THIRD DIVISIONDEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC.G.R. No. 158620and WARFREDO C. BALANDRA,Petitioners,Present:QUISUMBING,-versus-Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andMARIANO SALDIVAR, NENAVELASCO, JR.,JJ.TIMBAL, VIRGINIO VICERA,ALFREDO AMONCIO and NAZARIOS. COLASTE,Respondents.Promulgated:October 11, 2006x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:The main issue for resolution herein is whether there was sufficient cause for the dismissal of a rank-and-file employee effectuated through the enforcement of a closed-shop provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the employer and the union.The operative facts are uncomplicated.The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of plantation workers of petitioner Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) inBukidnon.RespondentNenaTimbal(Timbal), as a rank-and-file employee of Del Monte plantation inBukidnon, is also a member of ALU. Del Monte and ALU entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with an effective term of five (5) years from1 September 1988to31 August 1993.[1]Timbal, along with four other employees (collectively, co-employees), were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union, particularly for encouraging defections to a rival union, the National Federation of Labor (NFL). The charge was contained in a Complaint dated 25 March 1993, which specifically alleged, in relation to Timbal: That on July 13, 1991 and the period prior or after thereto, said Nena Timbal personally recruited other bonafide members of the ALU to attend NFL seminars and has actually attended these seminars together with the other ALU members.[2]The matter was referred to a body within the ALU organization,ominously named Disloyalty Board.The charge against Timbal was supported by an affidavit executed on23 March 1993by Gemma Artajo (Artajo), also an employee of Del Monte. Artajo alleged that she was personally informed by Timbal on13 July 1991that a seminar was to be conducted by the NFL on the following day. When Artajo demurred from attending, Timbal assured her that she would be given honorarium in the amount ofP500.00 if she were to attend the NFL meeting and bring new recruits. Artajo admitted having attended the NFL meeting together with her own recruits, including PazPiquero(Piquero).Artajostated that after the meeting she was givenP500.00 by Timbal.[3]Timbal filed an Answer before the Disloyalty Board, denying the allegations in the complaint and the averments in Artajos Affidavit. She further alleged that her husband, Modesto Timbal, had filed a complaint against Artajo for collection of a sum of money on17 March 1993, or just six (6) days before Artajo executed her affidavit. She noted that the allegations against her were purportedly committed nearly two (2) years earlier, and that Artajos act was motivated by hate and revenge owing to the filing of the aforementioned civil action.[4]Nevertheless, the ALU Disloyalty Board concluded that Timbal was guilty of acts or conduct inimical to the interests of ALU, through a Resolution dated7 May 1993.[5]It found that the acts imputed toTimbalwere partisan activities, prohibited since the freedom period had not yet commenced as of that time. Thus, the Disloyalty Board recommended the expulsion of Timbal from membership in ALU, and likewise her dismissal from Del Monte in accordance with the Union Security Clause in the existing CBA between ALU and Del Monte. The Disloyalty Board also reached the same conclusions as to the co-employees, expressed in separate resolutions also recommending their expulsion from ALU.[6]On21 May 1993, the Regional Vice President of ALU adopted the recommendations of the Disloyalty Board and expelled Timbal[7]and her co-employees from ALU.[8]The ALU National President affirmed the expulsion.[9]On 17 June 1993, Del Monte terminated Timbal and her co-employees effective 19 June 1993, noting that the termination was upon demand of [ALU] pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Article III of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement.[10]Timbaland her co-employees filed separate complaints against Del Monte and/or its Personnel ManagerWarfredoC.Balandraand ALU with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages.[11]The complaints were consolidated and heard before Labor Arbiter Irving Pedilla.The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five (5) were illegally dismissed and ordered Del Monte to reinstate complainants, includingTimbal, to their former positions and to pay their fullbackwagesand other allowances, though the other claims and charges were dismissed for want of basis.[12]Only Del Monte interposed an appeal with the NLRC.[13]The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ruled that all the complainants were validly dismissed.[14]On review, the Court of Appeals ruled that only Timbal was illegally dismissed.[15]At the same time, the appellate court found that Del Monte had failed to observe procedural due process in dismissing the co-employees, and thus ordered the company to payP30,000.00 to each of the co-employees as penalties. The co-employees sought to file a Petition for Review[16]with this Court assailing the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming their dismissal, but the petition was denied because it was not timely filed.[17]On the other hand, Del Monte, through the instant petition, assails the Court of Appeals decision insofar as it ruled that Timbal was illegally dismissed.Notably, Del Monte does not assail in this petition the award ofP30,000.00 to each of the co-employees, and the ruling of the Court of Appeals in that regard should now be considered final.The reason offered by the Court of Appeals in exculpating Timbal revolves around the problematic relationship between her and Artajo, the complaining witness against her. As explained by the appellate court:However, the NLRC should have considered in a different light the situation of petitioner Nena Timbal. Timbal asserted before the NLRC, and reiterates in this petition, that the statements of Gemma Artajo, ALUs sole witness against her, should not be given weight because Artajo had an ax[e] to grind at the time when she made the adverse statements against her. Respondents never disputed the claim of Timbal that in the two (2) collection suits initiated by Timbal and her husband, Artajo testified for the defendant in the first case and she was even the defendant in the second case which was won by Timbal. We find it hard to believe that Timbal would so willingly render herself vulnerable to expulsion from theUnionby revealing to an estranged colleague her desire to shift loyalty. The strained relationship between Timbal and Artajo renders doubtful the charge against the former that she attempted to recruit Artajo to join a rival union. Inasmuch as the respondents failed to justify the termination of Timbals employment, We hold that her reinstatement to her former position in accordance with theSeptember 27, 1996decision of the Labor Arbiter is appropriate.[18]The Labor Arbiter, in his favorable ruling to the dismissed employees, had noted that complainantTimbal[s] xxxaccuser has an axe to grind against her for an unpaid debt so that her testimony cannot be given credit.[19]The NLRC, in reversing the Labor Arbiter, did not see it fit to mention the circumstances of the apparent feud betweenTimbalandArtajo, except in the course of narrating Timbals allegations.However, in the present petition, Del Monte utilizes a new line of argument in justifying Timbals dismissal. While it does not refute the contemporaneous ill-will between Timbal and Artajo, it nonetheless alleges that there was a second witness, Paz Piquero, who testified against Timbal before the Disloyalty Board.[20]Piquerohad allegedly corroborated Artajos allegations and positively identified Timbal as among those present during the seminar of the NFL conducted on14 July 1992and as having given her transportation money after the seminar was finished. Del Monte asserts that Piquero was a disinterested witness against Timbal.[21]Del Monte also submits two (2) other grounds for review. It argues that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, which awardedTimbalfullbackwagesand other allowances, was inconsistent with jurisprudence which held that an employer who acted in good faith in dismissing employees on the basis of a closed-shop provision is not liable to pay fullbackwages.[22]Finally, Del Monte asserts that it had, from the incipience of these proceedings consistently prayed that in the event that it were found with finality that the dismissal ofTimbaland the others is illegal, ALU should be made liable to Del Monte pursuant to the CBA. The Court of Appeals is faulted for failing to rule upon such claim.For her part, Timbal observes that Piqueros name was mentioned for the first time in Del Montes Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.[23]She claims that both Piquero and Artajo were not in good terms with her after she had won a civil suit for the collection of a sum of money against their immediate superior, one Virgie Condeza.[24]The legality ofTimbalsdismissal is obviously the key issue in this case. We are particularly called upon to determine whether at this late stage, the Court may still give credence to the purported testimony of Piquero and justify Timbals dismissal based on such testimony.It bears elaboration that Timbals dismissal is not predicated on any of the just or authorized causes for dismissal under Book Six, Title I of the Labor Code,[25]but on the union security clause in the CBA between Del Monte and ALU. Stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since [a] CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor.