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Climate Change Climate Change

Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

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Page 1: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Climate ChangeClimate Change

Page 2: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Economists on Climate ChangeEconomists on Climate Change

Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do.analysis to determine what to do.

Have tended to champion discounting to Have tended to champion discounting to account for future people and future scenarios.account for future people and future scenarios.

Have tended to stress scientific uncertainty.Have tended to stress scientific uncertainty.

Have tended to stress an “adaptive” strategy.Have tended to stress an “adaptive” strategy.

Page 3: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Climate Change and JusticeClimate Change and Justice

Distributive Justice: What is a fair or equitable Distributive Justice: What is a fair or equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of climate distribution of the burdens and benefits of climate change?change?

Procedural Justice: How should responsibilities about Procedural Justice: How should responsibilities about what to do be defined and delegated?what to do be defined and delegated?

Participatory Justice: Who gets to delegate the Participatory Justice: Who gets to delegate the responsibilities and decide what to do and how it responsibilities and decide what to do and how it should be done?should be done?

Recognition Justice: What kinds of power from Recognition Justice: What kinds of power from different nation-states and other political actors different nation-states and other political actors should be recognized?should be recognized?

Page 4: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Ruchi Anand on Northern Ruchi Anand on Northern HegemonyHegemony

““The industrialized countries of the North being more The industrialized countries of the North being more powerful in many ways—i.e. politically, diplomatically, powerful in many ways—i.e. politically, diplomatically, economically, militarily, in terms of scientific research economically, militarily, in terms of scientific research etc.—they are more able [or capable] to tackle the etc.—they are more able [or capable] to tackle the problem of climate change. ‘Capability’ also implies that problem of climate change. ‘Capability’ also implies that if the industrialized countries of the North were to if the industrialized countries of the North were to decide that the problem of climate change was decide that the problem of climate change was immediate, urgent, serious and worth addressing immediate, urgent, serious and worth addressing without compromises, no other country of the South, without compromises, no other country of the South, individually or as a coalition, could block their actions, individually or as a coalition, could block their actions, whereas the reverse scenario does not hold true. If whereas the reverse scenario does not hold true. If countries of the South wanted to move on with the countries of the South wanted to move on with the climate change agreement, while the North rejected, climate change agreement, while the North rejected, was not certain of, or not yet decided on climate change was not certain of, or not yet decided on climate change as an issue worth pursing, the South would be unable to as an issue worth pursing, the South would be unable to do much without the approval and support of the do much without the approval and support of the industrialized North.” industrialized North.” International Environmental International Environmental Justice: A North-South DimensionJustice: A North-South Dimension (p. 41) (p. 41)

Page 5: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Ruchi Anand on Northern (U.S.) Ruchi Anand on Northern (U.S.) HegemonyHegemony

““Just as the industrialized countries of the North wield the power Just as the industrialized countries of the North wield the power to stay in the climate change negotiations and dictate terms, to stay in the climate change negotiations and dictate terms, they also wield the power of non-cooperation, thereby having they also wield the power of non-cooperation, thereby having the ability to bring the efforts of all others in the international the ability to bring the efforts of all others in the international community to a complete halt. The United States’ rejection of community to a complete halt. The United States’ rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and its decision to walk out of the regime the Kyoto Protocol and its decision to walk out of the regime has undermined the worth of the Kyoto Protocol. Efforts to has undermined the worth of the Kyoto Protocol. Efforts to curb climate change have lost support from the most powerful curb climate change have lost support from the most powerful country in the world today, and have also lost the participation country in the world today, and have also lost the participation of the main polluter (generator of greenhouse gases) from the of the main polluter (generator of greenhouse gases) from the Convention. … A reverse hypothetical scenario would be a Convention. … A reverse hypothetical scenario would be a developing country staging a walkout from the Convention developing country staging a walkout from the Convention without the North approving of it doing so. The industrialized without the North approving of it doing so. The industrialized North would have many ways to arm-twist and use North would have many ways to arm-twist and use conditionality to bring the violator country back to its knees, conditionality to bring the violator country back to its knees, and would not make as much difference, in any case.” and would not make as much difference, in any case.” International Environmental Justice: A North-South DimensionInternational Environmental Justice: A North-South Dimension (p. 57) (p. 57)

Page 6: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

VulnerabilityVulnerability

Who is most likely to get hit the hardest—suffer Who is most likely to get hit the hardest—suffer the greatest costs—by climate change?the greatest costs—by climate change?

Global SouthGlobal South Lower income communities and the poorer Lower income communities and the poorer

sectors of societies (poor pays, not polluter sectors of societies (poor pays, not polluter pays)pays)

Non-dominant groups of people in countries Non-dominant groups of people in countries with strong ethnic, religious, and other divides.with strong ethnic, religious, and other divides.

