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Clientelism, Political Cultureand Ethnic Politics inAustraliaGIANNI ZAPPALAPublished online: 09 Jun 2010.
To cite this article: GIANNI ZAPPALA (1998) Clientelism, Political Culture andEthnic Politics in Australia, Australian Journal of Political Science, 33:3, 381-397,DOI: 10.1080/10361149850534
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Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 381± 397
Clientelism, Political Culture andEthnic Politics in Australia
GIANNI ZAPPALAÁ *
University of Wollongong
The discussion of political culture in Australia that exists focuses on the
supposedly traditional traits of egalitarianism, utilitarianism, conformism,
materialism and so on. While not wishing to deny the British in¯ uence on
political institutions in Australia, to think that the massive nature of non-British
postwar migration has not in¯ uenced political culture in Australia is not only
naive but incorrect. In not paying attention to the impact of immigrants from
NESB, political cultures and practices such as clientelism have not been
the subject of Australian political discussion. Where ethnic participation in the
political system has been examined, some have argued that it is based on
corruption and has led political actors to deviate from national political and
cultural norms. This paper argues that clientelism can provide a more useful
and positive framework for understanding ethnic politics in Australia. After
examining various views on political culture and ethnicity in Australia, this
paper summarises some of the key points of recent approaches to clientelism.
It suggests that clientelism has a positive face, especially as a form of
representation for minority groups such as immigrants from NESB. The second
section then describes the key features of clientelism in the Australian `ethnic
electorate’ . It has evolved in ethnic electorates because of the process of ethnic
community formation, the nature of case-work in ethnic electorates and the
ability and willingness of political actors and parties to adapt their style to suit
the environment.
`Labor MP faces housing-for-votes allegations’ (Sydney Morning Herald 29 May
1997, 1), `ALP members allege intimidation, rorts’ (Australian 16 Dec. 1996)
`Ethnic ALP branchesÐ the Balkanisation of Labor’ (Healy 1993), `ALP stackers
in full swing for vote race’ (SMH 7 Dec. 1996): these headlines capture the mainthemes in both popular and scholarly discussion of the relationship between
ethnicity and political participation and political culture in Australia. We shall
return to these examples later; suf® ce to say that the ¯ avour is one of corruption,
of deviating from a previous political norm which is assumed to have been free of
corruption, and of practices which are likely to cause division both within thepolitical parties and in the wider community. Even though the word `political
* I would like to thank Colleen Mitchell, Liz Young, John Uhr, Jim Hagan and participants at the RAIGovernance Workshop held at ANU in July 1997 for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual
disclaimers apply.
1036-1146/98/030381-17 $7.00 Ó 1998 Australasian Political Studies Association
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382 G. ZAPPALAÁ
culture’ is rarely used explicitly in any such discussions, it is political culture that
is being referred to.
By political culture, I mean that `set of beliefs held by members of that culture
about the way in which the political system and its actors behave, and the way they
should behave’ (Hughes 1973, 133, emphasis added). It thus has both descriptiveand normative connotations. Furthermore, despite earlier approaches to the study of
political culture which tended to see it in homogeneous terms and as coterminous
with a nation’ s borders (Almond and Verba 1963), it is more correct to speak of
several `political cultures’ which co-exist, albeit at times uneasily, within the
national borders of any nation-state (Putnam 1993; Locke 1995; Pye 1995). It istherefore more useful to refer to political subcultures. As Jaensch (1992, 22±3)
suggests, `when the attitudes of a particular part of a population vary considerably
in either intensity or content, that part can be said to have its own distinctive
political subculture’ .
This paper argues that the role of immigrants from non-English speakingbackground (NESB)1 in the Australian political system has slowly evolved in the
postwar period so that we can now identify a distinct ethnic political subculture.
The next section brie¯ y reviews the existing conceptions of the relationship
between political culture and ethnicity in Australia. All have shortcomings. My
argument is that bringing ethnicity into the political culture narrative meansaccepting that a form of `clientelism’ is also part of contemporary Australian
political culture. The paper is therefore about rethinking frameworks of interpret-
ation with respect to ethnic politics in Australia. The paper illustrates how an
`Australian’ system of clientelism works in practice, who the key actors are, how
it incorporates immigrants into the political system and the role that ethniccommunity formation has played in the ability of parties and politicians to adopt
this system to assist their role as representatives.
Consistent with other recent studies of clientelism, the paper also argues that this
Australian version of clientelism can be a positive force, especially as a form of
representation for minority groups such as immigrants from NESB. This is becauseit is based on strengthening the ties of solidarity and trust both within ethnic
communities and between ethnic communities and their political representatives.
