Personal injury

8 Stowaways: the Master is not alone

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association LimitedRISK WATCH

Containers and cargoes

5 Chemical tankers carriage and sampling of cargoes of benzene

Volume 20: Number 2

August 2013

Navigation and seamanship

1 Collision case studies4 Failure of ship’s crane steel hoisting wire

Miscellaneous8 Risk management poster campaign: COLREGs

CASE STUDY 1

On board the MARTI PRINCESS (MP)The MP had just exited the Sea of Marmarain Turkey and was proceeding on a course of 208˚at 11 knots. At about 2150 the Master made his way to chart room to checksome documents. The chart room curtainswere drawn closed. The Master neither heard any exchange of messages on the VHFnor did the OOW inform him of anyparticular navigational problems. The Masterthen checked the chart and proceeded tothe bridge. Immediately the Master observeda ship on his starboard bow. The shipseemed very close. He also observed twoother ships on MP’s port bow, at about 5˚and 10˚respectively. The Master asked theOOW to indicate the speed and distance ofthe first ship.

The OOW reported a distance of about fivenautical miles. Somewhat surprised, theMaster requested the OOW to double checkthe calculations as the ship seemed to bemuch closer than five nautical miles. TheOOW checked again and this time hereported that the distance was eight cables.

Collision case studies

The Master ordered the OOW to changeover to hand steering and alter course tostarboard, the intention being to passastern of the ship on her starboard bow.This ship was later identified as ILGAZ. Given the close proximity of the two ships,the Master followed the situation andmanoeuvred visually rather than by radar.

Once ILGAZ was on the port side of MP, theOOW asked the Master whether he couldmanoeuvre the ship back to the originalcourse. Focusing entirely on ILGAZ, and withhis mind at rest that ILGAZ was now clear,the Master gave his consent to the OOW.The OOW had already started themanoeuvre when the Master noticedanother ship very close, almost dead ahead,with both side lights clearly visible. Atabout 2209, when this ship was less thanhalf a nautical mile away, the Master calledby VHF to the ‘ship on my starboard side’and requested that both ships pass port to port and he began altering course tostarboard. The Master repeated his request,this time addressing the ‘ship dead ahead’.

Risk management

6 Container ships: safe stowage and securing recommendations

7 MARPOL ANNEX V – residues from solid bulk cargoes

Two recent investigations by the German Marine CasualtyInvestigation Authority (BSU) illustrate the basic need for theOfficer of the Watch (OOW) to have full situational awareness.

2 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 20: Number 2: August 2013

Navigation and seamanship

At no point in time did the Master referto the ship, the RENATE SCHULTE (RS),by her name.

At 2210, MP and RS collided. RScontacted MP on her port side, almostperpendicular to cargo hold no. 2. MPsustained a huge tear on her port side.No. 2 hold was open to sea.

On board the RENATE SCHULTE (RS)At 2140, while north bound on thesame channel as the MP (on a course of025˚ and speed of 16.5 knots) the OOWon the RS had consulted his radar andobserved ILGAZ when she was on hisport bow and at a distance that wascalculated to be 11 nautical miles. ILGAZ was crossing the bow of the RSfrom port to starboard, with a closestpoint of approach (CPA) of about 0.5nautical miles.

When MPwas first detected on the radarby RS, shortly before 2200, she was onthe starboard side of RS at a distance of about five nautical miles. MP wascrossing RS’s bow from starboard toport. Consequently, the OOW focusedhis attention on ILGAZ. As soon as ILGAZcleared the bow of RS, the OOW alteredcourse to starboard by about 27˚ butonly so far as to be sure of clearing thestern of ILGAZ.

