CLAUDE FREEMANGOLD MEDAL CONSULTANCY ©

MAJOR DEVELOPMENT WORK BY CATEGORY 1981-2014

I. PROJECT MANAGEMENT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS; MANAGEMENT IN CONFLICT AREAS

II. AGRICULTURAL INPUTS:FERTILZER, SEED, AND CPCIII. COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF SECTORS, INDUSTRIES,

AND FIRMS: INPUT AND OUTPUT SECTORSIV. ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD SECURITY: SOILS, MINIMUM TILLAGE,

FOOD SECURITY IN INTEGRATED AG-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMSV. ENTREPRENEURIAL CATALYZATION AND DEVELOPMENTVI. FERTILIZER COMPANY MARKETING MANAGEMENTVII. TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERVIII. HORTICULTURE: EXAMPLE OF VALUE CHAIN WORKIX. NICHE VALUE CHAINSX. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND FISHERIESXI. NGO ORGANIZATIONS IN AGRICULTURE; TRADE ASSOCIATIONS,

CREDIT UNIONS AND PRODUCER COOPERATIVESXII. FINANCE FOR AGRICULTURAL ENTREPRENEURS: INSTITUTIONAL,

MERCANTILE, AND SUPPLIER CREDIT

I. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

NATIONAL LEVEL AGRIBUSINESS AND PRIVATIZATION PROJECT MANAGEMENT: THE PRIVATE SECTOR

COP of two major national level USAID projects for a total of 7 years. Both of these projects were funded at more than $13.5 MM. They were both successful. Sustaining the Restructured Fertilizer Sector in Albania SRFSA closed in 1999. The second, the Assistance to Albanian Agricultural Trade Associations AAATA was to follow for a full five years in the three plus two contract.

USDA Country Director for the Food for Progress project which ran parallel to the last year of the AAATA project and by auctioning US yellow corn and soybeans raised $4 MM. These funds went to a revolving credit fund in the Albanian American Bank focusing on large dairy operations and technical assistance for support to the two national level Apex agricultural associations (ABMC and KASH) targeting animal feed production. As Country Director, besides managing logistics and auctions, I successfully coordinated a national campaign to gain parliamentary acceptance of US GMO products. This campaign was based on a national media debate (TV, radio and print) and support activities by several agricultural trade associations as well as the national farmers union (BKSH).

These two projects addressed market development in both input and output markets which had to be resurrected after 45 years of Stalinist agricultural policy.

INSTITUTIONALISATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Helped plan and establish a Department within the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture to manage IBRD funded state wide integrated rural development projects. This institution the Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU) was created by the IBRD under its Agricultural Technical Assistance Project (ATAP) implement the Green Revolution in Nigeria. This agency still functions and has established 23 statewide agricultural development projects (as of 2010)

Besides planning and implementing this institution, provided policy and program concepts for the catalyzation of several statewide Agricultural Development Areas (ADAs) which were the precursors of the IBRD partially financed Agricultural Development Program (ADPs) and in time were phased into 23 full IBRD ADP projects. I have worked in connection to these projects for more than 25 years and how they have developed over time.

Besides helping in the establishment of FACU, assisted in concept development for various elements of these projects: commercial Services (inputs), extension (did a proposal for instituting the T&V system to the Ministry of Finance) and project agricultural research. I also helped address food security issues connected with these projects. I also helped institute the input function in three ADAS in Gongola, Bornu, and Imo states.

The most important lesson from this experience is that it provided a conceptual baseline for agricultural projects carried out on a national level whether they are public or privately oriented.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN CONFLICT AND/OR POLITICALLY UNSTABLE AREAS

Developed an approach to managing projects at a distance made necessary by problems due to host country conflicts and destabilizing political events. As an example as COP, I successfully managed planning and implementation a multimillion dollar USAID project for Albania (USAID/AAATA) when out of country for a period of nine months. In the same period, I helped manage the closure of another USAID project. This approach was first developed when evacuated by helicopter from Albania in 1997 in which the USAID SRFSA project was managed out of Rome for three months.

This approach was also based on experience learned from implementing various IBRD projects in Nigeria during two coup d’état in Nigeria as well as other conflict situations. I lead or was part of negotiating teams dealing with ethnic conflicts or disputes. In Bornu state, I negotiated with Fulani pastoralists concerning territorial issues in fertilizer distribution and worked with Kanuri District and Village Heads to arrange for fertilizer transport and storage on weekly market days. Many lessons were learned in implementing the procurement and distribution nationally of 850,000 MT of IBRD fertilizer immediately after the 1983 military coup.

Part of mediating team between MW Kellogg and the National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria (NAFCON) and community leaders on land issues and effective partnership with tribal/local governments concerning tribal land upon which two large international standard fertilizer factories were built. Ethnic issues can impede the management of projects and needs some negotiation skills to resolve what can become the critical path to any program.

II.AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

FERTILIZER

Nigeria 1

Worked with the IBRD to making major policy changes in the Nigerian fertilizer sector which at that time was totally controlled by the Federal Government of Nigeria. Based on state level experimentation, increased the national retail price to cover logistics and distribution costs and created nearly 60 new distribution points reducing transport costs by delivering fertilizer close to final rural markets.

Developed a system of distributing fertilizer in the deep Savanna based on using weekly periodic markets and agreements with local and village governance to provide free storage so that fertilizer could remain at village markets until following market days. Use of periodic markets made construction of project owned retail and storage input infrastructure unnecessary and modified previous IBRD approaches to fertilizer distribution in its Agricultural Development Projects.

Under the IBRD Nigeria Fertilizer Loan of 1984 ($250MM), managed the marketing and logistics of the importation and distribution of nearly a million tons of fertilizer into Nigeria which consisted of 55 ships (10,000 to 25,000 MT) through five ports using approximately 700 unit trains and 25,000 lorry loads to

all distribution centers in all states of Nigeria. The project also utilized barges on the Benue River which had not been done previously. Barges went from the Niger Delta all the way to Yola and Jimeta on the Cameroon border. Delivery was made to state ministries of agriculture, IBRD projects, university research centers, river basin authorities, and state farms. All deliveries were based on agronomic needs of production such that basal fertilizers went first moving south to north according to rainfall patterns, which included both double (Southern Nigeria-rice and maize) and single seasons(Northern Nigeria-sorghum, millet, and cowpea.

Introduced high nutrient fertilizers, particularly Urea and DAP. DAP had never been used in Nigeria before. Both fertilizers were part of the Green Revolution package of practices.

