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American Academy of Political and Social Science A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective Behavior Author(s): Elliott Currie and Jerome H. Skolnick Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 391, Collective Violence (Sep., 1970), pp. 34-45 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1040023 . Accessed: 02/08/2014 06:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Sage Publications, Inc. and American Academy of Political and Social Science are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 134.153.184.170 on Sat, 2 Aug 2014 06:40:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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American Academy of Political and Social Science

A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective BehaviorAuthor(s): Elliott Currie and Jerome H. SkolnickSource: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 391, CollectiveViolence (Sep., 1970), pp. 34-45Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political andSocial ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1040023 .

Accessed: 02/08/2014 06:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Sage Publications, Inc. and American Academy of Political and Social Science are collaborating with JSTORto digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

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A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective Behavior

By ELLIOTT CURRIE AND JEROME H. SKOLNICK

ABSTRACT: "Collective behavior" theory has its roots in antidemocratic theorists of nineteenth century Europe, espe- cially LeBon. American sociologists have modified but not eliminated these biases, particularly the imputation of "irra- tionality" to collective action. Yet evidence suggests that rioters, for instance, are more "rational" than is often sup- posed, and that authorities are also capable of "irrationality." In this paper, we critically examine Smelser's significant efforts to organize the field systematically. We argue that Smelser's efforts result in a "systematization" that often confounds rather than clarifies; that his conceptual organization is founded on undemonstrated assertions about the "exaggerated" character of "uninstitutionalized" beliefs and behavior; that his values are unstated or unclear; and that, whatever his values, he tends to drift into a managerial or administrative vision of collective action.

Elliott Currie is assistant professor of Sociology, Yale University; Ph.D. candidate in Sociology, University of California, Berkeley; formerly research assistant, Center for the Study of Law and Society, Berkeley; formerly assistant director, Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence; co-editor Crisis in American Institutions (1970).

Jerome H. Skolnick is a professor at the School of Criminology and research sociolo- gist, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley; senior social scientist, American Bar Foundation; formerly director, Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence; editor or author of the following: Crisis in American Institu- tions, with Elliott Currie (1970); Society and the Legal Order, with Richard D. Schwartz (1970); The Politics of Protest (1969); Justice Without Trial (1966); Problems of the Family, with Fowler V. Harper (1962). Author of numerous articles, consultant to various commissions, and formerly professor of Sociology, University of California, San Diego; associate professor of Sociology, University of Chicago; and assistant professor of Law and Sociology, Yale.

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NOTE ON CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

T HE study of "collective behavior" has always had a curious place in

sociology. No one has ever been happy with the state of the field; much effort is spent periodically in trying to define its boundaries and to pin down its elu- sive subject matter. This sort of effort is, of course, not confined to the analy- sis of "collective behavior," but it can be reasonably argued that it assumes a more conspicuous place in that field than in most others. The fault has usually been attributed to a lack of serious effort at systematization of the field, or of carefully constructed empirical research, or both.1 No one seems to have seri- ously asked the logically prior question: Is there something about the way we conceive of "collective behavior," in the first place, that militates against our making successful use of the idea? In short, does the concept of "collective behavior," as it is usually applied, have much heuristic value?

Increasingly, empirical work is begin- ning to chip away at some of the staple notions of early "collective behavior" theories.2 In an earlier discussion, we

1. For general treatments of the "state of the field," see Herbert Blumer, "Collective Be- havior," in Review of Sociology; Analysis of a Decade, J. B. Gittler, ed. (New York: Wiley, 1957); R. H. Turner and L. M. Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957); Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962); Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, "Collective Behavior," in International Ency- clopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, pp. 556- 564.

2. For example, Carl J. Couch, "Collective Behavior; an Examination of Some Stereo- types," Social Problems, vol. 15, no. 3 (1968), pp. 310-322; Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hill, "Who Riots? A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots," Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, July 1968); Jules J. Wanderer, "1967 Riots; A Test of the Con- gruity of Events," Social Problems, vol. 16, no. 2 (1968), pp. 193-198; and, for historical materials, see George Rude, The Crowd in His-

explored some of the assumptions of these ideas and their relevance for understanding contemporary group vio- lence. Our analysis centered on the following points:3

FOUR CONSIDERATIONS

1. Collective behavior theory has its roots in the antidemocratic theorists of nineteenth-century Europe, best repre- sented by LeBon.4 In being transferred to American social science, the anti- democratic biases in "crowd" theory were modified but not abolished.