Soon after 2200 the lookout reported aship, one point on the starboard bow,showing her green sidelight. The shipwas initially not visible to the lookoutbecause of the ship’s deck cranes.Following the lookout’s remark, the OOWswitched the radar to the six-mile rangesetting. At this time (approximately2203) MP was about 2.2 nautical milesahead and still slightly on RS’s starboardbow. The OOW on RS identified MP fromthe AIS (which was interfaced with theradar). He called MP by her name on theVHF four times between 2204 and 2207.There was no reply. Some time later, thelookout reported that he could seeboth sidelights. It was evident that MPwas dead ahead on a reciprocal course.

The OOW was quite surprised with themanoeuvre made by the MP andconcluded that the ship must have

altered course to her starboard to giveway to ILGAZ, although shortlyafterwards she came back to her initialcourse with a port alteration. The OOWconcluded that a further alteration tostarboard was only possible to a limitedextent since as ILGAZ was now on herstarboard side, almost abeam and washerself now altering course to starboard.RS continued swinging to starboarduntil 2209 when the Master, havingbeen called to the bridge, attempted tocome to port in order to avoid hittingMP in the accommodation block.

AnalysisThe investigation was unable todetermine why the OOW (and thelookout) on MP had not been monitoringthe situation until it was brought totheir attention by the Master of the shipwhen he visited the wheelhouse atabout 2150.

It was acknowledged that in thisparticular situation MP (as an overtakingship) was under the obligation to keepout of the way of ILGAZ as prescribed inRule 13 of the COLREGs. However, themanoeuvre that was undertaken wasneither substantial nor conducted inample time as required by Rules 8(b)and (c), eventually resulting in anotherclose quarters situation in contraventionwith Rule 8(c). A substantial alteration tostarboard by MP alone (as the give-wayship) to a new heading of 296˚ wouldhave meant that MP crossed the courseof RS at 90˚ and still passing behind thestern of ILGAZ.

In fact, had the OOW on board the MPmaintained his course, ILGAZ wouldhave crossed the bow of MP at adistance of three cables and wouldhave passed RS on her starboard sidenine cables away.

Adequate plotting by both ships couldhave prevented the close quarterssituation arising.

It was concluded that manoeuvring byRS could not have avoided the collisionbut it was observed that at no stage did RS reduce speed or come astern onher engines.

Collision case studies (continued)

3

Situational awareness:

• MARTI PRINCESSThe third officer on board MPwas underthe impression that ILGAZ was fivenautical miles away when in fact thetwo ships were only eight cables apart.This indicates the OOW had eithermisinterpreted the data from the radaror was (psychologically) disconnectedfrom the surrounding situation or that itwas a combination of both.

While the Master managed to interveneand succeeded in his manoeuvre toavoid a potential collision with ILGAZ,none of the crew members focused onthe wider context in order to determinethe consequences of their manoeuvresvis-à-vis the northbound RS. The factthat the OOW on MP asked for theMaster’s authorisation to steer back tothe original course, once the stern ofILGAZ was cleared, suggested that eitherhe was unaware of RS or that he wasaware of RS but was relying on theMaster to assess the wider situation.

It is clear that due to the evolvingsituation between ILGAZ and MP, theMaster was unaware of RS. Neitherofficer had accurate situationalawareness.

• RENATE SCHULTEThe OOW on RS had noticed thepresence of MP at an early stage, butonly concentrated on ILGAZ. After beingdistracted from continuously monitoringthe situation by a VHF conversationwith the local ITS, he did not reassessthe situation and was surprised whenhis lookout finally drew attention to theapproaching MP. This raised theimmediate question of when, if at all,the OOW of RS would have recognisedthat MP had manoeuvred in anunexpected way since first beingdetected.

Since the situations are dynamic it isimperative that monitoring by the OOWis continuous and uninterrupted.