This effort was praised in the 1985 Financial Times Nigeria Supplement.

Albania

Introduced DAP for the first time into to Albania which had previously used a low grade Single Superphosphate (SSP). It was auctioned off initially at below market prices but within a year due to performance was sold at international price levels.

With the introduction of high tech Israeli greenhouses introduced liquid fertilizers used in fertigation systems.

Nigeria 2

Under the USAID MARKETS project in 2006 conceived and implemented a national level fertilizer survey under the auspices of The Fertilizer Suppliers and Producers Association of Nigeria (FEPSAN). This survey was coordinated with State Ministries of Agriculture and various agricultural projects which carried out questionnaires. This survey found the FAO estimates to be deficient in several areas. This survey still provides a baseline for Nigerian fertilizer demand several years later.

SEED

Albania

Subsequent to nearly 50 years of government seed production and control under Stalinist agriculture, catalyzed a private seed production capability in Albania. This was done by first introducing from surrounding countries (Greece and Italy) quality seed varieties produced in modern scientific conditions. This required a change in the seed law as lobbied for by AFADA and IFDC. Subsequently as former government seed workers became involved in fertilizer marketing, assisted them via technical expertise and finance to begin certified seed production for those crops in which they had expertise and experience. . By 1999 private sales of certified seed is valued at $3.8 MM. 5000 MT of certified seed.

The project assisted in reforming the National Seed law and opened a new market for imported and locally produced seed. As a technical follow-up, the project installed a national seed lab and germplasm preservation facility.

Resurrection of the l seed industry activities from an $18,500 business in certified seed in the beginning of the project grew to almost $4 MM in four years across multiple firms and crops. The CPC business grew equally fast going from nil in 1995 to $5.3 MM in 1999.

Nigeria

As agricultural advisor to the large USAID MARKETS project in Nigeria, helped develop a private seed industry, working the National Nigerian Seed Association. Coordination with these new seed suppliers enabled the project to introduce a new national rice variety in Niger State which is the largest rice producing state in Nigeria. The three companies supported by the project provided the certified seed upon which the package of practices was based.

Under the IBRD ATAP programme, introduced new and better seed for grains such as corn, sorghum, and millet based on seed breeding by Federal and State research farms as well as best varieties of cassava as developed by IITA. These were marketed locally via the commercial services units of the IBRD integrated rural development projects (ADPs and ADAs).

CPC

Under the auspices of USAID MARKETS, the project was able to provide a major value chain intervention based on introducing a new rice variety in a package of practices led by two major CPC groups. This was an innovation as it was one of the few cases where such changes in input packages of practices were led by CPC companies versus seed or fertilizer companies. This was necessitated In the Nigerian situation, because fertilizer is largely impacted by government and there was a limited private seed industry.

The introduction of the new package of practices was part of a commodity value chain Intervention to move rice production to types preferred by urban populations who were largely dependent on imports from Southeast Asia. The varieties introduced, Faro 44 and 52 are long grain and have qualities similar to the popular Thai rice imports. The package of practices initially targeted at the Fadama North of the Niger River went statewide in first season quadrupling expected adopters. A private sector agro-processor, based on this success, introduced similar rice production on the Fadama south of the Niger River in Kwara state.

III.COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION: SECTORS, INDUSTRIES, AND FIRMS

COMMERCIALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PARASTATALS

Commercializing as much as possible government agencies or parastatals brings about efficiencies and benefits to farmers. In general it is a less desirable approach than privatization, but sometimes the political context will not allow the latter. I give three examples of commercially oriented adjustments made to government fertilizer distribution units; two at the state level in Nigeria and then reforms made at the Federal level. In these situations, state and federal distribution agencies acted more like commercial entities resulting in the first successful fertilizer distribution campaign in the country’s history. See the Nigerian Supplement of the Financial Times 1985.

Bornu State

My early work on IBRD Integrated Rural Development Programs sought practical adjustments to the Commercial Services units. One important point of intervention was logistics and transport. In Nigeria, my national level work/reform was based on experiments at the state level. In Bornu state (Northern Nigeria), I instituted two logistical solutions that activated the state fertilizer distribution system. First, I arranged with the Federal Procurement and Distribution Division of the Ministry of Agriculture to send fertilizer lorries (35MT) to locations in the state having storage and staff rather than having it be offloaded at the central depot. Not only did it reduce the number of times fertilizer was offloaded and reloaded, it enabled to get the fertilizer out because the state transport unit had collapsed. Once lorries offloaded at local government stores, it was possible to further refine distribution by establishing a village transport system based on using smaller trucks (rented rather than State owned) taking fertilizer to villages on market day. This intentional use of periodic markets allowed transport directly to the villages. Villages chosen to participate in this scheme were selected based on agreements with district and village heads to provide free secure storage close to the market such that unsold fertilizer could be kept there until the following market when it went for sale again.

A major cause of the breakdown of the state transport fleet was that there were many brands in the fleet cause from given procurement contracts to several people connected to government. This meant that there was no possibility to cannibalize parts from one truck to another. A major reform was a determination by the Ministry of Agriculture to insist on one brand of tractor allowing for the possibility of cannibalization for replacement parts. A similar problem plagued the state tractor units and it also was changed to focus on a particular brand of tractor. Many efficiencies came from these reforms.

Fertilizer in Nigeria was corrupt at all levels from port to state storage. Theft at central warehouse was common and there was a need to determine actual levels of fertilizer available and that missing. Rather than inventorying fertilizer bags at these warehouses, intact bags were transported out and sold in the market and once all bags were gone; it was possible to determine the quantity missing and find those accountable. Transport efficiencies learned from Bornu were later applied on a national level.

Imo States

In instituting efficiencies in Imo State where the situation was worse both in terms of warehousing and fertilizer loss. Ministry trucks were similarly broke down and after lobbying the State Council of Ministers it was agreed to raise the price of fertilizer sufficient to cover the cost of distribution. This council was brave in that it was essentially disregarding the Federal imposed price. It was considered a

breakthrough by the IBRD. Trucks were able to be rented once a successful negotiation had been made with the state lorry union.

