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Collaborative Governance in the United States andKorea: Cases in Negotiated Policymaking and ServiceDeliveryYong-Duck Junga, Daniel Mazmanianb & Shui-Yan Tangb

a Seoul National University, South Koreab University of Southern California, USAPublished online: 25 Mar 2014.

To cite this article: Yong-Duck Jung, Daniel Mazmanian & Shui-Yan Tang (2009) Collaborative Governance in the UnitedStates and Korea: Cases in Negotiated Policymaking and Service Delivery, International Review of Public Administration,13:sup1, 1-11, DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2009.10805136

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INTRODUCTION

Collaborative governance has been defined as theprocess of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, andmonitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements toaddress public policy problems that cannot be easilyaddressed by a single organization or the public sectoralone (Ansell and Gash 2008). Although a worldwidephenomenon, the rise of collaborative governance indifferent countries can be attributed to different factorsdepending on specific historical and institutionalcontexts. These differences affect collaborativegoverning arrangements and their relative efficacy astools for public problem solving. Yet in the emergingliterature on collaborative governance, there have beenfew systematic efforts that compare collaborativegovernance across different nations. In this symposium,we take a step in this direction by examining experiencesin two countries, the United States and Korea.

In this introductory essay, we first outline some majorforces that have been driving the rise of collaborativegovernance in each of the two countries. Then weexplore the theoretical and policy problems raised by thistrend in each country. Next, we provide an overview ofthe contributions to this symposium.

THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVEGOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES

AND KOREA

In the past several decades, governments around theglobe have been struggling to cope with a growing rangeof challenges. These challenges are emerging at the verymoment when the public has been generally disinclinedto support tax increases, especially for remote governmentsand for social policy purposes. The public is inclined tobelieve that governments are wasteful and fail torepresent its interests, and generally has a low regard forthe public sector and the legitimacy of government itself(Hetherington 2006). These phenomena, combined withglobal competition in the post-cold war era, are bothcause and effect of the continuing budget squeeze ingovernments and the lessening of the public sector’scapacity to address growing challenges. Consequently, alarge gap has remained between these challenges andwherewithal for adequate responses.

Governments, from the local up through the nationallevel, in both the United States and Korea, haveresponded in many ways. In some instances serviceshave been held to the level of funding and capacityavailable. Fiscal strategies have been employed to shieldthe true cost of services through such practices asdeferring worker compensation, or through borrowing

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA: CASES IN NEGOTIATED POLICYMAKING

AND SERVICE DELIVERY

YONG-DUCK JUNGSeoul National University, South Korea

DANIEL MAZMANIANUniversity of Southern California, USA

&SHUI-YAN TANG

University of Southern California, USA

© International Review of Public Administration2009, Vol. 13, Special Issue

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and bonding to cover current services. Sometimes publicagencies have “reinvented” themselves to be morebusiness-like, focusing on business sector principles ofperformance-based, client-centric management, andoutput and impact goals that are intended to producesavings and improved public satisfaction. In a number ofinstances, services have been contracted out to nonprofitand for-profit organizations to reduce costs, improvedelivery, and/or establish market-based benchmarks fortheir activity. And, in some cases, governments havetried one or more or a mix of all of the above.

Government service delivery processes and theirunderlying institutional structures are undergoingprofound changes. While hierarchical public agencieslarge and small remain the dominant form oforganization, the authority-based, hierarchical twentiethcentury public administration theory and practice is nolonger the dominant paradigm and way of thinking. Yetits replacement is not necessarily the other idealinstitutional form of delivery market-based transactions,once conceptualized as the “big tradeoff” (Okun 1975).Realistically, a continuum extends from authority-basedarrangements at one end to market-based arrangementsat the other, with much room for hybrids in between. Themost pressing question for understanding public sectormanagement and service delivery in contemporarygovernments has become, if not the classic ideal ofhierarchy versus market, which of the institutional formsalong the continuum are best suited to what types ofpublic purposes, and why (Hooghe and Marks 2003)?While institutional forms can be aligned along a fairlylengthy continuum, four major archetypical forms can beidentified (see Table 1).

