Collateral Damage Final Document

7/29/2019 Collateral Damage Final Document

1/29

Collateral Damage: A U.S. Strategy in War?

*BYMarcus Raskin and Devin West

RESEARCH AND GRAPH CONTRIBUTIONS BYEmma MarshakPaths For Reconstruction in the 21st Century

A PROJECT OFTHE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIESOctober 10, 2008


2/29

Contents

I . SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................... 3KEY FINDINGS............................................................................................................................................ 3

I I. COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN INTRODUCTION...........................................................................5

II I . PROPORTIONATE SELF-DEFENSE VS. AGGRESSIVE WAR................................................... 6

INITIAL NUMBERS AND BANNED WEAPONS ...............................................................................................6AONCEHELD AMERICAN VIEW ON WAR AND RECKLESSENDANGERMENT ............................................. 7AMERICAN RECKLESSNESS AND FALLUJAH................................................................................................8

THE U.S.REJECTION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY ................................................................................9

IV. BODY COUNTS .................................................................................................................................. 10

DEATH IN AFGHANISTAN..........................................................................................................................10

DEATH IN IRAQ.........................................................................................................................................10V. PUBL IC RELATIONS CAMPAIGNS................................................................................................ 13

HIDING THETRUTH .................................................................................................................................. 13THE LIES THAT LEAD TO INVASION..........................................................................................................14CREATING FALSE LEGITIMACY ................................................................................................................. 15

VI . THE L IGHT FOOTPRINT: BOMBS AND VIOLENCE ................................................................ 16

VIOLENCE AND WASTE ............................................................................................................................16MASKING OF THE INTENTIONAL AND RECKLESS ...................................................................................... 19

COLLATERAL DAMAGE: REFUGEE FL IGHT .................................................................................21

THE BURDEN OF WAR: COSTS TO THE US.....................................................................................22

U.S.PERSONNEL COSTS ...........................................................................................................................22FINANCIAL COSTS .................................................................................................................................... 22

CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................................24

ENDNOTES................................................................................................................................................ 26

*Front cover image by Adwoa Masozi. Adapted from a photo by Brice Canonne.


3/29

Summary

or decades, U.S. military officials

have used the euphemism collateraldamage to refer to the deaths of ci-vilians and destruction of property

that resulted from military operations. As apublic relations device, this term has helpedmask the true toll of aggressive actions andgiven the impression that any harm inflictedwas purely unintentional. Military officials alsorepeatedly assert that they make every effortto minimize these accidental results. As for-mer Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeldstated in an ABC interview shortly after the

Iraq invasion in 2003, Our preference is, as acountry, to have as little collateral damage aspossible.

The reality is that the U.S. military hasmade very little effort to avoid massive de-struction in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistanand in some cases, policies and practices seemintended to drive up the level of devastation.

This report provides an analysis of inter-national laws related to the use of aggressiveforce; assesses the death toll from the wars inIraq and Afghanistan; describes the militarypolicies that have driven up the level of devas-

tation and the public relations campaignsaimed at masking those impacts. It concludeswith a description of the costs of the war toIraqis and Americans.

Key Findings

1) The government uses the followingpublic relations tactics to mask thetrue toll of the current U.S. wars:

Banning photographers on U.S.military bases from covering the ar-rival of caskets containing the re-mains of U.S. soldiers killed over-seas;

Paying Iraqi journalists to writepositive accounts of the U.S. wareffort;

Inviting U.S. journalists to "em-bed" with military units but requir-ing them to submit their stories forpre-publication review;

Erasing journalists' footage ofcivilian deaths in Afghanistan; and

Refusing to disclose statisticsand information on civilian casual-ties.

2) The military has several policiesand practices that boost death and de-struction rates:

Immunity for contractors: For-mer head of the Coalition Provi-sional Authority L. Paul Bremergave security contractors a greenlight to act recklessly in 2004 whenhe declared all contractors immunefrom prosecution.

Impunity for top-level officialsand decision-makers: Only ahandful of people have beencharged with crimes related to thewars, and almost all who have areenlisted soldiers. Given the impu-nity enjoyed by those at the top, of-ficers and civilian policymakers faceless pressure to ensure that troopsunder their command behave in aprofessional and restrained manneron the battlefield.

Implementation of the lightfootprint policy: In the initialphases of the invasion, the militarydecided to rely on heavy bombingto keep the number of troops onthe ground as low as possible. Thislight footprint policy was a majorfactor in the uncontrolled and

F

3


4/29

widespread looting and violencethat erupted during this period.

Failure to distinguish betweencivilians and military targets:

U.S. troops have been directed toshoot indiscriminately at vehiclesand people who act suspiciouslyaround checkpoints and militaryconvoys, resulting in numerous in-stances of innocent victims.

3) Costs:

Death toll: As many as a millionIraqis have died as a result of thewar. Thus far, the Pentagon has

paid $42.4 million in compensationor condolence payments to victims.If those funds had been distributedequally among more than a millionvictims, it would have come to$41.05 per person.

Refugees: Five-and-a-half yearsinto the Iraq War, Iraqis are nowthe second-largest group of dis-placed people in the world, totalingmore than five million citizens.

U.S. expenditures: Instead of theexpected $60 billion predicted bysupporters of the war before theinvasion, more than $650 billionhas been spent in the past fiveyears.

Deaths and injuries to U.S.troops: In addition to the morethan 37,000 dead or physically in-jured, an estimated 19% of all thosewho have served suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.

Suicides among U.S. troops:The U.S. government does nottrack suicides among veterans, buta CBS investigation suggests thatthe suicide rate among veterans is

more than double the rate for therest of the population.

4


5/29

Collateral Damage: An Introduction

hat do American officials callthe bombing and killing of in-nocent civilians? Collateraldamage. This seemingly neu-

tral term obscures what is known about war,helping to ensure that operations behind col-lateral damage, especially those that may vio-late international or U.S. laws against warcrimes, are very lightly investigated or not atall. For decades now, government public rela-tions campaigns have used the phrase collat-eral damage with the aim of inducing

thoughtlessness and passivity within the citi-zenry. The public relations campaigns thathave accompanied the wars in Afghanistanand Iraq have endeavored to induce this sameresponse.

The American public has a difficult timediscerning what is currently happening on theground in Afghanistan and Iraq because ofpublic relations campaigns waged by the U.S.government. Lack of coverage and analysis onthe wars from mainstream news outlets createfurther challenges to comprehending the costsof fighting these wars. However, in the newage of the War on Terror, knowing the costsof such operations is of the utmost impor-tance for the American public. The War onTerror has ushered in a period of open-ended,indefinite, and indeterminate war. In the nameof pre-emptive self-defense, the Bush admini-stration has justified its actions as essential toprotect our national security. Understandingthe costs of these policies in terms of destruc-tion to life, property, and social systems aswell as the monetary costs is critical, particu-larly for the younger generations that will bear

the brunt of the economic and social conse-quences.

As this report documents, in Iraq and Af-ghanistan, environments of impunity are cou-pled with a lack of distinction between civilianpopulations and an enemy that U.S. officialsbelieve must be destroyed. Consequently, al-most anyone can be labeled as an enemy to

justify U.S. actions, regardless of the expenseto the civilian populations.

5


6/29

Proportionate Self-Defense vs.

Aggressive Actionrticle 2(4) of the UN charter main-tains a general prohibition on forceand only considers its use accept-able as a means of legitimate self-

defense in the event of an attack on a nation.In a paper for the American Society of Inter-national Laws Task Force on Terrorism, lawprofessor Mary Ellen OConnell writes that anation may use force to repel an attack in pro-

gress, or to prevent future attacks followingan initial attack.1 In addition, the use of forceas a means of self-defense must also be bothnecessary and proportional. This means theremust be convincing evidence not merely ofthreats and potential danger but of an attackbeing actually mountedand any possible civiliancasualties must be weighed in the balance soto not cause destruction to civilian life orproperty that is disproportionate to the objec-tive of self-defense. Otherwise, the use offorce, regardless of claims to self-defense, is

viewed as an aggressive act.

Initial Numbers andBanned Weapons

The issue of proportionality of force dur-ing self-defense raises concerns about the U.S.response to the September 11 attacks. Theseattacks resulted in the deaths of 2,974 people.Yet in the first eight-and-a-half weeks of theAfghanistan War and six weeks of the Iraq

War at least 10,406 civilians were killed.2 Thisis more than three times the people killed inthe September 11 attacks. Additionally the use

of cluster bombs, napalm, and depleted

It is worth noting that in 2008 over 100 countries agreed toban the use and production of cluster bombs because of the

bombs indiscriminate nature. Cluster bombs release hundreds

of smaller explosive bomblets, many of which do not explode

upon hitting the ground. The remaining bomblets, like land-

uranium (DU) in both Afghanistan andIraq further suggest that civilian casualtieswere not weighed in the balance when theUnited States undertook the use of force.3

mines, kill and maim victims long after their original purpose

has expired. Cluster bombs released over Afghanistan were the

same color, yellow, as the emergency food packets that were

airdropped for the starving populations residing within thebombed areas, causing untold deaths of people who mistook

bombs for food.

