5.1

[Partialworkingdraft.Pleasedonotcirculateorcitewithoutauthor’spermission]Cleisthenes’wagerDemocraticrationalityJosiahOberChapter5ofTheGreeksandtheRational(provisionaltitle)Draftof2019.08.24.Wordcount:18,500Abstract: In Plato’s typology of non-ideal regimes in Republic book 8, democracy comes second to last: below timocracy and oligarchy and just above tyranny. The reason for democracy’s low ranking is its irrationality: the democratic citizen and citizenry are characterized by Plato’s Socrates as having incoherent preferences, as well as opinion-based beliefs. As a result, democratic decision-making was inherently chaotic. Although the oligarch’s preference for wealth accumulation is not admirable, it is consistent over time. As a result, the oligarch is at least capable of instrumentally rationality. Democratic irrationality is associated by Plato with psychological liberty (the democrat is free to form a new preference at any moment) and equality (he fails to rank-order his preferences). Variants on Plato’s charge of irrationality are frequently repeated by modern critics of democracy. But a review of Athens’ citizen-centered institutions, established after the democratic revolution of 508 BCE, and recent scholarship on legislative, judicial, and executive institutions of democratic Athens in the age of Plato, refutes Plato’s charge: The citizens of Athens did indeed value political freedom and equality, yet they proved collectively capable of sustaining the conditions of state-level rationality. They did so through norms and institutionalized processes that enabled identification of available options and rational choice among options, based on coherent preferences over outcomes and orderly beliefs about the relevant state of the world. NOTE:Thischapterremainsincomplete.itlacksanintroductionandconclusion;section5.7remainstobefinished;endnotesareonlybrieflysketched;theWorksCitedisyettocome.1Introduction:Tocome.5.1Callipolisanditssuccessors MostofPlato’sRepublicisdevotedtoconstructing,throughphilosophicalargument,theideallyandethically(aswellasinstrumentally)rationalstatethatcomestobecalledCallipolis.Theimaginedstateisintended,aswehaveseen(Chapter4),asalarge-scalemodelofanidealizedhumanmoralpsychology,withtherightarrangementoftheelementsofreason,moralemotions,anddesires.Those

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elementsareschematicallyrepresentedbytheoccupation-classesofrulers,warriors,andproducers.Whenthetheoreticalprojectiscomplete,Callipolisisaperfectlyharmoniouskoinôniathatfunctionseffectivelyasasustêma,capableofprovidingsecurityandadequateresources,materialandmoral,forallofitsresidents.Itisgovernedbyapoliteiathatfullyinstantiatestheprimaryvirtuesofcourage,moderation,wisdom,andjustice.ItexemplifiesPlato’sconceptionoftruerationalityinrespecttobothendsandmeans.

HarmonyissustainedinCallipolisbythemoderation(sophrosunê)thatischaracteristicofallresidents,andtheomnipresenceofjustice(dikaiosunê),understoodaseachresidentbeingappropriatelyassignedto,andstayingwithin,hisandherownproperdomainofactivity.Eachscrupulouslyavoidsinterference(polypragmosunê)inanydomainbeyondhisorherown.Violationsofthisfundamentalrulearerecognizedaserrors,arisingfromafailureofknowledge(perthe“Socraticparadox”thatnoonedoeswrongknowingly),ratherthanfromwillfulcriminality.PunishmentbytheGuardiansbenefitsboththepunishedindividualandthecommunity.Justice,sounderstood,definestheconstraintsoneachresident’schoices,bothfromtherulesandfromtheexpectedchoicesofothers.Thoseconstraintsservetolimiteachresident’sactionstothepursuitofoptionslyingwithinhisorherproperdomain.Justicethusenableseachresident,evenonewhoseownsoulisnotruledbyreasonitself,toactrationallyintheinstrumentalsenseofthefolktheory.The“high-orderrationalityofends”manifestatthelevelofthestatefacilitatesthe“low-orderrationalityofmeans”ofevenitshumblestmember.2

ThepopulationofCallipolisisorganizedintorelevantcategories(gold,silver,bronze,iron)asdefinedbytheNobleLiemythofmetals.Membershipinagivencategory,basedonanindividual’scapacities,defineseachperson’spropersphereofactivity.Thatactivityensuresthewelfareofeachandofall,answeringthedemandsofinterdependence(seechapter7).Theactivitiesofthe“iron-andbronze-souled”producersandmerchantsensureanadequatesupplyandefficientdistributionofmaterialnecessities.Security,internalandexternal,isprovidedbythe“silver-souled”warrior-classofauxiliaryGuardians.TheauxiliaryGuardianclassisalsotheprimarylocusofthevirtueofcourage.CallipolisisruledbythetrueGuardians,philosophers,eachofwhommanifeststhevirtueofwisdom.Thephilosopher-rulersare–borrowingandadaptingtheconceptemployedbyThrasymachusforhishypotheticalself-interestedtyrant(inbook1)andbyGlauconforhishypothetical“unjustman”(inbook2)–unerringcraftsmen(demiourgoi)ofinterestsandoutcomes.Butthegoalthatthehypotheticalcraftsmen-rulersofCallipolisseekandunerringlyachieveisthecommoninterestofthestateanditspeople,ratherthanmerelytheirownegoisticself-interest.3

Byvirtueoftheirperfectedknowledgeofboththerightendofhumanlife(encompassedbytheFormoftheGood),andofalltherelevantsubsidiaryforms,the

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philosopher-rulersofCallipolismakenoerrorsinreasoningfrompreferences(whattheyvalue),viabeliefs(whattheyknow),tooutcomes.Thephilosopher-rulersderivetheirvaluepreferencesfromcertainknowledgeoftheforms,ratherthanfromordinarydesires(primitiveorotherwise).Consequently,theynecessarilygoforthebestoutcomesforeachandall.Ifaphilosophershould,somehow,cometoelevatehisownprivategood(spendingallofhistimeinthe“sun”ofphilosophicalcontemplation)tothegoodofthewhole(takinghisturninthe“cave,”doingtoworkofruling)inhispreferenceorder,hewillbecorrectedbytheotherphilosophers.Unlikemerelyinstrumentallyrationalpersons,whomustbepersuadedinpartby“noble”deceptions,thetrulyrationalphilosopher’spreferenceorderisassumedtobecorrigiblethroughreasonedargument.4

Thephilosopher-rulerscalculatetherightplanofactionleadingtothosebestoutcomes,basedontheirvalid(justified,true)beliefsabouttheactualstateoftheworld.Aswewillsee(chapter6),thosevalidbeliefsincludeanexpertmethodforaccuratelymeasuringtheprobabilityofagivenoutcomeunderconditionsofuncertainty(theexampleisthelikelihoodofwinningagivenbattleagainstexternalrivals).Therulersare,therefore,expectedtomakethebesthumanly-possiblejudgmentsaboutrisk.Andso,againborrowingfromGlauconinbook2,ifwecouldfolloweachofthephilosopher-rulersonhispath,wewouldarriveatanidentical,perfectlyjust,destination–thatis,atCallipolisitself.

Callipoliscannot,however,lastforever,evenintheory.Inbook8oftheRepublic,Platosketchesahypotheticaldegenerativehistoryofregimes,beginningwiththefallofCallipolis,duetoamistakeconcerningthealgorithmgoverningbreedingamongGuardians.Thecatastrophicresultofthaterrorisaviolationofdomain-action-ofsegregation:inthelanguageofthemyth,themetalsinthesoulsoftheresidentsbecomeimpurelymixed.BecausedomainsegregationisthefoundingprincipleofjusticeonwhichCallipolisispredicated,theregimecollapses.Thedegenerativesequenceofregimesthatbeginswiththeendoftheruleoftheknowledgeableloversofwisdom(Callipolis),resultsfirstintheruleofthecourageousloversofhonor(timocracy)andcontinuestotheruleoftheacquisitiveloversofwealth(oligarchy).ThisinitialsequenceisreadilyexplainedbyreferencetoPlato’shierarchyofvalue:knowledge(Callipolis)>honor(timocracy)>materialacquisition(oligarchy).5.2Democraticirrationality?Plato’scritiqueofdemocracy

ThetwofinalregimesdescribedinRepublicbook8are,inorder,democracyandtyranny.Tyranny,asacandidatefortheworstregime,hadbeeninPlato’scross-hairsfromthebeginningoftheRepublic–atleastsincetheinterchangewithThrasymachusinbook1andimplicitlyinthebanteraboutforceandpersuasionintheopeningscene.Book9islargelydevotedtodetailingthemiseryofthetyrant,

5.4

whosesoul,ratherthanbeinggovernedbyreason,ispushedandpulledhitherandyonbypowerful,chaotic,self-destructivedesires.Ultimatelytheprofoundirrationalityofthetyrant’ssoul,conjoinedwithhisneedforassociatestofulfillhislusts,resultsintheputativeabsoluterulerlivinginanabjectconditionasa“slaveofslaves.”ThisisthefinaldemolitionoftheclaimsofThrasymachusforthetyrant’shappiness,andlikewisethelongdeferreddefinitiverefutationoftheputativelyhappylivesofGygeswiththeringandthe“godlike”completelyunjustmaninGlaucon’scleaned-upversionofthefolktheoryofinstrumentalreason.5

Butweareleftwithapuzzle:Whyisdemocracyrankedbelowoligarchy?Basedonthehierarchyofvalue,oligarchyanddemocracymightseemtobeinverted.DemocracyisrankedaboveoligarchyinPlato’slaterwork,theStatesman,asitisbyAristotleinthePolitics.6PlatohaslittlegoodtosayabouttheoligarchsandtheirfocusonacquisitionintheRepublic.Theirbehavior,basedonplacingapreferenceformaterialgoodsatthetopoftheirranking,isobviouslymistakenandblameworthyinSocraticterms.Moreover,itmayoccurtothereaderthatitisoddthat,intheRepublic,Plato’sprimary“philosophical”characters(Socrates,Glaucon,Adeimantus),liketherealPlatoandSocrates,choosetolivetheirlivesinademocraticstate,ratherthaninoneofthereadilyavailableoligarchicalternatives(assuming,perhaps,thatnoreal-worldanalogueoftimocracy,e.g.Sparta,wouldhavethem).Finally,andperhapsrelatedly,Platohassomeevidentlypositive(ifperhapsalsoironic)thingstosayaboutdemocracy:Interalia,withitssupermarket-likediversityofvaluesandbehaviors,ademocraticstateistheproperplaceforphilosopherstoengageinaprojectofidealpoliticaltheorizing,astheparticipantsinthedialogue,andPlatoinwritingtheRepublic,weredoing.7

Theanswertotheapparentpuzzleabouttherankingofdemocracyandoligarchycan,Ibelieve,besolvedbyassumingthatPlatostructuredthesequenceofregimesnotonlyaccordingtoasecond-ordervaluehierarchynotedattheendoftheprevioussection(wisdom>courage>wealth),butalsoaccordingtoafirst-orderrationalityhierarchy:Rationalityofendsandmeans(Callipolis)>rationalityofmeansalone(timocracy,oligarchy)>irrationality(democracy,tyranny).8 InRepublicbook8,thelocusofdemocraticirrationalityismanifest,inthefirstinstance,inafailure,onthepartofthedemocraticindividualandthedemocraticstate,tosustainorderedpreferencesoveroutcomes,understoodasgoods.Thatlackoforderismostevident(invertingtheoriginalpremiseofthegreatervisibilityofjusticeinthebigpolistojusticeinthesmallindividualsoulinbook2)intherevealedpreferencesofthedemocraticindividual.EachregimeinPlato’sdegenerativesequenceisexemplifiedbyitsmodelcitizen,whosemoralpsychologyaccuratelyrepresentsthepoliteiaofhisstate.Eachmodelcitizenvaluescertaingoods.Maximizinghispossessionofthosegoodsishisgoal.Thetimocratconsistentlyrankshonoramongallothergoods.Heactsaccordingtohisbeliefs

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(validorotherwise)toachieveoutcomes(inthefirstinstance,victoryinbattle,duetoexemplarycourage)thatwillmaximizehishonor.Likewise,theoligarchconsistentlyplacespossessionofwealthatthetopofhispreferenceorder.Heseeksoutcomesthathebelieveswillmaximizethesecurityofhishoardedwealth.Eachdoessoattheexpenseofhispursuitofothergoods.

Bytheeighthbook,Plato’sreaderhaslearnedthatneitherhonornorwealthhasavalidclaimtobetop-rankedintheorderofpreferencesbyatruly(endsandmeans)rationalpersonorstate–thetimocratandoligarcheachmakesamistakeaboutvalue.Butthetimocratandtheoligarch,andtheregimestheyexemplify,canclaimtobeinstrumentallyrationalinthe“cleaned-up”folktheorysenseofGlaucon’sthoughtexperimentinRepublicbook2:Eachmanifestsacomplete,ranked,transitivesetofpreferences.Basedontheirownorderlypreferences,thetimocratandtheoligarchactaccordingtotheirbeliefs,includingtheirexpectations,basedontherevealedpreferencesofother“players”andcalculationsofrisk,tomaximizetheirown(subjective)advantage.Thebehaviorofthedemocratlacksthisbase-lineinstrumentalrationality.

