Classical Philosophies of India and the West

8/12/2019 Classical Philosophies of India and the West

1/21

Classical Philosophies of India and the WestAuthor(s): Kalidas Bhattacharyya

Reviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 8, No. 1/2 (Apr. - Jul., 1958), pp. 17-36Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397419.

Accessed: 14/09/2012 06:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Hawai'i Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy

East and West.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1397419?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1397419?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp


2/21

KALIDAS BIHATTACHARYYAClassical lolphiSsofndiaand heWest

CREATIVE THOUGHT IN India ndedwith dayananthetenthentury.D.'By"creativehought" emean erioustruggle ith heproblemsf lifeandexistence,s distinctrom ormalisticlarificationfissues lreadyecided. ost-Udayanahilosophersf ndiawere re-eminent-lyformalistic.ccasionallyriginal ndalways erious,heyweremoren-terestednformhan n matter. ut classical ndianphilosophylways adgenuineroblemshat oncernifeprofoundly,ndcontent asalways lacedaboveform. very ork, hetherriginal r ofthenaturef commentary,whetherfa widerange r ectional,ada contributionothe und f ruthsdiscovered. nalysis, roof,nd refutationhere ertainly ere, s in allsound hilosophy. utthesewerenever potheosized.ogicwasusedonlyas an instrumentfdiscovery.ven inference as employedorthe dis-coveryf truths.Udayana elongedotheNyiya-VaiSesikachooLTherewere therchoolsin classicalndia,ofcourse.The very arly chools n IndiaareSidhkhya,Yoga,Mimirbsi,Nyiya,Vaisesika, ainism,ome formsfBuddhism,nda form fthephilosophyfGrammar. ifferentedintic chools evelopedlater n classical ndia;' and between hese arlier nd later chools herewere hephilosophiesfthegaivas, heVaisnavas,tc., ndadditionalormsof he hilosophyfGrammar.Theproblemsf classical ndianphilosophyannot eneatly ormulatedas ethical,metaphysical,heological,ogical,psychological,tc. A precisedivision f philosophynto hese"departments"as unknowno the n-dians, s even ntheWest nearlier ays, nd fwith heRenaissancentheWestwe find his racticerowingndfinally eingrecognizednder res-sure fworkt sstill nopenquestionwhetheruchdivisionsdesirable.

'The period may be extended by another century to accommodate Riminuja and a few others.'The Upanisads were not worksof systematic philosophy.17


3/21

18 KALIDASBHATTACHARYYAEthics ndmetaphysicsreinextricablyonnected.roblemsfexistencearisebecause f man'sconsciousnessf freedom.f man were meretem

ofNature, e wouldhave no problemt all Questioningaturepresup-posestranscendence;e who questions as stepped sideand is consciousofthat ranscendence.quallyfree s one who answers. his consciousnessoffreedom asdegrees,f course.Though onsciousffreedom,nemaynotyetfeel an interestn it. As a free eing nemay urn o Naturen atheoreticalr a practicalttitude,itherostudyt orreorganizet na waythat s notpossible or mere tem fNature.This swhatmandoes.Butonemay lsoturn oward hevery onsciousnessffreedom,ndthen ourpossibilitiesresenthemselves:1) manmay ry o realize hisfreedomnthetheoreticalttitude;2) hemay,n the heoreticalttitude,e-interpretNature; 3) hemay ry orealize reedomn thepracticalttitude,ealizehimself,n otherwords,s freewilldissociatingimselfrom ature; r 4)hemay,n thepracticalttitude,ealize imselfsfreely illing y eorganiz-ingNature ccordingo his elf-consciousreewilLIf freedoms suchwere thekeynotefethics,ll philosophy ouldbeethic-centric.ften, owever, e aretold hat hefreedomhat thicson-siderss onlyfreedomfwill. Ifso,the elf s cognitivereedom ouldgoover o another isciplineobe calledmetaphysics,ndtheremight esomegoodground or eparatingthics rommetaphysics,rovided reedomfwill s entirelyndependentfcognitivereedom. lassicalndian nd clas-sicalWestern hilosophers3nterpretedreedomn both enses, ut, xcepttheMimirmsakasndtheearlier uddhists,one n India understoodthicsin the econd ense.TheAdvaitaVed~ntinsndtheS~hkhyasnsisted oreoncognitivereedomndregardedreedomfwill (vairsgya,etachment)as onlyancillary.' he Saivasheldthat hetwo freedomsre the nwardandtheoutgoingspects fthe ame elf ta superiorevelofpurity.5c-cordingoRiAminuja,he twofreedomsre ntertwined."he Yoga thesison this ointsnot nivocal."Noneofthese hilosopherseparatedthics rommetaphysics.venwhentheemphasiss oncognitivereedom,hemoral ct,which ofar ssubordi-nate, s understoods what s necessarilyonduciveo thisfreedomnd,therefore,s in someway nspiredy t.Thus heres noindependentthics.

'We mean philosophersprior to the eighteenth entury.'Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers,1956), section on "Studies in Yoga Philosophy," chap. 1.sHistory of Philosophy--Eastern and Western, S. Radhakrishnan, et al., eds. (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), VoL I, pp. 374, 384, 387-389, 404-406, 410.'Cf. the theoryof jfiinakarmasamsuccay (knowledge-cum-willapproach).'Krishnachndra Bhattacharyya,op. cit.


