SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR UNINTENDED EFFECTS

ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:

EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

"Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28 - September 1, 2003. Copyright by the American Political Science

Association."

Arturo C. Sotomayor VelzquezPolitical Science Department

Columbia Universityas813@columbia.edu

Dessie P. ZagorchevaPolitical Science Department

Columbia Universitydpz2@columbia.edu

**The authors welcome all comments and suggestions. Please do not cite without permission. **

1The end of the Cold War introduced important transformations in both domestic and

international politics. In light of these changes in the international order several Eastern

European and Latin American countries have intensified their participation in international

security institutions by incorporating their armed forces into collective defense organizations

(such as NATO) and collective security institutions (such as the UN peace missions). Countries

like Bulgaria began to participate in joint operations with other NATO-members, while states like

Argentina, Brazil and Chile sent large military contingents to UN peace missions. These shifts in

foreign policy occurred while these countries experienced processes of democratization. In

Eastern Europe, countries transited from party rule to democratic civilian control of the military;

while in Latin America the military institutions returned to the barracks after decades of

authoritarian-military rule.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of international security institutions on

civil-military relations in democratizing states and to analyze why engagement in such

institutions has had unintended effects in different countries and regions. In particular, our

project explores how involvement in international security institutions may have consequences

that are not always perceived or intended by policy-makers in the developing world. In so doing,

we attempt to identify linkages between comparative politics and international relations,

particularly in the realm of civil-military relations. First, we are interested in examining how

international factors can affect civil-military relations in democratizing states. We follow, then,

the theoretical insights of the second image reversed debate.1 Second, this project addresses

the academic debate about the independent causal power of international institutions in domestic

politics. It does so by evaluating how engagement in security institutions can transform civil-

military relations via unintended effects. In so doing, we wish to elaborate on Robert Jervis

insights about systems effects and their complexity in political life.2 We attempt to identify

examples in Eastern Europe and Latin America where unexpected consequences have been

2observed in the realm of civil-military relations, while explaining the causes and reasons for such

unintended effects.

We believe that these two regions, albeit different, can shed some light in the debate about

how security institutions can shape democratic processes within states. We will assess the

unintended effects of international engagement by employing the method of difference by

comparing cases with similar background conditions but different dependent variable outcomes

and by exploring cases with different characteristics and similar outcomes. Since we are dealing

with qualitative variables, we will trace the causal process backward, inferring from the particular

contexts of each case what caused each outcome. It is worth noting that field research has played

an essential part of our qualitative analysis. By analyzing these cases, we show that existing

explanations of institutional effects are insufficient in several ways. First, current scholarship

downplays the unintended consequences of institutions, which may lead to poor policy

prescriptions. Second, in so doing, institutional approaches have neglected the interaction

between structural and domestic variables, which lead to unexpected effects of the type this

project examines.

I. THE PUZZLE: DESIRED POLICIES AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS

Large-scale Eastern European and Latin American participation in international security

institutions, though recent, has already had an impact on civil-military relations. For the first

time, civilian and military personnel are working together within, on the fringes, and outside

security institutions.3 In both Eastern Europe and Latin America, policy-makers have relied on

international security institutions in order to further democratic reforms. The promise of NATO

membership, for example was to be used as a carrot for European countries in transition, and the

alliance proclaimed firm civilian control over the military as one of the conditions for accepting

new members. Through the Partnership for Peace, NATO developed programs intended to assist

3aspiring member with the practical implementation of civilian control. After 1991, such

programs included: the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the

Cooperative Threat Reducion (CTR) program, the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and the

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Policy-makers hoped that membership in NATO and/or participation in peacekeeping

operations would increase the contacts between the militaries of Eastern European and Latin

American states and their Western counter-parts. It is believed that enhancing such contacts

between the militaries would spread norms of civilian control. According to this argument,

institutionalized links with Western democracies will strengthen civilian control in the target

states by spreading norms of behavior as well as strengthening democratic institutions (e.g., adopt

new constitutions, reform and civilianize ministries of defense, increase parliamentarian control

over the militaries, and others.) Although there is no universally applicable model, there is an

agreement on at least some of the following basic conditions necessary for democratic civilian

control of the military:

(1) The constitution and/or its amendments and laws must establish a clear division of authority between the president and government (prime minister and defense minister). The law should be clear for peacetime authority (e.g., who commands and controls the military and promotes military officers); and for crisis (e.g., emergency powers) and transition to war.(2) Parliament must exert oversight of the military by exercising control of the defense budget; also, its role must be clear in deploying armed forces in emergency and war. (3) The civilian defense ministry should exercise peacetime government control of the military (General Staff and military commanders) including preparation of the defense budget; access to intelligence; involvement in strategic planning, force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments; and military promotions. (4) Citizen confidence in the military must be restored to the armed forces in order for them to be an effective institution. [] Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state.4

Therefore, these prescriptions have inspired politicians around the world to introduce

substantial changes in the militarys main mission. In Eastern Europe, NATO sponsored

4numerous joint exercises and training programs, as well as conferences and other meetings

between military leaders from NATO countries and aspirants for membership. Policy-makers

hoped not only to increase inter-operability, but also socialize former Communist militaries

into norms of democratic civilian control. Likewise, civilian decision-makers from Argentina

increased their participation in peacekeeping operations in order to find a legitimate (and

respectable) mission for their armed forces; thus decreasing the chances that the military would

engage in domestic politics. In both cases, it is believed that by teaching military personnel to

respect human rights norms abroad, it will make them less likely to violate basic democratic

norms at home.

Nevertheless, these carefully crafted policies have had consequences that were highly

unexpected. This is what Robert Jervis has termed as unintended effects; that is, actions that have

unexpected consequences on the actor, others, and the system as a whole, which means that one

cannot infer results from desires and expectations and vice versa.5 For example, in the case of

Eastern Europe, it can be argued that, to a certain extent, military participation in NATO joint

trainings, designed to increased military expertise, made officers more contemptuous of their

civilian counterparts, who they thought were ignorant of military affairs and who, especially at

the beginning, were rarely exposed to any kind of Western training and/or programs, as we

explain later on. Representatives of the military, especially after spending some time at NATO

headquarters, believed they knew more than civilians and thus poorly informed civilians about

their businesses.

