Cognitive-Functional Linguistics – Some Basic Tenets I

Cognitive-Functional Linguistics– Some Basic Tenets I

Cognitive-Functional Linguistics– Some Basic Tenets I

Rolf Theil

Bergen, June 19, 2006

Rolf Theil

Bergen, June 19, 2006

June 19, 2006 RT/CFL/I 2

– More juice!– More juice!

Nothing could seem less remarkable than a one-year-old child requesting More juice!

But the remarkable fact is that even this baby utterance differs from the communica-tive activities of other animal species in a number of fundamental ways.

Nothing could seem less remarkable than a one-year-old child requesting More juice!

But the remarkable fact is that even this baby utterance differs from the communica-tive activities of other animal species in a number of fundamental ways.


– Doggie gone!– Doggie gone!

Nothing could seem less remarkable than a one-year-old child commenting Doggie gone!

But the remarkable fact is that no other animals make disinterested comments to one another about missing dogs.

Nothing could seem less remarkable than a one-year-old child commenting Doggie gone!

But the remarkable fact is that no other animals make disinterested comments to one another about missing dogs.


The most astounding factThe most astounding fact

From an ethological perspective, perhaps the most astounding fact is that about 80 percent of all Homo sapiens cannot understand these simple utterances at all.

Whereas the individuals of all nonhuman species can communicate effectively with all of their con-specifics, human beings can communicate effec-tively only with other persons who have grown up in their same linguistic community.

From an ethological perspective, perhaps the most astounding fact is that about 80 percent of all Homo sapiens cannot understand these simple utterances at all.

Whereas the individuals of all nonhuman species can communicate effectively with all of their con-specifics, human beings can communicate effec-tively only with other persons who have grown up in their same linguistic community.


Language learningLanguage learning

Whatever may be the reasons for this unique, indeed bizarre, situation, one immediate outcome is that, unlike most other animal species, human beings cannot be born with any specific set of communicative behaviors.

Yound children must learn the set of linguistic conventions used by those around them, which for any given language consists of tens of thousands, or perhaps even hundred of thousands, of indi-vidual words, expressions, and constructions.

Whatever may be the reasons for this unique, indeed bizarre, situation, one immediate outcome is that, unlike most other animal species, human beings cannot be born with any specific set of communicative behaviors.

Yound children must learn the set of linguistic conventions used by those around them, which for any given language consists of tens of thousands, or perhaps even hundred of thousands, of indi-vidual words, expressions, and constructions.


FlexibilityFlexibility

The human species is biologically prepared for this prodigious task in ways that individuals of other species are not.

But this preparation cannot be too specific, as human children must be flexible enough to learn not only all of the different words and conventio-nal expressions but also all of the different types of abstract constructional patterns that these languages have grammaticized historically.

The human species is biologically prepared for this prodigious task in ways that individuals of other species are not.

But this preparation cannot be too specific, as human children must be flexible enough to learn not only all of the different words and conventio-nal expressions but also all of the different types of abstract constructional patterns that these languages have grammaticized historically.


Many yearsMany years

It thus takes many years of daily interaction with mature language users for children to attain adult-like skills.

This is a longer period of learning with more things to be learned – by many orders of magnitude – than is required of any other species on the planet.

It thus takes many years of daily interaction with mature language users for children to attain adult-like skills.

This is a longer period of learning with more things to be learned – by many orders of magnitude – than is required of any other species on the planet.


The Innateness HypothesisThe Innateness Hypothesis

Our ability to speak and understand a natural language results from – and is made possible by – a richly struc-tured and biologically determined capacity specific both to our species and to this domain. […] the language faculty is a part of human biology, tied up with the architecture of the human brain, and distinct in part from other cognitive faculties.

P. 216 in S. R. Anderson and D. Lightfoot (2002):

The Language Organ. Linguistics as Cognitive Physiology.

Our ability to speak and understand a natural language results from – and is made possible by – a richly struc-tured and biologically determined capacity specific both to our species and to this domain. […] the language faculty is a part of human biology, tied up with the architecture of the human brain, and distinct in part from other cognitive faculties.

P. 216 in S. R. Anderson and D. Lightfoot (2002):

The Language Organ. Linguistics as Cognitive Physiology.