4/21

CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST 19Neithers metaphysicsndependentf ethics.Metaphysics,e haveseen,is born fthedesire o attain reedomelf-consciously,ndthis s equallythefountain-headndtheultimatebjectivefethics.Attainmentfcom-pletefreedoms calledmoksa liberation).Detailsof ethics merge nlywhenmetaphysicssappliedoempiricalonduct.TheMimirihsakasndthe arly uddhists,owever, ere xceptions.helatter, orreasons o be seen ater,discouragedmetaphysicalpeculation,almost smodern ositivistso,andprescribedthics lonefor he piritualameliorationfman." TheMimidisaprocedure asdifferent.9nambigu-ously t subordinatedognitiono act. The fundamentalttitudef thespiritthe elf sfree) stoact n accordance ith thical rinciplesvidhi);and, f t s said that nquirynto henature f these rincipless cognitive,theMImi-ilzs hilosopherould fferworeplies. irst,hisnquirysonlyfor hepurpose fusing hoseprinciplesn acts, nd, econd--and his sthemoremportantoint--sincevery neof these rincipless an injunc-tion,ntheform Do this" r"You should othis,"hey onot lreadyxisttobediscoverednknowledge. heirvery eing s butpotentialealizationin concretects. Evenmetaphysicalruthsre relevantnly n thecontextof someact-actual or possible.The extremeMimiriasakaseldthat heknowledge hich s said toreveal hese ruthss itself subtle ction. t isdifficulto find parallel o this n classicalWestern hilosophy. nearanaloguesAmericanragmatism.Nordid ndianphilosophyistinguishetweenogicandpsychologyofknowledge) xceptoccasionally.t classifiednd analyzedn detaildif-ferent ays fknowingpramana) nddemonstratedheirnterconnections.But thiswas morepsychologyhan ogic. Even inference--andnothermethod losely lliedto it,but notalwaysdistinguished,iz.,postulation(arthhpatti)--wasnderstoodrimarilys a method f discoveringewtruths,ot way fproofrdisproofconfirmationrrejection.'o Notthattheconceptfproofwas unknownothese hilosophers.ather,hey, ar-ticularly yiya-Vaisesika,imirhsi,ndAdvaitaVedinta, evelopedtinmeticulousetail."1 utthemainproblem erewas whetherheprovednessandtherejectedness,.e., ruthndfalsity(primarnyandapriminya)ofacognition,re or arenotadditionalharactersf thatcognitionnd alsowhetherheknowledgefthis ruth rfalsity,s thecasemaybe, s or s

'M. Hiriyanna, utlines f IndianPhilosophyLondon:GeorgeAllen& UnwinLtd., 1951), pp.136-138.'Cf. amikara'sommentarynBrahmautra1. . 1,2, 4.'oM.Hiriyanna,ndianPhilosophicaltudies (Mysore:Kavyalaya ublishers,957), pp. 65-70.US. K. Maitra, tudiesn PhilosophyndRtligion Calcuttz:Chakravartihatterjee Co., 1956),pp. 151-164.


5/21

20 KALIDASBHATTACHARYYAnotcausedbythevery ame factorshat ause that ognition.2 xceptnthese heories f truthprdmmnya)ndalso n anotheroncept,iz., arka,that s,merecorroboration,1"here s little f "logic" n Indianphilosophy.'Tarkd' as mere orroboration,s alwaysubordinateo, nd,therefore,essin importancehan, iscovery.If ogic sconcernednlywithnference,ehave eenhow much f twaspermittednIndianphilosophy,nd nwhatway. n theWest,however,tis often oncerned,n addition, ithudgmentndconcept, hich realsoregardeds thework freason.Even n this ense ogicwas notwantingnclassical ndianphilosophy. very oncept herewas carefullynalyzed,classified,ndcompared ith ther oncepts. he Indianmindwasconsti-rutionallyogical n this ense.Clarity asa keynotef ndian hinking.Throughout,owever,ogic,whetherf inferencer of judgmentndconcept,was onlyapplicativend,therefore,ubordinate.ndiansneverdevelopedogicby tself nto self-completeheoreticaltudy.Therewasnever formalogic s an independenttudy,lthough,s alreadyaid, heIndianmindwasconstitutionallyogical.Somedistantnalogues o formallogic re,however,ound n the tudyfpure anguage ytheGrammarianphilosophers,im-itsakas,ndmany aivas. Butthesewerehardly om-parablewith heAristotelianype fformalogic.

Itwillnotbe farwrongosay hatwhat he prioristichinkersn theWestcall"thought"s what hesendians ould allpure anguage. ure anguage,accordingo these ndianphilosophers,s autonomousnd universal. t ispure n the ense hatgross oundswhich lothe he poken anguage,ndthe mageswhich ccompanyt n themindwhen t sspoken,renotmerelyaccidental;ccordingomany f these hinkers-andhey aveargued uttheir ase-thesesounds nd mages and,accordingosome, venconcretethings f theworld) are self-concretionsf pure anguage.Wordshaveeither emantic rsyntacticalmport.hattheword17means hefact intheworld sindeed matterfconvention,ut hat wordmeans ome actis certain priori.This meanings onlya priori nticipationf facts,which acts,herefore,renot o far ndependentfpurewords; ndthesemeaningsmay lso be classifiedpriori. nd the ame s truewithregardtowords hat tand or yntacticalelations. articular ords onventionallystand orparticularactual elations,ut herere alsoa priorinticipations

aWe find parallel iscussionn Logical ositivism.f"S. Bagchi, Inductive Reasonang--A Study of Tarks and its Role in Indian Logic (Calcutta:SriMunsichandrainha,1955)."1Three stages oi vdk (speech) were recognized. They are vaikhari (gross), madbyyam (inter-mediate), and paiyanti (pure). Some stretched this philorophyto the limit and admitted a fourthstage, viz., pari (ultimate). S. Radhakrishnan, ed., History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western,VoLI, pp. 374, 412-418, 422, 423.


6/21

CLASSICALHILOSOPHIESF INDIAAND THE WEST 21of relations, hichrelationsre,therefore,priori.4This semanticndsyntacticaltudyfpure anguageorrespondsomewhat ith he raditionalWesternogicof termsnd udgmentBut, irst,hiswasnever n indepen-dent tudy, eing lways n the nterestf (ethics nd) metaphysics,nd,second, o logic f he ormalyllogismas ver eveloped. heentiretudyofpure anguage uggestsheoldWestern octrinefLogos, nd,to someextent, ant's heoryfthe priori;nd, fthoughtndpure anguage retaken s identical,tmaybe saidthat his articularndian ineofthinkingsuggestsheentire ationalisticraditionn classicalWestern hilosophy.Otherndian ystems,owever, ereunsympathetic,ndsometimesvenhostile,othis hilosophyfpure anguage.Nyiya-Vai"esikandYoga (and,therefore,e presume,ithkhyaalso) unceremoniouslybjured ll trans-cendentalhilosophyf anguage,15ndVedinticystemsuietlygnoredt.Averse o all transcendentalhilosophy,yiya-VaiSesikatudiedanguagede novo nddeveloped newgrammarnlinewith tsownmetaphysics.tis only hephilosophersftheMimamisichool,nthewholetraditionforthodoxystematicndianphilosophy,hoadheredopure anguage.Buttheyoulddo this nly ecause ftheir entralnterestnthe tatus fethicalprinciplesvidhiand nisedha),which, ccordingo them, ad their nlysourcenscriptureshat ad tobeproperlynterpreted.aturally,hey everconsideredormalogic.Classical ndianphilosophers,hen,werenever ufficientlynterestednformalogic.Withregard o materialogic,however,hesituations dif-ferent-theyadabundantnterestnthat But, ven o,their ttitude asfundamentallysychological.hiswill be evident romhefollowing:"With theprobable xceptionf a fewBuddhists,ndianphilosophersholdthat nductions a matter fperception.With theGreeks lso,as isevident rom ristotle'sreatmentf t, t s ntuited,nd nmodernWesternlogicwefind heproblemesuscitated. odernWesternhinkersave skedwhethernductions a form finference,nd, fso,how. They naturallytend otreatt as inference-thoughotformal. hey all it nferencee-causeobserved ases-positive r negative--somehoworm,ccordingothem, ground or hegeneral roposition,nd this round,hey oint ur,increasesrdecreasesnstrengthnaccordance ith henumberndqualityofthe ases bserved. ut ndian hilosophers,lmost n inewithAristotle,haveargued hat heobserved asesareonlypsychologicalids to thedis-coveryfthegeneralonnection(arundhati-nyiya),ot logical round,ndadded hat hese ases anatmost etaken s contributingo thepsycholog-