In the Latin American context, participation in peacekeeping missions has enhanced the

competence of Argentine officers and increased their ties with Western armed forces, which in

turn has contributed to improve Argentine civil-military relations. However, this experience has

not been replicated in Brazil, one of Latin Americas major peacekeeping contributors since

1965. Elite soldiers from Brazil have been exposed to the same international experiences than

5their Argentines counterparts and, yet, few changes have been introduced in Brazilian military

policies. In fact, peacekeeping has merely reinforced current military doctrines and policies,

which are primarily focused on internal security and stability; hence, national security doctrines

continue to exist in Brazilian politics.

II. EXPLAINING THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS

If the interaction between former Warsaw pact members and Latin American soldiers

with their Western counterparts has not led to the predicted outcomes, how can we explain the

unintended effects? The international relations literature offers two types of explanations to

understand how security institutions may affect outcomes in domestic politics. For instance,

neo-realists (in particular perverse realists) and neo-liberals claim that security institutions are

structures that, under certain circumstances, can assist state interests and, in so doing, they can

shape and influence state behavior.6 While the debate between these two schools of thought has

contributed to understand international institutions in world politics, we believe that explanations

coming from this literature rely heavily on structural approaches. By focusing exclusively on the

role of international structures, neo-realism and neo-liberalism fail to capture how domestic

political factors influences and even attenuates the intended institutional effects.7 While we agree

that institutions do have an independent influence on state behavior, we believe that the

consequences they produce can be the reverse of what policy-makers intended.

In our account, the reasons why international security institutions have led to unintended

effects have little to do with the structure of the international system and/or the institutional

design. In the cases we have analyzed, we find that most of the unexpected consequences were

caused by at least two mechanisms at work 8 ; namely, (1) domestic political processes; (2)

different types of socialization.

6In the next sections we will develop each of these mechanisms, providing pertinent

examples from both Eastern Europe and Latin America. The first section will examine two

dimensions of domestic politics; namely, (1) civilian expertise in defense matters and (2) the

analytic utility of distinguishing between different forms democratization and their relationship

with civilian control of the armed forces. The second part will discuss the role of socialization

and how this mechanism may cause different outcomes among military officers.

III. DOMESTIC POLITICS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA: CIVILIANS AND

DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES

In the two regions analyzed in this paper, we find that domestic political variables are

often ignored and this is bad, both for policy and for theory. First, there has been a general failure

to improve civil education on defense matters, particularly among politicians and civil society.

Education is only one specific example of a more general failure, which we could call incorrect

diagnosis of the main issues/problems of the reform of civil-military relations or US/Western

policy- makers inability to diagnose properly the real problems and challenges of reforming civil-

military relations in these countries. Second, this inability still comes from the lack of

understanding of the domestic process in these countries. In particular, scholars and policy-

makers have failed to distinguish countries according to their degree and type of democratization.

Countries in the two regions have experienced diverse transitions to democracy and have

accomplished different levels of consolidation. Failing to recognize this fact has often led to poor

policy prescriptions that ultimately have unintended consequences.

A. Educating civilians in Eastern Europe: A neglected domestic realm

The main problem in the post-Communist states at their start of democratization was not

praetorianism, but lack of civilian expertise in national security and defense. Truly effective

civilian control is impossible without the existence of civilian policy-makers who are

7knowledgeable of military affairs. In the initial stages at least, NATO programs designed to

strengthen civilian control in Eastern Europe focused primarily (at times, exclusively) on the

military and neglected the civilian side of the civil-military relationship. Larger numbers of

East/Central European military personnel started to participate in various military and other

educational problems. At the same time, few civilians were exposed to similar experiences.9

While beneficial for the military, such programs could ultimately have negative effects on civil-

military relations in the region because they increased the gap in the competence between the

military and civilian decision-makers. In this case, the unintended consequences resulted from

the poor design of the institutional arrangements and programs whose authors failed to take into

account domestic political developments and failed to realize that training civilian specialists in

national security is more important than hedging against non-existent praetorianism of the

military.

This exclusive focus on the military is to be explained by the fact that the US and the

other NATO members saw the Communist militaries in Eastern Europe as the main barrier to the

democratic reforms. Such a view is easy to understand, having in mind that during the Cold War,

the US and its NATO allies were pre-occupied with the Soviet military. While using Western

institutions to reform the Communist militaries was certainly necessary, the above-described view

was at least partially flawed in that Western policy makers misunderstood or did not pay

sufficient attention to crucial domestic-political processes and characteristics of the pre- and post-

1989 situation in the Communist countries transiting to democracy. Have they done so, they

would have probably noticed a major problem of civil-military relations at the time of the

democratic revolutions, namely the lack of national security and defense expertise among East

European civilian policy-makers. In other words, the threat to democratic civilian control in East

Central Europe was not coming from a powerful military tempted to intervene in domestic

politics, but from lack of competent and responsible civilian leadership, ready to implement the

necessary reforms.10 By neglecting the civilian side and focusing exclusively on the military,

8some NATO programs may have weakened civilian control, which runs contrary to what they

were designed to accomplish. Hence, what led to the unintended negative consequences in this

case was a lack of understanding and/or a lack of attention to the domestic political factors of the

countries targeted for reform.