Democraticirrationalityarisesfromtheunderlyingcommitmentofthemodeldemocrat,andthusthedemocraticpoliteia,tothevaluesoffreedomandequality.ThosevaluesarecloselyrelatedinPlato’sview,aviewthatwassharedbyAristotle,othercriticsofdemocracy,andindeedbythedemocraticAtheniansthemselves.9WhatisdistinctiveaboutPlato’saccountofdemocraticvalueishisidentificationofindividualpsychologicalstateswithstate-levelinstitutionalarrangements.Moreover,unlikehonororwealth,freedomandequalityarenottakenbyPlato’sdemocrattobeclearlydefined“ultimatelymost-choiceworthy”goodsinthemselves.Nordotheypointtoanyspecifiablesetofrankedoutcomes.Rathertheembraceoffreedomprovidesthedemocratwithadoorwayontoawiderangeofgoodsandacomparablydiverserangeofpotentiallydesirableoutcomesandactionsaimedatsecuringthem.

Meanwhile,equalityleadsthedemocrattobeindifferent(overtime,andinthechoice-theoreticalsenseofindifferenceasequallystronglypreference)tothepossessionofanyonegoodoroutcome,amongthediverserangeofpossibilitiesthathisfreedomhasopenedtohim,overanyother.Eachseemstohim,overtime,tobeofequalvalue.Asaresultoftheinteractionoffreedomwithequality,eachgoodcancatchhisattentionmomentarily,bepursuedasadesiredoutcomewithavidity,andthensuddenlydroppedinfavorofsomeotherequallydesirablealternative.Thedemocrat’sindifferenceamongthediversearraythustakestheformofpursuingdifferentendsseriatim,justastheyhappentostrikehisfancy.Giventhateachis,ultimately,equallydesirable,abandoningtheoneandtakingupthenextiscostlessintermsofhisinternalaccounting.

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Insum,thedemocratisfree,anddelightsinhisfreedom,topursue,atanymoment,anyofthewidevarietyofgoodsthatseemtohim,overtime,tobeequallyfine.Andthustheindividualwhoisthemodelfortheregimeofdemocracyandwhoisrightlycalleddemocratic(561e),

…liveson,yieldingdaybydaytothedesireathand.Sometimeshedrinksheavilywhilelisteningtotheflute;atothertimes,hedrinksonlywaterandisonadiet;sometimeshegoesinforphysicaltraining;atothertimeshe’sidleandneglectseverything;andsometimesheevenoccupieshimselfwithwhathetakestobephilosophy.Heoftenengagesinpolitics,leapingupfromhisseatandsayinganddoingwhatevercomesintohismind.Ifhehappenstoadmiresoldiers,he’scarriedinthatdirection,ifmoney-makers,inthatone.There’sneitherordernornecessityinhislifeandhecallsitpleasant,free,andblessedlyhappy,andhefollowsitforaslongashelives(561c-d).10

Notably,includedamongthediverseendsthatthedemocraticmanmaytopursueisthesoldier’slife,recallingthetimocrat,andthatofthemoney-maker,recallingtheoligarch.Heevenmaydelveintowhathesupposestobethedomainofthephilosopher.But,unlikeanyofthosemodelindividuals,thedemocratdoesnotmakewealthorhonororwisdomashisprimaryend,nordoeshepursueitconsistently. Alongwithorderlypreferences,instrumentalrationalityrequiresreasonablycoherent(whetherornotvalid)beliefsaboutthestateoftheworldtoguideactionsaimedatsecuringmost-favoredavailableoutcomes.Platodoesnotgiveusreasontosupposethatthetimocratortheoligarch,anymorethanthedemocrat,ispossessedofbeliefsthataretrueinthestrongsenseofbeingbasedonactualknowledge–asarethetruebeliefsheldbythephilosopher-rulersofCallipolis–ratherthanonmereopinion.Butdemocracy,asapoliteia,maybesubjecttoepistemicdisabilitiesthatarepeculiartoitself.

Thediversityofthedemocratickoinôniameansthatthereis,atanygivenmoment,acorrespondingdiversityinskills(whethertechnaiormereempeiriai)andinformationsetsamongthepopulace.Because,inademocracy,alladultmalenativesarecitizenswhoarefreeand,accordingtoPlato’sdescriptionofthedemocraticman,eagertoattendthelegislativeassembly,thisdiversebodyofempiricalknow-howandinformation–callitgenerically“data”–isbroughtintothepublicspaceofcollectivedecision-making.Buthowisthismassofdatatobeorganized,suchthatonlytherelevantbitsaretakenintoaccount,andproperlyweightedandsorted,soastoyieldthesetofcoherentbeliefsthatwillallowthedemos,asamassoffreeandequalpersons,tomakeachoicethatwillfurtheritscollectiveinterests?Totheextentthateachofthethousandsofcitizensinthedemocraticassembly,“engagesinpolitics[by]leapingupfromhisseatandsaying

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anddoingwhatevercomesintohismind,”thecollectivebeliefformationprocessseemslikelytobeasdisorderedasthedemocraticman’spreferences.11

EachofPlato’stwosourcesofdemocraticirrationality–disorderlypreferencesandinadequatelycoherent,aswellasfrequentlyinvalid,beliefsaboutthestateoftheworld–hasbeenhighlightedbycontemporarycriticsofdemocracy.JosephSchumpeter2008[1950])definedtheissueinhisstill-influentialmid-centurybook,Democracy,Capitalism,andSocialism.Schumpeterclaimedthatwhathecalledthe“ClassicalTheoryofDemocracy”–thatis,theideathatamassofcitizenscouldbecapableofrulingthemselves–wasincoherent:ItgraftedRousseau’simplausibleconceptionofthegeneralwillontoJeremyBentham’snarrowlymaterialisticconceptionofutilityaspleasure.Schumpeterdeniedthatacollectivewill(arationaljudgmentconnectingcoherentsharedpreferencesoveroutcomestocollectiveaction)couldeverbeformedbyamassofcitizens,andscoffedatthenotionthatdemocraticcitizens,asindividualsorintheaggregate,knew,couldknow,orhadanymotivationtolearnenough,togovernthemselves.12

PickingupwhereSchumpeterleftoff,WilliamRiker(1982)zeroedinontheproblemoforderingcollectivepreferences.RatherthanleaningonPlato’saccountoftheindividualdemocrat’sirrationalmoralpsychology,RikerappealedtoKennethArrow’s(1962)“impossibilitytheorem”ofvoting,whichdemonstratesthat,underplausibleconditions,agroupfacedwithdecidingbyvotingamongthreeormorealternativescannotavoidthepossibilityoffallingintoacycleinwhichAischosenoverB,BoverC,andCoverA(seechapter3).Sincecyclingviolatestransitivity,Rikerpronounceddemocracyirrationaland,inprinciple,fatallysubjecttostrategicmanipulationbythosewhounderstandthemechanismofcycles.Rikeralsosoughttoshowthatcycleswereindeedprevalentindemocraticdecision-making;anempiricalconclusionthathasbeenchallenged.13Morerecently,epistemiccriticsofdemocracyanddemocraticrealistshaverevivedSchumpeter’sconcernsaboutthecapacityandmotivationofdemocraticcitizenstoknowenoughtovoteaccordingtotheirinterests–eveniftheyhappenedtobecapableofidentifyingthem.14

Moderncriticswhocontendthatdemocracyisbesetbyinherentirrationalitytendtofocustheirworriesonthenegativeimpactofirrationalityontheperformanceofdemocraticstatesasorganizations–thatis,inGreekterms,thecapacityofthestateassustêmatodeliverthegoodsofsecurityandmaterialwelfare.Theconstitutionalfixesthecriticssuggest(insofarastheymakepracticalrecommendations)aremeanttoenabledemocracytoperformaswellasahypotheticalalternative:abetterorganized,morerational,meritocraticand/orautocraticregime.15Plato’sconcernwasquitedifferent.

Ratherthanworryingabouttheunder-performance,inmaterialterms,ofdemocraticregimesrelativetoactualorhypotheticalnon-democraticalternatives,Plato’scriticismofdemocracycenteredonthecapacityandtendencyofdemocratic

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culturetocorruptindividualsouls.Thesuperficiallyattractivediversityofthedemocraticethosturnedpeoplewiththecapacitytobeatleastinstrumentallyrationalandpossiblyevenends-and-meansrational,whomightotherwisepursuevirtue,awayfromobjectivelybetterends.Thedireresultwasdenyingtoindividualsandtotheircommunitiesthepossibilityofachievinganypartoftrueeudaimonia.

Intermsofproducinghighlevelsofwealthandpower,Platoworriedthatdemocraciesperformedalltoowell.IntheGorgias(518e–519c;cf.Ober1998:209-210)Plato’sSocratesdisparagedvariousofAthens’famousfifth-centuryleaders–includingThemistoclesandPericles(seechapter1)–who,“theysay,”hadmadethecitygreat.Infact,Socratesclaims,theseso-calledleadersweremereflattererswhoturnedthepolisintoaswollentumor.Theyfailedtoinculcatesophrosunêordikaiosunêinthepopulation,insteadfillingthepoliswithjustthesortoftrashthedemoshappenedtodesire:harbors,city-walls,ship-sheds,andtribute.

Ofcourse,foranordinaryAthenian,oneconcernedwiththebasicgoodsofwelfareandsecurity,thosethingswerefarfromdespicable.Havingagoodsupplyofthosethingswasatestamenttothestate’sstrengthandtoitssuccessatprovidingthematerialconditionsofsecureprosperity:harborsfortrade,tributefordistributablestateincome,ship-shedsandcity-wallsforsecurityagainstattackbyseaorbyland.SotheordinaryAthenianmightassertthatthethingsthatthedemosdesired,insofarasPlato’sSocrateshadaccuratelylistedthem,fellwithinarationalcalculus.Platomight,however,besupposedtobepointinghiscontemporary(earlyfourth-century)readertothefactthattheequipmentthatSocratesoftheGorgiasalludesto(andthathadbeenmanifestatthelaterfifth-centurydramaticdateofthedialogue)hadbeenlostafterthePeloponnesianWar.BythetimePlato’sfirstreaderswouldhavehadaccesstohisdialogues,theAthenianempirewithitstributewasgone.ThewallshadbeenslightedbythevictoriousSpartans.Theship-shedsofthePericleanerahadbeendismantledandsoldforscrapbytheThirty.

Andyet,bytheprobabledateatwhichtheRepublicwasfirstcirculated,Athenshadatleastpartlyrecovered:Thecitywallsandthenavyoftriremewarships(alongwiththeship-shedstohousethem)hadbeenrebuilt.TheharboratPiraeuswasonceagainattractingasubstantialtrade.Laterreaderswouldbeevenlesslikelytotakethepoint.BytheendofPlato’slife,despiteaseveredownturninthemid350s,AthenswasagainaleadingGreekcity-stateandacenterofathrivingMediterraneantrade.Bythe330sBCE,whenAristotlewaswritingthePoliticsandcriticizingsomeofPlato’sarguments,Athens’staterevenueandpercapitaincomeequaledorexceededitsfifth-centuryimperialheight,eventhoughitscitizenpopulationneverregainedfifth-century,imperial-eralevelandtheempirewasjustamemory.Andinanyevent,itseemsoddonthefaceofittosupposethatPlatowouldbesoattentivetothecontingenciesofthehistoricalmomentinwhichhewrote.

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Weareleftwithapuzzle:Ifdemocracywasafundamentallyirrationalformofpoliteia,andAthenswasademocracy,howisitthatAthens’hadsuchaneffectiveandresilientsustêma–bothintheimperialfifthcentury,thedramaticdateofmostofPlato’sdialogues,andinthepost-imperialfourthcentury,whenPlatowaswritingthem?AtleastpartoftheanswermustbethattheportraitofthedemocraticmanintheRepublicoughtnotbetakenliterally,atleastinsofarasaliteralreadingwouldimplyacompletefailureofsociety-wideorstate-levelinstrumentalrationality.The“democraticman”ofRepublicbook8appearstobeassuredacertainbackgroundwelfareandsecurity:UnlikethemiserablecreaturesofHobbes’stateofnature,Plato’sdemocraticmanisnotsaidtobethreatenedbymaterialdeprivationortoliveinfearofthreatstohissecurity.AstheGorgiaspassageclearlyindicates,Platoknewthatthediversemembersofthedemos,intheirroleascitizensparticipatinginkeydemocraticinstitutions,werecapableofmakingcollectivedecisionsthatconduced,ifcertainlynottoeudaimonia,then(atleastmoreoftenthannot)totheendsofthesecurityandwelfareofthestate.

