Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
INDENTIFYING GAPS IN TRANSFORMING THE CZECH ARMED FORCES TO INFORMATION AGE WARFARE
by
Colonel Robert BielenyCzech Armed Forces
Dr. Jeffrey L. GrohProject Adviser
This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
U.S. Army War CollegeCARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Colonel Robert Bieleny
TITLE: Identifying gaps in transforming the Czech armed forces toInformation Age warfare
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 22 March 2012 WORD COUNT: 6,002 PAGES: 32
KEY TERMS: Command and Control, Human Domain, Power to the Edge
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
At its summit in Riga in 2002, NATO adopted a document declaring Networked
Enabled Capability (NNEC) as the key element of its transformation. Through this
action, NATO member states pledged to contribute to the creation of a workable NNEC
by building up their own national networked enabled capabilities. The president and
commander in chief of the Czech Republic (CR) signed the document, obligating the
country to contribute to an Alliance-wide NNEC. Transforming the Czech armed forces
(ACR) into a 21st century information age, networked enabled force will have many
challenges, and addressing all of them lies beyond the scope of this strategy research
paper (SRP). It examines the viability of current command and control concepts and the
organizational structure of ACR for 21st century network enabled warfare. It addresses
gaps in key doctrinal documents related to C2 concepts. This SRP indentifies
weaknesses in Strategy for Networked Enabled Capability of the Czech Armed Forces
(SFNEC) and it addresses this document’s inconsistent implementation. This SRP
recommends doctrinal changes in C2 concepts; organizational changes in ACR and
changes for SFNEC implementation.
IDENTIFYING GAPS IN TRANSFOMING THE CZECH ARMED FORCES TO INFORMATION AGE WARFARE
“… we consider Networked Enabled Capability as a fundamental prerequisite to achieve final goals of the transformation of the professional Czech armed forces and achieving final operational capabilities of the Czech armed forces for participating in a full spectrum of allied and coalition operations within the range of approved national political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic.”1
—Gen. Vlastimil PicekThe Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces
In 2007, the Czech armed forces (ACR) published the Strategy for Networked
Enabled Capability of the Czech Armed Forces (SFNEC). This document details the
goals, priorities, guidelines and procedures for implementing NEC in the ACR. The
strategy incorporated a resource framework, which while valid at the time proved
inadequate as subsequent reductions in spending significantly lowered resources. 2
Beyond inadequate financing, the strategy also suffered from a shortage of experience
and understanding of its implementers in allocating force structure to a networked
warfare environment. Inconsistent implementation of the national NEC strategy, poorly
defined Mission Capability Packages (MCPs), an Industrial Age doctrinal interpretation
of command and control (C2) concepts, and predominantly technically oriented
development priorities toward aligning the ACR with an emerging network enabled
environment in the 21st century constitute the major weaknesses in transforming ACR to
an information age networked enabled force. Additionally, these deficiencies have
frustrated the ACR’s ability to meet national force requirements and commitments
towards the development of the future NATO force.
Transforming the ACR into a 21st century information age networked enabled
force will face many challenges. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify and
address all of them. This paper will examine the viability of current C2 concepts and
organizational structure in the ACR for the 21st century network enabled warfare. It will
address weaknesses in key doctrinal documents related to C2 concepts, as well as
gaps in the SFNEC for transforming the force to the Information Age. This paper will
also recommend important doctrinal changes in C2 concepts; organizational
adjustments in the ACR and alternative strategies for implementing the NEC. These
changes will enhance the combat power and effectiveness of the ACR.
