Summary 3

Chart showing general area ofincident 4

Sources of information 5

Chart showing position of incident 6

Sequence of events - Longevity 7

Portion of chart in use byLongevity 8

Sequence of events - Blue Gooseof Arne

Chart showing positions ofEPIRB and rescue

The rescue

Portion of Longevity courserecorder chart

Analysis

Comment

Consideration of evidence

Enlarged section of courserecorder chart

Reconstruction of collision

Diagram 1 Reconstruction

Diagram 2 Reconstruction

Consideration of actions

Blue goose of Arne

Longevity

Foundering and rescue

Conclusions

Details of vessels

Submissions

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Shortly after 1700 hours on 2 March1992 the Philippine registered bulkcarrier Longevity, on passage fromKimitsu, Japan, to Newcastle, NSW,was in collision with the British yachtBlue Goose of Arne some 50 milesto the east of Sandy Cape. The BlueGoose of Arne was dismasted andalso holed on the starboard hull.

The Longevity turned about andprovided assistance to the loneyachtsman in effecting repairs to theyacht’s hull, after which both vesselscontinued on their voyages.

Some time later the Blue Goose ofArne suffered further damage whenit plunged off a wave crest, as aresult of which it flooded and sank.The yachtsman, supported only byhis lifejacket and clutching hisemergency radio beacon, waseventually rescued by helicopter.

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The Longevity is a Philippines flagbulk carrier of 69,248 tonnesdeadweight, having a length of238.146m, a beam of 32.20m and amoulded depth of 18.20m. On 22March 1992 the ship sailed fromKimitsu, Japan, bound for Newcastle,NSW, in ballast. It was manned by31 persons, including the Master, allof whom were Philippine nationals.

The bridge watch was dividedbetween three Deck Officers, theMate keeping the 4-8 watch, theSecond Mate the 8-12 watch and theThird Mate the 12-4 watch. Oneseaman was also allotted to eachwatch, to act as lookout andhelmsman.

During the passage south the shipexperienced mainly good weatherand the Master and Officers wereable to get their normal sleep andrest.

Alcohol consumption on board wasseemingly light, the Master believingin leading by example.

At 0221 hours 2 April 1992 theLongevity had reached a positionnine miles east of Frederick Reeflight and course was altered to 185degrees true, a course that wouldtake the ship to a position eightmiles east of Cape Byron.

At noon on 2 April the position,obtained from the satellite navigator,was logged as 23° 15'S: 154° 19'E,giving a speed of 14.40 knots fromFrederick reef. At this speed theship would pass 50 miles to the eastof Sandy Cape at 1800.

The ship’s radar was operational andbeing used for ship detectionpurposes and the course recorderwas running.

In preparation for the ship’s arrival atNewcastle, the Master hadinstructed the Mate to supervise thecrew working on deck. Therefore at1600 the Master relieved the ThirdMate on the bridge. At this time thewind was recorded as being east-southeast force 5, the sea rough:the visibility was said to be good, butmoderate (four miles) in passing rainshowers.

Shortly after 1630 the Masteraltered course to starboard, to 225degrees, to put the wind and seaslightly abaft the port beam, in orderto prevent spray from coming on tothe main deck, while the crew carriedout some painting.

Normal procedure on board was forthe Second Mate to relieve the Matefor a meal relief and accordingly theSecond Mate arrived on the bridge atapproximately 1655 hours. At aboutthe same time as the Second Matearrived on the bridge, the Masterobserved a yacht, which he statedwas about two points on the portbow at a distance he estimated asbeing four to five miles. The Masterchecked the compass bearing of theyacht, which he stated was initially155 degrees and changed very

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slowly to 154 degrees, from which hedrew the conclusion the yacht wasalmost stationary. The Masterlooked at the radar, but was unableto pick out any target echo of theyacht on the screen.

The Master altered back to thecorrect course at this time, butbecause the ship was now to thewest of the course line, set thecourse at 180 degrees. According tothe Second Mate, when he arrived onthe bridge the Master was instructingthe helmsman to steady the ship onthe 180 degree course.