For example, one of the problems was the fact that Western policy-makers did not fully

grasp a significant difference between the state of civil-military relations and the main threats to

civilian control in Eastern Europe and other countries who have undergone democratic

transitions. Some Western policy makers talked about establishing civilian control over the

militaries in the former Communist states, which is incorrect since civilian control already existed

in these countries. What was lacking was democratic control of the military. As David Betz

rightly argued, the military coup dtat has not been a factor in post-Communist transitions

because a professional military conviction that the armed forces should be the servant of the state

was a central feature of the Soviet-type system of civil-military relations.11 Hence, what the

post-Communist reforms had to achieve is not establishing civilian control over the military, but

transforming one model of civilian control into another moving from civilian control by the

Communist party to democratic civilian control.12

That is why, previous Western experience with the programs designed to strengthen

civilian control was not necessarily relevant. For example, both scholars and policy-makers alike

who have been highly influenced by research on civil-military relations in Latin American

countries, when thinking about strengthening civilian control of the military in East Central

Europe, assume that the main problem and threat to democracy in that country is a powerful

military with a strong desire to intervene in domestic politics, which could get out of control and

overturn a civilian government. Although true for some Latin American countries in the 1970s,

this would be a wrong assumption for the post-Communist states, where major problems were

related with the lack of civilian experts on military affairs. That is why it is important to focus

our analysis not only on the military, but on the civilian side of the civil-military relationship as

9well. As we show later, NATO programs focused exclusively on military-to-military training and

education.13 Neglecting to include more civilians in various programs could weaken civilian

control by increasing the gap between military and civilian competence and by making the

military less respectful of civilians who they see as having very little experience and

understanding of matters of national security.

One of the most significant barriers to strong democratic control of the military in East

Central Europe was and still is the lack of civilian policy makers and journalists with expertise in

military matters. Unfortunately, among MPs, there is little knowledge and interest in issues of

national security and military reforms and the sessions and the hearings that are devoted to these

matters are often poorly attended.14 Not unlike in the US, some military officials are better

prepared to deal with defense issues than their civilian counterparts. Many MPs (including those

serving on the committees with jurisdiction over defense and military affairs) lack the necessary

expertise in order to exercise effective control. The public is mainly concerned with the

economic state of the country and MPs (re)election depends primarily on their record on

economic issues. That is why Members of Parliament are little motivated (if at all) to develop

expertise in military matters. Incompetent civilian decision-makers have often earned the

contempt of the military and, thus, undermined civilian control. Since the accountability of the

military depends primarily upon the vigilance of the MPs and their ability to ask tough questions,

civilian lack of military expertise is one of the main obstacles to a more effective parliamentarian

control.

Unfortunately, MPs are not the only ones with little interest and understanding of military

issues. The same is true for the mass public and the media. As Anthony Forster rightly argues,

the role of a wide range of societal influences such as the media and public opinion have lagged

behind in generating a serious non-governmental capacity to make an independent contribution to

the checks and balances required in modern civil-military relations. The quality of press

10

reporting of military issues in the former Communist countries is rather poor an issue which

will have long-term consequences for society-military relations.15

In the East Central European countries, civilian defense expertise is lacking not only in

the Parliaments, but in Defense Ministries as well. In the case of Bulgaria, for example, although

the process of civilianization of the Ministry of Defense was largely successful, as late as 1998

some analysts expressed concerns that the MOD remains primarily a military-minded

institution.16 As in the National Assembly, part of the problem stems from the frequent change

of government. After taking office, each new government was quick to remove most of the

senior civilian officials in the Ministry of Defense and replace them with its own political

appointees. This process has made the accumulation of civilian knowledge and expertise in

military matters almost impossible. Civilian novices in the MOD have had hard time gaining the

respect of seasoned military officials and have been easily overawed by them. The enhanced

cooperation between East European countries and NATO has provided new educational and

training opportunities for government officials, but as we said exclusively for the military. As

analysts estimate, the ration of military to civilians in Western programs is 90 to 10.17

Parliamentarians and other civilian decision-makers in and outside the Ministry of Defense would

certainly benefit from training on matters of defense planning and budgeting, procurement, threat

assessment and others.

Another related concern is that civilian decision-makers, not only within the Ministry of

Defense, are often too dependent on military advice. In all major political parties in Bulgaria, for

example, retired officers are the main advisors on national security issues. Retired officers are

also civilians in key positions supposed to exercise civilian control in the MOD. In the

Ministry of Defense as well as in the National Assembly there are few civilian experts on national

security. Thus, the civilian leadership is weakened by the lack of a defense community that could

provide politicians with independent analysis and alternative solutions to national security

problems. This lack makes civilian decision-makers very dependent on the information and

11

advice provided by the military. Unlike the US, East European countries do not have the

numerous think tanks, research centers and institutes which are able to provide critical analysis of

defense and security policy issues. The few independent research institutes in the area of security

and foreign affairs are understaffed and under-funded.

Another problem in the relations between civilian and military decision-makers which

cannot be solved by adopting new laws or perfecting existing ones is the lack of trust between

soldiers and statesmen. The military is suspicious of politicians of their motivation driving the

reforms and of their competence to deal with the issues. Even worse, such feelings of mistrust

are mutual. The new political leadership has often been suspicious (sometimes hostile) to the

military because it perceives the officer corps as tightly linked to the former Communist party

and, by extension, to the Soviet Union. The military, on their part, fear that civilian leaders are

not only incompetent to deal with defense issues, but also that they are preoccupied with political

fights serving their narrow self-interests. Unfortunately, some inept acts of civilian decision-

makers in the last couple of years have validated these fears. The military started to lose trust at

the very beginning of the implementation of the radical reforms mainly because of certain hostile

attitudes on the part of civilians and because the military perceived the purges as not really

necessary for the reforms but as a way for the new ruling elites to settle political scores with

former rulers. The military felt used by politicians in their struggles for power. Furthermore,

there is some evidence that, not unlike in the U.S., there may be a growing gap between the

officers corps and the civilian society. The military see themselves as the defenders of the

national ideals and the embodiment of the high moral values of society, while they perceive the

politicians as corrupt and representing only narrow partisan interests.