'Yoga Satra I. 42; Yoga Bhisya I. 42, paragraph2; 21aso ydya Sutra I. 4, in S. Radhakrishnan andC. A. Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1957).


7/21

22 KALIDASBHATTACHARYYAical strengthf our convictionegardinghe generalproposition. hestrength,hey old, ncreasesnproportions thechanceofpossible rrordiminishes. iminishinghepossibilityf error s not logic. Whateverisasserted-perceptuallyrnon-perceptually--isssertedbsolutely.hancesoferror,nless heyresubstantiated,eednot ogicallyoncerns,for hatwould ead tounfoundedkepticism.he logicofprobability,f it s logic,is only he ogicoferror:wemean here redegrees ferror,otoftruth.If ogic sa criterionftruth hichspositive,otmerelyfthe bsence ferror,teitheroalesces ithdiscovery,hich s an absolute ssertionuntilcontradicted),r is the ogicofconfirmationhroughhe traditionalormsof nference."'6

Though ndianphilosophersidnot caremuch orwhat n theWest scalled ogic, heywere articularlyensitiveothe ruthor falsity)fcogni-tions.Butthey nderstoodhis ruths eitheronfirmednessofwhichwehavealreadypoken)ormerelyhefact hat hecognitiononcernedadnotbeencontradictedabidhita).Whentheymeant heformer,e haveseen, heydmittedogic, houghs subordinatedopsychology. hentheymeanthe atter,owever,twasallpsychologyrom eginningo end.True,evenpsychologicallyheywere iot ontent ith he imple act hat partic-ularcognitionadnotbeen ontradicted.hey lsoprescribedsychologicalprecautionaryeasuresn orderhat ontradictionight otoccur. pecific-ally n thecaseof nduction,hey rescribedhat t mustbe known s un-conditional(nirupfdhika),andthey arefullyefinedhe imitingondition(upfdthi).If by "logic"one meansthestudy f prescriptionsorcorrectknowledge,nehastoadmit hathere t least he ndianshaddevelopedlogic.But ogicproperssomething ore:thenormstdealswith reeitherover-empiricalrpostulates. he only ogic,f it s logic, hat he ndiansdevelopedn connection ith nductionsparallel o theassociationalogicofHumeandJ.S.Mill.

IIClassical ndianphilosopherswiththeexceptionslreadymentioned)didnotdivide hilosophynto ir-tightompartmentsike thics, etaphysics,psychology,nd ogic.Philosophy,or hem, asa unitarytudy evelopingdifferentindsof problems utdovetailinghe solutionsn theover-allcontextftherealizationffreedom.If,as withPlatoandAristotle,hilosophys saidto have originatedn" A passage uotedfrommy"IndianConcepts fKnowledgendSelf"-Fifth Instalment,nOurHeritage, esearch ulletinV, 2.


8/21

CLASSICALHILOSOPHIESF INDIA AND THE WEST 23wondernd fsome aterWesternhinkersavesubstituteduestionrun-derstandingor hiswonder,ndian hinkersreunanimousnbelievinghattheorigin fphilosophysman'surgefor ealizing reedom.Mutewonderleadsnowhere,ndquestionnd understandingrepossible nlythroughsomeconsciousnessffreedom.Consciousnessf freedoms ipsofacto eflective.ifferentrades fthisconsciousnessay hereforeetaken s stagesnthedevelopmentfreflec-tion. Atwhatevertage, hebusiness freflections todistinguishlementswhich rior othat eflectioneregiven na complex.Atthe owesttage,where eflections nomore han mpiricalnalysis, hat sdistinguishedna formsgenerallyelt s having eenalready nownnthat orm,houghindistinctly.uteventhisempiricalnalysis ften evelops ifficulties,swhen hetic-ticound fa clock s distinguishednly fterthasceased, rwhen picture-puzzles solved fterome xercisefattention.nsuch asesit is difficulto assert hatwhat s nowdistinguishedna certain orm asalready nown nexactlyhe ameform.Differentciences,ncludingsy-chology, ave ried oovercomehesedifficultiesndhave ucceededt eastpartially. ut t a stage freflectivenalysisome lementsmay ome obedistinguishedhich renot, t that tage freflection,elt s having eenpreviouslynownn that xactform.Space, ime,number,ogicalforms,andthedifferentategorieshatmetaphysicss saidtodealwith,ncludingthecategoriesfself ndGod,belong othis roup.Theanalysis hich is-tinguisheshesemaybe calledphilosophical. ut immediatelyith heseparationfphilosophicalnalysis rom tsempiricalounterpart,newproblemfcrucialmportancerises or hilosophy.he realforus,unlesswe aresophisticated,s the ctual mpirical orld, alledNature,ncludingtheworld fmind. f theelements istinguishedyphilosophicalnalysisare notfelt s having eenknown n Nature ntheformsn which heyrenowdistinguished,-hey annot ecalledreal.But, inceweare asyet nableto deny hem,heir tatusspeculiar.Theyonlydemand o be real-theyarefelt s whaitught oberealonly, ut renotreal as yet.As such,heymaybe called dealitiesrdemands.Also,theynecessarilyeema part fthereflectiveonsciousnesshat istinguisheshem,houghhey qually p-peartoclaim bjectivityf their wn. As they re notrealandyet renotcomplete nrealities,hey annot e spoken f mpersonally.ike thefalsesnakewhich annot e spoken f except s thesnake-as-it-is-for-me,heseidealitiesmaybe referredoonly s what heyre forme.17This is thepredicamentn whichphilosophyinds tself nitially,nd

'"Me" means hedistinguishingeflection.


