lsa substantial (23,000 men) internal securi ty force, including2,OOO-man Republican Guar

sworn to protect the President.The a ir force has an addition

al 20,000 men and approximately 200 serviceable aircrafThe air force 's major need is fomore long range interceptorand - in common with the res

of the CIS states - more funding for training and repair.

55



Chechnya

21st &22ndStavropol Cossac

22nd Don CossackSpetsnaz

x

II !l

Rural Patrolsx

165thCossack

I I I

I I I

I I Ir"i"1 =200 men~ 3 0 l i . &

Moo. gun,

Airforce=15 L-15trainers

Fleets, the 31st Maikop Motor Rifle Brigade, and foadditional motorized infantry regiments.

On 19 January the 276th Motor Rifle Regiment and876th Independent Assault-Landing Battalion capturthe Chechen presidential palace. By 31 January the ocial Russian causalty figures listed 735 Russian dead, bthe actual number was certainly higher. Moscow wasable to pronounce Grozny "secured" until 6 March, aeven then Dudayev's fighters continued to wage guerr

war from the surrounding hillsand

countryside.Adopting a "dest roy the village to save it" policy,Russians responded to Chechen raids with indiscriminshelling and bombing of towns. In reprisal , in June 19Chechen fi gh te rs s li pped into the Russian townBudennovsk, taking 2,500 hostages at the local hospiAfter two futile Russian assaults, which cost the lives140 hos tages, the Chechens were granted safe passaback to their homeland.

The war in Chechnya has been a debacle for tYeltsin government. Criticized from the left for wagan unnecessary war, the Kremlin has also been attackfrom the right for mili ta ry inepti tude. The armed forthemselves have been split over the intervention, w

several senior commanders resigning in protest over

invasion. Morale among the soldiers is poor. Moscoattempt to improve esprit by handing out over 5,0medals for bravery might have been more effective

fewer of them had been posthmous.Yeltsin had thus been reduc

at the start of the presidential capaign in April 1996, to simpannouncing the war is over. Butwar continues and Russian losare mount ing. The quest ion nownot whether Moscow can affordgrant Chechnya independence, bhow long it can afford not to.

81/9Oth Interior 33rd DonTank Div. Ministry Cossack

Totol =38,000 men, 230 tonks, 454 APes

I I I

I Other}unitsP I' Unknowno Ice number of

formations

Villa e =30,000Militra, men Iotol

The Moslem Chechen tribesmen of the North Caucasuswaged a bitter war against the Russian Empire beforethey were finally conquered in 1859. In 1918, aft er thefall of the czar, the Chechens briefly established an independent state, but the Red Army retook control of theregion two years l at er . In 1940 the Chechens rose inrevolt. Stalin responded by having the entire populationdeported to Central Asia in 1944. At least 200,000 died.The Chechens were only allowed to return to their homeland in

1957.In November 1990 th e National Congress of theChechen People elected air force Gen. Dzhokar Dudayevas their leader, then adopted a declarat ion of independence, which Moscow ignored. A year later Dudayev waselected president of Chechnya, and a second declarationof independence was issued. Yeltsin responded by sending a small security detachment to the Chechen capital ofGrozny to arrest Dudayev. Mobs of his supporters prevented their leaving the Grozny airport. The Russian parliament meanwhile voted against the use of troops toresolve the Chechen dispute.

Moscow next t ried to remove Dudayev from power byoffering support to h is pol it ical r iva ls in Grozny. InMarch 1992 there was a an attempted coup by pro

Russian rebels. When that failed, Russia instituted an economic blockade.In 1993 Dudayev dissolved the Chechen parliament

and began to rule by decree. Once againMoscow attempted to take advantage ofdivisions among theChechen c lans bybacking Dudayev'srivals, but again withlittle result.

By th eend of 1994,a hard-lineclique Abkhoz

around Yelt-

sin convinc-ed the Rus-sian presi-dent only military interventioncould put an end to the Chechen ulcer . Among th e hawkswere the minister of the Interior and the minister ofnationalities and regional policy, the head of theFederal Counter-intelligence Service (FSK), andYeltsin's advisor and bodyguard Alexander Khorzhakov. Intervention was initially opposed by DefenseMinister Grachev, but his attempts to negotiate a settlement were undermined by the FSK.

On 11 December 1994, the Russians invadedChechnya with a hurriedly gathered force of 10,000

men, many of them poorly trained Interior Ministry(MVD) and FSK troops. Three columns were launchedto encircle Grozny from the north , west, and southeast . But the Chechens had nearly 7,000 highly motivated volunteer fighters. The western and southeastpincers were halted. The northern pincer onlyreached Grozny on 31 December, where intense streetfighting began.

After the Russian commander in Chechnya was Later Russian Reinforcementskilled on 7 January 1995, Moscow ordered in rein- x I I Iforcements. By March the Russian force had grown to 74th Indep. U e 6 ~ ~ 6 ~ v .over 35,000 men, including an ad hoc airborne division made up of elements from the 76th, 104th and106th Airborne Divisions, assault groups from threenaval divisions of the Northern, Black Sea and Pacific

56 ISSUE 40 NOV 199



The l \ Iear Abroad and th e CIS - Kyrgyzs tan

POPUlATION: 4,600,000CAPITAL: BISHKEK

A relatively stable nation, Kyrgyzstan recently joinedKazakhstan and Belarus in signing a treaty to lower economic barriers with Russia. Its small army consists of asingle motorized rifle division (12,000).The air force (4,000 men) has access toa number of former Soviet air bases andover 300 aircraft, bu t no first-line inter

ceptors.The Kyrgyzstan armed forces remain

closely integrated with and reliant uponthe Russian armed forces. The Russians

have loaned the air force a unit of MiG-21 interceptofor ai r defense, and Kyrgyzstan is a member of thRussian-sponsored Joint CIS Air Defense System. ThRussians provide training to the officer corps, includintraining for battalion and brigade officers at the famou

Frunze Military Academy in Moscow.Kyrgyzstan's relat ions with neigh

boring Uzbekistan are tense, as thnation contains a large Uzbek minorit

With its defenses remaining largely iMoscow's hands, Bishkek has foundexpedient to support Russia in economic and foreign affairs.

In the west the Special Purpose Brigades (specialforces, or Spetsnaz) have long been portrayed asthe best of the best in the Russian armed forces.That title now more r ight ly belongs to the airbornebrigades, bu t the Spetsnaz remain a cut above most

Russian units. Often depicted as a force of sabot eu rs and assassins, the ir primary missions areactually intelligence gathering and reconnaissance.The Spetsnaz have been reduced from 10 brigades

to eight. The establishment strength of each hasbeen cut to 900 men, and several are seriouslyundermanned below that level. Overall, unlike theparatroops, the effectiveness of the Special PurposeBrigades is in steep decline.

Command & DoctrineCommand of the ground forces is divided. The

airborne forces are under the operational control ofthe chief of the general staff, while the infantry,tank and artillery forces are assigned to the militarydistricts (wartime "fronts"). The planned, bu t notye t implemented, creation of a rapid reactionmobile force, and the restructuring of the militarydistricts into four "strategic groupings" will place aforce of 100,000 under the d irect control of theRussian president, operating through the general

staff.The old Soviet military districts, which were

essentially unchanged from the days of czaristRussia, have also survived in the Russian Federation. The most obvious change is the reduction inthe number of districts, with the loss of those inthe newly independent republics (what theRussians term the "Near Abroad").

The l \ Iear Abroad and th e CIS - Moldova

POPUlATION: 4,300,000CAPITAL: CHISINAU

Under the USSR, th e Moldovian Soviet Socialist

Republic had been formed from the union of Bessarabia,seized from Romania in World War II, and the MoldovianAutonomous SSR east of the Dniester River. In 1990, aspart of the wave of nationalist unrest sweeping the SovietUnion during the late Gorbachev era, Moldova declareditself a sovereign republic. Full independence wasdeclared on 27 August 1991.

Fearing Chisinau planned t o reuni te Moldova withRomania, Russian nationalists in the Dniester region (whomake up 23 percent of the population there) began todemand their own autonomy. In late 1991 they declaredthemselves an independent republic.

From the start the Dniester Republic has receivedbacking f rom the Russian 14th Al l ArmsArmy stationed there. The first militaryadvisors to th e rebel republic were tworet ired commanders of that force. Officersof the 14th Army helped organize and equipthe rebels' army, the Dniester Guard. Russian and cossack volunteers also arrived tosupport the breakaway republic. Throughou t 1991 and the fi rst hal f of 1992 fierceguerrilla fighting erupted along and eas t ofthe Dniester river.

For Moldova, t he ex is tence of theDniester Republic has been t he focus ofboth military and foreign policy. Though intheory the government can call upon100,000 reservists, Chisinau's army num

bers only 11,000 men, organized into threeCOMMAND MAGAZINE

motorized infantry brigades. The army has 250 armorevehicles, but fewer than 100 tanks . The air force hafewer than 100 planes, including 12 MiG-29s. Opposinthe Moldovian army, the Dniester Guard has 10,00troops, including 4,000 Cossack volunteers.

In June 1992, as all-out war seemed about to breaout in Moldova, Gen. Alexander Lebed arrived to t akcommand of 14th Army. He immediately mobilized th10,000-man 59th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, anannounced his forces would retaliate fully against anattacks on Russian troops. He then conducted negotiations that led to the introduction of CIS peacekeepinforces (including four Russian airborne battalions) alonthe Dniester. In effect, Lebed used 14th Army to shiethe fledging Dniester Republic from invasion.

Moscow ha s since been ambivalent about it s polictoward Moldova. In October 1994, Russand Moldova agreed to the gradual withdrawal over three years of 14th Army, buthe Russians now claim pulling out thaarmy's 90,000 troops will take longer tcomplete.

Whether the Dniester Republic can suvive without the protection of the 14tArmy is an open question. The removal oLebed in May 1995 is another sign t hKremlin's support for the rebels may bweakening. But th e greatest blow to threbel government was Moldova's decisionot to unite with Romania, which has undemined much of the popular support eas t othe Dniester for continued separation.

5



The Near Abroad and th e

CIS - TurkmenistanPOPUlATION: 4,250,000

CAPITAL: AsHKHABAD

Turkmenistan is a relatively stable nation. It's foreign policy aims at closer relations with neighboring Turkey without

offending Moscow.The Turkmen armyhas 20,000 men inthree motorized rifle

d iv is ions , one tankand three artillerybrigades. The Turkmen air force is siz

able bu t much of it isin storage (there over500 MiG-29 intercep

tors in mothballs, bu tonly 16 in service), andthe air force remainsdependent on the Russiansfor spare parts, maintenanceand even pilots.

Today seven military districts remain. They arethe Leningrad (the name has apparently no t been

changed, though the city of Leningrad itself is againofficially and popularly known as St. Petersburg),Moscow, Volga, Urals, North Caucasus, Transbaikal,and Far East military districts. There are also sevenCombined Headquarters Groups, and a special

Western Group of Forces (100,000 men) withinKaliningrad enclave on the Baltic.

Despi te the organizational similarity, thereone profound difference between the military dtricts of the Russian Federation an d th e Sov

Union. Previously the districts consisted of twoers, with the outer layer of districts acting as a bfer protecting the internal layer (the Moscow, No

Caucasus, Siberian, Urals, and Volga districts). Tinner layer in turn acted as force generators asources of replacements for the forces in the fr

tier districts.With th e los s of the Baltic States, Belarus,Caucasus, the Moslem republics of Central Aand mos t of all Ukraine, the outer layer has b

peeled away. For th e first t ime s ince Pet er

Great, excepting the Russian Civil War of 1918-Moscow doesn't control the areas immediately srounding the vulnerable Russian heartland. Tgeographic fact, along with new limits placed

the army by the chaotic post-Soviet economy, a

the changing nature o f the threat s to the Russstate, have led to a profound rethinking of militdoctrine.

The military doctrine of the Soviet Union hbeen geared to protecting the Communist Emp

from the perceived threats of NATO in the west aChina in the east. The Red Army had been preping itself to ref ight (albeit with modern weapoth e great mechanized battles of World WarRemembering the destructiveness of those battlthe armed forces' highest goal was to insure a

future war be fought outs ide the t er ritory of

The A ir Force & Navy

The Russian Air Force in Europe is limited by th e

Conventional Forces Europe Treaty to 3,450 combat aircraft, 850 armed helicopters and 300 naval aircraft. Theactual Russian inventory currently includes 145 strategic

bombers, 250 long range bombers, 2,000 close air support craft and 1,050 interceptors in service. But many of

those aircraft are either out o f date or in poor repair.Not all combat planes are under air force cont rol . In

1991 the role of close ground support was assigned tothe army, leaving the air force with control over strategicbombing and "Front Aviation." The latter is a newly reinstituted concept from World War II, combining fighter

and fighter-bomber asset s in support of ground oper

ations distinct from immediate tactical requirements.

Much o f the air force budget and manpower (165,000men) is devoted to the Air Defense Force, which includesfighters, sur face to air missile units, and detection andtracking installations. The end of the Soviet Union meant

key radar and tracking stations were suddenly located in

territory no longer under Moscow's control, in the independent nations of the Near Abroad. The Russians haveattempted to remedy that problem by the creation, at theFebruary 1995 Almaty CIS summit, of a Joint CIS AirDefense Command. Russian Air Defense forces are currently stationed in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The air force 's largest problem is lack of fuel, whichdrast ical ly l imits training. Fighter pilots receive only 40hou rs o f flying time pe r year, strategic bomber crews

only 80. These numbers are less than a thi rd the flyingt ime for NATO pilots, and they are considered less thanthe amount r equi red to maintain basic piloting skills,much less combat effectiveness. Until the problem is

remedied, the Russian ai r force will be no t much more

58

than a hollow shell of i ts former self.The Russian navy is also suffering from shortages

fuel for training. Recent photographs show major surf

vessels anchored in por t with peeling paint and skele

crews. Of t he fou r Russ ian f leets (the Northern, BalBlack Sea and Pacific), only the submarines of the Norern Fleet continue to operate at near Cold War levels.

The submarine service now has 39 SSBNs (nuclear blistic missile), 19 SSGNs (nuclear gUided missile), fSSGs (guided missile), 51 SSNs (nuclear attack), and 60(conventional attack) subs. New subs continue to en

service while older vesse ls a re scrapped. The trendtoward a smaller bu t more modern fleet. The effectiness of the Russian silent service is expected to

enhanced by the increasing use of professional contr

sailors in place of conscripts.The Russian surface navy has two helicopter carrie

three battle cruisers, 10 cruisers, 33 destroyers and 1frigates. There is also Russia's first conventional aircr

carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been assignto the Northern Fleet.

The Russian navy has 300,000 men, roughly one-thof whom serve aboard ships, with the remainder involin training, logistical and other support services a

naval aviat ion. Each fleet also has its own naval grou

force. The largest group, equipped with 350 tanks a800 armored personnel carriers, belongs to the North

Fleet. I t inc ludes two naval infantry brigades, a codefense division, a coastal artillery regiment, and a scial purpose brigade.

Naval units have been heavily involved in both the win Chechnya and in CIS peacekeeping operations. Furtexpansion of the naval ground force, pos sibly a texpense of the fleets, can be expected in the future.

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



The l\Iear Abroad and th e CIS - Uzbeki! i tan


CAPITAL: TASHKENT

Bordering all four of the new centralAsian republics (Kazakhstan to thenorth and west, Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan to the east, Turkmenistan tothe south), Uzbekistan has emerged as

one of the strongest states in the region.While maintaining close relations with

Moscow, Tashkent has also moved tostrengthen ties with Turkey.Uzbekistan has a large Taj ik minor ity,

and fear the turmoil inside Tajikistan mightspread across the border has led t o Uzbek

economic and military aid to Dushanbe. At thesame time, Tashkent has been waging a cold

war wi th Kyrgyzstan, which has a large Uzbekpopulation.

USSR, and was therefore conducted on at least an

"offensive-defensive" basis.Under Gorbachev a new doctrine was introduced.

