Collecting Consciences: The Catholic Church and Populist Leadership in

Juan Perón’s Argentina and Salvador Allende’s Chile

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at

Syracuse University

Emma Louise Fountain

Candidate for Bachelor of Arts

and Renée Crown University Honors

Spring 2020

Honors Thesis in International Relations

Thesis Advisor: _______________________ Dr. Gladys McCormick

Thesis Reader: _______________________ Dr. Francine D’Amico

Honors Director: _______________________ Dr. Karen Hall

Fountain 2

Abstract

This paper identifies populism’s key actors and addresses three essential relationships. These actors are the political leader (the president), the religious leader (the Catholic Church), and the led (the people). The relationships examined here are those between the political leader and the led, the political and the religious leaders, and the religious leader and the led. This framework is then applied to the distinctly populist presidencies of Juan Perón in Argentina and Salvador Allende in Chile. Evidence for these cases comes from an assortment of sources, from contemporary accounts of leadership to recent reflections. Perón began his regime in 1946 with strong relationships on every front, but lost the support of the Catholic Church and subsequently the support of the people by the mid-1950s. Allende’s populism was a development of Perón’s populism. In the two decades that separated the Argentine leader from the Chilean, an activist movement within the Christian community undermined the Catholic Church’s political pull. Therefore, Allende’s weak relationship with the Church and powerful link to the people was politically successful. This comparison of Perón and Allende offers valuable insight on the viability of different modes of populism.

Fountain 3

Executive Summary

This interdisciplinary paper explores the roles of religion and politics in the populist

presidencies of Juan Perón and Salvador Allende. A definition of populism emerges through

identification of the key actors and three of their essential relationships. These actors are the

political leader (the president), the religious leader (the Catholic Church), and the led (the

people). The relationships examined here are those between the political leader and the led, the

political and the religious leaders, and the religious leader and the led. This framework is then

applied to the distinctly populist presidencies of Juan Perón in Argentina and Salvador Allende

in Chile. Evidence for these cases comes from an assortment of sources, from contemporary

accounts of leadership to recent reflections. Perón began his regime in 1946 with strong

relationships on every front, but lost the support of the Catholic Church and subsequently the

support of the people by the mid-1950s. Allende’s populism was a development of Perón’s

populism. In the two decades that separated the Argentine leader from the Chilean, an activist

movement within the Christian community undermined the Catholic Church’s political pull.

Therefore, Allende’s weak relationship with the Church and powerful link to the people was

politically successful. Comparison of Perón and Allende offers valuable insight on the viability

of different modes of populism.

This study relies on certain terms to define the boundaries of populism. First, the phrase

“political leader” refers to the two relevant presidents, with some additional reference to a

19th-century governor. Populism is this leader’s political style of choice.

Fountain 4

The “religious leader” in this paper refers to the institution of the Roman Catholic

Church. In both Argentina and Chile in these time frames, Catholicism was the majority religion

and the traditional religion affiliated with the state. In this study, I rely on testimony of ordained

Cardinals and Bishops, as communicated through the Conferencia Episcopal (Episcopal

Conferences) of Argentina and Chile, respectively.

Finally, the “led” is the community that makes up the nation. This study applies two

perspectives to this component: the religious and the political. The religious perspective of the

led is examined through comunidades eclesiasticas de base (Base Ecclesiastical Communities),

while the political perspective is seen through worker organization.

This project is especially pertinent in 2020, when a new wave of populist leadership has

swept the globe. Understanding the process through which populism can strengthen the base of

support for a president is a powerful thing – this understanding can reveal motivations. In a

democratic society, the right to vote confers the responsibility of electing leadership upon the

people. Our responsibility in this regard demands us to question the motives of our leaders, and

here I hope my research is relevant. Populism is a tactic used to win support, and it has a robust

political history. If we understand this history, we will be better equipped to see through the

empty promises of a politician trying to win power. Hopefully, this will bring us to more

qualified leadership, rather than to a president who only cares about how loudly his name can be

chanted at rallies.

Religion and politics shape each of our lives. These two great forces have always been

the architects of society, and the study of populism offers a window into a way in which these

forces can interact.

Fountain 5

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………. 7

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………10

Definitions……………………………………………………………………………………… 16

Political Leader ………………………………………………………………………... 16

Religious Leader………………………………………………………………………... 16

The People……………………………………………………………………………….17

The Institutional Catholic Church and the People……………………………………... 18

The Political Leader, the People, and Populism………………………………………...

22

Argentina………………………………………………………………………………………... 25

Juan Perón and the People……………………………………………………………... 25

Juan Perón and the Institutional Catholic Church……………………………………... 29

The Institutional Catholic Church and the People……………………………………... 32

Chile…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 37

Salvador Allende and the People……………………………………………………….. 37

Salvador Allende and the Institutional Catholic Church……………………………….. 40

The Institutional Catholic Church and the People……………………………………... 44

Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………... 47

Sources Cited and Consulted…………………………………………………………………… 50

Fountain 6

“The masses do not think, they feel.”

Rita de Grandis, 1999

Fountain 7

Acknowledgements

There are countless people who have brought me to this point, and it would be impossible

to name them all without writing another fifty pages. However, I will do my best in these few

paragraphs.

I started my undergraduate career as an International Relations major, and have been

amazed at the dedication of each of the professors I have encountered along the way. I chose IR

fairly arbitrarily, but I cannot imagine studying anything else. My world is bigger than I could

ever have anticipated four years ago. Not long after I began my time at Syracuse University, I

declared a major in Spanish Language, Literature, and Culture. While I may never fully grasp the

subjunctive, I have enjoyed every course I have taken with the Spanish department along the

way. This department is one of the most enthusiastic and welcoming communities I have

encountered. Thank you for the patience and compassion you have shown me again and again

throughout the years.

This thesis has been rattling around my brain ever since I took a course titled Religion,

Scripture, and Law in my sophomore year. Halfway through this semester, I declared a major in

Religion and began incessantly talking about how religion and politics occupy the same space. I

have found the professors in this department to be endlessly passionate and interesting, and I

appreciate every classroom lecture, office-hours meeting, and passing conversation on the bigger

(and smaller) questions in life. I feel especially proud and lucky to have been taught by many of

you.

Fountain 8

A few months after adding my Religion major, I landed in Santiago, Chile, for a

semester-long study abroad program. Mauricio Paredes’ emphatic lessons challenged me more

than I thought I could handle and changed the way I saw the world. It was there that I wrote my

first essays on the Church and governance in very hesitant Spanish, and, Mauricio, I will always

be grateful for your spirited guidance.

Formal work on this project began when I met Dr. Gladys McCormick in Spring of 2019.

This name had come up repeatedly as I asked around the Maxwell School for faculty who might

be willing to guide me through this process. Dr. McCormick, I remember leaving your office

buzzing with excitement to begin this project. I admit, that excitement mixed with terror as I took

Modern Latin America with you in the Fall, but your high standards have made this thesis

stronger and better than what I could have produced on my own. Thank you for always pushing

me to strive for more.

By now, I have taken three courses with Dr. Francine D’Amico, and if there was a way to

take any more, I would be the first to enroll. Dr. D, thank you so much for the kindness, advice,

and encouragement you have given me over these last few years. There is no way I would be

remotely close to where I am today without your support, and there is no adequate way to

express how much I have learned from you. Thank you.

There is a group of people at Syracuse who have been by my side every day through the

last four years. My friends: you are amazing, motivated, brilliant, ambitious, caring, curious, and

driven, and I cannot wait to see what you achieve. Thank you for laughing and crying with me,

for hunting down coffee at absurd hours, for telling me stupid jokes on bad days, and for

Fountain 9

believing in me. I love you all, and know that each of you has made an indelible mark on my life.

Thank you, thank you, thank you.

Finally, there are three people who have been my bedrock for as long as I can remember.

Olivia, you have inspired me at every turn. You’ve talked me down from every ledge and helped

me find my way every time I was lost. Thank you for telling me to apply to Syracuse so many

years ago. Dad, thank you for the much-needed levity throughout my roughest times. There have

been many times when I’ve wanted to give up, but your insistence that I “hang tuff” always

seems to pull me through. Mom, thank you for being there. Thank you for reading every iteration

of this paper and patiently helping me through mental blocks with much-needed FaceTime dance

breaks. I could never have arrived at this point without you. To my family, thank you; I love you

so much.

I could not have done this – this project, nor this degree – without all of these people. I

am so grateful for my extraordinary community.

Fountain 10

Introduction

Church and state have fought for power over centuries of political development, yet this

struggle remains unresolved. Political, historical, and theological researchers are inclined to

fixate on the apparently diametric opposition of these two powers (hence the ubiquity of the

phrase “church and state”). However, untangling one from the other is an impossible task. I

propose that humans are inherently both political and religious, requiring that the state, created to

enact politics, engage with religion, and that the church respectively engage with politics.