Political Culture and Ethnicity in Australia
A recent example of where traditional political culture and ethnicity have been seen
to clash is in the practice referred to as `ethnic branch stacking’ . The ABC program
Four Corners in a feature called `The Big Stack’ , also coined the term `ethnic
capture’ to describe the factional ® ghting over ethnic communities within LaborParty branches (ABC 1994). `Branch stacking’ is a phenomenon which normally
refers to the recruitment of members solely for preselection purposes (Healy 1993,
39). Factional leaders attempt to recruit people into their local party branches in
order to have suf® cient numbers of votes in internal party preselection ballots to
select `their’ candidates for local, state and federal seats. Branch stacking has a
1 The use of the term ethnic in this paper refers to Australians of non-English speaking background
(NESB). While the concept of ethnicity is more complex, this provides a useful working de® nition whichis consistent with its usage in Australian public policy terms. For a recent discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of using the NESB category, see Jupp (1996a).
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 383
long history in the Labor Party and was used in the earlier struggles between Irish
Catholics and non-Catholics (Allan 1984, 1988; Ormonde 1972).
The term `ethnic branch stacking’ has more recently entered political parlance
and refers to the practice of recruiting people of ethnic background, usually from
particular ethnic communities, for factional party preselection purposes (Healy1993). There is some debate within the party and among political scientists over the
precise meaning of a `stackee’ . As one MP has stated:
It’ s very dif ® cult [de® ning branch stacking] because someone who is a supporter
of an individual or a group is seen as a recruit, someone who is an opponent is
seen as a stack ¼ I think it should be de® ned as people who don’ t have a genuine
commitment to the movement, as people who won’ t be around in the longer term.
(Albanese, in ABC 1994)
Branch stacking, in other words, is in the eyes of the beholder. The practice is not
con® ned to any one faction, with all major factions having been accused by theothers of having been involved in ethnic branch stacking at some point in time.
Different factions, however, are said to recruit from different ethnic communities,
usually according to concentrations in the particular electorate and often from
groups who are seen as traditional rivals of another faction’ s `stackees’ . One
faction, for instance, may recruit large numbers of Turkish Australians if theopposing faction has a large support base among the Greek/Cypriot community.2
Linked to ethnic branch stacking are also allegations of corrupt vote-buying, of
MPs using local `ethnic community leaders’ to offer inducements and help to ethnic
constituents to join the party in order to vote for them in preselection ballots.3
Responding to such allegations the MP in one particular case replied: `I may wellhave said I will help them and do what I can, but what is wrong with that? I
promised to do no more than my job’ (SMH 29 May 1997, 1).
This response illustrates a key point about the normative aspects of political
culture. What is seen as corruption by some is seen as a legitimate form of political
exchange by others. It is also a useful point of departure to examine how therelationship between political culture and ethnic politics has been previously
conceptualised in Australia. Discussion of this relationship has followed one of
three paths:
· those writers on political culture who have ignored the in¯ uence of ethnicity;
· those who have looked at the role of immigrants from NESB in the politicalsystem but who have argued that they are marginal to it and that their impact on
Australian political culture has therefore also been minimal;
· those who argue that the government’ s (and in particular the Labor Party’ s)
approach to the policy of multiculturalism has led to the politicisation of
ethnicity such that immigrant involvement in the political system has becomecorrupt and deviant, and thus counter to the `traditional’ values of Australian
political culture which existed in the past.
The ® rst of these paths is not that surprising given that those who codi® ed the
accepted version of Australian political culture largely formulated their ideas prior
to the postwar mass immigration program. The views of scholars such as Hancock
2 For further examples of inter-ethnic rivalries in ALP branch membership drives see Healy (1993, 1995).3
See Sydney Morning Herald (29 May 1997, 1; 7 Dec. 1996); Australian (16 Dec. 1996); Healy (1993).
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384 G. ZAPPALAÁ
(1930), Rosecrance (1964) and Ward (1958), have usually ® ltered through to those
who turned their attention to the topic at later stages. What is generally considered
to be one of the best accounts of Australian political culture, for instance, does not
mention ethnicity (Collins 1985). Instead, it continues the focus on features such as
pragmatism, utilitarianism, egalitarianism and so on. In other words, it continuesthe tradition of seeing a country’ s political culture as a largely homogeneous,
macro-level phenomenon. The view that there is one national or uniform political
culture (no matter how ethnically homogeneous the population) is now generally
not accepted (Pye 1995). Sub-national patterns and local political networks exist
within the national boundaries of most countries (Putnam 1993; Locke 1995).As Dryzek (1994, 234) has argued, `it may be more fruitful to think not in
terms of the Australian political culture, but rather of a number of dispositions or
discourses which together make up that culture’ . Indeed, Rowse (1978, 27)
perceptively concluded his critique of writings on Australian political culture by
arguing that:
As a tradition of writing about Australia it must stand condemned as laughable for
its omission of sexism and racism as prominent themes in our social life ¼ these
writings tend to appeal to the Australian conceit that we have a national character
which is not subject to historic transformation. (Emphasis added)
Uniform or narrow conceptions of some supposed national trait can hinder a
more creative and realistic political imagination (Stokes 1994, 9). There have beenexceptions, for instance, studies of whether there is a distinct `regional’ political
culture in Australia (Denemark and Sharman 1994), or attempts to delineate
different understandings of democracy among the Australian citizenry (Dryzek
1994). Overall, however, the in¯ uence of ethnicity on political culture continues to
be relegated to footnotes or left for future study in the work of Australian politicalculture theorists. As early as 1973, for instance, Colin Hughes argued that
non-British immigrants `undoubtedly warrant the attention of students of political
culture to ascertain their deviance (if any) from the national norm ’ , but that it
would have to wait until the national norm itself was better known (Hughes 1973,
135, emphasis added). Dennis Altman (1988) has argued that Australian politicalculture experienced a shift towards greater individualism at the expense of
traditional allegiances to class, family and religion in the 1980s, but noted that
these changes did not extend to several ethnic groups. While acknowledging that
`economic strains and new ethnic allegiances are stretching the boundaries of class
and party loyalties in ways that make for a more complex political culture’ (Altman1988, 8), he did not explain the reasons for this `ethnic exceptionalism’ .4 While
acknowledgment is better than indifference, characterisations of Australian political
culture continue to be aggregate in nature (eg Bean 1991).
