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7/31/2019 Clearing Colombia's Fog of War
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ClearingColombiasFogofWar
AnHistoricalMaterialistAnalysisoftheWaronDrugsinColombia
RobSchuurmans
1803905
Amsterdam,21August2009
MasterThesis
MScPoliticalScienceVUUniversityAmsterdam
Supervisor:dr.E.B.vanApeldoorn
2ndReader:dr.J.Perry
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ABSTRACT
FordecadestheUShasbeenfightingafutilewarondrugsinColombia.AlthoughmanyUS
officials already stipulated the ineffectiveness of thiswar in the early 1990s, the Clinton
Administrations and the succeeding Bush Administrations intensified their military
campaigns and introduced extensive aid packages consisting of neoliberal policies to
counteracttheallegedthreatofnarcotics.Thisstudyarguesthatthisdiscrepancycanonly
beunderstoodinthelargercontextofUSinterestsinColombia.Itadvancesthenotionthat
thewarondrugsisaboveallusedasapretexttolegitimizeacounter-insurgencythataims
tocreateaprofitableeconomicenvironmentforcapitalaccumulationbydominantclasses.
Moreover,itshowsthatthepoliticaltrajectoryofthisprojecthasbeenheavilyinfluencedby
transnationalcorporations.Bytracingthepolicy-makingprocessitexamineshowcorporate
interestshavefoundtheirwayintotheformulationofthewarondrugsandwhattheeffects
of this influence have been on the humanitarian situation in Colombia. Rooted in the
tradition of historical materialism, thisstudy demonstrates how the concept of capitalist
imperialismoffers useful insights incoming to an understanding of the war ondrugs in
Colombia.
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Theresawonderfulphrase:thefogofwar.What"thefogofwar"meansis:warisso
complexit'sbeyondtheabilityofthehumanmindtocomprehendallthevariables.Our
judgments,ourunderstanding,arenotadequateandwekillpeopleunnecessarily.
-RobertMcNamara(2003)in:E.Morris(dir),TheFogofWar:ElevenLessonsfromtheLifeof
RobertS.McNamara ,DVD,SonyPicturesClassics.
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
ListofTablesandFigures v
ListofAbbreviations vi
1.Introduction 1
1.1.ResearchProblem 11.2.StateoftheArt 2
1.2.1. MainstreamConceptions 21.2.2. CriticalScholarship 3
1.3.ResearchAim 51.4.ResearchQuestions 51.5.TheoreticalFramework 6
1.5.1. HistoricalMaterialism 61.5.2. MarxistTheoryandImperialism 7
1.5.2.1.DialecticalLogicsofImperialistPower 81.5.2.2.NeoliberalismandCapitalistImperialism 9
1.6.Operationalization 101.6.1. OnConcepts 101.6.2. IdentifyingCapitalistImperialismintheWaronDrugs 11
1.7.Methodology 121.7.1. ProcessTracingandHistoricalNarratives 121.7.2. GeneralConsiderations 13
1.8.ThesisOutline 13
2.ThePoliticalEconomyoftheWaronDrugs 14
2.1.TheViolentHistoryofColombia'sDemocracy 142.2.USForeignPolicyTowardsColombia 17
2.2.1. HistoricalConnectionsbetweentheUSandColombia 172.2.1.1.LatinAmericaasAmerica'sBackyard 172.2.1.2.FromAdversariestoAllies 19
2.2.2. MilitarizationoftheWaronDrugs 202.2.2.1.PlanColombia 22
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2.2.2.2.RiseoftheTerror-CrimeNexus 232.2.3. TheWaronDrugsasNeoliberalization 24
2.2.3.1.TheEconomicsofPlanColombia 242.2.3.2.TheColombiaFreeTradeAgreement 25
2.3.OntheNatureofDrugValueChains 262.3.1. IllicitTradeintheGlobalEconomy 262.3.2. TheEconomicsofDrugTrafficking 27
2.4.EffectsoftheWaronDrugs 292.4.1. EffectsontheDrugValueChain 292.4.2. HumanitarianandPoliticalImplications 30
3.ThePowerofDominantClassesintheWaronDrugs 33
3.1.TheFormulationofUSForeignPolicy 333.1.1. LegalContext 333.1.2. InfluencingWashington 35
3.2.CorporateInfluenceinPlanColombiaandtheCFTA 363.2.1. TheBusinessLobby 363.2.2. TheMilitary-IndustrialComplex 40
3.3.CorporateInterestsandtheContinuationofViolence 43
4.Conclusion 45
Annex:DataonTNCsLobbyinginLatinAmerica 48
Bibliography 54
LISTOFTABLESANDFIGURES
Figure1: AnnualLobbyingbyUSCBP inUSdollars 37
Figure2: AnnualLobbyingbyCOAinUSdollars 37
Table1: AbstractsofLobbyingDisclosures1996-2000 39
Table2: LobbyingPaybacks 41
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LISTOFABBREVIATIONS
CFTA ColombiaFreeTradeAgreement
CIA CentralIntelligenceAgency
CIP CenterforInternationalPolicy
COA CounciloftheAmericas
CPI CenterforPublicIntegrity
CRP CenterforResponsivePolitics
DEA DrugsEnforcementAgency
ELN EjrcitoLiberacinNacional
NationalLiberationArmy
FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia
ColombianRevolutionaryArmedForces
FDI ForeignDirectInvestment
FDR FranklinDelanoRoosevelt
GAO GovernmentalAccountabilityOffice
GDP GrossDomesticProduct
HRW HumanRightsWatch
IR InternationalRelations
LATC LatinAmericaTradeCoalition
NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization
OXY OccidentalPetroleum
NSC NationalSecurityCouncil
TNC TransnationalCompany
UN UnitedNations
UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees
UNODC UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime
UNWDR UnitedNationsWorldDrugReport
US UnitedStates(ofAmerica)
USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment
USCBP UnitedStates-ColombiaBusinessPartnership
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. ResearchProblem
Fordecades,theUnitedStates(US)has been fightinganaggressivewaron drugs inLatin
America.Accordingtoitsofficialdiscourse,illegaldrugsareamajorsecuritythreattothe
USandhenceneedtobedealtwithattheirroots.Therefore,especiallyinColombia,worlds
largest cocaine producing country, the US has been supporting military interventions in
order to eradicate drugs. Domestically, the criminalization of drug use makes for a
comparable aggressive effort of the government to contain the spread of illicit drugs at
home.However,ithasbeenarguedthat,fromcropstoconsumers,theUShasbeenapplying
futilestrategiesalongthesupplychain.Overtheyears,cocaineproductionhasremained
stable and the demand for illicit drugs has not decreased. Throughout the 1990s many
liberalscholarsalready questioned itseffectiveness:ratherthanemphasizingthemilitary
dimension, they argued that the war on drugs could only be won by adhering to the
principlesofdemocracyandmultilateralism.However,inresponsetotheterroristattacks
of 11 September 2001 (9/11) the US re-emphasized their conservative and unilateral
foreignpolicy.Astorejecttheclaimsofalackoflegitimacy,thewarondrugsinColombia
was now portrayed as a war on terror, referring to an alleged terror-crime nexus of
ideologicalinsurgentsbenefitingfromprofitablecocainemarkets.
Nevertheless,whathasremainedunchangedsincethemilitaryinvolvementofthe
US in Colombia is the absence of any structural effects regarding cocaine production,
traffickingandconsumption.Asaresult,manycriticalscholarshavequestionedthemotives
underlyingUSpresenceinColombia.Nevertheless,althoughsuchacriticalapproachmight
provideausefulholisticunderstandingoftheintereststhatunderlietheofficialdiscourse,
thegreaterpartofitcontinuestobebasedonstate-centricpremises.Ingeneral,ithasbeen
argued that sucha realistontologyfallsshortin explainingthe transnational dynamicsof
drug trafficking and the political realm of conflict in Colombia (Bagley and Tokatlin in
Stokes 2005: 9). By the same token, it can be argued that this ontology falls short in
explainingthedomesticrealmofformulatingforeignpolicyonthewarondrugsintheUS.
Therefore, the development of an integral understanding of US presence in Colombia
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remainshindered bythe state-centric premisesof traditionalscholarshipin International
Relations(IR).Thisresearchproblemisthestartingpointofthismasterthesis.
1.2. StateoftheArt
1.2.1. MainstreamConceptions
Within the debate on the significance of the war on drugs, two opposing streams of
literature stand out: the mainstream is generally devoted to justifying US interventions,
whiletheotherstreamismorecriticaltowardsthelegitimacyoftheseinterventions.Inthe
mainstreamonecandistinguishbetweentwosub-streams;theconservativestreamandthe
liberalstream.AsDougStokes(2005:5)argues,themainstreamspansnotonlymostofthe
academicliterature,butisalsotheapplieddiscourseinmostmediaandpolicydocuments.
Conservative scholars argue that drug trafficking in Latin America constitutes a security
threat to the US and has to betackled chiefly with military means (Downes 1999). Itis
argued that US foreign policy witnessed a shift towards even more reliance on military
meansafter9/11,asthewarondrugswasinfusedwithcounter-terrorelements.TheUS
NationalSecurityStrategyof2002mentionedthatinColombia,we[i.e.theUSgovernment]
recognizethelinkbetweenterroristandextremistgroupsthatchallengethesecurityofthe
stateanddrugtraffickingactivitiesthathelpfinancetheoperationsofsuchgroups(NSC
2002:10).AccordingtoStokes(2005:7),by actinguponconservativeideas,theemphasis
has consequentlycontinued to be placed on a militarized solutionto Colombias internal
violence. Without reflecting upon the consequences of such a militarized policy,
conservativescholarsgenerallyarguethataggressivestrategiesbestsafeguardUSinterests
abroad.
The liberal sub-stream opposes this view. That is, without questioning the
objectivesandlegitimacyofUSinterventions,itcriticizestheoverlymilitarizedemphasisof
conservative scholars. Thus, liberals rebut conservatives in their means, but not in their
ends. They acknowledge that solely military interventions have yet not succeeded to
containthelevelofdrugsenteringtheUS,andthatthereforesocialandeconomicsolutions
have to be pursued simultaneously (Ibid: 8). In this respect,Adam Isacson (2005) states
thatthewarondrugsreliesonawrongconceptualizationofthetrueproblem.Accordingto
him,thetrueproblemofdrugsisthatitthreatenssocialhealth,notnationalsecurity.Inthe
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liberalstream,social,economicandinstitutionalsolutionsareintroducedtofacethethreat,
not military ones. Nevertheless, this liberal approach also presumes the need for US
intervention.Inshort,mainstreamconceptionsjustifyUSinvolvementinColombia,whether
itisoutofaneedtocounteractanationalsecuritythreatoroutofresponsibilitytopromotepeace and democracy in the region. It is these premises that are questioned in critical
scholarship.