On one end of the continuum is the classic authority-

based form (#1), characterized by command-and-control,with public agencies performing services and enforcingregulations, within the broader context of the threebranches of government (i.e., classic Weberianhierarchical, executive branch organizations within theU.S. model of representative democracy). At the otherend of the continuum is the market-based form (#4), ofimportance in the literature traditionally as the polaropposite of the classic public authority-based form(Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Poole, Mansfield andGould-Williams 2006). Examples of its applications canbe found today in such areas as emission fees and credittrading regimes to reduce air pollution (Tietenberg2003), and some limited uses of vouchers in elementaryeducation (Neal 2002; Steuerle et al. 2000). Whileinteresting theoretically, the market-based form has notbeen widely embraced in application as eithertechnically feasible or philosophically preferable in mostpublic service delivery arenas.

A form that has risen in prominence in the UnitedStates in the past several decades, has grown inimportance in Korea in the past decade, and has receivedthe most attention by advocates pro and con is form #2in Figure 1 government that is authority-based bututilizes outsourcing as the delivery mechanism for publicgoods and services. Proponents underscore thetheoretically important difference between the provisionof public goods and services the enactment of policiesby government and their production their implementation(Ostrom and Ostrom 1991; Savas 1987). They argue thatwhile governments should raise funds for and decide onthe quantity and quality of public services and goods, theactual production (delivery) of the services and goodscan be carried out by any number of public, nonprofit, or

2 Collaborative Governance in the United States and Korea: Vol. 13, Special IssueCases in Negotiated Policymaking and Service Delivery

Table 1. Four Institutional Forms

# 1: Authority-basedArrangements:Governmenthierarchies(command and controlregulations; governmentagencies)

#2: Authority-basedArrangements:Outsourcing(principal-agentrelationships; long-termcontracts)

#3: CollaborativeGovernanceArrangements (joint provision ofservices by public, for-profit, and nonprofitorganizations; broughttogether either bymandates or as anemergent phenomenon)

#4:Market-basedArrangements (self interest, financialrewards, competition,winners and losers,private property rights)

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private sector vendors competing in the marketplace.Proponents contend that this division of labor capturesgreater economies of scale and efficiencies than areusually obtainable within government (Donahue andNye 2002).

As a practical matter, outsourcing has become amajor feature of American government (Minicucci andDonahue 2004) and of growing importance in Korea aswell (Jung 2007). It has also come to play a central rolein the initiation and operation of e-government servicesthroughout the United States (Ni and Bretschneider2007). Clearly this is an important change in howservices are being delivered, raising important issues ofoversight (Marvel and Marvel 2007), accountability(Hodge and Coghill 2007), principal-agent relations(Knott 1993), and the public’s perception of servicedelivery and overall satisfaction with government.

Outsourcing itself has changed over the past decades,as it has moved from the simple model of onegovernment entity contracting with one outside vendor,to more complex models in which multiple governmententities contract with networks of vendors who areconnected to each other through multiple subcontracts. Aprominent example is the mental health service deliverynetwork in the state of Arizona studied by Milward andProvan (2000). One of their central observations is thatamong the network of vendors producing mental healthservices on behalf of the state of Arizona, principal-agentrelationships exist in terms of a network administrativeorganization (a nonprofit organization itself) beingempowered by its state funders to award subcontracts toother nonprofit vendors and to oversee their performance.At the conceptual level this type of subcontracting can bethought of as an important, albeit, second-order effect,with the primary effect being the government, asprincipal, contracting with private vendors. The point isthat several variations of institutional arrangements haveevolved within the broad umbrella of outsourcing, andhave continued to promote discussion and research in thefield of public management (Brown, Potoski and VanSlyke 2006).

An even more intriguing, theoretically important andchallenging set of questions is being raised by theemergence of collaborations that bridge the classicdivides of the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.Labeled #3 in Table 1, collaborative governance mayspan one, several, or even all the stages of the public policyprocess from formulation, enactment, implementationto evaluation and feedback. In this sense, the process

goes beyond the principal-agent relations of sub-contracting. Collaborative governance also draws on theunique attributes and resources of participating sectors,with each expected to add significant value to the jointenterprise. In broad terms, governments bring to theenterprise the authority and coercive powers of the stateand taxation powers. Private sector actors bring fundingsecured through private capital markets, real property,financial management skills, entrepreneurial spirit,agility and timeliness, business-like managementpractices, and organizational and individual incentives.Nonprofit and nongovernment organizations providevoice for the real or perceived under-represented sectorsof society and provide them a seat at the policy planningor negotiating table. This is so particularly when theview of the minority conflicts with the aspirations andprojects of the government in satisfying the needs of theoverall community, thereby reflecting the preferences ofthe majority. Also important is the willingness ofnongovernmental organizations to perform asintermediaries in the provision of public goods andservices, using their moral suasion and social capital, onthe one hand, and business-like management skills onthe other in delivering services (Smith and Gronbjerg2006).