It cal led for a "reasonable sufficiency" of force to

conduct a "defensive defense." The motivating factor beh ind the new doctrine was simply the USSR'sshrinking defense budget, and after 1989 the lossof i ts eas tern European satraps. The nation could

no longer foot t he bill necessary to maintain theolder definition of "sufficiency." Attempts by themilitary to resurrect pre-Gorbachev doctrine in1992 were thus rejected out of hand by the Russianparliament.

Not until November 1993, following the army's

support for the armed attack on his political enemies that October, did Yeltsin approve (in Presidential Decree 1833) a new doctrine for th e a rmedforces, which has remained in effect since.

The Uzbek armed forces are a mix of conscripts and

contract volunteers. The army has a s trength of 10,000men: one motorized rifle division (of two regiments), onetank brigade, one artillery and one airborne brigade

The army has 350 tanks in service (mostly T-62 and

T-72 models). There are also 750 other armored

vehicles, with another 1,000 in storage.The air force is being reduced to adhere to

treaty obligations: 100 combat aircraft and 32

armed helicopters. This downsizing wileffectively halve the nation's ai r assets.

The Russ ian mi li ta ry has two airdefense regiments based in Uzbekistanalong with a regiment of SU-27 inter

ceptor aircraft. It's also rumored theRussians may have as many as 800artillery pieces stationed in Uzbekistanas well.

That new doctr ine, developed by the generalstaff under instruction from Grachev, is an attemptto reconcile the limits of post-Soviet power with thegenerals ' desi re to revive the army's power and in

fluence in both domestic and foreign policy. On thedomestic side it calls for the government to protectboth the army's material well-being and i ts publicprestige. The decree also authorizes use of the military at home in matters ranging from organized

crime to attempts to secede from the Federation.In foreign affairs the document clearly states the

i nt eres ts of Russia are to be considered beforet hose o f the CIS, even in contravention of alreadysigned CIS accords. Moscow has also made clear itsintention to protect the interests of the millions ofethnic Russians in the Near Abroad.On a strategic/operational level, Russian doc

trine has changed to take account of the receding

The l\Iear Abroad and th e CIS - Tajiki! i tan


CAPITAL: DUSHANBE

During the Russian Civil War, Enver Pasha, the deposed war minister of the Ottoman Empire, attempted tocreate a new Islamic s ta te in Tajikistan. He was kil ledfighting the Red Army in 1922, bu t it wasn't until 1933the Soviets finally crushed all Moslem opposition in the

region. Today Tajikistan is again the site of conflict between Russian and mil it an t Islamic forces. The war inAfghanistan (a country with 4,000,000 ethnic Tajiks) during the 1980s led to a rise in Moslem fundamentalism.

But anti-Russian riots took place in Dushanbe as early as1978, the year before the Afghan war began.

After independence was declared in 1991, the first Tajik president was Rahman Nabiyev, leader of the Tajik

Communist Party and chairman of the

local supreme Soviet. Nabiyev's communist past, and his eagerness to establish close ties with Moscow, alienatedthe mullahs (the Islamic religious leadership). At the same time, his decisionto rule by decree a ngered more progressive elements. In May 1992 th eopposition People's Volunteer Corpsseized control of most of the capital.Nabiyev was forced to share power

with his enemies.COMMAND MAGAZINE

Not surprisingly this arrangement soon collapsed andopen civil war began. Nabiyev was forced to flee Dushanbe. Then, in the fall, his own supporters voted him ou t opower, replacing him with Imamali Rakhmonov.

Lacking any organized military, t he new Tajik leadeturned to Moscow for help. CIS t roops from Russia andUzbekistan intervened against the rebels. In Octobe

1992 the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division launchedan offensive against the Islamic Popular DemocraticArmy. In December the rebels were driven out o fDushanbe after bloody street fighting. Over 25,000 Islamic fighters were driven over the border into Afghanistan.

The rebel defeat did not end the fighting. Though Moscow arranged a cease-fire in April 1994, and a UN observer mission arrived to monitor i t t ha t December, the trucehas been honor ed only sporadically. To date the Tajikcivil war has killed tens of thousands and created almosa million refugees.

The Tajik army numbers fewer than5,000 men, and Dushanbe has no ai

force. The Kremlin has been grOWingincreasingly impatient with this state oaffairs. But Moscow can't withdrawwithout risking an Islamic victory tham ight le ad to similar Islamic revoltsthroughout the CIS.

59



threat from both NATO and China. The dangers toRussian security now are largely internal, from ethnic, religious and nationalist forces ins ide theFederation, as in the ongoing war in Chechnya. Theremaining external threats are from militant Islam,with its appeal to the millions of Moslem Russiancitizens around the Caspian Sea, and instability inthe neighboring republics.

In 1992 Grachev outlined plans to reorganize thearmy to deal with these new realities. He proposedthe creation of a "Mobile Force," which would allow

the Kremlin to inject mili tary power at any crisispoint within or around the Russian Federation.With this powerfu l s trategic asset to enforceMoscow's will a t home or in the Near Abroad, theremainder of the armed forces would adapt a staticdefensive role guarding the Russian heartland.

The Mobile Force is to be divided between anImmediate Reaction Force and a Rapid DeploymentForce (RDF). The Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) isto be formed around the a irborne divisions, airassault and Spetsnaz brigades, along with anamphibious assault force of seven navy and marinebat ta lions, 12 to 14 aviat ion regiments and threearmy airlift divisions. The IRF is to be kept on constant alert status, ready to move within 24 hours to

any trouble spot . It would be backed by the Rthree army corps and an air army, which coulddeployed as reinforcements in three to seven da

The Mobile Force idea represents a radical deture from the mass mechanized armies of the UBut the concept is well suited to Russia's cur

strategic needs, and could no doubt prove an eftive instrument of Russian power. Unfortunatfrom the Kremlin viewpoint , the Mobile Fothough originally slated to become operationa1994, sti ll exists mostly on paper. The Rus

army simply lacks the money to provide the eqment, training, transport and logistical suppreqUired.

With the creation of the Mobile Force stalled,Russians have attempted to increase their secuby beefing up the forces holding their strateflanks, the North Caucasus and Leningrad milidist ricts. To do this they have had to violatelimits placed on their forces there by the Convtional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), signed bySoviet Union in 1990.

The CFE Treaty dealt w ith the withdrawaSoviet forces from eastern Europe and set limitsdeployments of tanks, armored personnel carriartillery and combat aircraft in the Soviet Un

Guardians ot= The ! i tate

1.t Independent SpecialDe.lgnatlon Dlvl.lon

The Russian security forces now control almost350,000 well armed troops, 35 percent of the size of therest of the Russian ground force. The budgets of the secur ity services have continued to grow at the expense of

the Defense Ministry. Yet the role of the security forces inRussia remains unclear. In general, though, they can beseen as an expensive and potentially dangerous legacy ofthe USSR.

THE BORDER TROOPS

The Russian Border Guards were firs t estab lished in

1893. In 1993, Boris Yeltsin made them an independentforce, the "Border Service of the Russian Federation."Today there are 190,000 Border Troops, though their

authorized establishment cal ls for 250,000. They areequipped with armor, light artillery and assault helicopters.

Their primary responsibility is of course the securityof Russia's immense borders. There are seven BorderDistricts, with separate operational groups stationed inKaliningrad and outside Russia in Kyrgyzstan (2,500),Turkmenistan (15,000), Georgia and Armenia (2,000), andTajikistan (20,000). Border troops have also been used inChechnya.

The Director of the Border Service is Gen. Andrei Nikolayev, an able administrator who's won Yeltsin's confi

dence. He was thus able to block Defense MinisterGrachev's attempt to gain control of the bordertroops, and has even been considered a candidateto replace that minister. But Nikolayev was embarrassed in June 1995when he issued a self-congratulatorysta tement on his troops' success insealing the border with Chechnya onthe same day Chechen rebels seizedhostages in the Russian town ofBudyonnovsk.

THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE

The Federal Security Service (theFederal Counter-intelligence Service

60

pr ior to April 1995) is the lates t incarnation of the cbined 2nd and 5th Chief Directorates of the Soviet KWith a strength of 10,000, i ts responsibilit ies incl

counter-intelligence, anti-terrorism, prOViding armbodyguards and trained assassins, and "gathering inmation on threa ts to Russia's security." That last mdate is sufficiently broad to allow the conduct of options abroad in competition with the Foreign IntelligeService (the former KGB First Chief Directorate).

The Federal Security Service is headed by Gen. MikBarsukov, an ally of Gen. Alexander Khorzhakov, w

controls the 10,000 troops of the Presidential SecuService. The two men are the leading hawks in Yeltsinner circle.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS TROOPS

The Russian Interior Ministry (the MVD) contr70,000 mechanized light infantry troops. These are died between s ta ti c gar rison uni ts and a mobile 30 ,man Operational Designation Force (OP AZ). OPNtroops are armed with tanks, armored personnel carrand helicopters.

The most important OPNAZ unit is the 1s t indepdent Special Designation Division (1st ODON) statiojust outside Moscow. A reinforced mechanized unit,10,000 troops are organized in five mechanized r

ments, a tank battalion, an artillery bation, various specialized support units,

=10,000 men an elite anti-terrorist Special Forces comny.

The 1st ODON was formerlyFelix Dzherzhinsky Division, founin 1924 to protect the communistdership from counter-revolutiTraditionally the 1st ODON is nofor its absolute obedience to authty. In 1991 it obeyed orders fromleaders of the August Coup. Two yela te r it obeyed Yeltsin duringassault on the Russian parliament.

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



west of the Urals. After the Soviet Union was dissolved, the emerging CIS republics generally accepted a share of the forces allowed to the Soviet Unionunder the treaty.

In the case of Ukraine, that left the Russians facing a potentially hostile neighbor possessing 4,080tanks to Moscow's 6,400, and 1,420 combat aircraftto 4,340. With its vastly greater airspace to protect,Russia considered Ukraine's air allocation underthe CFE too high, and was also alarmed by the nearparity in tank strength.

The Russians have complained, with some justification, the CFE was intended to deal with a Sovietempire that no longer exists, and should thereforebe renegotiated. So far this p lea has largely fallenon deaf ears in the west. James Woolsey, who negotiated the CFE agreement for the US, has called theRussians' arguments "spurious." In rhetoric rarelyheard since the Cold War, he's accused the Russians of seeking a chance to destroy the agreementto serve their "ambi tions for dominance in theCaucasus and Eastern Europe."The Russians have tried to get around the force

limits imposed by the CFE in various ways. Tanksand ai r assets have been transferred from thearmed forces to the MVD, for example, while Geor

gia has been forced to count Russian un its on itssoil as part of her own force limits.The war in Chechnya and the general instability

in the Caucasus have also increased the Russians'dissatisfaction with the CFE, and their violations of

its limits have grown more blatant. From Moscow'sperspective the treaty imperils their ability to station forces in an area of genuine threats to nationalsecurity. But Russia's actions, however logical militarily, have only served, at least so far, to increasesuspicion in the west.But even if those CFE violations are taken to flat

ly prove Russia cannot be trusted to honor it sagreements, even if Russia returns to its authoritari an pas t, t he former Soviet menace cannot berevived. The events of 1989 to 1991 shattered the

Red Army (which in hindsight was probably less athreat than it appeared at the time). What remainsis powerfu l only in comparison to its immediateneighbors. Against the forces of western Europe,even without the United States, the Russian armywould stand no chance of offensive success.The problem for the Kremlin can be stated most

simply in economic terms. In the 1980s the Sovietmilitary devoured 15 percent of the USSR's wealth.Today the armed forces, including the BorderTroops and the forces of the MVD, take 22 percentof a vastly reduced Russian budget. But to bring themilitary up to the level of effectiveness envisionedby Presidential Decree 1833 would require a staggering 44 percent of the annual budget. It cannot

be done.The greatest threat to the west is posed not by

Russian strength but by Russian weakness. But theopportunity, if it ever rea lly existed, for a newMarshall Plan to secure the foundations of a stable

The l\Iear Abroad and the CIS - Ukraine

xxxxxxx(Formerly the USSR's~ = : : J

-Transcarpathion

UMilitary District)

craft, and the ai r force currently has 1,150 combat plane(not including trainers), with another 500 in reserveincluding 314 MiG-21s.

The Ukrainian navy ha s a strength of 15,00men. In 1995 Ukraine signed a treaty giving it 18.

percent of the Black Sea Fleet, the remainde

going to the Russian Federation. The core othe fleet is two frigates and 40 smaller vessels.

That resolved one thorny issue beween Kiev and Moscow, but otherremain. The status of the Crimea, witits large Russian populat ion and thhuge naval base at Sevastapol, continues to be a major source of frictionBoth Yeltsin and Ukrainian Presiden

Leonid Kuchma have an interest iimproving relations, but both are likewise wary of provoking a nationalisbacklash at home by seeming to givaway too much.

POPULATION: 51,500,000CAPITAL: KIEV

The most populous CIS nation after Russia and the

largest CIS nation lying entirely within Europe, Ukraine'sdefense establishment is the second largest \o\ithin thearea of the former Soviet Union.

The army has 217,000 men. In addition to the units inthe diagram, there are six at tack and five support helicopter regiments; however, many of those units are onlyat cadre strength.The Ukraine has over 4,000 tanks, including 1,500

T-72s and 350 T-80/90s. That's a formidable force, comparable to the 6,400 Russian tanks allowed in Europeunder the CFE treaty.The army is supported by over 50,000 border guards,

12,000 internal security troops, and a35,000-man national guard. There arealso 100,000 paramilitary troops inthe country, though Kiev has recentlybegun cracking down on the largest ofthese, the 70,000 member right wing

Union of Ukrainian Officers.Ukraine inherited the Russian sys

t em of milit ary districts (the Kiev,Odessa and Carpathian Military Districts), but they've since been disbanded and replaced by two "strategicgroupings," Western and Southern. It'salso planned to rep lace the Sovietarmy and division order of battle withmore western-style corps and brigadedesignations.Under the CFE, Ukraine's air force is

l imited to 1,090 combat aircraft and330 armed helicopters. But Kiev inherited some 3,000 Soviet military air-

COMMAND MAGAZINE 6



MILITARY, NAVAL, AVIATION,

AND

WORLD HISTORY BOOKS

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and democratic Russia has passed. We shall havelive in the future less under the threats posed

Russian expansion than by those posed by conued Russian implosion.

Selected SourcesCorley, Felix; ed. Jane's Sentinel Regional Secu

Assessment, Commonwealth of IndependStates. London: Jane's Information Group, 199

Galeotti, Mark. The Kremlin's Agenda. AlexandVirginia: Jane's Information Group, 1995.

Kuzio, Taras. "The Organization of UkrainForces." Jane's Intelligence Review, June 19pp. 254-258.

Schofield, Carey. The Russian Elite: Inside SpetsAnd the Airborne Forces. London: GreenhBooks, 1993.

Woff, Richard. The Armed Forces of the Form

Soviet Union, 4 vols. Portsmouth, EnglanCarmichael and Sweet, 1995.

The Baltic State! i

The three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuaniaare the only former Soviet Republics that didn't join theCIS. All three nations have worked to establish a jointBaltic States battalion to participate in UN peacekeepingoperations.

EstoniaPOPUlATION: 1,600,000CAPITAL: TALUNNEstonia established a defense ministry in April 1992,

and soon after introduced 18 month compulsory militaryservice for al l malesage 19 to 28. As withthe other Baltic States,

Tallinn's primary concern is to build up itsmilitary to prevent anypossible repet it ion ofthe Soviet take over of

1940.Today the Estonian

army has 5,000 troops

organized into sixmechanized infantrybattalions and a rapidreact ion regiment . The army is backed by a nat ionalistparamilitary force, the Defense League (Kaitselitt), whichhas 16 bat ta lions (6,000 men). The Kaitselitt is a mixedblessing, for its members have provoked incidents with

Estonia's large Russian population. One Estonian politician has compared it to "a large gentlemen's club, ratherthan a responsible paramilitary organization."

latviaPOPUlATION: 2,700,000CAPITAL: RIGA

Latvia's f ir st secur ity concern was insuring th eremoval of the 60,000 Russian troops based there. Thatwas accomplished by September 1994, with the help of

diplomatic pressure from the west. Latvia's second military objective has been the formation of an army largeenough to discourage any Russian return.