Federal Level

In 1984, the IBRD made a controversial loan to Nigeria to provide $250 MM for fertilizer to Nigeria for the 1984 and 1985. Based on the leverage provided by the loan the Federal Ministry of Agriculture agreed to several reforms which were detailed in two IBRD Preparation Reports in which I was the marketing and logistics expert. First, fertilizer procurement was based on a transparent tender and bidding process resulting in significant savings to the country. In the country’s first tender under the new democratic government 1981 resulted in fertilizer being priced double international rates. Secondly, the price of fertilizer was increased by a margin corresponding to the cost of distribution. Thirdly, the number of national receiving pints was increased from 19 to 60 resulting in significant savings in transport costs. Procurement of lorry transport was also based on a tender process which was completive as contractors bid based on transport geography; each contractor bidding across ten concentric delivery bands from each of the five ports. Importantly, transport became intermodal, with successful use of the train system based on unit trains, and barge traffic up the Niger and Benue rivers. Similar completive procurement of clearing agents was made based on elements of clearing at the five Ports: Lagos (2), Warri, Port Harcourt, and Calabar. This distribution effort was conducted during a period of political transition due to the 1983 coup.

My most important effort to liberalize the Nigerian fertilizer distribution system came in a 1994 consultancy to the Nigerian Minister of agriculture in which I recommended a two year transition in privatizing the sector. Under this ‘big bang’ approach I recommended that government look to large commodity firms to take over much of fertilizer import. While my recommendation was not followed completely, the Nigerian government liberalized the fertilizer market in 1997.

Sadly with the return to a democratically elected government two years later a new subsidy system was instituted. It is an absolute that if government is involved in any way with the commercial functions of fertilizer distribution, farmers will ultimately pay a premium on product and the fertilizer will be delivered late. My position against subsidies of any kind, including the voucher approach was vindicated by IFPRI in 2013. Old habits die hard.

PRIVATIZATION OF MARKETS, INDUSTRIES, AND COMPANIES

Albania

The goal of any intervention in input market should be complete privatization of the process. By successfully auctioning USAID UREA and DAP in 1992 my project catalyzed entrepreneurs who together ultimately created a private market in fertilizer and other inputs after decades of Stalinist agriculture. These new entrepreneurs not only provided a basis for a free market in inputs but also sparked privatization in the output sector. The privatization of the Albanian output system both production and processing was more complicated than that of inputs. There was a debate concerning approaches to privatization of these types of facilities. There was a strong opinion by some European specialists that

there needed to be reconstruction before privatization and there was a debate on this matter at a national congress convened by the IFDC Project. In the end, the debate was irrelevant to what actually happened. Entrepreneurs decided which approach was appropriate but generally facilities were just taken over and made to work subsequent to ownership or they just built similar more modern facilities from scratch. The project supported these efforts by collaborating and supporting entrepreneurs as organized in trade associations. Trade associations became the target for finance and technical assistance.

Success in catalyzing entrepreneurs to sustain a market in inputs led to other consultancy work some of which are given below:

In summary, concerning privatization, entrepreneurs will generally arise to well thought out opportunities, particularly if supported on a parallel basis by finance and technical assistance. In this process, donor projects and programs do best if they do not try to achieve transition to free markets by incremental solutions. Many bad ideas come from incremental approaches. As an example, some experts in the IBRD suggested converting project commercial services units into limited liability companies to be registered on the Nigerian stock market. It never happened because markets do not stop at administrative boundaries. Much time was spent in thinking about this approach and piecemeal introductions when THE transition came when the Government of Nigeria liberalized the fertilizer market in one year. Companies either integrated fertilizer into their bulk commodity business or entrepreneurs/companies sprang up to sale newly freed fertilizer product. Another example, of experts killing privatization by over think was a specialist team, recommending to government that the subsidy on fertilizer should be reduced by ‘47%’ over a seven year period. This concept was the competing approach to the ‘big bang’ two year transition recommended by myself.

IV.ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD SECURITY

My involvement in appropriate environmental practices has been primarily focused on soil protection especially as it fertilized to increase food production. This has been done in two ways, modifying approaches to fertilizer use and analysis of soils as they may be overdosed with particular macronutrients.

ENVIRONMENT AND SOILS

Nigeria

It was an objective of the IBRD $250 MM loan to Nigeria that there be a shift to high analysis fertilizer, specifically Urea, Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) and Muriate of Potash not only because they are labor and cost efficient in that less transport, storage, and application is required but also because they are more efficient in application of the appropriate rate of nutrient. Nigeria’s preference for a 1:1:1 ratio

such as 15:1`5:15 loads soils with unnecessary levels of phosphorus and potassium. In this IBRD loan project there was an intentional effort to reduce potassium application rates in Northern Nigeria (the largest consuming area) and as much as possible given very limited provide farmer application rates that would optimize phosphorous use. This concern resulted in the initiation via NAFCON in 1987 to develop a national soil map, similar that provided by the Fertilizer Association of India. Contracts were made with several research institutes and universities to undertake this activity. Development of a national soil map took 20 years finally completed under the initial orientation by FAO.

This soil map allowed serious analysis of the appropriate levels of macronutrient application in high consumption zones of Northern Nigeria. Thus nearly 20 years after having started the development of the Nigerian soil map I was able to assess the implications of existing fertilizer use in 2006. This was done in a collaborative effort with the Soil Science Emeritus of the University of Ibadan and the FAO Soil Scientists. This effort resulted in USAID publishing the Nutrient Rationalization in Nigerian Compound Fertilizers (NPK) with Special Focus on Phosphorous and Potassium Utilization . This was the first true analysis of fertilizer use on a global scale in Nigeria after spending $ Billions over a 30 year period.

Began the development of a national soil map of Nigeria as part of the 1987 NAFCON marketing plan which was ultimately completed by the FAO and was used in 2006 to determine whether the structure of fertilizer use in Nigeria was environmentally and economically appropriate. This USAID study Nutrient Rationalization in Nigerian Compound Fertilizers (NPK)With a Special Focus on Phosphorous and Potassium, co-authored with two of Nigeria’s best soil scientists clearly showed the over use of P and K coming from the application of the 15:15:15 European product. This product had been a preferred product of the Fertilizer Division of the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture since the 1970s. Co-authored major study with FAO utilization of fertilizer product in Nigeria, Nutrient Rationalization in Nigerian Compound Fertilizers (NPK) with Special Focus on Phosphorous and Potassium Utilization, which is now presently widely distributed in Africa and downloadable on the internet. My co author and Technical Referee is now the National President of Organic Agriculture in Nigeria. The end result of this study already evident to serious fertilizer experts was that while there were some areas needing K, several did not and the use of 15:15:15 through the years resulted in overloading in much of the mid-belt states and in the two major consumer Kano and Kaduna. However, the most glaring discovery was the P had been systematically overloaded in as much of the North had high or moderate P in the soils. Again, the 15:15:15 fertilizer product always purchased by the government and many private firms just following the government example and formal fertilizer application rates mean that $100s of millions have been wasted and became a burden on small farmers who were paying too much for their soil amendments. Importantly, this fertilizer product is associated with much of the procurement corruption that has taken place in Nigeria in the last 30 years.