1.2.2. CriticalScholarship
CriticalscholarsnotonlyquestionthemeansthattheUSappliesinthewarondrugs,but
alsoits motivesandobjectives.Theybasetheircritiqueon thelargediscrepancybetween
realityanddiscourseandnotethatthewarondrugsisineffective,or,accordingtosome
scholars, counter-productive. Rather, critical scholars tend to argue that US strategies to
fight drugs and terrorism in Latin America are a continuation of aggressive Cold War-
policiesdesignedtopreserveacapitalistsocio-economicorderconducivetoUSinterests
(Stokes2005:11).Followingthislogic,GargiBhattacharyya(2005:93)notesthatthewar
ondrugswasneverdesignedtoeradicatedrugs,butmerelytoexpandUSdominationin
LatinAmerica.Accordingtoheranalysis,thewarondrugsisanendlessandineffectualwar
attempting to renew neo-colonialism by force and to replace the dependency of one era
withanotherthatbetterfitsthedynamicsofaglobalizedworld.Inthisprocess,thedrug
trade is not eradicated, but merely redeployed for other ends (Ibid). These ends are
investigatedbyDavidBewley-TaylorandMartinJelsma(2007).IncitingapassageofPeter
Zirnite(inIbid:284),theyarguethat'thelinkingofdrugstonationalsecurityprovidedthe
rationale(...)tojustifyexpandingtheroleoftheUSarmedforces'.Theyarguethiswhile
observing that after decades of fighting drug cartels and trafficking networks, military
surveillancehasproventobeunabletoreducetheflowofcocainetotheUS(Ibid:286).
Subsequently, they emphasize that it was, however, the only possible post-Cold War
justificationformaintainingUSarmedforcesonthecontinent(Ibid).AccordingtoBewley-
TaylorandJelsma,suchpresenceisrequiredbecauseSouthAmericanoilisofincreasing
importancefortheUS(Ibid:287).Inthatsense,9/11provedtobeausefulcatastrophe,asit
providedanewpretextforUSpresenceinColombiainatimeinwhichthewarondrugshad
become largely discredited. Mara Lemus (et. al.2005) argues that leftistguerrillas were
henceforth purposely framed asnarco-terrorists.Coletta Youngers(2005:355) trivializes
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the legitimacy of such a polarizing discourse by observing that there is no distinct
phenomenon asnarco-terrorismandthat ithashad detrimentaleffects onthestabilityof
Colombiassociety.VariousscholarsthereforearguethatUSpresenceinColombiahasonly
worsenedthemalleabledomesticsituationandthatitislikelytobemoreharmfultotheregionthancocainetradeitself(Guqueta2003:89,Fukumi2008).Inmanycriticalstudies,
acentralfocusisthusontheeffectsofUSmilitarypresence.
Forexample,RachelNield(2005:92)observesthatthewarondrugsprevailsover
efforts to democratize and stabilize Latin America. According to her, counter-narcotics
initiativestendtooverridelong-termandlow-resourcedemocratizationprocessesandshe
notesthatthisisunlikelytoresultinsuccessfulcounter-narcoticspolicies.Fukumi(2008:
174) elaborates on this by stating that instead of supporting democracy and protecting
human rights, US interventions have caused human rights violations through aerial
fumigation, military involvement and the undermining of democratic processes. Julia
Bauder(2008)continuesthislineofreasoningwhenshecontendsthatthewarondrugsis
heavilyviolatinghumanrightsinColombia;indirectlybyfundingmalignviolentgroupsand
directlythroughaerialfumigation.AccordingtoJaimeNietto(2007),theassertedUSright
to intervention in favour of liberal ideals has led to a situation in which the defence of
humanrightsanddemocracyaresubordinatedtoeconomicandstrategicinterests.
An interesting avenue of research concerns the nature of these economic and
strategicinterests.Theextenttowhichsuchinterestscanbeunderstoodasconfigurations
ofthenationalinterestissubjecttoacademicdebate.Variousscholarshavearguedthatthe
geopolitical strategies of the war on drugs concentrate on securing access to natural
resources, but fail to determine the nature of these geopolitical preferences. Although
Colombiaiscurrentlyaminorsupplierofoilto theUS,thedominanceoveritsoilfieldsis
arguedto beofstrategicimportanceinthenearbyfuture.Forexample,Stokes(2007)has
argued that the USintends tosecure its totalenergysupply bymeans ofdiversifying its
dependencyon oil.Thereby,heimpliesa certainnational interestoftheUSthathastobe
met. Onthe otherhand, NazihRachani(2005) argues that the 'war system' inColombia
meetsspecificgroupinterests.Hediscussestheroleoftransnationalcorporations(TNCs)in
theColombianconflictandstatesthatUSmilitaryaidtoColombiahashelpedto'subsidize
andperpetuatethecivilwarbychangingtheincentivestructureofdominantclasses'(Ibid:
138).Inaddition,hearguesthatColombiahasbecomemorevulnerabletothedemandsof
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foreign capital (Ibid: 128). Thereby, he implies that the war on drugs meets specific
interestsofdominantclassesandforeigncapital,ratherthanaunifiednationalinterest.
Insum,after9/11criticalscholarshiphasgainedleverageintheacademicrealmas
itprovidesnewanalyticalfocitounderstandtherealitiesofthewarondrugs.ThesefocivaryfrommoreorlessunifiedconceptionsofthenationalinterestthatleadsUSbehaviour
in Colombia to presumptions that stipulate the influence of specific group interests that
wieldinfluenceonthatnationalinterest.However,thelatterfocusremainsunderdeveloped
andrequiresbroaderacademicattention.
1.3. ResearchAim
Whereas the larger part of academic research on the war on drugs inColombia reflects
state-centric conceptions of the national interest, this dissertation aims to provide a
historicalmaterialistanalysisofitsnatureanddynamics.Moreover,giventhatthegreater
part of the public is largely ignorant of the consequences of this war, it aims to create
awarenessonitshumanitarianimpactontheColombiansociety.
1.4. ResearchQuestions
Thequestionthatguidesthisstudyaddressesthemotivationforthewarondrugsinthe
broadest sense. Primarily, it needs to find out why the US is fighting awar on drugs in
Colombia.Thisgeneralquestioncanbedifferentiatedintoseveralresearchquestions.First,
itisindispensabletounderstandwhobearsthecostsandwhoreapsthebenefitsfromthewar
ondrugs.Next,itisusefultotrackhowthepolicyofthewarondrugshasbeenshapedand
especiallywhichactorshaveinfluencedthispolicy-makingprocess.Answeringtheseresearch
questionsultimatelypermittheansweringoftheguidingquestion.Theforemosthypothesis
is that the war on drugs is to be understood as an imperialist project.However, such a
hypothesis presupposes the definitions of certain concepts. It is therefore important to
operationalize these concepts. Whereas operationalization is the process of making
theoretical concepts measurable, it is thus first necessary to set out a theoretical
framework.
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1.5. TheoreticalFramework
1.5.1. HistoricalMaterialism
Inordertoassessthemotivationsofthewarondrugs,itisnecessarytoexaminetowhatextent its promoted aims serve a genuine national interest, or rather specific group
interests. The Marxist traditionof historical materialism provides a useful frameworkto
analyze the nature of such interests. The ontology of this framework is based on the
premisethatallhistoryistheproductofthematerialconditionsoflife(Marx1845).Karl
Marx elaborated this stance by explaining how 'real individuals, their activity and the
materialconditionsunderwhichtheylive()aretobebutthepragmaticbasisofanysocial
analysisofreality(Ibid:4).Hecallsthispragmaticbasisthepoliticaleconomy(1971:20).It
is argued that this political economy contains a 'basic and fundamental contradiction'
because a small part of society owns the 'means of production' inthe economy and the
majorityhasto'surrendercontrolofitslabourpower()inordertoproducetheirown
means of subsistence'(Baldwin et.al. 2004: 95, Linklater 2005: 113).According to Marx
(1971:20),thispoliticaleconomyformsthematerialbasisofanideologicalsuperstructure
thatfacilitatesformsofsocialconsciousness.Inawell-knownpassagehethenarguesthat
itisnottheconsciousnessofmenthatdeterminestheirexistence,buttheirsocialexistence
thatdeterminestheirconsciousness(Ibid:21).Marxthereforereckonsthedevelopmentof
historytobearesultofmaterialpreconditions,orinotherwords:
Menmaketheirownhistory,buttheydonotmakeitastheyplease;theydonotmakeitunderself-
selectedcircumstances, but undercircumstances existing already,given and transmitted fromthe
past(Marx1852).
Following the logics of this theorem, it is clear that inequalities are inherently
relatedtothematerialbasisofsocietyandthattheseinequalitiesexpressthemselvesinthe
superstructure. Whereas Marx himself never provided a parsimonious definition of this
superstructure, a useful definition is provided by Gerald Cohen (1978: 216) in his
reinterpretationofhistoricalmaterialism.Cohenincludesthelegalsystemandthestatein
hisdefinitionandimpliesthatthesetwoinstitutionalspheresreflectstructuralinequalities
outofthematerialbasis.Theseinequalitiesleadtoastrugglebetweentheaforementioned
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majorityofsocietywithoutcontroloflabourpowerandthesmallpartofsocietythatown
the means of production. In general terms, Marx (1848) labelled these two groups
respectively proletariat and bourgeoisie, but they also go by the label of labour and
capitalorinmorepopulartermsaspublicormassandelite(Doyle1997:321,Harvey2006).
Hence,fundamentalmaterialinequalitiesthatresultfrompropertyrelationsinthe
politicaleconomyarereconstructedinthepoliticalsuperstructure.Toconceiveofthestate
anditspoliciesasanexpressionofthegeneralinterestofitspeopleisthereforeequalto
confirmingtheseinequalities.Onlybyacknowledgingthatthepreferencesofastatearean
expression of the political interests of a dominant class, it becomes possible to critically
scrutinizethewaysinwhichthisexpressionisconfigured.