9/21

24 KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYAfromwhich n variousways t hastried oextricatetself.The historyfphilosophy,n Indiaand theWest, s the toryf these tempts. Broadlyspeaking,herere four uch rttempts,nd oneortwomayhave ub-types.One attempts to treat hese deal tructuress transcendentbjects.Eventhough heynow have existencen thedistinguishingeflection,hey, eare told,neverthelessemand ranscendence,e., somekindof ndependentstatus s objects. n theWest,Platoand all philosophershofollowhimaccept his lternative.n India,wefindt nSirhkhya,oga, 8aivism,hephilosophyfGrammar,nd someformsfBuddhism.n India,however,these ranscendentbjects renotthose ecognizedn theWest. They renotalways paceandtime, ndnever umber,ogicalforms,ndthecate-gories dmittedormallyn Western hilosophy.he idealitiestattvas)which hesendian hilosophersecognizedre ithermaterial,s inSibkhyaand Yoga (and also in some forms fBuddhism), r forms fpure an-guage, s inthephilosophyfGrammar,rboth,s inSaivism.Thematerialidealitiesre (1) fivemahabhditasgross lements,iz., arth, ater,ire,ir,and ether-as-the-essence-of-sound),2) fivetanmitrassubtleessencesor-respondingothese), 3) eleven ndriyaxsensibilities),ncludingheprin-ciplethatunreflectivelyssociates ensationsnd is called mind mnars),(4) thehalf-reflectivego-senseahbarhkra),5) thoughts theprincipleof reflectionbuddhi),and (6) the nchoaterimal tufft theroot fallthese pradhina)).None ofthese attvas,ncludingmanas, bhakika, ndbuddhi,s subjectiven theproperenseof theterm; hey reall objects(jada), becauseheyreknownintrospectively,s the asemaybe) asotherthan heknowledgehat srevealinghem.s8

IIISo much or hefirstttemptogetoutof the nitial redicament en-

tioned npage23. The second ttemptsexactlytsopposite. t is toholdthat dealities emandmergerwithpure onsciousness.n theWest, hefirst learmentionf pureconsciousnesss found n Neo-Platonismnd,longafter hat,n Descartes; nd,when his onsciousnesss preferredsthetrue or final)essence, his s always n theground hat t is a clearanddistinctssence.Theremight lso be other ssences,learanddistinct,butnone o clear nddistincts consciousness,o that heir laritynddis-tinctness ight etaken s borrowed.t isthis otion hat iesattheroot fall idealism, hethert be thatofBerkeleyr Kant or Fichte.Different8"The knowledge (introspection), however, which reveils the taitvw nos. 3, 4, and 5, particularlyno. 5, is subjective in the proper sense of the term. t is cailed purus..


10/21

CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIESOF INDIA AND THE WEST 25idealists aveonlybeen n disagreement,ach in his ownway, s towhyand n what ense onsciousnesssmost lear nddistinct,nd ntheir nder-standingf thenature fconsciousness.mpiricistdealists ake t as onlypsychicvents-thementaltates-andadd,atmost, substratumothese,a substratumhich, oo, s understoods only more nduringvent.Butthe Kantians nd Fichtreansnderstandtas over-natural,s thatwhich snever n object ikementaltates rtheirnduringubstrata,utever ub-jective,n autonomousctthat, unninghroughhemental tates, oldsthese ogethers systematicbjects.Kanttook t as a cognitivect;, ichteidentifiedtwithwilLRoughly orrespondingo Berkeleynd theKantio-Fichteans,e havein IndiatheVijfianavidauddhists:9ndtheAdvaitaVedintins.Bothpre-ferredhe ubjectiven theground--onlyneamongmany--that hile heobject s contingent,onsciousnesss indubitable. ut,while to theVijiii-navidaBuddhistshe ubjectiveasequivalento mental tates,heAdvairaVedintins,reatinghese s objects mental bjects evealed ypurecon-sciousness,alled aksin),nsistednautonomousure onsciousnesss sub-jectiventheproperense fthe erm.Thispure onsciousnesss never nobject, utever ubjective.heydefinedhesubjectives thatwhich s re-flectivelyelf-illuminatingsvaprakdla).

TheVijiiinavdda uddhistslsodifferedith erkeleynsomemportantpoints.UnlikeBerkeley,hey ook theverymental tates s self-revealing(svaprakaia), nddid notbelieve hat hese re known ya self.The sec-ondpoint fdifferences that heynever enied xternality. iththem,externality,ven as externality,s subjective,o that, ccordingo them,there re twokinds fmentaltates vijnanas)--externalpravrttivij-ana)andnon-externalilayavijniana). Thisreminds s of Kant'sdoctrine fspace (externality)s subjectivendtime s the form f internalense.TheAdvaitaVedintins ouldneverhaveadmittedhatmental tates ssuchareself-illuminating.hesestates,t is true, renoticedmmediatelyas they cutr.Butthat oesnotprove hat heyrenotobjects tointrospec-tion). They reobjects ith kind fprimitiveelf-evidence,ndaildependson what hisprimitiveelf-evidenceeally mounts o. Siriikhyaelievedthat t is dueto thedominancef a peculiar haracter,alled aitva-guna,

"9As nterpretedy theHindus.Genuine nd full-fledgediiiinavida was undoubtedlyranscen-dental though ifferentromAdvaitaVedinca).W-e arenotreferringo rhat."Alayauviiina s not thesdksinpure consciousness)f Advaita Vedinta. It is indeed he innerI-feeling, ut never definiteelf-containedeing.Conceived s dissociated rommental tates t iswholly ndefnite,ut as the nner oneof these tates t renders hemrelativelymore ubjective.notherwords,t as undeniablesyetwholly xhaustedn these taces.Kant's transcendentalpperceptionas pure ubjectivect is verynearlyfthis tatus, xcept hathewoulddraw distinctionetweenuresensibilitynd thought.