Recent research in C2 concepts and approaches to networked warfare invite a
fundamental rethinking of the goals, priorities and procedures requisite to implementing
NEC in ACR. It is becoming increasingly clear that the focus of building this capability
should not fall on its technological component. Warfare is a form of human and
organizational behavior; as such networked enabled warfare deals with human and
organizational behavior in networked environment.3 It is equally important to focus on
changes in ways of thinking and organizational collaboration. Technology is substantial;
however, it represents merely a tool and not the goal of NEC in the ACR. Intense
attention needs to focus on adapting new C2 approaches and concepts, unit
organizational structures, and understanding C2 in networked environment. The
strategy for NEC implementation should look beyond technological enablers. It needs to
address individual and organizational behavior.4
The origins of Networked Enabled Capability in the Czech Armed Forces
The approval of The Concept of Founding NEC in the Czech Armed Forces
(CFNEC) in 2004 constituted the ACR’s first step in implementing the NATO NEC. Due
to the lack of any previous strategic national guidance, the CFNEC drew on provisions
2
laid out in the NATO Strategic Vision 2004 and NATO NEC Foundation Document
2005. 5, 6 The CFNEC was the first conceptual document of this type in the ACR. It
established six developmental areas of focus: C2 systems; personnel; technology;
research and experimentation; acquisition and resourcing; and cooperation with
defense industries.7 It concluded by observing that the creation of a NEC in the ACR “is
a key prerequisite for increasing the overall operational capabilities of the forces and is
one of principal pillars of the transformation of ACR to a professional force.”8
The Czech National Security Strategy (NSS) considers “developing technical and
technological capabilities for processing and transmission of information, with an
emphasis on information protection and accessibility” as an interest of national
importance. 9 The NSS identified importance of achieving compatibility between the
ACR and its partners by stating, “The basic principle for safeguarding the defense and
security of the CR is active involvement in the NATO system of collective defense.”10
The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (NMS) similarly recognizes the strategic
importance of and the dependency of the CR on the Alliance. It provides that “collective
defense within NATO is the only effective, efficient and credible means of defense of the
CR.”11 This strategic guidance specifies the requirements for implementing technical and
technological developmental programs, including a national-level NEC, in harmony with
the CR’s allies to achieve coherent effects in NATO operations.12 By defining the
political-military ambitions of the CR, the NMS helps determine priorities with respect to
the specific units of the ACR.13
The recently released national strategic defense vision paper The White Book of
Defense of the Czech Republic (WBD) elaborates these priorities in more detail. It
3
states “cyber-defense and the ability to operate in an integrated information
environment within the framework of NATO operations are key developmental priorities”
irrespective of envisioned future fiscal constraints.14 The WBD also provides that the
main concern is the units, which fall within provisions of political-military ambitions of the
CR. Such strict guidance does not merely respect fiscal constraints; it signifies more
importantly that primarily those units represent national commitments of the CR toward
the NATO system of collective defense.
The NATO capability statement (NCS) prescribes required capabilities of
committed national formations. It is a core Alliance paper providing guidance to all
NATO member nations on units’ specific capability requirements. The NCS specifies
that any company-level formation serving as part of a NATO-led multinational operation
must be “capable of operating integrated in an NATO NEC environment.”15 Key national
strategic documents, together with allied capability requirements, supplied the Czech
Ministry of Defense (MoD) valuable guidance for developing a long-term strategic
approach for implementing NEC in the ACR.
In 2007, the MoD approved the SFNEC. The defense and security committee of
the Czech parliament and subsequently the Czech government acknowledged the
document in the fall of 2007. As with the drafting of the Concept of Founding NEC, the
SFNEC suffered from a lack of NATO strategic and doctrinal documents on NEC.
Therefore, the SFNEC had to follow provisions of NATO Strategic Vision 2004 and
NATO NEC Foundation Document 2004. Apart from NATO NEC conferences at the
experts’ level, the strategy was never the subject of any NATO strategic leaders’
forums. These facts serve merely to describe the strategic circumstances, environment,
4
and doctrinal void, which have accompanied the evolution of NEC in all NATO member
countries.
The SFNEC determines the mid- and long-term stages for creating the NEC. It
details only those tasks at the mid-term stage, dividing them into three phases. In its
chapter 3.1., it set out six key areas of focus completing the NEC in the mid-term:
building up an integrated environment - technological site; processes of command and
control; doctrinal development; education; personnel management; coordination of
building up NEC.16 Although the SFNEC elaborates on priorities in terms of technology,
it does not assess resources. It does not provide requirements for organizational
changes; research requirements for new C2 approaches and concepts; or any priorities
toward units.17 Significant fiscal constraints will continue to frustrate the timely realization
of many particular tasks throughout SFNEC phases.18 Thus, the SFNEC quickly became
outdated and irrelevant. One of the biggest weaknesses is a broad concept of
developmental priorities that is ignoring national political-military ambitions. This causes
a dedication of equal focus to the strategic, operational and tactical level, while national
political-military ambitions sets priorities to tactical deployable command and combat
elements of the force. It ignores the guidance to focus first on implementing NEC at the
battalion level for deployable units and then proceeding through to higher non-
deployable formations. There is an urgent need to update and rewrite the SFNEC in
accordance with outcomes of recent NATO studies, and align it with realities of
assessed future fiscal resource frames and guidance provided by respective strategic
documents.19 Additionally, the SFNEC does not embed provisions of C2 approaches
and concepts research. It does not shift the priority from adoption of information
5
technologies to developments in human and organizational behavior. Although the
SFNEC recognizes the importance of the human domain, it merely provides
requirements for military personnel to become information technology savvy. It does not
address preconditions for change in individual and organizational behavior. Therefore,
the way of thinking about the use of information has not materialized. Misunderstanding
the essence of C2 in the information age and a lack of doctrinal guidance causes an
unwillingness to share information and misinterpretation of C2 functions.