2. Perhaps the most fundamental of these biases is the implication that col- lective behavior is in some sense "irra- tional" behavior. This bias may be traced in LeBon's distaste for the mys- tical loss of individuality and civilized behavior in the "crowd," and reaffirmed in modern "riot control" manuals, as well as most contemporary social-scien- tific approaches. In line with the em- phasis on irrationality, collective behav- ior has usually been seen as destructive and, in most treatments, inappropriate and distasteful. Unlike conventional behavior, it is conceived by collective- behavior theorists as "likely to be fool- ish, disgusting, or evil." 5

3. This conception is neither empiri- cally valid nor theoretically justified. Studies of riots, in particular, show them

tory, 1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1949), and Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York: Norton, 1959).

3. Jerome H. Skolnick, dir., The Politics of Protest (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), especially pp. 329-346, and 3-8. This discussion was a collective effort; particular mention should be made of the contributions of Charles Carey, Anthony M. Platt, and Richard Speiglman.

4. Gustave LeBon, The Crowd (New York: Viking, 1960). For a discussion of the back- ground of theories of collective behavior, see Leon Bramson, The Political Context of Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1961).

5. Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 709.

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to be far more structured than collective- behavior theory would suggest, far more attuned to the redress of specific griev- ances and to the selection of limited and understandable targets. This is true both historically and currently.6 On the other hand, the implication that the behavior of authorities is more moderate or rational seems countered by the most cursory examination of social life, par- ticularly if we observe such carefully considered policies as weapons develop- ment, policies of mass extermination, incarceration of minorities, or religious persecution. On a more immediate level, such conceptions obscure the interactive nature of episodes of collective action: not only in that the "response" of agen- cies of social control may affect the outcome of the episode, but also that they may constitute much of the episode itself, especially in terms of its destruc- tiveness and human cost. Police or other officials may initiate a riot, may carry out most of the destructive behav- ior, and may be responsible for the esca- lation of the merely disorderly into the tragic.7

These considerations suggest that con- ventional approaches to collective behav- ior obscure more than they illuminate, and are therefore of little help in understanding collective violence or in providing a framework for careful con- sideration of the issues of public policy

6. In addition to the studies cited in note 2, see Robert Blauner, "Whitewash Over Watts," Trans-Action 3 (March-April 1966), pp. 3-9, 54; Anthony Oberschall, "The Los Angeles Riot," Social Problems, vol. 15, no. 4 (1968), pp. 322-342; Robert M. Fogelson, "Violence as Protest," in Robert H. Connery, ed., Urban Riots; Violence and Social Change (Proceed- ings of the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, 1968), pp. 25-41.

7. See The Politics of Protest, op. cit., ch. 7; National Commission on the Causes and Pre- vention of Violence, Chicago Study Team, Rights in Conflict (New York: Bantam, 1968).

and political action surrounding such violence. Moreover, many conventional treatments display an inherent bias toward an "official" perspective on col- lective action, one that tends to discredit the claims and perspectives of the par- ticipants while uncritically accepting those of constituted authorities and agents of social control.

We are not opposed to the study of the phenomena that fall conventionally under the rubric "collective behavior." The Politics of Protest (a discussion di- rected by Skolnick and later published) is an analysis of such phenomena, and the reader may refer to it both as an illustration of our approach and for further reference to the sorts of studies and approaches we regard as more or less helpful. In The Politics of Protest we argued, as an alternative procedure for comprehending the nature and signifi- cance of collective violence, a more critical and concrete approach that would take seriously the historical and political context of the collective events and the point of view of the people involved, as well as the specific "natural history" of episodes of collec- tive violence.8

A reasonable criticism of that earlier discussion is that it condensed its analy- sis of collective-behavior theory to such an extent that it blurred some important differences among various theorists and tended to lump together perspectives that differ from one another in impor- tant ways. With this in mind, we have decided to focus in this note on the work of one recent theorist: Neil J. Smelser.9

8. The Politics of Protest, op. cit., especially pp. 3-8.

9. Our analysis is confined to Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior, op. cit. (here- after TCB) and Essays in Sociological Expla- nation (hereafter Essays), (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), especially ch. 5, "Social and Psychological Dimensions of Col- lective Behavior," pp. 92-124.

