Combat estimate French Morocco Army May 1 1942. pt2

8/7/2019 Combat estimate French Morocco Army May 1 1942. pt2

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FRENCH MOBOCCOCombat

5. Equipment .Clothing and Equipment.a. Individual(1) Clothing.(a) Foreign Legionnaires . The dress of these men isthe kepi (cap) with curtain in back, blue coats > white trousers, low"boots. / (b) White troops* The Foreign Legion and colonialtroops wear the ordinary khaki uniform, with the addition of a "bluesash, or cummer "bund in the case of the former. Worth African troops,other than Algerian light cavalry (Chasseurs d'Afrique), wear the fezor turban ....'. In the case of officers, the service jacket is of

the British type, "but with a collar only just low enough to reveal aninner white collar and "black tie. Either "breeches or trousers may "beworn. Mounted officers wear spurs. With "breeches, cavalry officerswear field-boots, other officers ankle-hoots with leggings or puttees.The headdress is the "kepi", or, in the case of light infantry, tank,-armored car units and fortress troops the ""beret".Other ranks. The service jacket has a close fitt ingcollar. The greatcoat, in the case of infantry, is worn with thebottom ends folded back. Breeches only are worn,, no trousers. Mountedsoldiers wear leggings and spurs; dismounted soldiers; puttees* Thesteel helmet, with a white cloth cover to reflect the heat of the sunfrom the wearer's head, is worn for guard duties, maneuvers andexercises other than drill parades, /Extreme simplicity and utility is the principalattribute of French uniform.() Native troops. The Tirailleurs are dressed likethe European infantry. The Spahis wear long loose trousers gatheredinto their boot tops. A blouse, single breasted, is also worn.Around their waist, they wear a leather belt supported by bandoleersover their shoulders. Instead of greatcoats, they wear long capes.In action, they wear their belts and bandoleers over their capes, sothe cape becomes a long tunic. A turban is vorn on the head.(2) Personal equipment. Organizational and tactical equipment is lacking in quantity.The total weight in personal equipment carried by aFrench infantryman is 73-1/2 pounds.The total weight carried by a French cavalry horse,including rider, is approximately 375 pounds.Supplies to the army have been curtailed by the Germans.In some cases, the Germans have even requisitioned supplies directlyfrom the troops themselves. The Air Force troops around Marrakechin 19^1 had two of their winter issue of three blankets requisitioned-from them leaving them but one apiece for the approaching winter.

The French infantryman is armed with a rifle or. carbinewhich fires an 8 mm.' bullet and is equipped with bayonet. Officerscarry an automatic pistol firing a: 7- 65 caliber bullet. The riflesi>

s&


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' '15and carbines weigh about seven pounds. The pistol weighs. .a littleover two The rifle and carbine have a practical range of1,200 feet; the pistol, 150 feet. A rifleman can fire with accuracyeight to ten rounds per minute, depending, of' course, on his degreeof skill. Both rifle grenades and hand grenades are carried, Theformer has a. range of 15Q yards and the latter 30 yards.Bayonets of the long French type are carried by footsoldiers with rifles or carbines. ,Cavalry and artillery are armed with the same types ofpersonal weapons. Other branches are armed with pistols or rifles asdescribed above.

"b* Organizational.\2 5 a \u 2 5 a 0. (l; Tanks . So far as known there are no tanks with the, \u25a0units stationed inMorocco. '(2) Armored cars. There are believed to be about 25 Lafflyarmored cars of the 1930 type inMorocco.

c. \u25a0 \u25a0 Tactical Equipment.JTy Artillery. French artillery inMorocco is composed of(alModern Howitzers;155 m.mm. guns;10575 J^o1 * horse drawn;65 mm. horse drawn.These guns include one mountain or pack artillerygroup.(b) C.A.155 mm* long and marine guns;7.6-inch (19^ mm.) guns;5.^- inch (138 mm. ) guns ;Two 155 mm.. R.R. guns, suspected;3.9-inch (100 mm.) guns;2.95- inch (75 mm. ) guns(c). A_._A L90 mm. long A.A. guns;37 mm. long A.A. guns;13.2 mm. machine A.A. gunsThe 13.2 mm. A.A. is mounted on a tripod with a seat forthe gunner on one leg. The piece consists of two identical barrelslaid parallel so that one gun is really two.Many of the coast defense guns are in naval gun turretswith all around traverse or in concrete emplacements.The coast defense has recently been improved with allguns being put into shape, new ones set 7 up, \u 2 5 a 0 and all concrete requisi

tioned for emplacements, etc,


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat16(2) Anti-tank Guns.(a) 25 mm. guns (Canons de 25:38). The standard equip

ment is one to a "battalion and three to a regiment.. These guns didexcellent service during the invasion of France In 19^0. They wereparticularly effective against the !German tanks of the type PZKW -.1 and 2, against light tanks and ,armored cars up to a. range of 2,000yards; and against heavy tanks up to 1,000 yards. It was found verydifficult to camouflage these guns in the Flanders campaign, as thegun flashes were very "brilliant and immediately gave away' thepositions. ,\u25a0.\u25a0'\u25a0 \u25a0"\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0':.'\u25a0'.'