Women and childrenWomen and children

Page 7: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Six Possibilities for Burden-Six Possibilities for Burden-SharingSharing

1.1. Polluter Pays.Polluter Pays.2.2. Equal Entitlements: Everyone is entitled to an equal share Equal Entitlements: Everyone is entitled to an equal share

of the atmospheric commons.of the atmospheric commons.3.3. Performance: Countries who use energy more efficiently Performance: Countries who use energy more efficiently

should be rewarded with more benefits.should be rewarded with more benefits.4.4. Focus on the Poor: Improve the situation of the poorest Focus on the Poor: Improve the situation of the poorest

countries of the South, with the long-range intention of countries of the South, with the long-range intention of mitigating unequal distributions of wealth.mitigating unequal distributions of wealth.

5.5. Securing Basic Needs: Countries emitting more than what Securing Basic Needs: Countries emitting more than what is deemed “reasonable” to support a consistent, modest is deemed “reasonable” to support a consistent, modest standard of living should accept far higher mitigation costs standard of living should accept far higher mitigation costs than countries facing more poverty.than countries facing more poverty.

6.6. Solvency: Costs should be distributed among states Solvency: Costs should be distributed among states according to their ability to pay and their contribution to according to their ability to pay and their contribution to the problem of climate change. This is probably closest to the problem of climate change. This is probably closest to the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.

Page 8: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Kyoto ProtocolKyoto Protocol

Negotiated at the 1997 third Conference of the Negotiated at the 1997 third Conference of the Parties (COP) following negotiations formally Parties (COP) following negotiations formally started at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.started at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.

Regulates greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.Regulates greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Annex I countries were to reduce their GHG Annex I countries were to reduce their GHG

emissions to 5.2% below their 1990 levels by emissions to 5.2% below their 1990 levels by the years 2008-2012.the years 2008-2012.

http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.phttp://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.phphp In order to go into effect, at least 55 countries In order to go into effect, at least 55 countries

that collectively emitted at least 55% of the that collectively emitted at least 55% of the total GHG emissions in 1990 had to ratify the total GHG emissions in 1990 had to ratify the Protocol.Protocol.

Protocol went into effect on February 16, Protocol went into effect on February 16, 2005.2005.

Page 9: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

More Kyoto ProtocolMore Kyoto Protocol

As of December, 2006, 169 countries have ratified As of December, 2006, 169 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.the Kyoto Protocol.

The two notable Annex I countries that have not The two notable Annex I countries that have not ratified the Protocol are Australia and the United ratified the Protocol are Australia and the United States.States.

China, India, and other developing countries are China, India, and other developing countries are exempt from mandatory GHG emissions restrictions.exempt from mandatory GHG emissions restrictions.

Annex I countries are obligated to provide financial Annex I countries are obligated to provide financial and technological assistance to developing and technological assistance to developing countries.countries.

Following COP 6 (2001), a system of emissions Following COP 6 (2001), a system of emissions credits and emission rights trading among countries credits and emission rights trading among countries was added to the Protocol.was added to the Protocol.

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.hhttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.htmltml

Page 10: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

United States Opposition to KyotoUnited States Opposition to Kyoto

When the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, it When the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, it incorporated two strategies recommended by President Clinton incorporated two strategies recommended by President Clinton and Vice-President Gore to meet U.S. needs and demands: (1) and Vice-President Gore to meet U.S. needs and demands: (1) an emission trading scheme, and (2) a clean development an emission trading scheme, and (2) a clean development mechanism.mechanism.

On July 25, 1997 before the Kyoto Protocol was finalized, the On July 25, 1997 before the Kyoto Protocol was finalized, the U.S. Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, by a vote of 95-U.S. Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, by a vote of 95-0:0:

http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.htmlhttp://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html On June 11, 2001, President George W. Bush said: “The Kyoto On June 11, 2001, President George W. Bush said: “The Kyoto

Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways.”Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways.” One consistent U.S. criticism of the Protocol has been that the One consistent U.S. criticism of the Protocol has been that the

Protocol holds developing countries like China and India to only Protocol holds developing countries like China and India to only voluntary compliance standards.voluntary compliance standards.

President Bush has stated that the best U.S. strategy for President Bush has stated that the best U.S. strategy for combating climate change is to hold U.S. companies to combating climate change is to hold U.S. companies to voluntary compliance standards.voluntary compliance standards.