11/21

26 KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYAwhich ends o makewhateverbject tbelongs o incandescent.dvaitaVedinta, otdenyinghis, dds hat t sonly heunreflectivetage f ntro-spection hich,sgenuine,owever,salways eflective.ntrospectionwhichis siksin, ure onsciousness)tandst this tage s undistinguishedlyusedwithmental tates,much ikefirena red-hotronball. Not that t s im-plicity resenthere. Implicit"sa vagueword. What heAdvaita hinkersmeants that t in its full characterspresent,hough ndistinguished,e.,coveredby nescience (aj~ina);21 and wherever here s nescience there sconfusion.To reflectiventrospection,ental tatesrepresenteds objects. elativeto extra-mentalbjects,hesemental tatesmaybe called ubjective,ut heintrospectiontself,elativeo thesetates,s at eastmoreubjective. dvaimadds thatbehind his ntrospectionheres no furtherntrospectionhatmight old tas anobject.Thiswould nvolve regressrud infinitum,ndalso,as a matter f fact, here s no introspectionfintrospection.enceintrospections such ssubjectiven the roperense fthe erm.Between ant andAdvaitaVedinta heres a difference.ant didnottakepureconsciousnessreason)-the transcendentalpperceptionnd tsvarious orms--as yitself eal (existent).Pureconsciousness,e held, srealby tselfnlywhen s will itstands ealized.Otherwise,s theoretical(cognitive),t by tselfs only transcendentalresupposition,transcen-dentallydeal." The attitudefAdvaitaVedinta sdifferent.f an essenceis reflectivelyistinguished,t is distinguisheds demanding reality fitsown. True, hereality e started ith s Nature, et, ince tis distin-guishedrom utofthisNature,he ealitytdemands annot e thatNatureagain. What is demanded s a transcendenteality.Kant,too,couldnotdenyt andactuallypoke nits favor n hismetaphysicsfmorals,where,however,twas all a will-approach.heAdvaita edintin ouldwonder hythe ognitivepproachjifzna-mrarga)o the ver-naturalhould e banned.Likepurewilling,heresequally hepossibilityfpure ognition,ndpurecognitions firstelf-illuminating,nd,second, efers reely o object-in-general,which, s notNature ndnotthispurecognitiontself,s whollyindefiniteanirvacya). Once this ndefinitebject-in-generalaj/fana) sadmitted,t sofno valueto admitnotherndependentbject, iz.,Nature,whichsnotmerelyobebracketed,ut, s reducibleo, .e., swhollyntel-ligible n terms f,thisobject-in-general,s nothing orone whowouldrealize ure ognition.As a transcendentalhilosophy,dvaitaVedintahasa merit arelyobe

"Reflection alone posits it as distinct introspection.


12/21

CLASSICALHILOSOPHIESF INDIA AND THE WEST 27foundnany imilarystemn theWest.TheseVedintins ere ullywareofthedistinctionetweenctualitynd demandidealityressence).Ademandswhat ughtobe,butnotyet s. Philosophersryo realizetas anactuality,houghfa higherrder. ut,n themeantime,notherwordsntilhey ave ealizedt, heyemain eddedo differentrdersfnaturalctuality.his s the s-yet-unavoidedolid xistenceftheirife,which,houghnevil,must e ubmittedo.This,alledprovisionaleality"(vybvahsarika-sattd),ustbe madethebestuse ofwisely o longas onehasnot ranscendedt.Thatultimatelytwould ome onothingas s-suredo these edintins;heyould ithernferhis r earntfromhescriptures.ut nthemeantimethas obeput pwith,nd n uch man-ner hat he nward archothefinal ealizationay enotmerelyothamperedutpositivelyccelerated.hiscanbedonebestf n this ro-visionalifeweobservehe ules fcorrectognitionndconduct.heserules re notmereworkingypotheses;hey lsocontainhadowsftheultimateeality.heyre he ormshe ltimateealityssumesandthatfreelyndfalsely)n the ontextfthe mpiricalealityfcognitionndconduct.hese ules arys the ontextsary. here revarioustationsin life ndthereforeariousulesppropriateo them. his s the ndiantheoryf tationndts uties(adhikara).

IVThethird ayofcomingutof the anglementionednpage23 istotreathe emandsessences)ssubjectivend bjectivetthe ame ime.This olution,gain,sof wo inds: ne s theway fdualismnd he thertheway fmonism.o long s philosophystranscendental,ualismsadifficultiew. t is difficultoacceptwo ndependentbsolutes.et,Des-cartes n theWest andSidrikhyand Yoga in Indiaweretranscendental

dualists."WheretheCartesians ere tpainsto relate heirwo bsolutesandLeibnizfferedhe ngeniousheoryfpre-establishedarmony,im-khyandYogaunderstoodherelationnly eleologically."hesubject(purusa) and theobject pradhina) do not, ccordingothem,nfluenceeach ther;he atter ovesnddevelopsnto his ichworldnordernlythat hesubjectmayexperiencet in appropriate ays.24 his idea ofthesubject's xperience asnot mplantedythesubjectn theobject. ndeed,"Kant, with hissubjectiveeason nd thething-in-itself,ayalso be included n thisgroup."M. Hiriyanna,Outlinesof IndianPhilosophy, p. 273, 274, 281; A SourceBook in IndianPhbilosophy--Simkbyairiki LVII.24The ppropriatenesss determinedy the desert f the subjectacquired through is deeds nthepreviousycle f ife.This s an mportantspect fthe ndian heoryfkarma.