The gun is mounted on pneumatic tires and has a\u25a0shield. Fire is "by direct laying:.(3) Machine Guns. Besides the heavy ,13.2. mm. machine guns

mentioned a"bove, the army inMorocco has a number of Hotchkiss-guns 8 mm. "bullets. This gunis also mounted. on 1 a tripod with awide traverse and is of the air cooled type. The gun and stand to gether weigh ahout 10 U pounds, the gun a"bout 53 pounds. The gun fires200 rounds per minute and can "b e laid directly or indirectly. Whenlaid, "by the former method, it is effective up to 1,600 yards, and whenlaid "by the latter method, it is effective up to 3>SQO yards. Itcan also "b e use,d against airplanes up to 1,000 yards away.

It is thought that there are not over 500 machine gunsin all Morocco at present, including those which have "been overhauledand those which are to "b e overhauled, according to unconfirmed data*:.'

{k) Automatic Rifles. There are thought to "b e between 900and 1,000 automatic rifles in all French Morocco.These guns weigh approximately 20 pounds and fire a.7.65 calrber "bullet. The magazine contains 25 rounds. Their fire

is effective up. to 1,200 yards and their rate of fire in "bursts is150 rotmds per minute. A "burst of six to seven rounds is the usualmethod of fire.Direct and indirect fire is possible and a front of from"between 50 to 1,000 yards can "b e interdicted.The gun has two short legs near the muzzle for support,as it is usually fired from the prone position. However, it can "b e

fired at airplanes up to 600 yards away. There is a cone shapedshield, over the muzzle to camouflage the flash.(5) Heavy Weapons , other than Machine Guns .(a) 37 ffon gun. This is a close support weapon andu0084is mounted on wheels with a trail piece, like a miniature French75 mm., model 1897* The piece, recoil mechanism and "breach are thesame as the 37 mm. sub-cairber piece it is the custom to attachto the "barrel of our 75' s for sub-caliber practice; (i.e., there isa self-cocking mechanism operated "by the recoil action,' and the gunis single loading). It has a flash camouflaging cone over the muzzle.

The gun itself weighs 88 pounds, the carriagev88 pounds and the shield 66 pounds, giving the complete piece a totalweight of 2*4-2 'pounds. . .


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat17Effective fire is possible up to 1,500 yards, but

it is a poor "weapon when used against tanks and armored cars due toawkwardness in firing at moving targets "because of old type trailpiece. .(Id) 60 and 8l mm. mortars. The first of these throwsa 2.8 pounds projectile 1,000 yards at a rate of 18 rounds per minute,ifnecessary. The 8l mm. mortar has a range of 2,000 yards and aprojectile of great destructive capacity.

The 60 mm. mortar is carried "by one man. The8l mm. is "broken up into three pieces: "barrel, kO pounds; tripod,k-0 pounds; and "base, 46 pounds.(6) Ammunition. It is thought there is only enough ammuni-tion at hand inMorocco for a very short period of actual fighting '"bythe whole Moroccan Army. However, there have "been repeated rumors tothe effect that in the Azrou region of the Middle Atlas Mountains atEl Haji"b, quantities of ammunition (artillery and rifle) have "beenplaced in storage vaults tunneled out of the mountainside. Trucksloaded with ordnance have, at various times, "been observed movingto and fro in this region in large numbers.There have also "been rumors about another secret depotof this type in northern Morocco.6. Training, Efficiency and Morale.

a. Training.(l) Schools.(a) French officers receive their training in Franceat the military school of St. Cyr.1. Officers of the Metropolitan Army Serving outside France. A ll officers theoretically have to serve abroad accord-in g to a roster kept at the Ministry of War. Therefore, some Metro-politan Army officers from St. Cyr. and other schools are always on

\u25a0duty in French Morocco.2. Officers of the Colonial Army. These officerscome from the same source as the Metropolitan Army officers. They

must have completed six months of commissioned service before beingsent abroad. After two years abroad, they return to France to commanda colonial unit there and undergo more advanced training.3. Native Officers, Metropolitan Army. In theNorth African Regiments, belonging to the Metropolitan Army, nativesmay become officers but unless naturalized cannot rise above the rankof captain and it is only very rarely that they reach that rank.k. Colonial. Army. At present no native of thecolonies can become an officer unless he first, by naturalization,becomes a Frenchman. Naturalized natives have been known to attaincomparatively high rank, but such cases are very exceptional, andas yet natives of the colonies are not usually considered suitablefor commissioned rank. It is the intention, however, to train


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat18specially selected native N.C.O's as an experiment, with a view totheir 'becoming officers..5 Officers of "Service de,s Affaires Indigenes" .In each Worth Africa province there are civil and military zones,the former having grown gradually at the expense of the latter aspacification progresses. In the civil zones, administration iscarried out "by civil officials, in the military zones "by officers of"The Service dcs Affaires Indigenes", who are specially selected armyofficers. The standard attained "by the "Service" is very high, . andthe officers are all picked men. In general, their duties entail themaintenance of order, administration of justice and the generalpolitico-military control of the native tribes inhabiting these regions which have not yet come directly under civil administration.Officers are each responsible for a certain district within whichthey have very wide powers and much is left to their own initiative.Control is only handed over to the civilauthorities when there is no longer any fear of disturbance and whenthe natives have had many years of practice in self -administrationunder the strict supervision of the "Service dcs Affaires Indigenes".Officers also act in the capacity of intelligence officers; they are further responsible for recruiting of nativesin their district and for the collection of taxes. They officer thevarious irregular forces.

(b) French privates and N.C.O's used to be trained bythe traditional two years service, to which every man on reachingtwenty years was liable.This compulsory service has been abolished sincethe Armistice of 19^6.. To get around this, the Government at Vichyorganized the "Chantiers de la Jeuness". It provides -a way of givingmilitary training and still abiding by th e law.'It is patterned much like our own CCC camps. Every

Frenchman on becoming twenty years old must serve eight months in it.The organization is officered by carefully selectedFrench Army officers with a good deal of war experience and outstand

ing records. Enlisted pay corresponds approximately to that of asoldier of the old army; officers, the same as their corresponding'pay in the old army.There is an "esprit de corps" of the men andofficers which was never before known in the old army.