[26]The CBA, which covers all regular hourly paid employees at the pineapple plantation in Bukidnon,[27]stipulates that all present and subsequent employees shall be required to become a member of ALU as a condition of continued employment. Sections 4 and 5, Article II of the CBA further state:ARTICLE IISection 4.Loss of membership in theUNIONshall not be a ground for dismissal by the Company except where loss of membership is due to:1.Voluntary resignation from [ALU] earlier than the expiry date of this [CBA];2.Non-payment of duly approved and ratified union dues and fees; and3.Disloyalty to [ALU] in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws as duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.Section 5. Upon request of [ALU], [Del Monte] shall dismiss from its service in accordance with law, any member of the bargaining unit who loses his membership in [ALU] pursuant to the provisions of the preceding section. [ALU] assumes full responsibility for any such termination and hereby agrees to hold [Del Monte] free from any liability by judgment of a competent authority for claims arising out of dismissals made upon demand of [ALU], and [the] latter shall reimburse the former of such sums as it shall have paid therefor. Such reimbursement shall be deducted from union dues and agency fees until duly paid.[28]The CBA obviously adopts a closed-shop policy which mandates, as a condition of employment, membership in the exclusive bargaining agent. A closed-shop may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.[29]A CBA provision for a closed-shop is a valid form of union security and it is not a restriction on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.[30]Timbalsexpulsion from ALU was premised on the ground of disloyalty to the union, which under Section 4(3), Article II of the CBA, also stands as a ground for her dismissal from Del Monte. Indeed, Section 5, Article II of the CBA enjoins Del Monte to dismiss from employment those employees expelled from ALU for disloyalty,albeitwith the qualification in accordance with law.Article 279 of the Labor Code ordains that in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by [Title I, Book Six of the Labor Code]. Admittedly, the enforcement of a closed-shop or union security provision in the CBA as a ground for termination finds no extension within any of the provisions under Title I, Book Six of the Labor Code. Yet jurisprudence has consistently recognized, thus: It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed stipulations for union shop and closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interestsvis-a-visthe employer.[31]It might be suggested that since Timbal was expelled from ALU on the ground of disloyalty, Del Monte had no choice but to implement the CBA provisions and cause her dismissal. Similarly, it might be posited that any tribunal reviewing such dismissal is precluded from looking beyond the provisions of the CBA in ascertaining whether such dismissal was valid. Yet deciding the problem from such a closed perspective would virtually guarantee unmitigated discretion on the part of the union in terminating the employment status of an individual employee. What the Constitution does recognize is that all workers, whether union members or not, are entitled to security of tenure.[32]The guarantee of security of tenure itself is implemented through legislation, which lays down the proper standards in determining whether such right was violated.[33]Agabonv. NLRC[34]did qualify that constitutional due process or security of tenure did not shield from dismissal an employee found guilty of a just cause for termination even if the employer failed to render the statutory notice and hearing requirement. At the same time, it should be understood that in the matter of determining whether cause exists for termination, whether under Book Six, Title I of the Labor Code or under a valid CBA, substantive due process must be observed as a means of ensuring that security of tenure is not infringed.Agabonobserved that due process under the Labor Code comprised of two aspects: substantive,i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural,i.e., the manner of dismissal.[35]No serious dispute arose inAgabonover the observance of substantive due process in that case, or with the conclusion that the petitioners therein were guilty of abandonment of work, one of the just causes for dismissal under the Labor Code. The controversy inAgaboncentered on whether the failure to observe procedural due process, through the non-observance of the two-notice rule, should lead to the invalidation of the dismissals. The Court ruled, over the dissents of some Justices, that the failure by the employer to observe procedural due process did not invalidate the dismissals for just cause of the petitioners therein. However,Agabondid not do away with the requirement of substantive due process, which is essentially the existence of just cause provided by law for a valid dismissal. Thus,Agaboncannot be invoked to validate a dismissal wherein substantive due process, or the proper determination of just cause, was not observed.Even if the dismissal of an employee is conditioned not on the grounds for termination under the Labor Code, but pursuant to the provisions of a CBA, it still is necessary to observe substantive due process in order to validate the dismissal.As applied to the Labor Code, adherence to substantive due process is a requisite for a valid determination that just or authorized causes existed to justify the dismissal.[36]As applied to the dismissals grounded on violations of the CBA, observance of substantial due process is indispensable in establishing the presence of the cause or causes for dismissal as provided for in the CBA.Substantive due process, as it applies to all forms of dismissals, encompasses the proper presentation and appreciation of evidence to establish that cause under law exists for the dismissal of an employee. This holds true even if the dismissal is predicated on particular causes for dismissal established not by the Labor Code, but by the CBA. Further, in order that any CBA-mandated dismissal may receive the warrant of the courts and labor tribunals, the causes for dismissal as provided for in the CBA must satisfy to the evidentiary threshold of the NLRC and the courts.It is necessary to emphasize these principles since the immutable truth under our constitutional and labor laws is that no employee can be dismissed without cause.Agabonmay have tempered the procedural due process requirements if just cause for dismissal existed, but in no way did it eliminate the existence of a legally prescribed cause as a requisite for any dismissal. The fact that a CBA may provide for additional grounds for dismissal other than those established under the Labor Code does not detract from the necessity to duly establish the existence of such grounds before the dismissal may be validated. And even if the employer or, in this case, the collective bargaining agent, is satisfied that cause has been established to warrant the dismissal, such satisfaction will be of no consequence if, upon legal challenge, they are unable to establish before the NLRC or the courts the presence of such causes.In the matter at bar, the Labor Arbiterthe proximatetrierof factsand the Court of Appeals both duly appreciated that the testimony of Artajo against Timbal could not be given credence, especially in proving Timbals disloyalty to ALU. This is due to the prior animosity between the two engendered by the pending civil complaint filed by Timbals husband against Artajo. Considering that the civil complaint was filed just six (6) days prior to the execution of Artajos affidavit against Timbal, it would be plainly injudicious to presume that Artajo possessed an unbiased state of mind as she executed that affidavit. Such circumstance was considered by the Labor Arbiter, and especially the Court of Appeals, as they rendered a favorable ruling to Timbal. The NLRC may have decided against Artajo, but in doing so, it failed to provide any basis as to whyArtajostestimony should be believed, instead of disbelieved. No credible disputation was offered by the NLRC to the claim that Artajo was biased against Timbal; hence, we should adjudge the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals as more cogent on that point.Before this Court, Del Monte does not even present any serious argument that Artajos testimony against Timbal was free from prejudice. Instead, it posits that Piqueros alleged testimony against Timbal before the Disloyalty Board should be given credence, and that taken with Artajos testimony, should sufficiently establish the ground of disloyalty for which Timbal should be dismissed.The Court sees the danger to jurisprudence and the rights of workers in acceding to Del Montes position. The dismissal for cause of employees must be justified by substantial evidence, as appreciated by an impartial trier of facts. None of the trier of facts belowthe Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appealssaw fit to accord credence to Piqueros testimony, even assuming that such testimony was properly contained in the record. Even the NLRC decision, which was adverse to Timbal, made no reference at all to Piqueros alleged testimony.Del Monte is able to point to only one instance wherein Piqueros name and testimony appears on the record. It appears that among the several attachments to the position paper submitted by the ALU before the NLRC-RAB was a copy of the raw stenographic notes transcribed, apparently on17 April 1993, during a hearing before the Disloyalty Board. The transcription is not wholly legible, but there appears to be references therein to the name Paz Piquero, and her apparent testimony before the Disloyalty Board. We are unable to reproduce with accuracy, based on the handwritten stenographic notes, the contents of this seeming testimony of Piquero, although Del Monte claims before this Court that Piquero had corroborated Artajos claims during such testimony, positively identified [Timbals] presence in the NFL seminar on 14 July 1992, and confirmed that Timbal gave ArtajoP500.00 for recruiting participants in the NFL seminar.