Examination of Command and Control Arrangements Weaknesses
Misinterpretation of C2 Functions. The central issue to the successful
implementation of the SFNEC is “the need to understand C2 thoroughly.”20 Since the
dissolution of Warsaw pact, the ACR has striven to break away from the Soviet
understanding of C2 concepts and to adopt the NATO’s conception. Admittedly, such a
comprehensive undertaking has been a challenge. At the dawn of the 21st century, in
the emerging age of information-networked warfare, this task looks even more
challenging. Today, the ACR has neither its C2 doctrine aligned with Allied publications,
nor do these documents reflect the latest research in the field of C2. The knowledge
which doctrinal document provides still largely reflects an Industrial Age way of thinking
about C2. The ACR’s core document on Command and Control Pub-53-01-1 Command
and Control in Operations defines C2 functions as consisting “of arrangements of
personnel, material resources, communication means, signal connection, facilities,
liaison activities, and procedures, which are employed by the commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the
mission assigned.”21 This is rather vague definition of C2 functions for the ACR’s key
6
doctrinal document. The document neither defines nor explains C2 functions. The lack
of explanation causes misinterpretation in practice and is an important shortcoming in
the transformation of the ACR to Information Age networked warfare. This definition is
more than 20 years old. Even U.S. doctrinal documents used this version of definition in
the peak of the Industrial Age.22 U.S. doctrinal documents have matured with time,
incorporating new research and lessons learned; Czech doctrine, however, remains
mired in a bygone era.
In their work Understanding Command and Control, Dr. David Alberts, and Dr.
Richard Hayes, identified six functions associated with C2. These functions are
“establishing intent; determining roles, responsibilities, and relationships; establishing
rules and constraints; monitoring and assessing the situation and progress; inspiring,
motivating, and engendering trust; training and education; and provisioning.”23 The
reality is that none of the ACR’s doctrinal documents in any way defines command
functions. This particular absence has led to misunderstanding the core responsibilities
of the commander. This results in awkward situations when commanders do not differ
between command functions and control functions. Subordinates do not fulfill control
functions that are associated with required adjustments to current and planned efforts
within the guidelines established by command, primarily in form of intent. 24 Mislead by
obscure doctrine, in practice, ACR’s commanders insist on approving all possible
adjustments to current and planned efforts. This results in the over-centralizing of C2
functions in one person, the commander. Consequently, it teaches subordinates that
only commanders are responsible for exercising control over subordinates in all
occasion. This is the true legacy of Soviet conception of C2. Such heavy Industrial Age
7
behavioral runs counter to the essence of networked warfare, which aims at “supporting
the speed of command - the conversion of superior information position to action.”25 It
represents one of major burdens in transforming the ACR to a military of network centric
designs proposed by Arthur Cebrowski and characterized by four following concepts:
faster, more inclusive and comprehensive bi-directional information flows among unit, particularly laterally, to enable effective operational self-synchronization at the tactical level;
faster corporate learning;
an ability to develop more viable options for effective action faster than an opponent; and implement viable options faster than an opponent could counter them;
confronting an opponent with overwhelming complexity.26
Simply put, if there is a case for decision, it does not necessarily mean that it
requires a commander to function. “When it is recognized that some adjustments are
required, the function of control is to, within the limits established by command, make
changes to the established roles, responsibilities, and relationships, and the rules and
constraints that are in effect.”27 Unintended consequences of this way of thinking are
that it prevents subordinates from developing new core competencies needed for
Information Age organization like “self-synchronization and collaboration”.28 Industrial
Age thinking decreases C2 quality. It results in the lack of empowerment of
subordinates. Empowered subordinates can use robustly shared information for better
interaction, which enhances effectiveness and agility.
Lack of Empowerment. ACR Pub-53-01-1 Command and Control in Operations
provides that “command rests exclusively in the hands of the commander. It includes
authority, decision-making, leadership and control.”29 The document further provides
that a commander is a center element of command. The commander is the “key person
8
in the process of C2.”30 The role of a commander is “decisive for successful command
and control.”31 It as well signifies traditional principles of command and control like
“decomposition, centralized planning and control, and decentralized execution.”32 Such
doctrinal provisions, deeply rooted in an Industrial Age way of thinking, represent
another significant burden in transforming ACR to a networked warfare capable force. In
their work Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age Dr. David
Alberts, and Dr. Richard Hayes, provide that “This traditional view of command could be
characterized as power to the center.”33 The Information Age requires a new approach
to C2. “This approach is called power to the edge.”34 The essence of the new approach
is the empowerment of individuals and organizational entities for unlimited interaction,
robust information sharing, and elimination of unnecessary C2 constraints.35 With
application of power to the edge C2 concepts, “military organizations will be able to
overcome the shortcomings of their Industrial Age predecessors and develop the
interoperability and agility necessary for success.”36 The changes need to include the
way militaries think about the use of information and the power it bears in a robust
network. Militaries must change the way they understand the essence of command and
how they exercise control in networked warfare.
Military operations are “enormously complex, and complexity theory tells us that
enterprises organize best from the bottom-up.”37 Arthur Cebrowski contended “… the
new technology enables much greater military effectiveness from self-synchronization
by tactical units rather than from traditional hierarchical command structures.”38
Traditionally, however, a military commander works to obtain top-down command
directed synchronization to properly mass fires at the point of contact with the enemy.