A daily routine of army life is followed. Militarydrillby the company- is on a small scale at the camps but isthoroughly carried out inmaneuvers, in small groups.These camps are pro/bably the most important institution of the "New Order",For the moment, the "Chantiers" are absolutely

under the control of Vichy, but they are doing good work in revivingthe spirit of work and patriotism amongst the younger generation andshould the attitude of Vichy change, &h,y would probably give a goodaccount of themselves. Their leaders^Jrpj^'^^a^il^^ClaiblLa^


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FRENCH MOEOCCOCombat19(2) Unit and Combined- Training. Because of the use of thetroops as garrisons in "widely separated parts of the country, there

can "be no large scale maneuvers as .we know the term. Tactical train-in g is limited to regiments at the most. Usually it takes the formof marches and simulated campaigning with smaller units.Of late, there has "been much firing of coastal defenseand antiaircraft guns for practice.Troops have teen moved to strategic positions for thedefense of the protectorate. This has necessitated a greater groupingof large numbers of trcops and no- doubt combined training has taken'

\u25a0place. .b. System of Promotion for Officers. In peace promotion from

lieutenant through the various ranks to lieutenant- colonel is partly"by seniority and partly "by selection. Promotion 0 higher ranks isentirely "by selection. Inwar, all promotion is "by selection.The list for promotion, etc., for native officers is entirelyseparate from that for French officers.c. . Efficiency.(l) Officers. Generally speaking, officers are keen andzealous and take a great interest in the welfare of their men. Relations "between officers and men are excellent* They are not strictdisciplinarians of the Prussian type. Officers are professionals

and know their "business on the whole.Officers of the "Service dcs Affaires Indigenes" areparticularly well trained and the standard of discipline and efficiencyin their commands is excellent. They must "be "both excellent militarymen and good civil administrators. Observers who have reported ontheir work-in the unpacified parts of the country are full of praise.(2) Men.' In general, the army of North Africa, includingMorocco, Is an efficient and well organized fighting machine. Thetroops have repeatedly proved their worth, 'both InMorocco, whichthey may Justly claim to have conquered, and in the European wax of191^-18. They have always distinguished themselves.

A war-like existence hag endowed th e Moores and Berberwith excellent military qualities. They are warriors "by nature andpossess in a high degree the characteristics of the perfect infantry-man: sobriety, endurance, stamina, agility, discipline. They havenatural ability for surprise attacks, are stubborn at defense, Impetuous in attack, and furthermore, they have an admirable Instinct totake the best advantage of -cover, both In advance and retreat. Troopsformed of such soldier material are excellent, provided, they -arecommanded by experienced officers with distinct leadership ability.They handled,are best through personal influence and. prestige of .theirleader which is obtained by constant display of ability, fairnessand above all, courage.The black soldier is treated with great patience andindulgence, more like a child, than a grown- up human being; in fact,


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat20

it may "b e said, that patience is the keynote of the French method ofdealing with the natives, soldiers and civilians alike. As a result,desertions are few and the men appear contented.The Foreign Legion supplies the "best troops inMorocco.At present their -well known efficiency has .'"been slightly reduced "bythe exodus of German N.C.O's from their ranks. However, the Frenchand Spanish refugees who now swell their ranks make good fightersand the above handicap is fast "being overcome.The French soldiers in-Morocco are very much like their ,counterparts in France. They are excellent and efficient soldiersbut lack the supplies and equipment necessary to make an excellentarmy. (3) Combat Efficiency and. Value as a Whole.(a) Native Troops.1. Moroccan units are considered best for shocktroops. They are composed of Berbers, who the French consider thebest soldier material to be found in their entire empire. They arenatural fighters like the Senegalese, but without the complete dependence on the white officers that marks the latter. Their valueas a whole is high, but they have had little or no experience withor against armored units. This is an important factor and must beconsidered so. 2. Senegalese or colored troops: These men arenoted for their bravery, fidelity and natural soldierly qualities.

They are extremely willing, fairly intelligent, and get on well withother types of native regiments. Their weak points appear to beinability to grasp or master anything intricate, a natural addictionto drink, which if indulged in makes them highly dangerous > and the-usual weakness of negro troops a pathetic dependence on the whiteofficer in action. They shoot well, learn French fairly easily,and in a few cases, become' able to read and write.(b) The Foreign Legion is famous for its combatefficiency and bravery in the face of the enemy. Their disciplineis excellent and the small amount of punishment necessary to maintainit is inmarked contrast with the popular views on the subject.(c) French troops are also to be given good ratingsas to combat efficiency and value. They are intelligent, brave andmake excellent fighters when well led. However, their personalinitiative is not as high as American troops.In the last World War, I9IU-18,. all the varioustypes of troops listed above acquitted themselves very well. Theyare excellent troops for the area they are supposed to be used in-French North Africa. In France against the Germans during 19^0,the native and black troops did not stand, up well under tank and. divebombing attacks, however. They are so poorly equipped and have hadso little training in this type of warfare, that it is believed, theycould do little to protect Morocco from a serious attempt at invasion,especially one by land and air over the northern- frontier .