Although these collaborative arrangements seldomrequire a formal and explicit relinquishing ofgovernment authority, they do entail to some extentpower sharing, which flows from joint decision making,resource sharing, and joint responsibility to see that allparticipants in the process are satisfied in the outcome(Bogason and Musso 2005; Cooper, Bryer and Meek2006; Fung 2006). Within this context, there is also awide array of possible collaborative governancearrangements that embrace more versus less authoritysharing. These arrangements extend from those boundtogether by norms and trust among the collaboratingentities to those bound by higher order governmentexpectations or more formal requirements.

The rise of collaborative governance is evident inmany different arenas. In the United States it has becomestandard practice for sponsors to work with networks ofgovernmental, philanthropic, educational, and otherfunders to design, produce and manage low-incomehousing in poor inner cities (Langley et al. 1996). Inpublic health, public and private stakeholders health andsocial service providers, foundations, civic organizations,and citizens groups are regularly involved in partnershipsor coalitions for planning, managing, and evaluating

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community health initiatives (Weiner, Alexander andZuckerman 2000). In education, cross-sectoralcollaboration has played a significant role in thedevelopment and support of charter schools (Wohlstetter2004). Collaborative governance has also come todominate major water resource planning across the U.S.(Innes and Boher 2003; see also Blomquist, Schlagerand Heikkila 2004). Similarly, collaborative governancehas become the dominant form for resource managementplanning and implementation of the many resourceconservation and endangered species projects of theFederal Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management,especially those that encompass both public and privatelands (Porter and Salvesen 1995; Sabatier et al. 2005;Thomas 2003). And, as state and local governmentshave found themselves unable to fund their vitaltransportation and infrastructure needs through publicdollars alone, and/or to break through the gridlock ofprivate and public opposition to roads and freewayexpansion, they are being drawn to novel forms ofcollaborative governance for project planning, financing,and construction (Callahan 2007; U.S. DOT 2007).

Collaborative governance has been on the rise notjust in the U.S., but also in many other parts of the world(Freeman and Peck 2007 Lee and Haque 2006; Nobleand Jones 2006). Internationally, most economicdevelopment projects supported by internationalorganizations like the World Bank and the UnitedNations call for private sector business interests topartner with host governments, NGOs, and communitygroups in designing and implementing solutions to localpublic problems (Western, Wright and Strum 1994).

In Korea, collaborative governance has also been onthe rise, but in a different historical and institutionalcontext. Korea has existed as a nation state for nearly3,000 years?since 700 BCE. Yet it was only in 1948 thata republican form of government was established inKorea. In the years since the end of the Korean War(1950?1953), Korea has successfully developed amodern nation state. It achieved rapid industrialization inthe four decades after the war, and has consolidated itsdemocratic institutions since the late 1980s. Korea iscurrently the world’s thirteenth largest economy in termsof GDP and enjoys the highest level of liberal democracyin Asia (Thompson 1996; Freedomhouse.org each year).Yet the country currently faces a variety of public policyproblems, a result partly of the rapid industrialization and“condensed” growth of the past few decades.

Economic development policies in those decades

were based on a “selection and concentration” strategy,which has created many social imbalances and under-developed sectors in society. As a result, Korea is facedwith many public policy problems, including the need toredevelop poorly planned urban areas by applying soundurban design principles, restore damaged and pollutednatural environments, improve the quality of life for low-wage workers, and more.

In addition, there are many newly emerging publicpolicy problems. One urgent issue is to build socialsafety nets for people failing to adapt to neo-liberalistvalues and market-oriented competition in an age ofglobalization (Jung 2006). Korea also needs to addressthe problem of population aging, which is taking place atone of the fastest paces in the world. In order to resolveand prepare for the rapidly progressing phenomenon oflow fertility, Korea needs to reduce education costs forchildren while enhancing the effectiveness of publiceducation, and at the same time building childcarefacilities to help working mothers.

All these are tasks that need to be resolved throughpublic policies. In the two decades since the 1987democratic transition, the Korean government hassteadily expanded. This is partly the result of peopleexpressing their demand for public services in the now-democratic society, which they could not do duringformer periods of authoritarianism. Politicians easilyacquiesced to these public demands, hoping to win votesin the election processes that had become much morecompetitive than in the past.