The Language OrganThe Language Organ

The path of development which we observe suggests that the growth of language results from a specific in-nate capacity rather than emerging on a purely inductive basis from observation of the language around us. The mature system incorporates properties that could not have been learned from observation or any plausibly available teaching.

Anderson & Lightfoot (2002: 2)

The path of development which we observe suggests that the growth of language results from a specific in-nate capacity rather than emerging on a purely inductive basis from observation of the language around us. The mature system incorporates properties that could not have been learned from observation or any plausibly available teaching.

Anderson & Lightfoot (2002: 2)


Arguments for the Innateness Hypothesis

Arguments for the Innateness Hypothesis

Speed of Acquisition Language is acquired in a remarkably short period, which

would not be possible if humans did not have an innate language faculty.

Poverty of Data The grammar acquired by children is much more complex

than one should expect on the basis of the language data the children is exposed to from people around them.

Language Universals Languages resemble each other in structural features that are

not necessary properties of a language. These universal structural properties must be explained on the basis of innate knowledge.

Speed of Acquisition Language is acquired in a remarkably short period, which

would not be possible if humans did not have an innate language faculty.

Poverty of Data The grammar acquired by children is much more complex

than one should expect on the basis of the language data the children is exposed to from people around them.

Language Universals Languages resemble each other in structural features that are

not necessary properties of a language. These universal structural properties must be explained on the basis of innate knowledge.


Arguments against innateness IArguments against innateness I

Speed of Acquisition In order to assess this argument, we need to know what it means to

acquire language in «a remarkably short period», and this information has never been supplied.

Poverty of Data This statement about the poverty of data, which was done years before

anyone had done serious research on the nature of the speech addressed to children, has not been supported by later research.

Language Universals The number of language universals is not that impressive, and not large

enough to justify the postulation of an innate language faculty.

Geoffrey Sampson (2005): The ‘Language Instinct’ Debate.

Speed of Acquisition In order to assess this argument, we need to know what it means to

acquire language in «a remarkably short period», and this information has never been supplied.

Poverty of Data This statement about the poverty of data, which was done years before

anyone had done serious research on the nature of the speech addressed to children, has not been supported by later research.

Language Universals The number of language universals is not that impressive, and not large

enough to justify the postulation of an innate language faculty.

Geoffrey Sampson (2005): The ‘Language Instinct’ Debate.


Arguments against innateness IIArguments against innateness II

Speed of AcquisitionIt thus takes many years of daily interaction with mature language users for children to attain adult-like skills. This is a longer period of learning with more things to be learned – by many orders of magnitude – than is required of any other species on the planet.

Poverty of DataThe principles and structures whose existence it is difficult to explain without universal grammar (such Chomskian things as the subjacency constraints, the empty category principle, and the binding principles) are theory-internal affairs and simply do not exist in usage-based theories of language.

Language UniversalsVirtually all linguists … involved in the detailed analysis of individual languages cross-linguistically … agree that there are very few … specific grammatical categories and constructions … present in all languages.

Michael Tomasello (2003): Constructing a Language. A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition.

Speed of AcquisitionIt thus takes many years of daily interaction with mature language users for children to attain adult-like skills. This is a longer period of learning with more things to be learned – by many orders of magnitude – than is required of any other species on the planet.

Poverty of DataThe principles and structures whose existence it is difficult to explain without universal grammar (such Chomskian things as the subjacency constraints, the empty category principle, and the binding principles) are theory-internal affairs and simply do not exist in usage-based theories of language.

Language UniversalsVirtually all linguists … involved in the detailed analysis of individual languages cross-linguistically … agree that there are very few … specific grammatical categories and constructions … present in all languages.

Michael Tomasello (2003): Constructing a Language. A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition.


Language UniversalsLanguage Universals

Of course there are language universals. It is just that they are not universals of form – … not

particular kinds of linguistic symbols or gram-matical categories or syntactic constructions – but rather … universals of communication and cog-nition and human physiology.

Because all languages are used by human beings with similar social lives, all peoples have the need to solve in their languages certain kinds of com-municative tasks …

Michael Tomasello (2003): Constructing a Language.

Of course there are language universals. It is just that they are not universals of form – … not

particular kinds of linguistic symbols or gram-matical categories or syntactic constructions – but rather … universals of communication and cog-nition and human physiology.