Conflict, then, arises with diversity: there is no homogenous political or religious view, thus

presenting a problem when either power is given dominance over the other. Some countries

choose to conflate church and state, giving the executive both religious and political supremacy.

However, many countries, Argentina and Chile included, give primacy to the state; the executive

is a purely political figure and is the political authority of the nation. The state forms the laws

which the population must follow as citizens, while the laws of the church are not granted legal

status. This political state is tasked with promoting the well-being of the entire nation, and must

deal with the reality of pluralism. Although Argentina and Chile are majority Catholic countries,

and have been for many years, both have constitutions that feature freedom of religion as an

undeniable right. This leaves organized religions to form their own structures under the 1

guidance of the state. In this way, at the institutional level, church and state have materially

separated themselves.

1 Of course, enforcement matters more than existence with these constitutional rights.

Fountain 11

This satisfying divide does not exist on an informal level – again, people are inherently

both political and religious; they both vote and pray. The individual does not separate one from

the other. This reality complicates the job of the executive in a democratic nation, where

governance by the populous is the stated ideal. Democracy exalts the people, requiring

democratic executives to do the same: a politician must win the support of this population in

order to earn this office, making appeals to religion as well as politics viable.

This point prompted my interest in the power dynamics between the president and the

Roman Catholic Church in Argentina and Chile. Latin America has a robust tradition of

incorporating Catholicism into national identity, and presidents Juan Perón and Salvadore

Allende represent a political utilization of this tradition. Both leaders were undeniably populist in

their identification of the people as the most important facet of the nation, and I argue that this

form of populism relies heavily on an integration of religion and politics. I lean most heavily on

the definition of populism laid out by Alan Knight, who asserted that populism’s viability is

relational. For Knight, the leader’s ability to connect and identify with the led is the most

important relationship. While I agree with this point, I contend that there are three essential 2

relationships that are worth examining. To begin, we identify three actors. The first two of these

occur on the formal level. The Catholic Church is the formal religious institution, and in both

countries, the president is the political leader. The final actor is the most amorphous, and can be

labeled simply the led, or the people. This refers to the population that participates in politics and

religion. This phrasing is not intended to take agency from this group, but merely to emphasize

2 Knight, 1998

Fountain 12

their role in respect to their relationship with the political and religious leadership. Perón and

Allende focused on the working class as support bases in their campaigns, and so I follow suit.

With these three actors identified, the relationships I examine are those between the

president and the people, the president and the institutional Catholic Church, and the institutional

Catholic Church and the people.

In the case of Argentina, all three relationships were positive at the beginning of Perón’s

regime in 1946 (though all had soured by the 1950s). Three decades later, in the case of Chile,

the sole positive relationship was that between the president and the people.

Historical context is key in examining these differences. In the time between these two

cases, a split occurred in the religious community: the outbreak of liberation theology alienated

the institutional Church from the people, making an alliance between the president and the

Church less politically favorable. In this way, Allende’s populism is a logical progression of

Perón’s populism.

Fountain 13

Literature Review

Perón and Allende have been subjected to vigorous investigations over the years, many of

which center on their qualities as populist leaders. In this sense, my work here is nothing

revelatory. However, I hope to bring a new perspective with the introduction of religious

frameworks.

My studies benefitted from Alan Knight’s relational exploration of populism in Latin

America, which largely occurs through a political lens. Knight frames the connection between 3

the populist leader and the people as primarily anti-institutional, and labels this a distinctly

political standpoint. I expand this view to contend that the incorporation of the implicit and

explicit religious dimension furthers this anti-institutional stance. The use of this adjacent

terminology allows for a wider-ranging discussion of the magnetism of the populist leader.

Perón is commonly researched relative to his collaboration with either the Church or the

labor movement, but rarely are both elements addressed in the same investigation. I look most

often to Eduardo Elena’s multifaceted analysis of Perón’s campaign to ‘dignify Argentina,’

which does an excellent job of investigating the political motivations of the era. Once again I 4

was left wanting in terms of information explicitly concerning the Church and the people outside

the scope of Peronism. This frustration was somewhat appeased with David D’Amico’s

3 Alan Knight is a British professor who has written extensively on Latin American history, with a focus on twentieth-century Mexican politics. This western background should elicit some skepticism, but Knight’s work has been recognized and commended by the Mexican government and by various Latin America-based associations. This signals, to an extent, the viability of his work as not merely representative of a western mindset (Wilson Center, 2012). 4 Elena, 2011

Fountain 14

religio-historical analysis, which noted a connection between Perón’s populism and the ‘Third

World’ priests’ movement (liberation theology) in the late 1960s. Yet this was merely a passing 5

mention. I focus on Eva Perón as an expression of religiosity of the Argentine masses. Evita’s

religious role in the Perón regime is a heavily researched topic, with many scholars utilizing a

feminist perspective to make their arguments. Eva is a well-known figure (thanks, in part, to

Broadway and Hollywood romanticizations of her life ), and therefore continues to generate 6

much interest. More recent political investigations have begun to look at Eva’s importance to 7

Perón’s authority, where earlier forays labeled her a social climber who used her gender as a 8

means to secure power and money. Again, I relate these separate studies to one another in 9

exploring Eva’s religious and political role in Perón’s populist rule.

Allende is similarly well established as a populist president. Given the popularity of

liberation theology at the time, Allende’s (dis)engagement with the Catholic Church draws a

clearer divide between church and state than existed originally with Perón. While there is

substantial literature on Allende’s populism (specifically in his relationship with workers) and 10

on the Church hierarchy’s opinion of his governance, not much has been written about 11

Allende’s dimension as a religiously motivated leader. Instead, I use Knight’s definition of

populism and Peter Winn’s study of the Yarur textile factory as methods of triangulation to

5 D’Amico, 1977, p. 502 6 Evita, written by Tim Rice and scored by Andrew Lloyd Webber, premiered on Broadway in 1978. The film Evita was directed by Alan Parker and was released in 1996. 7 Misemer, 2008 8 Theweleit, 2009, p. 33; Patroni, 1999, p. 154 9 Misemer, 2008, p. 100; Navarro, 1999 10 Winn, 1986; Figueroa, 2013 11 Much of this comes from primary source analysis: specifically, documents from the Conferencia Episcopal.

Fountain 15

explore this dimension. Winn’s focus on these workers was especially useful in understanding

the dynamics of the Allende regime. Through his decades-long account of labor organization in

one particular factory, I gained valuable insight into the daily routines of workers and saw how

these routines were impacted by Allende’s actions.

Overall, each component of my study has a well-articulated library of research. I found

that these components generally stood independently, and therefore my main intention was to

explore the interdisciplinary relationship between both religious and political aspects of

populism.

I first define the important terms in order to properly understand these relationships.

Then, I examine the three relationships in Argentina, then do the same with Chile. Finally, I

present the differences between the cases.

Fountain 16

Definitions

Political Leader: President

Perón’s and Allende’s styles of populism are closely examined in this study. Rhetoric

used by populist leaders is crafted to reflect the hopes of the people. Allende and Perón were

both quick to invoke religious sentiments to garner support, neatly utilizing religiosity as a

personalistic form of communication to endear the leader to the led. Rather than relying on

devotion to the teachings of the institutional Catholic Church, these leaders instead called upon

general values and emotions. This looked different under either president, where Perón was

closer to the establishment of the Church than was Allende. With both, the empathic connection

was especially powerful, thanks to the deeply Catholic traditions of Argentina and Chile. This

internalized religiosity is an essential means through which the people fostered trust in their

leader.

Religious Leader: Institutional Catholic Church

The Church establishment mainly concerns traditional hierarchies and “official”

representatives. Much of the position of the formal Church is seen through statements from each

country’s respective Conferencia Episcopal (Episcopal Conference). This organization acted as

the mouthpiece of the Catholic Church, issuing proclamations penned by ordained Cardinals and

Bishops (national and regional religious authorities). In 1955, these national conferences joined

Fountain 17

to form the Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano (CELAM). This forum hosted many key

discussions on the role of liberation theology (a Christian activist movement) within the

Christian community throughout the second half of the 20th century. 12

The People

I identify two perspectives within the community of the people for the sake of

comparison with the institutional level. However, these labels are only for comparison. The led is

the group of people that make up a nation, and are not materially divided into religious and

political camps. This is why these are merely perspectives. Where I previously discussed the

division of church and state, it is now useful to consider both a specifically religious and a

specifically political perspective of this population. The former can be termed the social church,

and is best defined in opposition to the formal. The social church is the manifestation and

interpretation of Catholicism in everyday society outside the direct control of the institutional

Church. It is the end result of religion’s osmosis into a community’s culture, whether that 13

community be an entire nation or a single family unit. This popular church is the church created

by the people; it is the social aspect of spirituality that contrasts the Holy See’s tradition-heavy

formalities. The perspective of the social church will be seen in discourse originating from local

organizations, such as athletic clubs and small prayer groups.

12 Cruz, 2014 13 In the cases of both Argentina and Chile, this religion is Catholicism simply because of its cultural dominance at the time. While other religions were in practice, they are not relevant to this study.