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NOTE ON CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

SMELSER'S THEORY

Our singling-out of Smelser is neither accidental nor malicious. Smelser is an important writer in this field, and his contributions are relatively recent and systematic; they constitute, in fact, the most significant recent effort to organize systematically the idea of collective be- havior and to surmount some of the perennial problems associated with the field. Moreover, Smelser views his work as an important step beyond earlier ap- proaches-indeed, as a radical departure from at least some of the perceptions of those earlier approaches.10 We disagree. We will argue in this paper that Smel- ser's theory suffers from an excessive em- phasis on systematization; that, although superficially plausible, it does not move our understanding much beyond earlier approaches to collective behavior; that it is held together largely through un- demonstrated assertions about the "ex- aggerated" character of "uninstitution- alized" beliefs and behavior; and that it seems to adopt an administrative or managerial perspective on collective be- havior, in which unacknowledged evalu- ations take the place of forthright as- sertions of the social values underlying the study of collective action.

Like many earlier theorists, Smelser approaches collective behavior as a for- midable problem of definition and classi- fication. He suggests that "in all civili- zations men have thrown themselves into episodes of dramatic behavior, such as the craze, the riot, and the revolu- tion." 11 But the field of collective be- havior has often viewed these things as the result of the operation of mysterious forces; there is much indeterminacy and imprecision in the typical approach to these dramatic episodes. Therefore, the first problem is one of definition; what

10. TCB, p. 20. 11. Ibid, p. 1.

do we include in the concept of collec- tive behavior and what do we leave out?

For Smelser, collective behavior has three defining characteristics. First, it is behavior based on a belief which "re- defines social action," i.e., is aimed at some level of social change. Second, the beliefs guiding collective behavior differ from those guiding ordinary behavior: they are exaggerated, they involve the idea of the "existence of extraordinary forces-threats, conspiracies, etc.- which are at work in the universe." 12

These beliefs, both in the existence of "extraordinary forces" and in the as- sessment of "extraordinary conse- quences," lead to behavior that "short- circuits" normal channels. Thus, ac- cording to Smelser, collective behavior is "the action of the impatient." 13

Third, collective behavior is "not in- stitutionalized behavior." 14 It is not altogether clear what "institutionaliza- tion" refers to in this scheme. Some- times Smelser contrasts "collective" be- havior with "conventional" behavior,15 sometimes with "established" behavior,l6 and sometimes with behavior that is nolt aimed at social change.17 The inability to pin down the meaning of "institu- tional" behavior makes for a serious am- biguity, and we will return to this point later on. An immediate question is whether or not these attributes- (1) "uninstitutionalized," (2) directed toward social change, and (3) exagger- ated-necessarily "hang together"? Is there something about behavior that challenges existing social conditions, on whatever level, in "unconventional"

12. Ibid., p. 8. 13. Ibid., p. 72. 14. Ibid., p. 8. 15 Ibid., p. 67. 16. Ibid., p. 71. 17. "The 'uninstitutionalized' character of

collective behavior is also implied by the fact that the high level component (of social ac- tion) is redefined or reconstituted"; TCB, p. 71 fn.

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

ways, that makes it more likely to be rooted in exaggerated or distorted be- liefs than other kinds of behavior? If not, the linkage of these three attributes seems strained and artificial. And if this connection is in fact strained and artificial, the parallel linking of Smelser's various "forms" of collective behavior- "panics," "crazes," "hostile outbursts," and "norm-oriented" and "value-ori- ented" social movements18-would ap- pear to be equally strained and arti- ficial.

Smelser recognizes that these three components of "collective behavior" are not necessarily connected. For example, "generalized beliefs" may be institution- alized: the "hysterical belief" that un- derlies panic may also be found in "in- stitutionalized beliefs, such as supersti- tions, fears of witchcraft, demons, spir- its, and the like." 19 "Reconstitution" of social action-that is, social change- may clearly be "institutionalized," and Smelser illustrates this with the example of the post-Sputnik effort to boost American technological capacity.20 (Clearly, too, some institutions have as a main purpose the reconstitution of some component of social life; we think, particularly, of established agencies of social reform and amelioration or, in another sense, appellate courts.)