The second path to understanding the relationship between political culture and
ethnicity has been taken by political scientists who have studied the role ofimmigrants in the Australian political system, but who have then generally
concluded that their impact (both on the practice and culture of politics) has been
marginal.5
James Jupp (1996a, b) has argued that the core institutions of Australian
4See Altman (1988, 14±16) for other examples of ethnic exceptionalism.
5 Ethnic politics has not been an area of major concern to political scientists in Australia. Two key
exceptions to whose work this section mainly refers are James Jupp (ANU) and Ian McAllister (ANU).
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 385
society and democracy have little to fear from the largely disparate and heteroge-
neous ethnic community. Similarly, Ian McAllister, one of the few people to have
written widely on both political culture and ethnic politics, has stated that:
Despite the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity of these immigrants, they have
had comparatively little effect on the character or style of Australian democracy,
including its institutions, political parties, or major actors. (McAllister 1995, 100)
In spite of this conclusion, his most recent contribution on political culture
(McAllister 1997) does move more ® rmly towards accepting that immigrants from
NESB have made an impact on Australian political culture.Once again, there are exceptions (eg Frankel 1992), the best of which is the book
by Alastair Davidson (1997) on the history of citizenship in twentieth-century
Australia. Davidson shows how excluded groups such as immigrants from NESB
were nevertheless able to in¯ uence the theory and practice of citizenship in
Australia, bringing their continental traditions of `rights’ with them. Overall,however, neither of these writers goes so far as to suggest that we can identify a
distinct `ethnic political subculture’ in Australia.
This leads to the ® nal approach towards the relationship between political culture
and ethnicity. This approach is mainly associated with Bob Birrell and his colleagues
at the Centre for Population and Urban Research at Monash University. They haveargued that the Labor Party’ s approach to the policy of multiculturalism since 1983
has led to the politicisation of ethnicity such that it is corrupting the traditional norms
and values of political behaviour and culture (Birrell 1996; Healy 1993, 1995).6
Prime culprit in their eyes is the practice of `ethnic branch stacking’ within the ALP,
and the paying of grants to ethnic organisations, which they argue has `balkanised’the Labor Party (Healy 1993). They argue that measures to assist ethnic Australians
are not necessary as they are now overrepresented in the ALP due to the
establishment of ethnic branches which, according to one of this school’ s adherents,
`virtually [require] the Party to select ethnic parliamentary candidates, particularly
in seats in its inner Melbourne heartland’ (Healy 1993, 39). Another criticism madeof `ethnic branch stacking’ is that it ruthlessly uses `innocent’ ethnic constituents
as pawns in party factional battles with which they have no interest or concern.
Immigrants, as it were, have gone from being factory fodder to party fodder!
While this approach in a sense comes closest to identifying aspects of patron±
client relations (albeit the negative view), clientelism is not used as an explicitframework. Rather, their approach is closer to the ® rst view mentioned above, in
the sense that they see ethnic politics as a practice which deviates from a previous
national norm of political culture, in the normative sense of that termÐ that is, of
how political actors should behave. This particular culture is seen to have emerged
at the time of Federation (Birrell 1995). Thus, they see present practices against thisbenchmark:
Traditionally, Labor has been the party representing collectivist values in
Australian politics. However, it may be doubtful if the Labor Party can survive
6Such an approach is unrealistic in assuming that Australian political culture and Labor Party politics
were `pristine’ before the era of mass non-British immigration and multiculturalism. See for instance
McQueen (1970, 231±3). On anomalies in ALP preselection practices in the 1920s and 1930s see,Cosgrove (1996, 21, 28) and Hagan and Turner (1991, 76). For the 1950s, see Ormonde (1972). For
clientelistic practices and corruption in the ALP more generally, see Parkin and Warhurst (1983).