[37]There are evident problems on our part, at this late stage, in appreciating these raw stenographic notes adverting to the purported testimony of Piquero, especially as a means of definitively concluding that Timbal was guilty of disloyalty. Certainly, these notes cannot be appreciated as entries in the official record, which are presumedprima facieevidence of the facts therein stated,[38]as such records can only be made by a public officer of thePhilippinesor by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. These transcripts were not taken during a hearing conducted by any public office in thePhilippines, but they were committed in the course of an internal disciplinary mechanism devised by a privately organized labor union. Unless the authenticity of these notes is duly proven before, and appreciated by the triers of fact, we cannot accord them any presumptive or conclusive value.Moreover, despite the fact that the apparent record of Piqueros testimony was appended to ALUs position paper, the position paper itself does not make any reference to such testimony, or even to Piqueros name for that matter. The position paper observes that [t]his testimony of [Artajo] was directly corroborated by her actual attendance onJuly 14, 1992at the agreed [venue], but no mention is made that such testimony was also directly corroborated by Piquero. Then again, it was only Artajo, and not Piquero, who executed an affidavit recounting the allegations against Timbal.Indeed, we are inclined to agree with Timbals observation in her Comment on the present petition that from the time the complaint was filed with the NLRC-RAB, Piqueros name and testimony were invoked for the first time only in Del Montes motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. Other than the handwritten reference made in the raw stenographic notes attached to ALUs position paper before the NLRC-RAB, Piqueros name or testimony was not mentioned either by ALU or Del Monte before any of the pleadings filed before the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, and even with those submitted to the Court of Appeals prior to that courts decision.In order for the Court to be able to appreciate Piqueros testimony as basis for finding Timbal guilty of disloyalty, it is necessary that the fact of such testimony must have been duly established before the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, or at the very least, even before the Court of Appeals. It is only after the fact of such testimony has been established that the triers of fact can come to any conclusion as to the veracity of the allegations in the testimony.It should be mentioned that the Disloyalty Board, in its Resolution finding Timbal guilty of disloyalty, did mention that Artajos testimony was corroborated by Paz Piquero who positively identified and testified that Nena Timbal was engaged in recruitment of ALU members at [Del Monte] to attend NFL seminars.[39]The Disloyalty Board may have appreciated Piqueros testimony in its own finding that Timbal was guilty, yet the said board cannot be considered as a wholly neutral or dispassionate tribunal since it was constituted by the very organization that stood as the offended party in the disloyalty charge. Without impugning the integrity of ALU and the mechanisms it has employed for the internal discipline of its members, we nonetheless hold that in order that the dismissal of an employee may be validated by this Court, it is necessary that the grounds for dismissal are justified by substantial evidence as duly appreciated by an impartial trier of facts.[40]The existence ofPiquerostestimony was appreciated only by the Disloyalty Board, but not by any of the impartial tribunals which heard Timbals case. The appreciation of such testimony by the Disloyalty Board without any similar affirmation or concurrence by the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, or the Court of Appeals, cannot satisfy the substantive due process requirement as a means of upholding Timbals dismissal.All told, we see no error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it held that Timbal was illegally dismissed.We now turn to the second issue raised, whether the Labor Arbiter correctly awarded fullbackwagestoTimbal.Del Monte cites a jurisprudential rule that an employer who acted in good faith in dismissing employees on the basis of a closed- shop provision may not be penalized even if the dismissal were illegal. Such a doctrine is admittedly supported by the early case ofNational Labor Union v. Zip Venetian Blind[41]and the later decision in 1989 ofSoriano v.Atienza,[42]wherein the Court affirmed the disallowance ofbackwagesor financial assistance in dismissals under the aforementioned circumstance.However, the Court now recognizes that this doctrine is inconsistent with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect just five (5) days afterSorianowas promulgated. It is now provided in the Labor Code that [a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Thus, where reinstatement is adjudged, the award ofbackwagesand other benefits continues beyond the date of the labor arbiter's decision ordering reinstatement and extends up to the time said order of reinstatement is actually carried out.[43]Rep. Act No. 6715 effectively mitigated previous jurisprudence which had limited the extent to which illegally dismissed employees could claim forbackwages. We explained inFerrerv. NLRC:[44]With the passage of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect onMarch 21, 1989, Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows:Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.and as implemented by Section 3, Rule 8 of the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, it would seem that the Mercury Drug Rule (Mercury Drug Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 56 SCRA 694 [1974]) which limited the award of back wages of illegally dismissed workers to three (3) years "without deduction or qualification" to obviate the need for further proceedings in the course of execution, is no longer applicable.A legally dismissed employee may now be paid his back wages, allowances, and other benefits for theentire periodhe was out of work subject to the rule enunciated before the Mercury Drug Rule, which is that the employer may, however, deduct any amount which the employee may have earned during the period of his illegal termination (East Asiatic Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 SCRA 521 [1971]). Computation of full back wages and presentation of proof as to income earned elsewhere by the illegally dismissed employee after his termination and before actual reinstatement should be ventilated in the execution proceedings before the Labor Arbiter concordant with Section 3, Rule 8 of the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.Inasmuch as we have ascertained in the text of this discourse that the OFC whimsically dismissed petitioners without proper hearing and has thus opened OFC to a charge of unfair labor practice, it ineluctably follows that petitioners can receive their back wages computed from the moment their compensation was withheld after their dismissal in 1989 up to the date of actual reinstatement. In such a scenario, the award of back wages can extend beyond the 3-year period fixed by the Mercury Drug Rule depending, of course, on when the employer will reinstate the employees.It may appear that Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, has made the employer bear a heavier burden than that pronounced in the Mercury Drug Rule, but perhaps Republic Act No. 6715 was enacted precisely for the employer to realize that the employeemustbe immediately restored to his former position, and to impress the idea that immediate reinstatement is tantamount to a cost-saving measure in terms of overhead expense plus incremental productivity to the company which lies in the hands of the employer.[45]The Labor Arbiters ruling, which entitledTimbalto claim fullbackwagesand other allowances, without qualifications and diminutions, computed from the time [she was] illegallydismisse[d] up to the time [she] will be actually reinstated, conforms to Article 279 of the Labor Code. Hence, the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the Labor Arbiter insofar asTimbalwas concerned.Finally, we address the claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it did not rule on Del Montes claim for reimbursement against ALU. We do observe that Section 5 of the CBA stipulated that [ALU] assumes full responsibility of any such termination [of any member of the bargaining unit who loses his membership in ALU] and hereby agrees to hold [Del Monte] free from any liability by judgment of a competent authority for claims arising out of dismissals made upon demand of [ALU], and latter shall reimburse the former of such sums as it shall have paid therefore.