The Master advised the Second Mateof the course and speed, pointed outthe yacht, which the Second Matenoted to be between 1.5 and 2points on the port bow, and told himto keep clear of it, recommendingthat he alter course to starboard. Inmaking this recommendation theMaster took into consideration thatthe crew were still on deck and thehatch lids were open; an alteration ofcourse to port would have resulted insalt water spray being blown on tothe fresh paintwork on deck.

The Second Mate accepted thewatch, understanding the Master tohave said that the yacht wasstationary, although not recallingbeing told the bearing. He toogained the impression that the yacht,although under sail and with the sailstrimmed to port, was stationary.

The Master left the bridge atapproximately 1702 and the SecondMate stationed himself at the bridgefront windows, on the centre line.Watching the yacht he realised that itwas coming closer. He took a

bearing of the yacht at 1705 andfound it be around 165-170 degrees.The yacht continued to close and at1708 the Second Mate ordered thehelmsman to put the wheel 20degrees to starboard, then, as theyacht continued to close, hard tostarboard. He tried calling the yachton VHF Channel 16, but received noresponse. He then went to the portbridgewing from where he observedthe yacht collide with the port side ofthe Longevity, between Nos 5 and 6holds. He put the time of collision atabout 1715. At no time did he seeanyone on the deck, or in thecockpit, of the yacht

Immediately after the collision theSecond Mate ordered the helmsmanto bring the ship back to the 180degrees course and called theMaster, who returned immediately tothe bridge, arriving there at a time heput at 1716.

The position of the collision wasrecorded in the Deck Log Book asbeing 24° 30’S 154° 05’E.

As soon as the Master arrived on thebridge and had been advised by theSecond Mate that the Longevity hadbeen in collision with the yacht, heordered the crew and the engineersto stand by, posted lookouts andbrought the Longevity round to headdue north, back towards the yacht.

As the Longevity approached theyacht communications wereestablished on the VHF, but those onthe bridge had great difficultyunderstanding the English dialectspoken by the person on the yacht.

Arriving back at the yacht the Master

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made a lee on the port side and a Emergency Position Indicating Radiorope painter was passed down to the Beacon (EPIRB) signal detected inyacht, which was drifting astern. The position 24° 36’S : 153° 50’E. ByMaster then sent the Mate and the this time the Longevity was some 6.5Bosun, and later two more seamen, hours steaming time from thatdown on to the yacht to assist the location and was therefore releasedyachtsman to carry out repairs. to continue on its voyage.

The Master offered to take theyachtsman aboard and even to liftthe yacht aboard, but the yachtsmandeclined the offer, stating that hewould be able to make Gladstoneusing the engine.

The Longevity crew members helpedthe yachtsman to effect repairs tothe bow and to cut the mast andrigging free. While repairs were beingeffected, details of names, agentsand destinations were exchanged.

While the crew members wereassisting the yachtsman, the Mastersent a message to the MaritimeRescue Coordination Centre (MRCC),Canberra, advising them of thecollision and of the yachtsman’sintention to continue to Gladstone.MRCC Canberra confirmed that itwas in order for the Longevity tocontinue to Newcastle.

The Master again tried to persuadethe yachtsman to board theLongevity, again without success,following which the yacht motoredaway from the ship. The Master thentried further contact with the yacht byVHF, but received no response. TheLongevity got under way again at1912 and passage was resumed at1926.

At 0236 on 3 April the Masterresponded to a MAYDAY messagebroadcast by Brisbane Radio on VHFChannel 16, concerning an

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The Blue Goose of Arne, a bluehulled, fibreglass Prout Snow Goose37 catamaran yacht, registered inPoole, England, sailed fromWellington, New Zealand, on 21March 1992 bound for Gladstone,Queensland. The catamaran carriedthree sails, a white main sail, ayellow stay sail and a white jib. Theonly person on board was the Englishowner, a 59-year-old retired joiner.On clearing the western end of theCook Strait the yachtsman set acourse of 290 degrees magnetic, acourse that would take him towardsSandy Point, at the northern end ofFraser Island.