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386 G. ZAPPALAÁ
as a mass party if narrow sectional interests are permitted to predominate over
solidaristic principles, and when minority interests are encouraged to exercise a
power in excess of their numerical strength within the population. (Healy 1993,
42)
Apart from ignoring the fact that the Labor Party has always been a party of
sectional interests and clientelistic practices (Parkin and Warhurst 1983), such an
approach continues the myth that was critiqued by Rowse (1978), namely, that
Australia’ s national character has not been subject to `historic transformation’ . Itcontinues a view of the relationship between political culture and immigrants in
Australia that belongs to the days of assimilation. One of the ® rst studies of
immigrants and politics in Australia, for instance, concluded that:
The immigration of citizens from one political system into another is perhaps the
most direct way in which the system can be threatened (in terms of social con¯ ict)
with political and cultural dissonance ¼ caused by an ethnic group holding basic
political images and political behaviour patterns sharply at variance with those
held and displayed by the rest of the society. This, in turn, could produce divisive
tensions within the political culture. (Wilson 1973, 138±9, emphasis added)
Similar to this view, the work of the `Birrell school’ is replete with the discourseof assimilation. Indeed, in terms of a policy towards immigrants, assimilation
implied that there was some national norm or culture that the immigrants could aim
for, to become `New Australians’ .
The developments in ethnic politics from the 1970s to the 1990s, however,
exposed the myth of assimilation (Mitchell et al 1998). To name but a few: theformation of an ethnic rights movement, the formation of ethnic organisations
(from social to political), the establishment of ethnic structures within the main
political parties, and the developments in the policy of multiculturalism. These
changes led to a slow but signi® cant increase in the participation of immigrants in
various aspects of the political system (ZappalaÁ 1998a). This increased partici-pation, however, has in some cases been premised on a set of attitudes and
behaviour towards politics different from the set often held in Australia. In other
words, this participation has been premised on a different political culture which
can now be said to constitute a distinct political subculture. Before we outline the
key features of this subculture, the next section brie¯ y discusses some de® nitionalissues with respect to clientelism.
Clientelism: Old and New
The practices which, according to the `Birrell school’ , are argued to be a threat to
traditional notions of Australian political culture, are in fact expressions of different
forms of political participation better understood through a framework of clien-telism. The neglect or marginalisation of ethnicity in mainstream political sciencein Australia (Jupp et al 1989) has meant that clientelism has not received due
attention as a component of Australian political culture.7 The importance of
clientelism to the Australian political scene was noted more than a decade ago by
7For an exception, see Parkin and Warhurst (1983).
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 387
one of the keenest observers of ethnic politics, James Jupp, yet it has remained
unexplored. He argued that as the source countries of immigration moved towards
countries where clientelism was a common feature of the political culture, it would
introduce:
increasing numbers [to Australia] who have little or no experience of liberal
democracy (but who may be more attached to it in consequence of their
experiences elsewhere). This shift has brought in many who have been used to
patron± client relationships, to power brokers and vote bankers ¼ (Jupp 1984,
9±10, emphasis added)
A useful working de® nition of clientelism for the purposes of this paper is:
[A]n exchange relationship between roles ¼ de® ned as a special case of dyadic
(two person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individ-
ual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his [sic] own in¯ uence and
resources to provide protection and/or bene® ts for a person of lower status (client)
who, for his [sic] part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance,
including personal services, to the patron. (Scott 1972, 92)
The traditional view of clientelistic practices is that they run counter to thelogic of civil society and democracy, that they defy the modern notion of
representation (Roniger 1994, 9). More recently, others have pointed out that
clientelism can itself be more usefully seen as a form of representation, as an
important mechanism for obtaining transactional bene® ts within backgrounds of
periphery/dependence or provide ways of incorporating new sectors of thepopulation such as immigrants (Roniger and Gunes-Ayata 1994). Marginalised
groups such as immigrants often form patron±client relationships in order to
improve their position within the host society by gaining political, economic and
social resources. Clientelism is therefore `not only inevitable but also functional’
(Gunes-Ayata 1994, 19).Research has therefore concentrated on how clientelism coexists with other
contemporary forms of political exchange (Roniger and Gunes-Ayata 1994).
Scholars point out that clientelism may generate tensions because although we
have witnessed an increase in mass participation in public life, inequalities based
on market processes remain. They also point to the important role of modernpolitical parties in mediating these tensions. As well as providing a basis for
identity formation and a sense of belonging, parties are a means through which
bargaining over resource allocation and access to the centres of power can occur.
As one scholar concluded: `The political party ¼ creates at an ideological level
a strong sense of belonging, but it also creates mechanisms for establishingnetworks in which the resources are preferentially allocated’ (Gunes-Ayata 1994,
24).
An important feature of the co-existence of clientelistic practices and modern
forms of democracy is that the former tend to arise in areas where a sense of
community exists on the basis of a shared ethnic or religious background, andwhere groups (often because of this shared background) feel `alien’ to the
political system. This is not of course to suggest that clientelism, traditional or
modern, is an optimal mode of exchange for marginalised or alienated groups. It
remains a system of unequal exchange of which the `clients’ are only too aware.