[46]This stipulation does present a cause of action in Del Montes favor should it be held financially liable for the dismissal of an employee by reason of expulsion from ALU.Nothing in this decision should preclude the operation of this provision in the CBA. At the same time, we are unable to agree with Del Monte that the Court of Appeals, or this Court, can implement this provision of the CBA and accordingly directly condemn ALU to answer for the financial remuneration dueTimbal.Before the Labor Arbiter, Del Monte had presented its cross-claim against ALU for reimbursement should it be made liable for illegal dismissal or unfair labor practice, pursuant to the CBA. The Labor Arbiter had actually passed upon this claim for reimbursement, stating that [as] for the cross-claims of respondent DMPI andTabusuaresagainst the respondent ALU-TUCP, this Branch cannot validly entertain the same in the absence of employer-employee relationship between the former and the latter.[47]We have examined Article 217 of the Labor Code,[48]which sets forth the original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. Article 217(c) states:Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policiesshall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrationas may be provided in said agreements. [Emphasis supplied.]In contrast, Article 261 of the Labor Code indubitably vests on the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.[49]Among those areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators are contract-interpretation and contract-implementation,[50]the questions precisely involved in Del Montes claim seeking enforcement of the CBA provision mandating restitution by ALU should the company be held financially liable for dismissals pursuant to the union security clause.In reconciling the grants of jurisdiction vested under Articles 261 and 217 of the Labor Code, the Court has pronounced thatthe original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217(c) for money claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or contracts other than a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies, under Article 261.[51]Our conclusion that the Labor Arbiter in the instant case could not properly pass judgment on the cross-claim is further strengthened by the fact that Del Monte and ALU expressly recognized the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators in the CBA. Section 2, Article XXXI of the CBA provides:Section 2. In the event a dispute arises concerning the application of, or interpretation of this Agreement which cannot be settled pursuant to the [grievance procedure set forth in the] preceding Section, the dispute shall be submitted to an arbitrator agreed to by [Del Monte] and [ALU].Should the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator, the same shall be drawn by lottery from a list of arbitrators furnished by the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment.xxxxThus, as the law indubitably precludes the Labor Arbiter from enforcing money claims arising from the implementation of the CBA, the CBA herein complementarily recognizes that it is the Voluntary Arbitrators which have jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Labor Arbiter correctly refused to exercise jurisdiction over Del Montes cross-claim, and the Court of Appeals would have no basis had it acted differently. At the same time, even as we affirm the award ofbackwagesagainst Del Monte, our ruling should not operate to prejudice in any way whatever causes of action Del Monte may have against ALU, in accordance with the CBA.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated26 August 2002is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.DANTE O. TINGAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate JusticeChairpersonANTONIO T. CARPIOCONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticePRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate JusticeATTESTATIONI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate JusticeChairperson, Third DivisionCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice

[1]Rollo, p. 137.[2]Id.at 163.[3]Id.at 173.[4]Id.at 167-168.[5]Id.at 203-206.[6]Id.at207-215, 252-255, 257-260.[7]Seerollo, p. 216.[8]Id.at217-218, 256, 261.[9]Id.at 140-141, 266-267, 271-272.[10]See id. at 142-144. See also id. at 73.[11]Rollo,p. 73. The complaints of Mariano Saldivar and Nazario Colaste were respectively docketed asRAB 10-07-00433-93andRAB 10-09-00473-93while those of Nena Timbal, Virginio Vicera and Alfredo Amoncio were docketed asRAB 10-07-00442-93.[12]Id.at364.[13]Id.at 369-382.[14]Id.at 403-423. Decision authored by Acting Presiding Commissioner Oscar N. Abella, concurred in by Commissioner Leon G. Gonzaga, Jr.[15]In a Decision dated26 August 2002, penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio C. Garcia, concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Eliezer R. de los Reyes. Seerollo, pp. 12-23.[16]Docketed as G.R. No. 158394.[17]In a Resolution dated1 September 2003. Seerollo(G.R. No. 158394), pp. 674-676-401.[18]Rollo,p. 21.[19]Id.at 358.[20]Seerollo, p. 51.[21]Id.at 52.[22]Particularly citingConfederated Sons of Labor v.AnakanLumberCo., et al., 107 Phil. 915 (1960);National Labor Union v. Zip Venetian Blind, 112 Phil. 407 (1961) andSorianov.Atienza, G.R. No. 68619,16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 284. Seerollo, pp. 55-58.[23]Rollo,p.683.[24]Id.[25]SeeLABOR CODE,Arts. 282-284.[26]Ferrerv. NLRC, G.R. No. 100898,5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 410, 418.[27]Seerollo, p. 97.[28]Id.at99-100.[29]ROTHENBERG ON LABOR RELATIONS, p. 48; cited inConfederated Sons of Labor v.AnakanLumber Co., et al., 107 Phil. 915, 918 (1960).[30]Ferrerv. NLRC, supra note 26 at 418, citingLiragTextile Mills, Inc. v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87 (1981).[31]Rivera v. Hon. Espiritu, 425 Phil. 169, 184 (2002), citingLiberty Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., G.R. Nos. 58768-70, 180 SCRA 668, 679-680 (1989).[32]SeeCONSTITUTION,Art. XIII, Sec. 3.[33]SeeAgabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 689-690,J. Tinga, Separate Opinion citingPhil. Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. NLRC, 387 Phil. 250 (2000);Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, 372 Phil. 39 (1999);Jardine Davies v. National Labor Relations Commission, 370 Phil 310 (1999);Pearl S. Buck Foundation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 80728, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 446;Bagong Bayan Corporation, Realty Investors & Developers v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 61272, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 107;Labajo v. Alejandro, et al., No. L-80383,September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 747;D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan, et al., No.L-71413,March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 107;Santosv. National Labor Relations Commission,L-76271,September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166;People's Bank & Trust Co. v. People's Bank & Trust Co. EmployeesUnion, 161 Phil 15 (1976);Philippine Movie Pictures Association v. Premiere Productions, 92 Phil. 843 (1953).[34]Id.[35]Agabonv. NLRC, supra note 33 at 612.[36]Substantive due process mandates that an employee can only be dismissed based on just or authorized causes.Maneja v. NLRC, 353 Phil. 45, 66 (1998).[37]Rollo, p. 51.[38]SeeRULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,Rule 130, Sec. 44.[39]Rollo, p. 204.[40]There is no dispute that the requirement of an impartial tribunal is integral to substantive and administrative due process. On the imperative of ensuring due process in administrative proceedings,Ang Tibaylaid down the guidelines for administrative tribunals to observe. However, whatAng Tibayfailed to explicitly state was, prescinding from the general principles governing due process, the requirement of an impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review his decision on appeal.GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 511, 533 (1998).[41]Supra note 22.[42]Id.[43]SeePheschemIndustrial Corp. v.Moldez, G.R. No. 161158, 9 May 2005 citingRasonablev. NLRC, 253 SCRA 815 (1996).[44]Supra note 26 at 423.Incidentally, a case wherein the employees ordered reinstated were dismissed after having been expelled from their union.[45]Supra note 26 at 423-424.[46]Rollo, p. 100.[47]Id.at 363.[48]Which reads in full: Art. 217.Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission(a) Except as otherwise provided under this code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:(1)Unfair labor practice cases;(2)Termination disputes;(3)If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;(4)Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relation;(5)Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and(6)Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), regardless ofwhether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.(b)The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.(c)Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements."[49]SeeLABOR CODE,Art. 261. See alsoSanyo Phil. Workers Union v.Canizares, G.R. No. 101619,8July 1992.[50]SeeViverov. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 158, 170 (2000).[51]San Josev. NLRC, 355 Phil. 759, 772 (1998).