Thatispreciselythepointoftheanonymouslyauthored(attributedtoPseudo-Xenophon,knicknamed“TheOldOligarch)PoliteiaoftheAthenians,probablywrittenintheearly420sBCE.Theauthorishighlycriticalofdemocracyastheimmoralruleofthe“bad”manyoverthe“good”elite,butthemainpointofhisessayistoshowhisreaderjusthowwelltheAthenianmanymanageaffairsintheirowninterests(1.1).Theireffectivemanagementincludesresistingeffortsofsimilarlyself-interestedmembersoftheAthenianelitetocapturethegovernment.AstheOldOligarchbluntlynotes,weretheelitetorule,theywouldenslavethemany,andthemanyhadnointerestinbeingslaves(1.9).TheOldOligarchhasnodoubtsabouteithertheinstrumentalrationalityortheefficacyofthe“bad”demos,indeedthegravamenofhistextistoexplaintohisreaderthedifferencebetweenrationallyself-interestedbehaviorandmoralvalue:Theintrinsic“badness”ofthepoor,uneducatedmany(1.5)didnotimpedetheircapacitytoformorderedpreferences(withtop-rankedpreferencesfornotbeingenslaved,livingwellfromredistributionandpublicgoods,beingcateredtobyimperialsubjects).Andevidently,despitetheirlackofeducation,themanyhadformedbeliefsaboutthestateoftheworldthatwereadequatelycoherenttoenabletheirpreferredoutcomestoberealizedthroughcollectiveaction–thatis,throughdemocraticinstitutionsandpolicy.16

Wemaydiscountthepossibilitythatavoidanceofelitecapture,security,andstate-levelwelfarewereachievedbymereluck:Itissimplyimplausiblethatsuperior(inamaterialsense)outcomeswerearrivedatthroughdemocraticdecision-makingprocessesincapableofdoingotherthan(atbest)randomlymakingabetterchoiceamongoptionsandequallyincapableofconsistentlyactinginacoherentmannertopursuethechosenoptiononceachoicewasmade.The

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alternativeisthatthoseoutcomeswerequiteconsistentlyhighly-ranked,aspreferences,byanauthoritativemajorityofthemanycitizenswhoparticipatedinthemakingofstatepolicy.Moreover,thebeliefsthatwereheldamonganauthoritativemajorityofparticipatingcitizensconcerningthestateoftheworldmusthavebeensufficientlycoherent.Indeed,thebeliefsinformingdemocraticpolicy(andenabledthestatetoberelativelyprosperousandsecure)–musthavetrackedrealitywellenoughtoconnectpreferenceswithreal-worldresults.

ThesharedbeliefsthatallowedtheAtheniandemos’preferredoutcomesof(atleast)security,welfareandnon-tyrannytoberealizeddepended,inmanycases,onthepresenceoftrueexpertiseinthedecision-makingprocess,andonthewillingnessofthemassaudienceinthecitizenassemblytoattendtoknownexpertswhenmakinghighlysalientchoicesaboutdiplomaticandmilitarypolicyrelevantsecurityandeconomicandfinancialpolicyrelevanttowelfare.Andindeed,intheProtagoras,Plato’sSocratespointsouttohiscosmopolitanaudience(evidentlyfrompersonalexperience:“we”)that,whendeliberatingonsalienttechnicalmatters,the“wiseAthenians”werewillingtoattendonlytothosetheyregardedastrueexperts,summarilyrejectingspeakerswhoareregardedaslackingtherelevantexpertise:

Isay,justasdotherestoftheGreeks,thattheAtheniansarewise.NowIobserve,whenwearegatheredinassembly,andthepolishastodealwithanaffairofbuilding,wesendforbuildersasadvisors(sumbouloi)onwhatisproposedtobebuilt;andwhenitisacaseofwarship-construction,wesendfornavalarchitects;andsoinallothermatterswhichareconsideredlearnableandteachable.Butifanyoneelse,whomthepeopledonotbelievetobeanexpertcraftsman(demiourgos),attemptstoadvisethem,nomatterhowhandsomeandwealthyandwell-bornhemaybe,notoneofthesethingsinducesthemtoaccepthim.Theylaughandshouthimdown,untileitherheshutsup,havingbeenshouteddown,orelsethearchers[state-ownedslaves,employedasbouncers]eitherpullhimdownorexpelhimaltogetherbyorderoftheprutaneis.Thatishowtheyproceedinmattersinwhichtheybelievethereisrelevantexpertise(technê:Protagoras319b-c).17

Socrates’pointaboutthepracticesofthe“wiseAthenians”implies,ofcourse,

thattheAtheniansdoknow,collectively,whatkindsofexpertisearecalledforincomingtoparticularcategoriesofdecision(say,architectsforbuildingprojects),andthattheyareabletoidentifywhoistrulyexpertineachfieldandwhoisnot.The“collectivewisdom”sortingmechanismthatidentifiesthecategoriesofexpertiserelevanttoagivenproject,andthatseparatesexpertsfromnon-experts,isnotspecified.ButPlato’sSocratesimpliesthattheAtheniansdogettheexpertinputnecessaryfortheassemblytomakeachoice(avoteonaspecificproposal)atthe

5.11

endofthedeliberativeprocessinwhichadviceisofferedandtheassemblymenrespondvocallytothosewhoseektoadvisethem.TheAthenianswerenot,therefore,burdenedwiththepeculiarnotionsthatarecentraltothedeflationaryargumentsofcontemporaryepistocraticand,alternatively,neo-Rousseauiandemocratic,criticsofparticipatoryanddeliberativedemocracy:Theydidnotsuppose,ontheonehand,thattobeaneffectiveparticipantindecision-makingademocraticcitizenmusthimselfbeexpertonallmattersonwhich(oronthebasisofwhich)hemightendupcastinghisvote.Nordidtheysupposethattheproperroleofanassemblymanwastositsilently,attendingtospeechesfromhisbetters,formulatingaprivatejudgment,untilitcametimetovote.18

Socrates’descriptionoftheAtheniansas“wise”isironic,inthatheimmediatelypointsoutthatwhenconsideringgenuinelyimportantmatterstheAthenianssupposethattherearenoexpertsandsotheyattendtojustanyone.WhentheAthenianAssemblydeliberates"concerningthegovernance(dioikêseôs)ofthepolis"–presumablyreferringtosomethinglikealawgoverningchoice-makingproceduresortheelectiontothegeneralshipofaleadingfigurelikePericles–theAthenianswillinglyattendtoalmostanyone,whetherhebe"asmith,ashoemaker,amerchant,asea-captain,arichman,apoorman,ofgoodfamilyorofnone."Socratesarguesthattheydosobecausetheyacceptthatgeneralpoliticalexpertiseisnotsomethingthatcanbemasteredortaught(319d).Giventhattherearenoacknowledgedexpertsingovernanceassuch,everyone'sopiniononmattersofgeneralgovernanceisregardedasjustaslikelytobevaluableasanyoneelse's.

ForSocratesoftheProtagoras,“governance”andthetrueexpertingovernance(themasterofpolitikêtechnnê)mustbecentrallyconcernedwiththerationalityofends,thatistheperfectionofsouls,andnotjustthematerialconditionsofsecurityandwelfare.TheAtheniansrejecttheveryideathattherecouldbeknowledgeableexpertsonthevital(forPlato)questionofwhattheyoughttopreferorhowtogoaboutgettingit,evenif,counterfactually,theyknewwhatitwas.Buttheywere,itseems,adequatelyrationalintheinstrumentalsenseof(1)consistentlypreferringtolivewithsecurity(e.g.buildingships)andwelfareoveranyavailablealternatives,(2)formulatingtherelevantbeliefswithexpertassistance,and(3)carryingthroughwithactionsthatled,moreorlessreliably,towhattheyregardedasthebestavailableoutcome.

Thequestionremains:HowdidthekoinôniaoftheAthenians(orthecitizensofotherdemocraticGreekpoleis)cometohaveapoliteiacapableofsustainingasustêmathatdeliveredthebasicgoodsofsecurityandwelfare?Andhow,moreover,didtheydosoinwaysthatpushedbackagainstelitedomination–suchthat(afterthefallofthePeisistratidtyrants,andwiththenotableexceptionofthecrisesofthelastyearsofthefifthcentury),theAthenianstatewasnotcapturedbyajuntaoratyrantforcloseto200years?BecausethatisaquestiontowhichIhavedevoted

5.12

muchofmycareer,muchofwhatfollowsinthischapterdrawsonmyownearlierwork.ButrecentscholarshipbyotherhistoriansofGreecehasgonealongwaytowardsfundamentallyrevisingourunderstandingoftheAthenianpoliteiaandhowitoperatedinpractice.IntheremainingsectionsofthischapterIhavehighlightedsomeofthisnewworkthatisespeciallysalientinaddressingthequestionoftherationalityofGreekdemocraticstates.5.3Cleisthenes’wager:Rationaldemocratization

Democracy,understoodascollectiveself-governmentbyanextensiveandsociallydiversecitizenship(Ober2017),wasestablishedinAthensin508BCEintheaftermathofarevolutionaryuprisingsuccinctlydescribedbyHerodotusandtheAristotelianAth.Pol.19Aquasi-constitutionaltyranny(thetyrantsretainedthelawsofSolon),establishedaftertwofalsestartsahalf-centuryafterSolon’sconstitutionalreforms,endedwithaSpartanmilitaryinterventionin510BCE.Intheensuingpowerstrugglebetweenaristocraticcoalitions,thefactionledbyIsagoras,whohadapersonalrelationshipwithCleomenes,oneofthetwoSpartankings,wasinitiallydominant.Facedwithdefeat,Cleisthenes,theleaderoftherivalfaction,triedsomethingnew.Hewageredthatradicallyenlarginghiscoalition,by“invitingthedemostobehistrustedcomrade,”20wouldgivehimanadvantageinthepowerstruggle.ThepracticalmeansbywhichCleisthenessoughttoenlistamassfollowingwasthepromiseofconstitutionalreform,whichwouldallowordinarycitizensafullerroleinthepoliteia.Hiswagerquicklypaidoff:thedemosacceptedtheinvitationandCleisthenesnowdominatedhisrivals.Isagoras,however,respondedbyrequestingaidfromCleomenes.ConfrontedbythethreatofSpartan-ledorganizedviolence,CleisthenesandmanyofhisclosestalliesfledAthens.AmixedforceofSpartiatesandmercenaries,ledbyCleomenes,thenoccupiedthecity.

IsagorasandCleomenessoughttoconsolidatetheirpositionbyorderinganAtheniangovernmentcouncil(itisnotclearwhichone)todissolve.21Whenthecouncilorsrefusedtheorder,therestoftheAtheniansroseupinarms.Confrontedwiththisturnofevents,unexpectedgiventhatCleisthenesandhiscoresupportershadfledAthens,IsagorasandhisSpartanalliesretreatedtotheAcropolisstronghold,wheretheywerebesiegedbytheAtheniandemos.Afterthreedays,thebesiegedforcesurrenderedunderterms.IsagorasandCleomeneswereexpelledfromAthens;someofthemercenarieswhohadaccompaniedthemwereexecuted.Cleistheneswasrecalledbythedemostothecityandimmediatelysetaboutimplementingthepromisedreforms.

Thenewpoliticalorder,likethetyrannythathadprecededit,waspredicatedonthefoundationofSolon’searlierconstitutionalbargain(chapter4).Itwasinstitutedinthefaceofaseriousexternalsecuritythreat:animminent,large-scaleSpartanmilitaryresponsetothehumiliationoftheirking.In506BCEtheSpartans

5.13

andtheirPeloponnesianalliesdulymarchedagainstAthensincoordinationwithinvasionslaunchedbythepoleisofBoeotiatothenorthandbyEuboeanChalkistothenortheast.Againunexpectedly,theSpartan-ledarmyturnedbackattheAthenianborderfollowingthedefectionoftheCorinthians,akeySpartanally.Thetwootherinvasionforceswerequicklydefeated.ThevictoriousAtheniansthenattackedChalkis,seizinglandandbooty.22ThedramaticAthenianvictoryagainsttheSpartancoalitionpavedthewayforaquarter-centuryofconstitutionalreforms,beforethegreatPersianinvasionof480BCE.Wedonotknowexactlywheninthelatesixthorearlyfifthcentury,orbywhom,thetermdêmokratiawasfirstcoinedandemployedasthenameoftheAthenianpoliteia.23But,asapracticalmatter,therevolutionaryuprisingoftheAtheniandemosandthereformsthatfollowedestablisheddemocracy,ascollectiveself-governancebyanextensiveandsociallydiversebodyofcitizens.Inthelatesixthandearlyfifthcentury,otherGreekstatesexperimentedwithmorecitizen-centeredformsofgovernment(Robinson1997,2007),butAthens’democraticpoliteiaisbyfarthebestdocumentedofthem.

Wewillconsider,below,certainofCleisthenes’institutionalinnovationsandlaterconstitutionaladjustmentsmadeinthecourseofthefifthandfourthcenturies.IntermsofassessingtherationalityofAtheniandemocracy,thepriorpuzzleis,however,explainingthesequenceofeventsthatledtothecreationoftheneworder.Fromthestandpointofinstrumentalrationality,amongthekeyquestionsarewhyCleistheneschosetoinvitethedemosintohiscoalition,whythedemosroseupagainsttheSpartansafterCleistheneswasexpelled,andwhyCleisthenescarriedthroughonthepromisedreformsaftertheSpartanshadleftandhewasrecalled.

