Collingwood and Greek Aesthetics : Rosen

8/9/2019 Collingwood and Greek Aesthetics : Rosen

1/15

Collingwood and Greek Aesthetics

Author(s): Stanley H. RosenReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1959), pp. 135-148Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181656.

Accessed: 16/02/2013 20:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

BRILLis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Feb 2013 20:53:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4181656?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4181656?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap


2/15

Collingwood

nd

GreekAesthetics

STANLEY H. ROSEN

R

G. COLLINGWOOD,

writing

in

The Principlesof Art, has given

us an

interpretation

of

Greek aesthetics that is worth examining in

some detail.'

This

is

true

for at least two reasons. In the

first

place, Collingwood's work,

as in most

of

his

books,

is

original and

provocative2

and

it should be

more

widely studied by those who are

interested

in the

philosophy

of art. In the second

place,

it is

wrong,

which, when combined with the ingenuity just mentioned, makes it

perhaps

more

worthy

of

inspection

than

many

saner accounts. I hope

that

this

judgment

does not seem

perverse;

it

is

nothing

other than

a

reformulation

of the old

platitude

that we often learn more from those

whose views we

reject

than from those with whom we

agree.

I am

forced

to

reject Collingwood's picture

of the views of Plato and

Aris-

totle almost in their

entirety, yet

I believe that I have learned a

good

bit

about Plato and Aristotle in

doing so;

if this is so, it is only a sign

of the

truth which lies

in

platitudes,

and not of

any

scorn for

Collingwood.

In

the discussion which follows, it is my intention neither to deal adequ-

ately

with

the whole of

Collingwood's philosophy

of

art,

nor

with

that

of

the Greeks.

Apart

from its intrinsic interest and the usual

questions

of

space,

the

following justification may

be

given

for

considering

this

part

of

Collingwood's

book

in

isolation.

According

to

Collingwood,

Book

I

of

The

Principles f

Art contains

the

treatise's empirical

or

descriptive work

in

which

we

have

tried, so

far,

merely to repeat

what

everyone knows; everyone, that is,

who

is

accustomed to

dealing

with art and

distinguishing

art

proper from

art

falsely

so-called. 2

If the merely empiricalor descriptive work has

not been correctly done, as

I

shall have to contend, then the theory of

art

presented

in

Book III,which depends upon it, can by Collingwood's

own

scheme hardly be satisfactory.The empirical work itself falls

into

two

parts,

a

description of what art proper is not, and a description

of

what it is. In discussing what art proper is not, Collingwood

places

much of

the

stress of

his

description pon a historical study purporting

to

explain how Greek philosophy is in part responsible for current er-

roneous views and in part has been misinterpreted as a result of these

I

Oxford,

1938.

Reissued as Galaxypaperback, g9l. All quotationsare from the

i9gS

edition,

hereaftef

abbreviated

as

P.A.

2

P.A.,

pp.

273,

152.

I

3

S

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/15

views.

It therefore follows

that there must be, according to

Colling-

wood's line of thought,a contradiction n Greekaesthetics, one partof

which

is

wrong,

and

has

generated

the false

views

which,

in

the

course

of

time,

have

been turned back

onto

the

part

that is

right by

those

cor-

rupted by

the erroneous

part. Complicated

as this

sounds,

it is

very

much

like his

procedure,

if

not his explicit formulation.

If

Collingwood

is right,

then

everyone,

the Greeks as

well as

ourselves,

is at

least

half-

wrong; and in Collingwood's

hands,the half has

a

distressing endencyof

becoming

the

whole.

Before

turning

to

the details

of the

argument,

it

may

be

well

to

present certain technical termsused by Collingwood throughout,some-

times with dire consequences.The first involves a distinction

between

imitative and representational

rt: A work of art

is

imitative

in

virtue

of its

relation

to

another

work of

art

which

affords

t a

model of

artistic

excellence;

it is

representative

n virtue of its relation to something

in

'nature',

that

is,

something

not a

work

of

art.

I

The

second

involves

a

triple distinction of

false kinds

of art: (a) the theory that art

is a

craft,

like

cobbling

or

carpentry:

the

power

to

produce

a

preconceived

result

by

meansof

consciously

controlledanddirected

action;

2

(b)

the

the theory that art is magic: Amagicalart is an art which is represent-

ative

and

therefore

evocative

of

emotion,

and

evokes of

set

purpose

some

emotions

rather

than

others

in

order to

discharge

them

into

the affairs

of

practical life;

3

(c)

the

theory that art is amusement: something

designedto

stimulate

a

certain emotion (which) is intended not for

discharge

into

the

occupations

of

ordinary life, but

for

enjoyment

as

something

of

value

in

itself. 4

All

three

of these

theories

are

rejected by

Collingwood

as

part

of his

empirical task.

Collingwood begins

the

negative

part

of

his work

by denying

that art is

a craft, andin connectionwith this, that it is representation.This view,

still

popular,

he

tells

us,

owes

its

origin to classical philosophy

which

in this

matter,

as in

so

many

others, has

left

so many traces on our own

(thought),

both for

good

and

for

ill.

s

Let

us first

look

at what

he has

to

say

about

the Greek

theory

of

=LotrmX)

?Xvv.