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Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaTHIRD DIVISIONHERMINIGILDO INGUILLO AND ZENAIDA BERGANTE,Petitioners,-versus-FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES, INC.and/orAMPARO POLICARPIO, MANAGER,Respondents.G.R. No. 165407Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,*CORONA,**NACHURA,andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:June 5, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (1) Decision[1]datedMarch 11, 2004in CA-G.R. SP No. 73992, which dismissed the Petition forCertiorariof petitionersZenaida Bergante (Bergante) and Herminigildo Inguillo (Inguillo); and (2)Resolution[2]datedSeptember 17, 2004denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.The appellate court sustained the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that petitioners were validly dismissed pursuant to a Union Security Clause in the collective bargaining agreement.The facts of the case are as follows:First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing of weighing scales, employed Bergante and Inguillo as assemblers on August 15, 1977 and September 10, 1986, respectively.In 1991, FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU)[3]entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),[4]the duration of which was for a period of five (5) years starting onSeptember 12, 1991untilSeptember 12, 1996.OnSeptember 19, 1991, the members of FPSILU ratified the CBA in a document entitledRATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN.[5]Bergante and Inguillo, who were members of FPSILU, signed the said document.[6]During the lifetime of the CBA, Bergante, Inguillo and several FPSI employees joined another union, theNagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa(NLM), which was affiliated with a federation called KATIPUNAN (NLM-KATIPUNAN, for brevity).Subsequently, NLM-KATIPUNAN filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute[7]against FPSILU and FPSI.In said case, the Med-Arbiter decided[8]in favor of FPSILU.It also ordered the officers and members of NLM-KATIPUNAN to return to FPSILU the amount ofP90,000.00 pertaining to the union dues erroneously collected from the employees.Upon finality of the Med-Arbiter's Decision, a Writ of Execution[9]was issued to collect the adjudged amount from NLM-KATIPUNAN.However, as no amount was recovered, notices of garnishment were issued to United Coconut Planters Bank (Kalookan City Branch)[10]and to FPSI[11]for the latter to hold for FPSILU the earnings of Domingo Grutas, Jr. (Grutas) and Inguillo, formerly FPSILU's President and Secretary for Finance, respectively, to the extent ofP13,032.18.Resultantly, the amount ofP5,140.55 was collected,[12]P1,695.72 of which came from the salary of Grutas, while theP3,444.83 came from that of Inguillo.Meanwhile, on March 29, 1996, the executive board and members of the FPSILU addressed a document dated March 18, 1996 denominated as Petisyon[13]to FPSI's general manager, Amparo Policarpio (Policarpio), seeking the termination of the services of the following employees, namely:Grutas, Yolanda Tapang, Shirley Tapang, Gerry Trinidad, Gilbert Lucero, Inguillo, Bergante, and Vicente Go, on the following grounds:[14](1) disloyalty to the Union by separating from it and affiliating with a rival Union, the NLM-KATIPUNAN; (2) dereliction of duty by failing to call periodic membership meetings and to give financial reports; (3) depositing Union funds in the names of Grutas and former Vice-President Yolanda Tapang, instead of in the name of FPSILU, care of the President; (4) causing damage to FPSI by deliberately slowing down production, preventing the Union to even attempt to ask for an increase in benefits from the former; and (5) poisoning the minds of the rest of the members of the Union so that they would be enticed to join the rival union.On May 13, 1996, Inguillo filed with the NLRC a complaint against FPSI and/or Policarpio (respondents) for illegal withholding of salary anddamages, docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-05-03036-96.[15]OnMay 16, 1996, respondents terminated the services of the employees mentioned in the Petisyon.The following day, two (2) separate complaints for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and damages were filed against respondents by: (1) NLM-KATIPUNAN, Grutas,Trinidad, Bergante, Yolanda Tapang, Go, Shirley Tapang and Lucero[16](Grutas complaint, for brevity); and (2) Inguillo[17](Inguillo complaint).Both complaints were consolidated with Inguillo's prior complaint for illegal withholding of salary, which was pending before Labor Arbiter Manuel Manansala.After the preliminary mandatory conference, some of the complainants agreed to amicably settle their cases.Consequently, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[18]datedOctober 1, 1996, dismissing with prejudice the complaints of Go, Shirley Tapang, Yolanda Tapang, Grutas, andTrinidad.[19]Lucero also settled the case after receiving his settlement money and executing a Quitclaim and Release in favor of FPSI and Policarpio.[20]Bergante and Inguillo, the remaining complainants, were directed to submit their respective position papers, after which their complaints were submitted for resolution onFebruary 20, 1997.[21]In their Position Paper,[22]Bergante and Inguillo claimed that they were not aware of a petition seeking for their termination, and neither were they informed of the grounds for their termination.They argued that had they been informed, they would have impleaded FPSILU in their complaints.Inguillo could not think of a valid reason for his dismissal except the fact that he was a very vocal and active member of the NLM-KATIPUNAN.Bergante, for her part, surmised that she was dismissed solely for being Inguillo's sister-in-law.She also reiterated the absence of a memorandum stating that she committed an infraction of a company rule or regulation or a violation of law that would justify her dismissal.Inguillo also denounced respondents' act of withholding his salary, arguing that he was not a party to the intra-union dispute from which the notice of garnishment arose.Even assuming that he was, he argued that his salary was exempt from execution.In their Position Paper,[23]respondents maintained that Bergante and Inguillo's dismissal was justified, as the same was done upon the demand of FPSILU, and that FPSI complied in order to avoid a serious labor dispute among its officers and members, which, in turn, would seriously affect production.They also justified that the dismissal was in accordance with the Union Security Clause in the CBA, the existence and validity of which was not disputed by Bergante and Inguillo.In fact, the two had affixed their signatures to the document which ratified the CBA.In his Decision[24]datedNovember 27, 1997, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the remaining complaints of Bergante and Inguillo and held that they were not illegally dismissed.He explained that the two clearly violated the Union Security Clause of the CBA when they joined NLM-KATIPUNAN and committed acts detrimental to the interests of FPSILU and respondents.The dispositive portion of the said Decision states:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:1.Declaring respondents First Philippines Scales, Inc. (First Philippine Scales Industries [FPSI] and Amparo Policarpio, in her capacity as President and General Manager of respondent FPSI, not guilty of illegal dismissal as above discussed.However, considering the length of services rendered by complainants Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida Bergante as employees of respondent FPSI, plus the fact that the other complainants in the above-entitled cases were previously granted financial assistance/separation pay through amicable settlement, the afore-named respondents are hereby directed to pay complainants Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida Bergante separation pay and accrued legal holiday pay, as earlier computed, to wit:Herminigildo InguilloSeparation pay ................P22,490.00Legal Holiday Pay...........839.00Total23,329.00Zenaida BerganteSeparation pay.................P43,225.00Legal Holiday Pay...........839.00Total44,064.002.Directing the afore-named respondents to pay ten (10%) percent attorney's fees based on the total monetary award to complainants Inguillo and Bergante.3.Dismissing the claim for illegal withholding of salary of complainant Inguillo for lack of merit as above discussed.4.Dismissing the other money claims and/or other charges of complainants Inguillo and Bergante for lack of factual and legal basis.5.Dismissing the complaint of complainant Gilberto Lucero with prejudice for having executed a Quitclaim and Release and voluntary resignation in favor of respondents FPSI and Amparo Policarpio as above-discussed where the former received the amount ofP23,334.00 as financial assistance/separation pay and legal holiday pay from the latter.SO ORDERED.[25]Bergante and Inguillo appealed before the NLRC, which reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision in a Resolution[26]dated June 8, 2001, the dispositive portion of which provides:WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is set aside.Respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainants Inguillo and Bergante with full backwages from the time of their dismissal up [to] their actualreinstatement.Further, respondents are also directed to pay complainant Inguillo the amount representing his withheld salary for the periodMarch 15, 1998toApril 16, 1998.The sum corresponding to ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award by way of attorney's fees is likewise ordered.All other claims are ordered dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.