J. Paul de B. Tailion

Coalition Special Operation Forces

Coalition operations have becomethe crucial enabler for success inthe Global War on Terrorism(GWOT). Over the past decade,successful operations have beenconducted by coalition SpecialOperations Forces (CSOF) in Bos-nia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,underlining the need to support,facilitate, and expedite future CSOFoperations. Current and future coa-litions face difficulties, as they en-compass not only so-called "tradi-tional allies," but also non-traditio-nal special operations forces (SOF)partners, which raises a number ofsensitive concerns, including intel-ligence sharing, interoperabilityand maintaining coalitions whilebalancing national interests. More-over, the deployment of coalitionSOF represents the strategic inter-ests of their respective nations.

To appreciate the spectrum of CSOF capa-bilities, this article wiii expiore recent operationsin Afghanistan and Iraq, offering recommenda-tions on how tc enhance interoperabiiity andintegration. These include "outreach" or Coali-tion advocacy programmes, aimed at likelySOF partners and initiatives to facilitate theinteroperability of partners in a fully integratedjoint CSOF command structure.

The ThreatWhile terrorism was vievi/ed historically as a

criminal threat, since the 9/11 attacks it has be-come the primary focus cf the American na-tional security efforts and those of its partners.Terrorists are viewed as a serious and persis-tent threat tc all nations. American and CSOFare leading the way, using their unique skills,experience, language capabilities, and culturalavi/areness to develop personal links with localpopulations, thereby garnering critical intelli-gence, fostering all-important inter-personalrelationships, and forging strategically impor-tant global coalition partnerships.

American and coalition SOF operate in manyregions around the vi/orld. including the Philip-pines, the Pacific Rim countries, the South

American Tri-Border region (Brazil, Paraguayand Argentina), the African Sahel region (Chad.Mali, Mauritania and Niger), and they workclosely with local police, military, and securityauthorities tc counter the persistent threat fromten-orism. As Major General Gary L Harrell, theCombined Special Operations ComponentCommander, United States (US) Central Com-mand, has underlined. "CSOF are valuablecontributions to GWOT. far in excess of theirnumbers."

This American acknowledgment underlinesthe necessity to reinforce and expand suchcontributions, particularly as their SOF are re-portedly "so overstretched," due to their oper-ational tempo. Today's global terrorism chal-lenge necessitates the mobilisation and main-tenance of a collective will and determination,along with the requisite resources and ele-ments of national power, to facilitate the effortsof coalition partners. The American strategicpolicy of pre-emption will result in certain USgovernment initiatives taking place beyondwhat historically has been understood as des-ignated combat zones, underlining the neces-sity for closer cooperation, as well as the devel-opment of synchronised plans that draw uponthe strengths of the US and coalition partners.

Mililarv Technology MILTECH • Special Issue 2009

A CJIRU (Canadian Joint IncidentResponse Unit) operator conducts acasualty extraction. CJIRU is part ofCanadian Special Operations Forces

Command (CANSOFCOM).

To overcome contemporary terrorism, theUS and its allies must create an environmentthat eschews terrorism, and develop an adap-tive counter-terrorism strategy. This requiresthe support and full cooperation of the interna-tional community, as well as all US depart-ments and agencies, to adhere to the four prin-ciples that underline this strategy:

- Prevent the emergence of new terroristthreats;

- Isolate terrorist threats that have emergedfrom their respective support bases;

- Defeat isolated terrorist threats; and- Prevent the re-emergence of terrorist threats

that have already been defeated.

Strategic Requirement forBuilding CSOF Capacity

The momentum for embracing CSOF inter-operability increased dramatically in the wakeof attacks on 9/11. Since then, a spectrum ofCSOF has been operating and fighting along-side US SOF on a scale never before conceivedpossible. Moreover, the deployment and inte-gration of CSOF lends strategically importantpolitical and military legitimacy, as well asmoral weight, to the war on terrorism. In bothAfghanistan and Iraq, the US Army SpecialForces became the core for the CombinedJoint Special Operations Task Forces(CJSOTFs), the command and control umbrellafor CSOF.