The yachtsman was experienced inocean sailing, having sailed in theEnglish Channel and Bay of Biscaybefore sailing the Blue Goose of Arneto Australia in 1987. He had alsosailed extensively around theAustralian Coast, had made twovoyages to New Zealand and one tothe Fiji Islands.

The Blue Goose of Arne was wellequipped, having a GPS navigationalsystem, an Aries wind-vane steeringsystem and an Autohelm 3000automatic steering system, two

‘Plastimo” magnetic steeringcompasses and two handheldbearing compasses, a multi-channelVHF radio and a multi-band radioreceiver, a radar reflector, aninflatable zodiac dinghy, an inflatablelife raft and an EPIRB. The BlueGoose of Arne was also theyachtsman’s home and was fittedout accordingly, including a wellequipped workshop, containing histools of trade.

When well away from land theyachtsman used the Aries wind-vanesteering system. However, when incoastal waters and near shippinglanes he used the Autohelm, whichhad an integral ‘fluxgate” magneticcompass, steered a magnetic courseand had an offcourse alarm. Theyachtsman had checked his magneticcompasses in Brisbane in 1991 aridagain in Auckland and had found thedeviations to be no more than twodegrees.

For most of the daylight hours theowner would sit in the cockpit,usually reading. So as not tobecome too engrossed, he kept theoven timer alongside him, set for 15minutes, to prompt him to lookaround for shipping. At night he sethis alarm to sound every hour, on thehour, to wake him up, so that hecould get up and have a look forother vessels. He was concernedthat he was unable to keep a lookoutall the time, but considered he wasachieving the best that he could as asinglehanded yachtsman. If he

encountered shipping and found thata close-quarters situation wasdeveloping, his normal procedurewas to keep out of the way of theother vessel.

The yachtsman had no tight scheduleto keep, neither was he interested inhighspeed sailing. His normalsailing speed was around 6.5 knots,a speed he found to be bothcomfortable and manageable. Sinrsleaving Wellington his best day’s runhad been 170 miles (7.08 knots),whereas on two days he had sailedonly 60 miles (2.50 knots).

The yachtsman was in the habit ofmaintaining a detailed log, recordingthe catamaran’s position by GPSevery six hours and the results of hismorning and noon sights. He alsomaintained a plotting sheet, which heupdated every two hours.

On the morning of 2 April 1992 BlueGoose of Arne was in a position tothe northeast of the RecorderSeamount on a course of 290-300degrees Magnetic and making aspeed of 6.5 knots. The wind wasfrom almost right astern at 10 to 15knots and all three sails were setand trimmed out to port, over theport hull. In order to keep the jibproperly filled, the yachtsman hadbeen running with that sail poled out.In order to ensure an accuratecourse, so as to keep north of theRecorder Seamount, he had changedover to the Autohelm steering systemfour days earlier.

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The yachtsman realised that hewould not make Gladstone duringdaylight on the Friday (3 April) andso, in order to ensure that he arrivedduring daylight hours on the Saturday(4 April), he reduced his jib sail onthe roller reefing, cutting the speedto an estimated five knots.

Late in the afternoon, at a time hethought to be just before five o’clock(1700), he sighted a ship out on hisstarboard side, at a distance of fiveor six miles. The ship presented abroad aspect, as if it, too, was boundfor Gladstone. A little later, as hewanted to have his evening mealbefore dark, the yachtsman checkedthe bearing of the ship, then wentabout clearing the cockpit for thenight. He then checked the bearingof the ship again and found that,although the ship was closer, but notclose enough to distinguish thefunnel markings, it had drawn ahead.Although he could not rememberwhat the bearings were, he didremember that the bearing had gonenear the zero degree mark of thehand-held compass. Satisfied thatthe ship would pass clear ahead ofhim and posed no threat, theyachtsman went below to the galley,to prepare his meal.

At this time the yachtsmanconsidered the wind speed to be notgreater than 20 knots, as he had nothad to ‘reef in” the main sail, thesea to be around 3m, with low swellsfrom three directions.