AsintheSpartagame(Chapter4),anAthenianDemocratizationgamehighlightstherelevantcounterfactuals-thechoicesthatmighthavebeenmade,butwerenotmade,byvariousagents.Thegame,playedbetweenCleisthenesplushisoriginalaristocraticfaction,IsocratesincollaborationwiththeSpartans,andtheDemosofAthens,helpstomakesenseofthechoicesthatthehistoricalactorsactuallymade.BasedontheaccountsofHerodotusand[Aristotle]Ath.Pol.,weassigntheplayers’preferencesintheorderlistedinFigure5.1.Asinotherextensiveformgamesinthepreviouschapters,preferencesareordinallyranked.24[Figure5.1:AthenianDemocratizationGameabouthere]

Attherootofthegame,withIsagoras’factionhavingbecomedominant,Cleistheneschoosesamongacquiescencetothestatusquo(Yield);opposingIsagoras,employingthetraditionalmethodofenlistinghisaristocraticcoalition(Fight),withprobabilityofvictoryp1;andmakingthewagerofseekingtoexpandhiscoalition(InviteDemos).Acquiescenceassureshisworstpayoff.Fightingandwinningwouldgivehimhisbestpayoff.But,giventhatIsagoraswascurrently

5.14

dominant,hadwonthepositionofarchon,andcouldcountonthebackingofCleomenes,theprobabilityofvictorywaslow.ThisleftthewagerofinvitingintheDemos,which,ifitpaidoff,wouldgiveCleistheneshissecond-bestpayoff.TheDemosthenchoosesbetweenacceptingtheinvitationandrejectingit.BasedonHerodotus’accountoftheevents,itappearsthatCleistheneshadestablishedhiscredibilitybyproposingconstitutionalreformsadvantageoustothedemos,perhapsevenpassingthosereformsinthecitizenassembly.AcceptingtheinvitationgivestheDemosachanceofrealizingitstop-rankedoutcome,whilerejectingCleisthenes’invitationleadstotheless-preferredoutcomeofIsagorasruling.NotethattheDemosisassumedtobeindifferentbetweentheruleofIsagorasorCleisthenes(withouttheDemos).IftheDemosacceptsCleisthenes’invitation,Isagoras/SpartadecideswhethertoyieldortoexpelCleisthenes.YieldingmeansthatIsagoras/Spartansgettheirworstpayoff;expellinggivesthemachanceattheirbest.

IfCleisthenesisexpelled,theDemosinturnchooseswhethertoacquiesceortofightwithsomeprobability(p2)ofsuccess.Estimatingthatprobabilitywouldnothavebeeneasy.OntheonehandtherewastheDemos’lackofexperienceinactingasacollectiveagent,andSparta’sreputationformilitaryeffectiveness.ButtherewerereasonstothinkthattheDemos,ifitisabletocoordinate,hadareasonablechanceofvictory:HerodotuspointsoutthattheforceledbyCleomeneswasrelativelysmallandmixed-nationality–theDemoscertainlyhadabigadvantageinnumbers.Akeyfactor,then,wasthepresenceofafocalpoint(Schelling1960;seeChapter2)facilitatingcoordinationbythemembersoftheDemos.TheAcropolis,thenaturalfortressinthemiddleofthecityandthecenterofthestatecult,providedtheobviousfocalpointonwhichmassactioncouldbe(andwas)coordinated,withouttheneedforadvanceplanningandcommunication.NumbersandthepotentialforcoordinationincreasetheprobabilityoftheDemos’victory,whichinanyeventwecansetashigherthanp1.

IftheDemosfightsandwins,Cleisthenes,recalledfromexile,choosestofollowthroughonreformsandfighttheSpartanswiththesupportofDemosorrenegeonthereformsandfightSpartawithouttheDemos.RenegingoffersachanceforCleisthenestogainhisbestoutcome,rulingwithouttheDemos,whereasdemocratizinggiveshim,atbest,hissecond-bestpayoffoftheDemosruling(andhimselfleading).Ineithercase,democratizeorrenege,weassumethattheSpartans(joinedbyIsagoras)willattackbasedontheirowncommitmenttoavengingtheinsulttotheirking,sothereisnothirdoptionforCleisthenesofrenegingwithoutfighting.

If,ateitherofthesubsequentwin/loseforks,Spartawins,Isagorasrules,gettinghisbestpayoff,whileCleisthenesgetshisworstpayoff.Cleisthenes’choiceofdemocratizeorrenegeisthuspredicatedonthedifferencebetweentheprobabilitiesofvictorywiththeDemos(afterdemocratizing)orwithouttheDemos

5.15

(havingreneged).NotethattheDemoshasnoreasontosupportCleisthenesifherenegesonhispromise,beingindifferentbetweentheruleofIsagorasandCleisthenes(andnodoubtresentfultoboot).TheprobabilityofvictoryagainsttheSpartanswithouttheDemos(p3)mustbesetasverylow,certainlyevenlowerthanCleisthenes’chanceofvictoryagainstIsagorasattherootofthegame(p1).ThechanceofvictorywiththeDemos(p4)wouldhavebeendifficulttomeasure,butitwascertainlywassubstantiallybetterthanp3.TheprobabilitiesofCleisthenes’andtheDemos’beingvictoriousinthefourpossiblefightscanthusbelistedasp4>p3>p1;p2>p1.Evenwithoutspecifyingintensityofpreferencesoractualprobabilities,thegameisreadilysolvedontheequilibriumpathoftheheavystraightline.

Itis,ofcourse,unclearhowfarupthegametreeanyoftheactualhistoricalactorsmighthaveseen.Theprobabilitiesatvariousnodes(notablythelikelihoodthattheDemoswouldtwicebevictoriousoverSpartan-ledforces)wouldhavebeenverydifficulttoassess.Theextensiveformofthegameillustratestheoptionsfacedbyeachpresumptivelyself-interestedpartyandhighlightstheroleofSpartainAtheniandemocratization.ItshowsthatitisatleastpossibletoexplaintheoriginsofdemocracyatAthensbyassuming,inaccordancewiththefolktheoryofinstrumentalrationality,moreorlessrationalchoicesbyatleastpartiallyself-interestedagents.Thatistosay,itisnotnecessarytopositthatCleistheneswaseitheranidealisticdemocraticvisionaryora“Thrasymachean”strategicegoist.NorneedwesupposethatAthens’pathtodemocratizationwaseitheraninexplicableproductofrandomcontingenciesorinsomesenseinevitableinthewakeofSolon’searlyreforms.25

Spartaclearlyplayedakeyroleinthestory:ItisnotpossibletodemonstratethatIsagoras’relationshipwithCleomeneswasacentralfactorinhisearlydominationofCleisthenes’faction(signaledbyhisvictoryinthecompetitionforthearchonship)andthusinprecipitatingCleisthenes’wager.But,giventhatthefactionfightaroseintheimmediateaftermathoftheSpartaninterventionthatendedthetyranny,andinlightofHerodotus’(5.70.1)claimthatIsagorashadapriorrelationshipwithCleomenes,itiscertainlyquiteplausiblethatSpartawasafactorinCleisthenes’fatefulchoiceofinvitingtheDemosintohiscoalition.Next,Spartathreatenedthestandingofthedemos.UnlikeCleisthenesandthemembersofhisaristocraticfaction,thedemoslackedtheoptionofexit.If,unopposedbythedemosandbackedbySparta,IsagorashadrenouncedtheSolonianbargain,non-eliteAthenianscouldhavefacedanAtheniananalogueofhelotage:ThegainsfromtheSolonbargainwouldbelost,and,withSpartabackinganewElite,theAthenianMasslackedabackstop.TheseconsiderationswouldhavemadetheoptionoffightingafterCleistheneshadbeenexpelledmoreattractiveinspiteoftherisk,therebymotivatingthesearchforameansofcoordination.Finally,atthelastnodesofthegame,theSpartanthreatisthefactorthatblocksaputativelyself-interested

5.16

CleisthenesfromrenegingonhisbargainwiththeDemos.Theoriginsofdemocracymay,therefore,beexplainedintermsofthe

rationalchoicesoftherelevantplayers,giventheparticularcircumstancesinwhichtheirchoicesweremadeandtheoptionsavailabletothem.Bothpracticalreasoningandcontingency(thepresenceoftheSpartanthreat,victoriesinbattlesthatmighthavebeenlost)seemtohaveplayeddecisiverolesinthestoryofAthens’democratization.AbsenttheinstrumentalrationalityoftherelevantpartiesinthefaceofthepersistentSpartafactor,Cleistheneswouldnothavemadehiswagerandsubsequentlystucktoitsterms.Thewagermightnothavepaidoff:TheuprisingfollowingCleisthenes’expulsionmighthavefailed;theSpartaninvasionof506mighthavesucceeded.Ratherthantakingtheturntodemocracy,Athensattheendofthesixthcenturycouldhavebeenruledbyastableelitecoalition.Itmighthavedevolvedintoacycleofcivilconflict.But,asitturnedout,Athensdemocratizedandflourished.5.4Democraticrationalityinpractice.TheAthenianpoliteia,403-322

ThevictoryinthePersianWars(490,480-478BCE)wasaresultofAtheniancoordinationinthefaceoftwoinvasions,Athens’providentialchoicetobuildamajornavy,andSpartanleadershiponland.ThevictorywasfollowedbySparta’sdecisionnottojoininanalliancetocontainPersia.Sparta’sdecisioninauguratedafifty-yearerainwhichAthensbecamethedominantstateintheeasternMediterranean.ThelogicofAthenianimperialism,anditsrelationshiptoAthens’democracywillbethesubjectofChapter6.Inthissectionweareconcernedwiththerationalityofthedemocraticpoliteia.

InafamouschapterofhishistoryofthePeloponnesianWar(2.65),ThucydidesassessedtheleadershipoftheAthenianstatesman,Pericles,andattributedthesuccessfulpoliciesundertakenbytheAthenianstateintheyearsprecedingthewartohim.ThucydidesfocuesonPericles’firmgraspoftheendsthatthestateoughttopursue,basedonasharedpreferenceforsecurity,wealth,andpowerovertheiralternatives.Moreover,likeThemistoclesbeforehim,Periclespossessedthekeyattributeofforesight(pronoia).Thisisnot,forThucydides,amysticaloracularpowertoforeseethefuture,butratheritisacapacitytomakesoundjudgmentsbasedonacarefulassessmentofrelevantfactsabouttheworld.Foresightenabledcertainleaderstopromoteeffectivepoliciesthatmaximizedtheexpectedadvantage(intermsofsecurity,welfare,andpower)oftheAthenianstate.

Finally,Pericleshadanaccuratesenseofthepluralisticdesiresandbeliefsthatwereprevalent,atanygivenmoment,amongAtheniancitizens.HisrhetoricalskillenabledhimtoachievehisowndesiredendsbymanipulatingthosedesiresandbeliefsandtherebyunitingtheAtheniansbehindacoherentsetofpolicyaims.Thatistosay,Pericleshadthekindofpower,throughspeech,thatGorgiashadpromised

5.17

hisstudents,andthatCalliclessoughttogain.ThedifferencewasthatPericlesemployedhisrhetoricalskillstofurthertheinterestsoftheAthenianstate.Hisrhetoricenabledhimtotampdowninappropriatepopularenthusiasm(thatis,depressingthetendencytoimpetuouscollectiveaction).Andthismeanthecouldlimitthedemos’tendencytoseekdesiredoutcomesthatwereunobtainable,orthatentailedactionsinvolvingexcessiverisk.Bythesametoken,hisemploymentofrhetoricallowedhimtocounteractinappropriateriskaversionarisingfromexcessivepessimismaboutthestate’schancesofachievingvaluedandavailableends.InconsiderationofPericles’deploymentofpoliticalandrhetoricalskills,Thucydidesdeclaredthat,whereasinprincipleAthenswasademocracy,infactitwasruledbyitsleadingman.26

Thucydideswentontodenigratethewould-bedemocraticleaderswhofollowedPericles.Noneofthem,hesays,wasofoutstandingtalent.Therefore,theycontendedwithoneanotherforpopularityandintheprocessturnedoveraffairstothedemos.AstrongreadingofThucydides’assessmentofPericlessuggeststhatAthenswasarational,andtherebyhigh-performing,stateonlywhenitwasunderthefirmcontrolofanexceptionallyrational,anduniquelytalentedindividual.Thisstrongreadingis,however,falsifiedbyThucydides’ownhistoricalnarrativeofyearsfollowingPericles’deathin429.WhileThucydideshighlightsdisputesamongAthenianleaders,andthedireresultsofpolicyerrors,itisclearfromThucydidesaccountofthewarthatAthensfailedtocollapseintoinstrumentalirrationalityandpolicyincoherenceimmediatelyfollowingthedeathofPericles.27

Moreover,Thucydides’ownnarrativealsomakesitclearthatPericleswasnotinanysenseaking-likemasterwhoeasilybentapliantdemostohiswill.Pericles’signaturedefensepolicyofwithdrawingthepopulationbehindthecitywalls,whileusingcavalryandstrong-holdgarrisonstolimittheeffectsofenemyravaging,appearstobetheresultofabargainstruckbetweencompetinginterestswithinthecitizenbody–somewillingtoabandonthecountrysideentirely,othersdemandingthatextra-muralresourcesbeprotected.28Finally,ThucydidesleaveslittledoubtthatitwasAthens’policyintheageofPericlesthatprecipitatedthegreatPeloponnesianWar:ThesteepriseinAthenianwealthandpowerintheimperialeramadetheSpartanssufficientlyfearfulabouttheirfuturestandingthattheycametoseethewarasnecessary.