Currently the Latvian armed forces consist of four800-man mechanized infantry battalions and 11 frontier

62

guard infantry battalions. Ultimatelyit's planned fo r astanding army of9,000 men, backedby 10 ,000 nationalguards. The lat ter isan all volunteer force,which in peacetime isunder parliamentarycontrol. In the event ofwar, however, it would subord inate to the army and theministry of defense.

lithuaniaPOPUlATION: 3,900,000CAPITAL: VILNIUS

Lithuania was the first of the BalticStates to declare its independence, in March 1990.weeks later an embryo defense ministry, the Departmfor the Pro tection o f the Region, was established.January 1991, the Lithuanian armed forces had reach12,500 men, in addition to 32,000 paramilitary voluteers.Today Lithuania has 25,000 men under arms, incl

ing border and civil defense units. The army'smain formation is th e

recreated 16th Lithuan-ian Division, a World WarII Red Army uni t th athad been disbanded inthe 1950s.

Lithuania ha s maintained the most cordialrelations with Moscow ofall the Baltic States. As aresult, it was first to befreed of Russian troops.That was accomplished

by September 1993, withmost of the Russian personnel, some 45,000, being traferred to the coastal enclave of Kaliningrad.

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



World War II Axis Military History

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63



the resurrection of his service after World WaAfter throwing off the limitations imposed by

Versailles Treaty, which had barred Germany fr

possessing military planes, aircraft carriers, smarines and all warships in excess of 10,000 toby the time the new war began Germany posses

a modern, though small , fleet: two battlecruis

three pocket battleships, one heavy cruiser,light cruisers and 22 destroyers.

But even when the two new battleships, Bismaand Tirpitz, joined the fleet, the outnumbeKriegsmarine would still be no real match forBritish navy, which in 1939 had a dozen batships, three battlecruisers, seven aircraft carri62 cruisers and 159 destroyers.

As the war began, Raeder hoped the Germ

inferiority in numbers would be offset, at leaspart, by the quali ta tive superiority he assum

would be inherent in his more modern vesselsfact, though, there really wasn't much bas issuch a hope. The single heavy cruiser, Hipper, win refit until January 1940. The Scheer, one of thpocket battleships, was beset by protracted engproblems and would remain under repair uOctober 1940. The battlecruiser Scharnhorst w

also suffering engine problems; while even mimportantly, she and her sister ship Gneisen

lacked th e firepower required to successfuengage British battleships, and both needed toupgraded from II-inch to IS-inch guns before tcould be considered true capital ships.

Deployment of the major German warshwould also be hamstrung by the des troyers av

able as escor ts for the larger units . They weredesigned for long ocean cruises, and their limirange was further reduced because their poor skeeping qualities required them to retain at leastpercent of their fuel or risk capsizing in heavy se

Even more serious shortcomings existed inlight cruisers. The weight-saving technique of weing their hulls brought on critical structural dciencies, which were aggravated by the additionmore topside mass aft er commissioning. Simpeace time operations had already caused crackin their superstructures. Consequently, all six licruisers had to be barred from operating inAtlantic and were also prohibited from droppbelow half their fuel capacities.

ISSUE 40 NOV 19

Preparations for WarFor Germany's navy - Der Kriegsmarine -

World War II came six years too early. On 3 Sept

ember 1939, when France and England declared waron Germany in response to Hitler's invasion ofPoland, t he nava l rearmament program, the "ZPlan," was only eight months old. That grandiosebuilding scheme would eventually have given the

Thi rd Reich a fleet to rival the Royal Navy, including eight battleships and 10 battlecruisers, bu t themajority of the units were not to have been ready

until 1945.In the meant ime, Germany would have to f ight

the wor ld 's greatest sea power with what shipswere on hand. Adm. Erich Raeder, commander in

chief of the German navy since 1928, had overseen

Hitler (right center), with Adm. Raeder on his right, departsafter launching the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen on 22 August

1938. NationalArchives

64



65

o 30th Sept. 1939 - Cf ) 7th Oct. - Ashleo &

Newton B

8 17th Oct. - Huntsmae 22nd Oct. - Trevani9 15th Nov. - Africa S<':} 2nd Dec. - Doric Stao 3rd Dec. - Tairoo

o 7th Dec. - Streonsha

Voyage of thl iraff!ipee

'.TLANTIC

OCEA N

SOUTH

AMERICA

The crew of the Admiral Graf Spee musters on deck. Along withher sistershipsDeutschland and Admiral Scheer, the Graff Speewas unlike an y other warship in the world, since she mount

battleship-caliber guns on a hull smaller than that of some

heavy cruisers. National Archives

Exeter, bu t still suffered enough to cause her totake refuge in the nearest port, the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo.

The Graf Spee dropped anchor a t Montevide6just before midnight on 13 December, while

Achilles and Ajax remained outside the harbor. TheGerman ship's commander, Capt. Hans Langsdorff,surveyed the damage inflicted on his pocket battle-

Equally grievous faults handicapped the Germancapital ships, destroyers and heavy cruisers. Thepropulsion system Raeder had personally chosen topropel those vessels - superheated, high-pressure,steam boi lers - proved to be of dubious reliability.Under the rigors of extended use, the boilers brokedown with alarming frequency. Worse, the heavycruisers' turbines were no t fuel efficient, so anycombat voyages would be operationally hamperedby the requirement to pre-posi tion tankers to keepthem fueled.

But the most serious of the Kriegsmarine's flawswas the almost complete absence of a naval a irarm. Luftwaffe chief Herman Goring secured personal control over virtually all the Reich's militaryaircraft. The only planes operated independently bythe navy were the few seaplanes actually carried onsome of the larger ships. Even they were servicedand flown by air force personnel. Raeder opposed

the arrangement, but his apolitical background lefthim at a distinct disadvantage in arguments with

Goring, Hitler's long time Nazi crony.The Luftwaffe's aircraft monopoly, besides hin

der ing the formation of an air group for theplanned aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, meant thatin any naval opera tion only land based air support

would be available, and then only at Goring's whim.The Kriegsmarine also contributed to the bad situation when its command declared torpedoes to beexclusively naval weapons, refusing to give any tothe Luftwaffe to provide the basis for developmentof air-launched versions.

When the war began, Raeder told his officers:"Gentlemen, we have no choice - total engagement. Die with dignity!"

Later he wrote in his diary that in the expandingwar his navy men could hope to do li ttle more thanshow they knew how "to die gallantly."

The Early War at SeaDespite his pessimism, Raeder was determined

to imbue an offensive spirit in the f leet . In lateAugust, before the outbreak of war, he dispatched apair of pocket battleships to two areas in th eAtlantic. The Deutschland and the supply shipWesterwald were sent to a pos it ion off Greenland,while the Graf Spee and the replenishment vesselAltmark were deployed halfway between SouthAmerica and Africa.

When France and Britain declared war, however,Hitler still refused to permit the two warships toattack enemy merchantmen, hoping hosti l it ieswould end a fte r the fall of Poland. Only on 26September, after it had become apparent the warwould continue, did he give in to Raeder's requests

and release the pocket batt leships for commerceraiding.

The Deutschland's cruise was soon cut short byHitler, who ordered her back to port, fearing a blowto Germany's prestige and national morale i f theship bearing the nation's name were lost. But fortwo and a half months the Graf Spee maraudedacross the South Atlantic and wes te rn IndianOceans, picking off nine merchantmen while eluding the 23 Allied ships sent to hunt her down. On13 December, outside the River Plate estuary, looking for one last target before heading back toGermany, Graf Spee was caught by three Britishcruisers, the Exeter, Ajax and Achilles. In the ensuing "Battle of the River Plate," the German ship gotthe better

ofthe engagement,

heavilydamaging

COMMAND MAGAZINE



The Deutschland, with guns at full elevation, at sea in 1936.National Archives

ship, concluding he needed 14 days to make herseaworthy again. But after just 24 hours in port, theUruguayan authorities, citing international law,informed Langsdorff he'd be allowed only 72 morehours to make repairs , departing then or suffering

internment.As the crew furiously patched holes and madeother repairs as best they could, the ship's gunneryofficer reported sighting the battle cruiser Renownand the carrier Ark Royal outside the port. In fact,however , only the heavy cruiser Cumberland hadarrived, replacing the damaged Exeter.

The battlecruiserGneisenau. She and her sister ship Scharnhorst were the Kriegsmarine's largest warships when World WarII began. Despite their size, their nine eleven-inch guns were toosmall to take on British battleships, and their untried high-pres

sure steam boilers proved to be exceedingly unreliable.National Archives

66

Regardless of the actua l number of enemysels immediately outside the port, Langsdorfffully aware the Royal Navy would be concentraagainst his lone ship. On the 15th, after presidover funeral services ashore for his slain crewmhe signaled Berlin for instructions. Raeder, awarthe Uruguayan government's pro-Allied sentimeconsidered internment in Montevideo to be tamount to surrendering the sh ip to the British.told Langsdorff to either fight through to BueAires, Argentina (a country with a much more

Axis neutral ity at that time in the war), breakcompletely and return to Germany, o r scuttleship.Langsdorff was thus l ef t w ith few optio

Having been given enough time to only partirepair his ship's damage, battling past the blocking vessels and then steaming alone the 7,000 mback to Germany through a fully alerted Brifleet seemed a bleak proposition. Even the mshorter cruise to Buenos Aires would have requa ship the size of Graf Spee, due to the coursthe estuary channel, to go out through the Brand then turn back toward the Argentinean harbThe Graf Spee had expended over ha lf

ammunition in the Battle of the River Plate; ano

act ion would surely use up the remaining shwith no hope for resupply. In addition to limihim to no more than one engagement, the ammtion shortage also restricted Langsdorff's freedof action in another fashion: the shallow waaround Montevideo precluded him from mepulling the ship's seacocks i f scuttling becameessary. He would have to conserve what ammtion remained so he could explode the ship ifcumstances forced him to scuttle.

Faced with such dismal alternatives, Langsdpu t 700 of his men ashore, and at 6:15 p.m. onDecember 1939, an hour and 45 minutes beforeUruguayan deadline expired, he and a skelecrew sai led the Graf Spee past some 750,000

lookers out to shallow water . At 8:54, exact lysunset, the captain detonated the charges that bthe bot tom ou t o f his ship. Returning to shorewrote a let ter to the German ambassador in Argtina, justifying his act ions, then two days lwrapped himself in his ship's batt le ensignkilled himself with a pistol shot.

The Graf Spee's demise in this way infuriaHitler, who'd expected the pocket battleshipeither break out successfully or at least take soBritish ships with her to the bot tom. The ignomious suicide of both the ship and he r captsparked a growing distrust in the Fuhrer ofKriegsmarine's surface ships and their captains.

The Gmf Spee's loss was not the only cause

consternation in the navy high command durthis period. In Europe itself, coordination withLuftwaffe was a lso far short of satisfactory.instance, the air force 's use of its own call siand map coordinate system caused critical inservice communication breakdowns. Relatibetween the two services reached a low poinFebruary 1940, when Luftwaffe aircraft inadvertly attacked and sank two Kriegsmarine destroyA livid Raeder accused Goring or "sabotaging nwarfare," and even impl ied a court martial shobe convened against the Reichsmarshal.The navy's other primary e ffor t in the ea

months of the war centered on two mine layoperations. A mine barrier - then referred to

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



A Flight 0" , Fancy: The Z-Plan

A German naval officer casts a forlorn glance at the unfinished hull of the aircraftcarrier Graf Zeppelin; although construction began in 1936, work continued onlysporadically during the war and the ship was never completed. National Archives

Though upon coming to power Hitler professed hesought no war with England, his aggressive foreign policysoon set Germany on a path that inexorably led to justsuch a conflict. In November 1937, he confided to hisclosest associates he expected Britain would eventuallymove to block his expansionist policies. The follOWingyear he officially informed Raeder tha t, contrary to hisprior assertions, war with England was indeed inevitable,but not before 1944, and that the fleet should plan it s

construction program accordingly.In response, the navy drew up two possible programs.

One called for primari ly a submarine force, augmented

by surface raiders, while the other aimed at a big-ship,big-gun surface fleet. In January 1939 Raeder presentedboth schemes to Hitler, who chose the big-ship, big-gunoption - the "Z-Plan" - which called for eight bat tleships , 12 battlecruisers, 17 l ight cruisers, two aircraft

carriers, 50 destroyers, 64 torpedo boats and 22 submarines by 1945.Hitler 's personal fascinat ion with big, pres tigi s bat

tleships was a decisive factor in his adoption of the capital-ship-Iaden alternative. His selection delighted Raeder,who was also a big-ship, big-gun devotee who'd servedaboard the battlecruiser Seydlitz at Jutland in World War

I and had authored a book on cruiser warfare in 1922.The passage of time had done nothing to alter the admiral's views; as late as 1939 he claimed: "Battleships aloneare able to win or defend the supremacy of the seas." TheZ-Plan relegated aircraft carriers to a minor role. Raederderisively referred to them as mere "gasoline carriers,"useless in the stormy North Atlantic and Baltic, where thedecisive actions were expected to take place.While constructing a big-gun surface fleet was the

objective, movement toward that end was immediatelyfrustrated by massive obstacles, for the German shipbuilding industry had been devastated after World War I.As retribution for Germany's scut-tling of her interned fleet at ScapaFlow in 1919, the British had con-

fiscated 80 percent of the nation'sfloating dockyards.

Warship construction orderswere of course scarce in the pos twar years, and the merchant shipindustry also languished in thehard economic t imes . Conse-quently, German shipyards wereh ar d p res se d to p rovide theskilled manpower and facilitiesneeded to fulfill the immense contracts that began to be i ssued by

th e Kriegsmarine. As early as1937, even before the adoption ofthe Z-Plan, Raeder had complainedthose bottlenecks were threatening to bring naval construct ion toa standstill, and that even for thealready existing ships a shortage

of ammunitionwas looming.Two years later th e German

shipbuilding industry was stillst ruggling to meet the navy's burgeoning construction schedule,and on the day Hitler approvedth e Z-Plan Raeder warned himcompleting i t within six yearsmight well be beyond the nation'sabilities. The Fuhrer was not sympathetic; he told the admiral: "I f ICOMMAND MAGAZINE

can build the Third Reich in six years, then the navy cansurely build these ships in six years."

Though more time might have allowed Germany toexpand her maritime industrial base, no amount of timecould have furnished her with the natural resources necessary to complete the Z-Plan. When he approved the

plan, Hitler also attempted to stimulate shipbuilding by

formally giving the Kriegsmarine priority in raw materials over both the army and air force. But in 1939, Ger

many was already importing nearly 70 percent of he riron ore, and virtually all her nickel, tungsten, vanadiumand manganese, all indispensable elements for the production of the high-grade steel required for warships.

The German economy, still recovering from the hyperinflation of the 1920s and the global depression of the1930s, was further shackled by a shortage of both hardcurrency reserves and foreign earnings, which preventeda rapid increase in domestic production.The supply of oil to fuel the proposed ships was equa

lly precarious. Germany possessed no domestic oi l

reserves, and even though production of synthetics morethan tripled benveen 1929 and 1937, in that year theReich still imported nearly 60 percent of its peacetime oilrequirements. Germany was thus extremely vulnerable to

sharp reductions in the supply of essential raw materialsin the event of a peacetime embargo or war time blockade, either of which would abort the Z-Plan. The outbreakof war in fact prevented the Z-Plan, unrealistic to beginwith, from ever coming anywhere near completion. Onceembroiled in a shooting war that eliminated the luxury ofbeing able to wait five years for battleships to join thefleet, Raeder suspended the plan and ordered priority begiven to the construction of U-boats, which at the timewere being completed at the rate of only two per month.