In 1980, the UN banned the use of napalm, deeming it a

weapon which was indiscriminate and excessively injurious; na-

palm ignites and sticks to structures and bodies killing initially

through immolation and asphyxiation. Those who survive the

initial effects suffer intensely painful and severe burns that

eventually kill many of the victims. In Iraq the Pentagon ini-

tially denied using napalm, claiming the military had destroyed

its last batch in 2001. U.S. officials were later forced to admit to

using napalm after soldiers reported its use. Col. Randolph

Alles, who commanded Marine Air Group 11, based at Mira-

mar Marine Corps Air Station, told a reporter, the generals

love napalm. It has a big psychological effect. (San Diego Un-

ion-Tribune, August 5, 2003). Like the use of cluster bombs,

the United States did not ratify the treaty ban on napalm and

continued to develop and use the chemical.

DU (depleted uranium) munitions, whose use is considered

illegal by the UN Sub Commission on Human Rights, were also

used by the United States in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Once

fired, DU does not stop after hitting the wall of a building like

traditional rounds. Instead DU penetrates through many houses

before slowing down, killing anyone along its path. This brutal

fact makes the use of DU projectiles particularly dangerous to

civilians when used in densely populated areas. Moreover, DU

ignites into a radioactive aerosol burning at incredibly high

temperatures while releasing the substance into the environ-

ment. This radioactive material can be absorbed into the bodiesof inhabitants of the area, leading to adverse health problems

and affecting the population years after the wars have ended.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported that highly populated

areas where DU was used were, contaminated with abnormally

high levels of radiation. Some scientist, such as Dr. Rosie Ber-

tell, president of the International Institute of Concern for Pub-

lic Health and editor in chief of International Perspectives in

Public Health, have claimed that DU exposure is consistent

with Gulf War Syndrome.

6


7/29

A Once-Held AmericanView on War and Reck-less Endangerment

In the War on Terror, the ability to en-gage in military conflict has been simplifiedand streamlined under the guise of nationalsecurity. Under the U.S. Constitution, the de-cision to carry out war is not to be takenlightly. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower, afive-star general and Supreme Commander ofthe Allied forces, stated,

Every gun that is made, every warshiplaunched, every rocket fired signifies in the fi-nal sense, a theft from those who hunger andare not fed, those who are cold and are notclothed. This world in arms is not spendingmoney alone. It is spending the sweat of itslaborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopesof its children. This is not a way of life at all inany true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is

humanity hanging on a cross of iron.4

War brings inescapable destruction, and

for that reason resorting to violent engage-ment is restricted under international treatiesand laws unless it is essential for a nationsself-defense. Even then, war must be carried

out with intense effort to minimize its effectson innocent lives. Engaging in reckless, exces-sive, aggressive war carries the possibility ofdisadvantageous consequences and personalpunishment, as leaders and commanders ofthe Axis powers during World War II and theformer Yugoslavia in the 1990s found. Cer-tainly future generations will also look at theU.S. actions during this period not only tojudge, but also as a cautionary tale about waritself. Engaging in policies and actions thatrecklessly endanger civilian populations and

destroy their well-being can quickly turn sup-port into hatred, driving people to take uparms against the United States and any othernation or group thought to be assisting Amer-ica. If aggressive U.S. acts multiply, the abilityto justify military action will become more dif-ficult and resistance against the slaughter ofmillions will rightly solidify around the world.Other nations will not look kindly at the kill-

ing of millions, particularly when justificationfor using violence is questionable and theproportion of destruction caused in responseto the September 11 attacks greatly outweighsthe destruction caused by those initial attacks.

In the course of the wars with Iraq andAfghanistan there have been numerous allega-tions of war crimes, including crimes againstpeace and crimes against humanity. At theNuremberg trials U.S. chief counsel JusticeRobert Jackson made it clear that the U.S.view was one that held the highest Germanofficials responsible for war crimes and crimesagainst peace. Jackson said:

We must make clear to the Germans that thewrong for which their fallen leaders are on tri-al is not that they lost the war, but that they

started it. And we must not allow ourselves tobe drawn into a trial of the causes of the war,for our position is that no grievances or poli-cies will justify resort to aggressive war. It isutterly renounced and condemned as an in-strument of policy.5

Thus, Jackson intended to lay out a mark-er of responsibility that was later applied inthe Yamashitacase by the U.S. Supreme Court.Yamashita, a General of Japans Imperial Ar-my, was charged by the United States with"unlawfully disregarding and failing to dis-

charge his duty as a commander to control theacts of members of his command by permit-ting them to commit war crimes."6 Beneaththe idea of command responsibility lurks per-sonal responsibility. Officials cannot defendthemselves with claims of "superior orders"when they, or any reasonable person, wouldknow that the actions taken would increaseharm without concern for civilians. A policyof war in which the deaths and suffering ofcivilian populations are of no concern pro-duce a practice and pattern of activities willtend to fall within the legal framework of

crimes against peace and against humanity. Tohave no concern for a civilian population dur-ing war indicates a totalist view where all peo-ple of a country are seen as the enemy. Total-ism, the state of unrestricted power of gov-ernment, denies proportionality. The onlymission is to destroy the enemy with no con-cern for restraint. For example, viewing theattacks on Fallujah (explained in more detail

7


8/29

later in the next section) within the totalistcategory is hardly a stretch and should be ex-amined as a key model of U.S. recklessnessand disproportional use of force against theenemy. As Justice Jackson said, If certain acts

of violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimeswhether the United States does them or whether Ger-many does them, and we are not prepared to lay downa rule of criminal conduct against others which wewould not be willing to have invoked against us.7

A reasonable person would know that ter-rible harm would result from pursuing a strat-egy that could fall into the definition and legalframework for war crimes. When applied towar, reckless endangerment results in a strat-egy gone bad where intentions were hard todiscern but the results, and therefore the im-plications, became obvious for the actors.Reckless endangerment has the followingelements in law and must be evaluated in eachcase: (1) That the accused did engage in con-duct; (2) That the conduct was wrongful andreckless or wanton; (3) That the conduct waslikely to produce death or grievous bodilyharm to another person; and (4) That, underthe circumstances, the conduct of the accusedwas to the prejudice of good order and disci-pline in the armed forces or was of a nature tobring discredit upon the armed forces.8

Reckless conduct is conduct that exhibits

a culpable disregard of foreseeable conse-quences to others from the act or omissioninvolved. The accused need not intentionallycause a resulting harm or know that his con-duct is substantially certain to cause that re-sult. The ultimate question is whether, underall the circumstances, the accuseds conductwas of heedless nature causing imminent dan-gers to the rights or safety of others. It iswithin this context that the assaults on theIraqi city of Fallujah can be evaluated. The ex-tent of force used by U.S. military personnel is

astounding and highlights the way that theUnited States has been engaging force in theWar on Terror.

American Recklessnessand Fallujah

Fallujah was one of the most stable areas

of Iraq after the invasion and the arrival ofU.S. soldiers was received peacefully. How-ever, after the killing of 17 Iraqi civilians byU.S. forces during a nonviolent protest, andthe news of the U.S. abuse, torture, sodomy,and killing of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prisonin 2004, tensions quickly mounted within thecity, causing violence to erupt. Eventually thecity was taken siege and reinvaded twice byU.S. forces. Today the city is mostly ruined,with 60% of buildings damaged or destroyedand a population that is only 30%-50% the

size it was before the U.S. siege.9This was precipitated by the killing of

four security personnel from Blackwater USA,a private contractor whose freewheeling mer-cenaries were operating in the city. Iraqishung their dead bodies from a bridge on theoutskirts of Fallujah. Top U.S. officials prom-ised an overwhelming response to the kill-ings that would pacify the city. The assaulton Fallujah began on April 4. Marines, backedby air support, bombarded the city with mor-tars, bombs, missiles, and cannon roundsfrom gunships. Snipers were used heavily dur-

ing the assault and were reportedly told to fireon anyone of military age, regardless ofwhether or not they were armed. Both Al-Jazeera and the Associated Press reported onthe snipers as well as the use of cluster bombsin the highly populated city:

A spokesman for an Iraqi delegation fromthe violence-gripped city of Fallujah on Mon-day accused U.S. troops of using internation-ally banned cluster bombs against the cityMohammed Tareq, a spokesman for the gov-erning council of Fallujah and a member of

the four-person delegation, said U.S. militarysnipers were also responsible for the deaths of

many children, women and elderly people. 10

The U.S. military destroyed the Nazzal

Emergency Hospital in the center of townand occupied the Fallujah General Hospital,prohibiting doctors and ambulances access tothe main part of the city to help the wounded a direct violation of the Geneva Conven-

8


9/29

tions. The U.S. attacks took a heavy toll on ci-vilians as well as insurgents, stimulating grow-ing criticism from the Iraqi Governing Coun-cil, where one official stated, "these opera-tions by the Americans are unacceptable and

illegal."11

On April 9, 2004, U.S. troops forcedas many as 70,000 women, children, and eld-erly people to evacuate their homes in the city,although some remained (men were not in-cluded in this group and it was reported thatany male between 15 and 45 trying to flee thecity was turned away by the military).12 In ad-dition to the use of cluster bombs, the militaryalso deployed the incendiary weapon whitephosphorus. The Pentagon initially denied theuse of white phosphorus, but later U.S. offi-cials admitted that white phosphorus hadbeen used in Fallujah, though only for "illu-mination," "screening" and "psychological"purposes.13 The U.S. government maintainsits denial of white phosphorus use against ci-vilians but has admitted to its use as an offen-sive weapon against enemy combatants. How-ever, the Chemical Weapons Convention bansits use, whether or not it is only used on en-emy combatants.