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat21

An Invasion from the sea would "b e another matter.Even with the small amount of artillery available to the defenders,it is thought that a force would have to have marked superiority inarms and men in order to "be successful if the Moroccan Army wasordered to resist an invasion.

d. Morale and Outlook. In spite of the excellence of the armynoted above, its morale Is low. It is divided within itself, especially-among the officer personnel.The army, as a whole, does not want to fight. They know thatthey lack the arms and supplies to put up anything "but a futileresistance to German armored divisions. However, it is felt thatif ordered "by Vichy to defend North Africa, they would do so against

all attackers.As regards loyalty to Vichy:(l) Older officers from lieutenant -colonels up are infavor of Petain or whoever is head man at Vichy, and are inclined towait and see what happens rather trhan risk their person, pensionsor careers. (2) Younger officers up the rank of major are veryimpatient, even disgusted, with the policy of Vichy. They may ormay not "b e pro- de Gaulle, "but they are not anti-British and areanti-German and eager. Many of them would welcome the opportunity

to take up arms again on the side of the allies.(3) In contrast with the Navy, the army flyers inMorocco are violently pro-British, and greatly admire the R.A.F.with whom they flew In the Battle of France. At the orders of theGerman Armistice Commission, they are only allowed two hours supplyof gas when they fly, for fear they wil l take their planes and flyto Gibraltar to join the British.(k) French troops have experienced a slackening inmorale due to division of thought and more and more acquiescence to"collaboration". Their attitude can "b e summed up In a few words-"What's the use? There is little we can do. Let us make the "bestof a "bad bargain."

\u 2 5 a 0 (5) Native troops have kept up their morale very well.

They willno doubt follow their officers and fight whom they aredirected to fight.Any marked weakening of the German military situation would undoubtedly have considerable effect on the attitude andmorale of tho Northwest African garrisons, as they would then considerthat the Vichy Government, being held prisoner by Germany, would notbe in a position to make decisions and that Northwest Africa wouldbe loyally trying to shake off the German yoke if they took up armsand received help from the Anglo-Saxon peoples.


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FRENCH MOEOCCOCombat22

7. Mobilization Plan.a. Method of Recruitment.(l) Officers. French officers are sent out from France andare either Metropolitan or Colonial officers. The latter group,while coming from th e same schools as the Metropolitan, form a dis-tinct and autonomous corps. Allofficers theoretically have toserve abroad according to a roster kept at the Ministry of War. The

period of service in a colony or protectorate varies from two tothree years. Students at military schools apply for the ColonialArmy at the end of their course but may not "be sent abroad till theyhave completed six months commissioned service.

Natives can become officers inMetropolitan NorthAfrican regiments but cannot rise above the rank of captain unlessthey become Frenchmen by naturalization.At present no native can become an officer in a Colonialregiment unless he is naturalized* Naturalized natives have beenknown to attain comparatively high rank but such cases are veryexceptional and, as yet, natives are not usually considered suitablefor commissioned rank. It is the intention, however, to trainspecially selected native N.C.O's, as an experiment, with a view totheir becoming officers.There are some officers In Morocco, demobilized sincethe Armistice, who wil l undoubtedly be mobilized to officer menreturned to the army in the event of war.(2) Men. There is no conscription inMorocco; all troopstherefore, are volunteers. These serve two, three or four years inthe active army and eight, seven or six in the reserve, making atotal of ten years. Extension of service is permitted for a furtherfour years, and in exceptional cases, for one, two or three years.Natives are liable for service overseas.

b. Mobilization of Manpower. There are two possibilities formobilization of manpower to augment the French forces in Morocco.(l) Calling back to the colors of men who have been demobilized by tfie Armistice and calling up- the reserve.(2) Transportation of troops from Algeria into Morocco byrailroad through the Taza Gap between the Atlas and Riff mountains

in the north.The objection to the first method is that there arenot the necessary arms or supplies inMorocco to equip these men once

they are called in the army.The second method offers the greatest possibilities.Strong reinforcements could be brought in this way. However, therailroad facilities are limited, so that it would take considerabletime to noticeably bolster the Moroccan army. There are also severalvery vulnerable places on the railroad which, if cut, would hold uptraffic for weefcs.


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N*ika

FEENCH MOEOCCOCombat23c. Eeserve Supplies. As has "been mentioned^ there are practically

no supplies, necessary to an army, in reserve. With what is available .to them, the troops inMorocco could fight for a very short time.Fuel, and storage and transportation available for it, will"b e discussed in another part of this estimate.

The Germans have requisitioned practically all availablesupplies for their army. Much of the food and especially the wheatgrown in Morocco, is shipped out , of the country by order of theGermans. In fact, the food and clothing situation has become soserious that the Sultan is reported to have persuaded the French tosuspend shipments of wheat out of the country.Much of the shortage of wheat and farm grown products isdue to the extreme shortage of gasoline to supply tractor fuel. Itis necessary to do the .harvesting now by teams and old fashionedequipment .