According to

Colling-

wood

etXnv

(like

the

Roman

ars) meansa craft or specializedform of

skill,

like

carpentry

or

smithying

or

surgery.

6

Now this

is

certainly

one

of

its

meanings,

but

by

no meansthe

only one. It

can

also nmean

raftiness

in the

sense

of

cunning:

for

example, in a speech of Lysiaswe

read of a

I

Ibid., P.

42.

2

Ibid.,

p.

Is.

3

Ibid.,

p.

69.

4

Ibid., P. 78.

s

Ibid.,

P.

I9.

6

Ibid.,

P.

s.

136



4/15

man

with

a

t6Xv-

for

adulter).

I

Or it

can

refer

to a

way in which some-

thingis acquired, withoutanydefinitesense of art or craft.

z

Further-

more,

just

as in

English

here

is a

difference

between

a craft

ike

cobbling

and

an artor knack

ike

fishing as

used with

regard

o

amateur

ishermen),

andjust as there is a difference

between arts

like

fishing

and

arts like

flute-playing,

so too do these differences

exist

in

Greek.

What

unites

these

various-nstances

n

English

s that

all

are

manifestations f

tech-

nique,

an

abstract

term

which refers

to a

skilled

nmanner

f doing,

but

to

no

specific

manner:

the

manner varies

from

case

to

case. The

same is

true

in

Greek.

To have

a

'xv-1

is to be able

to

do

something

'exvy.x7,

and

tCXvmL

ike cobbling,carpentryetc,, arenot the only kindsof skilful

activity.

Collingwood

translates

xcxvn,

then,

in an

erroneously rigid

manner;

perhaps

he has been

misled

by

the word

technical,

which

he

does not want

to be associated

with art

proper,

and

which is

nowadays

usually applied to activities even

more

complex

than

cobbling.

But

there

is,

so

to

speak,

a

non-technical

use

of

the

term.

The matter

is made

clear

by

thinking

of the

colloquial

English

uses

of the

word

technique.

Just

as

Lysias

speaks

of

a

r'xv-

in

adultery,

so

do

we

say

of

a

man

that

his

technique

in love is

excellent. And

just

as

we

could

not

equate a

love technique with a cobbler's technique without misunderstand-

ing

or

blurring

the

meaning

of this

abstract

term,

so

too

would it

be

an

error

to

equate

the

reXvyq

f a

poet

with

that

of

a

cobbler,

if we

meant

to

say

thereby

that the

poet

exhibits

the

same

manner of

skilful

acting

as

does

a

cobbler.

But

this

is what

Collingwood would

make of

the

Greek

view,

and he

is

wrong

in

so

describing

it.

Poets

and

cobblers

both

practice

teXvat

but their

techniques

are

radically

different.

What

is

the

case,

however,

is that

Plato and

Aristotle

describe the

poet

as a

,uLd'-n)q

or

imitator, just

as

the

craftsman

(in

Collingwood's

sense of the term) is said to be an imitator. Poetry and craftsmanship are

both

techniques which

share the

characteristic

of

imitating, but

it

hardly

follows

from this

that the

'rexv- of the

poet

is

equivalentto

the

rexv- of

the

craftsman. A

large

share of

Collingwood's

objections to the

view of

notvLtx)LX

e'Xv

are

based

upon this

misunderstanding. The

term

'rxv-

has

a

whole

spectrum of

specific

meanings,

and if

Collingwood

wishes to

exclude art

from

all of these

meanings, then

he

must deny

that there

is

any

skill

involved

in

practicing art

proper.

That he is

very

nearly

involved in

this

absurdity, I

hope to

show in

a

subsequent

study of

his

description of

the

facts of art.

I

Lysias,

lEPI

TOT

EPATOSOENOTE

(DONOT,

16-17.

2

Liddell

&

Scott,

Unabridged

Greek-English

Lexicon,

gth

Edition.

5

I

37



5/15

Meanwhile,restricting

ourselves to

an

inspection

of

his

description

of

Greekaesthetics, we turn to an error concerningPlato's theory of art.

Collingwood

correctly

observes

that,

in the third

book of the Republic,

Socrates

distinguishes

between

imitative or mimetic

and non-imitative

narrative n poetry.

I

As this

passage

s of considerable

importance

to

Collingwood,

we must examine

it for a moment. The passages too

long

to

transcribe

n its

entirety, but here

is a

resume:

Socratessays

that all

poetry is a narrativeabout

the

past, present,

andfuture,

and that some

narrative

s

simple

and some imitative (&itci

'ffpIaLe

and

'LIya

8W.

~LL

7ewq).

That

is, sometimes

the poet narrates the experiences

of

others in his own voice, and this is imitative narrative;when the poet

distinguishes

what

he has

experiencedfromwhatothers

haveexperienced,

this

is

simple narrative.

The

question

is

now whether

to allow one

or

both or

a

mixture of

these two forms of narrative in the best

city.

The conclusion

is that

we are

to allow a mixture: mainly it

will be

simple

narration,

but

a

small

part may

be

imitative

when

it

is

a

good

man

that

is

the subject

of

imitation.