The full report can be found at: http://www.bsu-

bund.de/SharedDocs/pdf/EN/Investigati

on_Report/2012/Investigation_Report_2

30_09.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

CASE STUDY 2

On 22 November 2011 SPLITTNES wasproceeding up river (R. Weser, Bremen)behind MOL EFFICIENCY (ME) with aflood tide and low visibility due to fog.Several times between 1956 and 2006the Blexen Radar Station advised thatME would stop and turn in order toberth and several times SPLITTNESacknowledged and stated they werestopping to await the turn of ME. At2006 the two ships were 2.2 nauticalmiles apart and SPLITTNES was doing6.12 knots and ME was doing 0.5 knotsastern. At 2005 SPLITTNES had turnedslightly to starboard using rudder andbow thrusters so as to sit in behind MEand also to stay clear of the downstream bound ship. At 2009 the pilot ofthe ME suggested SPLITTNES ought topass them before they turned andSPLITTNES agreed.

SPLITTNES came ahead and to port butfailed to complete the manoeuvrebefore her stern contacted hard withthe stern of ME. Crucially, at the time MEwas doing 2 knots astern (in order tokeep herself in the turning circle) thussignificantly reducing the distance andtime that SPLITTNES had to completethe newly agreed overtaking.

In addition to highlighting the risksassociated with sudden change of plansthe BSU called on German pilots to‘consult with foresight and prudence inthe future’.

The full report can be found at: http://www.bsu-

bund.de/SharedDocs/pdf/EN/Investigati

on_Report/2013/Investigation_Report_5

07_11.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

SolutionsFor the majority of our readers – seafarers on board our Members’ ships – it is imperative that thebridge team should monitor the voyage and remain alert to everything happening around them –situational awareness. As illustrated by the case studies, situational awareness is dynamic, hard tomaintain and easy to lose. The following actions can help a team retain or regain situational awareness:

• Communicate clearly and effectively any observations on theship’s progress and contribute to any decision made by the team

• Assertive error spotting by the team should be encouraged tocombat complacency or distraction

• Look out of the window as often as possible

A general cargo ship was fitted with twincranes between nos. 1 and 2 cargo holds.During the discharge of an item of projectcargo weighing 27mt, which was within thesafe working load of the crane and the wire,the steel hoisting wire failed. The projectcargo fell down into the hold and damagedother items of cargo as well as causingdamage to the ship’s tween deck.

The wire rope was supplied to the ship in2009 and was inspected annually by aclassification society surveyor, with the mostrecent inspection taking place just twomonths before the incident. Despite thisrecent inspection, experts appointed by theAssociation concluded that the wire failed as a result of serious local degradation of the wire in excess of the limits set by theclassification society in their ‘Rules for the Certification of Lifting AppliancesOnboard Ships’.

The degradation of the crane wire wasattributed to the long term lack of a suitableprotective lubricant. It appeared that normalengineering grease was being used by ship’screw to lubricate the wire but that this hadnot penetrated to the core of the wire. Notonly had this thick layer of grease failed topenetrate the core of the wire, but the use ofsuch grease meant that moisture had beentrapped within the wire which acceleratedthe corrosion. In addition, the thick layer ofgrease made it hard to make a properinspection of the wire.

Classification society surveyors can onlyspend a limited time on board looking at thewhole ship and crew and shore staff must beaware that inspection of the crane wires maybe visual only and will not usually involve aclose examination of the core of the wire.Therefore, they should make their own,systematic, assessment of the condition ofship’s crane or derrick wires at regular intervals.

In order to avoid corrosion of the core of thewire rope, a suitable penetrative lubricantshould be applied. Even if the correct type oflubricant is used, it is important to make surethat the wire ropes are always cleaned priorto lubrication to avoid the effects of marinesalt and trapped moisture within the wire.

Failure of ship’s crane steel hoisting wire

4 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 20: Number 2: August 2013

Navigation and seamanship

The April 2006 edition of Risk Watch contained an article about crane wires, with specific reference totheir maintenance and lubrication. A recent incident reported to the Association has once againhighlighted the importance of ensuring that steel wire ropes on ship’s cranes are properly lubricated.