Because all languages are used by human beings with similar social lives, all peoples have the need to solve in their languages certain kinds of com-municative tasks …

Michael Tomasello (2003): Constructing a Language.


The Cognitive-Functionalist Linguists

The Cognitive-Functionalist Linguists

– Who are they?– Who are they?


Joan L. Bybee (1945–)Joan L. Bybee (1945–)

An active and productive scholar, in particular within the fields of phonology, morphology, typology and psycholinguistics. Recently, she was elected President of the Linguistic Society of America. In 1985, her book Morphology: a study of the relation between meaning and form became a great source of inspiration for linguists at the University of Oslo, and her work contributed greatly to the establishment of a Cognitive Linguistics group there – a group that has steadily grown to become a meeting place for new students, research fellows and visiting scholars.

An active and productive scholar, in particular within the fields of phonology, morphology, typology and psycholinguistics. Recently, she was elected President of the Linguistic Society of America. In 1985, her book Morphology: a study of the relation between meaning and form became a great source of inspiration for linguists at the University of Oslo, and her work contributed greatly to the establishment of a Cognitive Linguistics group there – a group that has steadily grown to become a meeting place for new students, research fellows and visiting scholars.


Ronald W. Langacker (1942–)Ronald W. Langacker (1942–)

Develops the central ideas of Cognitive Grammar in his two-volume Foun-dations of Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991), which became a major depar-ture point for the emerging field of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Grammar treats human languages as consisting solely of semantic units, phonological units, and symbolic units (conventional pairings of phonological and semantic units). Cognitive Gram-mar extends the notion of symbolic units to the grammar of languages. Langacker further assumes that linguis-tic structures are motivated by general cognitive processes.

Develops the central ideas of Cognitive Grammar in his two-volume Foun-dations of Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991), which became a major depar-ture point for the emerging field of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Grammar treats human languages as consisting solely of semantic units, phonological units, and symbolic units (conventional pairings of phonological and semantic units). Cognitive Gram-mar extends the notion of symbolic units to the grammar of languages. Langacker further assumes that linguis-tic structures are motivated by general cognitive processes.


George P. Lakoff (1941–)George P. Lakoff (1941–)

The author of Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, 2nd Ed., (2002). He is also the author of Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About The Mind (1987) and co-author of Meta-phors We Live By (1980), More Than Cool Reason (1989), Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge To The Western Tradition (1999), Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being (2000) and, most recently, Don't Think of an Ele-phant: Know Your Values, Frame the Debate (2004).

The author of Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, 2nd Ed., (2002). He is also the author of Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About The Mind (1987) and co-author of Meta-phors We Live By (1980), More Than Cool Reason (1989), Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge To The Western Tradition (1999), Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being (2000) and, most recently, Don't Think of an Ele-phant: Know Your Values, Frame the Debate (2004).


Leonard TalmyLeonard Talmy

A professor of linguistics and philo-sophy at the University at Buffalo in New York. In Toward a Cognitive Se-mantics (2000), Talmy basically de-fines the field of cognitive semantics. He approaches the question of how language organizes conceptual material both at a general level and by analy-zing a crucial set of particular concep-tual domains: space and time, motion and location, causation and force inter-action, and attention and viewpoint. Talmy maintains that these are among the most fundamental parameters by which language structures conception.

A professor of linguistics and philo-sophy at the University at Buffalo in New York. In Toward a Cognitive Se-mantics (2000), Talmy basically de-fines the field of cognitive semantics. He approaches the question of how language organizes conceptual material both at a general level and by analy-zing a crucial set of particular concep-tual domains: space and time, motion and location, causation and force inter-action, and attention and viewpoint. Talmy maintains that these are among the most fundamental parameters by which language structures conception.


Adele E. GoldbergAdele E. Goldberg

Professor of Linguistics at Prince-ton University. Her research inte-rests include argument structure, constructionist approaches to lan-guage, language acquisition, cate-gorization, and the role of infor-mation structure in syntax. Books: Constructions: A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure (1995); Constructions at Work. The Nature of Generaliza-tion in Language (2006).

Professor of Linguistics at Prince-ton University. Her research inte-rests include argument structure, constructionist approaches to lan-guage, language acquisition, cate-gorization, and the role of infor-mation structure in syntax. Books: Constructions: A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure (1995); Constructions at Work. The Nature of Generaliza-tion in Language (2006).