. Mechanized harvesting has been in use now for a number ofyears, and the old equipment has been exposed to the weather. As aresult, its usefulness has 'been impaired and smaller amounts of cropsare harvested.There is some corn growing and ripening, but the soil isunsuited to raise the kind of corn produced in the United States.& Method and Rat e of Procurement of Supplies .-.. Supplies of

equipment and pertain quartermaster stores -originate from France.They are under the supervision of the German Armistice Commission.There are, however, a number of .machine shop and repair-depot s- in Morocco for the repair of machine; guns andnd. maintenanceautomatic rifles. There are reasonably well equipped shops atCas ab lane a and Mekn s. It wouId, ;be p.o ssible to manuf ac tu r c bar re Isand rifles, in some of these places, and it is reported that someexperimental models: were made' prior to the war. At present there,is no known arsenal or post of maniifacture for either machine gunsor automatic rifles in this area, .; ;There is thought to be a small plant fo r the assembly ofairplanes a few miles out of Casablanca at the town of Mediouna.However ,. nothing is being done there at present, as the cratedAmerican planes still'in Morocco 3_ack certain \u25a0\u25a0vital parts such as\ : 'carburetors, -etc.: V ..'- .\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0' . '.\u25a0 \u25a0'. '\u25a0 \u25a0\u25a0 -..\u25a0- ' \u25a0'. . \\Eate of procurement . is very slow, for even when the Frenchare given permission to requisition supplies, it is usually foundthat they are unobtainable due to previous German requisitions in-:\u25a0\u25a0France. . \u25a0\u25a0-'\u25a0 -.\u25a0'\u25a0 ":*; \u25a0- ' \u25a0\u25a0"\u25a0... "'\u25a0 \u25a0. ,'.\u25a0-,'\u25a0;\u25a0;" ." ; '\u25a0'\u25a0.'"\u25a0:\u25a0 . \u25a0 .

. There is some requisitioning of local available suppliesi;sable by the Army. /: ': .; . ' : ; . '\u0084 .

c. System of Mobilization of Industry. The basic source ofsupply, France, is mobilized, but, as mentioned above, most of herproducts are consigned to Germany.


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat2k

There is some, manufacturing, inMorocco /but on a very smallscale* Undoubtedly, these are being used by the military.8. Theory of Combat.

a. Conception of Conduct of War. There are two possible avenuesof attack possible against Morocco: (l) an attack launched from theSpanish Zone to the north, and (2) a landing somewhere on the AtlanticCoast. (l) It is felt , "bj the French, that any attack from theAxis will simultaneously hit Morocco and Tunisia and then try to jointhe columns, moving east and west in Algeria.

The principal objective in the Moroccan attack will beCasablanca, and therefore, the first aim of the French defensemust be to secure Casablanca and keep the Atlantic ports open. Itis felt that with good intelligence cooperation, there will be fifteendays time to organize the defense.Against panzer divisions, the old type cavalry and.infantry are useless in average terrain, even with antitank weapons.They can, however, delay the advance of the panzers bythreatening their lines of communication and cause them to wait forthe arrival of their own infantry. This delaying maneuver can becarried out only by the organic units in Morocco, established inmountainous areas, threatening the main highways and controlling the

defiles and valleys least favorable to the advance of the armored >units. During the early months in 19^1* there were somemechanized and a small armored unit in North Africa. Since then thearmored unit and some mechanized units have been sent to Dakar. Itwas thought that when the invading infantry came up this armoredforce would attack it and render untenable the advanced position ofthe panzers. However,, the mechanized units available to them now areof little use. Main reliance wil lbe placed on infantry and artilleryto cut the panzers up in the mountains and delay their advance. Thecounter-attack maneuver willhave to be given up and after the panzersand infantry have passed through the mountains, if Morocco has notsurrendered, defensive positions wil lbe taken up in the favorableterrain between Rabat and Casablanca, where the wooded country facil-itates surprise and the "oueds-" (river beds) divide the terrain intocompartments.(2) Defense against a coastal landing can be more successfully carried out.Since the Syrian campaign in April 19*H> attention hasbeen dra,wn to the defense of the coast, and' coastal batteries havebeen re-equipped and given considerable firing practice. A list ofthe coastal defenses was included in the first parts of this estimate,'and they are to be respected.

Apportioned as Morocco is, perpendicularly from theshore by roads and valleys, the strategic movements of the French


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FRENCH MOEOCCOCombat25troops are to "b e maneuvered from the interior. In order to providefor reserve concentrations, Meknes, Oued Zem, or Marrakech wil l "bechosen as the headquarters for the divisions. divisions canThe^sethen be sent to the parts of the coast subject to invasion.The object wil l "b e to prevent the enemy from gainingcontrol of the strategic and vital coastal zone. There are onljr afew possible places where a landing in force could "b e effected, andthe French think they can concentrate their men in numbers suf ficentto stand off a landing at these places.

"b. Role of Different Arms inBattle. This subject has "been discussed in a general way in paragraph "a." above. Greatest reliance is placed on the infantry-artillery team. What mechanized they

have wil l not "be wasted against modern' armored vehicles "but will "b eused with infantry and cavalry against the enemy infantry, after theartillery has stopped the panzers; or against any "beach head theenemy secure, in the event of a coastal attack.c. Method of Conducting Combat.(l) Defense of Coastline. The garrisons in the interiorwill "b e supported "by mobile forces consisting of one infantry "battal-

ion and two squadrons of cavalry with a proportion of moMle fieldartillery. These wil l take advantageabout and engage the enemy.The element of surprisedefending units.

of the good road net

wil l "b e the keynote of the

to move

9. The Air Armya. Organization. In France the Air Force constitutes an inde-pendent arm. Metropolitan France is divided into Air Regions. TheMoroccan Air Forces "belong to the 6th Air Region with headquarters

in Algiers. The general officer in charge of the Region appears to"be responsible to "both the Commander of the Land, Sea,, and Air Forces,Admiral Darlan, and to the Secretary of State for Air, GeneralJennequin. The Superior A ir Commander, General Mendigal,, commandsthe Air Army units in the three North African colonies. Under himare three general air officers, who command the units in Morocco,Algeria and Tunisia, respectively. Their authority, of "both tacticaland administrative command, embraces the control of all troops,services and other activities of the Air Army, as well as the aircombat units, within their territorial jurisdiction. They are theimmediate commanders of the largest air combat unit stationed in theareas for which they are responsible.