Under increasing pressure from the Iraqigovernment and international community, theUnited States handed operations over to theFallujah Brigade in May 2004, resulting in

an almost immediate return of control to in-surgent forces. On November 7, 2004, U.S.forces again undertook the assault on Fallujahand the use of cluster bombs and white phos-phorus was again deployed in an assault thatlasted through December. And while 1,600insurgent deaths were estimated in the twooperations, 6,000 civilians were killed duringthe two assaults.14 Adding to the totalist na-ture of the assaults, a U.S. marine was filmedshooting and killing a unarmed and injuredIraqi captive, although a subsequent investiga-

tion by the military found the marine guilty ofno wrongdoing as his actions were consistantwith the established rules of engagement andthe law of armed conflict.15

The disproportionate number of civiliandeaths alone shows how the assaults on Fallu-jah were imminently dangerous to the rightsand safety of the population. Yet looking atthe orders and actions taken during the U.S.

operations in Fallujah it is clear that U.S.forces engaged in the reckless endangermentof innocent Iraqis. Furthermore, the use ofwhite phosphorus and cluster bombs in ahighly populated city where it was certain to

kill innocent people indicates that U.S. con-duct was both reckless and wanton. Finally,the order to shoot any military-aged Iraqi,armed or not, as well as the shooting of cap-tive, unarmed, and injured Iraqis is prejudicialto lawfulness and discipline within the armedforces; it disregards the U.S. responsibility todistinguish innocent civilians from real ene-mies. Combining these actions with the factthat U.S. forces cut off the citys utilities anddenied access to medical services for all indi-viduals within the city makes clear that theUnited States was more concerned with paci-fying the city than the foreseeable conse-quences of such actions on the Iraqi citizenry.

The U.S. Rejection ofCommand Responsibil-ity

The multiple accounts that asserted U.S.complacency and complicity in war crimes aredispiriting, especially since no high-ranking

officials have been held accountable. Almostall soldiers charged with crimes are enlistedsoldiers. Given the impunity enjoyed by thoseat the top, officers and civilian policymakersdo not need to burden themselves with ensur-ing that troops under their command behavein a professional and restrained manner onthe battlefield. Instead, they managed to getaway with blaming the atrocities committed inFallujah on a few bad apples operating oftheir own volition. In reality, this level of de-struction can only be accounted for by poli-cies and orders that were developed by high-

level commanders and their civilian leader-ship.

9


10/29

Body Counts

Death in Afghanistan

The mainstream media rarely report onthe high level of civilian casualties in Afghani-stan. To date there has been only one com-prehensive survey of civilian casualties incountry. The Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Af-ghanistan, maintained by University of NewHampshire Professor Marc Herold, compiledreports from a multiplicity of verified andcrosschecked international media sources.

Herold estimates that as of June 20, 2008,some 7,309 Afghan civilians have been killedby U.S.-led forces.16 Herold records only im-pact deaths, which are defined as deathscaused at the immediate point of explosion orshooting. The figures leave out the injuredthat die later and therefore represent a mini-

mumtoll.

The American publics seeming lack of in-terest in the plight of the Afghan populace isnot surprising considering that we have to relyon the efforts of a university professor fordata on the impacts of a war funded by ourtaxpayer dollars on civilians in Afghanistan.The government and military get away withsimply asserting that they are doing all theycan to minimize civilian deaths. And ofcourse this is hard to verify in the absence ofany official body count.. Indeed, in the age ofsmart and precision-guided bombs U.S. citi-zens have little reason to question actions orintentions when innocent Afghans are killedin sophisticated airstrikes. Of course the im-mense public relations campaigns undertakenby U.S. to blur the realities in Afghanistan aid

Though some U.S. officials have questioned these figures, theNew York Times, BBC, and Guardian, among others, have

cited Professor Herolds estimates in various articles and re-

ports. The figures are also the only set, according to Herold,

which is based on disaggregated data. Each death reported also

has some form of data about the individual, allowing for repli-

cation and confirmation.

the publics lack of interest, but that will betaken up later.

Death in Iraq

Several organizations have taken it uponthemselves to study the effects of the currentU.S. wars. This report looks at the estimatesof four organizations: a media tally from thegroup Iraq Body Count (IBC); a report by theIraq Ministry of Health done in partnershipwith the World Health Organization; a report

by Johns Hopkins University School of PublicHeath working with the School of Medicine atAl Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, Iraq;and an estimate from the Opinion ResearchBusiness.

Iraq Body Counts figures are not an es-timate of civilian deaths. Rather, like Heroldscount for Afghanistan, IBC is an updated re-cord of actual deaths which come from cross-checked English language media reports, hos-pitals, morgues, NGOs and any official fig-ures. As of May 2008, IBC reported a total of

93,818 civilian deaths. Each death recorded byIBC is based on disaggregated data; that is tosay, each death reported also has some formof data about the individual, allowing for rep-lication and confirmation. What the IBCnumbers show is the irrefutableminimumnum-ber of civilians who have been killed in Iraqsince the invasion and subsequent occupation.

The numbers reported by IBC have beencriticized for being too low, misleading peopleabout the violence in Iraq. But IBC itself ac-knowledges that many if not most civilian

casualties will go unreported because of thenature of war and of IBC's reliance on mediareports.17 Under-reporting aside, the death of90,000 civilians is still shocking. In an attemptto illustrate how high the rates of violence inIraq are, author and president of the GlobalAmericana Institute, Juan Cole, makes com-parisons between death rates in Iraq and vari-

10


11/29

ous other global conflicts that have occurredin recent history:

The Sri Lankan civil war between Sinhalese

and Tamils has killed an average of 233 per-

sons a month since 1983 and is consideredone of the world's major ongoing trouble

spots. That is half the average monthly casual-

ties in Iraq recently. In 2007, the conflict in

Afghanistan killed an average of 550 persons a

month. That is about the rate recently accord-

ing to official statistics for Iraq. The death rate

in 2006-2007 in Somalia was probably about

300 a month, or about half this year's average

monthly rate in Iraq. Does anybody think Af-

ghanistan or Somalia is calm? Thirty years of

North Ireland troubles left about 3,000 dead,

a toll still racked up in Iraq every five months

on average.18

Astonishingly, Juan Coles comparisonsuse monthly casualties in Iraq that includetime only after violence had dropped from itshigh in 2006 and 2007. Using IBCs death fig-ures, deaths average 1,513 a month from thestart of the war in March 2003 through May2008.

In January 2008 the Iraqi Health Ministryand the World Health Organization (WHO)claimed that there had been 151,000 violent

deaths in Iraq between March 2003 and June2006.19The Iraqi Health Survey (IHS) figuresare an estimate based on responses given by arepresentative sample of families from variousregions of Iraq.20 The 151,000 deaths esti-mated by the IHS averages to 127 deaths aday and 46,355 per year as a result of violence.Given the population difference of Iraq andthe United States, the IHS estimate wouldrepresent 499,049 violent deaths in the UnitedStates each year. This is three-anda-halftimes as many deaths as those who die eachyear from strokes, the third leading cause ofdeath in the U.S.21

These types of comparisons would prob-ably surprise many Americans, but few re-porters present the Iraqi death toll in context.Iraqi deaths are reported as numbers whichare easily consumed and forgotten, with nofurther thought for the hundreds of thou-

sands of lost lives or what practices have ledto such unintelligible numbers.

The figures reported by both IBC andIHS show the incredible loss of life that oc-curred as a direct result of actions conducted

by U.S.-led forces in the Iraq War. However,neither organization tallies the lives lost toside-effects of the war. . As previously stated,the effects of war are not limited to death anddestruction caused directly from the attacks,firefights, and bombings that occur duringwarfare. Wars invariably have unintentionalside effects which add to the destruction andmisery that accompany combat. Of coursethese unintentional effects are anything butunintentional when it is known that bomb-ing campaigns on a defenseless nation willleave hundreds of thousands without accessto food, shelter, medicine, clean water or elec-tricity, they cannot be considered accidents.