13/21


14/21

CLASSICALHILOSOPHIESF INDIA AND THEWEST 29V

In section V we haveconsideredhedualisticystemsftranscendentalphilosophy.herewerephilosophers,owever,othn ndia and theWest,whounderstoodssencessmonisticallyubjective-objective.ith ll theirdifferences,pinoza ndHegel belonged o thisgroup, nd Schellinglsoin a way;and f n Spinoza heattributesfthoughtndextensiono notbelongto Substance e toofalls n linewithSchelling.n India,we findsuchmonistsnmany aivas ndtheVedintins ftheschools fBhiskaraand Rimrnuja.2If in Spinoza's ystemhe ttributesfthoughtndextensiono belongto Substance,hiswould be a form f inclusivemonism.But canthey obelong?Pureconsciousnessthought) s never n object extension) ndobject (extension)as never ureconsciousnessthought)exclude achother. Suchmutuallyxclusiventities ouldbelong o a third ntityf,andonly f, hey adsomethingncommon,f, notherwords, hereweresomehigher lassunderwhich hey ouldbe subsumed. ut it s doubtfulifpure onsciousnessndobjecttand nder higherlass, nda moreeriouspoint sthatmost fthose-Spinoza, or xample--who elieventhis om-moncharacterave heldatthe ame ime hat hese lsobelong oit as at-tributesr,as someof them old,as parts.There s definitentagonism,so far,between hetwo, ndso their nitys impossible.Whatever nitythereppearsobe sonly semblance.Hegel intheWestandphilosophersftheSirikhya, oga, andAdvaitaVedinta schoolsn India were wareof this ntagonism. ut,while hishad led the ndians odismissll unity fpureconsciousnessndobject sillusory, egel,undaunted,roclaimed unity fcontradictories.saviorfor bouthalf centuryandstill o consideredn some uarters), isdaysarenow ver, articularlyhe ays fhisdialectic.

Otherphilosophersf the monistic roupnowto be considereditherignoredhe ntagonismr truggledodisprovetorprescribedcondescend-ing ndifferencehatbordersangerouslyn nihilism. eibnizwasonewhowasguiltyf gnoringhe ntagonismnvolved.Withhisconceptfknowl-edgeas a creativect,hebelieved ecould ilentlyass ver he ntagonism.But thiswas deliberate ver-simplification.chelling--and,f Spinoza sunderstoodna certainway, e,too-proposed ndifferences a methodftranscendingheopposition. ut as this ndifferences neitheronsciousnessnorobject t is hardlymore hana blank. If notexactly blank,t is atrFor Bhiskar2, see Yogendranach Tarka-Vedinta-Tirtha, The World as a Real Modification oftheAbsolute, in Our Heritage I. 2.


15/21

30 KALIDASBHATTACHARYYAleast hequintessencef ndefiniteness.heMidhyamikauddhistsn ndiaand Chinaheldthis iew. Theirview stechnicallynown s Sinyavida.Others, owever,truggledoshow hat heresnoopposition. iminujais one ofthem.Consciousness,ccordingohim, s self-illuninating.uthe so carefullyefinedhis elf-illuminationhat onsciousnessasnotde-barred rom eing nobject.He started ith hefact hat pastconscious-nessof mine ranotherman's onsciousnesssonlyrememberedr nferredas an object,nd held hat venAdvaita ouldnothave ts heoryfeternalpure onsciousnessnless his onsciousnessere nowns anobject, hetherofintrospectionr ofinference. ccordingohim, heself-illuminatingsthatwhich yvirtue f tsexistencetandsevealedo itsown ocus.28 Thelocus f ognitionsthe elf.)Riminuja could overcomeheantagonismnlybecausehis notion fself-illuminationas convenientlyaive. He hardlywentbeyondwhatAlexander alled "enjoyment,"eyondwhat we earlier alled "primitiveself-evidencefmental tates."Likethethinkersf theNyiya-Vaisesikaschool, e assumedhat here s noconsciousness-in-generalther hanmen-talstates,ndyet, nlike hem, e took hesetates hemselvess seif-illumi-nating.The fundamentalrrornhistheorys thatreflectiventrospectionwas notdistinguishedrom rimitiveelf-evidencefmental tates.Onceit is distinguished,t,as the AdvairaVedintinslaimed, osits tselfn atleastproblematicutonomy;nd,once t is so posited, he mental tatescannot ut be taken s objects, otthemselveself-illuminating.We find notherttemptodeny ontradictionetweenubjectndobiect,ina way,nCartesianismndexplicitlynthephilosophyfBhiskara.Theirideawas that,whetherhere s a contradictionheoreticallyr not, t is afact hat hetwodo stand elated.WhiletheAdvaitaVedintins,iketheEleaticsnancient ays,wouldthereforeejecthis o-called act s an illu-sion, nd whileHegelwould, n theother and,holdthat hereforehereis no clash betweenhe contradictiontselfndthefact, heCartesiansndBhiskara"putupwith his trangenitysa divinemystery.ow far hesephilosophersere ustifiedepends nhowfar he nfiniteapacityfGodcouldbe stretched,hether,n otherwords, e couldbe usedto work uteven ontradictions.TheSaiva30laimwasmore ational. hewayn which he aivas nalyzedknowledge evealed newphase, self-transcendingspect, f conscious-ness,whichKantandHegel,and n modernimes rentano,usserl,Mein-

"A SourceBook n IndianPhilosophy,p. 546,547;M. Hiriyanna, utlines f IndianPhilosophy,pp. 387, 388."Bhiskara tried,of course, to substantiatehis thesis ogically."3We mean those aivas who were monistsof the typewe are here considering.


16/21

CI.ASSICALHILOSOPHIES F INDIAAND THE WEST 31ong,andRoyce,might aveprofitablyncorporatedfonly o render heirtheories oreplausible. heanalysiss as follows:There s noknowledgehat s notofsomeform fspeech vik), grossorsubtle,31ndspeechs theonly cognitive) ituation hereweareawareofthe ubjectiveroper.nspeech,gain,weareaware qually f hatwhichis spoken f,thatwhich s meant, nd thismeanings apprehendeds afunctionfspeech tself,s itsintention,otas something hichwas al-ready nown,or very nowledgesspeech.Speech, ow,hasvarioustagesofpurirty--througharious tages t dissociatestself romtsaccompani-ments, iz., ounds,mages, tc.--and t eachhighertage treveals tselfas theessence f the ower.Yet,at every tage,ncludinghehighestne,itsself-transcendence,hemeaning,he intention,ontinues. he subtlestspeech, ndoubtedlyhe ubjectivearexcellence,as, herefore,he nevita-ble self-transcendencehich sobjectivitytthe ubtlest.If Saivism sanintelligiblettemptounderstandranscendentalemandsas monisticallyubjective-objective,here s anotherttempt hich,houghalonga differentinealtogether,s probablymore ntelligible.t is totakethe ubjectivenambiguouslyswill Kant didthis nthe econd ritique,"andFichte evelopedt nto ystematicetaphysics.n India heMimirhsakasarethe nly hampionsf this iew. With hem,he ranscendentalemandsareonly rinciplesfwork, rinciples hich aveonly obemadereal.Astheseprinciplesrenecessarya priori), heir nly mports thatNaturemustbe reorganizedccordingo them.The phrase accordingo them"does notimply hat hey ubsist latonically. heyare notalready eal(bhbtavastu)obeknown.Their nly tatus ies nbeingworkedut, ndbeforeheyre workedutthey aveno being.ThatwehavetoreorganizeNatureaccordingo theseprinciples oes not also presupposehat herewasalreadyNaturewhich appens ext obereorganized.heverytatus fNatures tobe soreorganized.t sonly ragmaticallyelevant,hichmeansthat ognitionsnomore han nstrumentalowill. TheMimirisakasome-timesheldthat ognitions evena form fwill.) Neither heprinciplesnorwhat is called "givenNature"can subsist lone. What so subsistsis thereorganizedature,which s subjective-objective.As we have lreadyaid, his octrines, nfundamentals,imilaro Ameri-can pragmatism,utwithone seriousdifference.he Mimirhsakaseldthat nowledgesonly ltimatelynstrumentalowill. Onemay rovisional-lyblink tthis nstrumentalharaicernd,remainingnterestedncognition