Each military air establishment of any size is consideredan air "base,, each having its own commander, who, in the case of "baseslocated in Morocco, are directly responsible to the Air Commander ofMorocco. The A ir Base commander is normally the commander of thelargest combat unit permanently stationed at his "base. He is the


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat26compulsory Intermediary "between the regional commander and the commanders of air -combat units only temporarily stationed at his "base. Ifthe "base is too small to have a full complement of services, it Isattached to a more important base for administrative purposes.

The normal organization of the Air Army is given in graphicform on the next page. In practice this scheme is not strictly fol-lowed. An Air Division may "b e composed of only one Air Brigade andother units not included in a Brigade. The Air Brigade may "b e composed of only one Air Wing_ and other units included in a Wing, and Itmay exist independently of a Division. Groups may, in like manner,exist independently of a Brigade. A regrouping of aerial units forthe purpose of forming specialized fighter and bombardment commandsin French Morocco is now taking place. In general, however, Wing,Groupfollows :

and SquadronThe usual identity has beenaircraft strength preserved.of the smaller units is as

Unit Fighters Bombers ReconnaissanceGroupSquadron 2612 . 136 136


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v FRENCH MOROCCOCombatnORGANIZATION OF THE AIR ARMY IN MOROCCO

(Since April 18, 19^2)Secretary of State forCommander of the Land, Sea and Air, General Jennequin,Air Forces, Admiral Dar lan. Besponsi"ble to Chiefesponsfble of State" to Chief: J of Gov't.~J -*

Navy Army Air

i ~i t r~~iu 2 5 a 0i i .-\u25a0\u25a0..Superior Air Command (The Air Begions of Unoccupiedof North Africa (Algiers) France and Colonial__ _ the otherr . ; ,I Air Commands)Air Command Air Command Air Commandof Algeriaof Morocco* of Tunisia

Air Division (2 or 3 Brigades)~**Air Brigade (2 or 3 Wings)

Wing (2 or 3 Groups)

Air Group (2 or 3 Squadrons)

Squadron* Note: The general officer having territorial command of the area is-&lso the immediate: coajimamder' of. the' Alt*Ddvisdon'locateTd. .. -titererj I fav&j oar. of the largest =anit in tike area;, \u25a0: aueii.*astiie;Air Brigade.**Note: Alltroops, services and operational units, stationed at amilitary airdrome are commanded "by an Air Base Commander, whois also the immediate commander of the largest air unit there.


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat28"b* Personnel. The total number of the m ili tary personnel in the

Air Army inMorocco is thought to lie "between 3>ooo and, k9OOO.k 9 000. Thereare estimated to "be a"bout 600 commissioned and non-commissioned pilots,only a small number of whom are fully qualified to fly modern aircraft.The naval air service strength is "believed to "be a"bout one- sixth aslarge as that of the Air Army.

c Equipment . (April 27, 19^2) Air Base No. A/C Type Group /WingCasablanca 13 Douglas DB-7 l/32Casablanca '. ' / 13, Curtiss 75-A (l) 11/5Casablanca (Supply Depot) 18 Glen Mar tin- l6 j (l)Casablanca (Supply Depot) ik Douglas DB-7 (3)Casablanca (Supply Depot) 2i+ CUrtiss . 75-A WFez ' 13 Curtiss 75-A 11/5 (Sq.#2)Rabat 15 L.E.0.-i+s l/22Rabat 24 Curtiss 75-A (l) 1/5

\u25a0Marrakech 7.. L.E.G. I/23 (Sq.#l)Marrakech 13 Potez 63/H 1/52Marrakech (Supply Depot) kO. Trainers\u25a0Ksar-El-Souk ' 6 L.E.O. h$ l/23 (Sq..#2)Meknes 13 L.E.O. U5 11/23Meknes (Supply Depot) 30 (5)Meknes (Supply Depot) 12 Curtiss 75-A (6)Agadir 13 Douglas DB-7 11/32Port Lyautey (Navy) 6 Glen- Martin-167 Unit IBPort Lyautey (Navy) 6 Glen Martin-167 Unit 3B

Notes: (l) Being re -equipped 'with Dewoitin e 520 T s.(2) Some of these are undergoing overhaul.(3) Four of these have "been test flown.(k) Seven of these have "been test flown.(5) Chiefly Potez -63 and Potez-s^+o/ also two or- threeAnyot-350. These planes would require at leastthree months to repair.(6) Allof these have "been test flown. .Total number of aircraft in French Morocco, "by types:

In Tactical Units In Depots'50 Fighters 36 Fighters67 Bombers 32 Bombers13 Reconnaissance aircraft 30 Miscellaneous12 Nava.l "bombers


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FRENCH MOEOCCOCombat29Immediate reinforcement of aircraft strength inMorocco could

"be obtained from the other two areas. Aircraft in Algeria are as'u 2 5 a 0follows :

102 Fighters\^h."Bombers28 Reconnaissance aircraft15 Transport aircraft36 Naval aircraft, all typesAircraft in Tunisia are as follows:

60 Fighters26 Bombers15 Eeconnaissance33 Naval aircraft(Reported 120 naval aircraft dismantled and storedat Bizerte.)

Q- Fuel* Aviation gasoline stocks inNorth Africa, as of themiddle of January, 19^-2, were estimated as follows, given in tons:Morocco Algeria Tunisia Total