William CroftWilliam Croft

William Croft is a professor of linguistics at the University of New Mexico, from January 2006; earlier at the University of Manchester. Books: Cognitive Linguistics (2004) with D. A. Cruse; Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective (2001); Explaining Language Change (2001); Typology and Universals, 2nd ed. (2003; 1st ed. 1990);

William Croft is a professor of linguistics at the University of New Mexico, from January 2006; earlier at the University of Manchester. Books: Cognitive Linguistics (2004) with D. A. Cruse; Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective (2001); Explaining Language Change (2001); Typology and Universals, 2nd ed. (2003; 1st ed. 1990);


Cognitive-Functional LinguisticsCognitive-Functional Linguistics

– What’s that?1. The Cognitive Commitment

2. The Generalization Commitment

3. The Functionalist Commitment

4. The Embodied Mind

– What’s that?1. The Cognitive Commitment


3. The Functionalist Commitment

4. The Embodied Mind


1. The Cognitive Commitment1. The Cognitive Commitment

Language and linguistic organization should reflect general cognitive principles.

Principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines

Accordingly, cognitive linguistics rejects the modular theory of mind.

Language and linguistic organization should reflect general cognitive principles.

Principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines

Accordingly, cognitive linguistics rejects the modular theory of mind.


The Modular Theory of Mind

The Modular Theory of Mind

The human mind is organized into distinct ‘encapsulated’ modules of knowledge.

One of these is the language module.

Linguistic structure and organization are markedly distinct from other aspects of cognition.

The human mind is organized into distinct ‘encapsulated’ modules of knowledge.

One of these is the language module.

Linguistic structure and organization are markedly distinct from other aspects of cognition.




Identify common structural principles that hold across phonology, semantics, pragmat-ics, morphology, syntax, and other aspects of language.

Language is not divided into separate modules.

Identify common structural principles that hold across phonology, semantics, pragmat-ics, morphology, syntax, and other aspects of language.

Language is not divided into separate modules.


The Modular Theory of Language

The Modular Theory of Language

Language is divided into distinct subsystems or modules – e.g. the phonology module, the syntax module, and the semantics module.

These modules are organized in significantly divergent ways, on the basis of different kinds of primitives.

Language is divided into distinct subsystems or modules – e.g. the phonology module, the syntax module, and the semantics module.

These modules are organized in significantly divergent ways, on the basis of different kinds of primitives.


3. The Functional Commitment3. The Functional Commitment

The Usage-Based Thesis: Language structure emerges from language use.

Language use is integral to our knowledge of language, our ‘mental grammar’.

The distinction between competence and performance is rejected.

The Usage-Based Thesis: Language structure emerges from language use.

Language use is integral to our knowledge of language, our ‘mental grammar’.

The distinction between competence and performance is rejected.


Competence and Performance

Competence and Performance

Competence: Knowledge of language. Performance: Use of language. Competence determines performance. Performance does not influence

competence. Performance can be affected by

language-external factors – tiredness, distraction, intoxication – and often fails to adequately reflect competence.

Competence: Knowledge of language. Performance: Use of language. Competence determines performance. Performance does not influence

competence. Performance can be affected by

language-external factors – tiredness, distraction, intoxication – and often fails to adequately reflect competence.


The Cognitive Commitment and its Implications for a

Linguistic Theory

The Cognitive Commitment and its Implications for a

Linguistic Theory

Principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines. Central aspects of this knowledge about human

cognition is represented by six basic psychological terms – presented on the following slides.

Principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines. Central aspects of this knowledge about human

cognition is represented by six basic psychological terms – presented on the following slides.


Six Basic Psychological TermsSix Basic Psychological Terms

Entrenchment Entrenchment (innprenting)(innprenting)

Abstraction Abstraction (abstraksjon)(abstraksjon)

Comparison Comparison (samanlikning)(samanlikning)

Composition Composition (komposisjon)(komposisjon)

Association Association (assosiasjon)(assosiasjon)

Embodiment Embodiment (kroppsleggjering)(kroppsleggjering)

Entrenchment Entrenchment (innprenting)(innprenting)

Abstraction Abstraction (abstraksjon)(abstraksjon)

Comparison Comparison (samanlikning)(samanlikning)

Composition Composition (komposisjon)(komposisjon)

Association Association (assosiasjon)(assosiasjon)

Embodiment Embodiment (kroppsleggjering)(kroppsleggjering)


ENTRENCHMENTNORWEGIAN: INNPRENTING

ENTRENCHMENTNORWEGIAN: INNPRENTING

The occurrence of psychological events leaves some kind of trace that facilitates their reoccurrence.