Thucydidesmakesitclearthat,inhisview,Pericles’optimisticassessmentofAthens’chancesofultimatevictoryinthatwaroughttohavebeenvindicatedbythecourseofevents,inlightoftheresourcesAthenshadamassedinadvanceofthewar.YetitisalsoclearthatPericlesfailedtotakeintoaccountthepossibility(howeverremoteitmighthaveseemedatthetime)ofanoutbreakofdeadlydiseaseconsequentupontheentirepopulationofAtticabeingcrowdedintothefortifiedurbancomplex.Intheevent,beginninginthesecondyearofthewar,theplague

5.18

killedroughlyaquarteroftheAthenians(includingPericleshimself)inthespaceofafewyearsNor,evidently,didPericles(orThucydideshimself),foreseetheimplicationsofthewarbreakingtheframeofAthens-SpartabipolaritywhenPersiaenteredtheconflict.29

AfterthecatastrophicfailureofanAthenianattempttoconquerSicily(incontraventionofPericles’advicenottoexpandtheempirebeforethewarhadbeenconcludedontermsfavorabletoAthens),thedemocracywasbrieflyreplacedwithanarrowoligarchy.Theoligarchyof“the400”wasinturnreplacedbywhatThucydides(8.97.2)describesasa“mixedregime,”followedbyareturntodemocracy(411-410).AfterAthensfinallylostthewar,thevictoriousSpartansimposedanotheroligarchy,butdemocracywasrestoredafterabrief,sanguinecivilwar.ThevictoriousdemocratsdefiedexpectationsbyinstitutinganAmnestyinsteadofpursuingavendettaagainstAthenianswhohadsupportedtheoligarchy.From403to322BCE,Athenswasonceagainademocraticstate.30

AlthoughAtheniandemocracywaslongassociatedwiththe“Pericleangoldenage”ofthefifth-centuryempire,ourbestevidence,bothliteraryanddocumentary,forAtheniandemocracyconcernsthe80-yearperiodfollowingthePeloponnesianWarandprecedingtheMacedoniantakeoverafterthedeathofAlexandertheGreat.ThisperiodofAthenianconstitutionalhistoryisthesubjectofthesecondpartoftheAristotelianAthenaiônPoliteia,probablywritteninthe320s,anincomparablecontemporarydescriptiveandanalyticsource.TheevidenceoftheAristotelianAth.Pol.isaugmentedbyarelativelyfullhistoriography,numerousspeechesbyAthenianpoliticalandlegalorators,andanexceptionallyrichdossierofdocumentsonstone,largelytheresultofongoingarchaeologicalexcavationsintheAthenianagora.AlonggenerationofintensiveworkbyGreekhistoriansonthosematerials,andonthearchaeologicalremainsofAthens’democraticinfrastructure,hasdonemuchtofurtherourunderstandingofthefourth-centurydemocracy.Thepost-PeloponnesianWareraisnowwidelyregardedbyhistorians,notasaperiodofdecline,butasthematureformoftheAthenianpoliteia.31

Inthenextthreesections,Iwillsketchcertainfeaturesoffourth-centuryAtheniandemocraticinstitutions.Thisisdecidedlynotaconstitutionalhistory,tracingthevariousinstitutionalchangesfromthelatesixth-centuryCleisthenicorigins,throughthePericleanimperialeraofthefifthcentury,andoverthecourseofthefirsteightdecadesofthefourthcentury.NorisitacompleteexpositionofthematureAthenianpoliteiaanditsfunctioningasasustêma.Nor,finally,isitanattempttodemonstratethereasonsforfourth-centuryAthens’comparativelyhighlevelofstatecapacityanditsmilitaryandeconomicperformance.Thosemattershavebeendealtwith,indetail,inotherrecentwork,myownandthatofothers.32Rather,thegoalwillbetotestthevalidityofPlato’sportraitofdemocraticirrationalitybyexaminingtherationality(orlackthereof)ofthematuredemocratic

5.19

state.Iproposetoapproachthequestionof“staterationality”atthreelevels.First,towhatextentdidthedecision-makingprocessesofthestatemaponto

theapproachtakenbythehypothetical“unerringcraftsman”inGlaucon’srestatementofthefolktheoryofinstrumentalrationality?HowcapablewastheAthenianstate–whichmeansinpractice,theAtheniandemosasacollectivity–offormingorderedpreferencesoveroutcomes?Developingcoherentbeliefsaboutthestateoftheworldatanygivenmomentintime?Updatingthosebeliefsovertime?Andultimatelyservingitsownself-identifiedinterests?Thatis,iftheAthenianswereindeedcapableofmakingarationalchoicebycalculatingthemost-favoredavailableoutcome,weretheyalsocapable,asacollectivity,ofactinguponthatdecision?Here,wemustallowforpreferencestodivergefromGlaucon’s“primitivepreferencetriad”ofsex,wealth,andpower.Ipostulatethattherelevant,alternative,state-level(thatiscommoninterest)top-rankedpreferencetriadwas–assuggestedabove–jointandseveralsecurity,generalwelfare,andtheavoidanceoftyranny,understoodaselitecaptureofthegovernment.

Next,withreferencetothebargainingsolutionssketchedinthepreviouschapter:Towhatextentdidthedemocraticpoliteiafacilitateproductivebargains,andavoidcostlybargainingfailures,amongAtheniangroupsandindividuals,eachpursuingtheirownpluralisticpreferences?Thosegroupsweredefinedinpartbymaterialinterests(distributiveshares)butalsoonidentitiesandloyaltiesarisingfromregionalism,socialstatus,religiousbelief,andothercleavages.Certainofthosecleavagesexistedamongthepopulationofadultmalecitizens.OthersaroseamongandbetweenthebroadersetofpersonssubjecttoAthenianjurisdiction,includingcitizenwomen,residentforeigners,short-termvisitors,andslaves.Howclearlyarticulatedandconsistentovertimewerethepreference-rankingsofinterest-andidentity-groups?Howwellknownweretheirbackstoppositionsandtheirrelativebargainingpower?Whatlinesofcommunicationwereopen(orclosed)tothem?WerecompetinggroupsabletomakecrediblethreatsandcommitmentsthatpushedtowardtheParetofrontierof“fullsocialvalue”withinthestableconstitutionalframework?

Finally,towhatextentweretherules–theformalinstitutions,socialnorms,andassociatedhabitsthatconstitutedthepoliteia–incentivecompatible?Didtheygiveindividualsgoodreasonstoactinwaysthatwerealignedwiththetop-rankedpreferencesofthestatein(exhypothesi)security,welfare,andnon-tyranny?Towhatextentwascooperationbyindividualcitizensandnon-citizenswilledandvoluntary,ratherthansimplycoerced?Whatreasonsdidindividualcitizenshavetopaytherelativelyhighcosts,inthecoinoftheirowntimeandattention,ofcollectiveself-government?Ortojoinincostlypunishmentofthosewhodefectedfromcooperativenorms?Wewillneedtotakediversityofpreferencesintoaccount:Athenianindividualswerecertainlynotlimitedtopursuingthecollectiveinterests

5.20

ofthestateortotheelementsofGlaucon’sprimitivetriad.ManyclearlysharedPlato’stimocrat’shigh-rankingofindividualhonorandactivelysoughttheesteemoftheirfellows.Manyothers,perthegreatmythofPlato’sProtagoras,weremotivatedbyasenseofjustice,whetheritwasdefinedashelpingfriendsandharmingenemiesorsomeotherdistributiveorretributivenorm.

Towhatextentdidtherulesleaveroomfor,oractivelypromote,thekindsofsociallyvaluablecompetition–political,economic,forpubichonorsandprivateesteem–thatmighttendtoincreaseordegradetheaggregatewelfareofthekoinônia?Whendidcompetitionbecomedestructive?Wasitonly,asThucydidesassertedwhencompetitorswerepoliticiansandtheirgoalwastheapprobationofthedemos?Orwascompetitionforwealth,honors,orothergoodsalsopotentiallydestructiveofaggregatewelfareorevenofstatesecurity?

Insofarasthepoliteiaofthedemocraticstatewasrationalinthesenseofhavingorderlypreferences,coherentbeliefs,andacapacitytoactaccordingly;insofarasitpromotedproductivebargainsandlimitedthelikelihoodofcostlybargainingfailuresamongidentity-andinterest-groups;insofarasitprovidedincentivestoindividualstoaligntheirpublicandprivatebehaviorwiththegoalsofthecommunitywritlarge,wemaysaythatPlato’schargeofdemocraticirrationality,assketchedabove,hasbeenrefuted.Thatrefutation,ifitisachieved,mightinturngosomewaytowardsofferingaresponsetocontemporarycriticismsofdemocracyasinherentlyirrational–eitherintermsoftheimpossibilityofstablecollectivepreferenceformation,orintermsoftheincoherenceorinadequacyofindividualcitizens’beliefsaboutthestateoftheworld.5.5Legislation:Councilandassembly. SocratesofPlato’sProtagorastakesthepolicy-makingprocedureoftheAthenianassemblyasexemplaryofthepracticeofthe“wiseAthenians”inattendingtoexpertsinthosetechnicalareasinwhichtheysupposedtrueexpertswerereadilyidentified.Likewise,inhisfamousaccountofthepossibilityofthepractical“wisdomofthemany,”Aristotle(Politics3.11)seemstohaveinmindthelegislativeproceduresofademocraticstate–plausibly,oftheoneheknewbestfromhislongresidence–Athens.33InAthens,andotherdemocraticGreekpoleis,thecitizenassemblyhelddecisionauthority.Thatauthoritywasnotunconstrained:Infourth-centuryAthens,policydecisionsmadebytheassemblyaspsêphismatawerelegallyrequiredtoconfirmwiththeestablishedconstitutionalnomoiandsubjecttojudicialreview.Butitwasthecitizensthemselveswhomadetheconstitutionalrulesandreviewedthelegalityofdecreesoftheassemblywhentheywerechallengedbyaconcernedcitizen(belowsection5.6).Thefourth-centuryAthenianlegislativeprocessis,atthispoint,tolerablywellunderstood,andoffersacasestudyininstitutionalrationality.

5.21

Beginningwithpreferences,itisvitaltokeepinmindthatthedecision-makingbythedemocraticassemblyofaGreekpolisfrequentlyconcernedmattersthatcanbegenerallydescribedas“highstakes.”TheworldoftheGreekcity-stateswascompetitive,oftenviolent,andunforgiving.Whiletheworldofthefourth-centurycity-stateswasprosperousbycomparativepre-modernstandards,ordinaryGreekslivedclosertothelevelofsubsistencethanmostpeopleinmodern“developed”countries.Tyranny–ofanindividualorajunta–wasapersistentthreat.Moreover,despiteimpressiveadvancesinthemanagementofstatefinances,thecapacityofthestatetoborrowmoneyortorundeficitswaslimited.Therefore,despitethediversityofgroup-levelandindividualpreferencesrepresentedintheAthenianpopulation,muchAthenianlegislationtendedtoconcernoneormoreitemsinofthebasic“security,welfare,non-tyranny”triad.Decisionsonrelativelylow-stakesquestionsweremadeintheshadowofthepersistentneedtomakegoodchoicesonhigh-stakesissues.34

Mattersofsecurity(internalorexternal)andwelfaredebatedintheassemblymightconcernallAtheniansorsomesubsetoftheAthenianpopulation.IntheexamplecitedbySocratesoftheProtagoras,buildingwarships,thebackgroundassumptionwouldseemtohavebeenthatthestate’ssecurityrequiredacertainnumberofshipstobebuilt,withinaspecifiedtimeframe,andwithinsomecostconstraint.Thequestiontheexpertmilitaryarchitectsmighthavebeenaddressingwouldthenhavebeen:Howmanyships(oftherequisitequality)couldbebuilt,howquickly,forwhatcost?Thepreferenceorderingofthemajority,ifnotall,citizensmightbesupposedtobesomethinglikethis:1.Highlevelofsecurityatanaffordablecost(minimalriskofinsecurity).2.Moderatelevelofsecurityatanaffordablecost(higher,butstillacceptableriskofinsecurity).3.Highlevelofsecurity,butonlyathighriskofstatebankruptcy.4.Insecurity.Howthedemoscouldknowthatthiswasindeedthepreferenceorderingofamajorityofitsmembersremainstobeseen;wereturntothatquestion,below.