When the person imitated is bad,

then

imitative narrative

s

undesirable,

for

obvious reasons.

This judgment

about

art is in

line

with

the

view

that men cannot

imitate manythings

well, thatis, that each manhashis own business to perform, andshould

stick

to

it.

Since

a

part

of this

business

in

every case

is to

be

virtuous,

it is

sometimes

permissible to

imitate virtuous

acts.

From this Collingwood

infers that for Plato, some

art is mimetic

and

some art

is not mimetic. The question, however,

is what is meant

by

mimetic

in

this

whole

discussion.

In the literal

sense,

there

can

be no

doubt

that Collingwood

is right. But the following

observationmay be

made. Collingwood

himself has shown us that mimesis

may have two

meanings:

imitation

and

representation.

Socratesmay mean by

mimetic

narrativehere a narrationin which one representsneself as someone

else,

and

by simple

narrative

a

narration n which

one does not so re-

present

oneself.

If

this interpretation,or something

ike it, hasany merit,

it

would mean

that Socrates s

here using

,dpuaLg

n a specialised

rather

than

in a

general

sense. Or, should this appear to

be over-subtle, we

might saymerely

thatSocratesby his own statement

has not yet

worked

out

the details of his

argumenthere,

and so that the details concerning

mimesis

will

receive

their full

treatment in Book

X.2 (It is this which

Collingwood,

as we shall

see,

wants

to deny.) Now

the question

whether

there

is

any reason

to

subject this passage

o what

may look like casuistry

I

392

d

s

ff.

2

See

394

d

7

ff.

138



6/15

cannot be answered until we

make

up

our

mind

about what is

said

in

BookX. If the literalreadingof the passage n Book III s consonantwith

Socrates' inal

position

in Book

X,

then there is no

problem

and

Colling-

wood is

entirely right.

I will now

show, however,

that

this

is

not the

case;

that the literal

reading

in Book III is

contradicted

by

the

literal

reading

n Book

X, despite

Collingwood'sclaims. This is enoughfor

us

to reject Collingwood,

but

it is not

enough

for

us

to

understandPlato.

I

can

only

show here that either some such

interpretation

as

I

have

sug-

gested

is

required,

or

there is

a

clear-cut

contradiction n the Republic:

whether

it is or is not susceptible of resolution

on a

deeper level,

on

this alternative,I cannot now enter into, but hope that my analysiswill

contributesomething

to

sharpening

he

question

involved

and

exhibiting

those of its

complexities

which

are blurred

by

Collingwood.

According

to

Collingwood,

an

unprejudiced eading

of Book X

in Greek (he rightly mistrusts translations) hows

that Socrates (again)

distinguishes

between mimetic and non-mimetic

poetry,

and,

in

this

severer

context,

nevertheless

banishes

only

mimetic

poets

from

the

city.

This is

simply

not correct.

For, by following Collingwood's

advice

and looking at the Greek text,

we find that Socratesnow explicitly

definespoetry as mimetic:

(Pau

X'

M

9cxpau)xcp

uyyLyVO4eVvJ

9PaXa

ywvva

[

LLlrnT)16X.

VEotxev.

T6Trepov,v

3'

Cye?,

xa

rv

6-V

iovov,

-

Xod xata

qvV

&XOi5v,

'v

8-

Trol'atv

vvop'c4opev;

Etxo6

y',

e,

xal

raufv.,

In

other

words, poetry

is

explicitly

defined as

imitation

by

sound

xoata

r-Jv

&xoiAqv.

his passage is never cited by

Colling-

wood, although it is crucial for understanding the passages to

which he

does

allude.

It

is

especially puzzling

to find this reference missing, in the

face of a sudden burst of Greek

quotations: he does cite, in a learned

footnote, two passages before ours and three after it (6oo e

5;

6o

I

a 4;

6o6

a

6; 607 b 2,6) where

he says that poetry is critically discussed

without being specified as representational

-

i.e. mimetic

-

poetry.

Collingwood says: In every

case except one, the qualification

is obvi-

ously implied in the context. (Little wonder, we may interpolate,

in light

of

the definition of poetry just noted.) The one exception

(607 b

6),

though a very interesting passage, is not one that affects the present

dis-

cussion.

2

Collingwood's accuracy

becomes further suspect

when we

note that at 6oo e g, poetry

is specified as mimetic, and his

argument

I

603

b

4..

I

P.A.,

p.

48,

p.

2.

139



7/15

hopelessly

confused

when

we further

observe

that

at

607

b

2-6

(interest-

ingly separated by Collingwood as two passagesrather than given as one),

the whole

passage

is

extremely relevant.

In

it,

Socrates states

that

we

were

right to

expel

poetry

(unqualified) from

the

city,

such

being

her

nature

('rota'rrvJ

oi'aov)

-

i.e.

that

she is

mimetic.

It is

not

nmimetic

poetry

in

opposition

to some other

poetr),

which

is

being

expelled, but

rather

poetry

which

is

being

expelled because it is

mimetic.

This

is

clear

from

Socrates'

allusion to the

long-standing quarrel

between

philo-

sophy

and

poetry.

As the

whole

argumnent

hows,

the

quarrel

is over

the

claim to

knowledge.