Surveys conducted by the Johns HopkinsBloomberg School of Public Health studiedthe total effects of the U.S.-led war in Iraqthrough the end of June 2006. The report wasnot concerned exclusively with deaths causeddirectly by fighting, bombings, or airstrikes.Instead, the survey was concerned with de-termining the total excess number of deathsthat had occurred as a result of the U.S.-ledwar. This included deaths caused directly by

the conflict as well as deaths resulting fromincreased lawlessness, displacement, degradedinfrastructure, poorer healthcare and limitedaccess to basic utilities. The school comparedthe difference between postwar and prewarmortality rates, ascertained by surveying a rep-resentative sample of households, and esti-mated that from the middle of March 2003through the end of June 2006 excess Iraqdeaths totaled 654,965.22

The Johns Hopkins study was not with-out its critics, many of whom were military

commanders and their civilian leadership.President Bush responded that the report wassimply not credible and called into questionits methodology. However, many experts inthe fields of statistics and polling defended themethodology;23 John Zogby, who heads aninternational polling agency that has workedin Iraq, claimed, "The sampling is solid [and]the methodology is as good as it gets.24

11


12/29

Frank Harrell Jr., chair of the biostatistics de-partment at Vanderbilt University, deemedthe design of the study to be solid, with a "ri-gorous, well-justified analysis of the data.25Other experts strongly defend the report and

the validity of its findings, claiming, this isthe best estimate of mortality [in Iraq] wehave.26

What is most important about the JohnsHopkins study is that the deaths estimated areexcess deaths; that is, deaths that occurredsolely because of the war and its conse-quences. The total body-count estimate of654,965 people is the equivalent of 2.5% ofIraqs population. These deaths occurred injust over a three-year period and since thenthe number of deaths has continued to rise.According to IBC, 2007 saw almost as manydeaths as 2006, which was declared by the UNto be the most deadly and violent year duringthe occupation. These deaths would not havehappened if the invasion had not been carriedout. Those responsible for propagating falseand misleading information, planning out theinvasion, ordering the use of force, and exe-cuting the use of force to invade and occupyIraq arguably are at fault for every excessdeath that has occurred in Iraq.

Fourteen months after the publication ofthe Johns Hopkins study, the Opinion Re-

search Business (ORB) group published asurvey on civilian deaths, also using data ob-tained by surveying a representative sample ofIraqs population. ORB estimated that1,033,000 had died as a result of the Iraq War.The report was largely dismissed and receivedlittle coverage by press agencies, althoughthere has been no explanation for why this is.The report is important not only because it isthe most recent estimate of casualty figures,but also because its numbers help to legiti-mize the numbers estimated by the Johns

Hopkins report. If these figures are correct,the deaths reported by ORB exceed the num-ber that occurred during the Rwanda genocide

of 1994.27

12


13/29

Public Relations Campaigns

s in past wars, officials from thePentagon, White House, and vari-ous other institutions constructedelaborate public relations cam-

paigns to obscure the realities of what is tak-ing place in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Hiding the Truth

The extensive public relations campaignsthat have accompanied the Afghanistan andIraq wars have been extremely effective inkeeping damning facts about the wars fromthe American public. Pentagon officials heldbriefings to privileged military analysts fromseveral prominent news networks, who thenrepeated White House talking points to gener-ate favorable coverage of how the Bush ad-ministration was handling the war. Analystswho did not repeat the talking points wherekept out of briefings.28The public relationscampaigns banned photographers on U.S.military bases from covering the arrival ofcaskets containing the remains of U.S. soldiers

killed overseas.29 They paid Iraqi journalists towrite favorable accounts of the U.S. war andplanted articles written by anonymous Ameri-can soldiers in Iraqi publications. Embeddedjournalists were required to submit their sto-ries to the military for pre-publication review.30 Officials erased journalists' footage of civil-ian deaths in Afghanistan and31 and refusedto disclose statistics and information on civil-ian casualties.

This last effort was brought to light whenthe American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

discovered in April of 2007 that the Depart-ment of Defense (DOD) did in fact have vol-umes of information detailing the impacts onciviliansdespite White House and Pentagonofficials repeated assertions that they did notkeep such information.

The disclosure was the result of theACLU suing the DOD under the Freedom ofInformation Act to obtain files on military

programs that compensate civilians and thefamilies of civilians who are injured, killed, orhave property damaged or destroyed becauseof U.S. forces.

In order to receive money from the U.S.military, victims or their families had to fillout a detailed report of the events thatharmed them, their family, or their property.For these grievances to be approved there hadto be prior military reports on the incident oroverwhelming evidence of U.S. involvement.To date only 496 claims have been released to

the ACLU. Of these, the United States recog-nized and made payments on 164 of theclaims. In about half of the 164 claims that re-sulted in payments the military accepted re-sponsibility and made compensation payments.With the other half of paid claims the UnitedStates took no responsibility for but made con-dolence payments to show sympathy for thevictim or their family. The Government Ac-counting Office reported in 2007 that condo-lence payments of up to $2,500 could bemade for each incident of death, injury, orproperty damage, although compensationpayments tend to be higher. In the three yearssince 2005, $42.4 million has been paid toIraqis alone, indicating a large number ofgrievances that the U.S. military held informa-tion on and acknowledged.32

13


14/29

Source Body Count: Number ofIraqis killed (between

dates)

Value of Life:Amount eachvictim's family would have

rec eived if the $42.4 million

in U.S. government com-pensation and condolence

payments had been di-

vided equally among a ll

victims

Iraq Body Count 93,818 (March 03- May 08) $451.94

Iraq Health Survey 151,000 (March 03- J une 06) $280.79

J ohns Hopkins 654,965 (March 03- J une 06) $64.74

Opinion Research Business 1,033,000 (March 03- August 07) $41.05

The Lies that Lead to In-vasion

Five years after the U.S. invasion, the UNwarned in November 2006 that Afghanistan,wracked by violence, crushing poverty and

rampant illegal drug activities, was at seriousrisk of becoming a failed state.33 How curi-ous this was, for 40 years ago many believedAfghanistan was a model of cooperation be-tween different groups.

As Americans, our responsibility is tojudge the actions of our government. But wefailed to judge our government appropriatelyafter the 9/11 attacks on the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon. By October 11,2001 President Bush said that formalities suchas evidence and proof were not necessary.

There is no need to discuss innocence orguilt. We know hes [Osamas] guilty.34

The invasion of Afghanistan was prem-ised on the belief that the Taliban had contin-ued to provide a safe haven for bin Laden andhis al-Qaeda operatives. As the U.S.-led cam-paign got underway, the Taliban announcedthat they would discuss handing bin Ladenover to a third country if the United States

halted the bombing and provided evidencethat bin Laden was behind the September 11attacks. However, Bush refused, choosing in-stead to continue the campaign of airstrikesthroughout Afghanistan, which killed andmaimed not only members of the Taliban andal-Qaeda but also thousands of Afghan civil-

ians.35

In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, theBush administration asserted on multiple oc-casions that Saddam Hussein was developingweapons of mass destruction and had sup-ported al-Qaeda. In February 2003, just amonth before the invasion, Bush stated:

One of the greatest dangers we face is that

weapons of mass destruction might be passed

to terrorists who would not hesitate to use

those weapons. Saddam Hussein has long-

standing, direct and continuing ties to terrorist

networks. Senior members of Iraq intelligence

and al Qaeda have met at least eight times

since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-

making and document forgery experts to

work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided al

Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons

training. And an al Qaeda operative was sent

to Iraq several times in the late 1990s for help

in acquiring poisons and gases. We also know

14


15/29

that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network

headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist plan-

ner.36

This statement and more than 150 others

made prior to the invasion are compiled in aCongressional Research Service report thatlists 237 misleading or untrue statements onIraq made by President George W. Bush, VicePresident Richard Cheney, Defense SecretaryDonald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State ColinPowell, and then-National Security advisorCondoleezza Rice.37 White House officialsnever acknowledged the problems intelli-gence organizations had with the credibility ofthe evidence used for many of the statementsused to gain support for the war. . These peo-ple misled the American public, Congress and

others throughout the world to support at-tacking a nation that did not pose any real orimmediate threat to the United States.

Creating FalseLegitimacy

Many of the statements made to justifythe invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraqwere not only misleading but outright lies.The fact that thousands of innocent lives were

destroyed because of invasions that werepredicated on false statements and question-able evidence is unacceptable. Even the mostardent militarists maintain that the deaths ofthousands must be justified by more thanempty claims that it was in the interest ofAmericas security, particularly when officialswithin our intelligence organizations foundthese threats based on flimsy or nonexistentevidence.

The fact that the invasions in both Iraqand Afghanistan were carried out under false

pretenses calls to question the legitimacy ofthe invasions, the destruction that resulted aswell as the deaths that resulted from the as-saults on Afghanistan and Iraq.