67



68

Naval Orders Of Battle For Weser Exercise

instances ships were nearly lost at sea due togine fires.On 13 December 1939, while in support of

of the mine laying missions, the l ight cruisNuremberg and LeipZig were torpedoed by a Brsubmarine. While the Nuremberg's damage wascatastrophic, the Leipzig went dead in the waThough she soon got underway again and, shetorpedoed again by a different submarine the nday. The Leipzig limped home, in need o f repthat would take a full year to complete, and e

when returned to service she was afterward sable only for training missions. The Nuremberg

back in.service by the spring of 1940, but she,was late for the Kriegsmarine's biggest surfoperation of the war: the invasion of Norway.

Norway: German Victory,

Kriegsmarine DefeatThe Scandinavian countries, though neutra

the war 's start, exerted a decisive pull on Gmany's war effort. The Reich annually consumedmillion tons of iron ore, 11 million tons of whcame from Sweden_ Half of that ore was trashipped to Germany via the northern, bu t ice f

Norwegian port of Narvik, and f rom there soalong that same nat ion' s coast. In fact, duringwinter months, when many Baltic ports froze oall Swedish ore was moved via Narvik.Germany at first had little incentive to use fo

to secure the ore trade, for conquering Norwayseen to be a potentially prodigious undertakiEven i f an invasion were successful, it would tbe another formidable task to garrison the counand protect the coastal ore freighters fromRoyal Navy. Hitler therefore began the war conto rely on Swedish and Norwegian cooperation

maintain the flow of the vital natural resource.But the status quo became more precarious

the war went on. Hitler began to fear British dip

matic pressure would compel Norway to halt allshipments out of Narvik, or that the Royal Nmight block the trade by mining Norwegian terriial waters. Worse still, i f the British secured bain Norway, either through political or militmeans, not only would the ore traffic be vulnerabu t a new Baltic flank would be opened agaiGermany.

orway's precarious neutrality was highlighon 16 February 1940. The Altmark, the Gmf Spsupply ship, was completing her transit acrossAtlantic, headed for Germany, carrying 299 Briprisoners, survivors from the ships sunk by thepocket battleship. Though the Altmark had reacNorwegian territorial waters, where according

international law she was entitled to unimpedpassage, sai lors f rom the destroyer HMS Cossforced their way past Norwegian patrol boaboarded the German ship and liberated the ctives. Hitler concluded from the inc iden t tBritain's respect for Norwegian neutrality was pfunctory at best and the indispensable irontrade was indeed in jeopardy. He ordered his stato begin preparing for the invasion of Norway_Raeder wholeheartedly supported the decisi

and in fact had been urging just that courseact ion on Hit le r for months. The conquestNorway would give the Kriegsmarine bases allowi ts ships eas ie r access to the Atlantic while apreventing the British navy from sealing the Balti

ISSUE 40 NOV I 9

Stockholm

,."

.I

". ~ . ' §

$$I: Umeae

v,

;'.Fornebu lC 0 I •

eO?'\

First Battle or Nan'ik, 10April

Five Destroyers: Hunter. Havock, Hotspur, Hostile, Hard)'

(Cpt. Warbunon-Lee's flagship)

Second Battle of Narvik, 13April

One Battleship: Warspite

Nine Destroyers: Bedouill, Cossack, Eskimo, Punjabi,

Hero, Icarus. Kimberly, Forester, Foxhound

Eight Minesweepers: R-17, R-18, R-19, R-20, R-21, R-22,

R-23, R-24, with 2,000 troops embarked._ ._ . +- Group VI: Egersund

Three Minesweepers: M-2, M-9, M·13, with 150 troops

embarked.

Groups VII-XI

These ferried 3.300 troops of the 198th Infantry Division to

the Danish ports of Korsor. 'yborg, Copenhagen,

Middlefan. Esberg andTyboriin. esconed by the obsoletebanleship Schleswig-Holstein.

Plus 28 to 36 V-boats concentrated in and near Norwegian

waters.

BRITISH

- - - . . . j ) ~ Mine Laying: Operation Wilfred

One Bartlecruiser: Renown (Adm. Whitworth's flagship)

Thirteen Destroyers

- - - • -.... From Home FleetTwo Battleships: Valiant, Rodney (Adm. Forbes' flagship)

One BattJecruiser: Repilise

Two Light Cruisers: Sheffield, Penelope

Ten Destroyers

ISO

250 300

Pre-lnvasiono British plane spots Gennan invasion force. I J:45a.m .. 7

April.

IBritish naval squadron lays minesoff arvik. 8 April.

Hipper sinks Glowwonn, 10: II a.m.. 8 April

• German rransport Rio de Janerio torpedoed, noon. 8 April.

lnvasion Day (9 April)e Gneise,wll damaged in running battle with Renown, 5:05 to

7:\5 a.m.

j'ennan troops capture Narvik, 7:10 a.m.

• ' German troops capture Trondheim during morning.

• Karlsruhe damaged, but Germans Lake Bergen, noon.

o I German troops take Kristiansand in afternoon.

• Blucher sunk, German landing repulsedat Oslo, 7:32a.m.

Gennan paratroops capture Fomebu airfield. then Oslo that '-__ ~ - I _ - - I .evening.

GERMAN

-_. . . . .) ~ Group I: Narvik

Two Battlecruisers: Scharnhorst, Gneisenall (flagship)

Ten Destroyers: Wilhelm Heidkamp, Anton Schmitt,

Wolfgang Zenker, Hans Ludemtmn, Herman Kwme,

Dieter von Roeder, Erich Giese, Erich Koellner, Georg

Theile, Bemd \'on Amim, with 2.000 troops embarked._ • . . . . Group II : TrondheimOne Heavy Cruiser: HipperFour Destroyers: PaulJacobi. Theodore Riedel, Bruno

Heinemann, Friedrich Eckoldt. with 1,700 troops

embarked.___ .... Group Ill: Bergen

Two Light Cruisers: Koln, Konigsberg

One Training Cruiser: Bremse

Seven Torpedo BoalS: Leopard, Wolf, 5-19, 5-21, 5-22, 5-

23, 5-24, with 1,900 troops embarked.

- - - - ->- Group IV : KristiansandlArendalOne Light Cruiser: Karlsruhe

Ten Torpedo BoalS: Greif, Luchs, Seeadler, 5-7, 5-8, 5-17,

5-30,5-31,5-32,5-33, Tsingtau, with \,100 troops

embarked.

• • • • • • • .... Group V: Oslo

One Heavy Cruiser: Blucher

One Pocket Banleship: Lut::.ow

One Light Cruiser: Emden

One Gunnery Training Ship: Brummer

Three Torpedo Boats:Mowe. Albarross, Kondor

the "West Wall" - was laid to prevent Allied shipsfrom penetra ting into the Baltic. A second miningmission, begun in October 1939, sent 11 destroyerson series of sorties to drop more than 2,000 minesoff the coast of England. That undertaking was successful. By March 1940 it claimed 76 merchantmen,totalling over a quarter-million tons, along withnine small warships, without a single destroyer everbeing so much as detected, let alone intercepted.While the Kriegsmarine suffered no losses in i ts

early mine laying operations, those missions didreveal chronic problems in the destroyers' highpressure steam power plants. The flaws resulted inexcessive time spent undergoing repairs, and in two



But the practical problems inherent in landing aninvasion fo rce so near to the main bases o f thenumerically superior Royal Navy were daunting.Because the northernmost objectives - the ports ofBergen, Narvik and Trondheim - were actual lycloser to British naval bases than to German ones,conventional pre-invasion bombardments with follow-on landings would be impossible. The Germanswould instead have to rely on stealth, surprise and

bluff, including assigning Royal Navy aliases fortheir warships to use if challenged on their ap

proach by Norwegian vessels.Raeder fully realized the operation risked the

loss of virtually his entire fleet, since every available Kriegsmarine ship would be called on to participate in transporting 8,800 soldiers to five simultaneous landings at Norway's five major ports :arvik, Bergen, Trondheim, Kristiansand and Oslo.

Still, he believed the potential gain outweighed theunescapable risk.The plan for the invasion of Norway, codenamed

Weserubung (the "Weser Exercise," deceptively aftera river in western Germany), commenced in theearly hours of 9 April 1940. Troops were putashore with little or no loss at Bergen, Trondheimand Kristiansand, bu t at Oslo the Norwegian shore

batteries sank the cruiser Blucher with heavy loss.The German landing force there withdrew, butparatroopers meanwhile landed outside the cityand seized nearby fornebu airfield. Quickly reinforced by a flown in infantry regiment, Oslo wassoon taken without navy assistance.At Narvik, 10 German destroyers successfully

landed 2,000 infantrymen, but then all those shipswere sunk when the Royal Navy arrived and counterattacked.After the initial moves, the Kriegsmarine played

almost no further combat role while the outcome ofthe Norwegian campaign on the ground remainedin doubt. fourteen German supply ships were sunkbefore reaching their destinations; only in the

southernmost ports , over which the Luftwaffe controlled the sky, could merchantmen dock safely.A 24,000 man Anglo-french-Polish landing force

retook Narvik on 28 May, with the Germans thereretreating into the hills surrounding the town. TheGerman navy was powerless to f rustra te otherAllied landings above and below Trondheim. TheGerman units in northern Norway, cu t off fromresupply, could only hold on in the hope friendlyforces advancing overland from Oslo would arrivebefore they were forced to capitulate.After the German invasion of france and the Low

Countries began on 10 May, however, the Allied situation rapidly deteriorated, forcing their abandonment of orway. With the evacuation of the last

British forces from arvik on 8 June, the Germansat l as t had complete control of the country . Theconquest had taken barely two months, and Germany then reaped the substantial benefits thatcame from gaining such an extended northern flankon the British.But the triumph had exacted an exorbitant price

from the navy. Weserubung c la imed 10 of Germany's 20 destroyers, one of two heavy cruisers

and two of four l ight cruisers, as well as five D-boats and several smaller vessels. Raeder's serviceable "fleet" consisted of bu t a single heavy and twolight cruisers and seven destroyers. All the major

losses had come in the first four days of the campaign in support of the landings. The landings at

COMMAND MAGAZINE

Trondheim, Bergen and Narvik pu t troops ashore atplaces that even under the best of conditions couldnot have been easily resupplied or reinforced. As it

turned out, they barely survived. Creating such isolated outposts had little real effect on the campaign. They weren't strong enough to impede anyAllied counterattack yet it was their insertion thatcost the Kriegsmarine so much.The key to victory in Norway lay in the accom

plishments of the German air force, not the navy.The paratroopers' swift capture of Oslo and i ts sur

rounding airfields allowed the Luftwaffe to establish air superiority over southern Norway, thusshielding the reinforcements sent there by both airand sea. The Luftwaffe was decisive in the ear lydays of the campaign, flying in some 8,000 troopsin the first 72 hours after the invasion began, thensupporting and reinforcing them with over 3,000air transport so rties t ha t b rought in more than2,000 tons of supplies, 250,000 gallons of fuel and

another 30,000 men.ot only had the navy's contribution in Norway

proved of limited value, the grievous ship losses

lef t the fleet impotent to interfere with the Allies'later \ \i thdrawal of 300,000 soldiers from Dunkirk

The German destroyers Jacobi (foreground), Lody (left), and Ihn

(right) escort the damaged cruiserHipper (center background),which had been rammed by a British destroyer the day beforeWeserubung. National Archives

69



an d 200,000 more from elsewhere in France. Withno warships to speak of, Operation Sea Lion, th eproposed invasion of England, was transformedfrom what would have been a difficult task to an

impossible one. Th e devastated Kriegsmarine'sinability to formulate any plan acceptable by the

army undoubtedly helped quash w ha te ve r r ea linterest Hitler may have h ad i n the undertaking.

Most i mpo r tan t ly , t h ou g h, th e Kriegsmarine's

Norway losses deprived Germany of h er b es t opportunity to help knock England ou t of the war. As theRoyal Navy husbanded all i ts st ren gt h ar ou nd theBritish Isles in the su mmer an d fall of 1940 to contest any attempted Channel crossing, stripping convoy escorts in the process, U-boats ravaged Alliedshipping. That ushered in six months of submarine

The Auxiliary Cruisers War Badge (left, armed merchant

raiders), and the High Seas Fleet War Badge.

70

successes later dubbed "The Happy Time." ButG er ma ny 's s u rf ac e s hi ps , sunk or damagedtherefore unavailable to escalate the attack one xp os ed s hi pp in g l an es i nt o o ut ri gh t decimatthere was to be no Happy Time.

By it s very nature, convoying reduces ove

shipping efficiency by 30 to 40 percent, due todelays inherent in gathering enough ships to for

convoy an d the inevitable congestion at the desttion. Those inefficiencies could have been grea gg ra va te d i f G er ma n surface r ai de rs h ad bavailable to inject further chaos into the procescompelling the British to assemble strong warescorts. With British imports already falling prectously, such a combined U-boat an d surface assmight well have generated the results necessarallow Raeder to prevail in his efforts to get Hitleconcentrate the Luftwaffe against England's poThat would have also hampered London's attemto supply its forces in North Africa, perhaps ebecoming the back-breaking straw that would h

forced them to the peace table.

Glory DaysWhile th e Kriegsmarine's m ai n s ur fa ce un

were embroiled in Weseriibung, Raeder was ablmaintain th e assault on Britain's ocean lifeliwith armed merchant cruisers only. Those vessmerchantmen of between 3,000 an d 9,000 tons,been converted to warships after the o ut br ea khostilities, yet maintained their harmless appeance even after the addition o f h id de n deck g

a n d m a ch i ne g un s, t o rp ed o t ub es a nd spotplanes.

Th e mission of t he se s hi ps i n vo l ved mo v

unnotic e d a cr os s t he immense expanse of

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



world's oceans, eluding detection by mixing withthe many legitimate freighters always plying the

seas. Beginning with the departure of the Atlantis

on 31 March 1940, six disguised raiders had sailedby 9 July. Preying on lone merchantmen steamingoutside normal trade routes, striking quickly beforetheir victims could transmit distress signals, byNovember 1942 the raiders had sunk 88 shipstotaling 538,000 tons.This form of attack intensified late in 1940, after

the fall of France and Norway gave the Kriegs-

marine new positional advantages. With France ou tof the war and Italy an active German ally, theRoyal Navy was forced to cover the Mediterraneanalone. More importantly, with Germany in controlof some 3,000 miles of coastline from the Arctic tothe Spanish border, England's overstretched fleetwas hard pressed to maintain the blockade of Germany. Raeder was suddenly well positioned to carryon commerce raiding in earnest.On 23 October 1940, the Scheer, one of the two

remaining pocket battleships, began one of themost successful naval missions of modern history.By the time she returned to Kiel, 161 days later, shehad steamed 46,419 miles, sunk 17 ships totaling113,233 tons, and had caused immeasurable dis

ruption to the convoy system.Similarly, the heavy cruiser Hipper sortied from

Brest on 1 February 1941 and attacked an unescorted convoy. She sank 17 merchantmen and damagedthree more before docking in Norway on 26 March.It was Adm. Gunther Lutjens, in overall com

mand of two battlecruisers, however, who carriedout the most spectacular raid of the war. Scharn-horst and Gneisenau had been out of act ion for sixmonths repairing torpedo damage received duringthe Norway operation, bu t by the end of 1940 bothwere again ready for duty. Between departing on 22January 1941 and returning to Brest 60 days later,the two ship steamed 17,800 miles without receiving so much as a scratch. Lutjens' bag, 22 ships of

116,610 tons, was impressive by itself, but evenmore sensational was his convincing demonstrationof the German battlecruisers' ability to run ringaround the Royal Navy.

Despite their best efforts, nothing the Britishtried kept the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau frombreaking ou t into the Atlantic. There they remainedundetected, striking and moving off at \\ill, finallyreturning unscathed to port. As succe sful as thebattlecruisers' winter cruise had been, even morewas expected in the spring, \",hen the new superbattleships, Bismarck and Tirpitz, would be readyfor action. It seemed then there would be nothingto stop Germany from sweeping clear the seas ofBritish convoys.