9
The unconstrained interaction will intensify the use of information. This will result in
increased speed of command, bottom-up self-synchronization, and higher situational
awareness. The theorist Jeff Cares in his book Distributed Networked Operations
refines the essence of networked centric operations. He suggests that with new C2
concepts “where power generates from robust networked enabled interaction, the fluid,
self-synchronizing military force will be the norm, at least at tactical level.”39 The primary
advantage in these self-synchronizing forces “arises from networked affects.”40 He
discusses distributed networked operations within the concepts of adaptive control
theory in an emerging complex and non-linear operational environment, and envisions
combat by a large number of diverse, small units rather than by a small number of
generally homogenous, large units.41 It is important for all militaries aspiring to transform
to Information Age to study this new theory for future operations and embed the gained
knowledge into doctrinal documents.
Networked warfare, where decision-making information goes out to the edges,
involves changes in collective behavior; in the size of units, and their efficiency.
Significant will be ability of each empowered individual and organizational entity, out at
the edges, in interpreting and maximizing the available information. These facts
emphasize the necessity of focusing on the human domain more than merely equipping
military personnel with information technologies.
Lack of Focus on the Human Domain. The SFNEC provides only vague guidance
for focusing on the Human Domain.42 Although it recognizes the importance of such a
domain, it merely provides the requirements for military personnel to become
information technology savvy. The detailed MCPs specified in chapter 4 do not set out
10
measures related to education, training, and exercises. MCPs do not address required
changes in the ways of thinking, implications of new C2 concepts and approaches,
mutual interactions, collaboration, and leadership.43 Admittedly, the nature of networked
warfare “is about human and organizational behavior.”44 Any approach, which merely
focuses on combining modern information technology (IT) and the best IT educated and
trained personnel, cannot be the model for Information Age networked warfare. McCann
and Pigeau, authors of Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience
assert, “equipment is useless without personnel who believe in the cause and are
motivated to achieve the goals that will further it.”45 The authors summarize that
“technological advances have certainly changed face and pace of C2, but these
changes have occurred within a philosophical and conceptual vacuum.”46 They
emphasize that with the emerging Information Age networked warfare “C2 approaches
and concepts must be defined and discussed from a uniquely human perspective.”47 It
will be priority for SFNEC to recognize the importance of the human domain and
redefine its MCPs. Human is the key element of battle command and control;
technology is only a tool. New capabilities cannot be limited merely to keeping up with
technological advancement or IT literacy of military personnel. Education, training, and
exercises must accurately reflect all identified changes in C2 concepts, approaches,
and individual and organizational behaviors.
All players in the Information Age operating environment will use technology to
cooperate in networked manner, including adversaries. Therefore, those who are
capable of making the best of available information will gain a competitive advantage
and not those who use the best information technology. The theorist Alexander Kott in
11
his book Battle of Cognition: The Future Information-rich Warfare and the Mind of the
Commander asserts that technological advance in the C2 field “can succeed only by
matching the new technology to the intricate strengths and weaknesses of the human
mind.”48 It is only the human mind, which can best make sense of any situation or any
problem, even in the most complex problems. The key is in acknowledging, “The mind
is gifted beyond any machine - indeed, beyond its own comprehension - and it now has
high-performance, distributed information systems to assist it.”49 It is important to
understand how people utilize the new technological capabilities in making the most of
information for supporting C2 processes. That means “enabling individuals and
organizations to create value in new ways.”50 Kott asserts, “Situation awareness,
collaboration, and effective decision-making are three most salient processes of
successful battle action and C2.”51 In short, humans conduct these processes with
support of technology, not vice versa. Kott further provides that “the quality of battle C2
is critically dependent on the extent to which the decision makers understand the
situation and on the degree of cognitive load they experience.”52 Education and training
efforts must concentrate on preparing military personnel to make sense of presented
information better, collaborate without constraints, self-synchronize, make decisions,
and communicate decision effectively.
Information has always played a key role in military operations. Ability to obtain
information and process it has led to decisive information advantage over an opponent.
Access to new ITs has vastly increased a force’s ability to collect, process, distribute
and use information. This all signifies necessity of free information distribution, and
utilizing all sources in obtaining and leveraging information in support of C2.
12
Constraint Distribution of Information. In concert with the book Understanding
Command and Control, the term information for purposes of this paper includes “data,
information, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom.”53 Pub-53-01-1 Command and
Control in operations specifies that information management is an organized process.
The key drivers of this process are both the commander’s critical information
requirements and his/her guidance related to requirements for exchanging information
either vertically or horizontally.54 This doctrinal document defines the essence of
information management as an “organized process utilized for constant provisioning of
important information to the right person in the right time in usable format for enhancing
situational awareness and decision-making.”55 Although there is principally nothing
wrong with this definition, the document further emphasizes that this is pre-dominantly a
commander-centric process, as it serves primarily a commander with information.56
Upon adoption of collected information, commander’s staff turns information into
intelligence and pushes it, respecting guidance on information exchange requirements,
either vertically or horizontally to identified users.57 Such doctrinal guidance is clearly a
legacy of the Industrial Age militaries, which “follows this practice of preplanning
organized system, and constrained distribution.”58 These doctrinal provisions require
rethinking and reflection on new research outcomes conducted on the field of
information distribution.