7,375 11,113 1,767 20,255These figures are thought to be high. Definitely some ofthis fuel now has been shipped to Li"bya. One source estimates thesupply in Tunisia and Algeria to "b e sufficient only fo r two days 1operations. Aviation gasoline stocks inMorocco are stored mostlyat Fedalah, and would "b e completely exhausted by full scale operationslasting more than one month, according to other reports/ The latterare,eports thought to "b e more accurate.

c. Airdromes and Landing 'Fields. The principal military airfields inMorocco are at or near the following places: Oujda, Fez,Meknes, Kasba-Tadla, Casablanca, Marrakech, Agadir, and Rabat.- Anextremely large number of other fields also exist. Generally throughout the colony new air fields could be constructed with a minimum ofeffort.f Combat Efficiency. Notwithstanding the fact that most ofthe military aircraft in Morocco, such as the Martin- 167's, theDouglas-DB-7 Is, the Curtiss 75-A's, and certain of the French types,are of comparatively modern design, the combat efficiency of the A ir

Army and of the naval air forces inMorocco appears to be comparativelylow. The same may be said of the other two subdivisions . of theSuperior North African Air Command. The absolute necessity of conserving


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FRENCH- MOROCCOCombat30the small aviation fuel stocks on hand has reduced flying to thepoint where a great many pilots fail even to meet the modest requirements for their monthly flying pay. Squadron and group training andmaneuvers have "been largely impossible. A large percentage of thepilots do not possess the ability to handle modern aircraft, nor areany steps "being taken to qualify them. The standard of aircraft maintenance is said to be extremely inferior. Spare parts are lacking. Alarge construction program at the main overhaul depot at Casablanca,however, Indicates that plans are under way to correct this defect.

The morale of the air personnel Is not thought to be particularly high. The large majority of the air officers are said to favorthe cause of the United Nations, or, at least, to be pro-American.Under present conditions, however, their very existence' is dependentupon obedience to Vichy. An Allied force of sufficient strength toindicate : its ability to successfully oppose any Axis cbuntermeasureswould probably not be confronted with very serious resistance from themilitary air units in Morocco.111. NAVY

10. General. Casablanca is the only naval operating base in FrenchMorocco, Any force contemplating the occupation of Morocco would haveto take the Vichy French Navy stationed at Casablanca into seriousconsideration. With the exception of the "JEAN BART", .and certainships now under .repairs the naval, units stationed here are tp fairfighting and cruising shape,11. Personnel.

\'# Active. Naval effectives vary according to the number ofships in port. The. latest estimate as of March 18, 19^2, Is thatthere are a.bout 11,500 men of the French navy manning ships and coastdefenses in Morocco.b. Reserve. French merchant sailors form the reserve of theFrench navy. However, the forces at Casablanca are thought to be up

to full strength, - and it is doubted if there is any appreciablereserve element inMorocco.c. Recruitment. There has been no naval recruitment in Moroccosince the Armistice.

12. Organ! zatin,a. An anomalous situation prevails in the present organizationof the French Navy in that Admiral Darlan, as Commander- in-Chief of

all armed forces, is responsible only to Marshal Petain, while aSecretary of the Navy is answerable to Laval, A possible source of


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat'31friction has thus "been created. At Casablanca, a dual command exists:.(1) 2d Squadron, comprising 2 light cruisers and 6-8 destroyers;(2) Casablanca Naval Base, including the "battleship "JEAN BART", submarines, and other naval vessels. An admiral commands each organization

b. Fleet Organization and Distribution. The naval vessels inMorocco, including the 2d Squadron of the French Fleet, are all "basedat Casablanca and must "b e considered as a unit.(l) Equipment. (May 1 , 19te)-1 Battleship "JEAN BART"; incomplete; 35,000 tons;-only k of proposed 8 15" guns have "been installed, and some, "but not all of the 15-6" guns,are installed, k planes.-2 Light Cruisers "GLOIRE"; completed 1935; 7,600tons; 51 knots; 9-6" guns, 8-3.5" A.A., k torpedo tubes; k planes .' "PRIMAUGUET"; completed.1926; 7,2^9 tons; 33 knots; Q~6% \ guns, U-3" guns;12 torpedo tubes; 2 planes.-3 Destroyer Leaders "EPERVIER", "MILAN" arid"ALBATROS"; completed 1938, 1933, 1931; 2,1+00tons each; 5~5" guns and torpedo tubes.h Destroyers.

10 Submar ine s 5 Avisos and numerous armed trawlers and patrol vessels.Woi*k is "being carried out on the "JEAN BART". Herantiaircraft defenses have /been augmented by the installation of12-37 mm. A.A. guns; 12-13.2 A.A. guns; and some 90 mm.. A.A. guns.Fire control is incomplete. There are no facilities at Casablancafor completing the vessel and it is stated that there is no intentionof moving it back to France. The present speed would not exceed20 knots. There is a small floating repair dock in Casablancawhich wil l take destroyers and very small cruisers.

13- Training, Efficiency and Morale. The enlisted men and officersare well trained and efficient and should not be underestimated. Theyare frequently called upon to convoy merchant ships to Dakar and toFrance. Submarine personnel are kept up to maximum efficiency by thepatrol operated along the coast, four of which are usually engaged inthis work at a time.The higher ranking officers of the French Navy, while not pro-Axis,,are definitely anti-British. They are Darlan men and can be countedupon to obey the Admiral's orders and would no doubt attempt to repelan allied threat of occupation inMorocco, Lower ranking officers andthe enlisted personnel, while perhaps sympathetic to the Allied cause,'\u25a0would probably obey the orders of their superiors.