5"The correspondingWestern doctrine is chat all knowledge is judment. The merit of the gaivatheoryis that speech is a simpler and more comprehensibleconcept than judgment (thought)."3Wich Kanc, of course, will was an act of withdrawl. So, he is out of the picture in this section.


17/21

32 KALIDASBHATTACHARYYAas such,develop ognitivecience ndmetaphysics.utultimatelyt willhave o begivenup,ortheentireognitivetudysto betranslatednto helanguage f will. The Mimiihsipositions,in thisrespect,he exact p-positeof thatof AdvaitaVed-inta.Metaphysicsf will is really thics fconductt bottom,nd forAdvaitaVedinta his thicssto besurrenderedfinally orcognitivemetaphysics.Uiminujattempted synthesisfthetwo, uttwas asnaive shisotherttempts.All the ndian thinkers howerefor nderstandinghe transcendentaldemandss monisticallyubjective-objectivereachedheprinciplef den-tity-in-differencebhedabheda) n someform r other,33nd,much s wefindn theWest,discussedtlengthwhethertwas ogicallyenable rnot.Muchas in theWest, gain,we findhat ncetheprinciplef dentity-in-differenceas admitted rom he transcendentalointofview tcametobe tooeasily sed s a master-keyounlockven mpirical ysteries.

VIIn thehistoryfphilosophy,nboth ndiaandtheWest,wecomeuponstill notherttempt adebya goodnumberfphilosophersogetoutofthetanglementionedn page 23. It is deliberatelyo deny hetranscen-dentalcharacterf the demands.Thisattempt as assumed woforms.somehave deniedonlythetranscendentalharacter ut admittedhede-mands at leastmany f these) inevitablys actuals hat an be arrivedatthroughhe imple rocessf nference.hey ecognizeeitherhe ught-to-be haracterf these emands or nykindoftranscendentalntuition.Metaphysicsfthe o-called ver-naturals,for hem, matterf nference.Thereareothers,gain,whodeny hedemandsltogethernd treathemas either ostulates r onlycrude, hough ommonlyccepted,inguisticforms,rmerelynstrumentalosciencendcommonife--in ny ase,notof any metaphysicalmport.Modernogicalpositivists,s wellas philos-

ophers f the school fAnalysisnd thepragmatistsfAmerica--andnemight dd Locke,Berkeley, ume,Mill,andComte--belongothe attergroup.Among ndians, heearlyBuddhists ereprobablyheonlyphilos-opherswhomight eclassedwith hem. itherhey ismissedhedemandsas moonshine,r some of them,manyaterBuddhistsncluded,egardedthem s whollyndefinitendthereforenamenableophilosophynd,forthatmatter,o any erious iscipline.omeCarvikas ndthephilosopherscalledVaitandinsarriedhis ineofthinkingothe extremeoint.All of"RIminuia, ic is true, openly abjured bhedibbeds, but when he did this he had in mind the

bhedjibbedaof the Mimizrisakas.He admitted substanciveaiffeccive nity (viis.ta) in spite of difference(bbeda).


18/21

CLASSICALHILOSOPHIESF INDIAAND THE WEST 33them, owever,t shouldbe noted, fferedtaggeringlyubtle rgumentsandanalyses.In classicalWestern hilosophyt is difficulto find ne whomight e-longtothefirstroupmentionedbove.But n ndiathere eremany.AllNyiya-Vaisesikahinkers,heVedintins f the Midhva and Riminujaschools,"nd heMimirisiphilosophersolong sthey eveloped rovision-al cognitivehilosophyelongn this roup. iraikhyalso, sdistinguishedfrom oga,proclaimedhat ts askwas toargue othe ver-naturalattvasr."We considerater heNyiya-Vaiiesikahilosopherstypicalf this roup.Correspondingothe ranscendentalsometimesalledphenomenological,sometimesntuitive)methodn theWest,we had n Indiareliance nscrip-tures r sources fsimilaruthority.utNyiya-Vaisesikaidnotrelypri-marilyn such ourcesvenwhen upersensuousruths ere oncerned.talways rgued ut tscasestrictlyn thebasisofchastenederceptionndthoroughnference.twent ventotheextent f ustifyinguthoritytselfbymeansof inference."8hrough hesemethods---perceptionnd infer-ence-it developed systematicheoryfknowledgendmetaphysics,verypoint fwhichwasfree rom hemysticouch.As in all goodempiricism,itwas heldthat verythings an objectn the enseofbeing evealable ycognition,hich,n ts urn,s also anobjectn the ame ense--itsequallyrevealed y ntrospection.othingwas recognizeds purelyubjective,sself-illuminating.t was admitted,owever,hatknowledgetands n auniquerelationo thecontentevealed y t,on account fwhich t wascalled ubjective,ndthe hingevealednobject.Hencepramina,he cog-nitional) nstrumentfdiscovery,asregardeds equally nobject mongobjects,houghnlyused n a way,much sweights, hich rethings,reused as measures orweighingther hings.This general tandpoint asdevelopedntoelaborate heoriesf perceptionnd (material) nference,theoverwhelmingetails fwhichwere verynchrational. omeofthedetails hatmight e edifyingomodernWestern hinkersrethe theoriesof indeterminatenirvikalpa) and determinatesavikalpa) perception,which oughlyorrespondothemodern otions facquaintancendper-ceptual udgment,3he heoriesf nductionndcausation,ndthe nalysisof language.Thisanalysisf language ndsimilarnalyses,hough long

"3Thedifferentolutions f thisproblem aisedon page 23 are not mutually xclusive.Thecorrespondingchoolsof philosophymay thereforeverlap,unless,of course, ne solution s theexactoppositef another.3SCf. Pulinbehari hakravarti, d.,Y'tidiPpik (Calcutza: Metropolitanrinting PublishingHouseLtd.,1938), opening erses os. a.rd 5.'sThiswas nsharp ontrast ith hea~tude oftheVedintinsnd the aivas."Indian thinkers ouldgenerallyaul L judgmental erception,nsistinghat t is perceptionn-volving hought,atherhan he converse.