1.5.2. MarxistTheoryandImperialism
Historicalmaterialismprovidesanoriginalbutdebatedperspectivetoanalyzeinternational
politics.Especiallywithintheframeworkofthisstudy,aninterestingavenueofcontinuing
Marxist debate worthy to discuss is the role of the state in world politics. As historical
materialistanalysisfocusesonclassesratherthanstates,MichealDoyle(1997:321)notes
thatthepoliticsofwarandpeace()takeplacetransnationally;acrossborders,notmerely
betweenorwithinthem(Ibid).Therealityofaninternationalstate-systemis,accordingto
Andrew Linklater (2005: 117), a confirmation of this stratification because it divides
humanity into nationalities whilst at the same putting control of state structures in the
handsofdominantclasses,whoallegedlypromotenationalinterests.Hence,alsoinaworld
societyperceivedasdividedintoclasses,statesplayasignificantpart.Aswillbeshownin
this section, recent scholarship on imperialism provides a useful theoretical account for
analyzingthewarondrugs.
1.5.2.1.DialecticalLogicsofImperialistPower
AsGiovanniArrighi(2005:23)argues,criticalthinkers,includingmanyMarxists,foundthe
conceptsofempireandimperialismoflittleanalyticaluseto describeUSglobalpowerin
the 1990s. However, since 9/11 and the US response to it, the dreaded concept of
imperialism has regainedleverage, both in academia andpublic discourse.David Harvey
(2003:26)warnsthatithassuchdifferentmeaningsthatitis difficulttouse() without
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clarificationasananalyticalratherthanapolemicalterm.TheconvergingworksofArrighi
and Harvey provide a useful analytical clarification of imperialism along the lines of
historicalmaterialism.
WhereasArrighi(2005:27)mentionsthatthemainstreamdefinitionofimperialismgenerallyemphasizestheextensionorimpositionof()power,authorityorinfluenceofa
stateoverotherstates,bothauthorsagreethatwithinthecapitalistmodeofproduction,
imperialism denotes not only this territorial logic of political power, but also a distinct
capitalistlogicofpower.Thiscapitalistlogicdescribesthepursuitofpowerasadriveto
commandovereconomiccapital(Ibid:28).Theselogicsof powerareno antagonisms,but
interconnectedcounterparts;onelogicgeneratescontradictionsthathavetobecontained
bytheother(Fay1996:224).Inthissense,imperialismistobeunderstoodasadialectical
fusionbetween thestrategicpolitics ofterritorialcontrol andthemolecularprocesses of
capitalaccumulationoverspaceandtime(Harvey2003:26).Intheliterature,thisfusionis
called capitalist imperialism and reflects the aforementioned need of capital for state
structures.HannahArendt(inArrighi2005:29)clarifiesthenatureofthisneedbystating
thattheprocessofcapitalaccumulationrequirespoliticalaccumulationofpowertoprotect
the growing property of capital. Joseph Schumpeter (in Ibid: 36) continues this line of
reasoning by emphasizing that these processes are based on the progressive capitalist
ideology of perpetual thirst for endless capital accumulation. Arrighi clarifies this by
stating that capital recurrently accumulates above what can be profitably reinvested in
existing territorial systems,which createsa tendency that Marx called thefalling rate of
profit(Ibid).Thistendencyidentifiesthedecliningrateofreturnoncapitalinvestmentasa
resultofcapitalbecomingmoreabundantthroughitsaccumulation,therebydecreasingthe
incentivetoinvest(Gilpin1987:36).
Imperialist behaviour is thus necessary to counteract this so-called crisis of
overaccumulation by creating spatial fixes: the incorporation of new spaces into the
systemof capitalaccumulationto absorbthesurpluscapitalandavertsuchcrises(Jessop
2006). Arrighi (2005: 36) and Harvey (2003: 88) subsequently argue that the global
capitalist system led by the US has been in such a crisis of overaccumulation since the
1970s.Therefore,theUShasappliedbothcovertandovertimperialiststrategiestoescape
thefallingrateofprofit.Notably,ithasdonesobymeansofintroducingneoliberalismin
worldpolitics.
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1.5.2.2.NeoliberalismandCapitalistImperialism
Harvey(2006)convincinglyshowshowneoliberalismhaseffectivelyrestoredthepowerof
dominantclassessincethe1980s.Byrelyingonappealingvaluessuchasindividuallibertyandvariouseconomicfreedoms,neoliberalismwas initiallywelcomedbymany countries.
Nevertheless,Harvey(Ibid: 145)argues thatneoliberalization has in effect swept across
theworldlikeavasttidalwaveofinstitutionalreformanddiscursiveadjustment,thereby
destructing institutional frameworks (), divisions of labour, social relations, welfare
provisions and so on. He continuesto explain that the crisis of overaccumulation in the
1970striggeredariseofsocialistandcommunistideaswithinthecapitalistworldeconomy
thatstartedtoposeaseverepoliticalandeconomicthreattotherulingelite(Ibid:148).In
ordertosecureitsinterests,theeliteintroducedneoliberalismasaneconomicandpolitical
toolkit that should revitalize global capital accumulation and, subsequently, restore class
power(Ibid:149).Harveycallsthemechanismthatredistributedwealthandincomefrom
the mass to the elite 'accumulation by dispossession' (Ibid: 153). He emphasizes that
deliberate manipulation and management of economic crises, state redistributions of
wealth,privatizationprocessesandincreasedfinancializationaretheprimaryexpressions
of capitalist imperialism (Ibid: 155). He then argues that the US has supported various
militarycoupsin LatinAmericathroughoutthe20thcenturyinordertoimposeneoliberal
economicreforms(Ibid:147).Recently,ithasdonesomoreovertlyafterthewarinIraq
(Harvey2003).Hence,libertyand freedom,thebasicvaluesof neoliberalism,arequickly
abandonedwhenevertheyconflictwiththisclassproject(Harvey2006:149).
1.6. Operationalization
1.6.1. OnConcepts
The operationalization of concepts is required to make the research questions more
manageable.Itis,however,impossibletodosoinaneutralway.JohnGerring(2001:35)
noted thatall social sciences arelinguistic expressions of thesocial world and that their
toolkitsmainlyrelyontheinterpretationoflanguage.Conceptformationcanthusbeseen
as the basis of social sciences and because this is an interpretative endeavour, it is
necessary to be explicit about the definitions used. This way, one can limit semantic
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confusion and promote scientific progress (Ibid). Moreover, due to the interpretative
nature,acrucialquestionin socialanalysisdealswiththeindicatorsof concepts: howcan
onemeasuretheoreticalconceptsinreality,or,howdoweknowitwhenweseeit(Ibid:
43)?Acentralconceptofthisstudyisthetermimperialism,whichisoperationalizedas
capitalist imperialism, ashasbeensetoutin the previoussection. Hence, itrefersto the
historical materialist proposition that the dominant class exerts geopolitical pressures
because it needs a spatial fix as a solution to the capitalist crisis of overacummulation.
Within the scope of thisthesis, these pressures express themselves both in military and
economic policies. Together, these policies are the foremost instruments of the war on
drugs.
The term war on drugs itself was first coined by former US President Richard
Nixon in 1971 and quickly made narcotics public enemy number one because its
connotationreflectedaggressivemeasurestocounteractanexternalthreat(NationalPublic
Radio2007).Thewar ondrugsisthusa metaphoricalconstructaimedatgainingsupport
forasetofUScounter-narcoticspoliciesamongthepublic.Asapartofthismetaphor,it
refers to the actual militarization of counter-narcotics policies in Colombia. Though,
because various economic measures have been taken simultaneously under the same
pretext,thewarondrugsisbothawarofhardandsoftpower.Therefore,thetermwaron
drugsisoperationalizedasametaphoricalconstructaimedatlegitimizingasetofmilitary
andeconomicpoliciesinColombia.
Ascanbegatheredfromthetheoreticalframework,theeconomicpoliciesofthewar
on drugs are based on the principles of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the economic
doctrinethatproposestheliberalizationoftheeconomyinordertoadvancehumanwell-
being (Harvey 2006: 145). However, in Colombia the ideology of neoliberalism conflicts
with itsreality. The practiceof neoliberalism in the war ondrugscan therefore best be
operationalized as the specific processes of privatization, financialization and crisis
manipulationthatredistributewealthfromthemajoritytothedominantclass,i.e.asthe
mechanismsofaccumulationbydispossession.
Thedominantclassisnotdefinedinatomistictermsofhumanbeings,butratherin
theholisticsenseoftransnationalcorporations(TNCs).Inmoderncapitalism,TNCsarethe
mainagentsofcapitalaccumulationandthusthemostimportantactorstoanalyzeinan
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assessmentofthemotivationsandinterestsinthewarondrugs.Finally,anothercentral
actoristheUS,whichisagenerictermfortheofficialstateapparatusofallgovernmental
departments and affiliated agencies within the US and which can be referred to in
theoreticaltermsasthepoliticalsuperstructure.
1.6.2 IdentifyingCapitalistImperialismintheWaronDrugs
As the discussed concepts are embedded in a historical materialist framework, they are
related in such a way that a distinct pattern or mechanism can be identified. In this
mechanism,theneedforcapitalaccumulationbythedominantclasscanbeunderstoodas
aninherentpartofthecapitalistmodeofproduction.ThismeansthattheinterestsofTNCs
are to be conceived of as an independent variable, which subsequently implies that the
eventual policies on the war on drugs are dependent of these interests. In order to
understandthislogic,itisnecessaryto understandthewaysin whichUS foreignpolicyis
shaped. According to historical materialism, this process takes place in the political
superstructureandthereforereflectsskewerproductionrelationsoutofthematerialbasis.
Asa result, the policy-making process has tobe seen as a product that is influenced by
TNCs.Onlyby examiningtheextentof thisinfluenceitbecomespossibletoshowwhythe
USisfightingawarondrugsinColombia.
1.7. Methodology
1.7.1. ProcessTracingBecausethewarondrugsinColombiaisdeeplyrootedinhistoricalconditions,anin-depth
case-studyis themostsuitedapproachto analyzeitsnatureanddynamicswithacademic
rigour.Inthisanalysis,themethodofprocesstracingisspecificallyuseful.Processtracingis
the method of following the process between an independent and a dependent variable,
whichis inthis casethe process betweenthe interests ofthedominant classon the one
handandactualUSforeignpolicyonthewarondrugsontheother.Accordingtorecent
appraisalof thismethodbyJeffreyCheckel(2005:5),a majorbenefitof processtracingis
thatitprovidesthemethodologicalbasisforanaccountofsocialchangebecauseofitsfocus
on identifyingmechanisms. Thisis a merit in current research areas of political science,
especiallybecausemanytheoriesthusfaronproblemsofinterestininternationalrelations
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() and US politics are probabilistic statements that do not specify the causal process
(BennettandGeorge2005:209).Thebestwaytomeasurethiscausalprocessistorelyon
harddata. The relative transparent nature of US politicsmakes it possibleto investigate
how the dominant class influenced the policy-making process of the war on drugs bytrackinglobbyingactivitiesfromTNCsinthepoliticalrealm.