Furthermore, dramatic episodes of col- lective action, even highly destructive action, may take place in "conventional" or "institutionalized" settings. Smelser notes that this is true of some kinds of ceremonials or patriotic outbursts: but

Even though these celebrations may pro- vide the setting for genuine collective out- bursts-e.g., the patriotic demonstration that turns into a riot-they are not in themselves examples of collective behavior. True, they are based often on generalized values such as the divine, the nation, the

18. TCB, pp. 79-130. 19. Ibid., p. 85. 20. Ibid., pp. 67-70.

monarchy, or the alma mater. True, they are collective. True, they may release ten- sions generated by conditions of structural strain. The basic differences between such ceremonials and collective behavior-and the reasons for excluding them-is that the former are institutionalized in form and content. The index of their institutionali- zation is that such events are often sched- uled for definite times, places, and occa- sions, and are shrouded in formal rituals such as chants, or semi-formal "ways of celebrating" such as drinking, whooping, marching, and so on.21

Moreover, Smelser is aware that certain kinds of behavior, such as lynching, for example, may be a "genuine hostile out- burst" or a "quasi-institutionalized form of justice." This should remind us that in many cases history does not always produce instances that fit neatly into our analytic definition of col- lective behavior. We must examine care- fully the context of the event in question before we decide upon its relevance for study.22

A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTY

Granted that classificatory schemes always have elements of arbitrariness, and that he recognizes that events in the real world may be more complex than his categories, there remains a more fundamental difficulty with Smelser's variant of the "structural-functional" approach to social theory. Like some others in this tradition, Smelser typically fails to clarify the relationship between his conceptual scheme and the real world, and does not provide adequate criteria for testing this relationship.23 For example, was the Free Speech Move- ment at Berkeley a "norm-oriented" or "value-oriented" movement? Which be-

21. Ibid., p. 74. 22. Ibid., p. 75. 23. For a discussion that touches on this

problem in the work of Talcott Parsons, see Tom Bottomore, "Out of This World," New York Review of Books, Nov. 6, 1969, pp. 34-39.

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NOTE ON CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

liefs of which participants are we to accept as the "generalized beliefs" of the movement? Whose beliefs were ex- aggerated? Those of all the partici- pants, some, the leaders? Were the beliefs of the authorities (about the movement) distorted? Which of the contradictory accounts of distinguished social scientists, concerning the validity of student beliefs, are we to accept?

Smelser's lack of criteria must lead to considerable confusion for anyone at- tempting to employ his analysis of col- lective behavior. Smelser sometimes seems to suggest that protest movements are, by definition, instances of collective behavior, because they inherently or typically possess the three relevant con- ceptual attributes. At other times, he seems to suggest that whether actual protest movements qualify as "collective behavior" is a matter for empirical in- vestigation. But an empirical investiga- tion obviously would assess the beliefs and goals of (say) a protest movement, the social and political context in which it takes place, and so on. It would also include criteria for determining whether the underlying beliefs were exaggerated. Having thus studied the movement (and not otherwise), we would presumably be in a position to decide whether the movement qualified as "collective be- havior." Why bother? Why-given that we must study the movement in order to ascertain its "relevance for study"-need we utilize Smelser's con- ception of "collective behavior" at all, with its potentially misleading implica- tion that social movements are neces- sarily based on distorted beliefs?

We may put this in another way. The notion of the "generalized belief" -an idea that links Smelser's work with the earlier stress on the "irrational" na- ture of collective behavior 24 is central

24. We are aware that Smelser does not identify his work in this way-that, indeed, he often rejects the idea that some simplistic

to Smelser's explanatory scheme. Pre- sumably, those who do not hold distorted beliefs seek social change through es- tablished institutions. Thus, without the idea of belief distortion, Smelser's model becomes capable of explaining most group behavior directed toward changing a "component of social action." Smelser himself notes that "relaxed in appropriate ways," his model could be used for other kinds of behavior.5 Yet, as already noted, the assessment that the beliefs underlying any actual in- stance of collective behavior necessarily involve "exaggerated" conceptions of the role of hostile forces and agents, fan- tasies of the exaggerated effectiveness of the movement, and so on, must be either (a) a matter for careful empirical analy- sis or (b) a doubtful theoretical prem- ise. But (1) if it is either of these, it clearly has no place in an acceptable ex- planatory model; and (2) if it is re- moved, Smelser's model lacks explana- tory power. Thus, says Smelser, The master proposition is . . . people under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief. Stated so generally, this proposition is not very helpful in interpreting the actual data of collective outbursts.26

But, according to Smelser, by specifying further conditions we can arrive at statements such as this one regarding panic: Panic will occur if the appropriate condi- tions of conduciveness are present, and if the appropriate conditions of strain are present, and if a hysterical belief develops, and if mobilization occurs, and if social controls fail to cooperate.27 notion of irrationality is a defining character- istic of collective behavior. How else, though, are we to take the idea that collective behav- ior involves distorted beliefs, feelings of "anx- iety, fantasy, hostility, etc." (TCB, p. 11) and so on?