Politicians, military commanders and theirplanners understand that the 'Long War,' as itis now known, will not be won unilaterally bythe United States. To prevail, the US and alliedcoalition partners must adopt Liddell Hart's"strategy of the indirect approach," to organiseand synchronise the efforts of a global coali-tion. This will necessitate the development ofeffective coalition military forces, and, in partic-ular, the interoperability and integration ofCSOF at all levels.

CSOF and building partner capacity becamestrategically salient in early February 2006,when the Joint Staff (J5 [plans]) at the Pentagonlaid out a new 20-year defence strategy for theLong War. This strategy outlined the deploy-ment of US forces, often clandestinely, to fightterrorism and other non-traditional threats, alarge boost in the number of SOF personnel, aswell as acknowledging the requirement tooperate around the globe. It was recognisedthat SOF would play a major role, and that"...[US} SOF will have the capacity to operate indozens of countries simultaneously," andwould deploy for longer periods of time, withthe aim of building relationships with foreignmilitary and security forces. This strategy fuliyacknowledged that the US military could notunilaterally achieve victory, therefore reinforc-ing the strategic importance of allies and coali-tion partners.

Building CoalitionInteroperability

Twelve countries have contributed or arecontributing CSOF to Operation "Iraqi Free-dom" (OIF), and Operation "Enduring Freedom"(OEF) for missions such as Direct Action (DA),Special Reconnaissance (SR), UnconventionalWarfare (UW), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psycho-logical Operations (PsyOps). Depending uponthe political or military situation, CSOF couldexpand or contract these missions as required.

To date, CSOF has integrated and func-tioned with relative ease in Afghanistan. Iraq,and other operational areas, as SOF from theEastern European and Pacific regions employthe NATO standards for training and equip-ment. Notwithstanding, some areas still needattention to ensure closer coalition SOF coop-eration, interoperability, and the integration ofCSOF staff in joint and combined operations. Ithas been recognised consistently that the ear-lier CSOF integration takes place, the better.Admiral Eric Olson, Commander US SpecialOperations Command, arguing that "the levelof coalition SOF integration, particularly early

on, will determine ultimate success in joint andcombined special operations. Organisationalrelationships and communications are alwaysissues in such operations, but feedback fromour SOF counterparts reflects fewer integrationand interoperability problems at the tacticallevel than we experienced as recently as acouple of years ago." Admiral Olson has noted,however, that the higher up the chain of com-mand one goes, the more the challengesbecome conceptual. It is, therefore, important -indeed imperative - that US and CSOF staff

Colonel J. Paul de B. Taillon. OMM. CD. PhD, Cana-dian Forces graduated from the US Army War Collegein 2006. and is deveioping a counter-insurgency edu-cation programme for the Canadian Forces.The author wouid like to extend his appreciation toBrigadier Tim Brewer. New Zealand Defence Force.Dr. James D. Kiras, Assistant Professor School of Ad-vanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB. Colons(ret) Joe CelesHi, US Army. Lieutenant-Colonel Ho-ward G. Coombs, Canadian Army, and Lieutenant-Co-lonel M. J. Goodspeed. Canadian Army, for their viewsand advice.

This article is a slightly edited version of a study, thatfirst appeared on "Canadian Military Joumal".

Military Technology MILTECH Special Issue 2009 13

and their commanders meet to discuss a con-cept of operations prior to assigning andengaging CSOF at the lower level, A salient les-son acknowledged by all is that the "...cam-paign plans, mission focus and executionparameters must be consistent across thecombined force."

To assist nations confronting terrorism.Central Command (CENTCOM) has created aspecial operations and counter terorist (CT)capability, so that regional partners can con-duct successful CT operations within their res-pective borders. CENTCOM is pursuing bilater-al SOF operations between regional nations todevelop SOF skill sets, and to expand theirrespective experience in coalition operations.Several strategic, operational, and tactical ini-tiatives have been launched to facilitate theinclusion of CSOF\ to include: A CENTCOMCoalition Command Cell (OOC) staffed by sen-ior national representatives and defenceattachés; Pre-deployment and interoperabilitytraining; Communications security memorandaof agreement (COMSEC MOA); Acquisition andcross-servicing agreements ACSA); and. Oom-bined training and exercises.