While preparing his meal the

yachtsman occasionally took a lookthrough the windows, having a goodfield of vision from the high windowsof the catamaran. On two occasions,when on top of a wave, he was ableto see the ship and all appeared tobe going well, so he busied himselfwith the meal preparation.

Having prepared the meal he took itinto the saloon, but before sittingdown he went into the cockpit tohave a look around. As he enteredthe cockpit he was confronted by a‘large red wall” and he found that hewas looking up under the flare of thebow of a ship and thought that theangle of the ship was such that theship appeared to have beenovertaking the Blue Goose of Arne.The Blue Goose of Arne then collidedwith the port bow of the ship. Thestarboard shrouds parted and themast toppled, the yachtsmanmanaging to dive into the cabin to.avoid being hit. As the catamaranpassed down the ship’s side theyachtsman had to fend off with hishands, particularly under the shipsquarter, where the Blue Goose ofArne was almost struck by thepropeller.

Once clear of the stern of the shipthe yachtsman checked for otherdamage and found that a large holehad been knocked in the starboardbow of the starboard hull.

The ship with which he had been incollision turned about and returnedto offer assistance. He wasinformed that the ship was the

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Philippines flag Longevity, bound forNewcastle, NSW. The Master of theship suggested that he abandon theBlue Goose of Arne and invited himaboard the Longevity. However, theyachtsman was not prepared toabandon all that he owned andsuggested that the yacht might belifted on board the Longevity, butafter discussion it was determinedthat it was too heavy for the ship’s 2-tonnes crane. After appraising thedamage he considered he could stillmake Gladstone, using the engine,so he requested assistance from theMaster, to help him effect temporaryrepairs.

A rope painter was passed downfrom the deck of the Longevity, whichthe yachtsman made fast to the BlueGoose of Ame, holding thecatamaran alongside and preventingit from drifting astern. Initially twocrew members, and later two others,climbed down to help the yachtsman.The yachtsman inflated the seat fromthe zodiac in the starboard bowspace, after which the storm jib sailwas lashed over the damaged bow,effectively plugging the hole. Thosesails that could be saved from thedowned mast were recovered andthen the mast and rigging cut free.All this took some considerable timeand it was dark by the time that therepairs were completed. Thetemporary repair reduced the wateringress to about one gallon (3.8litres) every 10 minutes, which theyachtsman was confident he’ couldcope with. However, he requested

that one of the ship’s crewaccompany him to Gladstone, to helpwith the bilge pumping, but thisrequest was refused.

Satisfied with the repairs andconfident in his ability to make it toGladstone, the yachtsman thankedthe Master and crew of the Longevity,exchanged names and other details,then prepared to resume hispassage. He started the engine, setcourse on 295 degrees magnetic andpressed the button to engage theAutohelm, then went below to pumpthe bilge; a task he expected to haveto perform every 10 minutes.

the starboard hull at a rate wellbeyond the capacity of the hand-operated bilge pump. The workshopspace, located in the forward area ofthe starboard hull, had originallybeen closed off by a heavy, marineplywood door. However, due to theweight of all of his tools, theyachtsman had discarded the doorbefore leaving England, so the waterentering through the damaged bowwas able to flood most of thestarboard hull.

He pumped the bilge and thencleared various items away from theaccess hatch, to avoid the bilgesuction becoming clogged. Onreturning to the cockpit he found thathe was again headed for the side ofthe Longevity. He disengaged theAutohelm, put the wheel hard to portand at the same time kicked thelever which changed the direction ofthe propeller thrust, which assistedthe turn, and managed to avoid tooheavy a contact. The Master andcrew of the Longevity called yet againfor the yachtsman to abandon theBlue Goose of Arne and to go aboardthe Longevity, yet again he declined.

A catamaran has a good chance ofsurvival even when the buoyancy ofone hull is lost, and the yachtsmanwas not too concerned. However, asthe catamaran rolled, water sloppedfirst into the centre cabin and theninto the navigation area in the porthull.

The yachtsman tried to pump out theport hull, but couldn’t keep up withthe water ingress and realised thatthere was nothing he could do.

He therefore set about makingpreparations to abandon.