And

poetry,

since it

merely

imitates,

does

not,

ac-

cording to Socrates, knou about the things which it imitates. Poetry's

nature

is

mimetic;

as

such,

it

makes

a

false

claim to

knowledge,

and

so,

as

partisans

of

philosophy,

we

nmust

expel

it

from the

city.

This

issue

will

shortly be

raised

again.

Meanwhile,

let us

notice one

last

passage which

Collingwood trans-

lates within the

laws

of

grammar,

but in

such a

way

as is

not

only not

required

by the

sense

of the

words,

but

which is

incompatible

with

Socrates'

argument.

At

607

c

5,

Socrates

says

that

pleasure-producing

poetry and

inmitation will

be

accepted

once

miore if

it has

arguments

to

defend itself from the charges brought against it. Collingwood translates:

poetry for

pleasure's

sake,

i.e.

representation.

The

Greek

reads:

7rp68

'8OVv

ltTjLX

xxat

L

L[)at.

Now, xcd

can

mean

id est,

but its

usual

meaning in such a

context

is

and ;

there

would be

no

reason

to

think of

id est

here,

given

the

whole

context,

unless

we

were

trying

to

read

Collingwood's

interpretation

into

the

text. But

this

interpretation

has

now

been

disproved,

with

respect

to

Book

X.

It

should

now

be

evident why I

was

worrying

the

meaning of

,uuvcaL4

in

the

passage

summarized

from

Book Ill.

If we

may take

the

argument

just

preceding as established, then, as I pointed out, we must either face a

contradiction in the

Republic,

or

resolve

it,

either

very

subtly or

very

simply.

I

have

suggested

a

simple

solution,

and

must let

the

matter

stand

there.

I

turn

now to

a

second

point at

which

Collingwood is

apparently

justified in

part

of

his

interpretation.

At

607 a

ff., Socrates

seems

to

contradict the

whole

surrounding

argument by

saying

that

some

forms of

poetry

will

be

allowed

to

remain

in the

city.

The

Greek

sentence

reads:

xP...

eL8eVOL

8'

&rr

oaov

[.ovov

[IJvou4 Ozozi

xac

yxcop

'rozc

MyOoZ 7M0CWX rXpOC&CxTr&OvCI

7ro'?LV.

i.e.,

one must

know

that

of

poetrv

only

such

hymns to

the

gods and

I40



8/15

encomia

to the

good

may

be admitted to

the

city.

What

this

means

is

that poetry as an independent endeavor has been banished from the city;

certain poems

which are consistent

with the moral

and

political

character

of

the

city

- in

other

words,

which can

serve

as

propaganda

-

will

be

retained.

There is no real contradiction here, although I grant that

the

language

is

confusing

because Socrates has

not

bothered to invent

a new

term

for

propaganda-art,

which is

certainly quite

different

from

the art

which

has been expelled.

But let us recall the passage in the Laws,

where-

in the Athenian

stranger says

that the laws of the

city

will be its

lyric

poetry.

I

It is in this sense that

the

present passage

must be understood.

The nature of poetry, as practiced by unregulated poets, which caused

it

to

be

banished from

the

cit),

is

perfectly

useful when

it

is

employed

as

a

tool of

the

city.

Most

important, however,

is

the fact

that,

by

re-

taining some poems

within the city,

it is not

thereby

argued that

these

poems

are no

longer

mimetic.

At the

very least, Collingwood

would

have

to admit

that,

if he is

right

about Book

III,

then he is

wrong

about

Book

X,

since the

poems

retained,

as encomia to the

good

and

hymns

to

the

gods,

obviously satisfy

the criterion

of

good

imitative narrative laid

down

in Book

III.

So far, then, we have discussed Collingwood's analysis of art as XVJ,

and

of Plato's

theory

of

the

mimetic nature

of

art.

In the

arguments

to

be

considered

next,

these

errors

are

combined in

a

way

which

generates

further

misinterpretations,

and

which culminates

in an omission of

what

is Plato's major

point

with respect to art. Collingwood says

that Plato

and Aristotle

took

it

for

granted

that

poetry,

the

only

art which

they

discussed in

detail,

was

a

craft,

that

is,

a

craft

like cobbling,

carpen-

tering

or weaving. The poet is a kind of skilled

producer; he produces

for

customers;

and the effect

of

his

skill is to bring

about

in

them certain

states of mind, which are conceived in advance as desirable states. The

poet,

like any other kind of craftsman, must

know what effect

he is

aiming at, and must learn by experience

and precept, which is only

the

imparted experience

of others, how to produce

it 2. This view of art is

said

to be the

predominant, if not the only,

Greek view: There are

suggestions in

some of them,

especially in Plato, of a quite different

view, but this is the one which

they have made familiar, and upon

which

both the theory and the practice

of the arts has

for the most part rested

down to the present time. 3

I

Laws,

8

ii

C-D;

817

B ff.

2

P.A.

p.

i8-19.

3

Ibid.,

P.

I9.

'4'



9/15

There

are

at

least two

thingsradicallywrong

here.

First: let

us assume

that the Greeks hadonly one majorview of art

-

namelythatit is

yT

j.