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388 G. ZAPPALAÁ
Yet:
the inequality in the modern patron-client relationship is very different in nature
from that in the traditional patronage system (e.g., landlord and peasant). In the
latter it is structural, permanent, and unquestioned; in the former it may be
tempered by egalitarian ideology of belonging to the same community and sharing
similar backgrounds, even though the relation is structurally highly inegalitarian
and involves unequal exchange (Gunes-Ayata 1994, 23).
In summary, clientelism should not only be seen as a negative phenomenon
because it can, in fact, assist the representation and incorporation of marginalgroups such as immigrants. It thus also provides an alternative (and more positive)
framework for understanding aspects of ethnic politics which have until now been
seen as either equivalents of baby-kissing and, therefore, unworthy of serious
attention or as forms of deviant behaviour, which threaten supposedly well-
established norms of political culture in Australia.
Clientelism in the Australian `Ethnic Electorate’
Where are we to ® nd the political subculture discussed above? The concept of an`ethnic electorate’ is an arbitrary one and has been used by political scientists in
Australia as a convenient way of identifying the `ethnic constituency’ (Jupp 1996b,
1997; ZappalaÁ 1997a, b). The post-1947 immigration program led to the formation
of concentrated ethnic communities in particular areas of major cities. When this
concentration is translated to the political system, almost a third of Australia’ sfederal electorates have more than 15% of their population born in non-English
speaking countries (NESC). Based on the 1991 Census data, for instance, 48 of the
148 federal electorates had at least 15% of their population born in a NESC. At
least 20 federal electorates have one-quarter or more of their population born in
NESCs. As Jupp (1988, 173) has stated:
[I]mmigrants of NESB in Australia should be and are of interest to politicians
because of their numbers in particular electorates ¼ such an element of the elector-
ate is too large, vocal and well organised to be ignored by parties hoping to govern.
`Ethnic electorates’ also share certain other characteristics: they are primarilybased in and around Sydney and Melbourne; they provide strong support for the
Labor Party, indeed, as the ethnicity of the electorate increases so does the
likelihood that it is also a safe Labor seat (ZappalaÁ 1997a, 181); they experience
a relatively low degree of transfer between parties (Economou 1994); and their
ethnic composition in¯ uences the behaviour of their elected representatives(ZappalaÁ 1997a, b). The remaining non-ethnic electorates can be more or less
equally divided between those which are also urban or metropolitan based but have
relatively small concentrations of immigrants from NESB, and rural electorates,
most of which have negligible concentrations of NESB immigrants (ZappalaÁ
1997b). These latter two types of electorates are primarily but not exclusivelyrepresented by the Liberal and the National Party respectively.
Given that many of the `ethnic electorates’ are safe Labor seats, electoral
competition for aspiring candidates is more in terms of preselection. It therefore
becomes paramount for incumbent MPs or aspiring candidates in these seats to
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 389
build up signi® cant support bases within the party branches and the local con-
stituencies. These seats often become the site for internal factional battles within
the local Labor party branches (Allan 1995; Bean and McAllister 1989). How MPs
build up this support is a useful point of departure for exploring the workings of
clientelism Australian style. There are three key factors to be taken into account:ethnic community formation, the nature of case-work in ethnic electorates, and the
political style of MPs and other actors in ethnic electorates.
Ethnic Community Formation
There are few if any electorates in Australia where one ethnic group forms a
majority. Nevertheless, within any one ethnic electorate there are usually signi® cant
concentrations of voters from say two or three different countries of origin or
language groups. The concentration of particular ethnic groups in speci® c areas and
locales in Australia was the result of several factors, such as the process of chainmigration, economic considerations such as proximity to employment, cheaper
housing, the siting of government migrant hostels in particular areas, and
discrimination and racism on the part of the host society.