This study which is controversial to those still abusing Nigerian soils can be downloaded to see my technical work as the study’s SOW was developed by myself knowing the general problem well and was edited to clarify technical issues by my unit. Several hundred copies were distributed to the states. An indication of its impact on technical thinking was a strong counter argument by the Federal Procurement and Distribution Division of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.

Lessons learned here is that the solution to big problems requires long term commitment and perseverance. Similar technical issues exist in many areas of developing agriculture and require a long term plan to resolve them.

Albania

Based on my Nigerian experience, when USAID introduced DAP into Albanian in 1992, it was marketed well and became the fertilizer of choice with Urea. Concomitant with the institution of a soil and fertilizer laboratory, the project supported the National Soil Institute in carrying out a large K study in Albania to determine what levels it existed in Albanian soils and what fertilizer types would be appropriate for Albanian farmers. This also had been a long term question that was solved by large scale soil study as facilitated by the project.

FOOD SECURITY

The Nigerian ATAP project was the IBRD’s effort to introduce the Green Revolution into Nigeria and was from the beginning a food security effort. Helping farmers produce more means more food for the population. It did this by introducing packages of practices for new more high yielding varieties of crops traditionally grown by Nigerian farmers. Not only was a concern for food security integrated into the policies of FACU, each state in which an Agricultural Development Project was instituted was provided new varieties, new growing techniques such as minimum tillage, and in many cases the promotion of a new crop normally not grown by farmers but which could contribute to increased carbohydrate availability. As an example in Imo ADA, the project introduced concept of minimum tillage concept in what had been formerly a slash and burn agriculture. This introduction was based on IITA experiments. Other issues addressed were the protein deficiency often accompanying the cassava dependency of the Igbo diet. The minimum tillage aspects of a soil management program for soil fertility addressed directly the soil destruction coming from exposure of lateritic soils.

V.ENTREPRENEURIAL CATALYZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Worked to catalyze input entrepreneurs via various methodologies in several countries. These are given by country where these methodologies were implemented.

Albania.

My early work in Albania which resulted in the creation of a strong cadre of complete input dealers based on early auctions of USAID fertilizer became a template in several countries, though the commodity differed in some cases. The input market in Albania was activated by auctioning USAID Urea

and DAP fertilizer product. These new entrepreneurs went on to not only privatize the markets for markets for certified seed and CPC. Having been capitalized by the sales of USAID fertilizer product they were able to take advantage of the oversupply of CPC by the EU and IBRD who had provided to the old state system and bought up virtually all the inventory of the EU and IBRD programs.

Development of their capabilities was made possible by establishing their own trade union AFADA (which recently celebrated their 20th year anniversary). This trade association in effect became a target cluster for technical assistance and financial aid. AFADA also led to the first active governmental lobbying effort by the private sector. New laws were enacted and other reforms were made under the auspices of AFADA. Other industries in Albania followed the trade association developmental approach which kick started private management of several output industries detailed in the section on trade association.

Subsequently, entrepreneurship in Albania focused on output marketing and processing. As by that time, all government enterprises had been privatized by being sold off to investors, the major effort to develop agribusiness was by training and technical assistance. On a numeric basis, it is estimated that AAATA supported 5,900 entrepreneurs via individual TA, trainings, and trade missions. Formal training in situ was provided to over 300 agribusinesses and their staff. The project supported seven core agricultural trade associations, two association apexes, the largest of which KASH was constituted by 28 associations and organizations, two credit unions, the national farmers union, and an association based think tank consisting of technical experts from the various industries supported.

Elsewhere

Similar follow-on activities elsewhere included a USAID funded commodity auction (feed concentrate) in Romania and provision of a strategy for an IBRD project in Armenia. A similar developmental approach was used in Nigeria for certified seed companies which were brought from early technological development to market activity in several crop areas, most notably rice.

VI. FERTLIZER COMPANY MARKETING MANAGEMENT

Nigeria

Significant experience in the international private sector, particularly marketing. Early work was with MW Kellogg, the fertilizer engineering firm. Early on was part of its marketing team seconded to the Ministry of Agriculture Fertilizer Procurement and Distribution Division to market 845,000MT of fertilizer product. Later when it had built its two fertilizer factories in Onne, Nigeria; I was promoted to National Marketing Consultant responsible for all domestic marketing from the Urea/Ammonia and Compound Fertilizer Facilities. This was as a part of it joint venture with the Nigerian Ministry of Industries NAFCON (National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria. I established its Northern office in Kaduna where fertilizer demand was greatest. Later became National Logistics manager responsible for procurement of

transport (all modes), clearing agents, and expert on the planned extension of the Nigerian National Railway to the Onne facilities.

Lead effort to provide Indian engineering staff to both factories based on important economies until Nigerian staff could be brought up to standard. Negotiated in New Delhi with several private fertilizer companies in India as well as the national parastatal, the Fertilizer Company of India to supply targeted staff. This effort was ultimately rejected resulting in higher running costs that may have resulted in early closure because of cost of US staff and limitations of Nigerian engineers.

Albania

Developed marketing policies for the two Albania fertilizer factories one producing Urea, the other SSP. Marketing polices for the Urea factory enabled the government company to clear the product that had accumulated and congested its facilities. Established a trade credit policy with newly catalyzed entrepreneurs which resulted in financed fertilizer being sold in targeted production areas and within logistical perimeters consistent with appropriate use of project trucks. The trade credit policy at the SSP factory allowed it to continue work for some years based on both the marketing policy and the factory’s progressive leadership. These two marketing policies allowed the factories to continue for longer than expected. Head of efforts to privatize the Urea factory which was Chinese built, liaising with the Chinese government and its local mission until the Albanian Ministry of Finance took over.

VII.TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

ALBANIA

Support to Public Technology Institutions: Establishment and Training. Running parallel to the development of free markets in inputs and outputs in Albania, my projects also strengthened institutional depth by increasing the technical capability of related research institutes. I was fortunate to have been part of the team or managed support of research institutions. Following the logical sequence of market development from inputs to outputs; the project iterated from input related public institutions like the Albanian National Soil Institute and the National Seed Institute to analogous output and food related institutions like the National Food Research Institute and National Veterinary Institute. I believe that to have been a technical specialist rehabilitating these institutions as the concomitant markets were developed provides an insight into what is required from public research institutions to help industries develop competitively. This continuous unbroken experience in Albania deepened my already strong experience in Nigerian by being in the process of logical sequential development of technology research and development across time and sectors.