Assuming,forthemoment,thatthepreferencesoftheassemblyonthematterofshipbuildingwereadequatelywellorderedandthattherightactionsarecarriedoutfollowingthedecision,whatbeliefsdidtheassembledcitizenshaveabout(interalia)numbersandqualityofships,timeframe,andcost,relevanttomakingadecisionthatwillenablethemtoattaintheirmost-preferredavailableoutcome?ThepassageinPlato’sProtagorashasalreadypointedtowardstheessentialroleofexpertiseinthedecisionprocess.SocrateshasconfidentlyassertedthattheAthenianswerecapableofrecognizingandattendingtoexperts,andthuspotentiallytoupdatingtheirbeliefs,atleastontechnicalmatters,likeship-building. ThestandardAthenian“enactmentformula”foralegislativedecreewas,edoxetêiboulêikaitôidemôi:“itseemedrighttothatcouncilandtheassemblythat….”Theactiveverbisedoxe,fromdokeô,“Ibelieve.”Legislationwas,therefore,

5.22

explicitlypredicatedonaclaimaboutbeliefsthatwereheldbytwocollectivities:thecouncilof500citizens,chosenbylotteryforaone-yearterm,andtheassembly,thatisthe6000-8000Athenianswhoattendedthelegislativemeetinginquestionandvotedonthefinalformoftheenactment.Theexperttestimonybythenavalarchitects(intheProtagoraspassage)wasrelevanttoformingcoherent,presumablymoreorlessreality-tracking,beliefs.Thoseincompetentswhowerenotgiventheopportunitytospeakonthematterwererejectedbythecollectiveactionoftheassemblymen(shouteddown)becausetheiropinionswereregardedasirrelevant(orworse,antithetical)totheformationoftherightsetofbeliefsonthematterathand.InsofarasPlato(oftheGorgias)supposedthattheAtheniandemocraticsystemsucceededinprovidingthepoliswith,interalia,warships,theprocedureseemstohavemetthebasicrequirementsofinstrumentalrationality. Buthow?Theabilityofthousandsofordinarypeopletodecideonacomplexmatterlikemilitaryprocurement,evengrantedahigh-stakesenvironmentconducivetopreferencealignmentandthepresencewithinthecommunityofrelevantexpertise,mayappearmysterious.But,whenweconsidertheinstitutionaldesignofcouncilandassembly,theproceduralrulesthatgoverneddecision-makingateachstepintheprocess,andthebehavioralhabitsthathademergedwithexperienceinworkingtheconstitutionalmachinery,themysteryissolved. TheCouncilof500(boulê),whichmetmostdaysoftheyearinapurpose-builtbouleuterion,wastheproductoftheoriginal,latesixth-century,Cleisthenicreforms.Its500memberswerechosen,inanannuallottery,basedondemes,thirds,andtribes.EveryAtheniancitizenwasanancestralmemberofoneof139demes(dêmoi:villagesandurbanneighborhoods)inAthens’hometerritoryofAttica.Eachdemewasassignedaquotaofcouncilmen(bouleutai),basedonitscitizenpopulation.Ademe,andthusitscouncildelegation,wasanadministrativesubunitofoneof30regional“thirds”(trittyes).Eachthird,roughly1/30ofAthens’totalpopulation,consistedofseveraldemesinoneofthethree(coastal,inlandandurban/suburban)primaryregionsofAthens’territory.Threethirds,onefromeachofthethreeregions,a“tribe”(phulê).

Eachtribethereforeconsistedofaroughlyequalnumberofcitizens,atenthofthewhole,drawnfromdifferentpartsofAthenianterritory.Eachofthe10tribessent50memberstothecouncileachyear.Tribeswerealsothebasisforvariousformsofreligiousritualandthelandarmy.ThesystemofartificialtribesrequiredAtheniansfromdifferentpartsofAthens’extensive(byGreekstandards)territorytocooperateinvariousdomains(politics,religion,war).Itfacilitatedtheformationofsub-stateidentitiesthatwereorientedtowardthestate-levelkoinônia,andsoservedasacounterweighttoregionalorsub-regionalloyalties.GiventhataveryhighpercentageofAthenianmenoverage30(theminimumageforcouncilservice)wouldhavespentayearonthecouncil(nomorethantwonon-consecutiveterms

5.23

wereallowed),itislikelythatthecouncil,inanygivenyear,wasroughlyrepresentativeofthesocialcompositionofthedemosasawhole.Councilmenwerepaidfortheirservice,sothepoorwerenotexcluded.Thedesignofthecouncilmilitatedagainstthedominationbyanyinterestoridentitygroup.35

Thecouncilwasresponsibleforcarryingoutavarietyofadministrative,fiscal,juridical,anddiplomaticfunctions,inadditiontothedutiesthatareourprimaryconcernshere:settingtheagendaformeetingsoftheassemblyandmakingpolicyrecommendations.Thecouncil’sworkwasstructuredaroundtheten50-membertribe-teams.Eachteamheldthe“presidency”(asprytaneis)ofthecouncilforanequal(tenthoftheyear)period;athirdoftheprytaneis(16or17men)wereresponsibleforremainingon24-hourduty(duringwhichtheywerefedatstateexpense)inthepurpose-builtprytanikon.TheCouncilmenwereprovidedwithapermanentsecretarialstaffofliterateandexperiencedpublicslaves.Theyhadreadyaccesstothenext-doorpublicarchives,whichincludedallofthecurrentlyvalidlaws(nomoi)anddecrees(psêphismata).

TheGreektermforpubliccouncil(boulê)refersdirectlytoadeliberativefunction(bouleusis).Althoughthereisnopreservedaccountofthecouncil’sdeliberativeprocess,wecanreadilyimaginediscussionsamongthesubsetoftheprytaneishousedintheprytanikon(around,one-roombuilding),andamongthemembersofthe50-mantribalteams.GiventhatahighpercentageofallAtheniansoverage30servedforayearonthecouncil,andthatvirtuallyallAthenianswouldknowformercouncilorsasmembersoftheirimmediatesocialnetwork,anenteringcouncilorwouldhavebegunhisyear’sservicewithagoodpracticalsenseofhowtheinstitutionfunctioned,whatwasexpectedofhim,andwhathemightgainfromhisyear’sservice.Ihavesuggested,elsewhere,thatindividualcouncilorswouldhavehadprivateincentives(bothmaterialandhonorific)toseekconnectionsbeyondtheirlocal-networkdeme-delegations,amongothermembersoftheirtribalteams,andamongthe450othercouncilmembers.Overall,thefullcouncilhadacollectiveincentivetoperformitsdutieswell–bothinlightofthehighstakesofpolis-leveldecision-makingandbecausetheassemblywouldannuallydecidewhetherornottogranttheyear’scouncilspecialhonors.36

Someofthebusinessofthefullcouncilwascarriedoutthroughattendingtoandrespondingtospeechesbycouncilmembers,stateofficials,ordomainexpertssummonedbythecouncil:Thecouncil-buildingwasdesignedasasmall“Greektheater”styleauditorium.Afewsurvivingspeechesweredeliveredbeforethefullcouncil,servinginitsjudicialfunction,andweknowthatthatthecouncilheardexperttestimonyrelevanttoitsagenda-settingandadvisoryfunctions,forexamplefromtheelectedgenerals(seebelow).Althoughwelackdirectevidenceofhowcouncildecisionsweremade,wemustassumethatthecouncilmenvotedonproposals,probablyordinarilybroughtforwardbytheprytaneis,andthatdecisions

5.24

weremadebyamajorityvotingrule.PerCanvevaro’sreconstructionofthevotingprocessinthefullassembly(below),wemayimaginethatthecouncilworkedtowardsconsensusdecisionsinmany,perhapsmostcases.

Insum,theconditionsunderwhichtheAtheniancouncilof500madedecisionswereconducivetoinstrumentalrationality,offeringadequateopportunityforthepursuitofindividualandsub-groupself-interestwithinconstraintsthatpushedinthedirectionofaligningprivateandpublicinterests:Small-andmid-sizedgroupdeliberations;wideexperiencewiththedecision-makingprocess;theprovisionofskilledsecretaries;accesstoarchives;testimonybyexperts;individualandgroup-levelincentivesforgoodperformance;allagainstthebackgroundofhighstakesconditionsdrivingupcostsoffailure.Itisplausibletosupposethatthesecircumstancesenabledthe500councilorstomodelthechoiceprocessofarational,well-informedindividual.

Insofarasspecificinterestsandidentitieswererepresentedamongayear-classofcouncilors,thedeliberativecontextandtheopportunitiesforbuildingtrustmadecrediblecommitment,andthusproductivebargains,relativelymorelikely.Whiletherewasampleroomforstrategicbehavior,intimateconditionsandrelativelysmallnumbersloweredthecostofcollectiveaction:exposingegoisticallyself-interestedbehaviorthatcouldhavereducedopportunitiesforcooperativeoutcomes,whileincreasingthesocialincentivetojoinincostlypunishmentofnorm-violators.Finally,thetermlimitonservice(withcompleteturnoveraftereachyear),whilesettinganend-pointtowhateverrepeatedgameswereplayedamongtheyear’scohortofcouncilors,preventedtheformationofacorporateidentitywithinterestsotherthanthoseofthekoinôniaatlarge.37

Inthefourthcentury,thecitizenassemblymet,usuallyinapurpose-builttheater-likeopen-airspace(thePnyx)40timeseachyear(fourmeetingsineach35/36-dayprytany).Somemeetingshadcertainfixedagendaitems;everyfourthmeetingwasdesignated“principal,”(kuria)and(atleastintheory)addressedtopicsofspecialsalience.Theagendaofthemeetingwasannounced,inwrittenpublicnotices,inadvance.Anycitizeningoodstandingcouldattendanymeeting.Citizenswhoattended(atleastuptoaquorum)werepaidfortheirservice;therateofpayincreasedoverthecourseofthefourthcentury.Meetingstypicallylastedhalfaday.Althoughthe6000-8000citizenspresentatagivenassemblywereneverperfectlydescriptivelyrepresentativeoftheentirebodyofca.30,000,thereislittlereasontosupposethatassemblieswere,overtime,systematicallybiasedfororagainstanysignificantsociologicalsubsetofthebroadercitizenpopulation.38

Themeetingwaspresidedoverbyasmallgroupof“presiders”(proedroi)drawnbylotfromtheninetribalteamsofcouncilorswhowhosetribewasnotinprytany.Theproedroiintroduced(throughaherald)eachitemontheagenda,andannouncedthecouncil’srecommendation(probouleuma),ifany.Atthatpoint,the

5.25

floorwasopenedto“anyoftheAthenianswithadvicetogive.”AsMogensHansenhasshown,giventhelargenumberofdecisionsthathadtobemadeinthecourseofayear,inmanycasesthecouncil’srecommendationwasacceptedbytheassemblywithoutdissentandthemeasurepassedbyconsensus.Butinothercases,debateensued.Experttestimonywasgivenandattendedto.Thecouncil’srecommendationcouldbe,andoftenwas,amendedorreplacedbyamotionfromthefloor.39

PerthepassageinPlato’sProtagoras,adviceontechnicalmattersfromthoseregardedasuninformedwasunlikelytobetolerated.Insomecases,testimonywasgivenas“pointofinformation.”Butinothercases,aspeakermadealegislativerecommendationintheformofawrittentextofadecree(oranamendmenttoaproposeddecree)thatwaspassedtotheproedroiforconsiderationbytheassembly.Certaincitizens,recognizedas“theusualspeakers,”haddevelopedreputationsforhavingspecialexpertiseandusefulsourcesofinformationonparticularareas–e.g.foreignpolicyorfinance.Theywerelikelytoberecognizedbytheproedroiandattendedto(atleastforawhile)bytheassemblymen.Buttheusualspeakersheldnoformaloffice–theywereordinarycitizens,notstatemagistrates–andthereisampleevidenceformeasuresbeingproposedbycitizensoutsidethegroupofwell-known“activepoliticiansandrecognizedexperts.”40

Inarecent,detailed,andconvincingreconstructionoftheassemblydecision-makingprocess,MirkoCanevaro(2018,forthcoming)hasproposedthatinthecaseofmultiplefloorproposals,theproedroiplayedacentralrolebydecidingwhichproposalwouldbeputtoafinalvote.Canevarosuggeststhattheprocesstheyemployedwasbroadlydeliberative,whilealsobeinghighlysensitivetoclearlyexpressedandwidely-heldopinions:Theproedroiacceptedwrittenproposalsforamendmentsfromthefloor,announcedandalloweddebateonthosethattheyregardedasmostviable,andthenassessedthe“senseofthemeeting”onsequentiallypresentedproposals.Theirassessmentwasbasedonaudienceresponses(audible,via“uproar”:thorubos,andvisiblesignsofapprovalordissent).Theyquicklyrejectedthoseproposalsthatfoundlittleaudiencesupport.Moreover,Canevarosuggeststhatthegoaloftheproedroi,andthusthecollectiveaimoftheassemblyasanexperiencedbodyofcitizens,wastoemploytheprocessofproposals,attendingtoandrespondingtospeeches,andobservablepublicresponses,toworktowardsameasurethatcouldgainverywide,perhapsevenuniversalassent.