[27]In reversing the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC[28]ratiocinated that respondents failed to present evidence to show that Bergante and Inguillo committed acts inimical to FPSILU's interest.It also observed that, since the two (2) were not informed of their dismissal, the justification given by FPSI that it was merely constrained to dismiss the employees due to persistent demand from theUnionclearly proved the claim of summary dismissal and violation of the employees' right to due process.Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was referred by the NLRC to Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose for report and recommendation.In its Resolution[29]datedAugust 26, 2002, the NLRC adoptedin totothe report and recommendation of Arbiter Bose which set aside its previous Resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter's Decision.This time, the NLRC held that Bergante and Inguillo were not illegally dismissed as respondents merely put in force the CBA provision on the termination of the services of disaffiliating Union members upon the recommendation of theUnion.The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Commission datedJune 8, 2001is set aside.Declaring the dismissal of the complainants as valid, [t]his complaint for illegal dismissal is dismissed.However, respondents are hereby directed to pay complainant Inguillo the amount representing his withheld salary for the period March 15, 1998 to April 16, 1998, plus ten (10%) percent as attorney's fees.All other claims are ordered dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.[30]Not satisfied with the disposition of their complaints, Bergante andInguillo filed a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA).The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit[31]and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.[32]In affirming the legality of the dismissal, the CA ratiocinated, thus:x x x on the merits, we sustain the view adopted by the NLRC that:x x x it cannot be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss an employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitutive of unfair labor practice, for such is one of the matters on which management and labor can agree in order to bring about the harmonious relations between them and the union, and cohesion and integrity of their organization.And as an act of loyalty, a union may certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor union and to consider its infringement as a reasonable cause for separation.The employer FPSI did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the disaffiliating union members, herein complainants, upon the recommendation of the union.Such a stipulation is not only necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union, but is allowed by the Magna Carta of Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the right of self-organization, it is at the same time postulated that such rights shall not injure the right of the labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.Having ratified their CBA and being then members of FPSILU, the complainants owe fealty and are required under the Union Security clause to maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, which was not present in this case.x x x the dismissal of the complainants pursuant to the demand of the majority union in accordance with their union security [clause] agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute unfair labor practice or illegal dismissal.Indeed, the Supreme Court has for so long a time already recognized a union security clause in the CBA, like the one at bar, as a specie of closed-shop arrangement and trenchantly upheld the validity of the action of the employer in enforcing its terms as a lawful exercise of its rights and obligations under the contract.The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union security clause-a closed-shop agreement.A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs.It is the most prized achievement of unionism.It adds membership and compulsory dues.By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity.(National Labor Union v. Aguinaldo's Echague Inc., 97 Phil. 184).It is a very effective form of union security agreement.This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.(Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87; Manalang v. Artex Development Company, Inc., 21 SCRA 561.)[33]Hence, the present petition.Essentially, the Labor Code of thePhilippineshas several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated, namely: (1) just causes under Article 282;[34](2) authorized causes under Article 283;[35](3) termination due to disease under Article 284;[36]and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285.[37]While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction.[38]Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends closed shop, union shop,maintenance of membership or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.[39]There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment.There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated.[40]A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.[41]In their Petition, Bergante and Inguillo assail the legality of their termination based on the Union Security Clause in the CBA between FPSI and FPSILU.Article II[42]of the CBA pertains to Union Security and Representatives, which provides:The Company hereby agrees to a UNION SECURITY [CLAUSE] with the following terms:1.All bonafide union membersas of the effective date of this agreement and all those employees within the bargaining unit who shall subsequently become members of the UNION during the period of this agreementshall, as a condition to their continued employment,maintain their membershipwith the UNIONunder the FIRST PHIL. SCALES INDUSTRIES LABOR UNION Constitution and By-laws and this Agreement;2.Within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Agreement, all workers eligible for membership who are not union members shall become and to remain members in good standing as bonafide union members therein as a condition of continued employment;3.New workers hired shall likewise become members of the UNION from date they become regular and permanent workers and shall remain members in good standing as bonafide union members therein as a condition of continued employment;4.In case a worker refused to join theUnion, theUnionwill undertake to notify workers to join and become union members.If said worker or workers still refuses, he or they shall be notified by the Company of his/her dismissal as a consequence thereof and thereafter terminated after 30 days notice according to the Labor Code.5.Any employee/union member whofails to retain union membership in good standingmay be recommended for suspension or dismissal by the Union Directorate and/or FPSILU Executive Council for any of the following causes:a)Acts of Disloyalty;b) Voluntary Resignation or Abandonment from theUNION;c) Organization of or joining another labor union or any labor group that would work against the UNION;d) Participation in any unfair labor practice or violation of the Agreement, or activity derogatory to the UNION decision;e) Disauthorization of, or Non-payment of, monthly membership dues, fees, fines and other financial assessments to theUnion;f) Any criminal violation or violent conduct or activity against any UNION member without justification and affecting UNION rights or obligations under the said Agreement.Verily, the aforesaid provision requires all members to maintain their membership with FPSILU during the lifetime of the CBA.Failing so, and for any of the causes enumerated therein, the Union Directorate and/or FPSILU Executive Council may recommend to FPSI an employee/union member's suspension or dismissal.Records show that Bergante and Inguillo were former members of FPSILU based on their signatures in the document which ratified the CBA.It can also be inferred that they disaffiliated from FPSILU when the CBA was still in force and subsisting, as can be gleaned from the documents relative to the intra-union dispute between FPSILU and NLM-KATIPUNAN.In view of their disaffiliation, as well as other acts allegedly detrimental to the interest of both FPSILU and FPSI, a Petisyon was submitted to Policarpio, asking for the termination of the services of employees who failed to maintain their Union membership.The Court is now tasked to determine whether the enforcement of the aforesaid Union Security Clause justified herein petitioners' dismissal from the service.In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the union or company.