Some time after clearing from theLongevity, at a time the yachtsmanplaced at about 7 o’clock (1900), theBlue Goose of Arne ‘fell” off a wavecrest and there was a loud crackingsound. On checking around theyachtsman found water flooding into

He inflated the life raft on the leeside and attached the EPIRB to theraft, then set about collecting itemsto put into the raft. He collected hispassport, log book, a few personalitems and his ‘emergency foodpack’, and then began collectingclothing, placing everything inwaterproof bags for stowing in theraft. On one of his excursions tocollect gear from below, the wind andsea lifted the raft on to the foredeck,

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where the sea anchor line and otherlines became itangled. Taking hisknife, he started cutting the raft free,but then he lost his knife. He hadanother knife in the cabin, but thatwas now under water.

Realising that his life depended onthe EPIRB, the yachtsman managedto break the fine polypropylenesecuring line and tied the EPIRB tohis life jacket, at the same timeactivating the beacon. Still snaggedon the foredeck, the bottom of theliferaft eventually tore and the bagscontaining his effects disappearedone after the other.

The yachtsman clung to the top ofthe slowly sinking catamaran until,eventually, it sank from under him,leaving him supported only by hisinflatable life jacket and clutching hisEPIRB.

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In October 1989 the Australian LocalUser Terminal (LUT) wascommisioned at Alice Springs,enabling Australia to participate fullyin the International COSPAS/SARSATsystem of satellite-assisted searchand-rescue procedures.

Six orbiting satellites are used topick up signals transmitted byEPIRBS. A satellite picking up suchsignals retransmits them to LUTs,where they are processed bycomputer to obtain the position ofthe beacon. The processedinformation is then passed to aMaritime Rescue CoordinationCentre, which in Australia is inCanberra, where search-and-rescueoperations are initiated.

The distress signal transmitted bythe yachtsman’s EPIRB was pickedup by satellite and relayed to the LUTat Alice Springs, where the positionof the distress was determined asbeing 24° 36.4’S 153° 50.5’E. Thisinformation was passed to theMaritime Rescue Coordination Centrein Canberra, where search-and-rescue operations were set inmotion. Ships in the area of thedistress were alerted and an airsearch was initiated. A helicopter,initially delayed by poor weather anda mechanical problem, departed forthe distress area at 0500 on 3 Apriland “homed in” on the signaltransmitted by the EPIRB.

The helicopter crew was expecting tofind a liferaft or small boat andpassed over the EPIRB position twicewithout sighting anything. On a third

run over the position one of the crewmembers hung out from the side ofthe helicopter and this time theyachtsman was sighted. One of thehelicopter crew entered the water toassist the yachtsman who waswinched to safety at 0739. Theposition of the rescue, as recordedby the helicopter crew, was 24°34.2’S 153° 51’E.

The yachtsman was flown directly toMaryborough hospital, where he wastreated for exposure.

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PORTION OF LONGS COURSE RECORDER CHART

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Comment

To reconstruct the events of thecollision it is necessary to establishthe courses and speeds of the twovessels.

The courses and speed of theLongevity are known with reasonableaccuracy. The courses and times ofalteration of course are recorded onthe chart of the ship’s courserecorder and the ship’s speed can beascertained from the chartedpositions of satellite fixes.

All records from the Blue Goose ofArne were lost when the yacht sankand there are no independent

sources of information. However, theskipper stated he was steering acourse of 295 degrees magnetic andhe estimated his speed to be aboutfive knots.

The Longevity did not detect theyacht on its radar because of the seaclutter on the radar screen.Therefore the distance of the yachtfrom the Longevity was notestablished at any time.

Consideration of evidence

The Longevity’s deck log book for2 April 1992 does not contain anyentries regarding the coursealterations carried out between 1630and 1700. However, theobservations column does containthe entry ‘1655 Sighted visually asailboat about 1.5 points on portbow at approximate distance 4-5miles”. Although this entry is in

accordance with the Master’s initialstatement, it must have been madeafter the incident and is notaccurate. At 1655 the Longevity wason a heading of 225 degrees andrelative bearing of 1.5 points on theport bow provides a true bearing ofabout 208 degrees. Had this beenthe case, when the ship resumed itscourse at 1701 the Blue Goose ofArne would have been on a divergingcourse two points (22.5 degrees) onthe starboard bow.