Whentheproedroibelievedthataproposalhadgainedahighenoughlevelofsupport,theyputittothevote.Mostvoteswerebyopenshowofhandsandtheresultwasannouncedbytheproedroi,basedontheirestimateofthecount.Onlyinspecialcases(andthroughaspecialprocedure)wasvoteheldbypebble-ballotandexactlycounted.Canevaropointsoutthat,wherewedohaveevidenceofactualcountedvotes,largelyfromHellenistic-erademocraticpoleis,mostvotesare

5.26

reportedasbeingeitherunanimousornearlyso.ClearlynoteveryAthenianvotewasconsensualorevenclosetoit.Thucydides(3.48.1)makesapointofthenarrownessofmajoritybywhichtheAthenianassemblychosetooverturnapreviousdecisiontoexecutetheentiremalepopulationofMytilenein427BCE(seechapter6).ButCanevaromakesastrongcaseforconsensusornear-consensusvotingasthenorminthefourth-centuryAthenianassemblyandotherdemocraticGreekcitizenassemblies.41

Assuming,exhypothesi,thatCanevaroiscorrectabouttheprocedure(whatevertheactualfrequencyofclosevotes),wastheAtheniandeliberative,consensus-seekingapproachtolarge-groupdecision-makingconducivetorationalandeffectivechoice-making?Inopen“showofhands”votingoftheAtheniantype,therecanbenoquestionofsustainingfullindependenceofindividualvoterjudgment,akeyfactorinmanyCondorcet-typejurytheoremresults.Thelikelihoodofcascadesofopinion-leaderorcuefollowing(whetherpositive,inrespecttocorrectnessofjudgment,orotherwise)washigh.42Opinion-leaderandcuefollowingintheassemblymightwell(andnodoubtsometimesdid)resultinpoorchoices–i.e.thosethatfailedtoachievetheintendedoutcomeforreasonsthat(inretrospectatleast)oughttohavebeenforeseeablebyaprudentlegislator.Butthepoorchoicewasnot,bythattoken,anirrationalone:Ifweassumereasonablywell-alignedandorderlybase-linepreferencesamongmostofthosepresent,itmaybeperfectlyrationalforanindividualtofollowtheleadofthoseheregardsasbetterinformedthanhimselfonagiventopic:IfAandBagreeonthehighpriorityofsecurity,saythatshipsmustbebuiltandthatcostisafactor,andAisregardedasbothtrustworthyandexpertonnavalaffairs,BmayrationallyfollowA’sleadonwhichofseveralproposalsismostefficacious,evenifBis,asitturnsout,mistakenaboutA’scharacterorlevelofexpertise.43

Weneednot,therefore,concludethatAthenianassembliesweretypicallyirrationalonthebasisof,forexample,Thucydides’well-knownaccountofthecascadeofvoterenthusiasmthatledtothecatastrophic(inretrospect)quasi-consensual(inthatdissenterswerefrightenedintosilence)decisionbytheAthenianassemblytosendagiganticinvasionfleetagainstSicilyin415BCE.Consensualdecisionsbyademocraticassembly,maysometimesbe,butarenotnecessarily,drivenbystrongbutshort-livedemotionalstates(inThucydides’accountof415:erôs)orbybeliefsbasedonsystematicallybiasedinformation(Alcibiades’claimsaboutdisorderinSicilianpoleis,Segesta’ssuccessintrickingAthenianambassadorsconcerningtheresourcesthatwouldbeavailabletosupporttheAthenianforcesoncetheyarrivedinSicily).WererawemotionandmisinformationtheonlyinputsintoAthenianassemblydecisions,itisimpossibletoexplainhowdemocraticAthenscouldhaverisentopowerintheGreekworld,foughtalongwar,orrecoveredafterthatwar.44

5.27

Moreover,weneednotsuppose–following,forexample,Thucydes’evenbetter-knownclaim(2.65.9)that,althoughthedemoswasmasterofstateaffairsinname,PericleswasthetruerulerofAthens–thatademosbecomescapableofactingrationallyandeffectivelyonlywhenitaccuratelyfollowstheleadofanexceptionallytalented,rational,andcharismaticleader.TheAthenianassemblyprovedcapableofmakingdecisionsthat,onthewhole,conducedtoAthens’securityandwelfare,bothbeforeandaftertherisetoprominenceofPericles.Andbythesametoken,duringtheperiodofPericlesascendencytheassemblymadedecisionsthatproved,inretrospect,bothgoodandbadinrespecttogainingthoseends.45

Nor,finally,needweaccepttheclaimmadebyancientandmoderncriticsofparticipatorydemocracy–forexample,bythe”OldOligarch,”PoliteiaoftheAthenians(above)–thatthedemos(understoodasthenon-elitemajority,ratherthanthewholeofthecitizenbody,massandeliteconjoined)wasrationalonlyinthesenseofactingconsistentlyasanegoisticallyself-interestedcollectivetyrant.46Thepotentialfortheprocedureoftheassemblytodevolveintoakindofmajoritytyrannywas,however,agenuineconcern.Arguably,therealizationofthattendencyatcertainmomentsinthelateryearsofthePeloponnesianWarcontributedtoAthens’failureinthatlongconflict.Thelegalreformsofthelastdecadeofthefifthcenturyseemtohavebeenaimedspecificallyataddressingpreciselythatmanifestdanger,andthusatrestoringthefoundationalSolonianbargainbetweenmassandelite,thebargainonwhichtheAtheniandemocracyhadbeenpredicatedfromCleisthenesonward.5.6Lawandcourts ThearchaicAtheniansystemoflawandlegaljudgmenthadbeenreformulatedunderSolonandwasfurthermodifiedinthemiddledecadesofthefifthcentury.Inthelastdecadeofthefifthcentury,thesystemoflaw-makingandtheconstitutionalrelationshipbetweencourtsandassemblywererevisedonceagain.Thestakesinthislatestwaveofreformswereespeciallyhighbecausetheywereundertakeninthecontextofcivilwar.In411andagainin404,thethreatofviolencebetweenAthenianelitesandmasses,avertedbytheoriginalSolonianbargain,hadbeenrealizedinbloodyfact.Immediatelyafterthedemocraticrestorationsof410,and403andintheyearsfollowing,thepotentialforrenewedviolenceremainedhigh.AsEdwinCarawanandFedericaCarugatihaveemphasized,thelegalreformsofthelatefifthcentury,andthereforethetheAthenianlegalsystemofthefourthcentury,werepredicatedonacontractualsolution,arevisedconstitutionalbargainaimedatforestallingfurtherconflict.47ThereformsleftintacttheSolonianfoundation,theCleisthenicinstitutionalframework,andtheestablishedcriteriaforcitizenship.Butthenewbargainsubstantiallyenhancedthepredictabilityoflegislativeoutcomesandlegaljudgmentsonconstitutionalmatters.

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AsCarugatihasshown,whileachievedwithoutanarbitrator,theneworderwasseenbytheAtheniansasarenewaloftheSolon’sbargainingsolutionof594BCE,nowreimaginedasanancestralcommitmenttolegality.48

Inthedecadefollowingthedemocraticrestorationof410,forthefirsttimesincetheoriginal“lawsofSolon”hadbeeninscribedandmadepublic,allcurrentlyvalidAthenianlawswerecodifiedandarchived.Afundamentalruleofnon-contradictionamongthestandinglawswasestablishedasacentralprincipleofAthenianlaw.Aclearhierarchicaldistinctionwasestablishedbetweenalegislativedecree(psêphisma)andconstitutionallaw(nomos).Alldecreesmustnowconformtotheexistinglawsandeverynewlawmusteitherconformtotheexistinglaws,ormandatetherevocationofthoseitcontradicted.Theprocessofconstitutionallawmaking,nowbylargepanelsof“lawmakers”(nomothetai),wasdistinguishedfrom,andmadesubstantiallymorecumbersomethan,theordinaryprocessofmakingpolicyinaregularassembly.

Althoughthereisdisagreementovervariousproceduraldetails,studentsofAthenianlawhavebeenabletoreconstructthemainlinesofthenewsystem,basedonthecomprehensiveaccountofcourtroomprocedureAristotelianAth.Pol.andasubstantialbodyofpreservedcourtroomspeechesanddocuments.49Moreover,despiteanongoingscholarlydebateonthenatureofthe“ruleoflaw”atAthens,thereisanadequatelevelofscholarlyconsensusonthesubstantivejurisprudentialissuesofdirectrelevancetoourquestionofsystem-levelrationality.50 Atheniandisputesthatwould,inAnglo-Americanlaw,beconsideredcivil,criminal,andconstitutionalcases,weretriedinPeople’sCourts(dikastêria).Theordinaryprocedureinmostcriminalcases(constitutionalandcivilcaseswereprocedurallysimilar;murdertrialsweretriedunderasomewhatdifferentprocedure)was,inbareoutline,asfollows:Aconcernedcitizenbroughtachargeoflaw-violationagainstanindividualtotherelevantmagistrate.Afterreceivingwrittentestimonyfrombothsides,themagistratereferredthemattertothePeople’scourtforjudgment.Eachcasewasheardbyseveralhundredjurors(dikastai).Jurorswerechoseninanelaboratelotteryfromtheca.6000citizensoverage30whohadtakenthejuror’soathandwhomadethemselvesavailablefordutyonagivenday.Thedikastaiserved,collectively,asjudge;themagistrateinchargewasonlyresponsibleforensuringthatprocedureswerecorrectlyfollowed.Prosecutoranddefendanteachgaveatimedspeechoutliningtheirpositions.Speecheswereofidenticallength,measuredbyawater-clock;theclockwasstoppedforthereadingofwhatthelitigantsclaimedweretherelevantsectionsofthelawcodeandforreadingoutofwrittentestimony(provided,underseal,bythemagistrate,basedonhispreliminaryinvestigation).Havingheardbothsides,thejurorsvoted,bysecretballot.Thedecisionwasbysimplemajority;thenumberofvotesforprosecutoranddefendantwaspubliclyannounced.Ifthedefendantwere

5.29

judgedguilty,asentencingphasefollowed.Theentiretrialprocesswascompletedinaday. Forourpurposes,theconstitutionalreformsofthelatefifthcenturyandtwocategoriesoflegalprocedureconcerningchargesofconstitutionalviolationareofspecialimportance.First,istheprocedureofgraphêparanomôn(writtenchargeofillegalityinpolicy-making).Inthisproceduretheprosecutor(potentiallyanycitizeningoodstanding)claimedthataproposalhadbeenmadeoradecree(psêphisma)hadbeenpassedintheassemblythatwascontrarytotheestablishedconstitutionalrules(nomoi).Nextistheprocedureofgraphênomonmêepitêdeiontheinai(writtenchargethatalawwasunsuitablyestablished).Inthisproceduretheprosecutorchargedthataconstitutionalrule(nomos)hadbeenproposedorpassedthatwascontrarytooneormoreoftheestablishedlaws.Ineithercase,theprocedureenabledanyconcernedcitizentoserveaspublicprosecutor,bringingachargeofillegalityagainstanothercitizen,justashewouldinacriminalcase.Thedefendantwastheauthoroftheproposal,decree,orlaw.Theprosecutorfacedapenaltyifhereceivedfewerthanone-fifthofthevotes.Inthecaseofachargeleveledagainstaproposeddecreeorlaw,theproposalwastableduntilafterthetrialhadbeenheld.Itwasinvalidatedinthecaseofaguiltyverdict.Inthecaseofadecreeorlawthathadbeenpassed,aconvictioninthetrialresultedinthestatutebeingvoided.51 Thenewprocedurehadobviousimplicationsforadecreeproposercapableofworkinghiswayupandbackdownthegametree.BythelatefifthcenturytheAthenianshadbecomedeeplyconcernedaboutthepotentialofskilledandself-interestedspeakerstoaffecttheprocessofpublicdecision-makinginwaysthatweredisadvantageoustotheinterestsofthedemos.Cleverorators,someofthemtrainedbysophisticmastersofrhetoricianslikeGorgiasandwithegoisticmotivationslikethoseofCallicles,seemedquitecapableofpersuadingthedemostotakeacourseofactionthatitwouldnototherwisehavetaken.PersuasionofthesortcelebratedbyGorgiasinhisDefenseofHelen,andbyPlato’sGorgiasinthedialoguenamedforhim,aimedatreorderingtheaudience’spreferencesonsomesalientmatter,orbybringingthelistenerstobelievethatapreferredoutcomewasreadilyavailable,andtherebycausingthemtoactaccordingly.Ifthosereordereddesiresandbeliefsproved,inretrospect,foolish,inthesensethattheriskwasexcessiveandthecollectiveexpectationofdesirefulfillmenthadbeenbasedonfalsepremises,thelikelihoodofcatastrophewashigh.

InPlato’sdialogue,Gorgiasseekstoexculpatethetrainedoratorfromresponsibilityforharmssufferedbylistenerssubjectedtohispersuasivetreatment(Gorgias457b).ButSocratesdoesnotletGorgiasandhisstudentsoffsoeasily,Hispointisthatunlesstheoratoractuallyhasgenuineknowledgeofwhatoutcomeisgoodforthetreated“patient,”heisinthepositionofafakedoctorpeddlingunwholesomesnacksintheguiseofhealingmedicine.52Fortheirpart,the

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Athenianswhovotedforthelegalreformssketchedabovehaddecidedthatpublicspeakersmustbeheldaccountableforthereasonablypredictableresultsoftheirpersuasivespeech.