Enter the ScientistsBefore the wintering German surface ships reen

tered the North Atlantic in May 1941, two developments took place that were to p rove decisive indetermining the outcome of the war at sea. Thefirst involved radar , the second the ULTRA code

breaking effort.When war had broken out in 1939, radar was

still in its infancy. Though promising, the technology was stil l fraught with imperfections and prone

to frequent breakdown. The Kriegsmarine held alead in radar technology at the onset of hostilities,and f rom the war's f irst days the ir superior equipment was instrumental in helping German ships

COMMAND MAGAZINE

find targets while eluding pursuers. But German

radar development stagnated, in large part becausethey chose to conduct little research below the 80centimeter wave length, instead placing emphasis

on expanding production of existing sets.German doctrine also cal led for l imit ing radar

use, since the device could reveal the user's position at distances greater than it could detect opposing vessels. Consequently, they came to use i t primarily to improve gunnery against known targetsrather than to search for st il l unseen ships. The

British meanwhile concentrated on shorter wavelengths, and success in the 50 centimeter bandresul ted in the "Type 284" se t, which had muchgreater range than its German counterpart.

As with radar, Germany at first also enjoyed anadvantage in communications security. The RoyalNavy employed code books to encrypt i ts signals,bu t the Kriegsmarine had actually been readingthose ciphers since 1938. By the t ime of the invasion of Norway, the Germans were decoding about30 percent of all British naval message traffic. OneBritish admiral complained: "I t is most galling thatthe enemy hould know just where our ships ...always are, whereas we generally learn where hismajor forces are [only] when they sink one or more

of our hips."ot until the British modified their ciphers at the

end of August 1940 did the Royal Navy regain amodicum of signals security.

--- Cruise of Admiral Scheer,October 1940 - April 1941--- Cruise of Scharnhorsf & Gneisenau,January - March1941

,,- The Raid!i of the Battlecrui!ie

71



Com.· Disp. (tonsl Lgth (ftl

capturing its code machine. Though the ship's cmanaged to destroy the actual Enigma machine,British retrieved the "Home Waters" key, whichused for 95 percent of German naval traffic.Two days later, in an unrelated incident, Bri

escorts depth-charged U-11 0, forcing her to theface, where the crew abandoned ship. The Briboarded the submarine, seizing both an intact Ema machine, with that day's settings intact , asas a variety of code books containing several V-and surface ship codes.

Suddenly, s tart ing in June 1941, using infortion taken f rom the Miinchen and U-110, the RNavy was able to read most German naval Enimessages within 36 hours of intercept, and sotimes much faster. That was done almost contously for the rest of the war, with the messacontents distributed to select, high ranking cmanders in documents prefixed "ULTRA." Thetem was not infallible, and was s u b j ~ c t to lapand misinterpretations, yet for the next four ythe Allies repeatedly took advantage of the fwarning VLTRA provided.

Nine Days of the BismarckWhen she was commissioned on 24 Aug

1940, over four years after she'd been laid dothe Bismarck was unquestionably the single mpowerful warship in the world, manifestly supeto the new King George V class of battleships t

822822

41,70042,900

8/40

2/41Bismarck

Tirpitz

After the British broke the German naval code in June 1941, the

RoyalNavy was often forewarned of enemy ship movements.Tipped off in February 1942 by Ultra intelligence that the PrinzEugen was bound for Norway, the British submarine Tridentambushed the German cruiser outside Bergen; as this photo-

graph indicates, the Trident's torpedo nearly blew off the ship'sstern. The Prinz Eugen eventually limped back to Germany for

repairs, bu t she never again saw action against the British.National Archives

Conversely, the British had a lmos t no successduring the f irst two years of the war reading intercepted German messages. To encode their wirelesstransmissions, all branches of the German armedforces used a machine called the "Enigma," a commercially produced device modified for military

use. The heart of the Enigma was a series of revolving drums that could accurately encrypt anddecrypt messages only if the operator first properlyset them with the right key. Since the keys could bealtered daily, and any attempt to t ransla te a message without one had to work through literally hundreds of millions of possible combinations, theGermans felt their system was impregnable. Thetask was even more complex because the variousb ranche s o f the German military each had theirown keys, resulting in well over 200 different keysin use.To aid in cracking the Germans ' naval Enigma

codes, on 7 May 1941 British warships ambushedthe weather ship Miinchen, with the sole purpose of

72

Scharnhorst 1/39 31,800 771Gneisenau 5/38 31,800 771

Deutschlandt 4/33 11,700 616GrafSpee 1/36 12,100 616Admiral Scheer 11/34 12,100 616

Admiral Hipper 4/39 13,900 675Blucher 9/39 13,900 675Prinz Eugen 8/45 14,800 689

Emden 10/25 5,600 508Konigsberg 4/29 6,650 570Karlsruhe 11/29 6,650 570Koln 1/30 6,650 570Leipzig 10/31 6,710 580Nuremberg 11/35 6,980 593

Notes·On average, a ship is not ready for active opertRechristened Lutzow, 11/39.

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



left the fuel carried in her bow inaccessible, forcingLutjens to cancel Rheinubung and try to return toport. As he headed for France, the shadowing Suf-folk used radar to maintain a tenacious track on the

""I-)

\i- ...~ ~

. - 1<'1'! ~ $ IfVoyage o f the Bismarck ~ ~ /

V\\

I \ -<> co

1\: : : ~ , i ~ : / 2 ; May _ __

Bismarck hit byIo<pedo from Swordfish

0306, 25 May_ _ _

contact lost ~ / - 1 - 0 3 - 0 - ' 2-6"Ma'y

" I Bismarck sighted. ~ I by RAF Catalina

. ~ \ e ~ Q;I... _ _ - .

o ~ ~ Prinz Eugen---arrrves at Brest

1 June

joining the British fleet. Over 40 percent of her displacement - some 17,000 tons - consisted ofKrupp armor plate, giving the Bismarck thicker andstronger protection than any British warship. Herexceptionally broad beam provided a remarkablystable platform for her eight IS-inch guns, producing a broadside more powerful and accurate thanthe King George V's ten 14-inch guns.All that a rmor and f irepower cou ld charge

through the seas at better than 30 knots, over twoknots faster than the King George V. Though she'd

been designed primarily for short range engagements in the Baltic and North Sea, the Bismarck's8,300 ton fuel bunkers gave her an excellent rangeof 8,SOO miles at a cruising speed of 19 knots.

In the early morning hours of 19 May 1941,Adm. Lutjens took the Bismarck on her first warcruise along with the newly commissioned heavycruiser Prinz Eugen. The mission was code namedRheinubung (Rhine Exercise), and according to theirorders the ships were to break into the North Atlantic and ravage Brit ish convoys. But as they passed

through the Denmark Strait they were spotted by

the British cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk.Those cruisers maintained radar contact, allow

ing two British capital ships, battlecruiser Hood and

battleship Prince of Wales, to intercept. In the ensuing battle the Bismarck's fourth salvo penetratedHood's magazine, blowing up the ship and killingall but three of her crew. But a hi t on the Bismarck

Fate

Sunk by gunfire, 5/27/41

Sunk by air attack, Tromso, Norway, 11/12/44

Scuttled, 5/4/45

Scuttled at Montevideo, Uruguay, 12/17/39

Bombed and capsized, 4/9/45

Sunk by Duke of York at North Cape, 12/26/43

Scuttled, 3/45

Scuttled, 5/3/45

Sunk by Norwegian shore battery, 4/9/40

Confiscated by US Navy, 5/45

Scuttled, 5/3/45

Bombed at Bergen, Norway, 4/10/40

Sunk by British submarine, 4/10/40

Bombed, 3/30/45

Relegated to training duties after 12/13/39

Confiscated by USSR, 5/45

(ktsl Crew Armament

BATTLESHIPS

30 2,200 8x15", 12x5.9", 16x37mm, 36x20mm

30 2,530 8x15", 12x5.9", 16x37mm, 72x20mm,6 n

BATTLECRUISERS

32 1,800 9x11", 12x5.9", 14x4.1", 16x37mm, 38x20mm, 6 n32 1,800 9x11", 12x5.9", 14x4. 1", 16x37mm, 38x20mm, 6 n

POCKET BATTLESHIPS

26 1,150 6x11", 8x5.9",6x4.1", 8x37mm, 10x20mm, 8 n26 1,150 6x11 ", 8x5.9", 6x4.1 ", 8x37mm, 10x20mm, 8 n26 1,150 6x11", 8x5.9",6x4.1", 8x37mm, 10x20mm, 8 n

HEAVY CRUISERS

33 1,600 8x8", 12x4.1 ", 12x37mm, 39x20mm, 12 n33 1,600 8x8", 12x4.1", 12x37mm, 39x20mm, 12 n33 1,600 8x8", 12x4.1", 12x37mm, 39x20mm, 12 n

LIGHT CRUISERS

29 630 8x5.9", 3x3.5", 4x37mm, 4x20mm, 4 n32 820 9x5.9", 6x3.5", 8x37mm, 8x20mm, 12 n30 820 9x5.9", 6x3.5", 8x37mm, 8x20mm, 12 n32 820 9x5.9", 6x3.5", 8x37mm, 8x20mm, 12 n.32 850 9x5.9", 6x3.5", 8x37mm, 8x20mm, 12n32 896 9x5.9", 6x3.5", 8x37mm, 8x20mm, 12n

' . ior Sh ips ot= th e Kr iegsmar ine , ' 9 39 · 45

eight months after commissioning.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 73



74

German ship for 32 hours, allowing the Royal Navyto begin concentrating against her.

Though Lutjens managed to shake off the Britishcruisers (taking advantage of that to separate fromPrinz Eugen), he inadvertent ly gave away his position by radioing back to shore. With the battleshipagain located, aircraft f rom t he carrier Ark Royal

torpedoed the Bismarck in he r stern, jamming he rrudders to port. British battleships were then ableto tr ac k a nd c at ch her . They battered he r into aflaming hulk, ending he r career a mere nine daysafter she'd first left harbor.

Rheinubung officially e nd ed on 1 July, whenPrinz Eugen slipped into Brest without having sighted a single m e rc h an t ma n . T h ou g h World War II

would rage for anoather four years, no othe r Germa n surface warship would sail the North Atlantic.

Bismarck's e x ce l le n t g u nn e ry , demonstratedagainst Hood, a nd h er ability to absorb punishment,demons trated in he r final hours, proved she wasthe world's best single ship at the time. But thatindividual superiority mattered l itt le when she wasforced to take on a large portion of the Royal Navyalone. The Bismarck was hunted down a nd s un k bya force of eight battleships, two aircraft carriers, 13cruisers, 33 destroyers an d eight submarines.

Lutjens an d the Bismarck suffered a fate similarto that which ha d befallen Langsdorff an d the GmfSpee 18 months earlier. Forced to fight, the Germans prevailed tactically, bu t the damage sufferedso far from home res tr ic ted the available options.That converted tactical victory into strategic defeatby allowing the British to bring to bear their overwhelming numerical advantage.

Admiral HitlerNot only was the loss of Bismarck a catastrophic

defeat fo r th e German navy, it also profoundlyaffected how that service would participate in therest of World War II. Hitler was inconsolable afterth e Bismarck's loss - one aide d escr ib ed h i m as

"melancholy beyond words."

The Battleship Bismarck with an escorting destr(1941). Watercolor p ain t ed b y Gerth B

The German dictator was moved to take uhimself nearly total control of all future naval oations. To avoid repeating the Bismarck debaclevetoed Raeder's plan to s en d h er s is te r ship,pitz, into the North Atlantic on a similar missHe f ur th er o rd er ed no cruiser or battleshiphenceforth ever to leave port without his persapproval. Later, on 13 November 1941, he alsonied Raeder permission to send the Scheer toshipping in the Indian Ocean.

Even if Hitler ha d ap pr o ved an ot h er sortie,British ha d succeeded in making such missipractically impossible. As catas trophic as theof Bismarck was, more long term harm came shly after th e battleship's demise, when th e RNavy descended on th e German fuel a nd s upships scattered across the Atlantic. Informed

ULTRA intercepts, in th e month after Bismar

sinking th e B ri t ish v i rt u al l y swept th e swasfrom the h igh seas, hunting down an d destroy14 ships, including four valuable tankers an d

supply vessels.Having told Raeder where German ships sho

no longer go, Hitler also instructed the admirato where they were to go. The Fuhrer proclaiNorway to be the Kriegsmarine's "zone of destiHe was convinced an Allied invasion of Scandinwas inevitable, bu t at the close of 1941, when

ordered the fleet to concentrate in Norway, mos

the ships reacted only slowly, having s p en t m ucthe previous year in port.

The cruiser Hipper h ad b ee n u nd er repair foof 1941. The pocket battleship Lutzow (formthe Deutschland) was pu t ou t of action untiluary 1942 when a 14-plane British airstrike, acon ULTRA information, torpedoed he r off Nortwo weeks a ft er t he loss of Bismarck. The Ti

was still working up in the Baltic, a nd t ho ug h

spent a b r ief p eri od in September su pp o rt i ng

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



75

The German squadron in line ahead during the Channel Dash.

I

aI

FRANCE

M;dn;ght. 12Scharnhorst, Gneisenou,Prinz Eugen and covering

destroyers sail

/ -,--,

([be--Chan e l Da!i

Scheer and five destroyers had arrived. But regardless of whether o r not the Kriegsmarine was ready,the two year battle of the Arctic convoys was about

to begin.

The Murmansk RunFor the res t o f the war the Kriegsmarine's major

surface units would battle in what has been called

the world's cruelest ocean, the Arctic. Crews continually had to deal with harsh s torms that cascadedendless waves across the decks, which then turned

to ice, making the ships dangerously top heavy,threatening to capsize them. In the summer the sunnever set; in win ter the darkness never ended.Regardless of the season, pilots and sailors alikeknew anyone unfortunate enough to end up in the

water had a life expectancy measured in secondsor, at most, minutes.War came to this desolate area because o f the

Murmansk convoys. To aid their new Soviet ally,soon afte r the Germans attacked them, England

began sending supplies by ship. The convoys werenumbered sequentially and prefixed "PQ" for ship

ments to the USSR, and "QP" for those returning.Moving supplies across the Arctic was the fastest

way to get them to the Soviets, but using the routealso meant the last leg of the voyage, the 2,000mile, 10 day, passage between Iceland and the finaldestination, skirted within 200 miles of the north-

invasion of the Soviet Union, the Kriegsmarine's lasttrue battleship was only considered fully ready forcombat at year's end."Every ship which i s not in Norway is in the

wrong place," Hitler declared, and he then ordered

the three in Bres t - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau andPrinz Eugen - to sneak up the English Channel and

transfer to Norway. On the nigh t of 11 February

1942, the Brest squadron began heading north(Operation Cerebus, bu t better known as the "Channel Dash"), and though Gneisenau struck a mine,

and Scharnhorst hit two, all three made it. Cerebusappeared a huge success for the Germans, for threemajor warships had run a gauntlet of vessels andaircraft and still survived."Nothing more mortifying to the pride of our sea

power has happened si nce the 17th century,"charged the infuriated London Times. The Royalavy indeed had ample cause for displeasure, in as

much as simple bungling and delays in decryptingULTRA intercepts had spoiled an unmatched opportunity to corner and sink three major enemy surface units. (ULTRA did at the last minute reveal thewarships' route, bu t the only thing the British did

correctly after that was manage to lay mines intheir path.)