The Second Mate stated that theBlue Goose of Arne was 1.5-2 pointson the port bow wheh he took overfrom the Master, when the ship washeading 180 degrees. It is thereforeconsidered that the time for the logbook entry should have been notedas 1701, not 1655.

The Master stated that when he firstsighted the yacht at 1655 he took abearing and that this bearing was155 degrees. If this was indeed thecase, the yacht was 70 degrees onthe port bow, 20 degrees forward ofthe port beam, at that time. For theBlue Goose of Arne to have reachedthe collision point from that line ofbearing would have required a speedin excess of 13 knots. The Master’srecollection of the bearing he said heobtained at 1655 is thereforeconsidered to be unreliable.

The Blue Goose of Arne was steeringa magnetic compass course of 295degrees. Given the local magneticvariation (11 degrees east) and aclaimed minimal compass deviation,the yacht’s heading would have beenaround 305 degrees true. This isgenerally consistent with a coursefrom Cook Strait to Gladstone.

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However, with the sails trimmed outto port in the 20 knots east-south-east wind, not only would the coursemade good have been marginallymore southerly, but the speed wouldmost probably have been greaterthan the estimated five knots.

Reconstruction of the collision

The Longevity’s course recorder wasset on Universal Coordinated Time.To obtain local time, EasternStandard Time, it is necessary toadd 10 hours to the times on thecourse recorder chart.

From the course recorder chart, at1630 (A) the Longevity was on acourse of 178 degrees. At 1632 (B)course was altered to starboard,steadying on 225 degrees at 1635(C). At 1658 (D) course was alteredto port and at 1701 (E) the ship wassteady on 180 degrees. At 1707 (F)course was altered to starboard. At1710 (G) the trace shows anincrease in rate of turn, indicatingthat maximum rudder was applied atthat time. At 1712 (H) the shipreached a maximum alteration ofcourse to starboard and commencedswinging back to port and wassteadied on a course of 180degrees at 1717 (J). At 1721 (K) theship started to turn to port, aroundon to a reciprocal heading.

Based on the time of the increase inrate of turn at 1710 and the time ofthe maximum alteration to starboardat 1712, it is considered that thecollision occurred between 1711 and1711.5.

Based on the charted positions ofsatellite fixes, the speed of theLongevity was 14.4 knots, or

444.75m/min. Between 1707 and1711.5 the ship would have travelled2001m, with an advance of 1668mand a lateral movement of about720m from the 180 degree track.

At five knots, the Blue Goose of Arnewould have travelled 695m in thesame period, in which case, to reachthe collision point, it would had tohave been on the Longevity’sstarboard bow when the SecondMate altered course at 1707.

The Inspector accepts that the BlueGoose of Arne was still on theLongevity’s port bow when theSecond Mate altered course and,therefore, that the Blue Goose ofArne was travelling at a speedgreater than five knots.

Based on the bearing of 170degrees, observed by the SecondMate at 1705, the course beingmade good by the Blue Goose ofArne is indicated as being about 300degrees and the speed as abouteight knots. The inspector considersthese to have been reasonablyconstant throughout the encounterperiod.

Based on this assessment, had theLongevity maintained the course of225 degrees it would have crossedahead of the Blue Goose of Arne at adistance of about 1.8 miles. Byaltering course to 180 degrees, theMaster created the development of aclose-quarters situation, in which,had the 180 degree course beenmaintained, the Blue Goose of Arnewould have crossed ahead of theLongevity at about 1708 at adistance of about 8.5 cables(1575m).