Fountain 18

The political perspective on the led is, again, frustratingly slippery. I use labor unions as

an example of this areligious organization. Both Perón and Allende looked to blue collar 14

workers to form their base, each deftly utilizing networks built by labor unions to make political

connections. Perón, in fact, led the Department of Labor and Welfare before becoming president.

He and Allende campaigned heavily on the promise of giving voice to labor unions, so

examining these groups gives valuable insight on the symbiotic nature of these presidents’

populist messages. 15

The Institutional Catholic Church and the People

Since Spanish colonizers arrived in Latin America in the 1600s and forcibly spread their

religion through violence and manipulation, the Catholic Church has played a large role in

shaping society – both in daily life as well as in the administration of the state. A western

mentality may ambitiously perceive the religious as the perfect politically neutral conduit

through which to form a community, but the Church has truly never been neutral. In the 19th

century, residuals of colonialism (when a monarch claimed his authority as given directly by

some higher power, which was then substantiated by the church) meant close ties between the

Church and the political state. While social Catholic adherence rose and fell throughout the

14 Organization that is not explicitly religious. 15 Labor unions, blue-collar workers, the working class: I use these terms variously to refer to the populations to which Perón and Allende appealed. However, this population is not homogenous, nor do I mean to detract from the important distinctions within these groups. For the sake of my argument, I felt it best to generalize, but there is excellent literature on specific labor movements in both Argentina and Chile for those interested in understanding this element to a deeper degree.

Fountain 19

years, Catholicism remained steadfast as the prevailing religion. One scholar notes that the 16

Catholic Church dominated civil society across Latin America, existing as the traditional

authority for “ministering to the poor and shaping ceremonial life across the colonies.” An 17

example of utilization of this theo-political relationship in the time of early independence comes

from Argentina, under caudillo leader Juan Manuel de Rosas.

The caudillo reigned in the chaos of post-colonial Latin America. He, like the populist,

was charismatic and individualistic, but lacked the democratic tendencies that endeared the

masses. Caudillos were strongmen authoritarian rulers, reliant on violence as an immediate

reaction to opposition. Juan Manuel de Rosas, known as the “Restorer of the Laws,” was one

such strongman. He picked up on the potential of charismatic leadership in the aftermath of

Spain’s withdrawal from Argentina, becoming governor of Argentine capital Buenos Aires (and

therefore the de facto national leader) in 1828 and reigning over a bitterly divisive era until

defeat in 1852. His authoritarian regime allowed no room for opposition, and his mazorcas

(armed followers) were responsible for thousands of murders. Rosas serves as an archetype for

caudillo rule in Latin America in the 1800s. Like the populist, he fostered a cult of personality to

become an idol of the people. However, unlike the populist, he was not interested in distancing

himself from the elite – in fact, his moneyed background was what propelled him to prominence.

Rosas adeptly adopted the guise of religiosity to unite his base, and a bifurcated political 18

climate encouraged the population to be emphatic in their support. He centered his regime upon

Catholicism (embracing the institution), setting a decidedly traditionalist tone for his Argentina.

16 Pike, 1968 17 Dawson, 2015, p. 2 18 Dawson, 2015, p. 2

Fountain 20

He formed a coalition known as “the Holy Federation.” As a leader, Rosas promoted the

narrative that his regime was supported by the Catholic Church (greeting any objections with

brutality), thus drawing support from the base that hoped to see the power of a waning Church

restored. This goal was aided by the hyperbolized political breaks of the time, which largely 19

fell upon religious lines. Rosas’ traditionalist Catholic Federalist’s hatred of the minority

population of liberal Protestant Unitarians was reciprocated in full. Esteban Echeverría, a famous

Argentine writer from this time, captured this hatred in El matadero, or The Slaughterhouse.

This short story concludes with the following lines:

“In those days, the slaughter yard’s butchers-cum-executioners were the apostles who by

dagger and fist spread the gospel of the Holy Federation, and it is easy to imagine what

sort of federation would emerge from their heads and knives.” 20

The religiously charged language is hard to ignore. Echeverría directly likens Rosas’ followers to

Jesus’ apostles, and foresees a vicious war prompted by evangelizing Catholic Federalists. Rosas

was a dictator, not a democratic leader, but like more contemporary populists, he understood the

importance of linking religion and politics.

In the 20th century, Rosas’ model of religious and political governance was still viable.

The importance of both the social and institutional Catholic Church remained, as the majority of

Chileans and Argentines still at least nominally identified as Catholic. This nominal 21

self-identification was the only legitimacy needed to guarantee the relevance of the institutional

19 Dawson, 2015, p. 2 20 Echeverría, 1871. Translation from Dawson, 2015, p. 59 21 Winn, 1986, p. 85

Fountain 21

Catholic Church. By definition, this branch of the Church has official supremacy. Those who

make up the institutional Church have been tasked with the administrative role of shaping the

social church. This role carries with it an intrinsic power, certainly over laypeople but also over

priests and other low-ranking Church officials. Given this relationship, the Church must

recognize its internal bifurcation. It has a vested interest in the reconciliation of these branches

(institutional and social) so as to carry out its task most efficiently. Documents disseminated by 22

the institutional Church in its administrator role sought to ‘reign in’ the Catholic population as it

drifted towards the radical on the political spectrum; the social church similarly addressed

directives from the institutional Church that went against the ideals of liberation theology. 23

However, the division between the branches continued to grow, especially given the inherently

political nature of the religious liberation theology movement. The rebellious base (the social

church) thus destabilized the power of the administrator (the institutional Church). Allende’s

brief presidency is then a progression of Perón’s early years in office. In Argentina under Perón

(from 1946-55), the split was minimal, and the Catholic community was a relatively united body

which delegated certain roles to its formal and informal actors, but which overall was unanimous

in its goals. This was different 20 years later in Chile: by 1970 and the election of Allende, the 24

informal branch of the Catholic Church had undergone a fundamental change, thanks mainly to

the tireless work of politically-minded priests such as Gustavo Gutiérrez. In the 1960s, 25

22 The ‘task’ of the Church is a tricky matter, but most simply, here I mean it as the promotion of Catholicism. 23 These goals are aligned with liberation theology, which promotes activism in defense of the poor. While the social church was not a cohesive group, it did have in common these shared goals. 24 D’Amico, 1977 25 Sigmund, 2011

Fountain 22

liberation theology became immensely popular among those ‘lower’ in the hierarchy of the

Church. Comunidades eclesiasticas de base (Base Ecclesiastical Communities) were the result of

an initiative by the Catholic Church to strengthen the connection between the people and the

Church, and serve as a useful marker of disunity. This initiative established prayer groups that

would regularly meet to discuss their personal commitment to the faith, hopefully bridging the

widening gap between the institutional and the social. However, this development, beginning in

the mid-1960s, backfired, in that these often-rural communities instead became catalysts for

political radicalization and promotion of liberation theology. The communities included the

blue-collar workers that would support Allende in the upcoming elections. Liberation theology

taught that the Church had a responsibility to uplift and to advocate for the poor, and became 26

the basis for an activist movement. As liberation theology gained purchase, the social wing of the

Church became politicized, and the rift between the social and institutional Church grew larger.

In Allende’s Chile, the two faces of the Church were actively opposed to one another, while in

Perón’s Argentina, this was not the case.

The Political Leader, the People, and Populism

Populism is a political style that has repeatedly found footing in times of turmoil. In the

cases of Chile and Argentina, charismatic authority as an essential component in leadership

evolved from early caudillo rule (1800s proto-populism) to the contemporary populism of Perón

and Allende. Rosas, Perón, and Allende all came to power in times of social unrest. This

26 Gutiérrez, 1973

Fountain 23

emergence in a time of crisis is a recurrent theme, harkening back to the savior role of a

charismatic politician. Populism’s viability rests in the leader’s ability to connect and identify 27

with the people, as explored by Alan Knight. This relational aspect is key; populism places the 28

people at the forefront and promises that the leader will be beholden to the interests of this

population. The leader serves at the behest of the people and relies almost entirely on their

mandate. This reciprocity can translate to a religious connection, as sharing a religion with

constituents can make a candidate more relatable (and therefore more popular). The personal 29

religiosity of these constituents creates a community with shared values and morals. This leader

can then identify with this community by appearing as a compañero or compadre (companion,

buddy) to garner support, something at which Perón and Allende excelled. This tactic

emphasizes that the candidate in question is not a politician, instead, he is an outsider – like the 30

people. In Latin America, the term el pueblo (the people, the town) evokes a rural image

quintessential to communal identity and casts the leader as emerging from the core of the country

rather than the institution; the leader takes on “the people as an identity.” 31

27 Robert Tucker’s 1968 work, “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” explores this savior role as a religious position. 28 Knight, 1998 29 Tucker, 1968 30 I intentionally use “he.” The leaders I discuss here are all men, and the ways in which they presented themselves to the public was gendered. Gender roles deeply impact politics, and a woman candidate would have a distinctly different style of populism. I do refer extensively to Eva Perón (the wife of Juan Perón), and her impact on her husband’s populism. However, she herself was not elected to office, and was therefore not beholden to the people through populism in the same way as her husband. 31 Knight, 1998

Fountain 24

Knight touches upon another component of populism: class consciousness as a driving

force. He noted that the leader adopts “pejorative (elitist, snobbish) labels and wears them with

pride.” This usurpation of the terminology of social hierarchies distances the populist from the 32

political elite. The audience is made to be an active participant in leadership, as their populist

representative is seen as an amplification of their voice. The most vibrant example of this comes

from Perón’s Argentina. His followers proudly declared themselves to be descamisados (shirtless

ones), thus taking a condescending label of their economic status and repurposing it as a symbol

of Argentine authenticity. This inherent connection between class and populism explains 33

Perón’s eagerness to secure the support of blue-collar workers and Allende’s similar enthusiasm

20 years later.