I^. Naval Air Force. .As this force is small, it has been combinedwith the Army Air Force under that heading in this estimate.


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FRENCH MOROCCOCombat32IV . GEOGRAPHIC

15. Geographic Features Affecting Strategy.a. General Strategic Location. French Morocco has several

Atlantic ports and a port on the Mediterranean. The principal port,Casablanca, with modern facilities and equipment and large capacity,is the main gateway through which supplies from overseas enter Worth-west Africa, and is connected "by road and railroad through a natural-corridor with the western Mediterranean ports of Oran, Algiers,Bizerte and Tunis, as well as with the smaller eastern ports of Sousse,Sfax and Gates.French Morocco to the north is vulnerable to land attack fromSpanish Morocco around the eastern and western ends of the practicallyimpassable Rif Mountain range. The threat at the eastern end of thesemountains would be especially serious if the Mediterranean entranceat Gibraltar were to be denied to supplies from overseas, as the vitaloverland communications between the Atlantic ports of Morocoo and theMediterranean areas of Algeria and Tunisia can be decisively cut inthe vicinityof Oujda."k* Mountains . From the sea at Agadir and Tiznit in the south,

in a northeasterly direction to the borders of Algeria on the north,Morocco is divided by the great chain of the Atlas mountains. Thischain is divided into three main parts: the Anti-Atlas, the HighAtlas, and the Middle Atlas, in that order from south to north. TheAnti-Atlas and the High Atlas run inland from the sea, the formerfrom Tiznit and the latter from Agadir. Between them lies the valleyof the Sousse river. -The valley gradually narrows as it proceeds inland unti l it becomes a mere pass at high altitude leading to. theSahara Plateau. The Middle Atlas branches off from the north sideof the two ranges mentioned before they join the plateau. The MiddleAtlas then proceed northeastward unti l they reach the Taza Valley, inthe north, which separates them from the Rif Mountains which proceedsouthward over the border from Spanish Morocco. This narrow valleyis the main corridor of communication between Morocco and Algeria andTunisia.

c. Rivers . There are numerous small rivers originating in theAtlas watershed, which flow across the coastal plain to the sea. Thetwo most important are the Sebou and the Sousse. The former runsdown the western end of the Taza valley and separates the Middle Atlasfrom the Rif Mountains, finally flowing into the Atlantic Ocean atPort Lyautey. The latter flows down the Sousse Valley between the Highand Anti-Atlas Mountains, through Taroundant and flows into the sea afew miles below Agadir.d. Valleys and Plains .(l) The coastal plain extends from Mogador on the south to Larache in the Spanish zone on the north. It rolls gently eastward to


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FRENCH /MOROCCO-Combat33 \J^*- .the foothills of the. Atlas Mountains and *northeastward to the foothills

It is a gently rolling country with variousf the Eif Mountains.'..types of terrain.' [' : ;(2) The Sebou is a typical river valley,. In addition to it,there are various "Oueds" (Wadis ) or dry river "bottoms running usuallyfrom east to west. These are sometimes quite deep and tend to cut thecountry near the coast into compartment s, as far as any military opera

tions are concerned. Near their southwestern extremity, where theyapproach the sea, the Atlas Mountains split into the High Atlas andAnti-Atlas ranges. The valley formed, "broadening as it approaches thesea, contains the cities of AgacLir, Tiznit, and Tarqudant and theSousse Elver.

c. Coastline. The coastline of French Morocco north to south isas follows: From the Spanish frontier a little south of Larache" toPort Lyautey the ground tends to "b e swampy. From Port Lyautey toRabat, the coast is wooded and presents admirable possibilities fordefense "by automatic weapons.South of E ab at we come to the "Zaer" region. This is hillyand cut into "by the "Oueds" or dry river "beds. These valleys aresteep and run directly down to the sea. They form natural avenuesof approach to the hinterland. This Zaer might "be a tacticallydifficult region especially for mechanized units.The Zaer region extends south of Eabat to Casablanca whereit flattens out into the "bled" or coastal plain. This country is, .considered the best terrain for operations by the French and of fersevident possibilities for the development of a mechanized struggle.This "bled" region of the coastline extends as far as Safi where thefoothills of the Atlas mountains begin to make their appearance towardthe coast. :South of Safi to Mogador, the coast becomes increasinglyhilly and cut "by valleys. From Mogador to Agadir the country is almostentirely mountainous. This area is where the Atlas mountains reachthe sea. However, there are some level places, where if the terraincould.be cleared of stone, landing fields for aircraft might beconstructed.The terrain between Agadir and Tiznit crosses the mouth ofthe valley formed by the Atlas mountains- on the north and the Anti-Atlason the south. Only two rivers need be crossed, between Agadir andTiznit the Oued Sousse and the Oued Massa. The soil in this area isof reddish color and said to be of very firm consistency.South of Tiznit, inland, from Spanish Ifni, to Goulimine, thelandscape is veined and threaded by a network of dried-up river beds,cactus plant growth,, etc. Great difficulty would be experienced inestablishing landing fields for aircraft in this area. Directly southof Tiznit, the Anti-Atlas approach the sea. South of these mountainsthe terrain becomes flat and arid with many dry river beds with nobridges. The surface is solid, however, and. would support the largestmotor trucks of a meehaaized'colikHisi*

Documents

Combat estimate French Morocco Army May 1 1942. pt2