Emerging ITs can provide for large-scale information sharing information and
distribution only if organizations adopt a philosophy of unconstrained collaboration and
interaction. “In a genuine Information Age (or an Edge organization), all information is
available to all the entities, with constraints minimized and focused on necessary
13
aspects of information assurance.”59 This misunderstanding of information distribution in
ACR’s C2 structure goes against Information Age opportunities. The implementation of
changes in the ways of distributing information concepts will enhance shared
awareness and collaboration, adding to increased synchronization. Admittedly, such
“advances in the information domain … will affect progress in the cognitive domain,
which in turn will be reflected in the physical domain in the form of responsiveness,
adaptability, agility, and flexibility.”60 These competencies will provide a source of
competitive advantage in the Information Age.61 The robust distribution of information
and close collaboration will enable a force to “convert information to better choices and
outcomes - this is called new edge battle wisdom.”62 The ACR’s doctrinal documents
need to provide guidance for all individuals at all levels of military organization to feel
hunger for information that is available in the environment. Every soldier, military
platform, and collaborating entity is a source of information. Just as they must collect
information, so they must leverage the collective intelligence enabled by free and robust
distribution of information.
These arguments are certainly only few of the already indentified C2 weaknesses
in the SFNEC and the ACR’s other doctrinal documents. However, this is not the only
area for improvement. This paper also addresses gaps in organizational structure.
There are weaknesses in tactical structures of Combat Support (CS) and Combat
Service Support (CSS) units. Important is as well a gap related to insufficient battle-staff
structures. These gaps as well have a potential to hamper successful transformation of
ACR to future networked enabled force.
14
Examination of Organizational Weaknesses
Unbalanced tactical structures of CS and CSS units. The ACR’s current
organizational structure has existed since 2003. In that year, the ACR adopted a new,
modular approach for constructing deployable brigade- and battalion-size task forces.
The ACR currently fields two maneuver brigades, each with four maneuver battalions.
Functional CS and CSS modules are not an organic to their parent maneuver brigades
or battalions. These modules exist in independent functional brigades. When directed,
functional brigades provide their “earmarked” battalion or company size modules for
maneuver formations. These arrangements bring several advantages, like enhanced
quality and effectiveness of functional training, more efficient links from functional
branches’ heads at strategic level to functional units at tactical level, and flexibility in
assigning functional units to maneuver formations prior identified deployments, to name
a few. However, these arrangements are the main source of inconsistent
implementation of a national NEC strategy. Although the SFNEC provides clear
objectives through particular MCP, the focus (fiscal, educational and research) has
shifted purely to maneuver brigades and battalion, and no or minimal effort has
remained toward functional elements. 63 This practice results in a major technological
disproportion between maneuver and functional modules. In parallel with a lack of
technology comes a lack of education and training. The 2010 Annual SFNEC Report is
the first document to identify such shortfalls and stipulate requirements for coordination
and mutual coherence of all NEC implementation projects.64 It suggests initiating, in
2012, NEC implementation projects for all functional support areas.65 On the other hand,
the report does not recognize necessity for more proportionate and incremental MCP
approach to NEC implementation.
15
Despite the SFNEC’s provisions, both maneuver brigades and their battalions
receive the new technology simultaneously.66 The MCPs should ensure that two
battalion size task force formations with all the functional support modules receive
technological and educational means and attention. Subsequently a second package of
two battalions should follow until all maneuver battalion size formations are completed.
The air force should adopt a similar approach to its wing-size formations. This approach
is consistent with national political-military ambition and ensures incremental adoption of
constantly improving information technology.67 Both fiscal constraints and the dynamic
pace of new technology advancement indicate a necessity to distribute all associated
costs and modernization projects in a more proportionate manner throughout several
years. Although, the SFNEC emphasize such argument of a balanced adoption of new
technologies and the adherence to political-military ambitions these provisions have not
materialized in practice.68 All maneuver battalion formations received simultaneously
only some parts of new technology, but not the entire package. This means that all of
them can fulfill only minimal operational requirements.69
The current structure of function-oriented units and the inconsistent
implementation of the SFNEC create an even more significant problem in deployable
brigades and battalion task forces. First, the battle-staff structures of these formations
lack functional combat support elements, which must ensure 24/7 performance of
control function. Second, these structures are composition of functional, enclosed
stovepipes throughout all command levels.