With the official Catholic Church in opposition to the more radical liberation theology

wing, the Vatican and the Pope (Pius XII, John XXIII, and Paul VI respectively held this office

in the time frame of this study) sought to encourage heads of state to veer away from Marxism.

In Chile, this anti-leftist conservatism in the institutional Church was spurred by the failure of the

Christian Democratic party to represent the interests of the Vatican, and by the subsequent 34

struggle of the Church to retain the confidence of its congregation.

32 Knight, 1998 33 Knight, 1998 34 Adriance, 1992

Fountain 25

Argentina

Juan Perón and the People

Juan Domingo Perón rose to power on the shoulders of workers, fueled by populism’s

sentimental perception of mutual adoration. The fact of this base of support is virtually concrete,

according to the academic community. Perón was a member of the armed group that enacted a 35

golpe de estado (coup d'état) and took over the Argentine government in 1943. Within this

military regime, the young Perón earned a position as the head of the Department of Labor and

Welfare. He was a popular figure, but in 1945 he fell out of favor with the regime and was 36

arrested. Notably, this arrest only served to inflate his popularity among the people, confirming

Knight’s identification of a populist leader as in defiance of the established state. Mere days after

his initial arrest, the regime released Perón from prison, conceding to demands from mass

protests. This day, October 17th, 1945, was celebrated as “Loyalty Day,” and marks a turning 37

point in Perón’s ascent to the presidency. Upon his release, Perón addressed the crowds gathered

in Buenos Aires in protest of his ‘wrongful’ imprisonment to announce his retirement from duty.

His carefully chosen words prompted cries of “We want Perón! We want Perón!”, and “This is

the people of Perón!” 3839

35 Alston, 2009, p. 21 36 Goebel, 2011, p. 67 37 Goebel, 2011, p. 67 38 Perón, 1945 39 This phrase makes more sense in Spanish: “Este es el pueblo de Perón.” El pueblo is a single community as well as a collective, and has a stronger connotation with identity than its English counterpart.

Fountain 26

“I hang the honourable and sacred uniform handed to me by my fatherland, to now wear

the civilian coat and join the suffering and sweating masses that produce the work and the

greatness of our nation… And I also give… my first embrace to this great crowd… This

is the people. This is the suffering people that represent the pain of our motherland,

which we have to defend… This is the people of the fatherland. The same people who in

this historic square, before the Congress, demanded that their will and rights be respected.

It is the same people that must be immortal, because no human treachery or evil will be

able to subdue this great people in feeling or in numbers… From today I will feel a real

pride of being Argentine, because I interpret this collective movement as the rebirth of a

consciousness of the working class… Of a consciousness of the working class that is the

only thing that can make our fatherland great and immortal… So, ladies and gentlemen, I

would like to take this opportunity, as a simple citizen, part of this sweaty mass, to

embrace you deeply and close to my heart, as I would do with my mother…. I aspire to

be loved by you… Remember, workers: unite!... In this beautiful country the unity of all

Argentines will be built on the unity of those who work.” 40

The following year, Perón won the presidency on a platform promising a prioritization of labor

rights. His new wife, Eva Duarte Perón (married four days after his rallying speech on October

17), became the bridge between the presidency and the people. This Peronato would last two 41

terms, until the Armed Forces once again led a golpe de estado and Perón was forced to flee in

1955. During this time, a positive relationship with workers was key to securing power. Perón’s

40 Perón, 1945 41 The term “Peronato” refers to Perón’s years in office from 1945 to 1955.

Fountain 27

deft populist maneuverings ensured a mandate from the people, by first reorienting the definition

of nationalism and then by aligning himself with cultural stars.

Together with his beloved wife Eva, Perón redefined the Argentine national identity to

frame workers as the core of the country. Under the Peronato, nationalism meant a respect for

those traditionally ignored by state leaders – that is, the working class. Perón made the claim that

allegiance to him was the only “legitimate expression of national identity.” This populist 42

symbolism solidified the link between the leader and the led: each was beholden to the other.

One union organizer, Doña María Roldán, acknowledged this symbiosis with the knowing

remark, “I think that Perón, without the support of the people, wouldn’t have been Perón.” 43

Many members of this working class belonged to unions, making unions a useful segment of the

population to study when measuring the response to Perón’s leadership. His previous position as

head of Labor and Welfare meant that even before his election, Perón had an advantageously

close relationship with union groups. This comfortable relationship continued throughout his

presidency, and was immortalized in Perón’s 1949 Constitution: Article 37 singled out workers

as citizens with special rights (such as special guarantees for decent wages, social security, and

safe working conditions). 44

In conjunction with this, Perón’s nationalism was fundamentally Catholic. This was

nothing new – Argentina had long been a Catholic country. However, Perón supported a

conservative Catholicism that he saw as ‘ideal’ for the Argentine citizen. Peronist publications

branded his platform as right-wing Catholic nationalism, and Perón himself frequently 45

42 Goebel, 2011, p. 66 43 James, 2001, p. 44 Elena, 2011, p. 128 45 Goebel, 2011, p. 76

Fountain 28

celebrated his movement as pro-Catholic. This repurposed the people’s Catholic identity as 46

fundamental to Perón’s status as a leader. This claim led to the eventual disagreements between

the Peronato and the Catholic Church: both powers “sought the loyalty of laboring classes and

youth,” but Perón asked for political loyalty while the Church sought religious support. These 47

competing dominant leaders fought for allegiance of the same groups, and by 1955, it was clear

that the Church and the state could not coexist. Perón attempted to pull these potential

constituents away from a reliance on the Church by forming social groups that resembled similar

clubs established by Catholic Action (a group run by the institutional Church). These would

presumably replace the socialization and community structure previously provided by local

branches of the Church. 48

Perón deftly utilized popular culture as another means to exalt the working class as the

Argentine ideal, as seen in his promotion of certain art forms and cultural figures. One tango

singer, Hugo del Carril, was known for singing the ‘Perónist March.’ This, among others, was

broadcast to the nation via popular radio programs. Additionally, Perón made the birthday of 49

author José Hernández a national holiday. Hernández wrote the gaucho (cowboy) epic Martín 50

Fierro, and Perón applauded this tale as an embodiment of Peronist Argentina that was

“incorruptible, stalwart, and freedom-loving.” These actions are in line with Barbero’s 51

definition of populism as the convergence of nationalism and popular culture. 52

46 Perón, 1958 47 D’Amico, 1977, p. 500 48 D’Amico, 1977, p. 500 49 Goebel, 2011, p. 84 50 Goebel, 2011, p. 82 51 Goebel, 2011, p. 82 52 de Grandis, 1999

Fountain 29

Perón’s message was received with vigorous enthusiasm. Many felt a fierce devotion to

this man and his wife to a point that inspired incredible partisanship. One account of this

emotional political atmosphere casts Perón as the new Rosas: Jorge Luis Borges’ and Adolfo

Bioy Casares’ La Fiesta del Monstruo tells the story of a Perón rally that turns sour when 53

supporters decide to converge on an individual Jewish bystander and enact violence for the sake

of violence. The point of this story, when taken as parallel to Esteban Echeverría’s 1871 work El

Matadero, is to denounce the zealous supporters of a vile authoritarian ruler. 54

Juan Perón and the Institutional Catholic Church

In Argentina, the Catholic Church had always been prominently featured in the de facto

administration of the nation. Its traditional role as the official state religion (and as the majority

religion) resulted in considerable influence in guiding political issues. In his early years, Perón

did not directly contradict this role. However, as his regime progressed and sought to claim the

form of loyalty previously reserved for the Church, Perón began to pressure this traditional

power. Under the Peronato, the Roman Catholic Church was required to register its priests and

secure government approval of bishops in order to receive federal funding. This act of creating 55

a registry solidified the hierarchy of the state over the Church, signaling that the latter was a

subordinate. This subordination became ever more militant as Perón’s rule progressed. One

journalist from the United States, after visiting Buenos Aires, recalls that

53 Domecq, 1947 54 Goebel, 2011, p. 72 55 D’Amico, 1977, p. 495

Fountain 30

“One parish magazine, a few months ago, published an article stating the Church’s case

in the present controversy. The pastor was promptly put in jail. He was still there when I

left the Argentine.” 56

Despite these conflicts, Perón’s regime promoted Catholicism (the religion, not just the

institution) at every turn. One Argentine scholar even declared in 1959 that “Perón was the

Argentine president who most favored and helped the Catholic Church throughout our national

history.” 57

On the other side of the equation, the Catholic Church did support Perón in the early

years, but the relationship soured in his second term. For the most part, the Church sought to

support a president who, in turn, promoted Catholicism. As was its prerogative, the Church and

the clergy favored Perón because of his socio-religious programs, rather than on account of his

politics. In many documents published by the Church, officials emphasize a reluctance to 58

comment on political matters. In one open letter from November 1945 encouraging citizens to

vote, officials of the Church enthusiastically cite Pope Pius XII.