Although the military-to-military contacts sponsored by programs such as NATOs

Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plans remain important for socializing the

militaries, they would do little to achieve their goals, if they are not supplemented with programs

reaching out to civilians who need to develop defense expertise. As we showed, such programs

12

have had some unintended adverse consequences on civilian control in the former Communist

countries.18 The irony is that after schooling at NATO headquarters, some military officials have

become even less respectful of their civilian masters. The military who are already contemptuous

of inept civilians lacking knowledge of military affairs, feel they really know it all and that there

is no need for civilian oversight. The last thing they need, some officers believe, are ignorant

civilians meddling in military matters. As Reka Szemerkenyi shrewdly observed: Western

educational and training schemes ... have added to the militarys disregard of, and distaste for,

civilian policy-makers in Central Europe.19 Such beliefs undermine civilian control rather than

strengthen it. These observations emphasize the important role of actors other than the military

such as civilian decision makers, academics, the media, and the NGOs and the need for NATO to

include them more often in its educational programs so they become more confident in their

abilities to provide the much needed strong civilian voice in debates and in governing.

B) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation in Latin America: domestic politics

and its legacies

Similarly to what has occurred in Eastern Europe, analysts of security affairs in Latin

America have often failed to explain how membership and participation in international security

institutions can influence the reform process differently depending on the country. Perhaps a

more useful way to analyze civil-military relations in developing countries is not by their

institutional membership, but according to their different levels of democratization, which in turn

may lead to different types of outcomes, some of which may be unintended.

For instance, in the developing world participation in peacekeeping missions has been

suggested as a means to achieve civilian control of hierarchical militaries that had previously led

national governments; hence UN peacekeeping is considered as a critical policy tool for states

that are coping with processes of democratic consolidation and civilian control of the armed

13

forces.20 Indeed, President Bill Clintons policy towards Nigeria consisted of training and

equipping Nigerian officers to be peacekeepers in Africa. It is believed that such policy allows

the UN to address internal conflicts without having to send American or Western European

soldiers into combat21, and at the same time it helps Nigerias effort to reform its armed forces,

which have been discredited by long periods of corrupt military rule.22

Nevertheless, just like in Eastern Europe, analysts of international security have failed to

take into account the domestic differences in terms of democratization processes and how such

distinctions cause different outcomes when they interact with international factors. For example,

in Latin America, like in most former communist countries, transitions to democracy varied not

only in time but in scope, leading to diverse forms of democratization and thus different

unintended effects. States in the region experienced transitions by collapse, by extrication, and

by transaction; all of which led to different levels of civilian control.23

For example, in Argentina, the transition took place by collapse, when the military was

defeated during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war and capitulated to demands for regime change.

Under these conditions, the military as an institution found itself in a fragile negotiating condition

to seek protection or to influence the democratization phase. As Felipe Agero argues, collapse

further weakened the military as it led to internal divisions, which developed partly as a result of

efforts to blame different leaders for past failures.24 The collapse of the Argentine military

government caused the military to reexamine basic doctrinal preferences. They were then forced

to innovate and search for new missions and doctrines for purely survival reasons. The transition

by collapse in Argentina led to a process similar to the one witnessed when a military

organization suffers a major defeat in war:

Soldiers fail; civilians get angry and scared; pressure is put on the military. Sometimes the pressure is indirect. Civilians become disenchanted with the performance of one service and shift resources to another. These resources may provide the slack for the newly favored service to attempt some innovations

14

civilians have the possibility, depending on the strategic position of the state, of choosing among competing services.25

With pressures from within the armed forces to institutionally survive the crisis caused by the

transition and demands from civilians to doctrinally innovate, the Argentine military found in the

United Nations a window of opportunity. UN peace operations provided a temporary and a low-

cost alternative mission for institutional change and survival; as well as a highly valued

professional experience when the armed forces were being deprived from their primary mission

of guarantors of internal security. Peacekeeping supplied the Argentine armed forces with a new

raison dtre by offering military personnel a credible participation in international missions.

Through internationalism, the military increased salaries and demanded for special training and

equipment.26 Participation in UN missions helped alleviate economic ailments by providing a

source of individual income, a lure to recruit young men and women into the armed forces, and a

means to provide additional training. As argued by Antonio Pal, Argentine policy-makers found

that their armed forces were better off by having their officers busy abroad than by maintaining

an ill-equipped, underpaid, and unused military establishment that spends the better part of the

day blaming the government for its predicament.27

The positive unintended effect of Argentinas participation in UN missions was that it

offered the armed forces the opportunity to practice the art of war in a legitimate way,

contributing to improve its reputation of a discredited military; hence helping to reform civil-

military relations at home. As Wendy Hunter argues, expanded international roles for the army

helped to create a positive public image for the institution, bolstering public support for higher

military budgets during critical periods.28

Nonetheless, Argentinas peacekeeping experience has not been replicated in other major

Latin American countries. As Robert Jervis has often claimed, we should not expect the similar

results given different environments, since in a system, actions have unintended effects on the

actor, others, and the system as a whole, which means that one cannot infer results from desires

15

and expectations and vice versa.29 For instance, in contrast to Argentina, Brazil and Chile

experienced transitions by transaction (or pacted transitions) in the mid and late eighties. In both

cases, powerful incumbent elites remained ambivalent about the process of democratization and

imposed strict conditions on opposition forces. Being powerful, authoritarian-military elites left

legacies by forcing democratic opponents to advance their agenda through negotiations and pacts.

In the Brazilian and Chilean examples, the rules of the authoritarian regime were relatively

abandoned, but the authoritarian government remained a decisive actor throughout the

transition.30 The negotiations and pacts between militaries and civilians (or between incumbents

and opponents) had perverse consequences on civil-military relations, as military institutions

bargained successfully for reserve domains; which, as Samuel Valenzuela argues, removed

specific areas of governmental authority and substantive policy making from the purview of

elected officials.31

The transitions to democracy in Brazil and Chile ultimately undermined civilian control

over military missions given two restrictions. First, tutelary powers, to use Samuel Valenzuelas

expression32, were imposed to the new democratic governments. Tutelary power takes place

through vague constitutional references to the role of the armed forces as guarantors of the

constitution and the laws, whereby the military institution is not subject to accountability and

oversight by other governmental bodies. By presenting themselves as protectors of political

order, the militaries were able to define, interpret, and design their main missions in terms of

internal stability without civilian intervention. Second, a degree of reserved domains was

conceded, since the exiting militaries required assurances that their interests were not going to be

affected by the incoming elected officials. In so doing, military governments tried to remove

specific areas of defense policy-making from the purview of elected officials by granting a high

degree of political autonomy. This, in turn, highly restrained the ability of the incoming

democratic governments to influence policy-making and determine military budgets, acquisitions,

foreign service assignments, curricula, and doctrine.