Some details follow:

1.Albanian National Soil Institute. The installation of two laboratories to assess soils and fertilizers in the Albanian National Soil Institute allowed that institute to conduct studies that had waited for decades. The soil surveys enabled by the installation of the soil laboratory answered technical questions of the highest importance. The most important discovery was that as thought by many soil scientists

many Albanian soils are potassium deficient. This required a new emphasis on importing high analysis potassic fertilizers like Muriate of Potash-MOP (60% K). Such importation balanced the N and P coming from Urea and Diammonium Phosphate. These soil testing laboratories also contributed to improved agricultural production by providing guidelines for fertilizer blending using Urea, DAP, and MOP.

An additional benefit was Albanian soil data was for the first time was introduced into the Geographic Database of Europe. Another scientific benefit was to enable the institute to introduce a more international system of soil classification; rather than having to reference the Russian system; the institute developed a new national soil map based on USDA soil taxonomy.

Additionally, the Soil Institute was enabled to support new national Fertilizer Laws and Regulations. Probably the most important application of this capability was to test imported fertilizer product to determine whether it had the nutrients advertized or displayed. The project also conceived a national agency to fertilizer testing.

2. National Seed Institute. The project installed at this institute a seed testing laboratory and germplasm storage unit. This was a natural follow-up to the introduction of improved seed for wheat and maize. The new seed laboratory facilitated the production of certified seed in country. It also tested branded imports to determine their quality and characteristics. The laboratory was immediately put to use as there were 5,600 seed lots tested in the first year. The gene bank reported over 3,700 accessions of seed samples, mainly wheat for conservation. Albania gained membership in the International Seed Testing Association.

In subsequent years the germplasm crop collection grew to 230 herbaceous species and 30 shrub and tree species. 260 species, subspecies, and varieties were identified. 80 are those cultivated and another 80 are spontaneous. This data come from MED-O-MED which conserves biodiversity and natural cultural heritage in the West and East basins of the Mediterranean

3. Food Research and Veterinary Research Institutes. As the project grew and changed so that it focused on output industries connected with Food and Veterinary Products, it began to help two National food related institutions; the Food Research Institute (FRI) and the Veterinary Research Institute (VRI). These institutions were helped by gaining them and their work recognition via a media campaign and helping them focus on key food industry problems. The media work was based on radio and TV talk shows where Albanians could inquire about aspects of food safety. Two examples of the technical work supported by the project that enabled these institutes to function as they should were: a) a olive oil producing and processing campaign in Southern Albania led by Greek experts and the FRI. This campaign resulted in Albanian producing extra virgin olive oil for the first time. The VRI along with the poultry industry trade association conducted a workshop on the role of poultry producers ‘self control labs.’ Direct support to these institutions was training oriented to food quality and safety. They were supported by training in Food Manufacturing Practices/Hazard Analysis Critical Control (GMP/HACCP). FRI and VRI were brought into the effort to reform the Law on Food in order to be harmonized with respective European laws. Work also commenced on the Albanian Codex Alimentarius-national regulations on food safety, standards and practical rules.

The VRI was assisted in transitioning from a centrally planned system for livestock production to an open market which increased the complexity of testing for animal diseases such as tuberculosis, brucellosis, and anthrax.

4. Private Agricultural Extension Systems. Based on the US inputs sales system, the project sought to establish a Private Sector Extension System (PSES) in collaboration with the European Symposium on Extension and Education. The Albanian input trade association (now celebrating its 22nd year) AFADA was seen as an alternative/complementary approach to costly traditional government extension systems. It was obvious that just as European extension agencies were being cut back or shut down it did not make sense to fund a government system in Albania whose budget is much less. In this approach, active educated agricultural input dealers (there were many educated input dealers coming from former centrally planned agencies) in extension methodologies. They were trained for two years in these methodologies and then let loose to provide agricultural advice as part of their product line.

NIGERIA

1.PROJECT EXTENSION PROGRAMMINGDeveloped agricultural extension policy paper for FACU based on T&V System which was submitted to the National Nigerian Technical Council in particular to the Minister of Finance. These concepts became part of the programming of the statewide IBRD integrated rural development projects implemented under the IBRD ATAP loan.

2.NATIONAL LEVEL SOILS ANALYSIS AND MAPPING

Negotiated with agricultural universities on applied research needed for a national soils map based on that of the Fertilizer Association of India. This research was initiated based on 1:1:1 ratio of NPK likely resulting in overdosing of P and K. Part of technical teams dealing with possibility of micronutrients Began the development of this national soil map of Nigeria as part of the 1987 NAFCON marketing plan which was ultimately completed by local FAO team and was used in 2006 to determine whether the structure of fertilizer use in Nigeria was environmentally and economically appropriate. This USAID study Nutrient Rationalization in Nigerian Compound Fertilizers (NPK)With a Special Focus on Phosphorous and Potassium, co-authored with two of Nigeria’s best soil scientists clearly showed the over use of P and K coming from the application of the 15:15:15 European product. This product had been a preferred product of the Fertilizer Division of the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture since the 1970s.

VIII.HORTICULTURE

The AAATA project approached value chains systematically and used the institutional resources of the relevant trade association, the National Farmers Union, and the council of Albanian agricultural experts (KEA). A good example of how the project approached a particular value chain is in horticulture.

Having facilitated the organization of the Albanian Horticultural Association, the project began to hear from constituent entrepreneurs that green houses looked to be a strategic opportunity. This was confirmed by KEA. Based on these insights the project undertook two comparative advantage studies early in the project on vegetable production and greenhouses. Using the Policy Analysis Matrices (PAM) approach it was found that both field vegetable production and greenhouses were competitive.

The field vegetable activities were initiated by the project coordinating with the very strong input association AFADA, local committees of the National Farmers Union, and with technical experts from KEA, to introduce various types of vegetables, with an emphasis on tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, and other crops. Active input dealers with project agronomists identified the most potential areas and began to promote the crops to local farmers providing a full conceptual package of practices, printed and on local radio. There was good success in potatoes and as a result a potatoes producers association and credit union was developed where production was highest.