[43]We hold that all the requisites have been sufficiently met and FPSI was justified in enforcing the Union Security Clause, for the following reasons:First.FPSI was justified in applying the Union Security Clause, as it was a valid provision in the CBA, the existence and validity of which was not questioned by either party.Moreover, petitioners were among the 93 employees who affixed their signatures to the document that ratified the CBA.They cannot now turn their back and deny knowledge of such provision.Second.FPSILU acted on its prerogative to recommend to FPSI the dismissal of the members who failed to maintain their membership with theUnion.Aside from joining another rival union, FPSILU cited other grounds committed by petitioners and the other employees which tend to prejudice FPSIs interests,i.e., dereliction of duty - by failing to call periodic membership meetings and to give financial reports; depositing union funds in the names of Grutasand former Vice-President Yolanda Tapang, instead of in the name of FPSILU care of the President; causing damage to FPSI by deliberately slowing down production, preventing the Union from even attempting to ask for an increase in benefits from the former; and poisoning the minds of the rest of the members of the Union so that they would be enticed to join the rival union.Third.FPSILU's decision to ask for the termination of the employees in the Petisyon was justified and supported by the evidence on record.Bergante and Inguillo were undisputably former members of FPSILU.In fact, Inguillo was the Secretary of Finance, the underlying reason why his salary was garnished to satisfy the judgment of the Med-Arbiter who ordered NLM-KATIPUNAN to return the Union dues it erroneously collected from the employees.Their then affiliation with FPSILU was also clearly shown by their signatures in the document which ratified the CBA.Without a doubt, they committed acts of disloyalty to theUnionwhen they failed not only to maintain their membership but also disaffiliated from it.They abandoned FPSILU and even joined another union which works against the former's interests.This is evident from the intra-union dispute filed by NLM-KATIPUNAN against FPSILU.Once affiliated with NLM-KATIPUNAN, Bergante and Inguillo proceeded to recruit other employees to disaffiliate from FPSILU and even collected Union dues from them.InDel Monte Philippines,[44]the stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and theUnion, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor.InCaltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. Brillantes,[45]the Court expounded on the effectiveness of union security clause when it held that it is one intended to strengthen the contracting union and to protect it from the fickleness or perfidy of its own members.For without such safeguards, group solidarity becomes uncertain; the union becomes gradually weakened and increasingly vulnerable to company machinations.In this security clause lies the strength of the union during the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.It is this clause that provides labor with substantial power in collective bargaining.Nonetheless, while We uphold dismissal pursuant to a union security clause, the same is not without a condition or restriction.For to allow its untrammeled enforcement would encourage arbitrary dismissal and abuse by the employer, to the detriment of the employees.Thus, to safeguard the rights of the employees, We have said time and again that dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal, subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal.[46]In like manner, We emphasized that the enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law, provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process.[47]There are two (2) aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantivewhether the termination of employment was based on the provisions of the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural - the manner in which the dismissal was effected.The second aspect of due process was clarified by the Court inKing of Kings Transport v. Mamac,[48]stating, thus:(1) Thefirst written noticeto be served on the employees should contain thespecific causes or grounds for terminationagainst them,andadirective that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.x x x(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct ahearingorconferencewherein theemployees will be given the opportunity to: (1)explain and clarifytheir defenses to the charge against them; (2)present evidencein support of their defenses; and (3)rebut the evidencepresented against them by the management.During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees awritten notice of terminationindicating that: (1)all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2)grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.Corollarily, procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing.The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected.The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.[49]The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.[50]In the present case, the required two notices that must be given to herein petitioners Bergante and Inguillo were lacking.The records are bereft of any notice that would have given a semblance of substantial compliance on the part of herein respondents.Respondents, however, aver that they had furnished the employees concerned, including petitioners, with a copy of FPSILU's Petisyon.We cannot consider that as compliance with the requirement of either the first notice or the second notice.While the Petisyon enumerated the several grounds that would justify the termination of the employees mentioned therein, yet such document is only a recommendation by theUnionupon which the employer may base its decision.It cannot be considered a notice of termination.For as agreed upon by FPSI and FPSILU in their CBA, the latter may only recommend to the former a Union member's suspension or dismissal.Nowhere in the controverted Union Security Clause was there a mention that once the union gives a recommendation, the employer is bound outright to proceed with the termination.Even assuming that the Petisyon amounts to a first notice, the employer cannot be deemed to have substantially complied with the procedural requirements.True, FPSILU enumerated the grounds in said Petisyon.But a perusal of each of them leads Us to conclude that what was stated were general descriptions, which in no way would enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses.In addition, the Petisyon did not provide a directive that the employees are given opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.Finally, even if We are to assume that the Petisyon is a second notice, still, the requirement of due process is wanting.For as We have said, the second notice, which is aimed to inform the employee that his service is already terminated, must state that the employer has considered all the circumstances which involve the charge and the grounds in the first notice have been established to justify the severance of employment.After the claimed dialogue between Policarpio and the employees mentioned in the Petisyon, the latter were simply told not to report for work anymore.These defects are bolstered by Bergante and Inguillo who remain steadfast in denying that they were notified of the specific charges against them nor were they given any memorandum to that effect.They averred that had they been informed that their dismissal was due to FPSILU's demand/petition, they could have impleaded the FPSILU together with the respondents.The Court has always underscored the significance of the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee and has ruled in a number of cases that non-compliance therewith is tantamount to deprivation of the employees right to due process.[51]As for the requirement of a hearing or conference, We hold that respondents also failed to substantially comply with the same.Policarpio alleged that she had a dialogue with the concerned employees; that she explained to them the demand of FPSILU for their termination as well as the consequences of the Petisyon; and that she had no choice but to act accordingly.She further averred that Grutas even asked her to pay all the involved employees one (1)-month salary for every year of service, plus their accrued legal holiday pay, but which she denied.She informed them that it has been FPSI's practice to give employees, on a case-to-case basis, only one-half () month salary for every year of service and after they have tendered their voluntary resignation.The employees refused her offer and told her that they will just file their claims with the DOLE.[52]Policarpio's allegations are self-serving.Except for her claim as stated in the respondent's Position Paper, nowhere from the records can We find that Bergante and Inguillo were accorded the opportunity to present evidence in support of their defenses.Policarpio relied heavily on the Petisyon ofFPSILU.She failed to convince Us that during the dialogue, she was able to ascertain the validity of the charges mentioned in the Petisyon.In her futile attempt to prove compliance with the procedural requirement, she reiterated that the objective of the dialogue was to provide the employees the opportunity to receive the act of grace of FPSI by giving them an amount equivalent to one-half () month of their salary for every year of service.We are not convinced.We cannot even consider the demand and counter-offer for the payment of the employees as an amicable settlement between the parties because what took place was merely a discussion only of the amount which the employees are willing to accept and the amount which the respondents are willing to give.Such non-compliance is also corroborated by Bergante and Inguillo in their pleadings denouncing their unjustified dismissal.In fine, We hold that the dialogue is not tantamount to the hearing or conference prescribed by law.We reiterate, FPSI was justified in enforcing the Union Security Clause in the CBA.However, We cannot countenance respondents' failure to accord herein petitioners the due process they deserve after the former dismissed them outright in order to avoid a serious labor dispute among the officers and members of the bargaining agent.[53]In enforcing the Union Security Clause in the CBA, We are upholding the sanctity and inviolability of contracts.But in doing so, We cannot override an employees right to due process.[54]InCarino v. National Labor Relations Commission,[55]We took a firm stand in holding that:The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without limitation.The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreementx x x. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious.Due process must be observedin dismissing an employee because it affectsnot only his positionbut also his means of livelihood. Employers should respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor."Thus, as held in that case, "the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his ownUnionis not wiped away by a Union Security Clause or a Union Shop Clause in a collective bargaining agreement.An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his ownUnion, the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job."[56]In fine, We hold that while Bergante and Inguillo's dismissals were valid pursuant to the enforcement of Union Security Clause, respondents however did not comply with the requisite procedural due process.As in the case ofAgabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[57]where the dismissal is for a cause recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence, the absence of the statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal, or ineffectual.Accordingly, for violating Bergante and Inguillo's statutory rights, respondents should indemnify them the amount ofP30,000.00 each as nominal damages.In view of the foregoing, We see no reason to discuss the other matters raised by petitioners.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant PetitionisDENIED.The Court of Appeals Decision datedMarch 11, 2004and Resolution datedSeptember 17, 2004,in CA-G.R. SP No. 73992, areherebyAFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONin that while there was a valid ground for dismissal, the procedural requirements for termination, as mandated by law and jurisprudence, were not observed.RespondentsFirst Philippine Scales, Inc. and/or Amparo Policarpio are herebyORDEREDtoPAYpetitioners Zenaida Bergante and Herminigildo Inguillo the amount ofP30,000.00 each as nominal damages.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeChairpersonANTONIO T. CARPIORENATO C. CORONAAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