This CENTCOM initiative has done much toaddress the challenge of coalition interoperabil-ity. To illustrate, an overview of CSOF opera-tions in Iraq and Afghanistan will underline thechallenges and successes faced in both thesetheatres.

CSOF Partners in Operation"Iraqi Freedom"

Over 13,000 SOF personnel were deployedduring Operation "Iraqi Freedom", making it thelargest SOF deployment since the VietnamWar. The contingent included Australian, Bri-tish, Polish, and American SOF, who undertooka variety of land, air, and maritime operationsthroughout the Iraqi theatre. To effect thoseoperations, the Combined Forces Special Ope-rations Component Command (CFSOCO) wascreated in early 2003, and it was charged with

CJIRU operators conducting teststo detect chemical agents.

the command and control of US Army, USAF,and USN SOF assets, including the CSOF pro-vided by the respective coalition nations.

To facilitate command and control duringOIF, three task forces were created to conductSpecial Operations (SO) missions within theIraqi theatre:- Combined Joint Special Operations Task

Force- North (CJSOTF-N);- Combined Joint Special Operations Task

Force - West (CJSOTF-W);- Combined Joint Special Operations Task

Force - South (CJSOTF-S).These task forces were directly supported by

the Combined Joint Special Operations Avi-ation Component (CJSOAC). which had Au-stralian and British aviation assets under itscommand and control. These assets flew at(east 2181 missions, many of which were be-hind Iraqi tines.

The OJSOTF-W was built around the USArmy's 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne),and was reinforced by coalition special forcesfrom the Australian and British Special Air Ser-vice, including the 4th Battalion, Royal Austra-lian Regiment (Commando). Its area of respon-sibility (AOR) was the western desert - the areafrom Baghdad to Kuwait. The primary missionof CJSOTF-W was to deny freedom of move-ment to the Iraqi ground forces, to plan andexecute strategic reconnaissance (SR), to con-duct unconventional warfare (UW). and, mostimportantly, to restrict Iraq's ability to launchSCUD missiles at coalition and friendly forces.Australian, British, and US SOF, along withUSAF Special Tactics Squadron personnel,were rapidly deployed throughout CJSOTF-WAOR. They commenced the forward reconnais-sance of Iraqi defensive positions, monitoredtheir ground movements, and conducted coun-ter-theatre ballistic missile (CTBM) operations.Amongst their assigned tasks, the CSOF teamscalled in close air support to suppress and de-stroy Iraqi defensive positions, and provided"eyes on the sparrow" intelligence and recon-naissance to both USMO and US Army com-manders throughout their rapid armouredadvance to Baghdad,

The assimilation of SOF coalition partnerswas facilitated by clear command relationships.

Speedy delivery courtesy of a427 Squadron CH-146 GRIFFON.

a common understanding of the importance ofthe principle of unity of command and effort,and solid grounding in the doctrine beingemployed and in staff procedures. During theopening phases of the attack on Iraq. Austra-lian and British SOF were assigned appropriatemissions, and they were under the tactical con-trol of OJSOTF-W. These tasks also contribut-ed to the counter-theatre ballistic missile oper-ations focused in the western deserts of Iraq,and they were tactically and strategically sensi-tive.