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CZ 834m

Reconstruction of Longevity’s track from course recorder record -- ,: .A. ‘.:;:;: :y;....:.::..“. ,.ci: “’ .,>;:;.:y ,... ;:.:..:;;:;:x:s:.: ;$$:#::::

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0 1705/

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1707

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Scale

Diagram 2

Reconstruction:Blue Goose of Arne bearing 170° at 1705

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The cause of the Blue Goose of Arnecoming into contact with the side ofthe Longevity after having set offunder engine power is uncertain.However, it is possible the autohelmdid not engage and the Blue Gooseof Arne proceeded in a circle, insteadof remaining on the 295 degreescourse. At that time the Longevitywas lying stopped in the water,headed in the general direction of020 degrees.

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Blue Goose of Arne

When the yachtsman took hearingsof the Longevity, although he couldnot remember what they were exactly, he did recall that the bearingwas approaching the zero line on hishand held compass. This meansthat, as his course was 295 degrees(magnetic), the Longevity was atleast 65 degrees on his starboardbow.

The Longevity was said by theyachtsman to be presenting a fairlybroad aspect to the Blue Goose ofArne, which did not change so as tocause him concern. Therefore it isconsidered that while the Longevitywas observed by the yachtsman itwas proceeding on the 225 degreecourse and that the time was not sofar advanced as the yachtsmanthought it to be.

In going below into the galley toprepare his evening meal, theyachtsman failed to maintain alookout and, in particular, a watch onthe Longevity. As a result, he failedto see that the Longevity made abroad alteration of course to thesouth, towards him, creating a closequarters situation.

The ship’s radar was said to havebeen switched on, but did not pick upthe Blue Goose of Arne, even on thesix-mile range. A moderate sea was

running, caused by the force 5 wind,which reportedly causedconsiderable ‘clutter” (radar echosof the waves) on the radar screen.The Blue Goose of Arne, althoughequipped with a radar reflector,would provide only a small targetecho on the radar screen, whichwould be easily masked by the seaclutter.

The Master said that he first notedthe Blue Goose of Arne at about1655. He also stated that he tooktwo bearings of the yacht, with aninterval of about five minutesbetween them, in which time thebearing opened (decreased) onedegree. From these observations,although the yacht was under sailand running before the east-southeasterly wind, he drew the conclusionthat the Blue Goose of Arne wasstationary. Had the Blue Goose ofArne in fact been stationary, at adistance of five miles, after a fiveminute interval the bearing wouldhave opened 14.5 degrees, after athree-minute interval seven degreesand the bearing would have openedthe one degree, to 154 degrees inless than half a minute.

The Master’s conclusion that theBlue Goose of Arne was stationary,based on the two bearings that hehad taken, was erroneous.

During the time between bearings, ormore probably, after he had takenthe second bearing, the Masteraltered the course of the Longevityfrom 225 degrees to 180 degrees.From the evidence of the courserecorder, the Longevity was broughton to the 180 degrees heading at1701 and the Master was said to

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have left the bridge at 1702. TheMaster, therefore, had no time inwhich to reevaluate the situation,brought about by the alteration ofcourse, before he left the bridge.

had very little time in which to makethat assessment.

The Master failed to properlyascertain the rate at which the BlueGoose of Arne was being passed andwhether it was safe to alter course to180 degrees. Then, having alteredthe course to 180 degrees, he failedto ascertain whether a safe situationexisted, before handing the watchover to the Second Mate.

By altering course at 1658 theMaster precipitated the collision.

As soon as the Master had beenadvised of the collision he alteredcourse and returned to the yacht. Hethen rendered assistance to theyachtsman, exchanged names andother details and advised theMaritime Rescue CoordinationCentre, Canberra of the incident. Healso offered to take the yachtsmanaboard, an offer which was declined,then remained on the scene until theyacht resumed its passage. It isconsidered, therefore, that theMaster fully fulfilled his obligationsfollowing the collision

Although the Second Mate did notimmediately take a bearing of theBlue Goose of Arne, by placinghimself on the centre line he wasable to ascertain very quickly thatthe yacht was closing the ship’scourse line. In altering course tostarboard he was following theMaster’s recommendation, whichwas made with the view to keepingsalt spray off the deck, rather thanfrom a safety consideration. In doingso, he was attempting to crossahead and down wind of the BlueGoose of Arne.