16

Therefore, it should not be a surprise that few changes in doctrine and orientation were

introduced when Brazil and Chile performed UN peacekeeping missions in the nineties, after the

end of Cold War. Historically, Brazil was Latin Americas major troop contributor to UN peace

missions. From 1957 to 1999, Brazil deployed more than 11,302 soldiers in support of

peacekeeping worldwide. Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries that sent

contingents of observers and troops during the Cold War to places such as Sinai, Gaza, Congo,

India-Pakistan, and Cyprus.33 By far, Brazils most important contributions in the post-Cold War

period have occurred in Africa, where Brazilian peacekeepers have been sent to Mozambique,

Angola, Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Namibia and Cape Verde.

However, unlike Argentina, Brazilian exposure to international peace missions has been

inconsequential in improving civil-military relations. Peacekeeping has not substantially

increased military budgets or military recruitment. In fact, for most Brazilian decision-makers,

peacekeeping is perceived mostly as a cost, rather than as a benefit, given the economic resources

that the government has to commit in order to send soldiers abroad.34 Perhaps most importantly,

participation in peacekeeping missions has not altered the general orientation and doctrine of the

Brazilian military. Internal missions bolster the armed forces organizational justification and, as

a result, the military is, essentially, an inward oriented institution. As Wendy Hunter argues,

internal security missions enlist military troops in what are essentially police or national guard-

functions, including combating crime in urban areas and drug interdiction.35 Consequently,

Brazils armed forces are torn between professional impulses to turn outward and political

considerations to carry on internal security missions.

Furthermore, peacekeeping participation has not increased civilian control over the

military. Because of the particular type of Brazilian transition to democracy, peacekeeping

matters are in the hands of each of the armed forces branches (Army, Navy and Air Force), with

little intervention from Congress or from the Ministry of Defense (founded only in the year

2000.) Each force is in charge of designing its recruitment policy and its own peacekeeping

17

doctrine. Therefore, the unintended effect of engaging the military in international missions is

that such policy has actually increased the militarys sources of autonomy vis--vis civilian

authority.

IV) SOCIALIZING SOLDIERS AND THEIR (UNINTENDED) EFFECTS

Socialization arguments have been thoroughly used to justify the involvement of the

armed forces in international security institutions. In the case of Eastern Europe, NATO

sponsored numerous joint exercises and training programs, as well as conferences and other

meetings between military leaders from NATO countries and aspirants for membership. Policy-

makers hoped not only to increase inter-operability, but also socialize former Communist

militaries into norms of democratic civilian control. As Harvey Waterman argues:

Formal institutions, such as NATO, once they have developed an infrastructure, established norms, and co-opted people into them, are better able than mere promises to enforce those norms. They require constant involvement, including participation in meetings, exercises, celebrations, and consultations. They appoint officers and representatives: positions that tend to acquire a continuity that keeps the flame lit. They produce cooperative activities that strengthen commitments and solidarity.36

Likewise, analysts of peacekeeping consider that participation in peace missions has the potential

of civilianizing previously authoritarian militaries. For example, in a study of the developed

world, Charles Moskos considers that the civilianization or penetration of civilians in military

organizations occurs, among other reasons, because the armed forces are being used more often in

international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by international institutions; hence, they

are being socialized by international processes.37

Therefore, it is often claimed that international security institutions socialize actors

according to liberal principles and thus contribute to improve civil-military relations via

continuous (or iterated) interaction with other armed forces from consolidated democracies.

According to this logic, international organizations help create new liberal institutions, reform old

18

ones, and inculcate liberal values in a direct and conscious attempt to transform the identities of

the actors involved.38

Indeed, socialization is often defined as a process by which novices become incorporated

into organized patterns of interaction. Socialization not only develops habits that eventually are

taken for granted; it is also claimed that continuous interaction with individuals placed in

particular environments can change habits, expectations, beliefs, preferences and even

identities.39 As Robert Jervis argues, because the incentives facing each other actor are

influenced by what others are expected to do, feedbacks can be central to the patterns that

develop the frequency of a form of behavior can change rapidly as one persons movement

leads at least one other to follow suit, which in turn sets off a cascade of changes.40 For

instance, learning a foreign language by studying abroad may produce deeper changes in a

persons life. He/she will not only develop new skills, but actually discover different ways to

appreciate and judge the world. Interaction and experience can produce deeper changes in our

values and thus determine our later behavior people change as they are affected by experiences,

including those that they have chosen.41

However, part of the problem in understanding the effects of socialization has to do with

the fact that (1) very few authors make their dependent variable explicit and (2) its mechanisms

are often assumed rather than described. The operation of socialization will be simply asserted

instead of being demonstrated. Authors arguing against and in favor of security institutions tend

to talk past each other and most of the literature uses terms such as civilian control and

professionalism interchangeably. Hence, engaging the armed forces in international security

institutions is often justified because it is assumed that it will help the soldier to become (1) more

professional, while, simultaneously, (2) contributing to subjugate the military officer to a civilian

authority. These are two very different dependent variables that are not subject to the same

mechanisms due to unintended effects unleashed when soldiers socialize.

19

Unintended effects are likely to occur even when soldiers socialize in international

security institutions. Under certain conditions and given certain mechanisms, the policies of

international organizations may come to work in ways very different from the ones they were

originally designed to work or even expected. Following Robert Jervis systems analysis, we

anticipate two types of feedbacks; namely, positive and negative. Some types of socialization are

likely to exercise positive feedbacks, which occur when a change in one direction sets in motion

reinforcing pressures that produce further change in the same direction.42 Positive feedbacks

support liberal thinking about socialization in international security institutions. On the other

hand, certain kinds of socialization are more likely to produce negative feedbacks, when the

change triggers forces that counteract the initial change and return the system to something like

its original position.43 Negative feedbacks are convergent with skeptical views about

international security institutions.