Once particular groups were concentrated and a critical mass developed, they were
able to shape their environments and create an `ethnic space’ , or develop some of thecommon attributes of community. The process of ethnic community formation has
usually followed several stages and developed in a circular rather than linear-chrono-
logical fashion. Places of ® rst settlement developed through chain migration which
brought about strongly localised patterns of settlement (Burnley 1977), providing a
critical mass of people to start the process of `placemaking’ (Pascoe 1992).The creation of ethnic institutions such as social and cultural organisations,
ethnic small businesses, churches, newspapers and so forth, followed and rein-
forced one another to form distinctively ethnic neighbourhoods or `spaces’ . Such
neighbourhoods were also reinforced through bonds of kinship, and regional and
folk loyalties, so that they developed complex social networks and viable sub-cultures (Price 1977; Burnley 1985). The stronger kin and friendship ties and
networks which exist among immigrants are strengthened by both formal and
informal ethnic institutions (social clubs, sports clubs, coffee houses, small busi-
nesses, regional associations and so on) which often provide a `two-way’ political
function for what appear to be non-political bodies (Alcorso et al 1992).Community formation is not just concerned with cultural maintenance, but is a
strategy which emerges to cope with disadvantage, to improve life chances and to
provide protection from racism. The development of ethnic `communities’ as
spatial, social and economic collectivities in Australia was therefore a necessary
precursor for immigrants from NESB to become involved in formal politicalstructures. On the one hand, the development of such communities provided the
resources which enabled particular ethnic groups to organise politically within
mainstream political structures. On the other hand, the visible presence of such
ethnic communities and their ability to mobilise compatriots for social or cultural
events made it dif® cult for politicians and political parties to ignore the `ethnicconstituency’ (ZappalaÁ 1998a). Such networks also mean that ethnic communities
are easier to mobilise by politicians and power-brokers who are able to tap
into such networks. The importance of understanding the link between com-
munity and politics with respect to immigrant behaviour and representation
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was underlined by Castles et al (1992, 132) where they noted the paradox that
although NESB immigrants:
¼ have not managed to achieve much representation in state or Commonwealth
parliaments nor in party leaderships, ¼ politicians cannot afford to ignore them
as a political factor ¼ [T]he attention given by politicians to the `ethnic vote’
implies other ways of participating in politics. The key to understanding this is
to look at the way in which community networks and associations mediate
between individuals and political institutions ¼ [Emphasis added]
The structures and webs that the processes of ethnic community formation havedeveloped have made it possible for some MPs (especially those representing
ethnic electorates) to embed themselves within such structures and networks to
assist their representational activity. Such overlapping networks and kinship bonds
provide representatives with visibility throughout ethnic sub-constituencies and
explain why some MPs place a great deal of importance on ensuring that ethnicorganisations within their electorates are adequately funded (ZappalaÁ 1997a). One
recent study, for example, found that ethnic constituents were aware of their local
MP’ s services through a variety of means and sources. These included attendance
at ethnic social functions, the `ethnic grapevine’ , ethnic organisations, ethnic
intermediaries, coethnic party members, the ethnic press, alternative facilitators(ethnic professionals such as accountants, lawyers and so on), and the employing
of electorate of® ce staff from similar ethnic backgrounds to those larger ethnic
groups in the community (ZappalaÁ 1997a). Similarly, a survey by Jupp et al (1989,
48±50) found that ethnic organisations, especially where they had access to a
full-time community worker, had been able to exercise an effective political role atgrass-roots level. They concluded that, ` ¼ ethnic organisation on a strong
community base is probably the best avenue for bringing NESB immigrants into
the political system as participants’ .
Community networks also explain why ethnic constituents are easier to recruit(not stack) to parties such as the ALP. Politics is often about numbers and numbersare often about mobilisation. It is easier to muster numbers and mobilise when the
chains of communication are well linked throughout a large group of people.
Recruiting one member from one family in one street often opens the door to a
whole string of possible recruits who are usually kin as well as neighbours. It is a
kind of `ethnic multiplier effect’ (ZappalaÁ 1997a). The kinship and networks whichhave arisen through the processes of ethnic community formation therefore have
provided a necessary pathway for clientelistic relations to emerge in areas with high
ethnic concentrations.
Case and Allocation Responsiveness in the Ethnic Electorate
Visiting one’ s local MP in order to get assistance with a particular problem is a
well-known aspect of political representation (Jewell 1982; Cain et al 1987, 57).
Studies also indicate that when assessing their MPs, constituents from ethnic
minorities place a much greater emphasis on case-work than other criteria, suchas, for instance, their MP’ s stance on a particular policy issue (Norton and Wood
1993; Cain et al 1987; McAllister 1992). This is often because immigrants’
concerns are to do with the initial problems of settlement and consolidation in
the host country. `Good representation’ is more likely to be seen in terms of
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 391
whether their elected representative helps them bring out a close relative through
a family reunion migration program. The nature of this case-work is a key site
where a `clash’ of political cultures may be said to occur (for further discussion of
the details of constituency case-work in ethnic electorates, see ZappalaÁ 1997a;
1998b).Immigration procedures and decisions in Australia are decided by explicit rules.
The curtailment of ministerial discretion and codi® cation of rules means that MPs
in `ethnic electorates’ are limited in the degree to which they can effectively assist
constituents with problems. Some may actually prefer this as it limits the degree to
which constituents can legitimately ask for assistance and removes temptations ofcorruption and favouritism (ZappalaÁ 1997a). Yet the political experience of many
ethnic constituents is one where an MP’ s in¯ uence over public of® cials is much
greater than that which exists in Australia. Constituents, for instance, often go to
their MP even though their initial immigration applications and subsequent appeals
have been rejected and even though the MP may have already written supportletters for them on previous occasions. The expectation in constituents’ minds,
however, is that the ® nal outcome is in the MP’ s hands, if only he or she would
exercise it. They may try and elicit this support with subtle references to past voting
behaviour or future voting intentions, and sometimes with offers of money or gifts.
This is a normal and accepted form of political exchange; indeed to many therewould be something wrong if they could not return the politician’ s favour.
The nature of case-work in ethnic electorates (ie immigration) therefore provides
an important issue over which an exchange relationship between patron and client
can ensue. In one ethnic electorate, for instance, 43% of all the constituency issues
dealt with by the MP related to the immigration problems of ethnic constituents(ZappalaÁ 1998b).