Coalition SOF Integration during OIFFrom the outset, it was vital to ensure that

CSOF were thoroughly integrated into the cam-paign plan for Iraq. Commanders and theirstaffs ensured that the integration started at themost senior levels of leadership residing at theTheatre Special Operations Command (TSOC).and then cascaded down to the CombinedJoint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF),to the combined Army Special Operations TaskForce (ARSOF), and to the respective tacticallevels. The effectiveness of coalition integrationin Iraq was demonstrated when an AustralianSAS patrol reached a boundary of their assig-ned AOR. The patrol commander observed anIraqi military convoy heading toward his posi-tion, and immediately sought a close air sup-port mission from the Airborne Warning andControl Squadron {AWACS). The BritishAWACS crew subsequently directed a flight offighters onto the Iraqi convoy, all this occurringwithin eight minutes of the air support request.It should be appreciated that such close airsupport procedures had been developed andfully rehearsed with American SF, coalitionSOF, and with British and US aircraft duringthree well-planned exercises that were under-taken leading up to the invasion. This occur-rence illustrates the critical importance of con-sistently exercising coalition operational andsupport procedures prior to any combineddeployments.

14 Military Technology MILTECH • Special Issue 2009

us SOF and CSOF Staff IntegrationDuring the initial stages of the operation in Iraq, the 5th Special Forces

Group (Airborne) made up much of the staff assigned to the CJSOTF-W.Embedded and integrated coalition staff, consisting of Australian andBritish officers, served in many of the directorates of CJSOTF-W.Notably, the CJSOTF J3 (Operations) and the deputy commanders, aswell as the J3 Western Desert and Assistant J2 (Intelligence) were allcoalition allies. The British J3 and his US staff were so well acquaintedwith the doctrine that integration "appeared to be seamless." A 'top-down' staffing approach with coalition seniors further facilitated multina-tional interoperability, ensuring that CSOF was integrated into eachphase of operations.

During the strategically important CTBM operations in Iraq, USSpecial Forces became a vital asset for the combined force air compo-neni commander (CFACC). During operations, coalition SOF units rap-idly adapted to new technologies by effectively employing precision-tar-geted air delivered ordnance. However, this coalition capability and flex-ibility was predicated upon years of training using well-establishedNATO close air support procedures, which ensured interoperability withboth American aircraft, and those of CSOF. These procedures were fur-ther exercised and honed by CSOF during follow-on air strikes againstthe Iraqi military targets.

While operating in Iraq's western desert, CSOF were attacked on anumber of occasions by Iraqi forces. Fortunately, these contacts wereshort-lived, as coalition SOF were rapidly supported by close air sup-port, and, therefore, could engage or disengage as required. To ensurethe effective coordination of air support tasks, a combined staff ofAmerican and British officers made up the 'joint fires element' ofCJSOTF. For CSOF undertaking counter-theatre ballistic missile opera-tions in Iraq's westem desert, the most harrowing time was during thedays immediately following their insertion. Initially, American, Australian,and British forces had to deconflict their respective operations to con-duct a passage of lines safely when CSOF planned (or suddenly foundit necessary) to transit each other's operating areas. This was complicat-ed further by the necessity of conducting all tactical moves at night - thesame period when Iraqi forces would conduct aggressive counter SOFoperations - resulting in an increased possibility of friendly fire incident.To mitigate potential problems, a series of rehearsals was conducted, acommon radio frequency was provided, and activities were tightlyplanned, coordinated, and controlled. It is notable that CJSOTF-W'sCSOF/US Special Forces detachments were successful, and theyachieved their missions without loss of any CSOF personnel, while, con-comitantly, inflicting substantial materiel damage and casualties uponthe Iraqi formations. The success of CSOF in Iraq was predicated upontried and true interoperable procedures, an integration of CSOF staffs,close coordination and integration of coalition partners up and down thecommand and control chain, and through extensive combined trainingin joint operations.

CSOF Assistance to Task Force 145The close liaison between the US Special Forces and the Jordanian

Special Forces helped produce a major success in the 2006 pursuit ofAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al Oaeda terrorist leader in Iraq. Mediareports indicated that the Pentagon's Task Force 145 received intelli-gence from a human source working under the direction of a JordanianSF team operating inside Iraq. While acknowledging the importance ofother intelligence collection methodology and techniques, it is often asingle 'informer' who can provide the critical piece of timeiy informationto take the operation to the next level - such as the capture of a highvalue target (HVT). In this case, the Iraqi informant identified Zarqawi'sspiritual leader, and American intelligence was then able to technicallymonitor activity through his mobile telephone communications.American intelligence subsequently located the spiritual leader at a safehouse, where he was meeting with Zarqawi. The house was surround-ed, and an air strike was called in on the premises. This successful mis-sion, within which Jordanian Special Forces played a lead role, furtherillustrates the critical and growing importance of CSOF in the Long War.