In our account, there are two types or forms of socialization; namely, professional and

personal. In professional socialization, soldiers interact with fellow military officers from other

countries. They will learn new military skills, become acquainted with modern equipment and

logistics, and gain knowledge of new military doctrines. Most likely, these soldiers will become

socialized through a process of emulation, whereby individuals that want to be praised and

promoted will look for role models and authorities for guidance and inspiration.44 Followers will

then attempt to copy attitudes and practices of previously accomplished actors, in the expectation

that by doing so they will also be acclaimed; thus, socialization will occur by emulating

previously successful militaries.

Professional socialization will also work via material incentives. Such a process occurs

when actors can internalize new understandings about particular issues by changing their

cost/benefit calculations with positive and/or negative incentives. According to this logic,

soldiers will adopt new practices as part of a tactical effort by which they intend to legitimize

themselves and maintain access to material benefits available in the environment. Under such

20

circumstances, individuals will receive goodies and praise if they successfully adhere to the norm;

but if they fail to behave as expected by others, then they receive denunciation, punishment and

peer pressure. Internationalist, and in particular constructivists, refer to this process as strategic

social construction.45

Nevertheless, professional socialization may not necessarily convert a soldier into a more

obedient officer; in fact, professionalism may lead to quite the opposite outcome. The link

between military professionalism and civilian control is not necessarily as clear as classical

writings on civil-military relations would want us to believe. Samuel Huntington for one argues

that, no doubt, military professionalism leads to strong civilian control. Even more, he equates

military professionalism with the militarys subordination to its civilian masters. In The Soldier

and the State he proposes what he argues is the way to keep the military under civilian control

and at the same time to maximize the security of the state.46 In his view, military professionalism

is best enhanced by taking the military out of politics and the politicians out of the autonomous

military sphere.47 Huntington, as we know, argues for a professional military, isolated from

politics and focused on improving its abilities to win wars and not on politicking or promoting its

bureaucratic interests. According to him, this could be achieved if civilian authorities allow the

military maximum autonomy within a carefully delineated military sphere. In return for letting

the military call the shots within their own sphere, civilian leaders can expect the soldiers to self-

impose norms of non-partisanship and non-intervention in the political realm.

In our study, we find evidence that socialization via professionalism does not lead to

more civilian control, as Huntington once claimed. Contrary to Huntington, there is no guarantee

that a professional military will respect the principle of civilian control. In fact, professional

socialization may be the source of military insubordination rather than a barrier for it. As

Guillermo ODonnell writes: Because of their professionalism, not in spite of it, professionalized

armed forces manifest a high probability of taking upon themselves the responsibility of

overcoming recurring civil-military crises by way of the installation of a new political regime.48

21

For instance, in the case of Eastern Europe, it can be argued that to a certain extent,

military participation in NATO joint trainings made officers more contemptuous of their civilian

counterparts, who they thought were ignorant on military affairs. Representatives of the military,

especially after spending some time at NATO headquarters, believed they knew more than

civilians did, and hence, saw no need of civilian oversight. In some of the East Central European

countries, the military has openly expressed its reluctance to be subject[ed] .. to the knife of

people ignorant of military realities.49

Similarly, the Chilean Air Force had its first peacekeeping experience in the UN Iraq-

Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), in 1994. Part of their main mission consisted of

monitoring the no-fly zone between the two Middle East countries and implementing the food

embargo against Iraq. Their deployment abroad involved socializing with pilots from Great

Britain and other NATO countries, which facilitated a transcultural orientation to which the

Chilean armed forces had rarely been used to. In interviews conducted by one of the authors,

Chilean air force pilots revealed that the deployment highly increased their professional skills.

On average, a Chilean pilot with peacekeeping experience flew four or even five times more than

a regular pilot in his native country. In other words, international missions offered a handful of

Chilean officers the opportunity to practice their profession in an environment that actually

resembled real-war experience. Yet, this practice did not translate into higher levels of civilian

control over the armed forces in Chile. The Air Force continues to have autonomy on issues such

as budget, promotions, doctrine, and recruitment. Civilianization was far from being achieved,

since the Chilean officers interacted solely with fellow military pilots from the West and rarely

socialized with civilian personnel from the UN or from non-governmental organizations

(NGOs).50

The examples from Eastern Europe and Latin America indicate that professional

socialization may have positive feedbacks, if internationalism promises incentives to improve

sophisticated training and weaponry, and if interaction occurs with highly modern armed forces.

22

In both cases, socialization has increased military professionalism via emulation and material

incentives; but it did not led to higher levels of civilianization. The unintended effect of

professional socialization is less, not more, civilian control or oversight. This is, at least in part,

due to the specific designs of the socialization programs and could be corrected in the future if

domestic political factors and developments are more carefully studied and taken into account.

On the other side of the spectrum there is personal socialization, affecting individual

military officers, as people, on the personal level, when participants enjoy unique opportunities to

travel and see the world, while performing non-military activities. In this form of socialization,

soldiers can reconsider their attachments by bringing new social constructs into line with their

personal experiences through the time they spend in and out of service. Thus a new military

identity can be constructed one person at a time, as officers, soldiers, and veterans are infused

with new national consciousness that they then diffuse to other colleagues surrounding them. In

this case socialization is expected to work in the military via persuasion, which works when a

highly authoritative member of a group attempts to persuade or convince fellow actors to change

their minds, to accept new rules or internalize certain norms. As Alastair Johnston explains,

persuasion is pursued by means of authority, whereby information is diffused by sources that are

liked and perceived as legitimate, and convincing.51 This is perhaps the most difficult form of

socialization, since it involves changing patterns of behavior without material incentives or

cajoling.