15


16/29

The Light Footprint: Bombs and Vio-lence

he large number of bombs usedduring the Iraq and Afghanistanwars was in part due to the lightfootprint policy that former Secre-

tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld envisionedduring his tenure. Light footprint meantthat the military would put as few U.S. troopson the ground as possible, relying instead onheavy bombings. This policy killed thousandsand had considerable indirect consequences

that complicated the initial phases of the IraqWar.

In Iraq, the light footprint policy hasbeen blamed for the widespread violence andlooting that erupted in the wake of the inva-sion. Many firearms and explosives used bythe insurgency were obtained by looting mu-nitions depots once controlled by Saddamsforces. And although researchers from Hu-man Rights Watch gave coalition forces theexact coordinates to many of these munitionsdepots, there were not enough coalition andU.S. troops to guard the depots. Hundreds ofthousands of pounds of explosives. as well ascountless weapons ranging from small arms torocket-propelled grenades, were taken fromthe depots.38 Insurgents used these weaponsand explosives against American troops andIraqi civilians, especially those showingfriendship with Americans or collaboratingand working with them. Pentagon plannersthought it more important to guard the oilfields than the national archives, art treasures,or weapons depots.

The New York Times reported that many

of the problems that accompanied the U.S.-led invasion, including the widespread looting,had been predicted in a State Departmentstudy.39 Pentagon officials largely ignoredthe report until the consequences predictedhad come to fruition. By that time the militaryhad to try and catch up with the situation onthe ground.

Although some improvements to infra-structure in Afghanistan have been made, thevast majority of the country exists withoutpaved roads or basic access to food, healthcare, education and clean water. The decadesof war that occurred prior to the U.S. invasionleft many areas of Afghanistan littered withlandmines, but more than six years after theUnited States entered the country, the UN es-timates there are at least 700 square kilometers

of land that contain mines, killing hundreds ofpeople every year, most of whom are chil-dren.40

Violence and Waste

AFGHANISTAN

Although the United States has been onthe ground in Afghanistan almost a year and ahalf longer than it has been in Iraq, it hascommitted substantially less aid to that coun-try, $7 billion between 2001 and 2008 com-pared to $26.4 billion between 2003 and 2008for Iraq. Most of the aid given to Afghanistanhas gone toward construction in and aroundKabul, doing little to improve the lives of themajority of Afghans who live outside of thecapital. Moreover, aid money supports high-priced American contractors, while largenumbers of Afghans remain unemployed andcannot provide for themselves or their fami-lies. As Reuters reported in November 2007,despite more than $15 billion of aid pumped

into Afghanistan since U.S.-led and Afghanforces toppled the Taliban in 2001, many Af-ghans still suffer levels of poverty rarely seen

outside sub-Saharan Africa. 41 In one case,the United States spent more than $190 mil-lion constructing a road between the cities

$15 billion aid amount is the combined total of international

aid given to Afghanistan.

T

16


17/29

Kandahar and Kabul, while the governmentof Afghanistan had estimated that Afghanconstruction teams could have done the workfor $35 million.

U.S. forces routinely undertake military

operations that kill large numbers of civilians,sparking understandable rage among Afghans.One such incident occurred on the night ofOctober 22, 2001. Human Rights Watch(HRW) reports that at around 11p.m. U.S. air-crafts began bombing the village of Chowkar-Karez. The bombing destroyed homes andcaused the villagers to flee from the area. Asthe villagers were trying to escape from thehorrific scene, the planes returned and begangunning down the fleeing villagers. This eventreportedly lasted for about an hour and re-sulted in the deaths of 25-35 civilians. Villag-ers and Human Rights Watch insist that therewere no Taliban, al-Qaeda, or any other le-gitimate targets in the area.42 The militaryhas declined to explain the event exceptthrough unidentified personnel who claimedthat Chowkar was a fully legitimate targetbecause it contained Taliban and al-Qaedasympathizers.43 This claim begs the question:what qualifies individuals as sympathizers?One may pluck examples at random to makethe same point.

Almost a year later, another startling inci-

dent involving U.S. aircraft resulted in 48 Af-ghan deaths and 117 injuries when a weddingcelebration was attacked by a gunship. Themilitary claimed that one of its planes hadcome under anti-aircraft fire from the group;this assertion was later repudiated in subse-quent investigations.44 Again U.S. military of-ficials refused to apologize for the mistakenbombing. Astonishingly the U.S. military hascarried out three other attacks on wedding ce-remonies which resulted in high civilian casu-alties; all four cases were notable in that the

events which unfolded as well as the explana-tion of flawed intelligence given by the U.S.military were similar. Even as recently as Au-gust 21, 2008 the UN reported that a U.S. mil-itary operation resulted in 90 civilians deaths,60 of which were children.45

Beginning in 2005, violence in Afghani-stan began to escalate both in intensity andfrequency. The UN reported more than 8,000

violent deaths in 2007, of which at least 1,500were civilians.46 Reckless U.S. operationsagainst the Taliban have resulted in an outcryfrom both Afghan civilians and governmentofficials. Afghanistans president, Hamid Kar-

zai has repeatedly demanded that coalitionforces take more precautions in preserving ci-vilian lives, saying, our innocent people arebecoming victims of careless operations ofNATO and International forcesAfghan lifeis not cheap and it should not be treated assuch.47

In response to demands from civiliansand international organizations, there havebeen investigations into at least some of thereported incidents of U.S. excessive force. Forexample, on March 4, 2007, U.S. Marines in-discriminately opened fire on civilians aftertheir convoy was hit by a suicide bomber. U.S.forces did not distinguish civilians from anenemy, killing 16 civilians and wounding an-

other 24.48 The Shinwar Massacre, as it wascalled, resulted in a 120-member Marine unitbeing forced to redeploy out of the countrybecause of the hostilities generated by the in-cident.

Annual Number of Suicide Attacks in

Afghanistan

0 2 3

17

123

160

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

[Source: U.S. Department of State]

Special Rapporteur of the United NationsHuman Rights Council Philip Alston reportedin 2008 on the disturbing reality of extra-judicial killings of civilians with no connec-tions to the Taliban, saying that foreign forcesin Afghanistan were operating with impunity.He also cited two American-run military bases

17


18/29

from which foreign and Afghan forces wereconducting raids that resulted in civilian kill-ings and for which no one took responsibility. These incidents suggest that military and in-telligence personnel in Afghanistan are at

times operating completely outside of the law,accountable to no one, without worry of re-course. And yet there is a paradox because ac-tions are authorized directly from the WhiteHouse, as in the case of sadistic torture tech-niques that have as their purpose intimidationand dehumanizing the captured, who may ormay not be guilty of anything.

Innocent civilians from both Afghanistanand Iraq have been subjected to detention atthe hands of the United States. Detainees andprisoners were held in different parts of theworld on American bases, on prison ships, orin Guantanamo Bay. The detailed abuses atthese sites include water-boarding, repeatedbeatings, and other forms of torture. RetiredArmy General Antonio Taguba, who investi-gated the treatment of prisoners that occurredin Abu Ghraib and found widespread negli-gence and abuse, wrote in June 2008 thatthere is no longer any doubt as to whetherthe current administration has committed warcrimes. The only question is whether thosewho ordered the use of torture will be held toaccount.49

Like collateral damage, abducting andholding thousands of prisoners who are inno-cent falls within the category of in war mis-takes will happen. Some former soldiers whohave worked in the prisons that hold prison-ers from Afghanistan, Iraq and the larger Waron Terror believe that no more than 1% ofthe more than 90,000 prisoners were guilty ofany crime.50 Thousands are held by theUnited States and other allies in a war withoutend.

IRAQ

Mr. Alston could only say that forces operating out of thetwo U.S.-run bases were foreign forces because of the refusal

by those operating from the bases to take responsibility for

their actions.

Unlike Afghanistan, Iraqis enjoyed one ofthe highest standards of living in the MiddleEast, even under Saddam Husseins rule. Ininterviews conducted by The Nation, ArmyLieutenant Van Engelen, who had served in

Iraq, talked about how a large majority of Ira-qis had access to most basic utilities such aselectricity, gas, and water before the U.S. inva-sion, but when U.S. operations got underwaybasically, all of that was stripped fromthem.51 Five-and-a-half years into the war,Iraqis still face a lack of access to utilities andservices.