The most innovative was in green houses. The project was fully aware of the technologies available having taken a trade mission to Israel to see their greenhouses and meet with greenhouse manufacturers. The basic concept was to work from the highest technology, the fully computerized and automated greenhouse downward, developing several levels of technology based on those systems taken as concept from the system of systems which was the high tech greenhouse. At the lowest level, farmers just improved their production by using better plastic; higher up the technology some introduced improved seed varieties, better plastic, drip irrigation, and fertigation. At the highest level three Israeli high tech greenhouses were introduced based on trade credit. Ultimately there would be ten of these computerized greenhouses as well as a national technology center on a centrally located farm that had all levels of technology and was available to any farmers wanting to explore opportunities in greenhouse. The idea was to pull out appropriate technologies for individual farmers based on agronomic aspects of farm location, financial capability, and farmer abilities. At the medium and low tech production areas, producer associations were catalyzed in areas where other projects or project donors could help. In one high producing area, the IBRD and GTZ helped with export possibilities.

The establishment of high tech greenhouses largely financed by trade credit from Israeli greenhouse manufacturers was initially very hard work.

This was major project effort and with the introduction of Israeli high tech greenhouse it created a new industry, probably the most advanced in the Balkans, producing tomatoes and cucumbers of export quality. As an experiment camera feed and other information was uploaded to the net so that greenhouse production could be followed at a distance by Israeli experts. Ultimately, more than $2 million were invested in the greenhouse business. At the time of project closure, well off entrepreneurs began to enter the business as matter of status.

IX.NICHE VALUE CHAINS

It is the hope of all agribusiness projects to identify a niche product which can provide good income to producer clients. AAATA experimented with many possibilities such as kosher olive oil, and Halal meat production for Middle Eastern markets.

The most successful niche value chain that the AAATA project had was in Herbs and ‘Spices’. My own early experience with this type value chain was university research work in South Indian spices such as black pepper, cardamom, clove, cinnamon, ginger, tamarind, and essential oils such as lemongrass and vetiver.

Success in many situations is just doing the obvious. Albania under the communist period exported ‘wild’ Albanian sage. Much of it went through a New York herb trader. This company was contacted and contracted to jumpstart a new Albanian herb and spice industry. The Albanian herb problem was although its ultimate market is the US; most of its production was going through intermediaries who got the margin.

After an initial survey, a strategy was developed based on establishing an Albanian trade association of committed and sophisticated gatherers and producers, developing a higher level of processing technology, conducting an environmental assessment in cooperation with the National Botanical Gardens to prevent endangering species, experimenting in field cultivation of herbs rather than gathering them, and determining which of the herbs available had real markets.

The Herbs and Spices Trade Association established was composed only of serious businessmen. It cost $4,000 in annual dues to join. These funds went to translating critical publications such as the Clean Spice Guidebook produced by the American Spice and Trade Association.

Success came despite setbacks. A drought in the first year resulted in developing field production based on irrigation. 40 members joined the association which reflected on the seriousness of the members. Most importantly was the facilitation of a direct connection to US buyers, not only the contractor but several others. Processing was either renovated or new technology introduced. Increased processing and sales resulted in higher employment and better incomes for workers gathering herbs. In the first year, more than 190 MT were sold at a value of $393,000 and grew thereafter. Field cultivation was established in sage, oregano, rosemary, thyme, and savory. Very importantly, a gathering production system was developed that would not endanger wild species.

X.LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND FISHERIES

While my background is not in animal science, I have developed markets for both the inputs and outputs of animal product industries. On the input side, I have auctioned or marketed bulk commodities used in animal feed as well as animal feed concentrate. The latter activates were oriented to local animal feed production for poultry and other industries. Additionally, my projects have been directly involved in

making markets for animal food products, poultry, fish, as well as dairy. I understand the basis of milk and meat production and how inputs fit into them. I have had exposure to some of the most complicated aspects of protein production.

KIRGHIZSTAN

Recently I addressed the issue of improving animal genetics in Kirghizstan where I assessed the readiness and capability of Kirghizstan for a national program of artificial insemination. I developed an approach to catalyzing a local market for Bovine Genetics for the Kirghizstan Dairy and Beef Herds based on both public and private breeding centers based on bulls supplied by USAID. Compared economics of Domestically Produced versus Imported Semen based on local semen production facilities

Importantly I was able to determine ‘the genetic multiplier’ for Dairy and beef Value Chains for the initial year and five years out. Established guidelines for a Public Private National Genetic Strategy. Planned subsidy scheme for the initial year of the domestic market to introduce/accelerate artificial insemination. Did a critical path analysis focusing primarily on availability of Liquid Nitrogen and AI Equipment.

ALBANIA

ANIMAL FEED. In Albania, my most important work was to develop an animal feed production industry capable of providing feed for poultry, beef, and pork production. This was done through two different projects. As Country Director of the USDA Food for Progress program, I imported several thousand tons of US yellow corn (20,000 MT) and soybeans (10,000) to be used to provide components for animal feed and establish a long term connection between Albanian industry and the US markets for these commodities. The maize and soybeans were auctioned at port and bought by animal feed producers. $4 MM were raised from these auctions and were used to provide TA targeted to small farmers growing animals for local slaughter. and reflecting economics of using quality animal feed in terms of increased production. Another portion went to a guaranteed credit scheme supporting medium to large scale dairy operations.

In the process of this program, various groups against GMO products attacked this importation. Unlike former recipients, my project dealt with the GMO issue head on via media and several regional meetings of trade association and farmer union members. The media campaign was highly sophisticated using TV, radio, and print to present both sides of the GMO issue and provide material for a contested debate in the Albanian parliament. The GMO side won in Albania whereas it had lost in Bosnia.

MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. On the meat processing side, the AAATA project worked with the Albanian Meat Producers Association and the FRI and VRI. Meat processing for several years after the opening of the Albanian market had been imported. The project began to support meat processors both in technology and processing. They grew quickly and became one of the most successful associations. By the end of the second year over a $1MM had been invested in facilities and sales had quadrupled.

Involvement by the FRI helped with the quality issue and AMPA developed a logo which became for meat products a sign of safety and quality. Poultry like meat was initially imported typically Hungarian frozen product. Poultry grew first in eggs but subsequently in meant. Its association the Albanian Poultry Farmers Association was the quickest growing organization. By year three more than $2.5 MM had been put into new production facilities. Reported sales were close to $8 MM. These numbers are probably on the low side given that often poultry facilities were Italian joint ventures.

SEA FISHING AND FISHERIES This group was highly capable having fished in the Adriatic for decades. With privatization of government vessels, this group became well off. The largest often had large side businesses of restaurants. When this association was conceived it also included fresh water fish particularly trout in Southern Albania. Not long after the association was establish the IBRD in conjunction with the Japanese government became interested in it to establish cooperatives per the Japanese model. Give resources available to the IBRD and Japanese, it was thought best to assist it in taking over both technical and organizational support.