Here

Collingwood's rigid translationof the term leads him to

misread

the

Greeks. It is the

point

both

in the Apology

nd

in the

tenth

book

of

the

Republic,

o

mention the

most

famous

instances,

that the

poet,

as

an

imitator,

s

inferior

o the

craftsmanwho makes things

like

shoes and

tables,

or to

the

skilled general who leads men

in action, or to the

political leader, and so

forth. We have only to

turn to the Greek text

to

see what

the

case

is.

Let

us

take

it

as

established

by

our

previous

argument

that,

in

the last

book of the Republic,all poetry is mimetic.

Socratesexplains, in termsof his theoryof Ideas,that the user of an art-

ifice

is

the

one

who

may be expected best to understand

t,

and not

its

maker

(i.e.

the

craftsman

s

Collingwood

uses

the

term.)

But

the

maker

is

carefully istinguishedfrom

he poetor imitator,whohas least knowledge

f

all.

Plato

writes:

ou're

&pOC

?a't 09XL

Oe p0&

OO

CL

0

4

LL'Ltr

7tcpL

6v

av

vuLL[LY

,tp4s x&XBo4

YN

7tOVtpW.

, ,,

-

OUX

?OLXEV.

-

XOCPICgL

v

'o

?'V

`

7r0t4)GE&

AJ1-TLXOq

rpO4

oPECV

srpl

Jv

&v

notj.

In

the rest

of

this

crucial

passage,

it

is

elicited that the imitator,

having

no

knowledge

of

any

value

concerningwhat he

imitates

(rOv

-r

V.L[LYrtX6V

p.ae7v

elaVatL

iLov

X6you

nrpL

xTv vLLteZ-ou) is, in the famous

phrase,

third from

the

truth

(-s

ae

81&

LuteutaOL

oUTo oi

7rEpl

v

pio pv

Ti

6Tv

LV

Mno-rTq

&?)rn0OLmx;).ollingwood collapses two

distinctions in reporting

on Plato's

theory

of

art. First,

it

is

true that the

word

for

poet

(7otoLrrq)

means

maker,

being

derived

from the

verb

to

make

(noLmw).

But

it

is

quite

clear

now

that

Plato

wants to distinguish two kinds of making, that

of

the

craftsman and

that

of the

poet. Second,

and related to

this,

both

the poet and

the

craftsman

are imitators, but

again they practise two

distinct kinds

of

imitation.

The

craftsman

(or the

man

of action)

imitates

the

Idea,

whereas the

poet

imitates

the artifact

or the action.

The

collapse

of these distinctions

probably

follows from the initial misinter-

pretation of

exvzY.

Further,

the whole issue of art

pivots upon

the central problem

of

knowledge.

Plato is

not

writing (nor Socrates speaking) as an aesthe-

tician,

but as

a

political philosopher. The question

here, then, is of the

political

function

of

art,

and

ultimately, of

its

epistemological status.

I

602

a 8

if.

142



10/15

As

the

reference,

cited

above,

to the ancient

quarrel between

philo-

sophy and poetry makes clear, and as all of Socrates' discussions of art

support,

the artist is subject

to the delusion that

his

r6yy-

or

making

is

equivalent

to the

possession

of

knowledge,

and this is a delusion usually

shared

by

the artist's

audience.

Since,

from Socrates'

viewpoint,

the

artist does

not

know,

and rather

tends to

corrupt

his audience because

of

the

persuasiveness

and

pleasantness

of

art,

he must

be

expelled

from the

best

city;

art will be

practiced

now

by

the

guardians

or

priests

in accord

with right reason.

I

Nowhere does Socrates suggest

that

craftsmen

(as

such)

should

be

expelled

from the

city;

it is the

poet

or artist

who must

go, and for the reasons given. The poet's lack of knowledge makes his

t&epv-

olitically

dangerous

in a

way

that

the

texv- of

the

craftsman

is

not;

even should the

craftsman,

who

is

also

an

imitator,

be

subject

to

the delusion

that he knows

by imitating,

he has not

got

the

power

of

persuading

his fellow

citizens

of

this

error.

Who

would take seriously

a cobbler's

claims that cobbling

is really philosophy? But that

the poet's

claims are very, very

seriously regarded,

we need

not take

Socrates'

word;

we have

only

to consider

the role

of the artist in

contemporary

society.

Thus far I have tried to separate the r?yvy of the craftsman from that of

the

artist.

But

there

is

a

second

difficulty

here.

The

view that art

is

a

Texv1

in

any

sense

is

by

no means the

only,

qr

even the most

exclusively

important,

of the views

present

in

Plato's dialogues.

Equally, perhaps

even more famous,

and

in the

long run

at

least

as influential, is

the view

that

art is

not

a

-rXywv'

t

all,

but rather

divine inspiration.

This

theory

is

developed

in

the Ion. It

is

related to the preceding theory

with respect

to epistemology:

once again

it will emerge that

the artist has no real

knowledge.

In

interrogating the rhapsode

Ion, Socrates

proceeds to

develop the argument that, in order to judge speeches about things, we

must first

be experts about

the things themselves

2

Poets

-

and rhap-

sodes

-

speak of

many things, about

none of which they

are expert.