Thenewlegalproceduresgavethedemosawaytoholdpublicspeakerstoaccountandtopunishthosewhowereregardedashavingmisusedtheirpowersofpersuasion.Themanwhosenamewasattachedtothelawordecreewasnowheldlegallyliableforitsconsistencywithexistinglawandpotentiallyforitsunanticipatedbadeffects.Politicalrivalsandopponentsofthepolicywere,therefore,providedwithapotentlegalweapon.Therationalpotentialproposer,lookingdownthegametree,wouldbehesitanttoadvocateanexcessivelyriskypolicy,evenifheweresurethathecouldstirupatleastmomentarypopularenthusiasmforit.Thenewrulestherebyreducedthedemos’tendencytotakerisksinexcessofwhattheAthenians,intheirnormal,“unexcited”psychologicalcondition,wouldbewillingtocountenance.Butwhataboutrationalrisk-takingandthedangersassociatedwithexcessiveriskaversion?Whywasthelegalweaponnotover-used,resultingintheconstraintsonlegislativeinitiatorsbeingsuchthatnoinnovationswereeverproposed?Whywasfourth-centuryAthensnotsubjecttopath-dependentpolicyossificationàlaSparta? BuildingonrecentscholarshiponAthenianlaw,FedericaCarugatianswersthatquestionbyrevisitingthequestionofAthens’constitutionalorderinthelatefifthandfourthcenturies.Carugatiarguespersuasivelythatthereformsrepresentanewconstitutionalbargain,struckinthehigh-stakescontextofthepost-civilwarera,betweenordinaryandeliteAthenians.Themassesagreednottopunishtheeliteforparticipationintheoligarchythroughexpropriation.Theeliteagreedtoparticipateinthedemocracy,interaliabypayingexpensiveliturgies.Thebargainresultedinastable,self-enforcingconstitutionalorder.AttheheartoftheneworderwasaroughconsensusamongAtheniansonthefundamentalvalueoflegality,nowunderstoodintermsoflegalcoherenceandconsistency:non-contradictionamongtheexistinglawsandanexpectationthatallnewlegislationpassedbytheassembly,andanychangesintheconstitutionalrules,wouldreflectwhatwasreimaginedasadeep,ancestral,Atheniancommitmenttolegality.53

AncestraldevotiontolegalitywasseenashavingbeenexemplifiedbytheoriginallawsofSolonandbythemanifestjudiciouswisdomofthelawgiverhimself.AbidingbythebargaincametoberegardedbytheAtheniansasacontractualobligation,anditwasenforcedassuch.Deviationfromthecontractwastakenasnotonlyaviolationofastronglyheldnorm,butasathreattosocialorder.ThethreatwasrealinsofarasitwascoordinationonlegalityasacorevalueofthedemocraticsystemthathadallowedtheAthenianstoexitthecivilwarperiodwithoutdevolvingintoadownwardgyreofsectarianviolence.Here,inthepromulgationofalegaldoctrineanditsassociatedbehaviors,weseeapracticalinstantiationoftheprocess

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ofmutualteachingandlearningthatSocrates’Protagoraspostulatedastheoriginofaself-enforcingsocialorderpredicatedontheestablishmentoflaw,obediencetolaw,andreliablepunishmentoflaw-breakers(chapter2).

Carugati’saccountofAthens’fourth-centuryconstitutionalorderemphasizesitsstatusasaself-enforcingagreement,ratherthanastheresultofthird-partyinterventionbythevictoriousSpartansafterthePeloponnesianWar.54Sheconceivesoftheneworderasanequilibrium,ingame-theoreticsensethatnoplayerhadabettermoveinlightofthemovesavailabletoothers.Assuch,sheshowswhytheAthenianconstitutionalordermaybecountedasrational.TheneworderenabledAthenians,asindividuals,asinterestgroups,andasacommunity,tomake,obey,andenforcedecisionsbasedonorderlypreferencesandcoherentbeliefs.55AsCarugatidemonstrates,italsoallowedtheAthenians,unlikethepath-dependentSpartans,torespondtonewchallenges,throughinstitutionalinnovations.56

Innovationsmustberesponsivetoanopportunityorthedemandsofanewsituationiftheyaretobeeffective.Yet,ifanexistingsocialorderistobeself-enforcing,innovationsmustnotunderminethereasonsthatpeoplehavetocontinuetopaythecostsassociatedwiththeregime.ThedynamicrationalityoftheAthenianpoliteiahungontherobustnessofthebalancebetweencreativedestructionofdispensableinstitutionalarrangementsandtheunderlyingstabilityofbasiccommitmentsandtheinstitutionsthatsustainedthem.Carugatiarguesthattheconstitutionalbalancingactwaspredicatedontheexistenceofnumerousvetopoints.Mostobviously,aswehaveseen,everycitizenheldapotentialveto,intheformofarighttolegallychallengeanynewlaworproposalmadeinthelegislativeassembly.Andyetifinnovationsweretoberesponsivetonewopportunitiesandthreats,thevetomustnotbeover-used.So,wecomebacktothequestionposedabove:Whywouldacitizenwhowasinsomewaysdisadvantagedbyanewrulenotchoosetoinitiatealegalchallenge,therebyatleastdelayingandpotentiallyvoidingthedisfavoredchange?Carugati’sansweristhatsuchachallengewouldberejected(andthechallengerinvariouswayspunished)unlesshecouldshowthathischallengewasbasedonaviolationofacoreprincipleoflegality:inconsistencywithestablishednormsorincontradictiontoestablishedlaws.

EmployingavariantonthewellknownMedianVoterTheorem,Carugatisetsupasimplegraphêparanomôngame,basedonthefollowingpremises:Inlightoftheconsensusonlegality,the“medianAthenianjuror”hadrelativelystablepreferencesoveroutcomes,andhadnormativeexpectationssimilartothoseofthemedianassemblyman.Policyinnovators(thosewhomightproposeanewrule)werecapableofroughlyestimatingthosepreferences.Theyweremotivatedbothbyconcernforhonororreputationandforachievingtheirpreferredpolicyoutcomes.Whenthemedianjuror’spreferencesoveroutcomesdivergedfromtheoutcomesexpectedfromthestatusquo,apolicyinnovatorcouldsafely(withoutserious

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dangertohisreputationandwiththechanceofwinninghonors)proposeanewpolicy,knowingthatanylegalchallengewouldhavetobeintheformofdefendingthestatusquo.

Solongastheproposedreform(1)offeredexpectedoutcomesthatwerenearer(onanimaginaryline,assumingaone-dimensionalpolicyspace)totheidealpoint(most-preferredpolicy)ofthemedianjurorthanweretheoutcomesexpectedfromthestatusquo,and(2)solongasthepolicywasconsistentwithestablishednorms,and(3)didnotcontradicttheexistinglaws,itwasnotatriskofbeingoverturnedbyagraphêparanomôn:ifthepolicywerechallengedincourt,thechallengewouldfail.Assumingrationalplayersinthisgame,andinlightofthehighcostsofafailedprosecution,proposalsshouldbecarefullywrittentoavoidlegalinconsistency,shouldbeofferedonlywhentherewasaperceivedgapbetweenthestatusquoandtheidealpointofthemedianjuror,andshouldnotstraytoofarfromthatidealpoint.

Solongasthoseconditionsweremet,innovationsshouldbeproposedwhenevertheexistingruleswerewidelyregardedassub-optimalwhilelegalchallengestopopularinnovationsshouldberare,andsuccessfulchallengesevenrarer.Carugaticoncludes:“Themodelyieldstwoprimaryresults.First,thegraphêparanomônpushedproposersofnewlegislationclosetothemedian.Second,thegraphêparanomônalsoenabledaproposertomoveawayfromthestatusquo.Takentogether,theseresultssuggestthatthegraphêparanomônenabledinnovationinpolicymakingwithoutjeopardizingthesocialorder.”57Inshort,likeSparta,therationalityoftheAthenianconstitutionalorderdependedonthewillingnessofeachcitizentoobeythelawsandtoparticipateintheenforcementofthem.But,unlikeSparta,Athenswasnotsubjecttoastrongformofpathdependencyandthuswasabletorespondtoenvironmentalchallenges–ifnotalwaystoanswerthechallengeinadefinitiveorfullysatisfactoryway.

5.7Individualsandofficials,initiativeandexecution Ifademocraticstateistomakerationalchoicesinwaysthatarerelevantlysimilartoaninstrumentallyrationalindividual,asimaginedbytheGreekfolktheory,severalconditionsmustbemet:Publicdecision-makingbodies(notablythoseconsideredabove)mustbecapableofaggregatingindividualpreferencesandbeliefs.Thosebodiesmustberepresentative,inthesenseofstandingfororbeingtakenas,thedemos.Assumingthat,perdiscussionabove,thoseconditionsareadequatelymet,therestillmustbetherightrelationshipbetweencollectivechoicesandtheactionsofthoseindividualsresponsibleforinitiatingtheprocessleadingtothedecision,andthenforexecutingthedemos’mandate.

Withreferencetotheirspecificroleintheprocess,theindividualsinquestionmusthaveareputationfor(atleast)competentperformanceandloyaltyto

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theregime.Thecompetencecriterionrequiresthattheybeadequatelyexpertintheirrole,orhavereadyaccesstotherelevantkindsofexpertise,suchthattheywereabletocarryouttheirdutiesinareasonablycompetentway.Theloyaltycriterionrequiresthatthepublicbehavioroftheindividualsinquestionbeadequatelywellalignedwiththebackgroundvaluesofthedemos,asexpressedinitslawsandnorms.Theymustnotbethoughttobetreasonousorcorrupt–andmustexpecttobepunishediftheyarediscoveredtobeso.Inthecaseofthosewithexecutiveresponsibility,loyaltyrequiresthatofficialsactinaccordancewiththedecisionsofpublicbodies.Theymustfulfillthespecificdemandsforactionthatthepublicdecisionimposesonthem.

Thetestoftheco-presenceofcompetenceandloyaltyatthelevelofindividualinitiativeandfollow-throughiswhetherthereisameaningfulandmoreorlesspredictablecausalrelationshipleadingfrominitiativetodecision,andfromdecisiontoexecution.Ofcourse,giventhatdecisionsaremadeinthefaceofuncertainty,thedesiredoutcome(say,victoryinwar,increasedvolumeoftradeinthemarket)maynotactuallybeachieved.Butthecollectivedecision-makersmustbeconfidentthattheconditionsmandatedbytheirdecision(say,acertainnumberofwarshipsbuiltbyacertaindate,theenforcementofnewmarketregulations)willbefulfilled.Anideal-typethoughtfulandwell-informedindividualcitizen,reflectingontheprocessexpost,oughttobeabletosay,“Thedeliberativeprocesssurfacedanoptioncapableofgainingourapproval(throughwinningamajorityorconsensusvote).Thepublicchoicemadebythevoteaccordedwithour(majorityorconsensus)preferencesinlightofourbeliefsabouttherelevantstateoftheworldatthetime.Subsequentactionsbyexecutiveofficialswereinaccordwiththatchoice.”

Ateachstep,wemustexpectsomeslippage.Giventheexistenceofmanyminds,anddiverseinterests,preferences,andbeliefs,itwouldbeabsurdtosupposethatthedemocraticstate-levelprocessofmovingfrominitiativetodecision,andfromdecisiontoactioncouldbeasstraight-forwardasasinglerationalindividualformingtheintentiontodosomethingandthendoingit.Eventhesimplestexampleofjointaction–asdemonstratedbyMichaelBratman’s(2014)discussionoftwopersonspaintingahouse–isfarmorecomplexthananactioncarriedoutbyarationalindividual.ThesizeandcomplexityoftheAtheniangovernmentalmachinerymeantthat,evenassumingthehighestpossiblelevelsofcompetenceandloyaltyfromeveryindividualinvolved,therewouldinevitablybeslippageacrossthecausalchain,alossofefficiencyandaccuracybetweentheinputofindividualpreferencesandbeliefsandtheoutputofpublicactions.Butiftheslippageweresogreatthattherewasnodiscernible(to,say,ourhypotheticalidealAthenianobserver)causalrelationshipbetweenpublicchoicesandoutcomes,itwouldbeabsurdtoclaimthatthedemocraticstatemanifestedevenminimalrationalityintheinstrumentalsenseofthefolktheory.Moreover,iftheprocessweretobecaptured

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bythoseindividualswithresponsibilityforinitiativeandexecution,suchthatthedemosbecameamerebystanderintheprocessofgovernment,itwouldbefalsetoclaimthatthesystemwasdemocratic.

Infourth-centuryAthens,asubstantialnumberofindividualshadresponsibility,formalorinformal,forinitiativeandexecution.Boththelegislativeandjudicialprocessdependedon“he[thecitizeningoodstanding]whoiswilling”(hoboulomenos)toinitiatetheaction–toproposeapolicyortobringachargeofillegalityresultinginalegaltrial.Inthelegislativeprocess,thenameoftheinitiatorwasattachedtothefinalformofthedecreeofthelaw–through,theformula,“soandsoproposed.”Allvalidlawsanddecreeswerearchived,atleastsomewereinscribedonmarblestelaiandpubliclydisplayed.Theindividuallistedastheproposergainedwhateverpublicpraise,honors,andpositivereputationwassubsequentlyassociatedwiththemeasure.Healsotookonformallegalresponsibilityforthemeasure,and,aswehaveseen,wou