Additionally, this lobbying data is backed by extensive historical analysis of the
dynamicsofthewarondrugsinColombiathroughtheperspectiveofhistoricalmaterialism.
Moreover, this historical analysis contributes to the aim of creating awareness of the
humanitarianimpactofthewarontheColombianpeople.
1.7.2. GeneralConsiderations
Inadoptingahistoricalmaterialistperspective,thefocusofthisstudyisonthepowerof
dominant classes in the war on drugs and enables a profound analysis of the specific
intereststhatitmeets.Thelargerpartofcurrentresearchlackssuchananalysisanditis
thereforeausefulcontributiontotheliteratureonthistopic.Nevertheless,duetothein-
depthanalysisofmaterialinterests,theroleofideologyinthewarondrugsisconsequently
reducedtoafunctionofmaterialpowerrelations,whichisalimitationtothereachofthis
study.Itishoweverimpossibletocomprehendallthevariablesofawarandtheoriginality
ofthisperspectivemightclearsomeofthefogthatcoversthewarondrugs.
1.8. ThesisOutline
After having set out the framework of the dissertation in this chapter, chapter two
continueswithadiscussionofthenature,historyanddynamicsofthewarondrugs.Herein,
awidearrayofdataconcerningtheferocityoftheongoingconflictinColombiaispresented,
as well as data on the ineffectiveness of US counter-narcotics policies. These data are
supportivetotheargumentthatthewarondrugsisnotprimarilymeanttoeradicatedrugs,
butthatithasaboveallbeenusedasapretexttojustifyalowintensitycounter-insurgency
onsocialforcesthatchallengethepowerofthestatus-quo.
InchapterthreeitisfurtherexaminedwhytheUSisfightingthisineffective,unjust
andviolentwarondrugs.FocusingondomesticprocessesinUSpolitics,itisdemonstrated
that the nature of its policy-making process is highly susceptible to corporate influence
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throughlobbying.Itisarguedthatthebusinesslobbyingeneralandthemilitary-industrial
complex in specific have pushed Congress extensively to pass the legislation on Plan
Colombia,alarge-scaleaidpackageconsistingchieflyofneoliberalandmilitarypolicies.
In a concluding chapter the findings are recapitulated and used to answer theresearchquestionsandelaborateontheprospectsforthefutureofColombia.
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2. THEPOLITICALECONOMYOFTHEWARONDRUGS
TheUS-ledwarondrugsinColombiaisfoughtinthecontextofanongoingviolentdomestic
conflict.Overtime,thiswarandconflicthavebeenentangledanditisthereforeimpossibletoisolateonefromanother,evenwereittobeforanalyticalpurposesonly.Bythesame
token,thewarondrugscanneitherbeunderstoodasauniqueexpressionofUSforeign
policy.Thischapterthereforefirstexplainshow thewarondrugsissituatedin thelarger
contextofUSinterventionsinLatinAmericaand,subsequently,itshowswhythewaron
drugsisafarceandhowitaffectsthehumanitariansituationinColombia.
2.1. TheViolentHistoryofColombiasDemocracy
Thehistoricalrootsofthedomesticconflictcanbetracedbacktotheearly19 th century,
when the colonial era left a legacy of land-owning elites and a poor, often non-white,
majority in the area now known as Colombia (Livingstone 2003: 59). Due to diverging
interestsofdifferentregionalelites,theprocessofstate-buildinghadbeentroublingfrom
the outset. In 1848 and 1849, these elites organized themselves in respectively the
ConservativeandtheLiberalparty,allegedlytopromoteanationalinterest(Ibid:61).This
marked the beginning of the bipartisan politics that characterize Colombias history.
Although both parties were essentially vehicles of the dominant class, the bipartisan
structuremobilizedmassesofpeopleandhencepolarizedsocietyintoaConservativeanda
Liberalcamp.Thissubsequentlyresultedineightcivilwars,togetherclaimingover250,000
lives(MazzucaandRobinson285,296).AsWilliamAvils(2006:25)correctlyargues,these
wars already emphasized the elitist andexclusionary character of Colombias democracy
throughout the 20th century, because both parties were led by the elite and employed
violenttacticstoexcludeorco-optpopularoppositiontotheircontrol.Inaddition,Russel
Crandall (2002: 54) stipulates that since one of the two parties was always in power,
violence increasingly began to resemble a battle between the government and its
opponents.
Inthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury,economicdevelopmenthelpedColombiatoenter
theworldeconomywithacompetitivepositioninthecoffeemarket.Livingstone(2003:63)
clarifies that this development madeColombiabetteraccessibleforforeigncapital,which
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consequently triggered more economic development, thereby facilitating urbanization,
industrializationand,hence,theriseofnewclasses.Inthemidstofthesedevelopments,a
radicalfractionledbyJorgeGaitnsplitfromtheLiberalpartyasitpromotedmorestate
controlontheeconomy,inordertodistributetheincreasingbenefitsofinternationaltrademoreequally.Heaccusedbothpartiesofservingonlytheinterestsoftheoligarchyand
opposedthecontinuingviolenceofthestateagainsttheopposition(Crandall2002:55).He
managed to mobilizemasses of people in his 1946presidentialcampaign, butultimately
failedto wintheelections.Gaitnnonethelesscontinuedhisrallyingagainst theoligarchy
andwasassassinatedin1948,whichledtoamassoutrageinBogotthatisreferredtoas
theBogotazo(Ibid).
TheBogotazosubsequentlyledtooneofthemostferociousperiodsinColombian
history,knownas LaViolencia.Thebipartisanconflicthadbecomeaconduitforahostof
otherconflictsandincreasinglydevelopedintoaviolentaccumulationofsocial,economic,
localandpersonalconflicts(Ibid:67).Itclaimedover200,000livesinmerelytenyearsof
virtualanarchy(Stokes2005:68).In1953thesocialupheavalwassilencedaggressivelyby
a militarycoup (Livingstone 2003: 68). As a result, the traditional parties cooperated to
regainpowerin1958.TheydidsobysigningagentlemensagreementcalledtheNational
Front,therebyconsentingonthesharingofleadershipinfour-yearterms(Ibid).Thisway,
traditionalelitescontinuedtodominatethepoliticalsystem.
The regainingof powerby the traditional partiesstrengthened the power of the
eliteandputintooperationmoreeconomicmodernization.Inordertoeasetherelations
with the army and to secure theirextended economic power, the army was given more
autonomy.Consequently,thearmycontinuedtheirrepressiveactions,butasanunintended
consequencepopularoppositionbegantotakeonstructuralforms.Mainlyinruralareas,
where the economic consequences of political exclusion were experienced most heavily,
insurgent movements easily gained support in the population and this resulted in the
establishment of the guerrilla movementsFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC) andEjrcito de Liberacin Nacional (ELN) in 1964 (Molano 2000: 26). Although
triggeredbythesameinjusticeandsuppression,theFARCstartedoutasapeasantarmy
with a pragmatic vision, often oriented more locally than nationally, while the ELN was
founded by leftist intellectuals with a more idealist Marxist aim inspired by Ernesto
Guevarasrevolutionaryideasonguerrillawarfare(Livingstone2003:72).
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Theseguerrillamovementsdevelopedintowell-organizedgroupsduringthe1970s.
BoththeFARCandtheELNgainedmoreterritoryandsupportinruralareasandimposeda
taxonbigland-ownersin orderto financetheiractivities(Crandall2002:84).As aresult,
big land-owners established self-defence groups that were also institutionalized by thegovernmenttoprotecttheinterestsoftheelite.Mostimportantly,thelate1970smarked
the beginning of the intertwining of the drug trade with the political conflict, when
displacedpeasantsfromguerrillamovementsstartedtogrowcoca.Althoughtheguerrillas
initiallytriedtoresistthistendency,bothfromamoralperspectiveandbecausetheywere
afraid that it would create a class of wealthy farmers that would no longer support its
politicalaims,extremepovertywithintheirpeasantsupportleftthemwithnochoicebutto
allowit,ascocaisaneasybutprofitablecroptogrow(Livingstone2003:76,Molano2000:
27).AstheFARCwasapragmaticmovement,itmanagedtoturnthecocaboomtotheirown
advantage and started to tax the trade, managed to co-exist with drug traffickers, but
restrained from trafficking itself (Livingstone 2003: 76). Trafficking was the domain of
notoriousdrugcartelsthatalsocameintobeinginthe1970s.TheMeddeln-cartelledby
Pablo Escobar became a monopolist in the trade and its profits started to corrupt all
sectionsofsociety(Livingstone2003:82).
Most intertwining of drug traffickingandpoliticalviolence occurred in the1980s
whenlarge-scaledrugtraffickersbecameawealthyclassthemselvesduetothehighprofits
returnedontheirbusiness.Theygraduallystartedtosharethesamehatredofguerrillas
withthebigland-ownersand,asaresult,analliancegrewupbetweenthetraditionalland-
owners, the narco-bourgeoisie and the military (Ibid: 78). The self-defence groups, or
paramilitaries, now also started to operate by order of the narco-bourgeoisie. As these
paramilitaries sophisticatedtheirmutualorganizationover timeandextended their cruel
andviolentmethods,theydeliberatelybegantolivealifeoftheirown(Crandall2002:86).
Atragicexampleofthisistheirkillingof3,000membersoftheUninPatriotica ,aleft-wing
politicalpartyinitiatedby theFARC(Livingstone2009:116).Thisway,the politicalcrisis
that had been apparent since Colombias independence began to transform into a
complicated and violent conflict between the government, the guerrillas and the
paramilitaries.Inthisconflict,theambiguousrelationbetweenthenarco-bourgeoisieand
theguerrillasisunclear.Onetheonehand,theyrelieduponeachotherinthedrugvalue
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chain,butinideologicaltermstheywereopponents.However,itisclearthattheentranceof
drugmoneyintheconflictappearedtobeoilonthefire.
ThehistoricalrootsofColombiasdomesticconflictaretobefoundinmajorclass
conflict,politicalexclusionandlarge-scaleviolence-by-reprisal.Nevertheless,historyalonecannotaccountforthebrutalityandseverityofthiscrisis,because'ifthecrisisstillhasits
rootsin history,it seemsto have taken ona lifeof its own, feeding onitself, enveloping
societyintoaviciouscircleofviolencewithnoendinsight'(Bergquistet.al.2001:vii).
2.2. USForeignPolicytowardsColombia
2.2.1. HistoricalConnectionsbetweentheUSandColombiaWhereasitisimportanttoincludethehistoricalrootsofColombia'sdomesticconflictinthe
analysisofthewarondrugs,bythesametokenitisindispensabletoplacetheroleofUS
foreign policy towards Colombia in a broader perspective. Therefore, this paragraph
discussesboththegeneralhistoryofUSinterestsinLatinAmerica,aswellasthemeansby
whichtheseinterestshavebeenpromotedinColombiathroughouttheyears.