19/21

34 KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYAotherines,bytheMim~msi hinkersndtheGrammarianhilosophers38were sself-completesmodernemanticsntheWest.

Nyiya-Vai.esikametaphysicssequally horough,ell-knit,nd olid, nddevelopedhrougherceptionnd inference. ll entitiesf theworld-internalndexternal-werelassifiedndereveral ategories,ith he on-stant arning,owever,hat hese ategoriess such reonlynominal roups,nothingeing ranscendent,nd omenot ven mpiricalniversals.ntitiesoftheworld reeitherubstancesdravya), rattributes(g.ua), ormotion(karma), runiversalssdmimnya),r nherence(samavdya),rfinal nique-ness (vilesa), or negation abhiva)." Each of theseconceptswas thenanalyzed s thoroughlys conceivable,nd all metaphysicaluestions ereallowed ocrop pandbedealtwith ccordingly.VIIAlmost ll problems--ethical,etaphysical,eligious,sychological,ndlogical-whichweretackled n classicalWestern hilosophy,nd manymore hat re dealtwith n themodernWest,viz.,positivisticeductionfcomplex oncepts,he tudyfsemantics,henomenologicaltudy,tc.,weretreated s thoroughlys possiblen classicalndia. True, omeofthe m-portantroblemsf Western hilosophyidnoteven strikehe ndians.These aretheproblemsf formalogic, hedetailed tudy fall phenom-enological r a priori resuppositions,articularlyhose dealitieshat reconnected ithformal ogic, nd thephilosophical roblems hat haveemergedutofthemodernevelopmentf science.Butthiswasquitena-tural. Classicalndian hilosophersere uperblynterestedn value(puru-srtha).,particularlyn what hey onsideredhehighestalue,viz., reedom(moksa),anddiscussednly hose roblemshat mergedrom his nterest.This explainswhy ormalogicand thetranscendentalresuppositionsi-rectlyonnected ith t wereexcluded. n Indianphilosophy e seldommeetwith henotion faprioritynd ts mplications.heirplacewasoc-cupied yverdictsfscriptures.aturallynly hose f the prioritiesereconsideredhichwere oundnscriptures.So far s the mpiricalrpositivisticutlooksconcerned,heresscarcelyany serious ifferenceetween ndianand Westernphilosophies,xceptthatmoderncience nd its mplicationsereunknownn India. Indianshad their wnscience,videntlynferioro themodern,hough asedondifferentostulatesltogether."'8 e may add Indian rhetoricians.'"S. Bhaduri, Studies in Nyiya-Vaiiieka Metaphysics (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research In-stitute, 1947).


20/21

CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST 35Whenweconsiderranscendentalhilosophy,owever,efind basicdifferencen approach.The transcendentalhilosophersftheWest wereall seer-speakers.hey,nwhatevermanner,irst iscoveredprioritiesndthenexpressedhem, ystematicallyr unsystematically.n India,on theother and, hedominantttitude asthat f a hearer, learner,ntent ndiscoveringpriorities,ut not havingyetdiscoveredhem r discoveredthem ully.This swhy hey elied o much n scriptures.ventoacquirea right o listen o scriptureshey adfirsto undergo traininguchthatthetruthsobediscoveredouldnotbedistorted,nd, lso, hat nemightnot submitblindly r be hypnotized. his listening,echnicallyalledfravana,was understoods already onstitutingranscendentalntuition,

thoughnthemaking. uteventhiswasnot onsiderednough.The hearerwas requiredo go on continuouslyubstantiatinghetruths,alfrealized,by means of argumentsro and con. (This secondprocesswas calledmanana.) Butthiswas again to be followed p bya third rocess, iz.,that fdeepconcentration,allednididhyisana,hichwasto serve doublepurpose. t wastodissipatehephilosopher-hearer'subconsciousoubts,fanywere till eft, nd, econd, sustainedeepeningfconcentrationasconsidered apable of disclosing eeper mplicationsnd ultimatelyhewholesystem f relevantpriorities. his last process, nown s jinana-scidhana,asa process hich latohinted t andKantdevelopedoa degreeand which s in modern imes reatednall seriousnessyphenomenologists,and vicariouslyymany xistentialists.his logicof the transcendentalwas elaboratedn detailbytheYoga ofPatafijali,nd all Indian ranscen-dentalists,nless hey adin themeantimewung ver ofeelingnd willphilosophies,4oracticallydoptedhis ogamethod.The discoveryftranscendentalruths as,thus, lsoself-demonstrative:the nner ialecticfthese prioritiesvinced systemftheir wn. Indianphilosophersere onscious, owever,hat his ogicwasesotericnd validonlyfor the initiated.When, therefore,hey urned o expressinghemtheynever hrank rom ublicdemonstrationhroughommonogic.True,someof the ndian hinkers,azhkara,or xample,nsistedhat he uper-sensuousannot e provedyordinaryogic, emindings of Kant ndHegel.But heydded hat mpiricalogicmay tleast ecorroborative(anagrahakatarka)yway fhalf stablishingven upersensuousruthsandrefutingontraryiews.Exceptor his eliancentestimonyIabda-pram~na),nd hat nly y

'Many Indianphilosophers,horough ationalistsntil the end of msnans,had so swungoverat the last stage.Nyiya-Vsiesi.kahad done that, nd Riminula partially. atauijali penly uggestedit as an alternative.


21/21

Documents

Classical Philosophies of India and the West