Insufficient Battle-Staff Structures. The principal doctrinal document related to
description of command and control concepts PUB 53-01-2 Staff Processes in
16
Operations provides detailed guidance on brigade, battalion and company level
command post (CP) arrangements. CP composition signifies the necessity of a
specialty based organization.70 It reflects the broadening of the future military mission
spectrum and it describes the necessity to establish either permanent or ad hoc
specialty- and threat-based functional groups.71 Such a philosophy follows traditional,
Industrial Age warfare C2 principles such as “decomposition, specialization, hierarchy,
optimization, deconfliction, centralized planning, and decentralized execution.”72 These
principles are not exclusive to the ACR. They remain important elements in most of
today’s military organizations.73 However, in the face of future operational environment
complexity, the broadening spectrum of missions, and the emerging needs for rapid and
unconstrained information sharing these principles and practices “will not permit an
organization to bring all of its information (and expertise) or its assets to bear.”74
Traditional way of thinking is not suited to realizing the Information Age key force
capabilities of interoperability and agility.75 An Industrial Age way of thinking, in principle,
relies on centralized planning and the ability to specify information exchange
requirements and collaboration in advance. However, in increasingly complex
situations, it is impossible to know with whom and when one needs to share information
in advance.76 The organizational transformation needs to focus on changing these
traditional C2 practices and adapt to an edge organization. Simply put, organizational
transformation must focus on “mastering the art of creating and leveraging information
advantage.”77 Maximum benefits of information technology “come not from automating
existing processes, but rather from developing new processes that take full advantage
of the new technologies.”78 Based on the results of existing research, “… the community
17
of researchers expects those organizations that are based on power to the edge
principles and that conduct network-centric operations to be more agile.”79
Recommendations
The leadership of the ACR and its personnel have invested a great deal of
valuable effort in transforming the ACR to 21st century warfare. The ACR’s success in
operations with NATO allies and coalition partners, primarily in Afghanistan clearly
demonstrates this. This paper provides some recommendations to assist the ACR
leadership in intensifying the process of force transformation and aligning the force with
allies. This paper also draws attention to the risks associated with the proposed
changes, enabling the ACR leadership to make sound decisions. These
recommendations relate to MCPs in strategy for NEC implementation, organizational
changes of the ACR, and doctrinal changes in C2 concepts.
Revision of NEC Strategy - resetting MCPs. A sound and coherent MCP should
consist of concept of operations (ConOps), C2, organization, doctrine, education,
weapons, and infrastructure, systems, and personnel.80 The SFNEC determines three
MCPs to achieve the transformation of the ACR into a 21st century information age
networked enabled force. 81 They provide detailed goals for the adoption of new
information technologies, for embedding staff procedures and include training for
mastering information technology. However, they do not specify goals for changes in
ConOps and C2 approaches. MCP’s do not set research requirements for new C2
approaches and concepts and goals for doctrinal adoption of available knowledge
related to C2 concepts in networked warfare. They do not embrace need for
organizational changes, changes in procedures and behavior, and any priorities toward
18
units. Therefore, the revised SFNEC should provide these specific goals and to redefine
the MCPs.
Strategy through reviewed MCPs must determine the specific goals concerning
the education and training of personnel to include new C2 concepts and ways of
thinking. It must require revision of doctrinal documents to reflect on research based
Information Age C2 concepts and approaches. Education and training comprising of
new C2 concepts, approaches and way of thinking must become a priority. To better
harness the power of new emerging technologies, the SFNEC must set the conditions
for the incremental and balanced modernization and adoption of new technologies for
battalion-size formations, including functional CS and CSS modules. MoD must avoid
the massive, an all-at-once, single employment of systems for all maneuver elements.
An incremental approach will better address all deployable formations, and
achievements of final operational capability requirements in accordance with political-
military ambitions.
The disadvantages associated with widening the scope of the MCPs in the
SFNEC relate to an increase of fiscal resources in the initiation phase, as there will be a
need for more training and education courses related to new C2 concepts, approaches
and way of thinking. It will require a radical change in the composition of the courses
and entities participating in their organization. Extensive cooperation with civilian
contractors prior the development of trained instructors and lecturers will also be
essential, as with reviewing mid-term research and innovations plans and enhancing the
research focus. However, the adoption of battalion wise incremental modernization
approach, instead of current mass approach could mitigate the risk of fiscal increase.
19
Transforming the organizational structure of the ACR. The current modular
organizational structure of the ACR is the main source of inconsistent implementation of
a national NEC strategy. It is necessary to provide functional CS and CSS modules the
same capability as maneuver modules. Presently, they do not receive the same
developmental priority from the strategic level.82 This must change. In addition to
confusing the implementing of the SFNEC, this structure increases the routine
sustainment cost of the ACR because functional brigade headquarters (HQs) are non-
deployable.83 These HQs serve merely as the peacetime administrative C2 elements of
their subordinate deployable modules.84 The MoD must rethink the functional brigade
based model. It should dismantle the functional brigades and redistribute the functional
CS and CSS battalions equally into both maneuver brigades, as obtained before
December 2003. These steps will facilitate political-military ambitions, preserve the
capacity to generate deployable formations, and maintain the concept of modular, task
driven deployable formations. Additionally, it will offer the potential of considerable fiscal
savings for other projects. Most importantly, it will focus development priorities in both
the maneuver and functional modules, and enhance interoperability, combat power, and
the effectiveness of the deployable formations.