ATTESTATIONI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeThird Division, ChairpersonCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

*Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 646 datedMay 15, 2009.**Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 631 datedApril 29, 2009.[1]Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara- Salonga and Arturo D. Brion (now a member of the Court), concurring;rollo, pp. 37-51.[2]Id.at 53-54.[3]Sometimesreferred to as FPSI Independent Labor Union in other pleadings.See note 13.[4]CArollo, pp. 189-197.[5]Id.at 198-199.[6]Id.at 198.[7]Entitled: In re: Intra Union Dispute at First Philippine Scales Industries, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan, Petitioner - versus First Philippine Scales Industries (Independent) Labor Union, Respondent; First Philippine Scales Industries, Employer, docketed as Case No. OD-M-9503-046 (OS-A-7-140-95).[8]Per Decision datedMay 17, 1995.[9]CArollo, pp. 120-123.[10]Id.at 124.[11]Id.at 125.[12]Id.at 126.[13]Id.at 127-128.The grounds mentioned in the Petisyon are quoted as follows:1.Ang mga opisyales na ito, ay ang mgadating [miyembro] at opisyales ng F.P.S.I. Independent Labor Union, na rehistrado sa DOLE bilang isang lehitimongUnion, atsilay tumiwalag upang magtayo o magtatag ng panibagongUnion;2.Hindi rin siya nagpatawag ng meeting kung ano na ang nangyari sa amingUnionat ang aming Union fund.Hindi rin siya nag-submit ng financial statement sa DOLE;3.Sila rin ang dahilan kung bakit naantala ang aming pakikipagnegosasyon sa inyo sa nalalabing dalawang taon;4.Nilabag din ni Domingo Grutas ang aming karapatan bilang isang [miyembro] ngUnion, dahil gumawa siya ng desisyon na lingid sa kaalaman ng kanyang kasamang opisyales at [miyembro];5.Dahil sa kanilang panggugulo bumagsak ang ating produkto at yon ang dahilan kung bakit hindi namin nakamit ang mga [benepisyo] na dapat naming hilingin at matanggap sa inyo;6.Dahil sa kaguluhang iyon nawala ang aming team work, at pagkakaisa sa paggawa upang tumaas ang ating produkto, at hindi kahiya-hiya kung hihiling kami ng karagdagang [benepisyo];7.Hindi rin namin nakamit ang kanilang kooperasyon dahil hindi sila nakikipag-usap at nakikiisa sa amin, bagkus, nagmamalaki pa, at nagbabalak pang manggulo muli;8.Nilalason din nila ang isipan ng ibang [miyembro] ng aming Union upang kumalas ito sa aming samahan;9.Ang paglustay ng aming [pondo] na lingid sa aming kaalaman at pagdeposito ng pera sa pangalan ng Presidente na si Domingo Grutas at Vise Presidente Yolanda Tapang, at hindi sa pangalan ng aming Union sa pangangalaga ng aming Tresurero;Kaya mahigpit po naming hinihiling sa inyong butihing opisina na tanggalin sila para wala nang hadlang at balakid sa aming pagsusumikap na gumanda at mapabuti ang daloy ng ating produkto upang makamit din namin ang iba pang [benepisyo].(Emphasis supplied).[14]See CA Decision,rollo, p. 39.[15]Records, p. 2[16]Docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-05-03144-96;id. at 13-14.[17]Docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-05-03138-96;id. at 28.[18]Records, pp. 46-47.[19]Id.at 40-44.The aforesaid complainants, agreeing to amicably settle their cases, executed a Quitclaim and Release upon receipt from FPSI of a financial consideration, as follows:Vicente Go--------------------P23,263.00Shirley Tapang-----------------P27,813.00Yolanda Tapang-------------------P39,740.00Domingo Grutas-----------------P23,589.00GerryTrinidad-------------------P23,454.00[20]Id.at 85.[21]Id.at 135.[22]Id.at 59-67.[23]Id.at 72-80.[24]CArollo, pp. 45-66.[25]Id.at 65-66.[26]Id.at 67-73.[27]Id.at 73.[28]Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Presiding Commissioner Roy V. Seeres and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo, concurring.[29]CArollo, pp. 75-85.[30]Id.at 84.[31]Rollo, pp. 37-51.[32]Id.at 53-54.[33]Id.at 45-47.[34]ART. 282.Termination by employer.An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:(a)Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c)Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and(e)Other causes analogous to the foregoing.[35]ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devises, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice to the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment [Department of Labor and Employment] at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.[36]ART. 284. Disease as ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.[37]ART. 285. Termination by employee. (a)An employee may terminate without just cause the employer-employee relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance.The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages.(b)An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice to the employer for any of the following just causes:1.Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the employee;2.Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his representative;3.Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of the employee or any of the foregoing.[38]Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC,G.R. No. 170287, February 14, 2008, 545 SCRA 351, 361, citingDel Monte Philippines v. Saldivar,504 SCRA 192, 203-204 (2006).[39]National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. NLRC,G.R. No. 179402, September 30, 2008, citing Azucena, C.A., The Labor Code with Comments and Cases, Volume 2, Fifth Edition, 2004, p. 242.The other common types of union security clause are defined and distinguished in the LABSTAT Updates of the Department of Labor and Employment, Vol. 1 No. 12, August 1997, to wit:(a)Open shop, which is an arrangement on recruitment whereby an employer may hire any employee, union member or not, but the new employee must join the union within a specified time and remain a member in good standing; (b)Agency shop, which is an arrangement whereby non-members of the contracting union must pay the union a sum equal to union dues known as agency fees for the benefits they received as a consequence of the bargaining negotiations effected through the efforts of the union; and (c)Check off, which is an arrangement by a union with the employer for dues to be deducted regularly from the members salaries wherein the sum collected is remitted to the union by check. (Emphasis supplied).[40]Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC, supranote 38, p. 361, citing 48 Am Jur 2d, 797, p. 509.[41]Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar,G.R. No. 158620, October 11, 2006, 504 SCRA 192, 202-203, citing ROTHENBERG ON LABOR RELATIONS, p. 48; cited inConfederated Sons of Labor v. Anakan Lumber Co., et al.,107 Phil. 915, 918 (1960).[42]Records, pp. 89-90. (Emphasis supplied).[43]Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC, supranote 38, at 362.[44]Supranote 38, at 201.[45]G.R. No. 123782,September 16, 1997SCRA 218, 236.In said case, one of the issues presented by the parties was their disagreement on the enforcement of union security clause in the CBA.The Secretary of Labor however considered the issue as procedural and failed to give a valid reason for avoiding the same.The Court held that the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion as he should have taken cognizance of the issue which is not merely incidental to but essentially involved in the labor dispute itself, or which is otherwise submitted to him for resolution.The Court went on to rule that it was precisely why the secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute over which he has jurisdiction at his level.[46]Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos,G.R. No. 113907, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 428, 470-471.[47]Id.at 463, citingSanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLUv. Canizares,211 SCRA 361 (1992).[48]G.R. No. 166208,June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116, 125-126.(Underscoring ours).[49]Landtex Industries and William Go v. Ayson,G.R. No. 150278,August 9, 2007, 529 SCRA 631, 652.[50]Id.at 652.[51]Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation,G.R. No. 173151, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 307, 322.[52]Respondents Position Paper, records, pp. 72-81, 76.[53]Records, p. 79.[54]Supranote, 44, at462.[55]G.R. No. 91086,May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 177, cited inMalayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawasa M. Greenfield v. Ramos,supranote 45, at462. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).[56]Id.at 188-189.[57]G.R. No. 158693,November 17, 2004,442 SCRA 573.