Romania Commodity Importation Program USAID/IFDC: Animal Feed Concentrate. Based on the Albanian model in catalyzing entrepreneurs based on auctions, USAID committed to auctioning several thousand MT (17,000) of poultry and swine feed animal feed concentrate. As prime technical consultant, I drafted the original project proposal. Additionally, I consulted to the project over a three year period. Developed auction proposal to incentivize privatization of government and cooperative animal production facilities. Identified likely auction participants and approach to leveraging imports of high protein animal feed supplement to move production out of government for progressive enterprises. I did port and transport assessments and made recommendations on project structure and relations with GOR Ministry of Agriculture and research institutions. Developed an approach to trade associations given characteristics of Romanian swine and poultry industry. The Romanian swine industry was large and had swine facilities of more than a 50,000 swine each. This compared to an average US model of 1,000 swine per farm in 1992.

XI.ASSOCIATION AND COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT; CREDIT UNIONS

Albania

Conceived an approach to agricultural development based on facilitating Albanian agricultural trade associations. Association development in Albania followed market development as it iterated through inputs to outputs and their processing. Based on early successes with input dealers whose association celebrated its 20th year anniversary in 2013, the concept was extended to several value chains in the second IFDC Albanian project. More than 20 years later this approach has brought about organizational sustainability for industries in both input and output industries.

The first IFDC project, SRFSA, help create the Albanian Fertilizer and Agricultural Inputs Association (AFADA). Its success in making markets in fertilizer, CPC, and Seed as well as initiating the first government lobbying efforts on behalf of agriculture encouraged a similar strategy for outputs and food processing. This led to the 2nd IFDC project AAATA.

Initially, the 2nd project worked with seven agricultural associations (poultry, horticulture, meat processing, flour milling, agricultural machinery, edible oils (olive oil), salt water fishing).Later this number increased to ten. In addition the project continued to work with AFADA, two associations based credit unions, the national farmers union, and an association based think tank that conducted scientific and economic studies. All of these associations are still viable through two association apexes more than a decade after project closure. Association sustainability came through the development of two national association apexes which brought success by joining resources and staff within each apex’s constituent members to carry out two important but different functions, 1) association management, TA, and support to donor projects and 2) lobbying government on behalf of private agriculture.

The 2nd IFDC project supported associations were used to catalyze and support the markets for outputs. These associations became the basis of value chain analysis and development. Important outcomes was the production of extra virgin olive oil for the first time, domestic substitution by locally processed meats (sausages and salamis), expansion of the broiler industry into turkey, locally produced processed fruits and vegetables bottle salads, jams, and jellies. These industries became the first Albanian products to penetrate the Balkan market: Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

At a point in late project activities , there were several trade associations both national and regional as well as a national farmers union and several village producer associations; and it made sense to facilitate a national apex association of associations; but the question at the time was whether to have the association management center that had been developed for core associations (so that they shared administrative staff and a furnished Tirana office) extended to cover non project related associations. The latter included non project trade associations together with other agriculturally or rurally oriented organizations such as the water users association and village producer associations so that all of private agriculture would be represented when the Apex lobbied government.

Ultimately two Apexes were established: one the Association and Business Management Center (ABMC) that provided TA to associations and their membership; including, inter alia, Association Development, Marketing and Business Skills, Funds Facilitation (Finance and Banking), Procurement, and Legal Counseling. It was also responsible much like a secretariat for member associations’, banking, meeting and election preparation, staff oversight, as well as the management of TA. In a 2013 analyses, ABMC was found to manage the elections of constituent associations as well as the venue and staff for all their meetings. As an example, it manages the Regional Meetings of AFADA. As planned, the ABMC is the managerial and technical secretariat for agricultural trade associations. It owns a fully furnished office in the center of Tirana with Board Room, computer and communications capabilities. ABMC’s URL is http://abmc.org.al/blog/also expected to manage project activities for various donor organizations that wanted to utilize the trade association structure. Ultimately, the ABMC was subcontracted to work with IFDC, Chemonics, Mercy Corps, GTZ, and SIDA.

The second apex, the Keshilli Agrobiznesit Shqiptar (KASH) was established to provide a vehicle for National Level Policy Advocacy on behalf of private agriculture. It also supported agricultural trade. It has 23 constituent national associations with 12 regional councils. In Advocacy for the entire agricultural sector, it recently presented its policy requests to the new Albanian government (2013) as the latter formulated its Fiscal Package. KASH belongs to several national level policy commissions including: The Business Advocacy Council, The National Labor Committee, and the National Authority of Food. KASH is holding the 12th National Agricultural Fair in September 2014. . In managing the national agricultural fair it makes profits sufficient to keep its office and operations funded. . KASH’s URL is: http://www.kash.org.al/new/. Similarly to ABMC, KASH owns its office in downtown Tirana.

It has established and sustained trade relations with Turkey, Kosovo, Macedonia and other Balkan Countries and has worked closely with Israel, which provided Albania high tech greenhouses in 2002-2004. Major trade successes of KASH have supported the horticulture industry. Among recent achievements have are registration of Albanian vegetables on the Turkish Stock Exchange and a MOU with the Izmir Commodity Exchange. Recently the Albanian Israeli Chamber of Commerce was established. Many of its members are horticulture and other agricultural companies (app. 25%) reflecting the deep cooperation between the two countries in agriculture notably in High Tech Greenhouses.

The national farmers union (BKFSH) is also represented in KASH balancing smallholder agriculture with input marketing and output processing.

The association approach to agricultural development worked in Albania to bring about long term sustainability for those associations and other organizations supported by IFDC’s two USAID projects. Sustainability is the ‘holy grail’ of project work particularly when sustainable organizations provide important support to value chains over the years. The Albanian model needs to be reviewed to see how it worked when other efforts to make trade associations a strategy did not.

Nigeria

My own experience in working with cooperatives in Imo state to implement an IBRD integrated rural development project was my first experience with the ‘numbers game’ in voluntary organizations. It was consistent with earlier research I carried out on Indian marketing cooperatives in which the primary product of such an approach were only numbers of members.

The Imo cooperatives ultimately had no role in the fertilizer reforms brought about in Imo state which set the stage for national reform. Often cooperative and, sadly, trade association thinking and analysis is ‘fantastical. ‘This is because getting trade associations to work is hard work and requires coming close to the entrepreneurs and members which are an important resource to their success. They require field work at the maximum. Unfortunately, because of development efforts looking for cheap success there has developed a cynical attitude that these approaches can work.