25. TCB, p. 387. 26. Ibid., p. 385. 27. Ibid., p. 385.

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

To arrive at this proposition, of course, requires many pages of exegesis of the meaning and significance of these terms within the "action" scheme de- rived from the work of Talcott Par- sons.28 Yet on examination, the state- ment seems still to tell us very little that we did not know before-or could not have assumed by ourselves, with one important exception. If we take out the exception-the idea that panic is based on a "hysterical belief"-Smel- ser's statement seems to tell us little more than that panic will occur if the conditions under which it could occur are present, and if counter-conditions are not present. To give concrete meaning to all this would require that we engage in actual study of some instance of panic, which is precisely what we would have done had we not had the explana- tory scheme.

Moreover, and this seems crucial, if we remove the a priori characterization of the belief as "hysterical" (or some other variant of the "generalized be- lief"), the model no longer differentiates "collective" from other forms of be- havior. But it is not clear that we can properly use the idea of "generalized be- lief" in this way, even in the case of panic. As Smelser himself notes, panic may be based-as in the "classic" panic situations of fire in a theater or a sinking ship-on a realistic threat and hence not on a "generalized belief" at all.29 Thus, as part of the conceptual scheme, in the case of panic as well as other forms of collective behavior, the idea of the "generalized belief" is problematic. As an assertion of predictable empirical regularities underlying actual instances of the various forms of collective be- havior, the notion of "generalized be- lief" is defensible only if it can be em- pirically demonstrated; and it is useful

28. See, especially, the discussion in TCB, ch. 2.

29. Essays, p. 113.

only if it can be shown that such beliefs do not regularly underlie "institu- tional" behavior as well.

SMELSER'S INTERPRETATION OF DATA

How does Smelser go about demon- strating the role of distorted, exag- gerated beliefs in collective behavior? What kinds of evidence does he provide for this fundamental idea of a contrast between collective and conventional be- havior on the basis of types of belief? In practice, Smelser's approach to this problem often blends an indiscriminate use of the empirical literature with a cer- tain tendency toward a priori discred- iting of behavior that challenges existing social conditions in ways that bypass or reject "normal channels." Used in this fashion, the notion of "collective be- havior" becomes a means of making evaluative judgments about social be- havior without coming to grips with the problem of specifying and defending the values underlying those judgments.

This process may be seen in several of Smelser's illustrations of the nature of collective behavior. Thus, the factory agitation in Britain in 1831-33 was "accompanied by many extravagant claims concerning the effects of ma- chinery and the factory on the health of the children, the morals of the factory population, and so on." 30 Early indus- trial protests in England were com- pounded of "anxiety, hostility, and fan- tasy." 31 Speaking of the failure of im- partiality of the police in the 1919 Chi- cago race riot, Smelser tells us that "the individual conduct of policemen was probably not so unfair as Negroes claimed." 32 None of these assertions is accompanied by empirical support. Consider this illustration from the lit- erature on prison riots:

30. Ibid., p. 85. 31. Ibid., p. 79. 32. TCB, p. 268.

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NOTE ON CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

In the prisons, the inmates' grievances centered around conditions such as "poor, insufficient, or contaminated food; inade- quate, unsanitary, or dirty housing; sadistic brutality by prison officials," or some com- bination of these. These reality conditions, combined with the exaggeratedly suspicious attitudes toward authority on the part of the selected prison population, made for a high level of hostility.

On what grounds are the prisoners' at- titudes termed "exaggeratedly suspi- cious"? Again, we are offered neither empirical evidence for this assumption nor criteria for assessing it. What we are in fact offered seems little more than a diffuse tendency to discredit the atti- tudes and beliefs of those who challenge "conventional" conceptions of political propriety or "institutionalized" defini- tions of social reality, and a tendency to accept the definitions offered by au- thorities.

We are not suggesting that all of Smelser's illustrative material is devoid of empirical support. What we are sug- gesting is that the a priori attitude that Smelser's model brings to the analysis of collective behavior makes for an absence of consistent concern for the empirical evidence. This lack of concern, in turn, allows Smelser to keep the conceptual scheme, with the central importance of the "generalized belief," intact. This, in its turn, allows Smelser to discredit the beliefs of the participants in collec- tive action on a priori grounds. The process is circular and self-justifying.