These proposed organizational structure changes will require yet another painful
force restructuring. The Chief of Defense has many times declared his concerns in
relation to the structural stability of the force and therefore the benefits of such force
reconstruction will need thorough deliberation. Further, dismantling of functional
brigades’ commands from the force structure will result in a decrease of experienced,
senior and mid-ranking personnel from the brigades’ leadership and staff. However,
20
there is a reasonable space to enlarge maneuver brigades’ staff; the JFC’s and MoD’s
functional staff cells, which are at present significantly undermanned in numbers and
capabilities. This will strengthen effectiveness of maneuver brigades’ staffs and overall
C2 processes. Additionally, there is an arithmetical prediction of fiscal saving in regards
to lowering the numbers of personnel, equipment and the usage of infrastructure.
Revision of Doctrinal documents - embedding new C2 concepts. The most
significant problem the ACR faces in transformation itself is outdated and unclear C2
doctrinal principles. The doctrinal C2 documents of PUB 53 - 01 series must reflect on
recent research findings and foreign military operation lessons learned. Education,
training and exercises intimately flow from doctrine. This implies that the changes in
way of human thinking must start with doctrinal changes. Doctrine must reengineer C2
concepts, clearly specifying command functions, control functions, and the role of
commander and organization in a networked environment. It must provide guiding
principles for NEC and power to the edge C2 concepts to enable organization to
leverage the power of information. The doctrine must inculcate in the military mind the
value intuition, rational reasoning of complex situations, collaboration, interaction,
problem comprehension, and “self-learning to improve the use of information and
decision-making.”85
Concurrently with doctrinal changes, cultural changes will encourage
organizational behavior to support the application of new ways of thinking and outlive
the old ones. The MoD must ensure that education programs, training and exercises
apply the new C2 concepts and approaches while intensively utilizing information
technology. Doctrinal and cultural changes represent the biggest challenge in
21
transforming the force in 21st century. It will require vast shift in thinking about C2
approaches and concepts. Leaders will need to push down decision-making authority to
lower levels; and foster mutual trust across all levels of command. Primarily long-
serving personnel in the MoD, responsible for education, training, and doctrinal
development, will be first to initiate this shift. There will be requirement for language
improvements as majority of C2 research bibliography is available only in English.
Additionally, the MoD leadership will need to create an atmosphere of urgency in the
ACR for NEC Information Age culture. Initial and subsequent constant seminar like
education will have to be established, which will stretch already tight working hours at
the strategic and operational levels. The proposed recommendations will enable the
force to become valuable member of multinational formations throughout the entire
likely spectrum of operations in the security environment of the 21st century.
Conclusions
The Czech strategic documents provide the guidance that signifies the need for
making the ACR a smaller, more effective military force, fully interoperable in a
multinational environment. The MoD, in its transformation plans relies on the use of
high-technology command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
systems (C4I) to leverage its military assets. 86 Advanced Information technology has the
potential to enhance combat power and the effectiveness of the force. Information
technology advances without changes in organization structure, C2 approaches and
concepts, organizational culture and doctrine, however great, would merely mean
higher expenses and a marginal enhancement of capabilities. The MoD must strive to
fix weaknesses primarily in the human developmental and doctrinal areas. A strategy for
22
the NEC must provide a long-term vision through well-thought and balanced MCPs.
Although, there are risks associated with a shift in strategy for NEC and organizational
structure, they are marginal in comparison with the prospect of enhanced future force
effectiveness. The MoD needs to create an atmosphere of urgency for NEC
implementation and necessity to accommodate network enabled Information Age
culture. There must persistently push for change in human and organizational behavior
to exploit fully the opportunity for information superiority. Only through long-term
sustained actions in all these areas will the ACR achieve its transformation force goals
for the 21st Century.
Endnotes
23
1 GEN Picek, V., “Network Enabled Capability and Transformation of the Czech Armed Forces,” keynote speech at the 9. International Conference ITTE, Prague, the Czech Republic, 2 May 2007.
2 For background on the development of the military budget of the Czech Ministry of Defense, see Jiri Sedivy, The White Book on Defense (Prague, the Czech Republic: the Ministry of Defense, 18 May 2011), 92 - 124, http://www.army.cz/ministry-of-defence/newsroom/news/the-white-paper-on-defence-2011--55474/ (accessed November 11, 2011).
3 Alberts, D., Garstka, J. and Stein, F., Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, the Command and Control Research Program, 2000), 88.
4 Cebrowski, A., The Implementation of Network Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense, 5 January 2011), i.
5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge (Norfolk, VA: Allied Command Transformation, August 2004), https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/StrategicV/StrategicV/file/_WFS/stratvis0804.pdf (accessed November 11, 2011).