5

The main use of benzene is as a solvent andas a constituent part of gasoline where itshigh octane characteristics are beneficial.Benzene is known for its carcinogenicproperties. Stringent specificationrequirements are applied to benzene.

The Association was recently involved in anincident involving benzene whichhighlighted various issues relating tosampling and testing. The entered ship, achemical tanker, carried several parcels ofbenzene from Kuwait to various ports in theNetherlands. The ship was equipped withpump stack sampling equipment in the formof an outlet valve to which a poly vinylchloride (PVC) sampling hose was connectedas well as a dedicated hermetically sealedsampling system. In Kuwait, the cargo wasloaded through the common manifoldconnection and in accordance with usualpractice, on the orders of the chief officer, apumpman took cargo samples from the ship’smanifold sampling outlet. Additionally, firstfoot and final samples of the relevant cargotanks were taken while circulating the cargoon the pump stack and by taking sampleswith the PVC sampling hose. Followinganalysis of the samples the content ofchlorides in the benzene was reported asvarying between nil and 1.5 mg/kg (this waswithin the maximum specification of 3mg/kg). Samples were retained on board andthe ship sailed.

Upon arrival at the first discharge port theChief Officer ordered the pumpman to carryout a pre-discharge sampling of all the tanksusing the same sampling hose and in thesame manner as was done in Kuwait i.e.sampling while circulating the cargo on thepump stack. The test results revealed thecargo was clearly off specification with a highcontent of organic chlorides present. First testshowed 48 mg/kg and second test showed 16 mg/kg. The local correspondent wasnotified as soon as these discrepancies were

discovered. Surprisingly, similar results wereshown from the re-testing of the samplestaken in Kuwait even though these sampleswere initially on specification when tested inKuwait. This substantiated suspicions ofcontamination.

Due to the level of organic chlorides in thebenzene the terminal refused to accept thecargo and the ship was asked to vacate theberth. At this stage a specialist surveyor wasappointed to attend. The ship sailed to avacant berth nearby where joint samplingwas arranged. On this occasion the sampleswere taken utilising the ship’s dedicatedhermetically sealed sampling system and, tothe surprise of the parties, no organic chlorideswere found i.e. the cargo was perfectly withinspecification. At the second discharge port asimilar joint sampling was arranged and theship’s dedicated hermetically sealed samplingsystem was again used. The benzene wasperfectly within specifications.

The ship now returned to the first dischargeport to discharge the parcel initially rejected.Again, the surveyor participated in the jointsampling using the ship’s hermetically sealedsystem and he also used a brought-inhermetically sealed absolute bottom samplingsystem. The cargo was within specificationsand was subsequently discharged.

Following investigation by the surveyorappointed by the Association the source ofthe confusion became clear. The pump stacksampling arrangement on the ship waspositioned at a high level above the weatherdeck and so, for practical reasons and to makesampling easier, the crew on the ship hadrigged up a PVC hose extension to the pumpstack sampling gear. When this PVC hose wasexposed to benzene, which is a solvent, theinner reinforcement of the hose dissolvedcausing an accumulation of organic chloridesin the samples taken via the PVC hose. As thehose was only used for sampling, the

increased level of organic chlorides waspresent only in the samples and did not inany way give a representative view of thecondition of the cargo. Accordingly, samplingof the cargo done using the ship’s dedicatedhermetically sealed sampling equipment andthe external bottom sampling appliancebrought in for the occasion showed that thecargo was consistent with the specifications.

The observant reader will have noticed thatthe initial sampling carried out in Kuwaitusing the pump stack sampling gear(including the PVC sampling hose) did notshow excessive presence of organic chlorides.The surveyor found that the testing carriedout on the loading samples in Kuwaitresponded only to inorganic chlorides i.e.chlorides originating from seawater and thusnot to organic chlorides. The testing carriedout in Kuwait was incorrect.