Page 11: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Some Criticisms of the Kyoto Some Criticisms of the Kyoto ProtocolProtocol

1.1. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows developed The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows developed countries to invest in developing countries to gain GHG countries to invest in developing countries to gain GHG emissions credits. This might allow developed countries to emissions credits. This might allow developed countries to continue to emit GHGs while paying developing countries not continue to emit GHGs while paying developing countries not to. (carbon colonization?)to. (carbon colonization?)

2.2. Emissions trading allows a country like Spain to buy credits Emissions trading allows a country like Spain to buy credits from another country like Russia, thus enabling Spain to from another country like Russia, thus enabling Spain to continue to emit high levels of GHGs. (license to pollute?)continue to emit high levels of GHGs. (license to pollute?)

3.3. Joint Implementation (JI) allows an industrialized country or Joint Implementation (JI) allows an industrialized country or company from an industrialized country to invest emission-company from an industrialized country to invest emission-reducing or COreducing or CO22 mitigating activities in other developed mitigating activities in other developed countries to gain climate credits or reduction units. But JI is countries to gain climate credits or reduction units. But JI is not clearly defined, and it might allow for investments in not clearly defined, and it might allow for investments in developing countries, thus allowing developed countries to developing countries, thus allowing developed countries to continue to emit high levels of GHGs.continue to emit high levels of GHGs.

4.4. With great changes in the economies of countries such as With great changes in the economies of countries such as Russia between 1990 to today, the developed vs. developing Russia between 1990 to today, the developed vs. developing country distinction might be problematic.country distinction might be problematic.

5.5. Key countries such as China and India have no mandated GHG Key countries such as China and India have no mandated GHG emissions restrictions.emissions restrictions.

Page 12: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Some More Criticisms of the Kyoto Some More Criticisms of the Kyoto ProtocolProtocol

6.6. Enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance Enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance are not clear.are not clear.

7.7. TheThe Protocol only covers carbon dioxide Protocol only covers carbon dioxide emissions.emissions.

8.8. The 1990 baseline might not be the best The 1990 baseline might not be the best baseline or might be an arbitrary baseline.baseline or might be an arbitrary baseline.

9.9. The GHG emissions limits (5.6%) might be too The GHG emissions limits (5.6%) might be too high or too low.high or too low.

10.10. There might be disproportionate economic There might be disproportionate economic impacts on different countries.impacts on different countries.

11.11. The Protocol might have little practical effect in The Protocol might have little practical effect in mitigating climate change.mitigating climate change.

Page 13: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

ButBut

Kyoto Protocol defenders argue that Kyoto Protocol defenders argue that something is better than nothing to something is better than nothing to legally mitigate climate change, and an legally mitigate climate change, and an imperfect agreement is better than a imperfect agreement is better than a perfect agreement that doesn’t exist.perfect agreement that doesn’t exist.

andand

Future changes can be made to Future changes can be made to strengthen the Protocol.strengthen the Protocol.

Page 14: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

““A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and Change, Intergenerational Ethics and

the Problem of Moral Corruption”the Problem of Moral Corruption”

Stephen M. Gardiner: “The peculiar features Stephen M. Gardiner: “The peculiar features of the climate change problem pose a of the climate change problem pose a

substantial obstacle to our ability to make substantial obstacle to our ability to make the hard choices necessary to address it. the hard choices necessary to address it. Climate change is a perfect moral storm”Climate change is a perfect moral storm”

Page 15: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

First Spatial Perspective of the First Spatial Perspective of the Moral StormMoral Storm

Dispersion of causes and effects of Dispersion of causes and effects of climate change makes it hard to climate change makes it hard to pinpoint moral geographical pinpoint moral geographical locations.locations.

Page 16: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Second Spatial Perspective of the Second Spatial Perspective of the Moral StormMoral Storm

Fragmentation of human agency Fragmentation of human agency makes it difficult to respond to makes it difficult to respond to climate change. From an climate change. From an individual’s perspective, it is rational individual’s perspective, it is rational not to restrict one’s own pollution, not to restrict one’s own pollution, while from a collective perspective it while from a collective perspective it is rational to restrict pollution = is rational to restrict pollution = Tragedy of the commons.Tragedy of the commons.

Page 17: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Third Spatial Perspective of the Third Spatial Perspective of the Moral StormMoral Storm

Institutional inadequacy hampers efforts to Institutional inadequacy hampers efforts to respond to respond to climate change, in that:climate change, in that:

1. There is no effective global governance system.1. There is no effective global governance system.2. Some nations might wonder if they will be 2. Some nations might wonder if they will be

better or worse off because of climate change.better or worse off because of climate change.3. Effectively mitigating climate change might 3. Effectively mitigating climate change might

require deep and profound changes in require deep and profound changes in economic economic and political structures. and political structures.