2.2.1.1.LatinAmericaasAmericasBackyard
In1823theUSyetexpresseditsinterestinLatinAmericabymeansoftheMonroe-doctrine,
in which former President James Monroe warned that the US would not tolerate any
Europeanattempttorestoreitscolonialholdonthecontinent(LaFeber2008:48).Ittook
untiltheendofthe19 thcenturybeforetheUSstartedtoshowimperialbehaviouritself.In
fact,asMikeMarqusee(2007:98)argues,itwasoneoftherareperiodsinwhichtheUShas
spokenopenlyofitselfasanempire.PresidentTheodoreRooseveltevenarguedin1904
thatchronicwrong-doingandincompetencemightforcetheUStoactasaninternational
police agent in thehemisphere, therebyoffering an idealistbasis for US expansion (Ibid:
100).AccordingtoGregGandin(2006:20),theUSinvadedLatinAmericaatleastthirty-four
timesduringthefirstthreedecadesofthe20 thcentury.Thiseracoincidedwithabigwave
of capitalist expansion and a burst of US investment in Latin America (Bergquist in
Marqusee2007: 99). Gandin (2006: 27) emphasizes that itshaped the USconception of
capitalistimperialism,asthegoalsofnationalsecurity,overseascapitalistdevelopmentand
democraticreformsjointlyenteredtheideologicalrealm.Hecriticallystatesthatasofthat
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moment, Washington has intervened in Latin America to conform to the standards of
internationalcapitalism(Ibid).
However,theovert imperialist moment came toa halt duringthe presidency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). Facing the severe economic crisis of the 1930s and heavyresistancetoimperialiststrategiesinMexicoandNicaragua,FDRfavouredaninwardlook
ratherthananexpansionistfocusandimplementedtheso-calledGoodNeighbourpolicy.
Based on the premise of non-intervention, this incentive withdrew US troops from the
region and resulted in an increased goodwill in Latin American countries (Ibid). This
subsequently opened the way for a decade of unparalleled hemispheric cooperation, in
whichmultipleeconomic,politicalandmilitarytreatiesweresignedbetweentheUSand
variousLatinAmerican countries (Ibid:34). Insteadof unilateraldomination,multilateral
institutions became thecontrollingforces of their ties. As it unleashed a variety of trade
agreements,theUSwasabletousetheGoodNeighbourpolicyasaprojecttorecoverfrom
the Great Depression (Ibid: 35). FDRs shift from hard power to soft power was thus a
successfulstrategy.
Nevertheless, at its heydaythesoftpower-approach beganto turn againstitself.
Inspiredby promises of democratic autonomy, Latin American countries started to form
andreformdemocraciesinthe1940s,withinitialsupportoftheUS.However,Gandin(Ibid:
41) argues that the Cold War triggered the USto favour anti-Communist regimes in the
regionratherthandemocraticregimes defacto andeventuallydemocratizationstarted to
endangerUS investmentsinLatinAmerica,asitinvokedmassstrikesthatcalledformore
equaldistributionsofwealth.BoththeeconomicthreattoUScorporateinvestmentsandthe
politicalthreatoftheColdWarlefttheUSwithnochoicebuttoabandontheirsoftpower-
approachinthelongrun.
Recently, the distressing effects of the need for pro-Washington and pro-capital
regimes in Latin America have widely been documented by various scholars and official
truthcommissions.SincetheCIA-backedcoupinGuatemalain1954,inwhichademocratic
governmentwasremovedinfavourofaviolentdictatorship,theUShasrepeatedlybeen
accusedofcovertlysupportingstateterrorisminLatinAmericathroughoutthe20thcentury
(Gareau2004:44).HundredsofthousandsofpeoplesufferedtheconsequencesoftheseUS
sponsoreddictatorships.InGuatemala,aUNtruthcommissionreported42,275victimsand
found that the US-backed government was responsible for 93% of these killings and
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desaparacidos (Ibid: 45). In El Salvador, a UN truth commission reported over 75,000
victimsandstatedthattheUS-backedSalvadorangovernmentwasresponsibleforatleast
95%oftheviolence(Ibid:41).Thestartlingimageofatrocitiesissimilarinothercountries:
brutal violence in Latin America haslargelybeen committedby US-backed governments,not by guerrillas, and the victims have significantly been more often civilians than
guerrillas.
What can be gatheredfrom these examplesis that US interestsin LatinAmerica
have barely changed over time. With a record of more than eighty covert and overt
interventions in Latin America ever since, the US has been promoting democracy where
possible, but counter-insurgency where needed in order to protect its investments
(Livingstone2003:171).Ithaspromotedfreedomandsecurity,notforthelargerpartof
theLatinAmericanpeople,butforthedominantclasses.SinceTheodoreRoosevelt,theUS
hasconceivedofLatinAmericaasitsownbackyard(Livingstone2009).
2.2.1.2.FromAdversariestoAllies
In the light ofthishistory, itis fruitfulto shed a lighton the political relations between
Colombia and the US before the war on drugs. These relations find their origins in the
quarrelontheconstructionofthePanamaCanalattheturnof the20thcentury.Thefailed
negotiationsbetweentheUSandColombialedtheUStosearchforotherwaystopushfor
theirdesiredcanalroute.BybackingthesecessionistleadersofthePanamanianelitewith
militarysupportintheirstruggleforindependence,theUSwasawardedwithacontractby
Panamanianofficialsontheconstructionofa canalthroughtheirterritoryassoonasthey
gained independence (Ibid: 20). This angered the Colombian government and the
problematictieswithColombiawerenotrestoreduntilthe1920s,whentheUSaimedto
benefitfromtherapideconomicdevelopmentofColombia.Asnoticedbefore,thiseconomic
development attracted foreign capital and, henceforth, US investors were an important
actorinrepairingtheharmedrelationshipwithColombia(Ibid).TheGoodNeighbourpolicy
subsequently eased the relation even more, which on its turn resulted in additional
investments.
TheriseofGaitnandthe1948BogotazotendedtoaltertheviewsoftheUS.Living
in the Cold War-era, these developments were easily perceived as disturbing signs of
susceptibility to communist ideas (Ibid: 23). However, the US found that the Colombian
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governmentwasavigorousallyinthefightagainstcommunismanditmadeColombiaa
showcaseforcapitalistdevelopmentandmodernizationinthe1960s(Crandall2002:24).
Meanwhile, to counteract the threat of communism the US simultaneously enhanced its
militaryrelationswithColombia.In1952,amilitaryagreementwassignedthatenabledtheUSto supportthe Colombian armyinits fight againstvariousinternalsecurityproblems
(Ibid: 24). Livingstone (2003: 179) shows that an average of 300 Colombian officers
receivedtheirmilitarytrainingintheUSannuallybetween1952and1980;morethanany
other Latin American country. Moreover, in the 1980s this number rose over the 700;
roughly twice as much as any other Latin American country (Ibid: 181). In a profound
assessmentof USmilitarymanualsthatwereusedbytheColombianarmythroughoutthe
1960s, Stokes (2005: 60-67) concludes that the US exclusively instructed counter-
insurgencywarfare.ItindicatesthattheColombianarmyhasincreasinglyreliedontraining
andaidfromtheUSinitsrepressionofpeasantsinruralareasand,hence,thatbotharmies
shareahistorythatgoesfarbeyondthewarondrugs.
2.2.2. MilitarizationoftheWaronDrugs
Takingintoaccounttheaforementionedhistory,itisevidentthatthewarondrugscannot
be understood in a vacuum. Rather, it has to be viewed in light of the continuity of US
interestsandmilitarysupportinColombia.Notwithstanding,PresidentNixondeclaredthe
war on drugs in 1971 allegedly in response to the domestic threat of a growing drug
endemicandnotasaninterventioninColombia(Bewley-TaylorandJelsma2007:284).In
thisrespect,theuseoftheword'war'ismetaphoricalandisappliedinordertolinkthe
issueofdrugstonationalsecurity.Unfortunately,duetothesecuritizationofthedrugissue
little timeand debate havebeen spent on thequestion whether thesolution to thedrug
endemicwastobefoundonthesupply-sideatall.
Whereasthe1980switnessedtheintertwiningofdrugtraffickingandthepolitical
conflictinColombia,theinitialtrainingofUStroopsinColombiawasaimedatcopingwith
narco-guerrillas and thus has equated drug traffickers with guerrillas from the outset
(Ibid).Bothwereperceivedasdangerousrepresentativesofthecommunistthreatanditis
argued that the war on drugs was welcomed by the Colombian government because it
providedsupportforitscounter-insurgency,inwhichnotonlyinsurgentsweretargeted,
butvirtuallyanyonethatthegovernmentlabelledsubversive(Avils2006:49).Quotingan
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anonymousUSofficer,Avilsnotesthatthereislittledifferencebetweencounter-narcotics
andcounter-insurgency;thechangeinvocabularyisonlyduetothefactthatthelatterword
is 'politically too sensitive' (Ibid: 47). According to official US discourse, the case of
Colombiaisa low intensityconflict,butithasbeenarguedthatthisis onlyanothertermfor counter-insurgency warfare outsourced to the local army and paramilitaries
(Livingstone2003:175).
Meanwhile,theColombiangovernmentwasinanambiguousposition.Traditionally
itsmainprioritywaskeepingitspeopleincheckwhilstdefendingtheinterestsofdominant
classes.Thedrug-bourgeoisiehadgraduallybecomesuchaclassduetothevastamountsof
capitalthatitgenerated.Intheearly1990sitlaunchedaviolentoffensiveagainstthestate
andthejudicialsysteminordertoensurethatnoonewoulddaretospeakoutagainsttheir
dominance (Ibid:83).Consequently,thegovernmentwas reluctantto complywiththe US
demandsofextradition.Ontheotherhand,becausetheUShadyetproventobea reliable
partner in its counter-insurgency objectives, the Colombian government was eager to
attract more US aid. This aid was provided by the Andean Initiative; a $2,2 billion
investmentintheAndeancountries,therebyincorporatingthesignificantpreconditionfor
Colombia that ithad to open its economy more to the penetration of US capital (Stokes
2005:85).Inthefollowingyears,USmilitaryaidwouldincreaseabouttenfold(Livingstone
2003:181).Sincethe1980stheUShasbeenmilitarizingthewarondrugs,whilstatthe
same time pushing for the liberalization of the Colombian economy. The most extensive
initiative by which it has done so is Plan Colombia. The contents of this versatile aid-
packagearediscussedinthenextalinea.