Through repetition, even a highly complex event can coalesce into a well-rehearsed routine that is easily elicited and reliably executed.

It equals “routinization”, “automatization” and “habit formation”.

The occurrence of psychological events leaves some kind of trace that facilitates their reoccurrence.

Through repetition, even a highly complex event can coalesce into a well-rehearsed routine that is easily elicited and reliably executed.

It equals “routinization”, “automatization” and “habit formation”.


Entrenchment: Unit NORWEGIAN: EINING

Entrenchment: Unit NORWEGIAN: EINING

When a complex structure comes to be manipu-lated as a “pre-packaged” assembly, no longer requiring conscious attention to its parts or their arrangement, it has the status of a unit.

Examples: Writing your signature Shifting gear Saying How do you do?

When a complex structure comes to be manipu-lated as a “pre-packaged” assembly, no longer requiring conscious attention to its parts or their arrangement, it has the status of a unit.

Examples: Writing your signature Shifting gear Saying How do you do?


ABSTRACTIONABSTRACTION

The emergence of a structure through reinforcement of the commonality inherent in multiple experiences.

By its very nature, this abstractive process ”filters out” those facets of the individual experiences which do not recur.

The emergence of a structure through reinforcement of the commonality inherent in multiple experiences.

By its very nature, this abstractive process ”filters out” those facets of the individual experiences which do not recur.


Abstraction: SchematizationNORWEGIAN: SKJEMATISERING

Abstraction: SchematizationNORWEGIAN: SKJEMATISERING

Schematization is a special case of abstraction.

It involves our capacity to operate at varying levels of ”granularity” or ”resolution”.

Schematization is a special case of abstraction.

It involves our capacity to operate at varying levels of ”granularity” or ”resolution”.


An Example of SchematizationAn Example of Schematization

The visual image of a person seen at a distance

versus

The visual image of a person seen close up

The visual image of a person seen at a distance

versus

The visual image of a person seen close up


Another Example of Schematization

Another Example of Schematization

A buffalo herd versus individual buffalosA buffalo herd versus individual buffalos


Other Examples of SchematizationOther Examples of Schematization

The structure of a sonnet versus the structure of an individual sonnet.

The meaning of animal versus the meaning of dog.

A consonant versus [p].

The structure of a sonnet versus the structure of an individual sonnet.

The meaning of animal versus the meaning of dog.

A consonant versus [p].


Abstraction: Schema and Instance

Abstraction: Schema and Instance

A schema is an ‘abstract’ or ‘coarse-grained’ representation vis-à-vis its more fully specified instances.

The instances elaborate the schema in contrasting ways.

A solid arrow represents the relationship between a schema and an instance:

A → B means ‘B instantiates / elaborates A’

A schema is an ‘abstract’ or ‘coarse-grained’ representation vis-à-vis its more fully specified instances.

The instances elaborate the schema in contrasting ways.

A solid arrow represents the relationship between a schema and an instance:

A → B means ‘B instantiates / elaborates A’


Schema and Instances

First example


First example

INSTANCEDog

INSTANCECat

INSTANCECow

SCHEMAAnimal

INSTANCEDog

INSTANCECat

INSTANCECow

SCHEMAAnimal



Second example


Second example

INSTANCE[i]

INSTANCE[a]

INSTANCE[u]

SCHEMAVowel

INSTANCE[i]

INSTANCE[a]

INSTANCE[u]

SCHEMAVowel


COMPARISONCOMPARISON

Fundamental to cognition is the ability to compare two structures and detect any discrepancy between them.

Comparison involves an inherent asymmetry: one structure functions as a standard of comparison, the other as its target.

Fundamental to cognition is the ability to compare two structures and detect any discrepancy between them.

Comparison involves an inherent asymmetry: one structure functions as a standard of comparison, the other as its target.