In NATO and in UN missions, personal interaction occurs when soldiers perform

humanitarian and peace missions. In those cases, soldiers build refugee camps, deliver food and

medical supplies, separate belligerents, and provide security for humanitarian organizations. In

order to accomplish such tasks, the armed forces need to be smaller, more flexible, and more

dependent on civilian personnel; thus, fully integrating women and other civil authorities. For

this reason, Moskos argues, the armed forces of Europe and in the United States have been

increasingly democratized, liberalized, and civilianized.52 In other words, through socialization

23

in international missions, the military becomes not only more professional, but actually more

democratic.

While personal socialization promises to accomplish higher levels of civilian integration

in military organizations, unexpected consequences can occur. To begin with, socialization via

material incentives will operate in reverse order. Humanitarian and peace missions hold few

enticements for developed militaries, since the goal of limiting confrontation conflicts with the

more professional pursuit of an efficient victory in war. Since peace missions entail encounters

with hostile civilians and irregular forces, such missions provide little justification for

sophisticated weaponry and training.53 Therefore, military leaders in contributing nations will

probably reluctantly supply peacekeepers forces if the mission grows, and threatens the more

traditional military missions, most military officers will try to resist peacekeeping.54

Positive feedback in personal socialization will then depend on productive interactions

with fellow civilians, with whom military officers identify as legitimate authorities.

Nevertheless, civilian and military interactions in NATO and UN missions may be inherently

conflictive in the field. According to Michael C. Williams, civil-military relations are most

difficult when soldiers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) interact in peace missions,

since many NGOs regard the military as out of touch with the values and members of the society

they seek to protect. The military, on the other hand, can see NGOs as undisciplined and an

impediment to their work.55

For instance, with more than ten years of service, Brazilian peacekeepers are among the

most professional soldiers in Latin America. Yet, compared to Argentina, military officers from

Brazil have been exposed to different kinds of socialization. The most active and numerous

peacekeeping experiences have occurred as part of Brazils involvement in Angola and

Mozambique. As Thomas Guedez da Costa argues, the contributions reflect Brazils zone of

regional projection. With regard to a commitment for troop presence, the sub-Saharan African

24

front is preferred.56 In particular, Brazil has traditionally deployed peacekeepers in Portuguese-

speaking nations, most of which are in Africa and Asia (East Timor.) Overall, more than 4,536

Brazilian soldiers were committed to peacekeeping missions in Africa from 1989-1999.

Deployment in Portuguese-speaking nations has led Brazilian authorities to be lenient in

encouraging their officers to become conversant in English and other languages. The unintended

effect of such policy is that transgovernamental contacts with civilians are hindered by cultural

and linguistic differences.

Similarly, missions in Angola and Mozambique entailed civilian activities, such as

reconstruction, policing, providing water, food, and medicine to local inhabitants. Hence, few

military officers perceived these activities as enhancing their professionalism. Mozambique and

particularly Angola involved very harsh conditions. In several interviews conducted by one of

the authors, deployed soldiers confessed that they had to deal with real-life difficulties such as

insects, malaria, dengue, bad weather, poor sanitation facilities, limited supplies of food, water,

and electrical power, poor UN logistics, and separation from families for long periods of time.

As one sergeant explained: Some of us can deal with these conditions during field exercises in

the Amazon, but those only last for weeks at a time; then we return to our units with proper

accommodations. In Angola, these conditions prevailed for months.57 Finally, Third World

countries have been the major troop contributors to missions in Africa. The top contributing

states are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Ghana, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Compared to the Brazilian

armed forces, the militaries of these countries have far less resources and training. As a result,

Brazilian officers exchanged experiences with soldiers and civilians from less developed

countries, some of which come from countries with persistent military-authoritarian regimes. As

a result, personal socialization did not increase civilian control of the armed forces in Brazil.

V. CONCLUSIONS

25

Whether in Eastern Europe or in South America, the important matter is not whether

institutions have effects or if they make a difference at the margins; what seems to be relevant is

that they exercise an indirect or mediated influence in the less expected areas and domains.

Given the different levels and degrees of democratization (or consolidation of democracy58) in the

two regions analyzed, we hypothesized that much of the unintended institutional effects are being

caused by domestic politics variables and by unintended socializing effects.

Membership to international security institutions has promised a new era of civil-military

relations in Eastern Europe and Latin America. It is believed that democratic norms of civilian

control will be spread through institutional incentives and regular contacts with militaries from

the West. However, analysts have often failed to understand the domestic politics of countries

with little or no democratic tradition. As a result, the effects of security institutions have varied

depending on the country being discussed. NATO and the UN have helped promote democracy

and accelerate economic reform in those countries not accepted in the first round of NATOs

enlargement or in countries with very specific types of transitions, where military missions have

been greatly questioned. However, these institutions have also exercised negative effects in

domains and areas not originally intended, as the previous examples have shown.

What should be done? Since the lack of relevant knowledge among individual decision-

makers and state institutions is one of the main obstacles to firm civilian control, military

education of soldiers, statesmen, journalists and the public could contribute significantly to a

better understanding of the principle of civilian control and to harmonizing civil-military

relations. The reforms in the system of military education in East Central Europe can go a long

way in solving some of the above problems.

Furthermore, since the strengthening of the democratic control of the military depends on

the creation of informed experts outside the government, the West should do more to promote

military expertise among various non-governmental actors such as the media, academics, and

NGOs. Civilian control over the military would be enhanced by bringing the NGOs and the

26

think-tanks into defense and foreign-policy decision making. In this way, civilian leaders will not

be so dependent on the military since they would have the independent assessments and

recommendations of non-military institutions.

Finally, policy-makers in the West need to rethink the involvement of armed forces in

complex peace missions and review their relationship with political and humanitarian structures.

While a cultural gap will always exist between the military and civilians, increased cooperation is

possible through better planning and decision-making, by enhanced training of civilian personnel,

and by active attempts by the military and civilians to achieve greater mutual understanding.