2.2.2.1.PlanColombia
InitiallypromotedbyColombianPresidentPastranain1999asacomprehensivesocialand
economic plan to restore security and peace through a $7,5 billion aid package, Plan
ColombiawastakenonbytheUSasameanstoextenditsinfluenceinthecountry.Initially,
theplandidnotspeakaboutmilitaryaidatall,butduetoColombiasneedforUSfinancial
backing,policymakersoftheClinton-administrationwereabletotransformPastranasidea
into a large-scale militarized plan that involved the US army and private contractors
(Livingstone 2003: 147). In first instance, Colombia planned to contribute $4 billion and
expected the international community to finance the remaining part. As a result of the
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transformation, however, the funding became problematic as most European countries
refused to contribute because they rejected the military emphasis of the aid package
(Stokes2005:93).Eventually,asdatafromtheCenterforInternationalPolicy(CIP)shows,
whentheUScontributed$1,3billionoverthefiscalyears2000and2001with75%ofthisbudget reserved for military aid, Pastranas original idea of social and economic
development remained nowhere to be found (CIP 2005). The Plan Colombia that was
implementedwasthusessentiallyaplanforwarratherthanaplanforpeace.
The military aid package of the plan has been substantial. In an extensive
assessmentbytheUSGovernmentalAccountabilityOffice(GAO)itisstatedthat,sincethe
comingintoforceofPlanColombia,theUShasprovided$4,9billioninmilitaryaidtothe
Colombian military and police, compared to only $1 billion in social and economic
developmentinthesameperiod(GAO2008:15, 28).Inmaterialterms,thelargestpartof
thismilitaryaidwasinvestedinhelicopters:theUSprovidedColombiawith72helicopters,
withanetworthofover$1,3billion(Ibid:28).Additionally,over$103millionhasbeen
spentonthetrainingandequippingofColombiangroundforcesandtheestablishmentofa
new counter-narcotics brigade (Ibid: 33). Under the label of infrastructure security, an
additional$115millionhasbeenspentonthetrainingof amilitarydivisionthathasbeen
chargedwithsecuringtheimportantCaoLimn-ConveasoilpipelineinEasternColombia
(Ibid: 35). In addition to these military investments, Plan Colombia promoted biological
warfare through aerial fumigation as a means to destroy drug crops (Livingstone 2009:
119).Thispracticehadyetbeencarriedoutsincethe1990s,buthasincreaseddramatically
inscopeafter2000(Jelsma2000,Livingstone2003:160).
2.2.2.2.RiseoftheTerror-CrimeNexus
Shortlyaftertheimplementationof Plan Colombia, theterroristattacksof 9/11fractured
theUSsenseofinvincibility.Often,9/11isinIRconceptualizedasacrucialturningpointin
international politics. However, as regards the war on drugs it is difficult to expose a
fundamental shift in US policy towards Colombia as US military presence in the region
continuedunhindered.Though,whathaschangedsignificantlyistheofficialdiscoursethat
legitimizedtheseactions.Whereasthewarondrugswasformerlyformallyseparatedfrom
the domestic political struggle and the counter-insurgency of the government, the Bush-
administrationcouldnowopenlyadmitthatitwasalsofightingawaragainstinsurgents
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(Stokes2005:105).ThisisexactlywhatSenatorJohnMcCain(2002)didwhenhenoted
that American policy has dispensed with the illusion that the Colombian government is
fightingtwoseparatewarsandAmericanpolicynowrecognizesthatreality,andabandons
anyfictional distinctionsbetweencounter-narcotics andcounter-insurgency. Inaddition,UScoordinatorforcounterterrorismFrancisTaylor(2001)portrayedtheFARCasthemost
dangerousinternational terrorist group basedin thishemisphere.After9/11,ithas been
openlyadmittedthatthewarondrugswasnolongersolelyaboutdrugs.Legallyspeaking,
the result of the terrorization of the war on drugs made it easier for US troops to get
involved in the counter-insurgency. They could now carry out special operations
themselves,insteadofhavingtorelyonlocalsoldiers(Livingstone2009:159).
Theriseoftheterror-crimenexusintheofficialdiscoursedoesnotrefertoanactual
change in the organizational structure of the guerrillas, but is chiefly a new pretext to
legitimize the continuing counter-insurgency of the US and the Colombian government
againstallegedsubversiveforces.InordertounderstandwhytheBush-administrationdid
notsticktothetraditionalpretextofcounter-narcoticsafter9/11,oneneedstotakeinto
account the lack of effects of the war on drugs. However, prior to this discussion it is
necessary to show why the war on drugs is simultaneously a continuation of economic
policiestowardsColombia.
2.2.3. TheWaronDrugsasNeoliberalization
Theaforementioneddiscussionon thehistoryof USinterestsin LatinAmericashowsthat
theUShasyetlongbeenpromotingliberaleconomicprinciplesinColombiatoensurethat
itscompaniescouldflourish.Sincethe militaryagreementof1952,the USgotinvolved in
thedomesticconflictandithasbeenarguedthatthisinvolvementhasonlybeenaimedat
destroyingaperceivedthreattotheexistingstructureofsocio-economicprivilege'andat
the 'integration of Colombia into the global system on the terms that the US demands'
(Chomsky 2000: 68, 73). The terms that Noam Chomsky mentions are the terms of
neoliberalism.
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2.2.3.1.TheEconomicsofPlanColombia
ThetermsofneoliberalismarewellintegratedinPlanColombia.Itis typicalthatthefirst
chapteroftheplanconcernstherestructuringoftheeconomy,whereassubjectsasdrug
demandreduction,the peace process,democratizationandsocialdevelopmentonlycomeupfordiscussioninlaterchapters(PlanColombia1999).Indeed,aconsiderableefforthas
beentakentoensurethattheplanpushesforneoliberalreforms.Itadvocatesa'fiscaland
financial strategy that includes though austerity and adjustment measures', partly to
'recover the historically excellent prestige of Colombia in the international financial
markets'(Ibid). Thehistorically excellent prestigedoes howevernot refer toits domestic
market,whichishistoricallycharacterizedbyextremeunequaldivisionsofwealth(Stokes
2005: 4). The general lack of attention for socio-economic development that should
distributewealthmoreequallyisreflectedinthebudgetoftheplan.Asarguedbefore,with
75% of the budget reserved for military purposes, the possibilities for socio-economic
developmentareratherlimited.
The US nonetheless contends that alternative development programmes are a
centralelementofPlanColombia.A GAO-report(2004:9)showsthatuntil2004only$84
millionhadbeenspentontheseefforts.Comparedtothe$2.7billionthathadbeenspenton
militaryissuesduringthesamelengthoftime,thisamountissignificantlylow.TheGAO-
reportadditionally shows that theoriginalalternative developmentprogrammeof theUS
Agency for International Development (USAID) had an estimated cost of $4 billion. This
amount equals the total reservation for the military programme and would have had
profound effects on socio-economic development (Ibid: 11). However, the policy makers
drastically adjustedthe amount, which is a clear indicator of themarginal importance of
socio-economicdevelopmentinthefinalPlanColombia.
In the first chapter of the plan, the need to stabilize the economy is emphasized.
According to the plan, a stable economy can be achieved through privatizationof public
companies and 'rationalization' of public finance (Plan Colombia 1999). Together with
though austerity, these measures fall remarkably well in line with general neoliberal
strategies.TakingintoaccountthetransformationoftheplanbyUSpolicymakersandthe
subsequentcompelledacceptanceofitbytheColombiangovernment,itcanthereforebe
argued that the plan resembles another neoliberal tidal wave of institutional reform and
discursiveadjustment.
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2.2.3.2.US-ColombiaFreeTradeAgreement
The mostrecent attempt to liberalize the Colombian economy is the proposal of the US-
Colombia Trade Promotion Act, better known as the Colombia Free Trade Agreement
(CFTA),a bilateraltreatythatshouldeliminatevirtuallyalltradebarriersbetweentheUSandColombia(Villareal2008).ItissaidthattheCFTAwillbebeneficialtobothcountriesas
itislikelytoincreasemutualtrade(Ibid:2).Moreover,proponentsoftheCFTAarguethatit
willtriggereconomicdevelopmentasithasstabilizingeffectsontheeconomyduetoarise
in foreign direct investment (FDI) and improved investor confidence (Ibid: 3). Not
surprisingly, the CFTA proposal has raised many criticisms. The bottom line of these
criticismsisthatapossibleimplementationwouldimplicitlylegitimizeagovernmentthatis
failing on its basic principles of democracy and human rights (Cardona et. al. 2008: 4).
Additionally,itisclaimedthattheCFTAisinextricablylinkedtotheongoingconflictand
will only secure the economicinterests of TNCs,not thoseof the majorityof the people
(Ibid:13).GaryLeech(2006)elaboratesonthisbynotingthattheCFTA'dramaticallyopens
theColombianmarkettoUSproducers',but'onlyallowsaslightincreaseinaccesstotheUS
marketsforColombians'.
Most importantly, the measures that areused in estimationsthatemphasize the
positiveeffectsof theCFTA lookat shifts in overalleconomicdevelopment:a rise of the
grossdomesticproduct(GDP),animprovedtradebalanceandincreasedFDI.However,all
thesemacro-economicmeasures saylittleaboutthe distributionof additionalwealththat
might be generated through the CFTA. Taking into account Colombias highly unequal
income distribution that lies at the roots of the conflict, the CFTA will not be able to
influence the distribution of this wealth. Instead, it is likely to invoke ever increasing
inequalities in the income distribution (Ibid). In line with the neoliberal policies of Plan
Colombia,theCFTAcanthereforebestbeperceivedasanothervehicleforneoliberalization.
2.3. OntheNatureofDrugValueChains
2.3.1. IllicitTradeintheGlobalEconomy
Theallegedtargetsofthewarondrugsarenotthatdifferentfromitsbeneficiaries.Whereas
TNCsaimtoaccumulatewealthinthelegaleconomy,thedrug-bourgeoisieaimstodo the
sameintheilliciteconomy.Asaresultofeconomicglobalization,thesetwoeconomieshave
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becomepervasivelyintegrated.Globalizationmadeiteasierforcapitaltoflowandfixitself
inthemostprofitableenvironment,butitsimultaneouslycreatednewpossibilitiesforillicit
activitiestoexpandandincreaseprofits.MosesNam(2006:19)arguesthatillicittradein
fact benefited more from globalization, 'for there remained plenty of rules for legitimatetradetoobeywhilemarkets()keptgrowing'.Nam'sbasiccontentionholdsthatmarkets
have integrated muchfaster than political systems and that illicittradershave benefited
fromthisrealitybecause'governmentssimplyhavelesslatitudetoact,enforce,andspend'
thanillegalnetworks(Ibid:20).Thecontinuingsuccessofdrugtraffickingnetworksisthus
partlyfacilitatedbythepushtowardsaneoliberaleconomy.