CSOF Partners in Operation "Enduring Freedom"In 2002, the first year of Operation "Enduring Freedom" in

Afghanistan, SOF units operated hundreds of miles from their parentCombined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). To address this situation, the CJSOTF-A commander established aSpecial Forces liaison element, better known as a coalition coordination

Military Technology • MILTECH • Special Issue 2009

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cell that subsequently wasstaffed from the 3rd SFGroup, and co-iocatedwith the five CSOF taskgroups. The coordinationcell had staff representa-tives from J2 (intelligence).J3 (operations), J4 (logistics) and J6 (com-mand, control, communications and computersystems). The coordination cell provided anAmerican C2 (command and control) umbrella,as well as the vital communications and intelli-gence links to coalition SOF headquarters. Thecoordination cell also facilitated access to anddissemination of American intelligence inresponse to coalition requests for information(RFIs), video feeds, surveillance and reconnais-sance reports, radio frequencies, and cryptolo-gy. The coordination cell ensured deconflictionand facilitated the incorporation of coalitionSOF throughout the Afghan battle space whenthey conducted special reconnaissance anddirect action missions against al Qaeda andTaliban elements.

In December 2001, CSOF, drawn from sevennations, were deployed to Afghanistan to con-duct operations under the auspices of OIF.During the following year, these coalition part-ners conducted over 200 direct action, specialreconnaissance, and sensitive site exploitationmissions. This tempo could only have beenaccomplished due to a high degree of coordi-nation and interoperability. The CJSOTF-A rep-resented interoperability at the operationallevel, having CSOF representation from con-tributing nations, although interoperability moreoften than not was truly manifested at the tac-tical level of an American SF battalion. Whenthe 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group was assignedto and established its forward operating base32 (FOB 32) at Kandahar Airfield, it was co-located with five CSOF task groups embeddedin the coalition coordination cell. Taking advan-tage of CSOF expertise in static and mobilespecial reconnaissance, FOB 32 commencedthe operational preparations for their respectiveSF detachments. FOB 32 also planned andundertook combat missions with coalition SOFin the Afghan provinces of Oruzgun, Helmund,and Paktika. These initial reconnaissance mis-sions were instrumentally successful duringsubsequent operations against leadership cellsbelonging to al Qaeda and the Taliban. More-over, SF detachments conducted many of theirmissions based upon the intelligence and infor-mation provided by CSQF - a true indication oftrust in their CSOF partners.

During initial operations, it was recognisedquickly that certain CSOF partners were partic-ularly skilled in mobile reconnaissance mis-sions, enabling the identification, seizure, anddestruction of enemy arms caches. Predicatedupon sound and timely intelligence, and exer-cising close coordination. CSOF members con-ducted their cwn successful direct action mis-sions, locating and capturing a number ofmembers of the Taliban leadership cadre.

Lessons Learned andRecommendations

The experiences and lessons leamed fromIraq and Afghanistan underscore the criticai im-portance of deliberate planning for coalitionSOF operations. Fortuitously, the planning anddecision-making processes employed byCSQF mirrored American doctrine. The "com-monality" of doctrine and formats for develop-ing concepts of operation, staff work, and brief-backs facilitated interoperability, and has fur-ther cemented the professional trust betweenthe US and the various CSOF units engaged inoperations. Moreover, under the American C2umbrella, coalition SOF proved their ability toundertake special operations successfully atboth the tactical and operational levels. Stra-tegically, CSOF contributes directly to the legit-imacy and credibility of US and coalition politi-cal and military objectives, and to subsequentinitiatives in the struggle against terrorism.