Style and Nature of the Political Actors
It is one of the ironies of Australian politics that the bulk of ethnic electorates arerepresented by MPs from non-ethnic backgrounds. This does not imply, however,
that they are not `ethnic representatives’ as they may nevertheless be sensitive and
responsive to NESB voters (Jupp et al 1989, 32). Indeed, a necessary precondition
for the development of clientelistic relations is that the MPs in ethnic electorates
are willing and able to adopt a representational style capable of winning over thesupport of ethnic constituents and communities. A key tool for the MP (patron) in
carrying out this task is to utilise patron-brokers to mediate between themselves and
the various ethnic communities.
Patron-brokers in the ethnic electorate can be referred to as `ethnic intermedi-
aries’ (ZappalaÁ 1997a). Ethnic intermediaries are individuals from particular ethniccommunities who by virtue of their relationship to the MP have come to be seen
by other members of their respective community as a conduit to access the MP and
his or her of® ce. One can distinguish between `core’ and `peripheral’ ethnic
intermediaries (Scott 1972, 99). Core intermediaries are those who are also active
members of the MP’ s party and generally also belong to the same faction. They aretrustworthy and key members of the MP’ s closest circle of supporters. In contrast,
peripheral intermediaries may or may not be party members and are more distant
politically from the MP. Their main concern is their own standing, political or
otherwise, within their respective communities.
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392 G. ZAPPALAÁ
In general, intermediaries arise because of unequal access to markets and
sociopolitical spheres of action caused by class and ethnic barriers. Becoming an
intermediary to a political patron is a way of improving one’ s social position
(Roniger 1994, 11). More speci® cally, ethnic intermediaries arise in ethnic elec-
torates for several reasons. First, poor English language ¯ uency on the part of manyethnic constituents creates a role for people who are from the same cultural and
ethnic background as the constituent but who are ¯ uent in English. Many core
intermediaries are tertiary educated. Second, in many cases intermediaries are
people able to provide a form of political engagement more familiar in non-
Anglo-Saxon political systems. In such systems the idea of seeing or writing toyour local MP is pointless, if not impossible, without the introduction of an
appropriate intermediary. Third, ethnic intermediaries serve a useful function for
the MP in an ethnic electorate and are therefore created or encouraged by the
MPs themselves. The MP±ethnic intermediary relationship is a symbiotic one,
each needs the other to survive (Roniger 1994, 4). Fourth, social mobility and thedrive for status and power is easier to achieve within ethnic communities and
organisations often because of discrimination by the wider host society (Tsounis
1975, 48).
Intermediaries act as the MP’ s scouts in the ® eld in the different ethnic
communities, advertising the MP’ s services and reaching out to their friends,friends of friends, relatives and so on. They play a tentacle role. Ethnic intermedi-
aries are ® rst and foremost walking advertisements for the MP in the electorate and
as a result increase the accessibility of the MP to his or her ethnic constituents.
Second, and conversely, intermediaries can be used by MPs to relay their point of
view on a particular issue back to the community. That is, they act as the MP’ smouthpiece or messenger. Third, and relating primarily to the core intermediaries,
they play a recognisance role for the MP on the particular mood or views that are
present in their respective communities concerning policy or community issues.
Fourth, and following on from this, intermediaries also inform the MP of particular
events that occur in their respective communities which they feel are in the MP’ sinterest to know about. They take on the role of cultural translators, not only
informing the MP of particular events but indicating the political signi® cance that
he or she should attach to them.8
In summary there are three key actors in the clientelistic triangle found in ethnicelectorates: the MP (patron), ethnic intermediaries (patron-brokers) and ethnic
constituents (clients). Clientelistic relations between these three actors, de® ned as
a particularistic exchange of political favours, occurs in several ways. To the MP,
the three key inputs are:
· that an ethnic constituent joins a local branch of the party and votes in
preselection campaigns according to the wishes of the MP and his or her faction,
8The reliance on intermediaries may also pose several potential dangers for MPs. First, intermediaries
at times create false expectations in constituents about the extent to which an MP is able to help them
with their particular problem. As a consequence, constituents may leave disillusioned or feeling that theywere not fairly treated. Second, ethnic intermediaries may loose touch with their communities hence
providing unreliable information to the MP (Converse and Pierce 1986, 503). Third, some intermediariesmay attempt to become alternate centres of power within their communities which in turn could be used
to bolster their own political ambitions or to control voting behaviour (party preselections and elections).
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 393
· that ethnic constituents and intermediaries recruit other members to particular
branches in order to ensure his or her faction has the `numbers’ in key votes, and
· that ethnic constituents vote for the party at general elections.
To the ethnic constituents, the three key inputs are:
· that the MP assists them with their immigration applications (usually of relatives)
and any problems which may arise with such applications,
· that the MP supports their ethnic community organisations in terms of govern-
ment funding, and
· with respect to ethnic intermediaries, that the MP bolsters their standing among
the community.