6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO NEC Foundation Document (Norfolk, VA: Allied Command Transformation, Jun 2005), http://nnec.act.nato.int/pages/documents.aspx (accessed January 21, 2012).
7 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Concept of Founding NEC in the Czech Armed Forces (Prague, the Czech Republic: the Chief of the General Staff, 6 February 2006), 23 - 30.
8 Ibid., 34.
9 The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (Prague, the Czech Republic: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2011), 7, http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=8503 (accessed November 11, 2011).
10 Ibid., 5.
11 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (Prague, the Czech Republic: the Ministry of Defense, 23 July 2008), 3, http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=8503 (accessed November 11, 2011).
12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Strategic Vision, 11.
13 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, 5.
14 Sedivy, The White Book on Defense, 117 - 118.
15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements (Norfolk, VA: Allied Command Transformation, 16 April 2008), 24 - 107.
16 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Strategy of Founding NEC in the Czech Armed Forces (Prague, the Czech Republic: the Chief of the General Staff, 9 September 2007), 15.
17 Ibid., 16 - 21.
18 For economic details, see Sedivy, The White Book on Defense, 56 - 71.
19 Ibid.
20 Alberts, D. and Hayes, R., Understanding Command and Control (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, the Command and Control Research Program, 2006), 1.
21 Vejmělka, O., PUB 53-01-1 Command and Control in Operations (Vyškov, the Czech Republic: Training and Doctrine Directorate, 2006), 6.
22 U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 01 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint Chief of Staff, January 1986), 74.
23 Alberts, and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 47.
24 Ibid., 59.
25 Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare, 88.
26 Blaker, J., Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 19.
27 Alberts, and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 155.
28 Cebrowski, A. and Garstka, J., Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future (Annapolis, MD: Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 124, no. 1, 1998), 12.
29 Vejmělka, PUB 53-01-1 Command and Control in Operations, 7.
30 Ibid., 65.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 37 - 58.
33 Alberts, D. and Hayes, E., Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, the Command and Control Research Program, 2003), 203.
34 Ibid., 5.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 165.
37 Cebrowski, and Garstka, Network-Centric Warfare, 7.
38 Blaker, Transforming Military Force, 92.
39 Cares, J., Distributed Network Operations: The Foundation of Network Centric Warfare (Newsport, RI: Alidade Press, 2005), 54.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 52 - 74.
42 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Strategy of Founding NEC, 13 - 15.
43 Ibid., 17 - 25.
44 Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network centric warfare, 88.
45 McCann, C. and Pigeau, R., The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience (New York, NY: Kluwert Academic / Plenum Publishers, 2000), 3.
46 Ibid., 181.
47 Ibid.
48 Kott, A., Battle of Cognition: The Future Information-rich Warfare and the Mind of the Commander (Westport, CO: Praeger Security International, 2008), 7.
49 Gompert, D., Lachow, I. and Perkins, J., Battle Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006), xv.
50 Alberts, D., Garstka, J., Hayes, E. and Stein, F., Understanding Information Age Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, the Command and Control Research Program, 2001), 45.
51 Kott, Battle of Cognition, 5.
52 Ibid., 5 - 6.
53 Alberts, and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 107.
54 Vejmělka, PUB 53-01-1 Command and Control in Operations, 82 - 101.
55 Ibid., 82.
56 Ibid., 83.
57 Ibid., 84 - 88.
58 Alberts, and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 110.
59 Ibid., 111.
60 Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, and Stein, Understanding Information Age Warfare, 48.
61 Ibid., 49.
62 Gompert, Lachow, and Perkins, Battle Wise, xiii.
63 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Strategy of Founding NEC, 17 - 21.
64 The Czech Ministry of Defense, 2010 Annual Report of Implementation of Strategy of Founding NEC in the Czech armed forces (Prague, the Czech Republic: Communication and Information Systems Division, General Staff, 26 May 2010), 5 - 6.
65 Ibid., 14.
66 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Strategy of Founding NEC, 17 - 21.
67 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, 5.
68 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Strategy of Founding NEC, 5, 7 - 8, 16.
69 The Czech Ministry of Defense, 2010 Annual Report, 5.
70 Vejmělka, O., PUB 53-01-2 Staff Processes in Operations - part 1 (Vyškov, the Czech Republic: Training and Doctrine Directorate, 2007), 42 - 46, 52 - 56.
71 Ibid., 49 - 50.
72 Alberts, and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 37.
73 Ibid., 37.
74 Ibid., 56.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 59.
77 Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, and Stein, Understanding Information Age Warfare, 55.
78 Cares, Distributed Network Operations, 21.
79 Alberts, and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 221.
80 Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network centric warfare, 193 - 197.
81 The Czech Ministry of Defense, The Strategy of Founding NEC, 17 - 21.
82 The Czech Ministry of Defense, 2010 Annual Report, 5 - 6.
83 Sedivy, The White Book on Defense, 29.
84 Ibid., 44.
85 Gompert, Lachow, and Perkins, Battle Wise, 111.
86 Ibid., 26 - 28.