In the end, though, it was the British, no t theGermans, who profited from the move. The mine

damage to the German ships took several months

to repair, and the withdrawal from Brest of theKriegsmarine simplified the Royal Navy's Atlanticblockade by allowing its strength to be concentrated in the north . Further, the British were soon toprove German warships were just as vulnerable toair attacks in German and Norwegian ports as theywere in French harbors.Despite their escape from Brest, the battlecruis

er s contributed nothing to the immediate wareffort. The Scharnhorst spent the balance of 1942undergoing repairs. Her sister ship Gneisenau had,by the end of that year, been repaired and began

preparing to sail for Norway. However, on the nightof 26-27 February 1943, a single bomb hit from aBritish air raid started a massive fire that killed 112men, wounded 21 others, and inflicted damage ex-tensive enough to require an estimated two years tofix. Gneisenau went into drydock, where the repairsand an overdue upgrade were initiated. Her bow

was lengthened by 30 fee t and he r triple II-inchgun turrets were replaced with twin IS-inchers.The Prinz Eugen was the only one of the Brest

squadron to complete the Channel Dash unharmed.

Along with the pocket battleship Scheer and fourdestroyers, she immediately headed north to join

Tirpitz, which had arrived in Norway on 16 January1942. But the Germans ' p lans were again betrayed

by ULTRA, and the forewarned Bri tish sen t foursubmarines to ambush the sh ips out side Bergen.HMS Trident fired three torpedoes at Prinz Eugen,and - r eminiscent of the Bismarck's demise - onestruck the cruiser aft, jamming her rudders 10

degrees to port as well as blowing away over 30feet o f h er stern . Prinz Eugen crawled back to

Trondheim, and after jury rigging a temporary rudder left for Kiel for repairs that would keep her outof action for the res t of the year.With ULTRA divulging German naval movements

and exposing their ships to attack while in passageto Norway, only gradually could Hitler mass his

naval forces there. While some slipped through dueto delays in decryption, by March 1942 only Tirpitz,

COMMAND MAGAZINE



The Arct ic

GREENLAN/

ATLANTIC

OCEANo 100

9 200 800Km

NORWEGIAN

SEA

Sullom Voe

SHETlANDIS.

AT BRITAIN

Occupied by or allied with Germany

or German ai r bases

;f; German naval anchorages

or Allied ai r bases

- - - - Summer convoy route--- Winter convoy route

$ 4 limits of Allied land-based air patrols

er n coast of German occupied Norway. Even whenAllied ships arrived in Soviet ports , they were stillsubject to attack, since Murmansk, only 90 milesfrom t he G er ma n airfield at Petsamo, was a frequent Luftwaffe target. Despite all those obstacles,though, during the critical f irst year of the RussoGerman war, when the Soviet Union teetered on thebrink of defea t, 3.6 mil lion tons of material wereshipped there by the Allies, near ly half of i t via theArctic.

PQ-1, the first Allied convoy to the Soviet Union,left on 21 August 1941, only two months after theGerman invasion began. For several more months,the convoys found the "Murmansk Run" uncontest

ed. Even after the arrival of Tirpitz in Trondheim on16 January 1942, there were still no ef forts by theKriegsmarine to a ttack the supply route. The shortage of des troyers - the enduring legacy of the losses su ff er ed in th e invasion of Norway - wouldhave r eq ui re d t he b a tt le sh ip so rt ie u n escor t ed , atactic far too risky in light of the his tory of successful British submarine attacks off the Scandinaviancoast. Not until th e small flotilla o f d es tr o ye rsreturned to Norway in late February, after assistingt he b at tl ecruisers in the Channel Dash, could th eGermans contemplate surface attacks against th econvoys.At last, however, when PQ-12 was spotted by the

Luftwaffe on 5 March 1942, Tirpitz, with Adm. Otto

76

Ciliax aboard, left Trondheim to destroy it. Butonly did the battleship fail to locate the convoy,he r way back to port she ha d to evade a torpattack by aircraft from HMS Victorious. In a briefthree days later , Raeder explained to Hitler thha d it no t been fo r s om e g oo d luck, CiliaxTirpitz could e a si ly h av e met th e same fateLutjens an d Bismarck. In light of the Kriegsmari

complete inability to counter th e British carthreat, Raeder urged Hitler to resume construcof the carrier Graf Zeppelin, an d to order Gorinr ei nf or ce t he Luftwaffe in Norway. The dictaagreed to Raeder's r eq ue st s a nd direc ted therean increased effort to interdict the PQ convoys.

After PQ-12, the Kriegsmarine force in Norwwas strengthened by the arrival of the heavy cruHipper, which after a year of repairs an d trainarrived in Trondheim on 21 March. But givenap p aren t d e te r mi n at i on o f th e British to pthrough the convoys, Raeder was sti ll loath to cmi t hi s ships before all available reinforcemeha d been assembled. Further, he would no t counance a r ep e ti ti o n o f Tirpitz's unescorted sointo the Arctic, an d since there were no t enodestroyers to properly s co ut a he ad of th e bats hi ps a nd c ru is er s, he demanded th e Luftwa

begin completely an d accurately fixing enemy lotions and strengths before his ships sailed. Stillther, the fleet was no t to be committed at dista

ISSUE 40 NOV 19



until it was verified the enemy was actually sendinga convoy to Russia and not an invasion force toNorway, since the Kriegsmarine was also tasked toguard against any attempted landings in Scandinavia.A growing fuel shortage also limited Raeder's

options in the north. Already in November 1941 thenavy's monthly fuel allocation had been slashed by

more than half, and within a month after that theGerman naval staff began describing their service'sfuel situation as "very cri tical." Thus, despite

Hitler's 13 April 1942 pronouncement that "attackson the Murmansk convoys are most important atthis moment," and even though each succeeding

one was larger than it s predecessor and wouldtherefore furnish even more means for the Sovietsto res is t the upcoming German summer offensive,the Kriegsmarine offered little opposition to thenext four. The fuel s itua tion had, in fact, got ten sobad during this period the navy high command wasforced to order "all operations are to be discontinued, including those by light forces. The sole exceptions to this ban on consumption of fuel oil areoperations made necessary by offensive enemyaction."

By May, as the Royal Navy prepared to send

through another convoy, again larger than the previous one, growing German air and U-boat opposit ion was at least beginning to cause London somemisgivings. Adm. Dudley Pound, Britain's First SeaLord, was unenthusiastic about the concept of continued Arctic convoys, complaining: "The whole

thing is a most unsound operation, with the diceloaded against us in every direction."But with Roosevelt and Stalin pressuring Chur

chill to accelerate deliveries to the embattled SovietUnion, cancelling the shipments was politicallyunthinkable, regardless of the increasing militaryobstacles. Consequently, 35 merchantmen of PQ-16sailed from Iceland on 20 May, with the British

Prime Minister rationalizing: "The operation is jus

tified if a half gets through."With the arrival of the pocket battleship Lutzow

in Narvik on 25 May, the Germans completed theconcentration of their big ships in Norway, nowhome to Tirpitz, Scheer, Lutzow, Hipper and eightdestroyers. But dur ing the upcoming fighting,Tirpitz would not pu t to sea to engage the convoy,bu t only to work up after her long period of inactivity. Instead, the assault on PQ-16 would be spearheaded by the Luftwaffe, which now numbered inNorway 129 combat and 72 reconnaissance aircraft.After detecting PQ-16 on 20 May, the Germans

began their aerial assault five days later, climaxingwith attacks by 108 planes on the 27th. The Luftwaffe sank six ships, damaging five more whileanother was sunk by a U-boat. Still, while the destroyed merchantmen went down carrying a total of177 vehicles, 147 tanks and 77 a ir craf t in the irholds, another 2,507 vehicles, 321 tanks and 124aircraf t were del ivered to the Red Army, allowingBritain's Adm. Sir John Tovey to claim a "successbeyond all expectations."

PQ-17By June 1942 there was finally enough fuel on

hand - 15,500 tons - to allow the fleet to be committed. Tirpitz, heavy cruiser Hipper, four destroyers and two torpedo boats were formed into the 1stBattle Group at Trondheim, while farther north at

Narvik lay 2nd Battle Group, consisting of the pock-

COMMAND MAGAZINE

et battleships Lutzow and Scheer along with sixdestroyers. The Luftwaffe had been reinforced to atotal of 189 combat and 74 reconnaissance aircraft,and a dozen U-boats were also available. With thecoming of summer and its perpetual daylight, thetiming seemed perfect for a majo r effor t by the

fleet. With the German summer offensive in Russiaabout to kick off, the overall military situation alsodemanded such an effort.The opera tion was code named Rosselsprung

Knight's Move. Once the next Russia-bound convoy

was s ighted, the Tirpitz squadron would transfernorth to arvik, while the original arvik forcestaged even farther north to Altenfjord. The fleetwould then unite 100 miles off North Cape, fallingupon the convoy east of Bear Island. Hitler approved the concept of Knight's Move, bu t the lossof Bismarck to British car ri er p lane s, and theTirpitz's near repetition of that debacle, had made adeep impression. He therefore laid down yet another restr iction on the battleship's movements: he

would not allow her to a ttack the convoy unless allnearby British carriers had been pu t out of action.Given the German fleet had no attack planes underits control, this was a crippling requirement, onewhich was hardly within Raeder's power to satisfy.

German attacks on the next northern convoy,PQ-17, began on 2 July. Two days later, when theRoyal avy, in a move stil l controversial , withdrewit major surface ships from the escor t, it was

feared the Tirpitz was only hours away from attacking. To avoid a massacre by the German battleship,the Admiralty ordered PQ-17 to scatter, with everymerchantman to proceed to Russia on its own asbe t it could. The resulting carnage was inevitable,in a much as the round-the-clock daylight left theunprotected f re ighters no place or time to hide.German aircraft and U-boats claimed 22 of the 33ship, eliminating 3,350 vehicles, 430 tanks , 210

A German air-launched torpedo rips into an American freighter,one of the twenty-two merchantmen sunk while en route to

Russia in convoy PQ-17. National Archives

77



IKm

59 109 159

Nautical Miles

199 299 399

LFairfie/d City

Sunk 5 Ju"t

LPemrKerr

LEar/ston LPankraft

LEmpire Byron LRiverAfton

CaritonL

A/dersda/eL LO a "/MLHonomu me organ

LZaaforan

Cruiser & destroyerescort head south.

BARENTS SEA

"-Bear Island

--- ....---- ..." ~ ~'.1 ~ L W a s h i n g t o n, Ba/ton Ca",e

I Paulus Palter

f, \. \\e\o I (

dg

e

0 ,ce .....ope. . . ..sla..n d ~ ~r = - - : - - - - - = , . . . . . . ~ - - ,

~ )Sp'tzb fgen

Afternoon,S JulyTirpi/z, Scheer, Hipper

& 6 destroyers sail.

Earlier: 2 ships returnto Iceland after collision;4 ships sunk by planes.

~ ~

"'" /~ ~ .-"

\ ? ~\ a\ r\ I ":J

th. "Pan At/anile L ~ H a r t / e b u r y L f t

"" Wmston Sa/em -40-+ 0Sunk 6-8 July ....: I

O l o p o n a ~ a

John Wllherspoa*

~ - - : - : c - : : : - : , . . . . . , . . . - = - - - - , A/coo RangerL\ '? 5 >fiord 21305 July, German \

~ e ( \ C ) ships return to bose \

rv!: CV'7 due to success of IC\ Y /<( C ; ~ I bomber & submarine ,

Tromso L. f ' - , /) attacks on PQ- 17. , , ,

· r -..../ ' V'l.----

__--~ ~ o o k "/ I ~ ./ T ~ r d u l o s ~ ...

--- . I . ~ . ~ a l g u e v i('-> -/ , NORWAY K i r k ~ e s f / - + A • ~ H a o " e r > S u n k l 0 J u l y /l-.-:;.y ,- .. c'.. \ _ I / I ... Petsomo V ' ~ V ' : LE I Capiton l;j , , , , - ' " ',"'- .....\)". \" /. /

,\_' .. i eMurmonsk : c o p e K a n i n ~SWEDEN FINLAND I

I / US S R To Archangel /

,...,

The ! i l augh te r

o'f I :onvoy PO-17

L Merchant ships sunk by U-boats & bombers. . . . .A- Merchant ships run aground

T German air bases

aircraft and nearly 100,000 tons of other suppliesin the process.

So bad was the slaughter that on at l east oneoccasion crew members, stranded in lifeboats aftertheir ship had been sunk, refused to board anotherundamaged freighter, so certain were they theirchance of survival was better in an open boat adriftin the frigid Arctic, hundreds of miles from shore,rather than aboard another targeted ship.

This German victory could no t have been attained without the Kriegsmarine, for even thoughthe surface ships never actual ly fi red a shot theirpresence precipitated the scattering, allowing for

the piecemeal destruction of the convoy. But thenavy's failure to pursue the dispersed ships madethe victory incomplete. Over the next 19 days 11merchantmen, plus a tanke r and 13 light escorts ,trickled into Russian ports, delivering 896 vehicles,164 tanks, 87 aircraft and over 50,000 tons of othercargo.While it had certain ly been prudent for the

German command to recall the big ships to portonce the convoy scattered, the fai lure to employtheir smaller warships allowed a portion of the convoy to survive when i t shou ld actually have beencompletely eliminated. German surface ships wouldalso have stood a reasonable chance of capturingsolitary merchantmen along with their valuable car-

gos, especially considering that in nine separinstances merchant crews hurriedly took tolifeboats after their vessels suffered less than fdamage.But instead of enjoying the huge morale and p

paganda boost tha t would have accompaniedtotal des truction of an Allied convoy and thelowing well-publicized display of prizes,Kriegsmarine's warships went back to port w

nothing concrete to show for their efforts otthan the damage sustained by three destroyersthe pocket battleship Lutzow. All of th emstruck submerged rocks and had to sail back

Germany for repairs.After PQ-17, the British suspended convoys

Russia for two months, in part to wait for the dto shorten, and in part to release fo rc es toMediterranean for Operation Pedestal, a relief effor beleaguered Malta. The next convoy, PQ-18,t hree ships to U-boats and 10 more to aircrWhile the Iceland-bound QP-14 had three merchmen, a fleet oiler, and an escort sent to the botby U-boats, the Germans also lost 41 planesfour submarines in the effort .Again conspicuous by their absence during th

ferocious battles were the surface units ofKriegsmarine. Even though Tirpitz was unavailadue to engine trouble, and Lutzow had been rec

78 ISSUE 40 NOV I 9



COIDparati1le Na1lal Art i l le ry

What a Dif ference an Inch Makes

Naval artillery is rated primarily by the width of the barrel, and secondly by the ca

the gun. Thus a 15/1/47 gun of the Bismarck had a width of 15 inches and a barrel 47 ti

long as it was wide. Though a one inch difference in barrel width sounds insignificant,

chart shows, a single inch greatly affects shell size and gun weight.

Gun Size Found On18.1/1 /45 Yamato (Jpn)

16/1/ 50 Iowa (US)

16/1 /4 5 Rodney (UK)15/1 /42 Hood, Repulse (UK)

15/1 /47 Bismarck (Ger)

14/1 /45 King George V (UK)

13/1 /52 Dunkerque (Fr)

11.1/1 / 54 Scharnhorst (Ger)

8/1/60 Hipper (Ger)

Note: AP. =Armor Piercing

sary of the Nazis' coming to power and a convenient news cover for all parties to avoid embarrassment.

As one of his last official acts, Raeder delivered amemorandum on 15 January setting out the consequences of Hitler's dismantling of the surface fleet.He pointed ou t the ludicrousness of such a move,explaining scrapping the ships "would constitute abloodless victory for the enemy" that would allowthe British to redeploy their naval forces while alsolaying bare Germany's coast. Worse, there would be

no corresponding gain for Germany's war effort, foreven scrapping all the ships would yield less thanfive percent of the total s teel requirements for amonth, furnish guns for only 15 shore batteries(none of which would be available for a year), andrelease fewer than 9,000 men for other duty.

Hitler remained unmoved, remarking only: "Thistime it mu t be done, for there is no other way." On26 January he ordered all ships larger than lightcruisers be either relegated to training duties orpaid off.

