12) G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the NationalCapital

Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were

married inHongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently,

they weredivorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van

Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their conjugal property; that

petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the

conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in

the divorce proceedingsbefore the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

HELD: 

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals

are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public

policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided

they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from

the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have

no standingto sue inthe case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is

bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he

does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged

conjugal property.

1. PHILSEC. INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 274 SCRA 102 (1997)

FACTS Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the sum of $2.5M secured by shares of

stock owned by Ducat. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc. undertook the obligation to pay by virtue of

a Warranty Deed with a Vendor’s Lien. Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to Athona Holdings (“Athona”) a parcel of land in Texas while Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M loan to Athona to partially cover the value of the $2.8M lot.

Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc. worth $.3M to complete the payment for the lot. After all these transactions, Ducat was released by Philsec and Ayala of his loan.

Athona failed to pay the $.3M promissory note. 1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the $.3M. The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending, Philsec filed a complaint to recover

a sum of money with damages in a Makati RTC against Ducat. Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the basis of litis pendentia and forum

non conveniens. The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc. because the action was neither in

rem nor quasi in rem, accompanied by the fact that the said defendant was a non-resident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUES1. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non conveniens?

RULING

1. Yes. First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not include forum non

conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance.

In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM TAKING JURISDICTION SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO, AND THAT IT WAS THE EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LATTER’S DEBT WHICH WAS THE OBJECT OF THE TRANSACTION UNDER LITIGATION.

The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

7) MANILA HOTEL CORP AND MANILA HOTEL INT’L LTD. VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 120077, (OCTOBER 13, 2000), 343 SCRA 1

FACTS Marcelo Santos was employed as a printer in a printing press in Oman when he received a job offer

from Palace Hotel in China for the same position and a higher pay. Santos remained in correspondence with Palace Hotel while he was still in employed in Oman. After negotiations, Santos accepted the offer and signed the contract with Palace Hotel (while still in

Oman). His contract provided that he will receive a monthly salary of $900 and the employment contract should last for two years.

After he resigned from his Oman job, he went back to the Philippines. Thereafter, he left for China.

When Santos arrived in China, he signed an amended employment agreement (terms were not stated in the case), and the agreement was also signed by Mr. Schmidt of Palace Hotel and noted by the VP of Manila Hotel International Company Limited (“MHICL”). Santos commenced employment immediately.

After a short vacation leave, Santos returned to Palace Hotel and he was informed that he was going to be terminated due to business reverses suffered by the company.

After a month, he was indeed terminated and all his benefits were paid to him. When Santos came back to the Philippines, he filed a suit in the NLRC, naming Manila Hotel Corporation (“MHC”) and MHICL as defendants.

To clarify the relationship of Palace Hotel and MHICL and MHC:

The NLRC awarded damages to Santos, but MHC and MHICL assailed NLRC’s jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUEDid the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case at bar?

RULING NO. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely

foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that Santos is a Filipino citizen. THE PALACE HOTEL AND MHICL ARE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. NOT ALL CASES INVOLVING OUR CITIZENS CAN BE TRIED HERE.

The employment contract. —SANTOS WAS HIRED DIRECTLY BY THE PALACE HOTEL, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. HE WAS HIRED WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE POEA OR ANY AUTHORIZED RECRUITMENT AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

UNDER THE RULE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A PHILIPPINE COURT OR AGENCY MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IF IT CHOOSES TO DO SO PROVIDED:

(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

THE CONDITIONS ARE UNAVAILING IN THE CASE AT BAR.

8) Civil Law – Conflict of Laws – Processual Presumption – Forum Non Conveniens

Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Rule 34 – Summary Judgment

Gil Miguel Puyat, a foreigner, lost a collection suit filed against him by Ron Zabarte in a court in California, USA. The

California court ordered Puyat to pay the amount of $241k. Puyat was only able to pay $5k.

In January 1994, Zabarte filed an action to enforce the California judgment here in the Philippines against Puyat. Puyat

filed an Answer where he alleged, among others, that the California court had no jurisdiction over the case, hence, the

foreign judgment is void. He likewise averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the issue involved are

partnership matters which are under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Zabarte then filed a motion for summary judgment as he argued that Puyat’s Answer tendered no issue. The trial court

granted the motion and eventually gave a favorable judgment for Zabarte. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of

the trial court.

On appeal, Puyat now avers that the trial court should have never taken cognizance of the case because it had no

jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the forum non conveniens rule. He averred that under this principle, since all the

transaction involved in this case occurred in California, he being aforeigner, and the California law was not properly

determined, the trial court had no jurisdiction. He also assailed the validity of the trial court’s act in granting the motion for

summary judgment filed by Zabarte.

ISSUE: Whether or not Puyat is correct.

HELD: No. The allowance of summary judgment is proper. In this case, Puyat’s Answer did not really tender an

issue. Summary judgment is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.  When affidavits,

depositions and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to

pierce the allegations in the pleadings and to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment.  In short, since the

facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. In this

case, Puyat’s Answer merely alleged that the California court, a civil court, had no jurisdiction because the case involved

was a partnership issue. He however admitted that the issue involved is the payment of money upon promissory notes

with damages. Puyat also did not attach a copy of the complaint filed by Zabarte with the California court. As such, the

trial court properly presumed, applying the principle of processual presumption, that the California law is the same as

Philippine law  – that cases involving collection of money is cognizable by civil courts. And by applying the principle of

processual presumption, there’s no longer a need to try the facts in this case, hence, a summary judgment was in order.

Anent the issue of forum non conveniens, such does not exist in this case. Under the principle of forum non

conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for

any of the following practical reasons:

“1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case

transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure

procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be

overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and

The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.”

2) MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]

Facts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, §7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of

the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee. Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. §33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. §16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of §7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is §7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”