Page 18: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

First Temporal Perspective of the First Temporal Perspective of the Moral StormMoral Storm

Dispersion of causes and effects over time might Dispersion of causes and effects over time might under-motivate people to mitigate climate under-motivate people to mitigate climate change because of:change because of:

1. The resiliency of the climate change 1. The resiliency of the climate change phenomenon.phenomenon.

2. The fact that climate change impacts are 2. The fact that climate change impacts are seriously seriously back-loaded. back-loaded.

3. Climate change is a substantially deferred 3. Climate change is a substantially deferred phenomenon.phenomenon.

Page 19: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Second Temporal Perspective Second Temporal Perspective of the Moral Stormof the Moral Storm

Fragmentation of human agency across Fragmentation of human agency across time makes it difficult to respond to time makes it difficult to respond to climate change. From an individual climate change. From an individual generation’s perspective, it is rational not generation’s perspective, it is rational not to restrict current pollution, while from a to restrict current pollution, while from a collective intergenerational perspective it collective intergenerational perspective it is rational to restrict pollution = is rational to restrict pollution = Intergenerational tragedy of the Intergenerational tragedy of the commons.commons.

Page 20: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Third Temporal Perspective of the Third Temporal Perspective of the Moral StormMoral Storm

This intergenerational tragedy of the commons has This intergenerational tragedy of the commons has multiplier effects, namely: multiplier effects, namely:

1. Inaction now raises transition costs that might make 1. Inaction now raises transition costs that might make future change harder.future change harder.

2. Insufficient action now might make some generations 2. Insufficient action now might make some generations suffer unnecessarily (e.g., CC harms future suffer unnecessarily (e.g., CC harms future generations generations A, B, and C, but current inaction leads to harming A, B, and C, but current inaction leads to harming future generations D and E as well).future generations D and E as well).

3. Insufficient action now might result in tragic choices 3. Insufficient action now might result in tragic choices for future for future generations.generations.

Page 21: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Theoretical StormTheoretical Storm

Our best theories face severe difficulties Our best theories face severe difficulties addressing issues such as scientific addressing issues such as scientific problems of uncertainty, ethical problems problems of uncertainty, ethical problems of collective agency, justice problems of of collective agency, justice problems of how to think about intergenerational how to think about intergenerational equity, and ethical problems of how to equity, and ethical problems of how to think about the values of nonhuman think about the values of nonhuman nature.nature.

Page 22: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Moral CorruptionMoral Corruption

Humans are often:Humans are often:

DistractedDistracted ComplacentComplacent UnreasonableUnreasonable Self-deceptiveSelf-deceptive ManipulativeManipulative Selectively attentiveSelectively attentive DelusionalDelusional HypocriticalHypocritical

Because of these human characteristics, and because climate Because of these human characteristics, and because climate change involves a complex convergence of problems, we change involves a complex convergence of problems, we will often fall prey to moral corruption. will often fall prey to moral corruption.

Page 23: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

The Perfect Moral Storm of The Perfect Moral Storm of Climate ChangeClimate Change

Page 24: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

Climate Change ExerciseClimate Change Exercise

USAUSA EU (European Union)EU (European Union) ChinaChina IndiaIndia AfricaAfrica AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island

States)States) Latin AmericaLatin America Eastern EuropeEastern Europe

Page 25: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

ConsiderationsConsiderations

1.1. Binding emissions targetsBinding emissions targets Should they exist? If so, in what form? If not, why Should they exist? If so, in what form? If not, why

not?not?

2.2. Economic developmentEconomic development How would a CC response affect your ED?How would a CC response affect your ED? How much of an effect is acceptable?How much of an effect is acceptable?

3.3. Ethical responsibility/Procedural justiceEthical responsibility/Procedural justice Who is responsible for responding to CC?Who is responsible for responding to CC? How should responsibility be allocated?How should responsibility be allocated?

4.4. Emissions tradingEmissions trading Should it exist? If so, in what form? If not, why not?Should it exist? If so, in what form? If not, why not?

5.5. Technology transfer/Financial assistanceTechnology transfer/Financial assistance Should it exist? If so, in what form? If not, why not?Should it exist? If so, in what form? If not, why not?

6.6. National securityNational security How would a CC response affect your NS?How would a CC response affect your NS? How much of an effect is acceptable?How much of an effect is acceptable?

Page 26: Climate Change. Economists on Climate Change Have tended to champion using a cost-benefit analysis to determine what to do. Have tended to champion using

DiscussionDiscussion

You are President of the World You are President of the World (El Queso Grande) (El Queso Grande)

How would you orchestrate a How would you orchestrate a global response to climate global response to climate change?change?

Who should do what and why?Who should do what and why?