Nam(Ibid:8)goesevenfurtherbystatingthatillicitnetworksarenotonly'tightly
intertwined with licit private sector activities, but [that] they are also deeply embedded
within the public sector and the political system'. In Colombia, the integration of drug
traffickingnetworksintotheinstitutionalenvironmentoccurredbecausethestatehadlost
itslegitimacyduetoitsinabilitytostopthedownwardspiralofviolence.Inthe1980s,drug
moneystartedto entersocietyon an enormousscale and flooded the country with new
investments,contractsandbusinessopportunities(Livingstone2003:82).Soon,thewhole
economygotinfectedwithdrugmoneyandattheheydayofthebigcartelsofMedellnand
Cali, drug traffickers were often even seen as benefactors in their cities because of the
charitableinvestmentstheymadewiththeirdrugmoney(Castells2000:204).
Mauricio Reina (2001: 92), however, argues that the overall effects of drug
trafficking have had negative effects on the licit economy. Although it has facilitated an
influx of foreign money, the additional wealth has significantly concentrated itself in the
handsofthedrug-bourgeoisie.Furthermore,ithasdistortedlegaldomesticmarketsdueto
the abundance of illegal resources that make licit business less profitable (Ibid: 87).
Moreover,Reinanotesthattheincreasedofferingofforeignexchangehasputpressureon
theexchangeratesandhascausedanovervaluedColombianpeso,whichhasresultedina
riseofimportsandadeclineofexports(Ibid:82).Theseresultspointoutthattheeffectsof
drugtraffickingareharmfulto thenationaleconomy,thoughnotdefactoincontrastwith
neoliberalpolicies.
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2.3.2. TheEconomicsofDrugTrafficking
Today, drug trafficking has become a highly diffuse activity. Whereas it was initially
controlledbylargecartelsinthe1980s,fromthe1990sonwardstheseverticallyorganized
cartelstransformedintodecentralizednetworksasaconsequenceoftheintensificationofthe war on drugs. Again, this successful transformation can partly be ascribed to the
introductionofneoliberalpoliciesinColombiabecausethesepoliciesbenefitedillicittrade
significantlymorethanlicittrade.Inthislight,itisdisputablewhetherliberalpolicieshave
thedesiredeffectsinthewarondrugs.Theunderlyinglogicissimple:thelessercontrolon
theeconomy,thebiggertheopportunitiesarefordrugtraffickers.Anapproachtostopdrug
traffickingbasedonimprovingtradehollowsouttheColombianeconomyevenfurtherand
willlikelyhavecounter-productiveeffects.
Besidesthedubious effects of neoliberal policiesin thewaron drugs, itcan be
advancedthatmilitarypoliciesarelikewisefutile.Inordertounderstandthefutilityofthe
militarizedapproach,itisnecessarytofocusonthenatureofnarco-terrorists.Byfightinga
warondrugsattherootsofthesupply-side,theprimarytargetsarethegrowersofcoca.As
hasbeenexplainedbefore,cocawasinitiallygrowninruralareasbypoorpeasantsthathad
beenforcefullydisplacedinthedomesticconflict.Becausecocaisaneasycroptogrowand
canbeyieldeduptofourtimesayear,itwastheonlypossibilityformanypeasantstomake
alivelihood.Drivenbythisreality,cocaleroshavegoodreasonstocultivatetheircrops.It
makes aerial fumigation somewhat a doubtful strategy, because it drives cocaleros into
further despair and leaves them with no choice but to restart their coca-cultivation
somewhere else. In this sense, aerial fumigation only invokes the narco-industry to find
morecreativemethodsto continuethe cultivationofcoca.Consequently,Nam(2006:70)
arguesthattraffickershaveyetdevelopeda cocaplantthatisresistanttofumigation.Itis
estimatedthatonly0.1%to0.3%ofthestreetpriceofcocaineintheUSisgeneratedinthis
firststageofthedrugvaluechain(Livingstone2003:128).Aerialfumigationisthusmainly
anattackonpoorpeasants.Inhigherstagesofthechain,Nam(2006:65-67)continuesto
demystify the image of narco-terrorists as he shows that most traffickers are not that
differentfromthecocaleros.Often,traffickersarealsomerelytryingtomakealivinginan
economyshatteredby decadesof violentconflictandrisinginequalities.Moreover,as the
legaleconomyis massivelyinfusedwithdrugmoney,aggressivelyfightinga warondrugs
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willnotonlyaffecttheilliciteconomy,butalsotheliciteconomyandallthepeopleworking
init.
Moreover,bymilitarizingthewarondrugs extrapressureshavebeenputon the
valuechain.Itisamatterofsimpleeconomicstoarguethatextrapressuresincreasethevalueofaproduct.Themoreeffortshavetobetakentoensureasafepassageofdrugstoits
markets,thehigherthepriceandthemoreprofitablethetradegets.InNamslogic,the
'addedvalueisgreatestwheretheriskishighest'(Ibid:82).Duetoitsaddictiveness,the
demandtodrugsisinelasticandwillnotbehighlyaffectedbyextrapressures.Whatever
strategies mightbe pursued todeal with the supply ofdrugs, aslong asthereremainsa
steadydemand,drugtraffickerswillfindawaytobringtheirhighlyprofitableproductson
themarket.
These logics show thatthewar on drugs isineffective. Thishasyetbeen widely
acknowledged before the making of Plan Colombia by US officials in the 1990s. A GAO-
report stated that 'military surveillance has not demonstrated that it can make a
contribution()thatiscommensuratewithitscost'(GAO1993).Thus,inthe1990sitwas
alreadyofficiallyacknowledgedthattherewasnovaliddrivetocontinuethewarondrugs
inColombia.SincetheBush-administrationhasaccordinglyacknowledgedthatitisfighting
a war against insurgents rather than against drug traffickers, it becomes untenable to
legitimizeUSpresenceinColombiasolelyatthehandofthewarondrugs.Hence,thereare
additionalcovertmotivationsfortheUStofightinColombia.
2.4. EffectsoftheWaronDrugs
2.4.1. EffectsontheDrugValueChain
Theprevioussectionhasshownhowthepoliciesofthewarondrugsarebasedon'lousy
economics'(Nam2006:82).ThemostrecentUNWorldDrugReport(WDR)confirmsthis
notion. The UN (2009: 66) states that aerial fumigation has destroyed about 130,000
hectaresofcocacropsannuallysincetheimplementationofPlanColombia,andthatmanual
eradication rose enormously from 1,745 hectares in 2000 to 95,634 hectares in 2008.
However, the WDR shows that global cocaine production has not changed significantly
duringtheseyears(Ibid:65).Onthecontrary,itshowsthatitequalled879metrictonsin
2000,andincreasedto1,000metrictonsinthefollowingyears(Ibid:76).Thisisastrong
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indicatorfortheideathatfumigationanderadicationdonotdiscouragecocalerostorestart
theircropcultivationafterfumigationandfortheideathattraffickersfindmorecreative
waystogetroundtheintensified'hunting'.Ithastobesaidthoughthatthishunting,i.e.
interception, has had some positive effects. It is estimated that the interception rate ofcocainerosefromabout25%toabout40%inthelastdecade(Ibid:76).However,when
lookingatthetotalamountofcocaineavailableforconsumptiononthemarket,itisnot
possibletoidentifyasignificantdecreaseduetothisimprovedinterception.Moreover,the
interceptionrateofcocainehasonlyincreasedinEurope,whileitremainsstableintheUS
and Colombia (Ibid: 79). Interestingly, the report states that transport hubs in Central
America andAfricaare increasing in importance. Althoughthe records of drugflows are
based on these interceptionrates which makeit difficult to assess thefull scopeof such
flows,itindicatesthattraffickingnetworksarechanging,butthatthischangeisarguably
onlyarestructuringofthenetwork.
Lookingattheothersideofthevaluechain,itisnotsurprisingtoseethattheprice
ofcocainehasincreasedontheUSmarketovertheyears.Adjustedtothepurityofcocaine,
the street pricehasmore thandoubled; from$89pergramin2006to$200pergramin
2008,basedonadecreaseinpurityof33%(Ibid:72).Regardingitsofficialobjectives,the
warondrugsisthusunsuccessful.Ithasnotalteredproduction,ithashadnosignificant
effects ontrafficking and the rise indilution and prices implya rise in profitabilityand,
hence,provideanincentivefordrugtrafficking.
2.4.2. HumanitarianImpactandPoliticalImplications
Whereasthewarondrugsisfailingtomeetitsexplicitobjectives,itisfailingevenmoreon
therecordofhumanrights.Mostimportantly,accordingtoHumanRightsWatch(HRW),
thereis abundant andpersuasiveevidenceofclosetiesbetween theColombianarmyand
the paramilitary forces (HRW 2001). These ties comprise shared communication, shared
intelligenceandextensivecoordinationbetweenthearmyandparamilitaryforcesinjoint
operations. By supporting the Colombian army in its counter-insuirgency, the US is thus
imperatively linked to the paramilitaries. In response to the atrocities committed by
paramilitaries, US Congress has therefore introduced the Leahy-law, a provision that
restricts any assistance to parts of the Colombian army that have proven ties with
paramilitary forces (Stokes 2005: 97). However, Stokes argues that this provision is too
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weak inblocking illegitimate assistance,because it is unable to trackthe ways inwhich
assistanceisdistributedandpassedonwithintheColombianarmy(Ibid:97-98).Moreover,
asregardsPlanColombia,PresidentClintonsignedawaivertopassitwithoutanyhuman
right provisions, becausehe argued that drugtrafficking wasa threatto national securityandrequiredquickaction(Ibid:99).Inotherwords,forthesakeofnationalsecuritytheUS
openlyrefusedtocomplywiththestandardsofhumanrights.
ThelinkageoftheUStotheparamilitariesisremarkable,inparticularbecausethese
paramilitaries traditionally aimed tosecuretheinterestsof thenarco-bourgeoisie.Infact,
theparamilitariesnowrelyheavilyondrugtraffickingthemselvesinordertofinancetheir
activities.According toformer leaderof theparamilitariesCarlosCastao (inLivingstone
2003:133),drug traffickingfinances70%of their activities.At thesametime,thewaron
drugsfocusesonnarco-terroristsandleft-winginsurgentsoftheFARC,whilethereisno
evidencethattheyareinvolvedindrugtraffickingatall.Althoughtheyareknowntousea
taxation system for coca growers, James Milford (1997), agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration(DEA),arguesthat'thereislittletoindicate[that]theinsurgentgroupsare
trafficking in cocaine themselves'. Because these notions were already widely accepted
beforePlanColombia,itisstrikingtoseethatthewarondrugsisnowfoughtbytheUS-
backedColombianarmyagainstleft-wingguerrillaswiththehelpofparamilitaries,whilstit
isevidentthattheseparamilitariesarethelargestdrugtraffickers.