In the 'Long War', CSOF operations will re-main a vital component of the coalition effort.Hence, it is incumbent upon military profes-sionals to assimilate the experiences and les-sons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, and tobuild upon them in order to increase the effi-ciency and effectiveness of integrated CSOFoperations. A key lesson from operations inAfghanistan and Iraq is the early integration ofqualified CSOF personnel into senior positionsin CJSOTF. This ensures a unity of effort, and itmaximises the skills and potential of coalitionpartners. Multi-national SQF exercises, at boththe tactical and operational levels, could im-prove interoperability and build upon the hard-won lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq. The fol-lowing recommendations would, if incorporat-ed, expand and enhance future CSOF interop-erability, and assist in coalition efforts in the'Long War'.

Create Coalition SOF Mobile TrainingTeams (CSOFMTT). Operators from Australia.Canada, New Zealand, Poland, and othersunder NATO(+) could develop NATO standardSQF tactics, technologies, and procedures(TTPs) to enhance individual military skills,develop counter insurgency and counter terror-ist expertise, and pass on proven techniques.The creation of the International Special ForcesTraining Course (ISFTC) at Fort Bragg is animportant and substantial step towards CSOFinteroperability.

Creafe a NATO SOF School. The Interna-tional Special Training Centre at Pfullendorf,Germany Pfuliendorf, Germany provides spe-cialised training to both US Forces personneland personnel from other NATO countries.Courses are offered in the areas of patrolling.

survival, reconnaissance, medical and plans.Although it is neither a NATO School or underNATO command, the school is advised by theNATO Training Group in order to maintain thedoctrinal azimuth of NATO SOF operations.Informally ISTC also works closely togetherwith NATO Special operations CoordinationCenter (NSCC).

Identify coalition SOF expertise and lever-age thai expertise. Many nations have devel-oped unique or niche capabilities, such as theNorwegians have done for snow or high alti-tude conditions. Coalition SOF must have anawareness and appreciation of respective skillsand capabilities, and leverage these to the ben-efit of the CSQF community.

Creafe an SOF "Olympics." OSOF wouldbe tested by undertaking several operationalscenarios, such as a direct action operation, ahostage rescue, a strategic reconnaissancemission, and a long-range patrol to assess theprofessionalism, flexibility, and equipment ofthose partaking, and for ascertaining the inter-operability of these CSOF partners. This wouldprovide a venue to learn from the respectiveexperience of the participants, so as to sharesuccessful TTPs in preparation for futuredeployment initiatives.

Creafe a SOF Staff College. The Collegecould look at special and asymmetric opera-tions that have occurred throughout history,including the profiles and experiences of vari-ous Special Forces to garner insights as totheir respective history, skills, and methodolo-gies. The SOF staff college would teach newplanning methodologies, emphasise theresponsibilities of commanders and staff inplanning sensitive, as well as normative, SOFoperations. The curriculum could examine theissues and experiences of CSOF partners, andthe development of their respective SQF.Courses would be taught to enable SOF oper-ators to understand various cultural mores,behaviours, and traditions, as well as toemphasise that this cultural understanding isas important as the weapons they carry. TheSOF Staff College could also conduct a seriesof NATO standard exercises focusing upon thespectrum of SQF missions. This would assistin talent spotting, and in the training and devel-opment of operational skills of SOF/CSOF per-sonnel, as well as staff planners, train-ers/instructors, and commanders. This initia-tive could be extended to incorporate the crea-tion of an SOF planning specialty, similar to theSchool cf Advanced Military Studies (SAMS),conducted at the US Command and StaffCollege in Leavensworth, as well as selectingofficers to become speciai operations andirregular warfare strategists. This initiativecould readily be put under the umbrella of theJoint Special Operations University (JSOÜ),based at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

Increase coalition SOF attachments andsecondments to various SOF/CSOF schools.The exchange of officers, instructors, and stu-dents would secure the human dimension ofCSOF. and put a real coalition face upon, inparticular, American SOF schools and trainingprogrammes. This would ensure an increase ininteroperability through an awareness of thevarious coalition cultures, staff and operatingmethodologies, while concomitantly develop-ing personal contacts.