“‘It is hardly necessary to recall that, according to the teachings of the Church, it is not

forbidden to have a political preference without prejudice to Catholic teaching about

authority,’ and that the Church ‘does not disapprove of any forms of government, as long

as they are conducive to the common good of citizens.’” 59

The Church proclaimed its own neutrality all while maintaining that a Catholic vote seeks the

best for the faith and the country: the public good is superior to the good of the party.

56 Silva, 1955 57 Badanelli, 1959, p. 39 58 Marsal, 1955, p 148, 151-152 59 Copello, 1945

Fountain 31

However, clashes over policy did occur, and many scholars postulate that it was the

eventual divide between the institutional Church and Perón that led to the loss of the popular

mandate in 1955. This is a valid claim: in 1954, Perón threatened to disestablish the Catholic 60

Church in Argentina. The Church responded by excommunicating Perón in 1955, after which he

was overthrown by a golpe de estado. After 1951, Perón leaned into his authoritarian tendencies.

He fought the Church on many fronts, and in his final years clearly lost the fight along with his

supporters. This strategic loss is obvious in one story of the juxtaposition between a Perón rally 61

on the 1st of May and a Catholic Mass on the first Friday of this same month in 1955, both

located in the Plaza de Mayo. The first event, promoted tirelessly by Peronist propaganda, was

sparsely attended. Just a few days later, the same Plaza was inundated with the faithful,

pronouncing the slogan “nos somos el pueblo también” (“we are the people too”): Perón no

longer held spiritual command of the people. 62

Perón’s relationship with the institutional Church was key to maintaining popular

support. As his regime progressed, the break in this relationship ensured a loss of power. His

political style relied on a projection of religious authority (as a Church-mandated leader).

Populism, for Juan Domingo Perón, was distinctly Catholic, but when he infringed upon the

jurisdiction of the institutional Catholic Church, he lost the support of both the institution and the

people.

60 D’Amico, 1977, p. 499 61 D’Amico, 1977 62 Silva, 1955

Fountain 32

The Institutional Catholic Church and the People

The relationship between the Catholic Church and the led in Argentina was unremarkably

close. Argentina’s population was still majority Catholic, and most Argentines were aware of the

position of the institutional Church as the authority on official Catholic matters. Closer ties 63

between religion and politics allowed for an individual to capture the love of the masses for

political gain by becoming a semi-religious figure herself. This was the role of Evita Duarte

Perón, Juan Perón’s beloved wife.

Working Argentines adored Evita. This is a simple fact, attested to by stacks of literature

proclaiming the goodness of this woman. While Evita was fundamentally a political figure (as

wife of the president and as an authority in the Department of Labor), she essentially became a

religious icon through her interaction with the masses. Eva had previously been a radionovela

star, and her skill as a captivating voice was prominently featured during the Peronato. Those

that heard her speak, as well as those who saw her either in person or broadcast over television

waves, recount an “overwhelming” spectacle. Without Eva, Juan likely would not have gained 64

the same level of popular support. Indeed, she was essential to his populist style. As a public 65

figure, Eva took great pains to ensure that her gifts to the poor (in providing appliances,

medicine, or even housing) were orchestrated in a way that was selfless and “purposefully

anti-bureaucratic.” This quality satisfies Knight’s condition that the populist rejects the 66

institutional standards and instead functions at the empathetic level of the masses. While her

63 D’Amico, 1977; Elena, 2011 64 Dawson, 2015 65 Patroni, 1999, p. 154 66 Elena, 2011, p. 140

Fountain 33

husband was known to adopt the slang of lower-class Argentines, Eva was the true conduit 67

between the people and political authority.

Evita’s material influence was most obviously represented in the work done by the

Fundación Eva Perón (Eva Perón Foundation, or FEP). This organization was founded in 1948,

and by 1954 had grown to have a budget larger than some federal institutions. The FEP was a 68

discretionary foundation, dedicated to uplifting the needy in whatever way Evita deemed best.

Letters poured in from all corners of Argentina, begging Eva for salvation; it was here that the

deification of Eva Perón began. She responded to these letters with generosity and grace, and

Juan Perón deftly amplified her rapport with the people through vigorous media promotion. One

such example is a cartoon of two children talking about going to the post office to pick up a toy.

When one asks who has sent this toy, he responds, “Don’t you know…? Evita!” Stories like 69

this were everywhere, promising a better life at the behest of Eva Perón. Her renowned

graciousness found its way into folklore (encouraged, no doubt, by the president). The letters that

arrived in the FEP office often contained discourse saturated with religious imagery, painting

Eva as a saint. One beneficiary of the FEP wrote that “all good Argentines” would “idolize”

Evita and “vote now and always” for Perón, acknowledging the joint supremacy of Eva and 70

Juan as both religious and political.

“You can hardly walk a hundred yards along a Buenos Aires street without encountering

a row of pictures of Juan Perón and his late wife, Evita. Every second hoarding bears the

legend: ‘Perón cumple, Evita dignifica’ (‘Perón does it, Evita graces it’). Another

67 Elena, 2011, p. 68 68 Elena, 2011, p. 124 69 Elena, 2011, p. 131 70 Elena, 2011, p. 147

Fountain 34

common notice runs: ‘Eternal glory to Evita Perón.’ At one street corner an eternal flame

burns before a bust of Evita, and bouquets of lilies are placed before it every day. Peasant

women in from the country sometimes kneel and pray before the bust, some of them

probably under the impression that it is the Virgin.” 71

That Evita could have been taken for la Virgen is an extraordinary sentiment. Her identification

with this Catholic figure tied the religious population to a political leader. This bridging of the

gap between Catholicism and secularism was manifested in Evita’s portrayal as this iconic leader

in the Chrisitan faith. There are countless investigations into Eva as a Mary-figure that was both

political and religious. Many of these accounts note that Eva took an active role in this portrayal,

in that she perpetuated her saintly status. Misemer gives an interesting take on this narrative,

blending the fairytale of Cinderella and the tradition of marianismo (worship of Mary) to explain

Evita’s specific importance to the masses. She was able to become a religious icon while 72

steadfastly remaining in her primary role as a political authority.

Notably, Eva was not a woman religious (as defined by one scholar of gender studies,

Mary Katzenstein): she held no official position in the Church. This does not mean that she 73

existed separately from the Church. In fact, there was a tradition in Latin America of female

symbolism relative to the Catholic Church, best described by Misemer in a 2008 work.

“Many saw women as being morally superior to men and therefore thought they should

be in charge of the morality of the nation. In this way, women were allowed to carve out

71 Silva, 1955 72 Misemer, 2008, p. 105 73 Katzenstein, 1998

Fountain 35

a niche in the mostly patriarchal system of Christianity that excluded them from the upper

echelons of power within the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.” 74

Eva used her status as a layperson to endear herself to Argentines; she was seen as a commoner,

coming from outside of both religious and political hierarchies. This plebeian origin story had its

political fairytale ending, and almost had a similarly quixotic conclusion in the religious world.

In 1952, news of Eva’s cancer and subsequent death rocked the nation.

“Evita’s death was a monumental theatrical event for the Argentine nation that lasted for

weeks. When news of her passing was announced, the city ground to a halt. Cinemas and

theaters closed down, interrupting movies and plays that were in progress; restaurants,

bars, and discotheques also closed immediately, leaving the city with an unusual

silence.” 75

This tragic moment was marked by national mourning, and in the days following her death, a

movement began to canonize Eva Perón formally. Her descamisados wanted their beloved

standard bearer to truly become Santa Evita. This request was denied by the Vatican, but 76 77

Eva’s informal position as a saint to the masses had already been established. Although she may

not have been Katzenstein’s woman religious, she was certainly a religious figure.