Violence and looting have devastatedIraqs basic utilities such as electricity, waterand sewage. The confluence of this damagecreates a feedback loop, where the damage toone utility exacerbates the problems caused bythe damage to another utility. Intermittent ornonexistent electricity makes it difficult to de-contaminate water through boiling. As of July2008 the electric generation averaged just 11.3hours a day, one of the highest averages sincethe invasion.52 Contaminated water and non-functioning sewer systems combine to createenvironments ripe for diseases such as pneu-monia and epidemic levels of diarrhea. Chil-dren are the most severely affected by thissituation; Save the Children reported that in2005, 122,000 Iraqi children died before their

fifth birthday. The International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that in2007 many Iraqis continued to rely on unsafewater supplies, inviting cholera and salmo-nella, because treatment plants are still notfunctioning. Those who can afford cleandrinking water are forced to pay excessiveprices because of the severe lack of supply. Atthe same time the sewage systems are so dete-riorated that there is an overall lack of sanita-tion, and risks of contamination to existingwater supplies by sewage is high.53 These fac-

tors came together in 2007 when a massiveoutbreak of cholera occurred, affecting morethan 30,000 people in over 29 districtsthroughout Iraq. These conditions count ascollateral damage.

The lack of utilities and supplies, alongwith an environment where the demand forhealth services far exceed what can be pro-vided, create a dire situation for Iraqs health

18


19/29

systems. During the invasion in2003, almostall hospitals in Iraq were looted of suppliesand equipment, and the lack of security thathas existed since the invasion has resulted inthe continued looting of hospitals. Much of

the population has no access to any form ofhealthcare, even in cases of medical emergen-cies, and most Iraqi hospitals are unable toprovide services for increasingly common se-vere trauma cases because of the high vio-lence levels. Private hospitals exist, but formost Iraqis the cost of services at these insti-tutions excludes them from service. In thissituation, the U.S. military provides servicesfor almost every major injury for all Iraqis,soldier and civilian alike. However, because ofthe high demand for services, the military onlyholds patients for a few days before they aretransferred to an Iraqi hospital. DiscoveryMagazinereported in late August 2007 that be-cause of the condition of Iraqs public hospi-tals, a number of patients who are transferredfrom military care would not survive an-other case of collateral damage.54

The US Iraq Relief and Reconstructio

Fund's Top Healthcare Expenditures

$406

$247

$73

$0.00$50.00

$100.00$150.00$200.00$250.00$300.00$350.00

$400.00$450.00

Nationwide

Hospital and Clinic

Improvements

Equipment

Procurement and

Modernization

Pediatric Facilities

in Basra

Millions ofDollars Spent

Masking of the Inten-tional and Reckless

There are now almost as many contrac-tors in Iraq as there are U.S. military person-nel, which number around 190,000.55 The in-vasive presence of contractors fuels discon-tent with the occupation as unemploymentruns as high as 40% and Iraqis see well-paidcontractors daily who do seemingly little toreconstruct the country.56 The lack of security

and high levels of violence in Iraq further in-flate the already hefty price of contractors.Companies add as much as 25% to their costestimates to pay for security to protect theiremployees working in Iraq.

Former head of the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority L. Paul Bremer gave security con-tractors a green light to act recklessly in 2004when he declared all contractors immunefrom prosecution. In late 2007 the UN re-ported that security contractors were killingIraqi civilians indiscriminately.57 The use offorce by contractors has become so rampantthe UN has demanded that security firms con-trol the actions of their employees and hasthreatened to charge contractors with crimesagainst humanity and war crimes for the mur-der of civilians. The use of force against civil-ians by security contractors has infuriatedIraqis and fueled tensions between the popu-lation and occupying forces. In one instanceof unprovoked force, contractors working forBlackwater USA opened fire and killed 17 ci-vilians.Al Jazeeraquoted a UN official as say-ing "international humanitarian rights law ap-plies to them [contactors] as well."58 None ofthe crimes committed by security contractors,however, has been prosecuted by the U.S.,suggesting that U.S. authorities feel Americansare above the law in Iraq.

While the conduct of contractors in Iraqadds to the opposition felt towards the occu-pation, U.S. forces on the ground have alsoadded to Iraqis negative feelings becausemany U.S. operations are conducted with alack of regard for Iraqi property and life. Dur-ing convoy missions, U.S. forces drive at ex-tremely high speeds to avoid the chance ofbeing hit by improvised explosive devices(IEDs). The drivers of the convoys crash intoany person, car or other object that gets intheir way. Soldiers are ordered not to stop

unless absolutely necessary, and pedestrianswho step in front of convoys are not deemedto be a necessary or reasonable cause forstopping or even slowing down. Soldiers aredirected to shoot at any vehicle that comestoo close to convoys.59

Unfortunately, the rules of engagementfor firing on people or vehicles are often notwell explained and the shootings are almost

19


20/29

never investigated. This has resulted in troopsengaging in reckless use of force, knowingthat there is little chance of consequences fortheir actions. Pulitzer Prize-winning authorChris Hedges and journalist Laila al-Arian

claim that soldiers in convoys are so tensethey often fire on any vehicle or person thatmake them feel uneasy and then plant a wea-pon on civilian victims, on the off-chance thatthere is actually an investigation.60 Innocentvictims who survive and have had a weaponplanted on them are taken to a detention cen-ter, where they are held indefinitely and facepossible abuse or torture.

Checkpoints set up and manned by U.S.forces have also resulted in numerous Iraqisbeing shot at or killed while driving in theircar. Checkpoints are put up and taken downin a short period of time and because of thismany Iraqis do not know when checkpointshave been erected. It is common for unawaremotorists, particularly at nighttime, to comeupon a newly placed checkpoint and not beable to slow down in time. Cars approachingcheckpoints that do not show signs of slowingare fired upon.

20


21/29

Collateral Damage: Refugee Flight

iolence that has occurred in Iraqand Afghanistan has not only af-fected people through the deaths,injuries, and destruction of prop-

erty, violence has also displaced millions ofpeople. Refugee displacement is part of thecollateral damage of war. The plight of refu-gees has received a limited amount of cover-age in the United States but more attentionshould be paid to the situation as the numberof people affected by displacement is truly as-tounding.

Since 2002 almost all of the one millionAfghans displaced after September 11, 2001have been voluntarily repatriated with assis-tance from the United Nations High Com-mission on Refugees. Yet violence, drought,and hunger kept at least 153,000 displaced bythe end of 2007, according to the UN.61 Asviolence continues to climb in 2008 this num-ber is likely to increase. The United States hasnow begun military operations and bombingsacross the border of Afghanistan in sovereignPakistan, displacing more people and violatinginternational law.

Violence has made the existence of dis-placed Afghans more difficult. Franz Rau-chenstein, deputy head of the ICRC delega-tion in Afghanistan, explains that because ofthe violence "It's difficult to assist those whohave been displaced. We have less access tothem now than at any time during the past 20years, and that's both worrisome and frustrat-ing."62 USAID, the U.S. body providing aidassistance to Afghanistan, does not have abudget to help internally displaced people in2008, and only had a supplemental budget of

$16 million to help displaced people in andaround Kabul.63 Kabul is located in the Eastof Afghanistan and the vast majority of dis-placed people are located in the South. Thefact that over 150,000 displaced people existin Afghanistan and the U.S. government hasnot allocated funds to help them again showswhat little value the U.S. government placeson Afghan lives. The lack of commitment to

the Afghan people is presented in a report bythe Agency Coordinating Body for AfghanRelief which shows that the United States hasdisbursed only half of the money it committedto Afghanistan from 2002-2008, while dis-placed Afghans constitute the group of dis-placed peoples third-most in need of aid.64

The intense levels of violence that haveoccurred in Iraq have created massive dis-placement. Five-and-a-half years into the IraqWar, Iraqis are now the third-largest group ofdisplaced people in the world and the group

most in need of aid.65

In total almost five mil-lion Iraqis have been displaced, with two mil-lion of those displaced living outside thecountry.66 Most of the displacement has oc-curred in the last two years, stretching the al-ready limited resources of international aidagencies.

In certain instances, as noted in Fallujah,more than one hundred thousand people fleda single city, knowing their lives were at greatrisk as long as they remained in their homes.The lack of mainstream news stories that haveexposed Iraqi displacement speaks volumes tothe effectiveness of the public relations cam-paigns and the shallow reporting that blanketall consequences of the wars in Iraq and Af-ghanistan as collateral damage, that paper-thinjustifier of so much and virtually nothing

21


22/29

The Burden of War: Cost to the US

efore concluding this report, it isimportant to consider the humanand financial toll on American per-sonnel as a result of the illegal wars

in Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S. Personnel Costs

To date, there have been at least 4,669military deaths and 32,692 injuries in Iraq andAfghanistan.67 The bulk of deaths and inju-

ries have occurred in Iraq, where there havebeen 4,116 confirmed U.S. military deaths and30,435 injuries as of July 19, 2008.68 Therehave also been at least 172 American contrac-tor deaths but this number is not complete ascontractor deaths do not need to be reportedto the public like deaths within the military. InAfghanistan there have been at least 553 mili-tary deaths and 2,257 injuries. The militarypays out $500,000 for each death that occursand disability pay to those service memberspermanently disabled by their injuries.