Asregardsthehumanitarianconsequencesofthewar,itisestimatedthatmorethan
70,000peoplehavebeenkilledintheconflictoverthepast20years,ofwhichthemajority
was civilian (Amnesty International 2008). It is argued that 'the greatest number of
casualtiesofthecivilwarhasbeeninflictedbythearmyandtheright-wingparamilitary
groups,notbytheleftistguerrillagroups'(Gareau2006:21).About85%ofthedeathsin
theColombianwarcanbeascribedtotheparamilitaries,10%tothearmyand5%tothe
guerrillas (Ibid). These data are disturbing, but awkwardly in accordance with the
numericalbreakdownofUSsponsoredstateterrorisminotherLatinAmericancountries
throughoutthecentury.HRW(2009:174)reportsthatColombiahasthehighestmurder
rate of trade unionists inthe world; more than 2,600 since1986.The majority of these
killingscanbe ascribedtotheparamilitaries(Ibid).Theheavyviolenceisalsoreflectedin
thereportofthenon-governmentalColombiantruthcommissionMemoriaHistrica(2008:
13). According to their data, there have been as much as 2,505 massacres with 14,660
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victims in the period 1982-2007. Furthermore, Amnesty International (2008) estimates
that 30,000 people have forcefully been disappeared and that 20,000 people have been
kidnapped (Ibid).Additionally, theUN HighCommissioner forRefugees (UNHCR)reports
that Colombiahasnow thelargest population ofinternallydisplacedpeoplein theworld,thereby exceeding war-torn Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan (UN 2008: 29). More than
3,000,000people haveabandoned their homesand over350,000 people live as refugees
acrossthe borders.Moreover,thereportnotesthatthere isan alarmingriseinthreats to
civilsocietyingeneralandinpublicaccusationsbygovernmentofficialsofhumanrights
defendersforcollaboratingwithguerrillas(Ibid:175).Adistinctpatternarisesoutofthese
data,pointingoutthatlarge-scaleviolenceandoppressionbyright-wingparamilitariesand
thearmyhasfocusedonanypossiblethreattotheinterestsofthedominantclass,whether
thisallegedthreatcomesfromguerrillas,humanrightsdefenders,unionists,orcourageous
civilians.
As regards the economic consequences, the inequality that has characterized
Colombia is ever increasing. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) notes that the
richest10%ofColombiaisresponsiblefor46.9%of theincome,whilethepoorest10%is
only responsible for 0.7%(UNDP 2007:281). Witha Gini-coefficientof 0.59Colombia is
among the top ten countries with the most unequal income distribution (Ibid). This
supportstheargumentthatthe liberalizationof theColombianeconomybenefitsonlythe
dominantclassesandthatmacro-economicmeasuresofdevelopmentareinherentlybiased
at thecost of thelower income groups. Additionally, an analysisby theColombian labor
organizationSINTRAMINERCOLnotesthatcurrently1,8%ofthepopulationstillowns53%
of the land (Ramirez Cuellar 2005: 83). Moreover, the analysis reports that 65% of the
Colombianpeoplearelivingbelowthepovertyline(Ibid:82).
ArecenttrendintheconflictistheincreasinginvolvementofTNCsintheviolence.
Currently,therearevariouslawsuitsagainstlargeTNCsthatareaccusedofhavingcloseties
with paramilitary forces and have ordered the killing of their own employees. Ramirez
Cuellar (Ibid: 73-80) shows that the mining company Drummond Coal and oil company
Occidental Petroleum (OXY) signed 'security contracts' with paramilitaries to ensure that
any opposition in the workforce was silenced. These cases are no particular exceptions.
AnotherstrikingexampleisCocaCola,alsoaccusedoforderingthemurderingofseveral
unionists by paramilitaries, which resulted in a growing ban on its products on US
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universities (Business Week 2006). Carlos Castao never denied close relationships
betweentheparamilitariesandTNCs.Heevenproudlywonderedwhycompaniesshould
notsupporthimwhentheyseetheirinvestmentslimitedbytheterrorismandbarbarityof
theguerrillas(Reuters2000). InthischapterithasbecomeclearthatthewarondrugsinColombiahaslargely
beenacontinuationofolderUSforeignpolicyobjectives.Toalargeextent,ithasbeenused
asapretexttoopenupColombiaseconomyforcapitalofitsdominantclassesbymeansof
neoliberalpolicies,and,additionally,ithasbeenusedtofightacounter-insurgencyagainst
alleged threats to this capital. In doing so, the US has been an accessory in sponsoring
terrorism and violence aimed at social forces that challenge the status-quo. By violently
repressing these voices, democratic principles have been undermined in favour of the
preservingofasocio-economicorderthatisconducivetoUSinterests.Thenatureofthese
interestsiselaboratedinthenextchapter.
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3. THEPOWEROFDOMINANTCLASSESINTHEWARONDRUGS
WhereasthepreviouschaptershowedthatthewarondrugsinColombiaistobeperceived
as an aggressive effort to stabilize Colombias political and economic realm in order tocreateabeneficialenvironmentforcapitalaccumulationbydominantclassesatthecostof
the Colombian people, this chapter explains how TNCs have wielded their power in the
domesticprocess of formulating US foreign policy onthe war ondrugs. In a democratic
society with formal separation of powers, transparent politics and an institutional
distinctionbetweenthemarket-economyandpoliticalinstitutions,itisoftenbelievedthat
thedominanceofadominantclassisconfinedbydemocraticmechanisms.However,this
chapter argues instead that democratic mechanisms have allowed them to reflect their
materialpowerinthepoliticalrealm.ItfirstshowshowtheprocessofUSforeignpolicy-
makingisinitsrootssusceptibletocorporateinfluence.SeconditshowshowTNCsactually
influenced policy-making in the war on drugs and, third, it focuses on the motivations
behindthisinfluence,i.e.theinterestsoftheseTNCsinColombia.
3.1. TheFormulationofUSForeignPolicy
3.1.1. LegalContextLegally,thepowertomakeforeignpolicycannotbeclaimedsolelybya singleactorinthe
politicalprocess.TheUSConstitutionisnotclearwherethelocusofpowershouldbeas
regardsforeignpolicy.AlthoughArticleIallocatesvariousresponsibilitiestothelegislative
branch,i.e.Congress,ArticleIIallocatesrelatedresponsibilitiestotheexecutivebranch,i.e.
thePresidentandhisAdministration.Whereas,forexample,Congresshasthesolerightto
declare war, the President is ordained as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and
takes up a central role in war-planning (Olson 2001: 548). Consequently, both the
legislativeandtheexecutivebranchclaimtheirpowerinforeignpolicy-makingonthebasis
ofdifferentprovisionsintheConstitution.Hence,theConstitutiondividespowersinforeign
policy-making,butnotina definitivemanner(Grimmett1999).Overtime,thishasledto
changingrolesforCongressandtheAdministrationintheprocess.
Foreignpolicyisself-evidentlysomewhatundemocratic.Thatis,becauseitaimsto
secure the alleged national interest internationally in an anarchical system, a level of
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secrecy and exclusion is often needed to ensure effective policies (Foley 2008: 112).
Historically, the locus of power in foreign policy has therefore concentrated itself at the
executiveendof thepoliticalprocess.However,inresponseto actualeventsCongresshas
claimed more powerin the domain offoreignpolicyovertime. Most tellingmight beitseffortsinresponsetothepoliticalexcessesoftheVietnamWarandtheWatergate-scandal
in the 1970s, through which the executive power lost part of its prerogative (Peterson
1994:8).Ratherthancontinuingtobeamodelofcompliance,Congressbegantocritically
challengetheexecutivepowersandgraduallytransformedintoamodelofassertionwith
increasedcontrolandbudgetarypressuresuponfederalexpenditures(Foley2008:117).As
aresult,themostbasicfunctionofCongresstodayisliterallytopaythebillsforUSforeign
involvement(Olson2001:550).AnotherreasonfortheincreasedinfluenceofCongressis
to be found in its decentralization. As technical expertise of Congress has increasingly
becomefragmentedoverspecificcommitteesandsubcommittees,possibilitiesforextensive
monitoring, judging, and recommending have improved (Ibid: 553). As a result of the
increased powers of Congress, William Olson argues that foreign affairs has long since
ceasedtobetheexclusivepreserveofaneliteprotectedfromthedemocraticprocess(Ibid:
563). Richard Grimmet (1999) arrives at a similar conclusion when he states that the
executive branch still has the principal responsibility for taking action to advance US
foreign policy interests, but that Congress () can affect the course of policy through
enactmentoflegislation()andthroughtheappropriationordenialoffunds.
ApartfromCongressandtheexecutivebranch,theformulationofforeignpolicyis
subjecttotheinfluenceofathirdbranch.Dueto thedemocraticrighttopetition,civilians
areallowedtointerferewiththepolicy-makingprocessbyexertinginfluenceoverpolicy
makers.Thisprovisionhasledtotheriseofindependentorganizationsandindividualsthat
representtheinterestsofspecificgroupsinsociety.Themakingofforeignpolicyisthus
legallysusceptibletonon-governmentalinfluenceaswell.
3.1.2. InfluencingWashingtonSinceforeignpolicyisincreasinglysubjecttodemocraticaccountabilityinCongress,many
efforts have been taken by a wide array of actors to ensure that Congresss interests
converge with their specific interests. Lobbying firms are a necessary mediator of these
interests and as the powers of Congress increased, so did the lobbying industry in
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Washington.TheCenterforResponsivePolitics(CRP),anon-partisanwatchdogofmoneys
influenceinpolitics,reportsthatin2008morethan$3,2billionwasspentonlobbying(CRP
2009a).Thisboilsdownto$17.4millionforeverydayCongresswasinsessionandmakesit
one of the most lucrative businesses in Washington (Ibid). The gold-rush on K-Street,indicatesthatinfluencecanbeboughtand,hence,thatthosewithresourcesarebetterable
to promote their interests than those without (Birnbaum 2005). In this light, material
preconditions constitute an important factor in influencing politics. It gives dominant
classesasubstantialadvantagevis--visothergroupsinsociety.
Although the practice of lobbying is f