1 Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,

International Organization, 2(1978): 881-912.2 Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton

University Press, 1997): 61.3 See, for instance, instance Michael C. Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi

Paper 321, no. 32: 13.4 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, McNair Paper 39

(National Defense University, April 1995), Ch. 9. 5 Robert Jervis,

6 See for instance the debate on NATOs expansion and its implications for democracy in Eastern Europe in

Dan Reiter, Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001): 41-67 and Correspondence, International Security, Vol. 26, 3(Winter 2001/2002): 221-235.7 See Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, International

Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 491-517. Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation, World Politics 44 no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96. 8 This essay does not provide an exhaustive list of mechanisms, although we believe these mechanisms do

shed light in explaining the unintended effects in both Eastern Europe and Latin America.9 Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Relations at Risk, Adelphi Paper 306 (The

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), see especially pp. 64-74.10

See, for example, Ionel Nicu Sava, Western (NATO/PfP) Assistance to Build Democratic Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe. The Case of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, The Manfred Worner Fellowship Final Report (Bucharest, November 2002), p. 3.11

The Persistent Problem of Civil-Military Relations in East and Central Europe: A Briefing Note on Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Fourth International Security Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, 15-17 November, 2000. 12

For a good discussion of different models of civilian control, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 157-62. He discusses four models/ideal types of civil-military relations, namely: the artistocratic, the communist, the liberal, and the professional model. For an analysis of communist civil-military relations see also Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

27

13 For a summary of some of these problems, see Ben Lombardi, An Overview of Civil-Military Relations

in Central and Eastern Europe, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 28-30.14 For a show of little interest in national security matters, take the case of Bulgaria -- in the 38th National Assembly during parliamentary-control sessions held as a rule every Friday, the Minister of Defense, Mr. Boiko Noev, has received 38 inquiries and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Nadezhda Mihailova 51. For comparison, for the same period of time, the Minister of Finance has received 216 inquiries and the Minister of Economic 195. For more details, see Spravka za deinostta na 38-to Narodno sabranie, 7 Mai 1997-12 April 2001, at http://www.parliament.bg/Press/spravka.htm, pp. 2-3.15

Paper presented at the 4th International Security Forum, 14-17 November, 2000, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 16

Plamen Bonchev, Civil-Military Relations in the Process of Security and Defense Policy Formulation: A Case Study of Bulgarias Participation in Partnership for Peace, Sofia, 8 October 1998. 17

Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Relations at Risk, Adelphi Paper 306 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), see especially p. 69.18

See also, Dan Reiter, Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy, International Security 25:4, see especially pp. 60-61.19

Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Relations at Risk, Adelphi Paper 306 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), see especially p. 71.20

See for instance Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopeacekeepingins University Press, 1999): 14.21

See, for instance, The UNs Missions Impossible, The Economist August 5, 2000: 24-26.22

Douglas Farah, American Troops Arrive in Nigeria; Soldiers to Train UN Peacekeepers, The Washington Post August 25, 2000: A23.23

For the literature on transitions see J. Samuel Valenzuela, Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions, Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillmero ODonnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1992); see also Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).24

Felipe Agero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopeacekeepingins University Press, 1995): 59.25

Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984): 57.26

See Deborah L. Norden, Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentinas UN Missions, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, 3(August 1995): 330-349.27

Antonio L. Pal, Peacekeeping and its Effects on Civil-Military Relations, International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, Jorge I. Domnguez (ed.), (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 131-132.28

Hunter, Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America, State and Soldier in Latin America: Peaceworks #10, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1999): p. 6.29

Robert Jervis, op.cit., p. 61.30

Scott Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues, in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo ODonnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992): 322.31

J. Samuel Valenzuela, Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions, Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillmero ODonnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1992): 64.32

Ibid, 62-63.33

See Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da Fontoura, O Brasil e as Operaes de Manuteno da Paz das Naes Unidas, (Brasilia, Instituto Rio Branco-Fundao Alexandre de Gusmo-Itamaraty, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999): 201-265.

28

34 Interviews with Brazilian diplomats at ITAMARATY, Brasilia, Brazil, April 3, 2002.

35 Wendy Hunter, op.cit., p. 6.

36 Harvey Waterman, Correspondence,, International Security, Vol. 26, 3(Winter 2001/02): 225.

37 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Armed Forces after the Cold War,

The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds.), (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 1-13.38

See Mark Peceny and William Stanley, Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America, International Organization, Vol. 55, 1(Winter 2001): 149-182.39

Stryker S., and A. Statham, Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory, in The Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 1, G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), (New York: Random House, 1985): 325.40

Robert Jervis, Correspondence: Institutionalized Disagreement, International Security, Vol. 27, 1(Summer 2002): 174.41

Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, p. 52-53.42

Ibid, p. 125.43

Ibid.44

See Alastair Iain Johston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, (2001): 489, 499-506.45

See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, International Organization, Vol. 52, 4(1998), p.910.46 The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).47

Ibid, 83-84.48

Modernization and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons and the Argentine Case, in Abraham Lowenthal, ed., Armies and Parties in Latin America (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976), p. 120.49

Janos Szabo, Facts and Problems of the Civilian Control of Armed Forces in Hungary, paper presented to the IISS workshop on Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe, Budapest, 23-24 March, 1996, pp. 7-8.50

Interview conducted by Arturo Sotomayor with a Colonel from the Chilean Air Force, which requested anonymity. Chilean Air Force, Diego Portales Building, Santiago, Chile, November 14, 2002. 51

Alastair Iain Johston, op.cit., p. 496-499.52

Charles Moskos, Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, op.cit., 9.53

David Sorensen, Soldiers, States, and Systems: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War World, presented to the Mershon Center Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Ohio State University, 4-5 December, 1993. p. 21.54

Ibid, p. 25.55

Michael C. Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 321, (London, international Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998): p. 38.56

Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Democratization and International Integration: The Role of the Armed Forces in Brazils Grand Strategy, Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, David R. Mares (ed.), (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998): 232.57

Interviews with Brazilian officers that requested anonymity. Brazilian Army, Brasilia, Brazil, 15 April 2002. 58

For a debate about transitions and consolidation to democracy see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.)