When we

want to

know about medicine,

we consult a doctor;

when

we

want to

know about war,

we consult a general,

and so on.

But we never

consult the poet about these

things, even when

he imitates perfectly

war

or sickness.

And should we wish

to know about poetry

itself, we

I

See Phaedrus

271 C ff. for a

description of how to

speak and

write

'reXvLxtq;

one

must know the

different

naturesof the men &

the kinds of argument

o

which

they will

respond, when to speak and when to keep silent, etc. In other words, one must be a

philosopher.

Compare 277 B-C.

2

Ion,

S3

b

ff.

I43



11/15

would

consult,

not

a

man

who is

a good

reciter

of

Homer,

for

instance,

but one who knows about poetry as such, by skill and systematic

knowledge

(t6Xwvjn

oc ia

npv).I When

we do

interrogate poets on

the

matters

about which

they write,

we findthat

they

do not

understand

them

(as

Socrates

recounts

in

the

Apology).How, then,

do

poets make

poems.?

t

cannot,

as

we

have

just seen, be by

rxv,

for

then

they would

know

the

things

which

theyareable to describe. (It

is now

assumed hat

a

reXvLrq

as some knowledge about his production, probably

what

is

called

secondary

knowledge

in the

Republic

not true

knowledge,

but

better

than that

of

the

poet).

The answer is

this:

Vrowreq

yap OZ

'r

TCI)V

e'7CV

7COLJTL

0. &yaOol

oux 'ex evq

ax'

evoeoL

ovtrs xoaL xCtCx6VoL 7toiV'r

TMUOC

T&

XoXO

AeyoUaL

7Mt0LY)paLo,

OcL

OL

LXOuTC0OLQoL

&yOoO1

JCaurcq.

All good epic poets speakall their beautifulpoems, not from craft, but

through

their

being inspired and possessed, and

the

same

is

true for good-

lyric poets. 2

The

poet must

be E`XcppoV

(out of his mind) before he

can

7roLSLV

(poetise). Thus,

the

poets speak as messengers for the gods (oA

ad

=OL-?yol

ou8E'v

&'

'

epptvi5

dLai trv

Os@v); the god

himself

speaks

(O

OE64

oc4

E'LV O

Xeycow)

3

The view that poets are divinely inspired, then, denies that art is a

r6xvn,

but,

like

that

view, also denies that the poet has knowledge.

The

first

part

of this view

(the second is usually forgotten)

has

had

a

con-

siderable influence in

the

history of aesthetics, both in its orthodox

and

in

its more extravagant interpretations. That Plato does not take it liter-

ally is,

I

think, clear from

the

bantering tone of the whole dialogue.

(This

is of

course not

to

say that it has no significance for Plato.) We

may

note

one

decisive passage. Socrates says to Ion at 53 2 d 6:

M\X&

aoCpo?0

eV

7OtUEaTC

?'V.CZ

O'L Cpaol

xac

U,7txpLTML

xod &v up?L

Oere

rok

7roL .Lcxroc, y&) 8K

oi'rv &Xo6 wro

i

?kyo, otov

CLxbo

L86Y

TV

iVOpCOWOV.

You

rhapsodes

and

actors,

and the

poets whose work you sing, are wise,

but

I

speak nothing

else

than

the

truth, as is fitting to an ordinary man.

That

the

poets

are

not

aoyop6

requires little argument; in the Socratic

doctrine,

not

even

the

philosopher can make this claim. The

aocplO

of

the

poet would,

of

course,

be

that

of

the

gods who speak through

his

lips.

But if

the

poets speak

coypEo,

whether

it is

theirs or not, we ought

to

study

their

divinely inspired poems

rather than the

mundane treatises of

lI

Ibid., 53

2

c 6.

2

Ibid.,

S33

e

S.

3

Ibid.,

S34dff.

144



12/15

philosophers

and other technicians. Nowhere does

Socrates

say that

we are to do this; his instructions are exactly the reverse. As a lover of

wisdom,

we may safely

assume that

Socrates

does

not

then

believe

the

poets

to

speak it,

and so

we are

not to

take

literally

his injunction

that

they are divinely

inspired.

What

he is

really saying,

for

better

or

for

worse,

is that

poets

are

ignorant,

and

that their

ignorance

is

akin

to

madness.

I

This does

not mean that

he denies their

great

gifts,

but

simply

that his

concern

with

poetry,

as in all the

dialogues,

is

epistemo-

logical.

Why

does

Collingwood

never

refer

to this

theory

of art

as divine

inspiration? It would be base to suggest that he omits it because it does

not suit

his

interpretation;

and in

fact,

it could

actually

be

made

har-

monious

with one

aspect

of that

interpretation.

If artists are said to be

divinely

inspired

because

one wishes

to

account

for their ignorance,

and

consequently

for their danger

to society,

we might rejoin

that

this

is

to

misunderstand

the

function of

art

proper,

which,

as

Collingwood

holds,

serves

no

political

end.