With hindsight one might say that thecorrelation between the pump stacksampling and the results appear obvious.However, the combination of inappropriatetesting carried out in Kuwait as well as theseemingly correct operation of the samplingequipment by the crew – it was not until laterthe PVC hose modification itself wasdiscovered – led to an increasingly stressfulsituation as the supposed contaminationwould have resulted in substantialdepreciation in the value of the cargo.

It should also be noted that, due to the minornature of the discrete modification to thesampling gear, it went unnoticed by theshipping company’s own operational audits,vetting inspections and external cargosurveyors.

The lesson to be learned from this incident isthat on chemical tankers, the crew must onlymodify or change the cargo sampling gearafter due consultation with the ship’stechnical managers.

Chemical tankers – carriage and sampling of cargoes of benzene

Containers and cargoes

Benzene is an organic chemical compound classed as a hydrocarbon. A constituent of crude oil,benzene is a basic petrochemical product usually extracted from mineral oils.

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6 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 20: Number 2: August 2013

Risk management

Container ships: safe stowage and securing recommendations

When trying to assess the number ofcontainers lost overboard there is muchdisagreement. The World Shipping Council(WSC) surveyed its members and hasreported that around 600 – 700 containersare lost overboard each year. Other reportsmention figures as high as 10,000 containerslost per year. The truth is that there are nodependable global statistics available. Despitethe relatively small numbers lost in relation tothe total number shipped, it should always beremembered that any container stow collapsemay have serious repercussions.

Root cause analysis (RCA)The Club’s risk managers have conducted aRCA of container operations for severalMembers. Common trends identified were:

1Maximum tier weights as detailed in theship’s Cargo/Container Securing Manual(CSM) do not appear to be checked regularlyeither by shore or by ship’s officers whenplanning or approving a stow. The weightallowances of individual containers for thetiers are therefore often exceeded. This isimportant even if the total stack weight is stillwithin limits.

2 The lashing modules incorporated into thevarious stowage planning programmes, suchas CASP, TSB Supercargo, LashMate etc. arenot often utilised to the fullest extent byship’s officers, with the result that the actuallashing applied is inadequate for thecontainers as stowed.

This means that all stowage plans proposedby charterers should be checked in detail bythe Master or Chief Officer.

Clearly the number of containers loaded onmodern large container ships will requiresoftware to be used to work out the stowageplan. It is the Master’s (or Chief Officer’s) dutyto ensure that the on board computers areable to receive and utilise all the datareceived from shore planners in order thatthey can carry out the stowage checksmentioned above in good time and beforedeparture.

It is the shipper who is obliged under SOLASto declare the gross weight of the containerand contents. There is discussion at theInternational Maritime Organisation (IMO)which may lead to the requirement thatshippers produce a verified gross weight inthe future. The intention is that without averified gross weight the container cannot be loaded on board. This is to be debated atIMO DSC17 in September this year.

3 Laden heavy units were observed to bestowed on upper tiers, often over lighter unitsin lower tiers, with the result that allowablestresses on the lashings and maximumweight for the stowage position(s) wereexceeded.

4 In many cases, the ship’s metacentric height(GM) when sailing exceeded the GM providedfor in the CSM (as well as the industryrecommendation of the maximum GM notexceeding 3% of the ship’s beam). In suchcircumstances it is often not possible for theship’s officers to verify the stowage andlashings as being within acceptable limitswithout doing complex multiple calculations.This deficiency might be minimised ifavailable software is utilised to its fullestextent by ship’s officers.

ResponsibilitiesThere is often some misunderstanding aboutthe responsibilities of owners and chartererswith regard to stowage planning andsecuring.

Even if the charterers are responsible under acharterparty for the stowage and lashing ofcontainers, it remains the Master’s obligationto ensure that the proposed stowageprovides the ship with acceptable draught,trim, stability and stress limits and also thatthe containers are secured within theconstraints set out in the CSM so that the shipis safe and seaworthy in its loaded condition.