Moreover, such a perspective means that certain kinds of people standing in a particular relationship to authority- prison inmates, lower-class people, stu- dents, children, women-will be most likely to have their behavior character- ized as odd or threatening, and most likely to have their beliefs and attitudes discredited on a priori grounds.

Thus, Smelser suggests that collective behavior is clustered most often among

such groups as "adolescents, recent mi- grants, and unemployed people." 34

This raises several issues. A main prob- lem with this conception is that-as we noted above-empirical research does not consistently support it; ghetto rebel- lions, for example, are characterized by the participation of a far broader spec- trum of people than the conventional picture suggests. But the basic problem is deeper; it is the failure to specify the criteria on which attitudes are judged "exaggeratedly suspicious," or what have you. Lacking such criteria, we simply have no way of adequately assessing Smelser's contentions. Whether the be- havior involved is that of rioters or feminists, stockbrokers or segregation- ists, the assessment of their attitudes in Smelser's work seems quite arbitrary. Clearly some criterion is being used; but we are not told what it is, and it is of course quite possible that Smelser is also unaware of its nature.

From an official or managerial point of view, it is subordinates who are likely to be most threatening insofar as they behave "collectively" in challenging and unconventional ways, and it is gen- erally to the interest of officials to dis- credit such behavior and to attempt to "channel the energy of collective out- bursts into more modest kinds of be- havior." 35 But to recognize this fact is one thing: to present sympathy with official perspective as social science analysis is another thing altogether.

Smelser's tendency to discredit arbi- trarily the beliefs of some of the partici- pants in collective action is coupled with a complementary tendency to accept un- critically the testimony of "official" commentators or of clearly hostile ob- servers such as LeBon. The early the- ories of the crowd were "top-down" the- ories, reflecting the fears and resent-

33. Essays, p. 112. 34. Ibid., p. 97. 35. TCB, p. 73.

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ments of antidemocratic thinkers facing the aspirations of formerly excluded and exploited groups. This is especially true of LeBon, and it is therefore remarkable that Smelser places such credence in LeBon's "insights" into the "mysteries" of the peculiar thought processes of crowds.36 It is even more remarkable that Smelser frequently relies on official "riot control" manuals for empirical de- scriptions of the "hostile outburst," without so much as suggesting the need for exercising caution in the use of such sources.37

MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE

Again, this suggests a diffuse but per- vasive tendency toward what might be called a managerial or administrative perspective on collective action. Such a perspective carries the implication that collective behavior is something requir- ing "control" or "containing" or "han- dling and channeling," an emphasis not nearly so apparent in the work of such writers as Blumer, Turner and Killian, and Lang and Lang.38 For Smelser, the issue becomes whether or not control is applied in effective fashion in order to ensure the strict "maintenance of law and order." 39 Such imagery underesti- mates the role of agencies of social con- trol in the origins and the content of the "outburst" itself, rather than merely af- fecting its outcome. It is surely such an overly sanguine interpretation of the meaning of "social control" that enables Smelser to criticise the "weak governor who shilly-shallies in deciding to call in the National Guard to put down a dan- gerous riot." 40 And it is surely the same uncritical attitude that permits Smelser to present as an "objective" assessment the statement of E. S. Bo-

36. Ibid., p. 80. 37. Ibid., pp. 222-268. 38. Cf. fn 1 and Essays, 79-80. 39. TCB, p. 266. 40. Ibid., p. 262.

gardus that a "mob in full fury will not listen to reason; it can be stopped only by force, by tear bombs, by bayonets." 41 Smelser's discussion of hostile outbursts recognizes the impact of government, as in the Red Scare following World War I, and in the McCarthyism of the 1950's, in fomenting hostile outbursts. Indeed, he claims not to venture judg- ment even on the desirability of vio- lence; which, says Smelser, is "some- times . . . necessary to smash a brittle social order; sometimes it merely adds to social chaos." 42 Yet this recognition of the possible complicity of the govern- ment and its agents fails to inform Smelser's entire discussion of the "Con- trol of Hostile Outbursts," which moves little beyond the level of the "riot con- trol" literature on which it is heavily based. This section offers little more than the conventional view of the nature of riots, mystified by the attachment of a complicated, cumbersome, and confus- ing classificatory scheme. Thus mysti- fied, these essentially commonsense at- titudes about riots and their control may have a formidable effect on the unwary reader, who will doubtless feel con- fronted by "social science" at its most impenetrable and forbidding. But they do not suffice as an empirical examina- tion of riot behavior, or as a convincing illustration of the utility of Smelser's analytical scheme.