Critical literature concerning Eva’s active role in Perón’s rule was sparse until the 1970s,

when Perón’s return to Argentina prompted a resurgence in Evita’s idolization (and subsequently

in denunciations of her work). This likely is due to the restrictions on literature under Perón in

his first two terms: there exists a wealth of Peronist propaganda exalting Eva, and there are

74 Misemer, 2008, p. 108n8 75 Misemer, 2008, p. 109 76 Navarro, 1999 77 San Martín, 2019

Fountain 36

thousands of anecdotal accounts of her wonders. However, Perón did not permit the publication

of opposition literature, and this included any disparagement of his wife. It was not until the later

1950s, when Perón was overthrown and the succeeding authoritarian regime crumbled, that

critical scholarship began to appear. On a global scale, interest in Eva’s legacy was especially

piqued after the emergence of Andrew Lloyd Webber’s 1978 musical Evita and its 1996 film

adaptation. In years since, Eva has continued to captivate imaginations, and the request that she 78

be canonized was renewed (and denied) in 2019. Her religious status among the masses in 79

conjunction with Juan Perón’s worker-centric political platform is emblematic of this Catholic

populism.

78 Navarro, 1999 79 San Martín, 2019

Fountain 37

Chile

Salvador Allende and the People

In Chile, Salvador Allende’s 1970 election to the presidency was a victory for union

workers. In general, the relationship between Allende and these workers was positive, especially

when he was first elected. This can be seen through two labor groups: the Yarur textile factory

workers and the Central Única de Trabajadores (Central Union of Workers, or CUT). At the

time of his election, Allende was an established political figure, known for running socialist

campaigns for president. He was widely regarded to be “the voice of the people.” He shirked 80 81

the tradition of wearing formal dress for his inauguration, favoring the more plebeian business

suit. This emphasized Allende’s direct link to the people: he would be their voice, their leader. 82

His populist messaging paralleled religious teachings, although unlike Perón, he was not 83

deliberately presenting himself as religious. One might even apply the same directive of Vatican

II to his campaign message: Allende certainly hoped to embody a preferential love for the 84

common people. This loyalty to the people was read by Allende’s constituents as loyalty to the

80 Dawson, 2011 81 Winn, 1986, p. 66 82 Winn, 1986, p. 72 83 However, Allende himself was not working in conjunction with the Church. 84 The Puebla document, as referenced by Escobar (1986), declares “the Church’s preferential love for the common people.”

Fountain 38

social church and, more specifically, to liberation theology. In contrast to Perón, Allende’s 85

Catholic populism circumvented direct association with the institutional Catholic Church.

One specific factory serves as a case study for the relationship between blue collar

workers and Allende in the 1960s through his murder in 1973. In the Yarur textile factory,

workers became highly politicized on a national level in the years leading up to Allende’s

election. There was a union for these factory workers, but it was run by the Yarur family,

rendering it an unrepresentative organization. In the late 1960s, Amador Yarur (son of the

respected founder of this textile mill) owned the factory. Amador was widely regarded as a poor

imitation of his father, and was known to be steadfastly dedicated to the prevention and

expulsion of any communist ideology from his employees. Workers were aware of pernicious

soplones (informers) who would eagerly report any suspicious activities to Don Amador. 86

Amador worked hard to seed mistrust and to decentralize organization among his employees.

This strategy ultimately failed.

In the 1960s, worker demographics began to skew younger and more educated. These

workers increasingly came from larger cities or from migrant families, and brought with them a

powerful working-class identity and a strong sense of social solidarity. This change catalyzed 87

the activist movement within the factory as the 1970s neared. The new, younger employees felt

empowered to speak out against Don Amador and his regime, and small dissociated movements

began to grow within the Yarur factory. Various publications began to emerge around this time,

85 One expert in Chilean history notes that Allende “wanted people to make a conscious decision to participate in their own liberation.” (Figueroa, 2013) 86 Winn, 1986, p. 81 87 Winn, 1986, p. 84

Fountain 39

including La Firme. These publications spread leftist (often Marxist) ideology and encouraged

workers to defy Don Amador as well as to support popular presidential candidate Salvador 88

Allende. La Firme endorsed Allende as “the workers’ candidate” and openly mused that he

might bring “an independent union to the factory and the Yarurs’ reign of terror and exploitation

to an end.” 89

These Yarur workers function as a case study of Allende’s constituents. Don Amador had

previously allowed select candidates to speak at the factory, and in some strange calculation to

win back the favor of his workers, he allowed Salvador Allende to do the same in 1970 before

the national elections. Yet Amador’s graciousness was limited: although this speech was

permitted, attendance was heavily discouraged through various intimidation tactics. However,

despite these barriers, the speech was attended by around 500 workers. In this speech, Allende

spoke explicitly about how he would remove Don Amador from his leadership position and

return power to the workers. This injected the workers’ activist movement with immense 90

energy: although barely a handful of workers felt safe enough to applaud at the close of the

speech, there was tangible excitement within the factory to get Allende elected. Winn 91

concludes, “Chile’s workers might have been responsible for Allende’s nomination and surging

campaign, but he could claim credit, in turn, for enlarging and accelerating the worker’s

88 Winn, 1986, p. 97 89 Winn, 1986, p. 97 90 Winn, 1986, p. 99 91 According to one recollection, a measly four people in the audience expressed support of Allende in this way (Winn, 1986, p. 99).

Fountain 40

movement at the Yarur mill.” This symbiotic relationship is indicative of the capability of 92

Allende’s populism.

The Yarur workers aimed to regain control of their union. This desire was fulfilled after

Allende’s election in 1970 when his Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, or UP) party allied with the

Central Unica de Trabajadores. This alliance demonstrated Allende’s dedication to the people

and clearly promoted workers’ rights. Part of this deal was that workers (rather than managers or

owners) had to be involved in union management. This caveat reflects precisely the struggles of 93

the Yarur workers, and underlines the critical and reciprocal relationship between the leader and

the led. The UP-CUT agreement brought the workers even closer to the leaders, as CUT

functioned as a revolving door for political candidacy: leadership within CUT was a viable step

to becoming a national political leader.

Salvador Allende and the Institutional Catholic Church

Allende’s populism was not reliant on the institutional Church. This allowed his

constituents affiliated with liberation theology to comfortably support his political platform

without compromising their religious beliefs. While Allende never explicitly rejected the

Church, he implicitly distanced himself from the hierarchy. However, to retain a semblance of

power, the institutional Church had to continue to insist upon the unity of the Catholic

community, despite the growth of liberation theology. It is no surprise, then, that Allende did not

have a positive relationship with the formal Catholic Church. This stemmed from his socialist

92 Winn, 1986, p. 100 93 Zapata, 1976

Fountain 41

political views and his affiliation with the anticlerical Masons. The Church had spurned 94

Allende from early on, notably in its backing of Eduardo Frei against Allende in former

elections. This animosity did not change after Allende’s election. The institutional Church’s 95

alignment with middle-ground politics (embodied in part by the Christian Democratic party)

resulted in repeated condemnations of Allende’s left-wing views. While the messaging of both 96

may have been similar in looking to protect and uplift the poor, the Church was too dedicated to

eliminating potential communism in Chile to align with Allende.

In the years leading up to and during Allende’s leadership, the institutional Catholic

Church put out various statements that give valuable insight to its views on political events. As

late as 1970, the Church was still claiming unity between the formal hierarchy and base

communities, however, this unity did not exist. This disconnect is noted in comments 97

concerning the 1968 Plenary Assembly of Chillán, where members of the Catholic hierarchy

gathered to discuss the administration of the Church. The institutional Church recognized the 98

growing divide and strove to recommit to laypeople. In one resolution, the Conferencia

Episcopal de Chile (Episcopal Conference of Chile, or CECH) pledges that “the Bishop will seek

to support particularly the work of the people (priests, the religious and laity) who are more

engaged in these key points of social change.” These goals show that the Church was 99

concerned with the relationship between the hierarchy and the laypeople. Cardinal Archbishop

94 Winn, 1986, p. 55 95 Winn, 1986, p. 61 96 Winn, 1986, p. 66 97 CECH, “Pastoral Orientaciones III” (1970) 98 CECH, “Pastoral Orientaciones III” (1970) 99 CECH, “Pastoral Orientaciones III” (1970)

Fountain 42

Raúl Silva Henríquez was the highest ranking Catholic authority in Chile at this time. On July

20, 1970 (months before Allende’s September election), Henríquez released a written statement

concerning the intertwined character of the Church and the state.

“A Christian does not cease to be a citizen. On the contrary: his same faith, his Baptism,

commits him forever to a supportive Christ, servant and liberator of his brothers. And that

will mean, to some extent depending on his vocation, some kind of participation in

political life.” 100

In this speech, Henríquez declared the importance of a formal church that does not engage with

politics. His call for unity overshadowed all else, and though he recognized that a Christian

person is certainly a political citizen, he insisted that the Catholic Church itself will not endorse

one particular political option. This argument is an optimistic one: the Church has always

demonstrated certain political preferences. Instead, this statement may be read to indicate a 101

distancing from more activist grassroots movements claiming ties to Catholicism, such as the

social groups to which many union workers belonged. Henríquez’s call for harmony is, in fact, a

recognition of deep discord. The Archbishop simply requested that politics be left out of any

religious conversations; liberation theology and Catholic activism were, however, too far gone –

this apoliticism was never an option. Henríquez closed his speech aspiring for “a Church that

does not want to win votes, but educates in the faith it loves and expects.” The first part of this 102

goal directly contradicted Allende’s campaign strategy of “collecting consciences” rather than

100 Henríquez, “Iglesia, Sacerdocio y Política” (1970) 101 I mean this to say that the Church is a large enough body that it is always political; even a claim that it is abstaining from politics is a political claim. 102 Henríquez, “Iglesia, Sacerdocio y Política” (1970)

Fountain 43

votes; try as the Church might, the politician cannot disregard the electoral strength of a 103

religiously motivated voting base.