Foundering and rescue

Because the Blue Goose of Arnesank, it has not been possible todetermine what further damageoccurred to the yacht as a result ofthe seas. However, it is consideredprobable that more of the fibreglasswas torn away from the areadamaged by the collision, resulting inthe rapid flooding of the starboardhull.

In taking over the watch from theMaster, the Second Mate acceptedan unknown situation, which rapidlydeveloped into the collision. Hisactions, in trying to keep clear of theBlue Goose of Arne, were directed bythe Master’s recommendation to goto starboard, rather than the result ofa correct assessment of thesituation. However, as the collisiontook place only about 10 minutesafter he had taken over the watch, he

Once the Blue Goose of Arne beganto sink the yachtsman appreciatedthat his life depended on his EPIRB.Scantily clad as he was, the time hespent clinging to the sinking yachtand in the water was a feat ofphysical endurance. However, hisrescue was purely due to the factthat he had an EPIRB on the BlueGoose of Arne and that he had tiedthe EPIRB to his lifejacket as soonas he realised that he had lost theuse of the liferaft.

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It Is considered that:

1. While on the 225 degrees coursethe Longevity was proceeding in asafe crossing situation and wouldhave crossed about two milesahead of the Blue Goose of Arne.

2. By altering course to port at 1658the Master precipitated thecollision.

3.The Master failed to properlyascertain the situation withrespect to the Blue Goose of Arneand whether it was safe to altercourse to 180 degrees.

4.The Master also failed, havingaltered course to 180 degrees, toascertain whether a safe situationexisted, before handing over thewatch to the Second Mate.

5. In taking over the watch from theMaster, the Second Mateaccepted an unknown situation,which rapidly developed into thecollision.

6.The Second Mate’s actions weredirected by the recommendationsof the Master, not as a result of acorrect assessment of thesituation.

8. The yachtsman failed to maintaina lookout and, in particular, awatch on the Longevity. As aresult, he was unaware of thecourse alteration by the Longevityand the developing situation.

9. Although the time the yachtsmanspent clinging to the raft and inthe water was a feat of physicalendurance, his rescue andultimate survival were due to thefact that he had an EPIRB.

7.After the collision, in turning andproviding assistance to the yachtand in reporting the incident, theMaster fully fulfilled hisobligations.

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LONGEVITY

Port of Registry: Manila

Type of ship: Bulk carrier

Year built: 1981

Number of holds Seven

Owner: San lldefonso ShippingCorporation

Crew: 31, Filipinos

Classification Society:Bureau Veritas

Length overall: 238.146m

Beam: 32.2m

Moulded depth: 18.2m

Tonnages: Gross: 37,939

Nett: 22,643

Deadweight: 82,171

Main engine: B & W 5L80GFCA(D)

Service speed: 14.50 knots

BLUE GOOSE OF ARNE

Type: Prout “Snow Goose 37” Yacht

Hulls: Two, fibreglass

Masts: One, 11.28m, steel.

Sails: Three: main, stay and jib.

In accordance with regulation 16(3)of the Navigation (Marine Casualty)Regulations copies of the reportwere provided to the Master andSecond Mate of the Longevity andthe Skipper of the Blue Goose ofArne.

Written submissions were receivedfrom the Master and the Skipper andthe text has been amended whereconsidered appropriate.

In his submission the Master of theLongevity raised the following points:-

Log Book entry for 1655 - this waswritten after the event and iserroneous.

The course recorder time was inerror by 2-3 minutes.

This would not affect the actualsequence of events, the effect beingthat events occurred 2-3 minutesearlier than indicated in the report.

The yachtsman’s requests wereunderstood to be for assistance inclearing the mast and sails and inmaking temporary repairs to thestarboard hull. The yachtsman wasnot understood to request a seamanto proceed with him to Gladstone.

Due to the language differences anddialect this is readily understood andaccepted. However, it would havebeen extremely difficult for theMaster to comply with such arequest.

The Master was adamant that thebearing he took of the yacht at 1655was 155 degrees and that when hechecked it again, at 1658, it was154 degrees.

The Inspector considers that thismatter has been fully covered in thereport.

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