This type of exchange relationship has been made possible or has evolved in ethnic
electorates because of the process of ethnic community formation, the nature of
case-work in ethnic electorates and the ability and willingness of political actors
and parties to adapt their style to suit the environment.
Conclusion
Political cultures based on clientelism have traditionally been associated with
countries such as Italy (Graziano 1973) and in the Mediterranean generally (Gellner
and Waterbury 1977), and parts of Asia (Scott 1972). More recently, however, it
has been shown that clientelism is often an integral part of so-called modern
democracies and can have positive as well as the negative effects, especially withregards to marginalised groups like immigrants (Roniger and Gunes-Ayata 1994).
Modern forms of clientelism, such as those which exist in Australia’ s ethnic
electorates, assist opportunities for mobilisation and bargaining over resource
allocation. It creates community solidarity and trust and establishes mechanisms for
marginalised groups to access centres of political power (Roniger 1994; ZappalaÁ1997a). The Australian form of clientelism has been a key factor in explaining the
increased political participation of NESB immigrants (ZappalaÁ 1998a).
It has taken a good 40 years since the start of the mass migration program,
however, for this increase to occur and for immigrants of NESB to become active
agents in the political process (ZappalaÁ 1998a). Those who use notions of politicalculture which assume some national homogeneous norm question the legitimacy
and nature of this participation. From the framework of this paper, however, `ethnic
branch stacking’ can be better understood as a situation where a constituent (client)
joins a particular branch of the party to support a particular factional leader (patron)
in the expectation that he or she will receive something in return in the future,usually assistance with an immigration problem or assistance with funding for an
ethnic organisation. Joining a party to assist a particular factional leader is a form
of political exchange which is more familiar to people from non-Anglo back-
grounds and is a practice which has in the past occurred within their own ethnic
organisations in Australia (Tsounis 1975, 50). Some politicians have argued thatthey ® nd it easier to recruit ethnic rather than Anglo-Australians because the former
generally have lower expectations of what joining a political party or being
involved in politics involves. Anglo-Australian constituents, they suggest, tend to
join the party for more ideological and idealistic reasons and therefore need more
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394 G. ZAPPALAÁ
convincing about the party’ s policy (ZappalaÁ 1997a).9 Furthermore, the view of
ethnic constituents as `innocent pawns’ noted above assumes that they have no
agency of their own, and are unable to understand certain types of political
bargaining.
Many ethnic constituents do not see a problem with this form of participation.As one respondent from a case-study replied:
the people I sign on in this way are not stupid, they know what they are
doing ¼ many ethnic constituents are familiar with this kind of politics from their
home countries, in fact, to them any other kind of doing politics would be strange,
so they are just being involved in the way they know how ¼ of course they ask
me `what’ s in it for me?’ ¼ and the usual answer is, look you might need some
help to sponsor your mother or brother to Australia and if you help us by joining
we’ ll try and do the right thing by you ¼ (ZappalaÁ 1997a, 166)
To many immigrants of NESB, local clientelistic networks are a legitimatemeans of getting involved in mainstream political structures in Australia to further
both domestic and homeland political issues. It is a form of exchange and a
political system they are familiar with and some argue that immigrants may one
day use such forms of organisation to their own bene® t, that is, to elect candidates
from ethnic backgrounds rather than providing the numbers for primarily Anglo-Australian factional leaders. As studies of modern clientelism in other countries
have shown, patron control over clients is never fully legitimated and is always
vulnerable to attack (Roniger 1994, 4).
Finally, this paper is about arguing the need for a new way of thinking about
ethnic politics and representation in Australia. It is about understanding existingand future empirical evidence within a framework of clientelism. As such, it is new
ground in the Australian context and raises further questions and issues which
require examination. For instance, what is the nature of the relationship between
clientelism and civil society? The accepted view is that they are mutually exclusive
(Putnam 1993). There is some evidence, however, to suggest that this may not bethe case in Australia with respect to ethnic electorates (Vasta 1996; ZappalaÁ 1997a,
170±6). Given the resurgence of interest in active local citizenship this line of
inquiry may bear some fruitful results.
How will the `ethnic political subculture’ discussed here in¯ uence wider
attitudes and behaviour? Given that this subculture is situated within politicalinstitutions and values which have been structured by the norms of the dominant
Anglo-Australian group, the clientelism or gift-exchange which immigrants may
bring is carried on within a different environment. It may therefore take on a
different nature and have different effects from those which it had in its original
environment (ZappalaÁ 1997a). Political cultures change, adapt and often formamalgams so that new forms emerge as actors go through a process of political
learning (Clark 1994). Questions of whether and how such a process is occurring,
and whether new amalgams of Australian political cultures are emerging deserve
greater attention and documentation from the political science community. Accept-
ing that a distinct ethnic political subculture exists in areas of Australia is the ® rstand necessary step in that process.
9 This of course ignores the long history of Anglo- and Irish-Australians joining the ALP for largely
instrumental reasons at various stages since the turn of the century. See references in note 6.
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CLIENTELISM, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC POLITICS 395
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