In the December 2008 presidential election, however,Korean voters departed from their previous support ofgovernment growth, and elected by a landslide acandidate with a “small government” platform. Theirchoice can be interpreted as a new public sentiment thatthe government should promote economic growththrough tax reductions, deregulation, and marketcompetition principles.

Although Korean voters opted for “small-government,”it is unclear whether they would actually support acutback of the public services they have been enjoyingfor the past twenty years. While preferring fewer taxburdens and government deregulations, the Koreanpeople were also making demands that conflicted withthese preferences asking the government to maintainthe expanded public services and furthermore to addresseffectively various newly emerging public problems. Toresolve this political dilemma, Korea needs to enhanceits governing capacity such that it can keep government

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small while at the same time provide a wide array ofpublic services and address the newly emerging publicpolicy problems of this age and time.

The institutionalization of a new governance systemis needed also to meet the demand for democraticparticipation. Korea has witnessed a dramatic growth incitizen participation in public policy making since the1987 democratic transition. However, given the rapidpace of democratization in the past two decades, aneffective governing system that matches the need forexpanded citizen participation and civic engagement hasyet to take root. This has created numerous conflictsbetween social groups (e.g., between doctors andpharmacists over the enactment of the Separation ofDrug Dispensing and Prescription Act), between thegovernment and individuals/social groups (e.g., betweenthe government and local residents over the selection ofa U.S. Army relocation site), between governmentagencies (e.g., between ministries over the selection of aministry to supervise information and telecommunicationspolicies), between the central and local (or local andlocal) governments (e.g., over the selection of aradioactive waste disposal facility site), and so on. Theseconflicts lead to delays in public policy making or tosudden suspensions of policy implementation, damagingKorea’s national competitiveness in the process. It istherefore necessary to leave behind this stage of conflictsand disputes, and to institutionalize a new collaborativeapproach where government, civil society, and themarket address public policy problems through mutualadjustments and collaboration.

CHALLENGES FOR RESEARCH

In the context of the United States, because of itsblended character, collaborative governance requiresaddressing anew the classic questions of representativegovernance, with its delegation of powers to publicagencies to carry out the public purpose, and itsquestions of how to understand and track policyimplementation, the role of public, nonprofit, and for-profit actors, and the sharing of power and responsibility.For example, when authority is shared among entitiesfrom multiple sectors, how is accountability to theelectorate to be upheld? How are conflicts and collective-action problems among participating entities to beresolved? How is collaborative governance to beevaluated, both substantively and procedurally? What

are the appropriate sanctions and rewards for the variousactors? Is the emergence of collaborative governancesimply a consequence of the shift toward a privatesector oriented ideology among elected officials andthe public? While collaborative governance may be amore flexible organizational form, is it as reliable asother traditional forms of public problem solving? Whenprivate interests are directly involved in the governanceprocesses, how are the classic public managementconcerns of agency capture, public sector personnelcorruption, and public transparency to be addressed?

In Korea, it remains a question as to whethercollaborative governance can be institutionalized in asociety in which the traditional mode of governing, anAsiatic administrative state, had for centuries beenpremised on centralized and hierarchical authorities(Jung 2005; Thompson 1996). Another obstacle for theinstitutionalization of collaborative governance in Koreais that despite the rapid growth of civil society in the twodecades since the nation’s democratic transition (seeFigure 1), there remains a serious lack of trust amongorganizations from different sectors the state, themarket, and civil society.

With regard to the evolution and institutionalizationof collaborative governance, the United States and Koreaprovide interesting contrasts. In the United States, whilethe contemporary form of collaborative governance is anewly emergent phenomenon, the country itself has hada long tradition of drawing on civil society and theprivate sector in search of solutions to public problems.In contrast, the history of Korea is filled withexperiences of state-centered approaches to publicproblem solving, including hundreds of years ofhierarchical governance based on Confucian values,Japanese imperialist colonial rule (1910-1945), and fourdecades of authoritarian administrations since thefounding of the Republic. This explains why distrust stillruns deep in the relations between government, market,and civil society. Accustomed to a state-centeredapproach to public problem solving, the Korean peoplemay now prefer “small government” but may still expectthe central government to undertake decisive andsometimes heavy-handed approaches to public problemsolving. All these factors raise doubts about thefeasibility of building effective collaborative governancearrangements in Korea.