A new report by the RAND Corporation,

a global policy think tank, shows that in addi-tion to the visible physical injuries that havebefallen U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,U.S. troops face vast psychological and hid-den physical costs. RAND estimates thatabout 19% of the over 1.6 million militaryservice members that have served in Iraq andAfghanistan, about 300,000 in all, have symp-toms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder(PTSD) or major depression. Another320,000 suffer from traumatic brain injuries.Because the number of veterans suffering

from PTSD and depression are so large, Vet-erans Affairs hospitals and other mentalhealth facilities are only able to take about halfof those seeking treatment..69 RAND assessedthat the social cost of these conditions overjust a two-year period are between $4 billionand $6.2 billion for PTSD and depression,with another $32,000-$408,000 to treat eachbrain injury case, depending on the severity.

Suicides Among Active Duty U.S. Ar

52

68

79

67

87

10

11

9.8 11. 12. 10. 12.17. 18.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2001200220032004200520062007

Number of Suicides

Number of Suicides100,000 Soldiers

CNN reported inSeptember of 2008 thatif the rate of suicidesamong active dutysoldiers continues forthe remainder of theyear then it will surpassboth last years numbersand the rate of suicideamong the general U.S.population- an eventwhich has not occuredsince Vietnam in the late1960's.

Source: US Departme

the Army

The emergence of large numbers of ser-vice members suffering from PTSD and ma-jor depression has also led to an increase insuicides and suicide attempts within the mili-

tary. In 2008 CNN reported there were 115suicides within the Army alone; in 2006 therewere 102 suicides.70 These numbers are de-ceiving, as they only include the number ofactive-duty Army personnel who committedsuicide, not those who have committed sui-cide after being discharged from serving inIraq and Afghanistan. No government agen-cies track suicides among veterans, but a 2005CBS News investigation indicates that veter-ans were more than twice as likely as non-vetsto commit suicide.71

Financial Costs

The cost associated with the injuries toU.S. forces shows how expensive and harmfulthe wars have been to America. This contra-dicts the statements made in the lead-up tothe wars, when the Bush administration reas-

B

22


23/29

sured the public that the war would be rela-tively inexpensive. Estimates ranged from$50 billion to $60 billion dollars, not all ofwhich would be financed by the Americanpublic. The plan was for the revenue from

Iraq's oil reserves to pay for much of the costof the war and subsequent Iraqi reconstruc-tion. Some even speculated that the UnitedStates could benefit from the war not only bytoppling the Saddam regime and thereby mak-ing America more secure, but by gaining in-creased oil supply from Iraq while remakingthe Middle East by adding a large number ofU.S. military bases to ensure American he-gemony in the area and guaranteeing a reliableflow of oil.

These estimates were completely off-base.Instead of $60 billion, the United States spentover $650 billion on the war in five years. A2006 congressional analysis showed that theIraq War was costing America almost $2 bil-lion a week.72 Nobel Prize-winning economistJoseph Stiglitz and Harvard economist LindaBilmes put the cost of the war around $3 tril-lion, but they claim that those estimates werebased on relatively conservative assessments,and the cost is now probably closer to $4 tril-lion. This means that the Iraq War is the sec-ond-most costly war in U.S. history.

Supporting this estimate, Congressional

Budget Office Director Peter Orszag said intestimony before the House Budget Commit-tee that he estimated the wars in Iraq and Af-ghanistan will cost $2.4 trillion over the nextten years.73 This74 amounts to approximately$21,500 for each American household.

The expected oil revenues have not mate-rialized, while the weapons of mass destruc-tion, which were the original justification forthe war, vanished. Even the purported benefitof having strategic U.S. bases in the MiddleEast lacks popular political support in the

United States. A majority of Americans sup-port a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq andover 70% of Iraqis oppose a permanent U.S.presence in their country. American moral au-thority has gone into debt; the wars causedcreating worldwide unease and anger towardsU.S. leadership.

23


24/29

Conclusion

ollateral damage is used as a term tomake the horrors of war more pal-atable to the U.S. public, allowingour nation to take on warfare with

more ease. In Vietnam, U.S. officials learnedthat with the advent of new technologies suchas television, the horrors of war were moreeasily transmitted to Americans. Learningfrom this, U.S. officials have steadily increasedtheir control of information and access thatnews agencies and reporters in the U.S. havein combat. Since Vietnam there have been at

least nine major military operations that theU.S. has been involved in, as well as dozens ofcovert missions and small interventions. It hascontinued to refine methods to control andmanipulate unsettling information. The effec-tiveness of these methods is now seen in themultifaceted public relations campaigns ofU.S. military and government officials. Con-trolling the number of major sources thathave independent access to events during war-time means that U.S. officials statements andaccounts of events become more difficult todispute, as the government paints any dissent-ing or contradictory voice as sympathetic tothe enemy, not to be trusted. Yet it is impor-tant to remember that much of the worlddoes not get their news from the samesources as Americans and while U.S. officialsmay have spent the last decades learning howto control the news and information thatAmericans receive, this is a much more diffi-cult task to accomplish for the rest of theworld. As a result, people around the worldhave an unfiltered view of the actions andconsequences of the U.S. campaign against

terrorism The U.S., as a result, is further iso-lated, no longer a safe haven but a menacingsuperpower committed to permanent war.

Collateral damage will have a blow-backeffect; that is, it will make missions, whethermilitary, humanitarian, or diplomatic, harderto achieve. This also has an immediate effectof exposing U.S. forces and institutions togreater danger. What may have once been a

willingness to cooperate transforms into a ha-tred that propels people to take up armsagainst U.S. forces, as they are seen as bring-ing nothing more than death and destruction.C U.S. officials need to once again take upthe ideal of command responsibility and nolonger allow reckless operations that take thelives of countless civilians. Those who orderand command such operations must be heldaccountable for their actions and be prose-cuted or court marshaled. New agencies ofgovernment, secret or otherwise, must also

stop their complicit and report on the truelevels of death and destruction that have ac-companied the U.S. war on Terror. Finally,the American public must also take on the re-sponsibility of educating themselves, seekingout independent and non-American newssources as cross-references. With this knowl-edge, Americans can demand a stop to thepolicies that have led to the horrific occur-rences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If current trends continue, the result willbe continued infrastructural decay in theUnited States. Congress should authorize andurge the establishment of a presidential officecharged with the responsibility of closing allbases that are used and for torture purposes.Torture should be declared a criminal offenseunder U.S. law.

Congress should urge continued talks to-wards the abolition of nuclear weapons as onemeans of regaining the initiative on prolifera-tion. It cannot do so unless it is prepared tonegotiate in good-faith radical cutbacks of nu-clear weapons and missiles. The negotiationswill begin in 2009 and 2010 under the NPT

and the Start talks.The U.S. is on the road to having troops

in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, andthe Sahara, as well as long-standing armedforces in Europe. These forces are very ex-pensive, especially when added to new costsfor expanded warfare in Afghanistan and newweapons systems. These wars are destroyingthe infrastructure of the U.S., now in desper-

24


25/29

ate need of funds to rebuild highways, har-bors, schools, medical facilities, treatment forwounded veterans, and aid for military fami-lies. This means that Congress must redirectwar and defense expenditures for public re-

pairs and personal savings. It controls thepower of the purse and must now use thispower responsibly.

25


26/29

Endnotes

1. Mary Ellen OConnell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, The American Society for International Law Task Force on Terrorism, Au-gust 2002, Available online at https://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf, Accessed July 13, 2008.

2. Iraq Body Count. Available online at: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database.html, accessed June 20, 2008; Marc Herold, Appen-

dix 4: Daily Casualty Count of Afghan Civilians Killed in U.S. Bombing Attacks, Available online at

http://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty_count.htm, accessed June 23, 2008.

3. Globalsecurity.org, MK77 750lb Napalm MK78 500lb Napalm MK79 1000lb Napalm, Available online at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk77.htm, accessed September 25, 2008; Dave Lindorff, Radioactive

Wounds of War, In These Times, August 25, 2005.

4. Dwight Eisenhower, Chance for Peace Address, April 16, 1953.

5. Robert Jackson, International Conference on Military Trials, Nuremberg, August 12, 1945.

6. Stuart E Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century - A Century of Evolution,Murdoch Uni-

versity Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 10 number 1, Available online atwww.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/hendin101.html

7. Robert Jackson, statement made August 12, 1945 concerning the Nuremburg Tribunals conclusions prohibiting aggressive war.

8. Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

9. Mark Marqusee, The Name that Lives in Infamy, The Guardian, November 10, 2005; Jonathan Holmes, The Legacy of Fallujah,

The Guardian, April 4, 2007.10. Iraqis: United States Uses Cluster Bomb in Fallujah,Associated Press, April 26, 2004.

11. Anne Barnard, Anger Over Fallujah Reaches Ears of the Faithful, The Boston Globe, April 11, 2004.

12. U.S. Wont Let Men Flee Fallujah, Fox News, November 13, 2004. Available online at:

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,138376,00.html, accessed July 1, 2008

13. Andrew Buncombe and Solomon Hughes, The Fog of War: White Phosphorus, Fallujah, and some Burning Questions, The Inde-

pendent/UK, November 15, 2005.