Adm. Karl Donitz, commander of the U-boatforce, succeeded Raeder as Supreme Commander ofthe German a\,y, and within nine days had submitted a chedule for getting rid of the ships. After

another three weeks, though, he commuted thefleet's death sentence. Possibly seeing the merits ofRaeder' position, Donitz ordered the Lutzow,

Scharnhorst and Tirpitz spared to continue operating in the Arctic against the convoys. The new navycommander persisted in his decision despiteHitler' \ 'ociferous objections: "Beginning with theGmf Spee, one defeat had followed another. Largeship are a thing of the past."

But the Fuhrer eventually relented rather thansuffer the loss of prestige that would have resultedhad Donitz resigned, as he threatened to do, sosoon after having been appointed. When Donitz\\"ent on to promise he'd get better results from thebig hip within three months, Hitler predicted:

"E\'en if i t hould require six months, you will thenreturn and be forced to admit I was right."

lndeed, the results to that time gave credence toHitler' \ie\\'. The German surface fleet's overall

Max Range

45,276

36,900

34,766

39,589

39,590

45,600

41,700

46,749

35,000

Gun Weight (Ibs)363,762

267,904

266,000

224,000

244,000

207,200

155,503

117,396

45,540

A.P. Shell Wt. (Ibs)

3,219

2,700

2,375

1,938

1,764

1,590

1,235

728

268

ed to Germany, the light cruiser K61n had arrived inNorway from the Baltic, and along with Hipper,

Scheer and five dest royers was to have been usedagainst the wes t-bound ships of QP-14 as theyrounded North Cape. But the operation never cameto pass, for on 14 September Hitler told Raeder theprimary task of his surface ships was henceforth

the defense of Norway. The admiral was ordered"not to accept any undue risks" going after convoys, prompting Raeder to keep his ships in port.

Beginning of the EndIn December 1942 the convoys to Murmanskresumed, now prefixed with "]W" rather than "PQ,"and broken into two parts, "A" and "B," to make

them more manageable. On the 15th, convoy JW-51A, consist ing of 15 merchant ships with 12escorts, including seven destroyers, left for Russia,arriving intact on Chr is tmas Day without havingbeen attacked or even detected. The second part ofthe convoy, ]W-51B, left Scotland on 22 December,and consisted of 14 merchantmen carrying 202tanks, 2,046 other vehicles, 120 aircraft, 24,000tons of fuel, and over 54,000 tons of other supplies.I t was spotted by U-354 on 30 December.

At the time the convoy was located, Hitler was in

a headquarters meeting with the Kriegsmarine representative there, Vice Adm. Theodore Krancke, andwas in the process of berat ing the navy to him. Hecharged the surface ships were "lying idle in the

fjords," and were "utterly useless, like so much oldiron." When Krancke announced U-354's convoysighting, Hitler immediately authorized the Hipper

and Lutzow to attack, the only proviso being he bekept informed of developments.

That se t into mot ion Opera tion Regenbogen

(Rainbow). Though both Tirpitz and Scheer wererefitting and therefore unavailable, nearly everyother suitable German ship in Norway was committed to the attack. Hipper and three destroyers wereto come in from the north, drawing off the convoy's

escorts, allowing Lutzow and three more destroyersto pounce from the south the next morning. But inthe event, instead of destroying the convoy, theGermans were unable to sink a single merchant

man, losing a destroyer in theattempt.

An exasperated Hitler wentberserk at the news, an nounced he intended to scrapthe ent ire surface fleet, anddemanded Raeder appear before him. The admiral stalled,hoping a few days delaywould allow Hitler's temperto subside. When he finally

met w ith the dictator on 6January 1943, he was treatedto a 90-minute tirade detailing the shortcomings of the

navy since the mid-19th century. Hitler compared his decis ion to scrap the big ships

to the army's disbanding ofcavalry divisions.

Realizing he'd los t his superior's confidence, Raedermet again with Hitler privately and tendered his resignation, with an effective date of30 January, the 10th anniver-

COMMAND MAGAZINE 79



The Scharnhorst being saluted by the crew of a departing U-

boat. National Archives

..

All ied !!!ihip LO!!!i!!!ie!!!i t o

l iernJan Attack!!!i in WorldWar I I

Allied base at Spitzbergen, an exercise worthmention because it was the only time the battlefired her guns in the presence of the enemy.weeks later British midget submarines snuckAltenfjord, detonating three two-ton mines benher, causing heavy damage. The German northsquadron was further depleted the next day wLutzow returned to the Baltic for refit.Under the protective cover of the endless A

winter nights, the Murmansk convoys resumed

November 1943, with the first five in the new se

all escaping Luftwaffe detect ion . In the fifth,British, emboldened by the lack of res is tance,the first time used a batt leship to escor t a conall the way to Russia. With Allied escorts s trothan ever, and the Germans weaker than ever,prospects for a successful attack on a convoy wbleak. But that didn' t deter Dbnitz, whose promto Hitler of a victorious action was already emonths overdue. On 20 December he toldleader the Scharnhorst would attack the next Aconvoy.Soon after that next convoy was spotted,

Scharnhorst and five destroyers set out on Option Ostfront (East Front). But twice British cruisequipped with superior radar - something inv

able for fighting in the perpetual winter dark- kept the German bat tlecru iser f rom get tin

the merchantmen. The Scharnhorst then ranport, bu t before she could drop anchor the baship HMS Duke of York cut off her retreat routethe ensuing Battle of North Cape, the Duke uaccurate radar-controlled fire to send the Gerbattlecruiser to the bottom.With the loss of Scharnhorst, the Germans w

powerless to interfere effectively with the Mmansk convoys. Tirpitz's repairs weren't f inis

until 3 April 1944, and on that day she was daged yet again, this time by an air strike. Furhits from planes on 14 September left her cpletely unseaworthy, and on 12 November Ti

capsized and sank after another air raid, her caended wit hout her ever having sighted a si

enemy ship.The German navy' s efforts in the Arctic t

ended in what can only be described as colofailure. During the course of the war 725 freighdelivered over 4 million tons of cargo to the Soports of Murmansk and Archangel via the AOcean. Despite the near complete dedication ofKriegsmarine to s top those convoys, only 62 mchant ships were sunk en route to Russia. Ofnumber exactly one - the Bateau, a straggler fPQ-13 - was sunk by German surface ships.cause of the marked inability of the German fleinterdict the Murmansk convoys, by that north

route alone the Allies delivered 3,480 tanks - mthan Germany used to launch the initial invasiothe USSR - and 7,000 aircraft - over 2,000 mthan the Germans had possessed in their ent ireforce in June 1941.

A Fleet SquanderedHistory shows that minor naval powers ra

find an opportunity to use their fleets to any geffect, but in World War II Germany hadchances to use her s to change the course offighting. First, when England stood alone in 141, the German surface fleet could have bolstthe air and U-boat attack on her ocean lifelines,haps decisively. Second, the warships could h

Tonnage

Sunk

14,687,2312,889,8831,406,037829,644498,4471,259,478

21,570,720

Merchant Ships

Sunk

2,828820534133104731

5,150

performance against the Murmansk convoys had

been dismal. A total of 306 merchantmen hadsailed in the first 21 Arctic convoys, with only 53

being sunk: 25 to air attack, 17 to U-boats, and onlyone to surface attack.On 14 March 1943, over a year after she'd left

Brest, the Scharnhorst finally arrived in Norway,joining Tirpitz and Lutzow at Narvik before the

three sailed together to Altenfjord on the 22nd.They arrived just as the Allies again suspended theMurmansk Run for the summer. The Allies felt theycould afford to make that move because by thattime supply routes through the Persian Gulf andthe Soviet far eas t had come to surpass the Arcticroute as the main aid corridors.The total supplies shipped to the USSR in 1943

amounted to nearly 4.8 million tons, almost doublethe 1942 total, with less than 15 percent routed viathe Arctic. Consequently there was no longer aneed to tie down Allied warships, while also riskingheavy merchant ship losses, with Murmansk convoys during the long days of spring and summer.The Germans' opportunity to decisively sever theAnglo-American supply line to Moscow had irrevocably passed.On 8 September 1943, Scharnhorst, Tirpitz and

10 destroyers made an inconsequential raid on the

Type ofAttacker

U-boats

Aircraft

Mines

Merchant Raiders

Surface Warships

All Other Causes

Total

80 ISSUE 40 NOV 19



butchered the exposed Murmansk convoys duringthe critical first year of the Russo-German War, perhaps thereby fatally weakening the already embatt led Red Army. In both instances the Kriegsmarine,its command beset by the excessive caution that sooften pervades outnumbered f leets, fai led to actdecisively.Aside from those two missed opportunities, the

surface ships of the Kriegsmarine also failed to create any other strategically significant accomplishments dur ing th e course of the war. Victories

against enemy warships were few, an understandable result since battle was usually avoided, and bywar's end the surface ships could take credit forsinking only one enemy battlecruiser, one aircraftcarrier, one cruiser and a dozen destroyers. In cont rast , the U-boats, though targeted almost exclusively against merchant shipping, were far moredeadly to Allied navies. German submarines sank50 Allied warships during World War II, includingtwo aircraft carriers, two battleships and two cruisers by the end of 1941 alone.The surface fleet was also essentially ineffective

against cargo ships. During the entire war theynever once fought their way past a convoy escort tosink even a single merchantman. Perhaps the great

es t indic tment against the big ships is that by V-EDay the mighty German battleships, cruisers anddestroyers had actually caused less harm to theAllied merchant marine than had the nine converted merchant raiders.The German surface fleet certainly died in World

War II; by the end of the war only three cruisers

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and 15 destroyers were left to be claimed by theAllies as war prizes. But because the Kriegsmarine'ssur face ships fai led so abjectly to influence thewar's outcome, the fleet cannot be said to have diedgallantly. Indeed the surface ships' greatest serviceto Germany was more social than military, andcame in the Baltic during the war's last five months,when its units helped evacuate westward an estimated 2,116,500 soldiers and civilian refugees. Buttransporting people out of the path of an advancingenemy ground force was far from the intention that

underlay the fleet's creation. 0

Selected SourcesFu h re r C o nf e re n ce s on N a va l Af fa i rs . Annapolis,

MD: aval Inst. Press, 1990.Hinsley, F.H. British Intelligence in the Second World

War, 3 \ ' 01 . ew York: Cambridge Univ. Press,1981.

Irving, Da\id. Th e D e st r uc t io n o f Convoy PQ-17.ew York: t. lartin's, 1987.

Kennedy, Ludo\ic. Pursuit: The Chase an d Sinkingo f the Bismarck. ew York: Viking, 1974.

Pope, Dudley. The Pursuit o f the Graf Spee. Philadelphia: ].B. Lippencott, 1957.

Roskill, Capt. .W. The War a t Sea, 1939-1945, 3

vols. London: Her Majesty 's stationary Office,1961.

Tarrant, \'.E. The Last Year o f t h e K ri e gs m ar i ne ,

Ma y 19..1-1 - Ma y 1945. Annapolis: Naval Inst.,199-1.

Whitley, .. I.J. G e rm a n D e st r oy e rs in World War II,

2nd ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst., 1991.

81



I Remember•••

Total War in BritainD.). Collier

Inhabitants ofLondon receive their government supplied "Anderson Shelters. "The shelters were designed to be sunk deep into the ground. Unfortunately

most of urban London was heavily paved.

At the outbreak of the SecondWorld War, in September 1939, I wasjust a child. I vividly recall goingwith my best friend and her dog tosay goodbye to the local park and allour favorite suburban haunts. Welived on the outskirts of London,and having seen newsreels of citiesdevastated during Spain's civil war,we were convinced we, too, wereabout to be bombed to bi ts . As ithappened, we were only partly right;we were bombed, bu t not at thattime.

First we endured several months

of "Phoney War." During that time itwas decided by our respective parents that, with London being th emost likely target , the far ther awayfrom it we were the safer we'd be.

Earlier we'd enjoyed a holiday on thesouth coast, so off to Eastbourne wewent again - only this time it wasn' t to play on the sands bu t to attend a newly opened junior highschool at th e foot of the SouthDowns.

When we got there we found theplace already crawling with childrenwhose parents had the same idea asours, but thanks to staggered classes it was stil l possible to spend several hours a day at the beach. Butour unexpected vacation came to anabrupt end when the lady with

whom we were staying committedsuicide. Overwhelmed with grief atthe loss of her only son, who wentdown on the submarine Thetis, shewent by what in those days was

known as "taking a shill ing's woof gas."We were immediately whis

back to London. Tired of waitingthe anticipated attack to begin,author iti es had reopenedschools. Though our local gramschool was brick-built and sol idrock, windows were taped and gdoors boarded up to reduce the dger, and the outside walls were rforced with sandbags. A cloakroin the heart of the building wasdesignated "safe area."Meanwhile householders, w

were issued with sheets of corrued steel, were ordered to buildraid shelters in their back gardeOurs must have been delivered wI was at Eastbourne, but it was neassembled. I can only think my fer, a keen gardener , simply refuto dig up his precious flower bedmake space for an unsightly "Anson Shelter." Instead we accepthe makings for an alternative "Mrison Shelter," which resemblelarge steel table and was eventuinstalled in a downstairs room. Wa full-size mattress on top and

other below, it made as comfortaa haven as the old time "bed recein the home of my Scottish graparents.Despite the fact that to you

sters like myself the pace ofseemed no different than usuBritain was slowly getting intogear. Everyone was issued withidentity card and gas mask, anddue course everyone also receiveration book and clothing coupons

Air raid sirens had already bin place, and air raid wardens' posprang up like mushrooms. Gun

searchlight emplacements joinedbarrage balloons in public parksvacant lot s. They offered endlpossibilities for play, and it was jas well the RAF ground crews kthem off limits or we undoubtewould have completely commdeered them. We hea rd tha t oyouth gang found a way to fimuniti ons f rom an isola ted arcamp and had used them to takeall comers - including a platoonRoyal Marines - until their amfinally r an ou t and they were oblito give up.

82 ISSUE 40 NOV 19



The clearest signs of the impending danger came f rom the s tr ic tlyimposed censorship and the blackout, of which the latter was far moreirksome. Kids were hardly likely topossess vital information, let alonepass it on to Berlin, bu t remembering to obscure all lights during thehours o f darkness proved quite aburden. I f you went about a t n ight

using a flashlight, some over-offi

cious warden might accuse you of"endeavoring to communicate with

the enemy," bu t if you ventured outwithout one you were sure to beknocked down.

Nights were otherwise worry freeuntil the time I awoke to find myparents, their backs toward me, staring out the bedroom window, watching the searchl ights t rack Germanreconnaissance planes. The ve rynext day I embarked on my secondspell of evacuation, this time to asmall market town some 30 miles tothe west of our suburb. I t wasn't

nearly as congenial as my stay atEastbourne. This time my friendswere scattered far and wide and forthe first time in my life I felt lonely. Iattended th e local school , hungaround a nearby amusement arcade,spent countless hours at the cinema,and longed for home, never realizingthousands of other children across

Britain were enduring the samepangs of loneliness.

After two or three months myparents gave in to my pleas, bu t myreturn unfortunately coincided withthe start of the Blitz. That worried

them but, initially at least, delightedme. I became an avid watcher of aerial dogfights and a collector of war-

t ime memorabil ia. As t he PhoneyWar turned into a real one, my boxof souvenirs gradually filled withshell casings, spent bullets , the tailfin from an incendiary bomb, a fragment from the fuselage of a downedaircraft and even a scrap of parachute silk.

Then in August 1940, RAF planesturned the tables by raiding Berlin.That so angered Hitler he ordered

widespread bombing of London andother population centers. From thenon every evening as dusk fell the air

raid sirens would wail, signaling theapproach of that day's first wave ofheavily laden bombers.

Those civilians who had acce s tothem went to specially preparedbasements or underground railwaystations. The rest of us retired todownstairs rooms or walk-in closets,there to listen to the thump-thump

of guns firing in the park, the taccato crack of the Bofor gun (mounted on railway roll ing tock), the

whine and crump of the "blockbusters," the strident bell of ambulances, and eventually - after about12 hours - to the weet ound of"all clear."