This

is one criticism

which

he enjoins

against

Plato,

who,

he

says,

discusses

amusement art,

which

I

have

defined

above

as

the

stimulation

of an emotion for pleasure

in

itself,

not

for release into practical life. And Plato was wrong, he continues, to

think

that the evils

of a world

given

over

to amusement

could

be

cured

by

controlling

or

abolishing

amusements.

2 Presumably

the

error

is

corrected by

Aristotle

in

the

Poetics,

who

speaks

there as

the champion

of

poetry

for

pleasure's

sake,

that

is, representation

(Republic

607

c),

called

for

by

Socrates

at

607

d. Apart

from

the

errors

already

discussed,

it

is

missing

Plato's most important

point

not to see

that

he explicitly

criticizes

all

art,

and

that the distinction between

imitative

and other

narratives

in

Book

III of

the

Republic

rests upon

a different,

more

technical, and so, less general usage of the word.

Thus,

Collingwood

is mistaken in

thinking (a)

that Plato

does not

discuss

art proper

(whether

he does

so correctly

or not

is another

matter),

and (b) that

Plato

wants to

criticize,

of the

false

kinds of

art,

not magic

or religious,

but only

amusement

art. Contrary

to

Col-

lingwood's

assurance,

Plato's

criticism

is intended

to hold

up

against

magic

art,

which,

we

recall,

is

representative

and evokes

specific

emotions

in order to

discharge

them

into practical

life.

In many

ways,

I

It is often

the case that philosophers (such

as Spinozaand Maimonides),

in

attributing

prophecy to the imagination, ind a correspondingdepreciationin the intellect of the

prophet.

2P.A. p. 98.

6 '45



13/15

this is the least comprehensible of Collingwood's errors,

because it is

precisely against the effect of art on the affairs of practical life that

Plato is legislating. It seems safe to say that, if art had no such effect,

Plato would not have expelled it from his

best

city.

Plato may, of course,

have

confused

magical

art with art

proper,

but Collingwood

would

still

be

wrong

in his reading of Plato. Certainly

Plato did not think that art

proper

has

no

consequences

in

practical

affairs.

To decide

whether

Plato

or Collingwood

is

right

would be

the subject

of a

long

and

separate

inquiry. We may not

care

to agree with Plato, but we must see that he

is, as a political philosopher,

a

radical enemy of art, or what comes to the

same thing, of philosophically unlegislated art. This position of Plato's

has nothing

to do with his own status

as

an

artist,

or as

a lover of

and

commentator

on

art.

It has to

do

with

the

place

of art

in

the best

city,

and because Collingwood

does

not appreciate this,

he

is

led to

the

absurd view that,

for

Plato, poetry

is

equivalent

to

shoe-making, to

the

confusion

of

Plato's

extremely complex

analysis

of the

epistemological

character

of

art, and

to a

misunderstanding of the relation between

the

work

of

Aristotle

and

that

of

Plato

with

respect

to

art.

Aristotle

could not

possibly

be the

sort of defender that Collingwood

suggests he is, because Aristotle's subject in the Poetics s quite different

from Plato's subject

in the

Republic.

In

the Poetics, Aristotle is not con-

cerned

to

show

the

epistemological clharacter of art, nor the place of

art

in

the best

city,

but

gives instead

an

analysis (limited, perhaps)

of

the

function

of

art

(through

the

most

important

-

for

him

-

example

of

poetry)

in

actual

cities.

When

Aristotle

comes to discuss the place of

art

in

the best city, as

he

does in Books VII-VIII of the Politics, his posi-

tion

is

in

essence, though

not in

degree, that

of

Plato:

art

has

as

its

end,

not

merely amusement,

but

moral training,

and

as such

it

must

be

sub-

ject

to

political restrictions.

I

will

not

quarrel with Collingwood that,

in

Aristotle's

case,

art is

described as a

t6xv, for Aristotle has no theory

of

art as

inspiration

-

i.e.

as

atechnical.

But

we

must recall

our

previous

discussion of

the

meaning

of

the term

eyxv-.

Aristotle is if anything more

insistent than Plato in differentiating activities according to their func-

tion.

If

we

consider only the doctrine

that

the

end

of

art

is

xVoxapaLq,

t

is

clear

that

the

-rxvn

of

art

is

radically

different from the

-TxV-

of cobbling,

for

example,

which

has

as

its end

the

repairing

of

shoes. When we

turn

to

the

Politics,

we find that

xa&ocpa6L is only one end of art; another

is

instruction (-aLc). Aristotle, contrary to Collingwood, does not

limit

xacOapatc

to

amusement art

or representational drama. Art-

I

See for example the

distinction

with respect to

the use of the flute

at

3

+i

a 38.

146



14/15

forms

may

share

a

plurality

of ends, depending

upon

the context

of

their use. Flute-playingmay amuse,purifyor instruct, andhow we are

to

behave

toward

it

depends

upon

the

purpose

we have in mind.

It

is

with respect

to

instruction,

the same

end

with which

Plato

is

always

concerned,

that

Aristotle

recognizes

the

need

for

regulating

art.