16 Mditary Technology • MILTECH • Special Issue 2009

Solicit CSOF participation in US and coaii-tion SOF exercises and, at the same time, gar-ner coalition input and ideas. CSOF obsen/ers/participants may have unique cultural, opera-tional, or methodological insights that would beadvantageous to the SOF/CSOF community. Therequest or invitation to participate would, in itself,acknowledge coalition value and importance.

Assist coalition initiatives in the 'LongWar', particularly in regions where post-coloni-al nations are experiencing confrontations withterrorism and insurgency. And also whereBritish or American presence could be proble-matic, coalition partners may wish to providemilitary assistance through a future NATO (+)programme. This multinational operationaldetachment A team (ODA, which is a US AniiySpeciai Forces A Team) could consist of coali-tion SOF members from Australia, Canada.Germany, New Zealand. Poland, and so on.This would be an expansion of the WW2-eraJadburgh teams, or "Jeds" for short. Thesewere small units comprised of three officers orNCOs - one British (Commonwealth), oneFrench and one American - that were para-chuted into France to provide intelligence, andto assist the French underground in aligningtheir activities to support Allied operations,conducted both prior to and after the Nor-mandy invasion. Such multinational ODAscould conduct foreign training and undertakeadvisory missions, essentially performingForeign Internal Defence (FID) or Stability andSecurity Operations (SASO). Today, this initia-

tive would embrace coalition SOF, taking it to ahigher level through team integration - a real'Rainbow 6'!

Support ongoing intemational SOF sym-posiums and academic institutions thatstudy irregular warfare and speciai opera-tions. These venues could be employed toenhance coalition SOF exchanges, to taprespective SOF academics, and to build net-works internationally within the SOF academicfield. This has been demonstrated at thenumerous international SOF symposia held atthe Royal Military College of Canada, which hashosted four such events to date.

Select, train, and retum intelligence sup-port personnel. In recent operations, a majorand persistent issue was the difficulty of intelli-gence sharing amongst coalition allies. Consi-dering the criticality of intelligence in drivingSOF initiatives, the integral SOF intelligence or-ganisations, particularly those of the traditionalor special alliance comprising Canada, GreatBritain, Australia, New Zealand, and the UnitedStates, must address how to manage SOFintelligence requirements appropriately in acoalition. While it can be appreciated that intel-ligence sources and sensitive technology mayhave to be protected, assigning coalition allieshigh-risk conventional or SOF missions withoutproviding critical all-source intelligence, alongwith the assigned target package, is arguablyimmoral, and particularly disenfranchising. It isvital to ensure that SOF select and retain intel-ligence support personnel who are capable of

operating effectively on a joint and coalitionstaff, as well as working with ambiguity, pricklyintelligence issues, allied/foreign SOF opera-tors, and allied agendas.

ConclusionThe 'Long War' will require great patience

and a comprehensive approach to defeatingthe terrorism threat. More importantly, it mustbe recognised that this is not purely an Ame-rican problem, but an international problem inwhich military forces alone cannot win. The wardemands the concerted, multi- disciplinaryeffort of global partners, and CSOF will beinstrumental in conducting long-tenn, effectiveoperations aimed at generating enduringeffects to defeat the terrorists and their supportnetworks. To ensure strategic success in the'Long War', coalition members must maintain aunity of effort. All avenues that help to seed,nurture, and renew mutual trust and coalitioninteroperability will do much to ensure victoryon this new 'battlefield.'

To facilitate the successful interoperability ofSOF, there must be a coalition SOF standard.This will not be easy, since there is no simple"silver bullet" solution to ensure interoperabiiity.Hence, the coalition special operations com-munity must come together and provide theguidance, doctrine, training, and education toachieve seamless interoperability, thus ensur-ing that coalition Special Operations Forcesremain the 'tip of the spear.' i..ZiSS^.

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Military Technology • MILTECH Special Issue 2009 17