Until the bombing abated in fay1941 there were no good nights,only nights when, till itting upright, we somehow managed todoze, or from sheer exhau t ion fellasleep on the floor. There weremany occasions when a tick ofbombs would pierce my dreams and

I would find myself making wild

in volunta ry movement imilar to

those who were called ' hell hockvictims." On one occa io n I wasmildly concussed when the French

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COMMAND MAGAZINE 83



Londoners spending the night in their bomb shelter - the London underground.

doors of our living room were blownopen, but that was the closest I cameto physical injury.

Thank God there were no d irect

hits in our immediate neighborhood;the nearest were about a quartermile away. No doubt my parents sawme as more and more of a liability,because I was again hast ily packedoff, this time to the Midlands, tostay with friends in a small village.

Though my parents hadn't realizedit, it was dangerously close to anironworks near Coventry. Thus itwas tha t on a moonlit night in November 1940 I watched that city bedestroyed.Next day it was almos t my turn.

Out wheeling a neighbor 's child in apushchair, I heard an aircraft overhead. Looking up I saw a bomb arcing its way toward the earth. Forgetting that the trajectory would carryit well away from me, I hurtledacross the road, pushchair and babybouncing wildly before me, and

threw myself into the nearest ditch.

When I looked up I found the babystill asleep, the pushchair undam-aged, and the plane long gone.When news of my nar row escape

reached my Mum and Dad, I wasordered back to London. Their newunspoken philosophy seemed to be:"If we're going to die, let's all gotogether."

o sooner was I resettled atschool then, out of the blue, the let

ter arrived. My mother, who must'veknown what was coming, waiteduntil Dad had finished his eveningmeal. Putting the long brown envelope on the table, she said: "Thiscame for you today."Dad took one look and then faint

ed dead away. The funny thing was, Iremember, that he did it in slowmotion. First he leaned back, thenthe whites of his eyes appeared, andfinally he slumped sideways, slipping o ff his chair and on to thefloor. He never expected to be calledup. Having enlisted as a boy of 16

during the First World War, he

thought he'd be too old for a seturn, bu t the Signal Corps neehim and off he went. The caverrailway station, where Mum awent to see him off, echoedcontinuously played sentimemusic. Had we known all thatstil l to come we would've criedmore than we did.

In spite of our being on ourwith the danger increasing and

t ioning getting tighter, life stil lit s l ighter moments. We atewhenever we could, sometijoined by Mrs. Smith, an old frwho catered to war workers inhome. One day we all went to a nby "British Restaurant" (actuakind of glorified soup kitchen),when the food was served each ohad, in addit ion to a generous hing of potatoes and greens, twosausages. Before my plate hadtouched the table, Mrs. Smith'sreached out and one of my sauswas deftly removed and wrappe

a handkerchief. "That 'l l do forlodger's supper," she said.In those days the radio was

only our main source of news,also a great sou rce o f comfokeeping service men in touchtheir families and providing m

and laughter. Apart from thegrams pu t out by "Aunty BBC,"morale was also boosted byeventual arrival in Britain of th8th A ir Force, and the s ta rt ofraids against German cities. ThoGerman bombers continued todeath and des truc ti on on us, t

r aids got more sporadic . But wscarcely recovered from the exment of D-Day in June 1944 wthe VI attacks began.Since the VIs' range was

about 150 miles, London and soeast England were hardest hit. Ti n Sep tember the larger and mdeadly V2s started to come in.since they traveled faster thanspeed of sound, it was impossibanticipate their arrival, which

bed them of some of their hoFor six months our corner ofland took another terrible pound

unt il the Dutch and Belgian lausites were eventually put ouaction by advancing Allied troopWith the celebration of V-E Da

May 1945 we could at last exhget a proper 1 'ght's sleep, and tabout putting ou r lives bacorder. Fear "as behind us, andprivation lay ahead. Times remavery hard . deed, as Britain and

people were emotionally and ficially dra ined. Of course , the ppaid by me and thousands of otwas the premature loss of childhinnocence and trust.

84 ISSUE 40 NOV 19



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THE BATTLEFIELDSOF THE CIVIL WARBy William C. DavisTechnical Advisor:Russ A. Pritchard

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COMMAND MAGAZINE 85



Mort Kiinstler

I t happened by accident. All MortKiinstler wanted was a quick bite toeat, but instead he discovered theAmerican Civil War.

I t was a cold, gray, wet winter'sday in 1988, and Kiinstler was thenknown to many in American art circles as "America's foremost histori

cal art is t." He had come to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, site of the greatest battle of the War Between theSta te s, t o research a painting ofPickett's Charge for th e battle's125th anniversary. Aside from paintings for CBS-TV's "The Blue and theGray" mini-series in 1982, Kiinstlerhad never seriously tackled a CivilWar subject in more than 30 years ofprofessional painting.

He had done lots of other things,however, including art s choo l a tBrooklyn College, UCLA, and PrattInstitute; a long and successful tour

86

as an art is t for national magazineslike Saturday Evening Post, National

Geographic, Newsweek and Argosy,

and decades of work as an acclaimedartist of historical subjects. He hadspecial ized for a while in the OldWest, had done numerous one-manexhibitions, had become affiliated

with New York City's prestigiousHammer Galleries and had seen hiswork showcased in a dazzling artbook: Th e A m e r i c a n Sp i ri t: Th e

Paintings o f Mort Kiinstler. His historical art hung in prominent spotsfrom Madison Square Garden to theWhite House, and after years of success he seemed to be at the pinnacleof his career. Then he discovered theCivil War.

After a long morning examiningthe battlefield that day in 1988, KiinstIer headed into Gettysburg searching for lunch - bu t was lured into a

The Last Council.

storefront by a two-word sign:Art." I t was Gettysburg's AmerPrint Gallery, and without realizithe man considered by many tAmerica 's leading historical ahad wandered into America 'smier publisher of Civil War art.

"I knew who he was and I

seen his work," remembers gaowner and publisher Ted Sutpheknew he had th e t alen t and b

ground to paint Civil War ar tnobody else had ever done. Heartist of the old school - the yoest of the great 20th century Aican magazine artists. I knewpotential of the Civil War art maand I knew with the proper expothat he had the abi li ty to reexplode as a Civil War artist."

So Sutphen made an offer:pay the royalties up front forprint rights to Kiinstler's prop

Gettysburg painting and he 'dmise volume sales . The offerprised Kiinstler. Even with hisexperience in the ar t field, heunaware of the tremendous popity of Civil War topics. He wasunprepared for the response tofirst major Civil War canvas,High Water Mark," which was sped up by a wealthy ar t collestraight from Kiinstler's studiofore the work was even finishedfor the pr int? Sutphen did a limedit ion, which produced a reresponse and quickly sold out.

Today, many paintings later,Kiinstler specializes in Civil Warj ec ts and is heralded as Amermost popular Civil War art is t.the only living artist to have aexhibition of Civil War art at a mNew York City gallery. The US AWar College has commissionedto do a record five paint ings. Gercy Books has produced a volof 72 Kiinstler Civil War paintentitled Images o f th e Civilaccompanied with a narrativPulitzer Prize winning Civil Wartorian James

McPherson. Hisw

ISSUE 40 NOV 1



has been showcased by a one-hourdocumentary on the A&E Channelthat chronicled the War Between theStates through Kunstler's art. Morerecently, Gettysburg: The Paintings ofMort Kunstler, a handsome collectionof his art depicting the Battle of Gettysburg, has been published by Turner Publishing, Inc., in associationwith TNT's epic production of "Gettysburg," the feature film and mini

series based on the best-seller, KillerAngels."He has the abili ty to paint mili

tary art in a way that's generally losttoday," explains Sutphen. "He's fromthe old school of artists who weret ra ined in action artwork and thenlearned their craft in the great magazines of the 30's, 40's and 50's. He'sonly in his early 60 's, bu t he wasthere and he was the youngest of theold-time magazine artis ts . His workemphasizes realism and action, andi t captures key moments in a waythat's rarely seen today. A Kunstler

paint ing is like a moment in historyfrozen in time."On New York City's West 57th

Street, where serious ar t collectorscome to invest serious money inoriginal art, Mort Kunstler's work ismajes ti ca ll y f ramed and hung inHammer Galleries' tastefully furnished salons. There, in the samerooms that routinely display originalpaintings by Monet, Renoir andGrandma Moses, collectors examineand admire Civil War scenes f romLookout Mountain, Gettysburg, FirstManassas and other bat tles as dep

icted by Mort Kunstler."I consider Mort Kunstler to beone of America's foremost artists,continuing in the tradition of Frederic Remington and Charles Russell,"says Richard Lynch, Hammer's director. "Mort spends weeks doing extensive research, visits the actual locatio ns and consults with leadingexperts. His paintings have portrayed every aspect of American history from the pioneers of the Westto the pioneers of space. Now thathe is specializing in the AmericanCivil War, I think it 's generally

accepted his work in that field is unsurpassed. ot only is he America'sforemost historical ar tist , he is nowunquestionably America's leadingCivil War artist."

And what does Kunstler thinkabout his rapid rise to popular ity asa Civil War artist?

"I can still hardly believe it all," hemarvels, sit ti ng amid the brushes,oils and easels of hi s Long Islandstudio. "The response has been overwhelming. People are so appreciativeand so excited to see the historicalevents they imagined for years final-

COMMAND MAGAZINE

High Water Mark.

ly depicted on canvas. I find it amazing that people are so fa cinatedabout a per iod of history. I\-e neverreceived so many letters in my career. Without question, Civil \ ar

buffs take their his tory and their artseriously. I did subjects from the OldWest fo r years and people likedthem, bu t the response to the CivilWar subjects I paint now is justastounding."

In a sky-lighted studio high aboveLong Island's Oyster Bay, Kl.instlerworks at a sturdy bu t car red andsplattered easel, creating colorfulimages of despera te and dramaticmomen ts on what earlier was anempty white canvas. Slim, energeticand cheerful, he look like anythingbut "one of the old masters," as

some admirers call him. When painting, he routinely consults a library ofbooks about Civil War uniforms,equipment and weapons, doublechecking details like cartridge boxesand military insignia. Puzzling over a

Chamberlain's Charge.

detail, he' ll pick up the telephoneand call an obliging historical authority, inquiring about weather condit ions during a battle or seeking someobscure fact about Civil War artil

lery_While paint ing the Civil War requires demanding attention to historic details, Kunstler notes, it alsooffers enterprising artists an immensely rich lode of untapped subjects_ For an action-oriented artistlike Klinstler, the abundance of CiviWar subjects is like a dream cometrue. Painting the War Between theStates, he says, is even more satisfying than depicting scenes from theOldWest.

Kunstler is enthusiastic aboutwha t has become his favorite topic.

Like countless other Americans today and in generations past, he hascaught Civil War "fever." He isamazed by the drama of the conflict,by the courage and sacrifice demonstrated by both sides. 0

87



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KILLING GROUND ON OKINAWA:The Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill,

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On May 12, 1945, the 6th MarineDivision was nearing Naha, capital of

Okinawa. To the division's front laya low, loaf-shaped hill. It looked nodifferent from other hills seized withrelative ease over the past few days.But this hill, soon to be dubbed,"Sugar Loaf," was very different indeed. Part of a complex o f thr eehills, Sugar Loaf formed the western

ancho r o f General Mitsuru Ushijima's Shuri Line, which stretchedf rom coast to coast across the island. Sugar Loaf was critical to thedefense of that line, preventing USforces f rom turning the Japaneseflank. Over the next week, the Mar

ines made repeated attacks on thehill, losing thousands of men todeath, wounds, and combat fatigue.Not until May 18 was Sugar Loaffinally seized. Two days later , theJapanese mounted a battalion-sizedcounterattack in an effor t to regaintheir lost position, bu t the Marinesheld.

Ironically, these losses may no thave been necessary. General LemuelShepherd, Jr., argued for an amphibious assault to the rear of the Japanese defense line, but his proposal

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Commander General Simon BolivarBuckner. That refusal led to a controversy that has con tinued to thisday.

HERAKLES & THE SWASTIKA

Greek Volunteers in the GermanArmy, Police, and SS 1943-45

by Antonio Munoz, Axis Europa,

Inc.68 pages, $17.95 +$3.00 S&H

With this latest book on the Axisforces allied with Germany during

88

the Second World War, Antonio Munoz has placed an underline under hisname as one of the most knowledgeable exper ts in the study of the foreign volunteer movement of Nazi

Germany.His latest effort is a thought pro

voking account of what has up untilnow been a l i tt le-known subject:Greek participation on the Axis side.With personal anecdotes, interviews,and hard documentary evidence, Mr.Munoz has shattered forever th e

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was in the tens of thousands. The 81/2" by 11" book features a glossycardstock cover that is in color. It isthe first time ever a full-page photograph is used on the cover. The colorphotograph chosen is quite impressive. It is a German STG-IV assaultgun with crew, moving under a hill.On top of the hill you can see theGreek Parthenon. A most impressivepicture to be sure.

The quality of this 68 page book

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I have all of Mr. Munoz's books,including his voluminous "ForgottenLegions," bu t I must say that, like afine wine, has writing skills and hisresearch have matured to my taste. Inoticed no typing or spelling errorsin this, his lates t effort. I know a fewtypos did creep into some of his earlier studies, bu t they do not retract

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THE IRISH GUARDS IN THE GRE

WARThe First Battalion

by Rudyard Kipling320 pp. 16 pp. iIIus. 1-885119-3

06 x 9 cloth, $35.00 Nov.

Rudyard Kipling's "forgotten mterpiece," republished after 70 ye

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The ultimate regimental histdetai led appendices l is t the barolls of honor and casualty listall officers and men who serve

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Volume II of Rudyard Kipling's TheIr ish Guards in the Great War, "TheSecond Battalion," is scheduled forpublication in fall 1997.

FORGOTTEN SUMMERS:

The Story of the Citizens' MilitaryTraining Camps, 1921-1940

by Donald M. KingtonTwo Decades Publishing

lIIus. Notes. Bibli. Index Pp. xv,238. $18.95

Finally an account of the 20-yearhistory o f th e C iti zens ' MilitaryTraining Camps (CMTC) ha s beenpublished. Donald M. Kington, aretired Army colonel, recount thehistory of those 20 years whenyoung men from allover the nationattended month-long camps run bythe Army. Of t he nea rly -100,000young men who attended a year ormore of CMTC, many - probably

most - later s erved in America'World War II f ighting force . Twofuture U.S. presidents took par t; afuture literary giant was in p ired towrite his first poem while training;and three of the country' mo testeemed military leader playedmajor roles.In addition to extensi\'e and thor

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CAMPAIGNSBy John Spencer Cooper

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had sent home years before. In thatbox is the diary of the second man.Lieut. Nguyen van ghia is nearly

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TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM THEWAR OF 1870-1871

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Ever wonder what made the Prussian Army of the later part of nineteenth century so great? Find theanswer in th e excellent Tactical

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and veteran of the Franco-Prussianwar) highl ights the successes andfailures of the Franco-Prussian War,weaving a blend of concise tacticalthought with a good dose of European military history. His astuteobservations of the war include howthe opposing s ides fought and explain how effective the needlegunand chassepot really were. Further,he reveals many of the "real time"

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Arsenal), and CompuServe (keyword: GAMBPUB, Arsenal

Publ ishing fi le l ibrary). The demo i s a lso available free-of

charge by phoning Arsenal at (703) 742-3801 between 9 a.

an d 5 p.m. eastern time .

AVAILABILITY:

TacOps is available for Windows an d Macintosh fo r $44.95

plus $5.00 shipping & handling (international shipping &

handling $15). To order, phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a we

1-800-247-1877. Visa, MasterCard, an d Discover accepted.

residents add 4.5% sales tax. Mail ordersshould be sent to: ArsePublishing, Inc., 11144 Forest Edge Dr, Reston, VA 20190-40

Software Copyright © 1994-19961. L. Holdridge. Published by Arsenal Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Microsoft,Windows, and t he Window