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CNTRIBUTIONS IN THIS SYMPOSIUM

The papers in this symposium approach the issue ofcollaborative governance along two distinct butcomplementary analytical dimensions. The firstconsiders the important stages of the public policyprocess in a democratic society from the way issuesare culturally framed and understood within a society, tothe process of policy formulation and planning forspecific projects, through to the actual delivery of publicgoods and services when in one or more of the stepsalong the way, these processes take place through acollaborative mechanism. The second dimension is thatof efficacy, that is, the extent to which the collaborativeapproach can be judged as successful in the context atthe stage in which it is utilized. Always important butfar less easy to gauge is the extent to which thecollaboration had a notable or substantial effect on theproject or activity that was the end goal.

The contexts in which collaborative approaches arebeing used today are many and growing. This isillustrated by the eight cases that follow. They alsounderscore the fact that although the techniques ofcollaboration and conflict resolution are becoming wellknown, the result of a collaboration and the link to policy

and program goals can only be understood within thespecifics of the particular case. This leads us to theconclusion that while collaborative approaches are beingemployed widely as an alternative to top-down andunilateral government action and as good (“best”)practices, the outcome of these processes remains mixed.In essence, we have come to understand collaborativeprocesses as better than the conventional, yet recognizethat they provide us with necessary but not sufficientconditions for successful resolution of political andpolicy controversies and conflicts. At least this is theconclusion drawn from the cases examined herein.

The first paper in the symposium, by MichaelMoody, “Everyone Will Get Better Together: HowThose Responsible for California’s Bay-Delta WaterSystem Understand Collaboration,” takes as its startingpoint the importance of the different understandings thatthe participants bring to a collaboration. These differentunderstandings are based on experience, perceptions,and interests, and are exacerbated when a wide range ofparticipants are drawn together because of the scale,complexity, and potential impacts of a public policydispute. In this case, it was over the long-termmanagement of the California Bay-Delta, which iscentral to the economic and urban growth and ecologicalwell being of the entire state. The study illuminates the

6 Collaborative Governance in the United States and Korea: Vol. 13, Special IssueCases in Negotiated Policymaking and Service Delivery

Figure 1. Growth of Civic Groups in Korea, 1940s-1990s

Source: Jung (2006:281).

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importance of understanding such differences, andshows that acknowledging and accommodating them atthe very early stage of the policy process is necessary ifthe collaboration is to have a chance at being successful.The analysis focuses on how the participants came tounderstand the core elements, definitions, and difficultiesof collaboration, as well as how they came to justifycollaborative activities and how they perceived thebenefits, that is, how understandings developed throughmutual practice of collaboration and, in turn, how theseunderstandings had positive practical consequences.Data for the analysis were gathered from multi-year andmulti-method research on the participants in the Bay-Delta policymaking and governance process.

Jin Sik Choi adds to our understanding of theimportance of the stakeholder perception in his paper“The Roles of Affect and Cultural Heuristics inCollaborative Approaches to Conflict Resolution:Crematory Facility Siting in Korea.” In this instance, thefactor examined is non-government actors’ perceptionsof the intent of government actors. Choi posits that “ifthe actors in the non-government sector perceive thatcollaborative governance may be against their interests,they will dispute, rather than collaborate, with thegovernment.” This is a paradox of course, since “it is inthe very cases where public interests are incompatiblewith private interests that the government shouldcollaborate with actors in the private sector.” Based on acultural heuristics model of risk perception and empiricaldata of the perceptions around a proposed siting of acrematory, Choi peels back the layers of factors affectingperceptions of “others,” as they relate to perceptions ofrisk, through exploring an array of values, attitudes, andpartisan views. He explores the possibility that negativeperceptions by the community can be off-set by offers ofcommunity development and various forms ofcompensation.

Lisa Schweitzer examines the issue ofjustice?actually the “injustice” that often accompaniesthe siting of unwanted land uses, in “EnvironmentalJustice and Collaborative Governance: Building ASocio-Spatial Perspective for Management.”

The paper examines “the challenges to cross-sectoral,collaborative governance of urban environments asviewed through the lens of environmental justiceactivism to explore another double-edged aspect ofcollaboration: legitimacy and justice.” Schweitzer drawson the extensive environmental justice literature andexperiences in the United States over the past several

decades, which find a concentration of environmentalhazards, including polluting and nuisance industries(such as recycling) among communities inhabited byracial minorities and the less-well-off groups in theUnited States. The paper reviews both the experiencesand approaches to off-setting if not remedying theimbalance in power, when the less-well-off andespecially racial minorities have attempted to opposeunwanted facilities.