In a more recent paper, Smelser has attempted to come to grips with the issue of the relation between social and psy- chological aspects of collective behavior. Here, too, unfortunately, the approach seems conditioned by an empirically un- founded and theoretically questionable tendency to discredit the beliefs under- lying collective action. This seems evi- dent in the way in which Smelser con- ceives of the "psychological" aspect of the behavior: collective behavior is held

41. Quoted in TCB, p. 267. 42. Ibid., p. 227.

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NOTE ON CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

to have a psychological as well as a social dimension, since the "deepest and most powerful human emotions-ideal- istic fervor, love, and violent rage, for example-are bared in episodes of col- lective behavior, and since persons differ psychologically in their propensity to become involved in such episodes."43 This seems to imply that collective be- havior is "psychological" because it is "emotional" indeed, that "psychologi- cal" behavior is "emotional" behavior. Surely there is more to the "psychologi- cal" dimension of social behavior than this. This perspective seems to suggest that "psychology" is something we use to uncover the peculiar aspects of un- conventional behavior, and not, for ex- ample, to expose what may be the deeper pathologies of "normal" social life.

Consider the discussion, in this more recent paper, of the psychological as- pects of protest movements. Smelser notes:

Harshness and rigidity (in the response of authorities to protest) provide the partici- pants with "evidence" of the vicious char- acter of the authority, and thus justify extreme and militant tactics; weakness or collapse in the face of threats provides "evidence" that these extreme tactics are in fact effective, and encourages participants in protest movements to give credence to their own fantasies of omnipotence.44

The question arises: when is evidence not really evidence? Why put "evi- dence" in quotes? Why characterize the participants in protest movements as motivated by fantasies of omnipotence? If this is intended as an empirical as- sessment, Smelser provides no evidence for it. If it is intended as a theoretical premise, it must be said to prejudge the issues rather heavily.

More generally, Smelser's analysis of

43. Essays, p. 92. 44. Ibid., p. 114.

the "psychological level of explanation" of protest movements concludes that their psychological aspect lies in the fact that they allow repressed Oedipal conflicts to "emerge and be gratified." This is held to explain the ambivalence toward the "leader" that Smelser tells us characterizes protest movements. On the one hand, such movements are char- acterized by "unqualified love, worship, and submission to the leader."45 On the other hand, such movements display "unqualified suspicion, denigration, and desire to destroy the agent felt responsi- ble for the moral decay of social life and standing in the way of reform." 46 Does this apply to the NAACP? the SPCA? the UMW? Again, no evidence-not even, in this case, that of hostile ac- counts-is provided for those assertions.

All of this should not be taken to im- ply that we reject the attempt to inves- tigate the psychological aspects of social movements. We do insist, however, that, as Allan Silver has remarked, "men who engage in dangerous and desperate behavior-indeed, any behavior-have a certain claim to have taken seriously the meanings which they see in their own acts, and wish others to see in them." 47

Moreover, the interactive aspect of so- cial behavior applies to its psychological dimensions as well as its social ones: it is misleading to focus on the hidden psy- chological motives of one set of partici- pants in a protest situation while leav- ing the other side unexamined, as John P. Spiegel has recently suggested regard- ing student protest:

It simply isn't reasonable to raise questions about the irrational, unconscious motiva- tions of students without also probing the behavior of faculties and administration in a similar vein. Such a procedure not only reveals (embarrassingly, one would have

45. Ibid., p. 119. 46. Ibid., pp. 119-120. 47. Allan Silver, "Official Interpretations of

Racial Riots," in Connery, op. cit., at p. 154.

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

thought) the blind spots of the observers; it also prejudges the question of where the pathology lies.48

There is also the question of the ap- propriateness of the analysis, the extent to which it fairly engages the major is- sues in the situation. Thus, we could have concentrated in this discussion on the psychological motivations for Smel- ser's "exaggerated" concern for system- atization, his distaste for a "lax eclecti- cism," 49 and the general tendency to discredit behavior that is in some sense out of control.