In an

interesting

discussion

about

the

degree

to which

different

kinds

of

art-

forms

are able

to

represent

states

of character,

he even pursues

this

need

with

respect

to

art-forms

which

aye

least

representative

in this

way:

oG

,L~v

&XX'

aov

&LOC(9peL

XX

7t?pi

T9V

TOUcv

OccopEav,

eZ

A

TM

llotu'ao)vo

Oertpsv

rouq

Vtouq,

&XX 'ra

floXuyvc'Tou

x&v

et

'nc

OMor

rc-Ov

ypoacp6cv

~

6v

& ,11roncot6v ,crrv TOLX6O.

But

insofar

as there

is a

difference

in

looking

at

these

works,

let

the

young

not

see the

works

of

Pauson,

but those

of

Polygnotus

and

any

other

painter

or

sculptor

who

may portray

moral

character.

,

And that

Aris-

totle

does

not

limit

representation

to

a

species

of

poetic

drama

is

made

clear

by

the

very

next

sentence:

'v

8=

'ooLZ UL6xeaV Oavoz4

EalL

L,nMra

'Wv

,

O\v

xc't -rot'',

v,

6,

Musical compositions

are in essence imitations

of states

of

characters.

This

is clear. 2

So

far,

then, Collingwood

is wrong

in his view

of

the

intention of the

Poetics,

he is wrong about Aristotle's doctrine of

XaOmpapt

and

he is

wrong

about Aristotle's

doctrine

of

tL?aLq.

This

last

error

must

be

examined

more carefully.

Collingwood

poses

the

question:

did

Aristotle

think

of

art as

essen-

tially

representative?

This,

as we know,

is

Collingwood's

way

of

asking

whether

for

Aristotle

art

is mimetic. Collingwood

answers

himself:

He

makes

it

clear

at

the

beginning

of

the Poetics

that

he did not.

He

there

accepts

Plato's

familiar distinction

between

representative

and

non-representative

art...

3

We

have already

seen that

this distinction

is

not so familiar. But, we may ask, does Aristotle accept this distinction in

the

Poetics

regardless

of whether

Plato does

or not?

Here

is the sentence

which leads

Collingwood

to say no :

e7roWOLEM

'

Xocl

T7q

rpCyc3LzX

7CO'VJaqL

8ae

XC8

XOal

4)

8LOupOLo-

7OL7TLX'

XOd

'r71 OCi'XIJTLXY

q

7C'LOT7

XOCL

LOXpLa'TLXY5

teXcaot

TUy&xvUoaV

OicatL

t1LPL4aCL4'

au

OXOV.

Epic,

tragic,

comic

and

dithyrambic

poetry,

the

majority

of

flute and

lyre music,

are all

in general

mimetic. 4

Now

even

in the

face of the

' POl.

1340 a

22.

2 1340

a

25

3

P.A.

p.

go.

4

Poetics,

1447

a

13.

147



15/15

fact thatapparently

ome forms

of flute and lyre

music

are

not mimetic,

it must be transparently clear that this exception is insufficient

for

invalidating the claim

that Aristotle considered

art essentially

representative.

And there

are no exceptions to

the view that

he

considered

poetry as essentially

representative.

The strongest case

that

Collingwood

could

in

reason have made

would be this: for Plato,

not

all poetry is mimetic;

for Aristotle,

not all music

is mimetic. Were this

the case,

it would not transform

the Poetics

nto a

Defence ... of

Representational

Poetry

I

as though Aristotle

recognized any poetry

which

is not mimetic. As

a matter of fact, Aristotle

asserts

in the first

line that he is speakingof poetry

as such

(7cept

-OLYTLXTJ

ocu> -r

XXL

,tiovdt83v

au'rr),2

all

of which, to repeat, is

mimetic.

We have already

discussed the first part of

Collingwood's

hypothetical

case.

As

for

the

second, two lines

may be taken. The

first,

and admittedly less

satis-

factory,

is that

the exception

noted is too

trivial to take

seriously.

It

would perhaps

make

more sense to say

that

those

forms

of

flute and

lyre

music which

are not

genuinely

artistic

are not

mimetic,

thanto con-

clude that art

is

not essentiallyso.

But fortunately,

this

passage

does not

stand alone

in

the Aristoteliancorpus;

we have just inspected

a

passage

from the

Politics

which Collingwood does not seem to have known, in

which

music

is declared to

be

manifestly

mimetic.

Since this

passage

s

utterly unambiguous,

and

since

Aristotle

never

amplifies

what he

means

by saying

most

flute andlyre music

in

the Poetics,

nor

gives

any

exam-

ples

of

music

which is not imitative, but

only

of music

which

is,

I

submit that

either the suggestion

which I

have made, or one something

like

it

-

stylistic caution,

perhaps

is

the

correct

explanation

f

the

case.

I

do

not

insist

upon

my suggested

reading,but only

that

Colling-

wood's interpretation

of

Aristotle'stheory

of

art

is

as

grossly

inaccurate

as

his

interpretation

of Plato.

But

finally,

it

should be

urged

that,

as

always,

Collingwood

is

provocative

and

valuable

in

his

analysis,

which

notices what

are admittedly

ambiguities

in

Greek

aesthetic theory.

1

P.

A.

p.

sp.

2

Poetics)

I447

a

i.

The

Pennsylvania

State

University

148

Documents

Collingwood and Greek Aesthetics : Rosen