Schweitzer concludes that “the overwhelming lessonfrom the research and activism on environmental justiceis that neighborhoods are not equal. Their histories, theirengagement with local governments and institutions,their goals, and their capacity for political self-determination differ significantly because of thegeographically uneven distribution of poverty andopportunity.” This stands as a caution to those whobelieve there is a simple or equitably drawn collaborativeanswer to inherent inequities and racial differences, atleast in American society, notwithstanding the success ofcollaborative forms in providing some neighborhoodstargeted for a LULU with an effective means of opposition.

The paper by Elizabeth Graddy, “Cross-SectoralGovernance and Performance in Service Delivery,”moves into the implementation stage of the public policyprocess, assessing the value of collaboration in the actualdelivery of social services. It explores the influence onservice delivery effectiveness of the structure andmanagement of inter-organizational governancefunctions, the nature of interdependencies in servicedelivery, the intensity of interactions, the characteristicsof the constituent partners, and the characteristics of thenetwork within which the partnerships operate. Thestudy compares twenty-six different networks providingchild and family services throughout the county of LosAngeles, which is one of the largest social service areasin the entire United States. After testing a number ofpropositions from the literature about what should leadto effective collaborative service such as the perceivedtrustworthiness of partners, the openness of decisionmaking, information and resource sharing Graddyconcludes that the best predictor of success is thepresence of a formal contract that defines “the roles andresponsibilities” of the different entities involved. Sheconcludes, among other things, that “results providesupport for the pervasive use of formal written contractsin defining the nature of inter-organizationalarrangements to deliver publicly-funded services.” Whilethis may be an particularly American phenomenon, it is a

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reminder that explicit methods of accountability andperformance are needed in a collaborative arrangementas much as, if not more than, in a hierarchicalarrangement.

Anyone familiar with delivery of welfare services incontemporary societies can appreciate the challenge ofaddressing ever increasing public expectations forservice and the growing difficulty of coordinating anddelivering those services. Hyun Joo Chang’s paper,“Collaborative Governance in Welfare Service Delivery:Focusing on Local Welfare System in Korea,” highlightsthis point well. To meet this growing need, traditionalwelfare service delivery in Korea has been moving fromtraditional hierarchical public agencies to new forms ofnetworking and collaborative service provision, that is,as in the Graddy study, collaboration in the implementationstage.“Since late 1990s, along with a trend ofdecentralization, there has been an increasing effort toput greater emphasis on building a local welfare systemor community-based....services to meet the needs of theelderly, the disabled, women, children, and youth.” Thishas resulted in the emergence of Community WelfareCouncils that are intended to bring together the range ofgovernment, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in acommunity to provide services in a more efficient andcoordinated manner. This study provides a detailedassessment of the extent of collaboration in the planningand delivery of different welfare services through thecouncil process, identifying areas where it worksreasonably well, but also where it does not, which isoften due to the inherent tension and built-in conflicts ofmission among the different members of thecollaboration.

Hyun Jun Park and Min Jeong Park, in their paper“Types of Network Governance and NetworkPerformance: Community Development Project Case,”extend the analysis of collaborative approaches from thedelivery of specific services to a broad focus on effortsby local communities to devise and carry out programsof development. While once the providence of governmentplanning agencies, community development in Koreatoday (and in the United States) has become theresponsibility of local actors, who of necessity must jointogether in cultivating the growth and development oftheir communities. The result is a growing number ofcollaborations and alliances formed by local governmentsthat include private and non-profit organizations, plusstate and national government agencies. The questionPark and Park set out to answer is which types of

community development collaborations are preferredand why. Their study draws on the experiences of a setof thirty local governments in building networks andgarnering support for them through Korea’s HAPPYKOREA project, which “aims to develop characteristicand elegant living conditions that the present andsubsequent generations can possess under cooperationbetween communities, residents and administration byutilizing natural resources in their communities.” Andwhile the development efforts are relatively young, theassessment has found that more important than anyparticular organizational and structural features of thecollaboration is trust the most successful ones arebuilding on the trust that has been cultivated among themembers. In the end, the ties among the players morethan the form of the organization may be the overridingfeature of effective collaboration among networkedorganizations. This appears to be the essence ofcollaborative governance in Korea, the United States,and most likely everywhere else it is emerging.