Comparison(by Americans)Comparison(by Americans)

Standard: USA Target: Turkey

The standard is familiar and well entrenched

The target is unfamiliar

Standard: USA Target: Turkey

The standard is familiar and well entrenched

The target is unfamiliar


Comparison:CategorizationComparison:

Categorization Categorization is a special case of comparison:

the standard represents an established unit and the target (at least originally) is novel.

When there is no discrepancy between standard and target, there is an instantiation relationship between them: A → B.

When there is a discrepancy between them, there is an extension relationship between them: A B.⇢

Categorization is a special case of comparison: the standard represents an established unit and the target (at least originally) is novel.

When there is no discrepancy between standard and target, there is an instantiation relationship between them: A → B.

When there is a discrepancy between them, there is an extension relationship between them: A B.⇢


Categorization: TreesCategorization: Trees

oak oak

oak birch

instantiationinstantiation

extensionextension


Categorization: Face RecognitionCategorization: Face Recognition

Suzanne Kemmer as a good instance of Suzanne Kemmer.

Suzanne Kemmer as a poor instance of Sydney Lamb.


COMPOSITIONCOMPOSITION

The combination of simpler structures to yield a more complex structure.

It involves the integration of two or more component structures to form a composite structure.

The combination of simpler structures to yield a more complex structure.

It involves the integration of two or more component structures to form a composite structure.


The Buddhist MonkThe Buddhist Monk

A Buddhist Monk begins at dawn one day walking up a mountain, reaches the top at sunset, meditates at the top for several days until one dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches at sunset. Make no assumptions about his starting or stopping or about his pace during his trip. Riddle: Is there a place on the path that the monk occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys?

A Buddhist Monk begins at dawn one day walking up a mountain, reaches the top at sunset, meditates at the top for several days until one dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches at sunset. Make no assumptions about his starting or stopping or about his pace during his trip. Riddle: Is there a place on the path that the monk occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys?

佛


Arthur KoestlerArthur Koestler

This is the amazing riddle that Arthur Koestler presents in The Act of Creation. […] Imagine that the monk is taking both ways on the same day. There must be a place where he meets himself, and that place is the one we are looking for. Its existence solves the riddle.

Fauconnier & Turner (2002): The Way We Think.

This is the amazing riddle that Arthur Koestler presents in The Act of Creation. […] Imagine that the monk is taking both ways on the same day. There must be a place where he meets himself, and that place is the one we are looking for. Its existence solves the riddle.

Fauconnier & Turner (2002): The Way We Think.


ASSOCIATIONASSOCIATION

The well-known phenomenon in which one kind of experience is able to evoke another. The smell of bananas always reminds me of my

week in hospital in 1952. I always had bananas on my night table.

The well-known phenomenon in which one kind of experience is able to evoke another. The smell of bananas always reminds me of my

week in hospital in 1952. I always had bananas on my night table.


AssociationAssociation

The particular kind of association that concerns us is symbolization: The association of conceptualization with

the mental representations of observable entities such us sounds, gestures, and written marks.

The particular kind of association that concerns us is symbolization: The association of conceptualization with

the mental representations of observable entities such us sounds, gestures, and written marks.


Association: The Symbolic UnitAssociation: The Symbolic Unit

An established symbolic relationship – a symbolic unit – is conveniently given as [ [ A ] / [ a ] ], where upper and lower case stand respectively for a conceptualization and a symbo-lizing structure. The slash ( / ) stands for the symbolization relationship.

An established symbolic relationship – a symbolic unit – is conveniently given as [ [ A ] / [ a ] ], where upper and lower case stand respectively for a conceptualization and a symbo-lizing structure. The slash ( / ) stands for the symbolization relationship.


The Bipolar Symbolic Structure

The Bipolar Symbolic Structure

[ [ TREE ] / [tɹiː] ]

A symbolic structure is bipolar.

The conceptualization is the semantic pole.

The symbolizing structure is the phonological pole.

[ [ TREE ] / [tɹiː] ]

A symbolic structure is bipolar.

The conceptualization is the semantic pole.

The symbolizing structure is the phonological pole.