With Allende’s election, the traditionally robust relationship between the formal Church

and the leader was visibly strained. In previous years, the CECH had sent a delegation to visit the

winning candidate in the presidential election at the close of the nationwide vote. However, on

September 2nd, 1970, Carlos Oviedo Cavada, the Secretary General of the CECH, issued a

statement notifying president-elect Allende that he would not be receiving this same visit.

Oviedo claimed that this was due to the unusual circumstances of the election, in that Allende

had received a plurality rather than an absolute majority. However, this is an indicator of the

distance between the socialist president and the traditionalist Church. This was precisely the

widespread interpretation by the media, as Oviedo was pressured to issue another statement

denying this implied disagreement in the days following this announcement. 104

This turmoil prompted many more statements from the CECH. Notably, on September

24th, the Plenary Assembly of the Conference felt compelled to issue yet another explanation. 105

This opened with the insistence, “No one in Chile wants to see the episcopate or the clergy acting

in politics. Neither do we.” This strong stance was undermined in the following sentiment: “But

the country is living in tense hours. Of joy and hope for some, of fear and anguish for others.

That is why we are going to give our opinion about the present moment that we want to be

inspired only by the Lord’s opinion.” This statement then appealed once again for an open 106

103 Figueroa, 2013 104 Oviedo, “Declaración… Sobre la visita de los representantes…” (1970) 105 Asamblea Plenaria, “Declaración de los obispos chilenos sobre la situación…” (1970) 106 Asamblea Plenaria, “Declaración de los obispos chilenos sobre la situación…” (1970)

Fountain 44

dialogue – it lamented the divide in the Catholic community. This prompts the question, was this

community ever truly cohesive?

The Institutional Catholic Church and the People

The answer to this question lies with the organizations that sprung up among the social

church. Christians for Socialism was one such religious group that explicitly marketed itself as

political, to the point that it collaborated with the leadership of the Unidad Popular. This 107

organization stemmed from an April 1971 meeting of the Group of 80, which was a summit of

priests and other Catholic laypeople inspired by the teachings of liberation theology. In July of

the same year, a similar Group of 200 priests met for reflection. This swelling social movement

of priests infuriated the CECH. The Conferencia Episcopal de Chile responded to a 1972

meeting of Christians for Socialism in a scathing letter which reiterated the institutional

Church’s distaste of directly mixing the religious with the political.

“We have insisted, and we insist again, our priests must refrain from taking partisan

political positions publicly. The opposite would be to return to a surpassed clericalism

that nobody wants to see appear again.” 108

Any preconceptions of unity and harmony, which had been preached two years earlier, fell away,

with the decisive condemnation from Oviedo after a lack of response to the organization of the

Latin American meeting of Christians for Socialism.

107 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972) 108 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972)

Fountain 45

“We would not be pleased if our silence could be interpreted as approval of that meeting.

Nor would we be pleased if this same silence was used to obtain the presence or

participation of representatives of other Episcopates in that meeting.” 109

In a more conciliatory tone, the Bishop then remarked,

“However, we would be very pleased to hear from the Bishops of that Conference about

the organization of these priestly groups, their connection with the local Hierarchy and

the future April meeting.” 110

This middle point is of most interest: Oviedo acknowledges that there was a failure of connection

between this sizable group of activist priests and the “local Hierarchy,” or the formal Church.

Once again, this highlighted the break between the religious authorities and their

constituencies. 111

When dealing with the perspective of this constituent population, the relationship

between the institutional Church and the people was weak. Instead, Catholicism manifested in 112

the form of social groups – either explicitly established base communities or the more informal

youth groups. Many people in the Yarur worker community were members of (or had grown up

as members of) various groups aimed at promoting health and companionship. These athletic

groups became focal points of the community and served as accidental forums for religious

109 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972) 110 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972) 111 Another interesting document here was issued by the CECH in 1973 (in August, mere weeks before the golpe de estado that removed Allende from power). Titled “Christian Faith and Political Action,” this clearly enunciates the ideals of the formal church as directly in contrast to its informal counterpart. 112 Winn, 1986, p. 85: “The Catholic church, to which most Chileans nominally belonged, was particularly weak among working-class males, whose religious experience was often limited to the major rites of passage and annual holidays.”

Fountain 46

development. This religious development was therefore dissociated from the institutional 113

Catholic Church – like a game of telephone, the formal messaging was interpreted and

reinterpreted to the point that it no longer resembled the apolitical goodwill of the Vatican nor

the “gospel of social harmony and peaceful reform” beloved by the Christian Democratic

party. 114

The unity formed among these workers through this shared religio-political experience

directly shaped the conversation around union power. The ideas communicated via these social

church outposts allowed workers to forge a strong ideological connection which boosted their

ability to bond in the face of oppression from Amador Yarur and his control of the company

union. In this way, religion – and the bond formed by Catholic-based groups – empowered

workers to take back ownership of their union and to exercise their collective power. In turn, the

empowerment of workers served as the platform upon which Allende marketed his claim to

political influence.

113 Winn, 1986, p. 84 114 Winn, 1986, p. 85

Fountain 47

Conclusions

Church and state cannot be separated in lived experience. While this is a useful tactic for

academic purposes, in reality, humans will always be inextricably tied to both religion and

politics – both are realms that aim to shape the very way in which we live. However, these two

dimensions are rarely considered together in the study of populism. Perón and Allende both

serve to show the value of explaining value through a political as well as a religious lens. To

varying degrees, each leader gained authority through a populism that blended religion and

politics. This blend is particularly relevant given the wave of populism that has recently swept

the globe. Presidents and prime ministers are using these same blended populist tactics to win

support, and responsibility falls to the electorate (every one of us) to understand the respective

implications. That is, invocations of God are politically effective; and the Church is always

political.

Juan Perón’s rule in Argentina can be viewed as the precursor to Salvador Allende’s rule

in Chile. The two men came from different sides of the political spectrum – where Perón was a

conservative traditionalist, Allende was a progressive socialist – but shared much in terms of

their style of leadership. However, their regimes were significantly different, thanks to a stark

change in the role of the Catholic Church over time. Going back even further, Juan Manuel de

Rosas fits this model. His proto-populism set the stage for Perón’s veiled authoritarianism, which

gave way to Allende’s personalist grassroots presidency. In this earliest iteration, the Catholic

Church sat as the clear dominant power in society and lent its power to Rosas, and there was

little to no conflict between the Church and the state.

Fountain 48

In Perón’s time, the Church occupied a different role. Increasing plurality in the religious

composition of the country necessitated the leadership of an areligious figure, and so Perón was

mandated to represent the interests of the people. However, the Church was still viewed

favorably by the population: while democratic development pushed the Church out of official

political (de jure) authority, it retained its de facto spiritual leadership. Perón tapped into this

leadership and sought to redirect the support of the people from the institutional Catholic Church

to his Peronist political platform.

Finally, Allende’s populism was distinct in that he challenged the Catholic Church. He

sidestepped the previously required alliance with the institution and instead sought loyalty

directly from the voters – a loyalty that was built upon a religious-like devotion. This heavy

emphasis on individuals logically led to a strong link between Allende’s leadership and labor

unions, in that labor unions represented a form of social organization that was not explicitly

religious.

Both Perón and Allende lost political power abruptly and violently. While Perón was

excommunicated and exiled, Allende was murdered in the presidential palace during Augusto

Pinohet’s golpe de estado. Both leaders were succeeded by military dictatorships, which in their

own ways fostered special relationships with the Catholic Church. This mode of expulsion gives

way to a form of political martyrdom which, when in conjunction with the scope of these 115

leaders’ populist bases, has resulted in a staggering legacy. Millions of Argentines and Chileans

today recognize Perón and Allende as national symbols of the people.

115 Perón did come back to Argentina and in 1973 was once again elected as president, but promptly died, leaving behind an unremarkable third term.

Fountain 49

Religion and politics shape each of our lives. These two great forces have always been

the architects of society. The study of populism allows for an understanding of how these forces

interact, and gives us insight into the causes and consequences of our political choices.

Fountain 50

Sources Cited and Consulted

Adriance, Madeleine. “The Paradox of Institutionalization: The Roman Catholic Church in Chile and Brazil.” Sociological Analysis, vol. 53, 1992, pp. S51–62. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3711250.