CONCLUSION

Collaborative governance has been emerging as a keyinstitutional approach to public problem solvingworldwide, including in the United States and Korea. Itspotential role spans the entire spectrum of the policymaking process from planning and design toimplementation and evaluation. The papers included inthis symposium examine the role of collaborativegovernance at both ends of the policy process, i.e.,negotiated policy making and service delivery. Asdiscussed earlier in this essay, collaborative governancein the United States and Korea has emerged fromdifferent historical and institutional settings. Yetcontributions in this symposium show how a number ofcommon factors may account for the dynamics andperformance of collaborative governing arrangements inthe two countries.

First, collaborative governance involves actors frommultiple organizations and sectors; as illustrated in thestudies on California’s Bay-Delta Water System and thecrematory and waste facility siting cases in Korea, theseactors tend to differ in their understandings andperceptions about the nature of the public problem theyare involved in. These cases, for example, demonstratehow actors may differ in their perceptions about potential

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benefits and risks, and how various participatory anddeliberative processes may shape and reshape theirperceptions, and thus their willingness to join force witheach other in tackling common problems.

Second, collaborative governance is inevitablyconnected to broader distributional issues in society, asillustrated by the discussions on environmental justice(or injustice) in the United States and the siting of locallyundesirable facilities in Korea. These distributionalissues tend to be conflict-ridden, and collaborativegovernance is seen by many as a tool for addressingdistributional conflicts. Yet one must be cautious in notemploying collaborative governance as a panaceabecause, as is illustrated in the cases, collaborativegovernance has both potential and limitations as a toolfor conflict resolution.

Third, the cases show that collaborative governancetends to work better in the policy planning andnegotiation stage when it seeks to involve a broad rangeof stakeholders in a less structured manner; at theimplementation and service delivery stage, collaborativegovernance tends to work better with a more formalizedstructure, as illustrated in the cases on social/welfareservice delivery in Los Angeles and Korea. Yet, asillustrated in the study on community development inKorea, local alliances and coalitions for development canbenefit from the cultivation of trust among participants.

Finally, while the cases in this symposium highlight anumber of common factors affecting the dynamics andsuccess of collaborative governance in the United Statesand Korea, one might speculate that these factors wouldplay out differently in the two countries due to thedifferences in their historical and cultural contexts.Although the current cases do not address these issuesdirectly, they provide useful starting points for the designof studies that explicitly compare and contrast thecollaborative processes in the two societies. These allsuggest important avenues of future research that couldhelp clarify the applicability of different governingapproaches, such as collaboration, in different culturaland societal contexts.

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Yong-duck Jung is President of the Korea Institute ofPublic Administration (KIPA) and Professor at theSeoul National University. He has acted as editor ofKorean Public Administration Review and KoreanJournal of Policy Studies and as editorial board memberof several academic journals including Governance. Dr.Jung has served as the 35th president of the KoreanAssociation for Public Administration (KAPA), member

of the presidential committees for administrative reform(1988-2005) and the National Committee for the 6th

Global Forum on Reinventing Government, and co-chair of the Government Performance EvaluationCommittee. He is the author and editor of many booksincluding the State Apparatus in Korea and Japan.

Daniel Mazmanian is the Bedrosian Chair inGovernance at the School of Policy, Planning andDevelopment at the University of Southern California,and Director of the USC Center on Governance and thePublic Enterprise. Author of eight books, numerousarticles, and the recipient of National ScienceFoundation and other research grants, his areas ofinterest are public policy analysis and implementation,with special emphasis on environmental policy andsustainability, and California governance andpolicymaking. He served as Dean of the School ofPolicy, Planning and Development from 2000-2005 andDean of the School of Natural Resources andEnvironment at the University of Michigan from 1996-2000. In 2005 he served as President of the Associationof Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. From2005-2007 he was a member on the Task Force onEnvironmental Governance for the Chinese Council forInternational Cooperation on Environment andDevelopment, Beijing.

Shui-Yan Tang is Professor in the School of Policy,Planning and Development at the University ofSouthern California. He is also the Research Director ofthe Bedrosian Center on Governance and the PublicEnterprise at USC. His main research interests includeinstitutional analysis, collaborative governance,environmental politics and policy.

Received: November 14, 2008 Accepted with no revision: January 23, 2009

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