The stack collapse and loss of containers overboard can pose a significant risk to crew, salvors andstevedores. Lost containers may float semi-submerged for some considerable time and can be ahazard for other shipping in the area. There may also be pollution of the marine environment fromhazardous contents of the lost containers leaking into the sea.

7

MARPOL ANNEX V – residues from solid bulk cargoes

These new regulations mean that ships andtheir operators need to have procedures inplace to ensure that pollution by garbagedisposal overboard does not occur. Shipsmust plan for disposing of garbage ashoreand will need to be aware of all relevant localregulations when doing so. The best way toachieve this is to contact the local agents inadvance and ask for advice relevant to theparticular port.

Rules governing the disposal of residues fromsolid bulk cargoes are now addressed byAnnex V. The remains of cargo in wash waterare also defined in the regulations as ‘CargoResidues,’ the disposal of which will also needto be carried out as per the Code.

Cargo that is harmful to the marineenvironment (HME):The most important aspect to consider whendealing with solid bulk cargo residues iswhether or not the cargo is HME or not.

IMO guidelines state that it is the responsibilityof the shipper to declare the cargo as HMEwhen completing the information requiredunder section 4.2 of the IMSBC Code(Provision of information). Members should,therefore, always insist on full documentationbeing provided by shippers to protect theirposition in this regard.

Hold cleaning chemicals: It is important to find out whether the holdcleaning chemicals being used are classed asa marine pollutant. This will depend onwhether or not they contain any carcinogenic,mutagenic or reprotoxic (CMR) componentsand this should be clearly identified in theMaterial Safety Data Sheet (MSDS).

General requirements:The general requirements for disposal of bulkcargo residues under the revised Annex V areas follows:

• If the cargo is declared as HME, or thechemicals used to wash down the holds are amarine pollutant, then cargo residues alongwith wash water must be retained on boardand discharged to shore reception facilities.

• If the cargo is non HME, then the cargoresidues (hold sweepings and any remainingcargo not removable by accepted methods)may be discharged overboard whilst at sea,provided the ship is more than 12 nauticalmiles from the coast and also provided theship is not in a Marpol Special Area.

• Cargo residues contained in wash water maybe discharged overboard as long as the cargowas non HME and the chemicals used forwashing down were not a marine pollutant

and also did not contain any of the CMRcomponents, again provided the ship is morethan 12 nautical miles from the coast and notin a Marpol Special Area.

• If the ship is sailing in a Marpol Special Areathen discharge of cargo residues contained inwash water is prohibited unless it is under thecircumstances set out in Annex V regulation6.1.2. The circumstances in which it may bepermitted to discharge within a Special Areainclude (a) where the port of departure andthe next port of destination are within aSpecial Area and the ship will not transitoutside the Special Area between those portsAND (b) no adequate reception facilities areavailable at either the port of departure northe destination. In any case, the ship must beat least 12 nautical miles from the coast.

It is important to note that if HME cargoes arecarried, the disposal of any cargo residuesmust be properly documented in the GarbageRecord Book.

Guidelines for reporting are set out in the IMOCircular MEPC.1/Circ.469/Rev.1.http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/Po

llutionPrevention/PortReceptionFacilities/Doc

uments/469-Rev-1.pdf

Members are also able to view details and toreport ports with inadequate receptionfacilities via the IMO GISIS (Global IntegratedShipping Information Service) website whichcan be found at: http://gisis.imo.org

The standard format of the advancenotification form for waste delivery to portreception facilities is contained inMEPC.1/Circ.644:http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/Po

llutionPrevention/PortReceptionFacilities/Doc

uments/644.pdf

If further information or guidance is required,Members should contact the Managers.

The new MARPOL Annex V regulations came into force on 1 January 2013. These new rules largelyprohibit the disposal of garbage at sea with few exceptions.