Alston, Lee, and Andrés Gallo. “Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Perón and Demise of Checks and

Balances in Argentina.” National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009, doi:10.3386/w15209.

Asamblea Plenaria de CECH. “Declaración de los Obispos Chilenos sobre la Situación Actual

del País.” Conferencia Episcopal De Chile, 24 Sept. 1970, www.iglesia.cl/846-declarac ion-de-los-obispos-chilenos-sobre-la-situación-actual-del-país.htm.

Asamblea Plenaria de CECH. “Orientaciones Pastorales III 1970.” Conferencia Episcopal De

Chile, 1 Mar. 1970, www.iglesia.cl/985-orientaciones-pastorales-iii-1970.htm. Badanelli, Pedro. Perón, La Iglesia y Un Cura. Tartessos, 1959. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. “More than Ideology: The Conflation of Populism with the Left in

Latin America.” Harvard International Review, vol. 28, no. 2, 2006, pp. 14–7. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/42763105.

Comité Permanente. “Fe Cristiana y Actuación Política (Primera Parte).” Conferencia Episcopal

De Chile, 1 Aug. 1973, www.iglesia.cl/146-fe-cristiana-y-actuacion-politica-prim era-parte.htm.

Cook, Guillermo, and J. B. Libanio. “Base Ecclesial Community: A Protestant Perspective.”

Transformation, vol. 3, no. 3, 1986, pp. 5–11. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43052951. Copello, Cardenal Santiago Luis. “Pastoral colectiva sobre los deberes de los Cristianos en el

momento actual.” Conferencia Episcopal Argentina, 1945, www.episcopado.org/docum entos.php?área=1&tit_gral=Documentos%20hist%C3%B3ticos#10.

Cruz, Joel Morales. “Latin America.” The Histories of the Latin American Church: A Handbook,

Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis, 2014, pp. 3–16, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9m0t2k.7. D'Amico, David F. “Religious Liberty in Argentina during the First Perón Regime, 1943-1955.”

Church History, vol. 46, no. 4, 1977, pp. 490–503. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3164442.

Davis, Harold Eugene. “The Presidency in Chile.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4,

1985, pp. 707–24. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27550272.

Fountain 51

Dawson, Alexander. Latin America Since Independence: A History with Primary Sources.

Routledge, Second edition. 2014. De Grandis, Rita. “The Masses Do Not Think, They Feel.’” Canadian Journal of Latin American

and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines Et Caraïbes, vol. 24, no. 48, 1999, pp. 125–32. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41800100.

Domecq, H. Bustos (Borges, Bioy). “La Fiesta Del Monstruo.” Montevideo Marcha, 30 Sept.

1947, pp. 20–3. Elena, Eduardo. Dignifying Argentina: Peronism, Citizenship, and Mass Consumption.

University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011. Echeverría, Esteban. El Matadero. Centro Editor de America Latina, 1871. Escobar, Samuel. “Christian Base Communities: A Historical Perspective.” Transformation, vol.

3, no. 3, 1986, pp. 1–4. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43052950. “Evita Perón Historical Research Foundation.” Evita Perón Historical Research Foundation,

Family of Eva Perón, 2011, www.evitaperon.org/. Figueroa, Victor. “Chile: Salvador Allende 40 Years On.” Socialist Lawyer, no. 64, 2013, pp.

14–6. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/socialistlawyer.64.0014. Goebel, Michael. “Between Co-Optation and Opposition: Peronism, Nationalism and the Politics

of History, 1943–55.” Argentina’s Partisan Past: Nationalism and the Politics of History, 1st ed., vol. 11, Liverpool University Press, 2011, pp. 65–107. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vjfdc.7.

Gutiérrez, Gustavo. A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation. Maryknoll, New

York. Orbis Books. 1973. Henríquez, Raúl Silva. “Iglesia, Sacerdocio y Política.” Conferencia Episcopal De Chile.

Intervención Del Sr. Cardenal Arzobispo De Santiago En Teletrece Del Lunes 20 De Julio De 1970, 20 July 1970, www.iglesia.cl/848-iglesia-sacerdocio-y-politica-intervenc ion-del-sr-cardenal-arzobispo-de-santiago-en-teletrece-del-lunes-20-de-julio-de-1970.htm

. James, Daniel. “Doña Maria’s Story: Life History, Memory, and Political Identity.” Duke

University Press Books. 2001. Knight, Alan. “Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico.” Journal of

Latin American Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 1998, pp. 223–248. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/158525.

Fountain 52

Kurth, James. “The Vatican's Foreign Policy.” The National Interest, no. 32, 1993, pp. 40–52.

JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/42896845. Marsal, Pablo. Perón y La Iglesia . Rex, 1955. Misemer, Sarah M. “Corpse And Corpus: The Incorruptible Santa Evita.” Secular Saints:

Performing Frida Kahlo, Carlos Gardel, Eva Perón, and Selena, Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, NY, 2008, pp. 97–124. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt9qdmrn.7.

Navarro, Marysa. “Wonder Woman Was Argentine and Her Real Name Was Evita.” Canadian

Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 24, no. 48, 1999, pp. 133–152. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41800101. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020

Oviedo Cavada, Carlos. “Carta Circular De Mons. Carlos Oviedo, Secretario General De La

CECH, a Los Presidentes De Conferencias Episcopales De América Latina, Sobre Reunión Latinoamericana De ‘Cristianos Por El Socialismo’", En Santiago De Chile.” Conferencia Episcopal De Chile, 12 Jan. 1972, www.iglesia.cl/119-carta-circular-de-mons-carlos-oviedo-secretario-general-de-la-cech-a-los-presidentes-de-conferencias-episcopales-de-america-latina-sobre-reunion-latinoamericana-de-cristianos-por-el-socialismo-en-santiago-de-chile.htm.

Oviedo Cavada, Carlos. “Declaración De Mons. Carlos Oviedo, Secretario General De La

CECH, Sobre La Visita De Los Representantes De La Conferencia Episcopal a Candidato Triunfante En Las Elecciones.” Conferencia Episcopal De Chile, 2 Sept. 1970, www.iglesia.cl/847-declaracion-de-mons-carlos-oviedo-secretario-general-de-la-cech-sobre-la-visita-de-los-representantes-de-la-conferencia-episcopal-a-candidato-triunfante-en-las-elecciones.htm.

Patroni, Viviana. “A Discourse Of Love And Hate: Eva Perón And The Labour Movement

(1940s-1950s).” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 24, no. 48, 1999, pp. 153–75. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41800102.

Perón, Juan Domingo. “Del Poder al Exilio.” 1958, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Speech. Perón, Juan Domingo. “This Is the Suffering People That Represent the Pain of the Motherland.”

1945. Edited by Maria Alejandra Vitale, African Yearbook of Rhetoric, vol. 6, no. 2, 2015, pp. 55-60. http://www.africanrhetoric.org/Pdf/Ayor%206.2%208%20Juan%2 0Peron%20-%20This%20is%20the%20suffering%20people%20that%20represent%20the%20pain%20of%20the%20motherland.pdf.

Pike, Fredrick B. “Church and State and Political Development in Chile.” Journal of Church and

State, vol. 10, no. 1, 1968, pp. 99–113. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23913837.

Fountain 53

Power, Margaret. “The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election.” Diplomatic History, vol. 32, no. 5, 2008, pp. 931–53. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24915965.

San Martín, Inés. “Argentine Union Wants Evita to Be Saint, Church Says 'Not so Fast'.” Crux,

Crux Catholic Media Inc., 2019, cruxnow.com/church-in-the-americas/2019/05/argentine-union-wants-evita-to-be-saint-church-says-not-so-fast/.

Silva, M. F. X. Da. “Inside Perón's Argentine.” The Furrow, vol. 6, no. 8, 1955, pp. 475–88.

JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27656736. Sigmund, Paul E. “Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution?” Oxford

University Press, 2011. Sigmund, Paul E. “Revolution, Counterrevolution, and the Catholic Church in Chile.” The

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 483, 1986, pp. 25–35. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1045537.

Stern, Steve J. “The Memory Box of Pinochet's Chile: Memory Struggles in Pinochet's Chile,

1973-1988.” Vol. 1-3, Duke Univ. Press, 2006. Sywulka, Stephen R. “A Latin American Evangelical View Of Base Communities.”

Transformation, vol. 3, no. 3, 1986, pp. 29–30. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43052957. Thompson, E. P. “Homage to Salvador Allende.” History Workshop, no. 34, 1992, pp. 177–8.

JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4289190. Weyland, Kurt. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American

Politics.” Comparative Politics, vol. 34, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–22. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/422412.

Wilson Center. “Alan Knight.” Wilson Center, 2012, www.wilsoncenter.org/person/alan-knight.

Winn, Peter. “Weavers of Revolution: the Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism.”

Oxford University Press, 1986. Zapata, Francisco S. “The Chilean Labor Movement under Salvador Allende: 1970-1973.” Latin

American Perspectives, vol. 3, no. 1, 1976, pp. 85–97. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2633254.