Such an analysis would be "psycho- logical"; it might even be useful, under different circumstances. But we do not think it is a fair or especially helpful way to engage the issues involved in the study of collective behavior. Likewise, Smelser's invocation of the Oedipal con- flict to explain some of the character- istics of protest movements would be useful if it were a response to the issues raised by careful empirical analysis of protest movements; if, that is, there were well-observed phenomena surround- ing such movements that seemed diffi- cult to explain without some such ap- proach. As it is, however, Smelser's treatment, since it is not grounded in such careful assessment of the issues, appears forced and out of place. It is hardly reassuring, therefore, to be told that this exercise represents an effort to transcend one-sided interpretations of collective behavior in the interests of a "synthetic" approach.50

CONCLUSION

Lacking consistent empirical founda- tion, Smelser's characterization of col- lective behavior as mobilized on the basis of some form of "generalized be-

48. John P. Spiegel, "Campus Conflict and Professional Egos," Trans-Action, October 1969, at p. 42.

49. Essays, p. 91. 50. Ibid., p. 121.

lief" seems little more than a prejudg- ment. If so, the somewhat tenuous re- lation between the several "forms" of collective behavior would appear to be most questionable, as would the utility of the conceptual edifice invoked to ex- plain it. Furthermore, Smelser's ten- dency toward an administrative perspec- tive is related intrinsically to the idea of isolating a class of kinds of behavior related solely by virtue of their (a) ori- entation to change, (b) "unestablished" character, and (c) purportedly distorted or exaggerated perspective. Such a con- ception virtually builds in the idea of "control," the attempt to "channel" such behavior into paths more acceptable from the viewpoint of the maintenance of some set of (usually unspecified) so- cial and political conditions. When ap- plied to the real world of social conflict and political struggle, "collective behav- ior" theories based on such a conception often acquire the appearance of a litera- ture of counter-insurgency. Worse, as- sociated with a claim of neutrality, they tend to drift into this attitude, without consciously and explicitly defending it.

In addition, the arbitrary linkage of social movements of all kinds with so- called "panics" and "crazes," the tradi- tional approach to the study of "collec- tive behavior," seems to us to be mis- leading on its face. To link these phe- nomena means that those richer in social and political meaning tend to be re- duced to a common and basically trivial level. One can, of course, compare the hula-hoop "craze" of a few years ago with the Cuban revolution of roughly the same time, and doubtless discover some similarities and points of comparability. But these are likely to be unilluminating and quickly exhausted; if taken as de- finitive, they are likely to blind us to what is most compelling, both analyti- cally and politically, about the latter event.

We are not suggesting that it is point-

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NOTE ON CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

less to study such things as "panics" or "crazes" or behavior in disasters or social movements or revolutions: far from it. We are suggesting, however, that the boundaries holding together the traditional field of collective behavior are conceptually weak and empirically misleading. Creative work in the several areas it has covered can be done, and done better, without them. What Pro- fessor Smelser has to say about actual instances of collective behavior, for ex- ample, could still be said without his model, and said more simply, more per- suasively, and more readably. Cer- tainly, the study of protest and move- ments for social change is better off if it is less tendentious, less evaluative in hidden ways, and yet more attuned to the moral and political issues that sur- round these phenomena.51

CONCEPT OF INSTITUTIONS

One step in this direction might in- volve the use of a richer and more ex- plicit conception of what we mean by

51. We recommend, as illustrations of theo- retical work that is empirically grounded, the major investigations of such men as Eric Hobsbawn, George Rude, Arthur Waskow, and Barrington Moore, Jr.

"institutions." We suggest above that the idea of "institutional" behavior is unclear in Smelser's perspective, and that this leads to some ambiguity about whether "institutional" behavior means behavior that is structured, or behavior that is conventional or accepted, or some combination of these. We may suggest another idea of the meaning of institu- tions, which conceives of institutions as having a potential for the development and maintenance of human values-val- ues such as democracy, participation, and the reduction of the repressive as- pects of social life. From this perspec- tive, we would want to look at various forms of collective action-whether within or beyond the "normal" or con- ventional social and political arrange- ments-in the light of their capacity to promote (or retard) the creation and maintenance of these values. Such a conception would thus place the values that guide our research at the threshold of the inquiry, rather than at the back door, and would avoid the equation of the "institutional" with the merely routine, the reflexive affirmation of the usual, and the implication that the non- conventional is a "problem" to be inves- tigated with an eye to control and con- tainment.

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