14. Dahr Jamail, Life Goes On in Fallujahs Rubble, Inter Press Service, November 24, 2005. Available at:

http://www.rense.com/general68/falluf.htm, Accessed July 3, 2008.

15. No Charges In Fallujah Shooting, CBS News, May 4, 2005, Available online at

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/iraq/main693025.shtml, accessed September 25, 2008

16. Marc Herald, Table 2. Summary of Civilian Impact DeathsResulting from US/NATO Military Actions in Afghanistan, (October 7,

2001- June 20, 2008), Available online at http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/memorial.htm, Accessed June 28, 2008.

17. Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org

18. Juan Cole, A Social History of the Surge, July 24, 2008, http://www.juancole.com/2008/07/social-history-of-surge.html accessed

September 25, 2008.

19. Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Iraq Family Health Survey Report (IFHS) 2006/7.

20. The Iraq Health Survey as it is known was not without criticism. One of the core criticisms was that the survey was carried out by

people who identified themselves as government officials; leading some taking the survey to refrain from identifying all or any violent

deaths within their family for fear of being accused and targeted for being an al-Qaeda sympathizers or resisters of the occupation.

This fear of reprisal from the Iraqi government is in part created by the numerous attacks by Iraqi and United States led forces on ci-

vilians who have been labeled as sympathizers or resisters without explanation. Another critique of the reports numbers is that sur-

veys were not conducted in the most dangerous provinces within Iraq. Instead the IHS used numbers of violent deaths that IBC had

reported for 2003-2006. This is a problem because most violent deaths likely occur in the most dangerous provinces. The reliance on

the numbers reported by IBC leads to a lower estimate as IBC said that many if not most of civilian casualties are not reported. In-

deed when you see that the IHS reported that between 151,000 violent deaths occurred in just a three year period while IBC reports

that 93,818 deaths occur for a five and a half year period it is easy to recognize why relying on IBCs numbers would lead to a lower

estimate.

21. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention reports that strokes account for 143,579 deaths in the US in 2005, the most recent

year data is available for. Information available online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/FASTATS/lcod.htm, accessed September 25,

2008.

22. Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional clustersample survey, The Lancet, October 11, 2006.

23. Anna Badkhen, Critics say 600,000 Iraqi dead doesnt tally. But Pollsters defend methods used in Johns Hopkins Study, San Fran-

cisco Chronicle, October 12, 2006.

24. Ibid.

25. Malcolm Ritter,President Bush says he doesnt believe it. Some experts have a problem with it. But several others say it seems sound,

The Associated Press, October 11, 2006.

26. David Brown, Study Claims Iraqs Excess Death Toll Has Reached 655,000, Washington Post, October 11, 2006.

27. Opinion Research Business, September 2007 More than 1,000,000 Iraqis murdered, Available online at

www.opinion.co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=78, Accessed June 20, 2008.

28. David Barstow, Pentagon Suspends Briefings for Analysts, The New York Times, April 26, 2008.

26
https://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdfhttp://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty_count.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk77.htmhttp://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/hendin101.htmlhttp://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,138376,00.htmlhttp://www.rense.com/general68/falluf.htmhttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/iraq/main693025.shtmlhttp://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/memorial.htmhttp://www.juancole.com/2008/07/social-history-of-surge.htmlhttp://www.cdc.gov/nchs/FASTATS/lcod.htmhttp://www.opinion.co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=78http://www.opinion.co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=78http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/FASTATS/lcod.htmhttp://www.juancole.com/2008/07/social-history-of-surge.htmlhttp://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/memorial.htmhttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/iraq/main693025.shtmlhttp://www.rense.com/general68/falluf.htmhttp://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,138376,00.htmlhttp://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/hendin101.htmlhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk77.htmhttp://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty_count.htmhttps://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf


27/29

29. Melissa Block, U.S. No Photo Policy of the Caskets of U.S.,All Things Considered, NPR, April 23, 2004.

30. David Cloud, U.S. Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters, The New York Times, May 24, 2006.

31. Elana Zeide, In Bed with the Military: First Amendment Implications of Embedded Journalism,New York University Law Review, pp.

1309-1344, Vol. 80.

32. US justifies erasing attack footage,Al Jazeera, March 10, 2007.

33. Government Accountability Office,Military Operations: The Department of Defenses use of Solatia and Condolence Payments in Iraq and Af-ghanistan, May 2007.

34. Afghanistan could return to being a failed State, warns Security Council mission chief, UN News Service, November 22 2006.

35. Bush rejects Taliban offer to hand Bin Laden over, The Guardian, October 14 2001.

36. Ibid.

37. Congressional Research Service, Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administrations Public Statements on Iraq, Prepared for Rep. Henry Waxman,

March 16, 2004.

38. Ibid.

39. Iraq: Coalition Ignored Warnings on Weapons Stocks, Human Rights Watch, October 29, 2004.

40. Eric Schmitt & Joel Brinkley, State Department Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, The New York Times, October 18, 2003.

41. Report of the Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, United Nations, March

6, 2008.

42. John Hemming, Too Much aid to Afghanistan Wasted: Oxfam, Reuters, November 20, 2007.

43. Afghanistan: New Civilian Deaths Due to U.S. Bombing, Human Rights Watch, October 30, 2001.

44. Luke Harding, No United States Apology over Wedding Bombing, The Guardian, July 3, 2002.

45. United States Justifies Afghan Wedding Bombing, BBC, September 7, 2002.

46. At least 90 Afghan civilians killed in recent military operations, says UN, UN News Service, Available online at

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27816&Cr=Afghan&Cr1=, accessed August 28, 2008.

47. Report of the Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, United Nations, March

6, 2008.

48. Hamid Karzai, statements made during press conference on June 23, 2007.

49. Carlotta Gall, 16 Civilians Die as United States Troops Fire on Afghan Road, The New York Times, March 5, 2007.

50. Broken Laws, Broken Lives: Medical Evidence of Torture by United States Personnel and Its Impact, Physicians for Human Rights

June 19, 2007.

51. Alex Gibney (Producer), Taxi to the Dark Side (Motion Picture), Jigsaw Productions, April 28, 2007.

52. Chris Hedges and Laila al-Arian, Collateral Damage: Americas War Against Iraqi Civilians, p. 26, Nation Books, June 2008.

53. Michael Mason, Iraqs Medical Meltdown, Discover Magazine, August 2007.

54. Iraq: No Let-up in the Humanitarian Crisis, International Committee of the Red Cross, May 2008.

55. Michael Mason, Iraqs Medical Meltdown, Discover Magazine, August 2007.

56. Contractors Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, Congressional Budget Office, August 2008.

57. Erik Leaver and Jenny Shin, The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War: The Iraq Quagmire, Editor: Saif Rahman, Foreign Policy in Focus, March

4, 2008, Available online at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5036, Accessed July 3, 2008.58. Human Rights Report: July- December 2007, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq,Available online at

http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Jul%20Dec%202007%20EN.pdf, accessed July 17, 2008.

59. UN Urges Action over Iraq Killings,Al Jazeera, October 11, 2007, Available online at

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/10/200852514746225402.html, Accessed July 28, 2008.

60. Chris Hedges and Laila al-Arian.

61. Ibid.

62. UNHCR Global Report 2007: Afghanistan, United Nations, Available online at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/48490afa2.pdf.

63. Franz Rauchenstein, Humanitarian situation worsens as Afghan hostilities spread, ICRC interview with Franz Rauchenstein, Feb-

ruary 18, 2008, Available online at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/afghanistan-interview, Accessed August 14,

2008.

64. Congressional Research Service,Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and United States Policy, June 6, 2008.

65. Matt Waldman, Falling short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief, March 2008.

66. Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis, International Rescue Committee, March 2008.

67. The Iraqi Displacement Crisis, Refugees International, July 18, 2008, Available online athttp://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9679, accessed August 1, 2008.

68. Casualty Summary by State, Department of Defense Personnel and Procurement Statistics, Available online at

http://siadapp.dmcdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.html, accessed July 28, 2008.

69. Icasualties.org, accessed July 28, 2008.

70. Invisible Wounds of War: Summary and Recommendations for Addressing Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, The Rand Corporation, 2008

71. Army Suicides up 20 percent in 2007, CNN, January 21, 2008, Available online at

http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/01/31/army.suicides.ap/, accessed July 28, 2008.

72. Suicide Epidemic Among Veterans, CBS News, November 13, 2007, Available online at

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/13/cbsnews_investigates/main3496471.shtml, accessed July 28, 2008.

73. Bryan Bender, The Cost of Iraq War Nearly $2 Billion a Week, The Boston Globe, September 28, 2006.

27
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27816&Cr=Afghan&Cr1http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5036http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Jul%20Dec%202007%20EN.pdfhttp://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/10/200852514746225402.htmlhttp://w

Documents

Collateral Damage Final Document