XII.FINANCE FOR AGRICULTURAL ENTREPRENEURS

Nigerian

ALBANIA

The 12 years of IFDC success in Albania was based on innovative ideas and experimentation but as a program, it ran on finance to entrepreneurs. Its early success was made possible by extraordinary financial advice by a Bangladeshi banker as well as Albanian experts. As I became COP of the SRFSA project and later the AAATA project, I built on early successes made by my colleague.

INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT

The auctions of USAID fertilizer that brought a free market to supply and distribution of fertilizer was made possible by the support of state-controlled banks. The success in 1992 auctions demonstrates that effort and savvy can overcome natural resistance to provision of finance. The spark that brought about auction success were state-controlled banks providing loans to inexperienced and poor entrepreneurs who in the ultimate process created personal capital that made it possible to grow their businesses such that in two years they were capable of importing their own fertilizer from the Ukraine through important shipping technical assistance provided by the project.

A system for institutional fiancé was established in the first couple of grants that would carry forth for the next ten years though with modification. The principles that made the project’s financial unit successful in the following years were basic 5 C’s of credit. Early repayment success was critical in establishing a good reputation for the unit. Additionally, the establishment of a cadre of financial staff insured that the qualities of analysis and follow-up became a culture and though the staff kept changing over the years the traditions went deep into all who were part of this unit. However, institutional credit of the three sources of finance, institutional, mercantile, and supplier was primarily important only in the early years. Later, mercantile and supplier credit dominated but these became possible because project clients were trustworthy and capable.

MERCANTILE CREDIT

The first change in dependence on banks came from mercantile credit provided through the marketing policies instituted by the marketing expert at the two Albanian fertilizer factories. In the second year of the project mercantile credit exceeded fiancé from the banks. By the 4 th year, bank credit became secondary to mercantile and supplier credit. The support by the factory further strengthened the capital of entrepreneurs as well as one off opportunities made possible by donor mistakes, one of the most important being the provision of CPC by the IBRD and the EU who rather than working with the new entrepreneurs supplied them to the state supply system. When this system failed, CPC was auctioned and sold at tremendous bargains. Not only had the IBRD and EU chose the wrong approach but double counted supply double what was needed. This oversupply depressed prices and the AFADA entrepreneurs bought CPC at prices that allowed certain of them to be effectively millionaires in a couple of years.

SUPPLIER CREDIT

Supplier credit dominated input sales until the end of the project. This was remarkable because these suppliers, mostly smaller international fertilizer traders, knew and trusted AFADA dealers even during and after the 1997 pyramid crisis when Albanian society essentially collapsed and gangs ruled large swathes of the country and civil war threatened.

AFADA importers were trusted and supplied by a handful of traders until the inputs part of the IFDC project finished. These traders were initially supported by IFDC which provided them entre to the dealers and as the market developed dealers that could be effective importers were reduced to a handful in which trust was such that deals could be made on the basis of a ‘handshake.’ Early trade missions helped introduce AFADA dealers to input suppliers, not only for fertilizer but especially for seeds, where Italian and Greek seed suppliers supported early seed market privatization efforts. An example of AFADA dealer trustworthiness is that in 1996, repayment was at 98.5% which is extraordinary in early development contexts. This reflected project staff being willing to chase debtors everywhere if needed, even in road less Albanian mountains.

By 1999, supplier credit was $5 million per year. At this point, the four largest fertilizer dealers were financing their imports from their own capital and from supplier’s credit.

Finance to AFADA dealers by the end of the input projects totaled $17 MM. Approximately 75% of fertilizer imports were self financed which is remarkable that the largest input bidder in 1992 had $3,000 of capital from selling vegetables and trading currency.

FINANCE AND INVESTMENT FOR OUTPUT MARKET DEVELOPMENT

Credit supplied in the output part of the project exceeded $12.5 MM coming from supplier credit and bank loans. Entrepreneurs in the various value chains were financially better off than early input entrepreneurs and there were different circumstances including foreign companies seeking joint ventures. The largest poultry operation was a joint venture with an Italian firm. Similar arrangements existed across the poultry industry. Another industry in which there were several joint ventures was the meat processing industry. Primary recipients of these loans were poultry ($4 MM), meat processing ($2.9 MM) and horticulture and olive oil at about $1.8 MM each.

To give an idea of the level of self sufficiency, it was calculated that by the end of the AAATA project, self investments by agribusiness clients was approximately $20.5 MM. Again poultry was highest with $13MM. Flour milling was third with $4.3 MM; while horticulture was second with $4.4 MM. Meat processing and olive oil followed with $3.4 MM and $2.9 MM respectively.

A major factor in supporting AAATA value chains were JICA grants. JICA supported members of the Agricultural Mechanization Association and Olive Oil producers. In the latter industry, excellent oil mills purchase from Pieralisi the best known Italian manufacturer were made possible by JICA grants. The collaboration between IFDC and JICA was particularly rewarding.

Another important source for high technology was provided by Israeli manufacturers of high tech greenhouses. Their TA insured that their greenhouses, the best technology in the Balkans was successful and this industry grew dramatically allowing for export and domestic markets for tomatoes and cucumbers in the winter. Not only did companies provide assistance but also the Israeli development agency the MASHAV provide free TA across the industry spectrum within the project.

Ultimately, importantly to USAID, generated total cost share contributions exceeded $34 MM; $15 in phase one of the project and $19 in phase two.

USDA COMMODITY SUPPORT FROM THE FOOD FOR PROGRESS PROGRAM

An important contribution to meat and poultry food production and processing was the provision of 10,000 MT of soybeans and 20,000 MT of yellow corn for animal feed. These came in via three ships which were monetized by auction at $4 MM. One $ million went to TA for animal feed and $3 million went to a Credit Enhancement Program at the Albanian American for large dairy facilities.

GHANA 1990: WAREHOUSING COLLATERAL SCHEME

As part of an IFDC team to support the Ghanaian input sector; fertilizer and seed approach to fiancé fertilizer dealers in transitional period after government financial collapse. In n consultation with the Central Bank of Ghana conceptualized approach to financing input dealers based only on available domestic resources. Had the project been approved, planned USAID commodity support to the project to fiancé early entrepreneurs. At this point in time, interest rates were 27% and underlying inflation 34%. Investigated group loan approach which was being used at the time by USAID contractors but importantly innovated commercial approach based providing filed warehousing collateral for supplier credit or for loans planned to be provided under a Rural Finance Program.