EMBODIMENTNORWEGIAN: LEKAMLEGGJERING, KROPPSLEGGJERING

EMBODIMENTNORWEGIAN: LEKAMLEGGJERING, KROPPSLEGGJERING

Experience is embodied: We have a species-specific view of the world due to the

unique nature of our physical bodies.

In other words, our construal of reality is likely to be mediated in large measure by the nature of our bodies.

The human mind – and therefore language – cannot be investigated in isolation from human embodiment.

Experience is embodied: We have a species-specific view of the world due to the

unique nature of our physical bodies.

In other words, our construal of reality is likely to be mediated in large measure by the nature of our bodies.

The human mind – and therefore language – cannot be investigated in isolation from human embodiment.


Mind/Body DualismMind/Body Dualism

Since René Descartes (1596– 1650) developed the idea that mind and body are distinct entities, there has been a com-mon assumption within philo-sophy that the mind can be studied without recourse to the body, and hence without recourse to embodiment.

Since René Descartes (1596– 1650) developed the idea that mind and body are distinct entities, there has been a com-mon assumption within philo-sophy that the mind can be studied without recourse to the body, and hence without recourse to embodiment.


The Rationalist Approach

The Rationalist Approach

In modern linguistics this rationalist approach has been most evident in formal approaches such as the Generative Grammar developed by Noam Chomsky (1928–) and formal approaches to semantics, such as the framework developed by Richard Montague (1930–1971). It is argued that language can be studied as a formal system, without taking into account the nature of human bodies or human experience.

In modern linguistics this rationalist approach has been most evident in formal approaches such as the Generative Grammar developed by Noam Chomsky (1928–) and formal approaches to semantics, such as the framework developed by Richard Montague (1930–1971). It is argued that language can be studied as a formal system, without taking into account the nature of human bodies or human experience.


Embodiment: Image SchemasNORWEGIAN: BILETSKJEMA [image: (mentalt) bilete]

Embodiment: Image SchemasNORWEGIAN: BILETSKJEMA [image: (mentalt) bilete]

One way in which embodied experience manifests itself at the cognitive level is in terms of image schemas:

”A recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence to our expe-rience”.

(M. Johnson 1987: xiv.)

One way in which embodied experience manifests itself at the cognitive level is in terms of image schemas:

”A recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence to our expe-rience”.

(M. Johnson 1987: xiv.)


Image SchemasImage Schemas

Human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without which our expe-rience would be chaotic and incomprehen-sible. I call these patterns ‘image schemas’, because they function primarily as abstract structures of images.

Johnson (1987: xix)

Human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without which our expe-rience would be chaotic and incomprehen-sible. I call these patterns ‘image schemas’, because they function primarily as abstract structures of images.

Johnson (1987: xix)


More on image schemasMore on image schemas

IMAGE The term ‘image’ is equi-

valent to the use of this term in psychology, where imagistic experience re-lates to and derives from our experience of the ex-ternal world. Another term for this type of experience is sensory experience.

IMAGE The term ‘image’ is equi-

valent to the use of this term in psychology, where imagistic experience re-lates to and derives from our experience of the ex-ternal world. Another term for this type of experience is sensory experience.

SCHEMA The term ‘schema’ tells us

that image schemas are not rich or detailed con-cepts, but rather abstract concepts consisting of pat-terns emerging from re-peated instances of em-bodied experience.

SCHEMA The term ‘schema’ tells us

that image schemas are not rich or detailed con-cepts, but rather abstract concepts consisting of pat-terns emerging from re-peated instances of em-bodied experience.


A Selective List of Image Schemas‘Most of the more important’ (Johnson 1987: 126)

A Selective List of Image Schemas‘Most of the more important’ (Johnson 1987: 126)

CONTAINER BALANCE COMPULSION

BLOCKAGE COUNTERFORCE RESTRAINT REMOVAL

ENABLEMENT ATTRACTION MASS-COUNT

PATH LINK CENTRE-PERIPHERY

CYCLE NEAR-FAR SCALE

PART-WHOLE MERGING SPLITTING

FULL-EMPTY MATCHING SUPERPOSITION

ITERATION CONTACT PROCESS

SURFACE OBJECT COLLECTION


CFL – Basic TenetsCFL – Basic Tenets

End of Part IEnd of Part I

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Cognitive-Functional Linguistics – Some Basic Tenets I