8 Britannia RISK WATCH RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia SteamShip Insurance Association Limited, and can befound at www.britanniapandi.com/en/publications

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance AssociationLimited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watchto be reproduced but would ask that writtenpermission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

Tindall Riley (Britannia) LimitedRegis House45 King William StreetLondon EC4R 9AN

Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942 www.britanniapandi.com

Editor’s messageWe are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articleswithin Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk

Personal injury

Stowaways: the Master is not alone

It is recommended that extra precautions aretaken when calling at ports in these areas,including restricting access to ships andmaking regular searches for stowaways beforedeparture and immediately afterwards. Moststowaways will reveal themselves within 48hours of the ship being at sea due to lack offood and water. The reaction of the Masteronce a stowaway has been found can have abig impact on the subsequent handling ofthe incident.

When a stowaway has been found, it isimportant that the ship owners/managers’office is advised immediatelyIt is then essential that the P&I Club iscontacted so that the Club can liaise with thenetwork of correspondents and consultantsstraight away. Direct support can then beprovided to the Master on a daily basis untilthe conclusion of the case.

The stowaway must be interviewed andphotographedIf at all possible, the Master must find out thestowaway’s identity and nationality as thismakes repatriation much. Ideally, there shouldbe a questionnaire based on a stowaway’ssupposed port of embarkation and specific to his nationality. Questions will include: portof embarkation, name, date of birth, homeaddress and family contact details andnationality. There could be additionalquestions to discover nationality, such asbeing asked to name the President of hisalleged country or describe its flag.

If more than one stowaway is discovered,interviews should be conducted separately

Risk managementposter campaign:COLREGsThe International Regulations for PreventingCollisions at Sea (COLREGs) are the basicrules to avoid collisions which have been inexistence for 41 years and must beunderstood by all seafarers before they canpass an examination to become a bridgewatchkeeping officer.

Collision claims handled by the Club showthat infringement of one or more of thecollision rules is the single most commoncause of collisions. The cases seen by theClub demonstrate a lack of understandingand application of the COLREGs by theofficer of the watch.

The Club is producing a series of posters toremind bridge watchkeeping officers of therequirements of COLREGs. The first twoposters are being sent out with this editionof Risk Watch, together with a full descriptionof the relevant regulations and a full copy ofthe text.

It is hoped that the posters will be displayedon the bridge and in common areas. If extracopies are needed, please do not hesitate tocontact us. Posters can also be downloadedfrom the Britannia website.www.britanniapandi.com

with interpreters if necessary. To save precioustime, interviews can often be arranged bytelephone while the ship is at sea.

This information, together with a photograph,should be sent by email to all parties as soonas possible and this will allow the Club todecide how best to deal with the case andliaise with correspondents at the ship’sforthcoming ports of call.

It should be noted that stowaways frequentlylie about their identities in order to delaydisembarkation and if a Master suspects this to be the case he should report this to theClub or the correspondents. Many stowawaysare repeat offenders and therefore know whatto expect when they are discovered.

The stowaway must be searchedThis might give clues as to the identity andnationality of the stowaway. They will oftenhide ID documents about their person or inthe location on board where they werediscovered.

A more experienced stowaway who hastargeted a ship because of its voyagedestination may carry a mobile telephone withmany contact details stored or he may choosethe more traditional method of carrying anotebook or Bible in which to log his intentions.

Modern technology, together with a proactiveMaster who follows the steps detailed above,can help to identify the issues at an early stageand this can mean that the stowaway’s time onboard is greatly reduced and does not undulyaffect the day-to-day operation of the ship.

In the first six months of 2013 there has been a marked increase instowaway activity from the West African ports of Tema and Takoradi inGhana (with stowaways often hiding in empty containers) and also fromthe Red Sea port of Djibouti, where Ethiopian and Eritrean nationals areregularly embarking on ships bound for Europe or the Far East.

Miscellaneous