Clarke 2002

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2002 32: 131Philosophy of the Social SciencesSteve Clarke

Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing

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PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002Clarke / CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THEORIZING

Conspiracy Theories andConspiracy Theorizing

STEVE CLARKECharles Sturt University

The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is consid-ered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to anattitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspir-acy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to con-tinue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearanceof forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued thatthe pervasive effect of the “fundamental attribution error” can explain thebehavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley,which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemicgrounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.

Conspiracy theorists, like creation scientists and astrologers, areadvocates of ideas that are generally quite popular. There are largenumbers of people who believe that the United States’ military hasconspired to keep the public uninformed about visits by alien lifeforms (Shermer 1997, 91-93). Others believe that Elvis Presley con-spired to fake his own death (Brewer-Giorgio 1988). Some evenbelieve that Ludwig Wittgenstein led a secret double life as a Sovietspymaster (Cornish 1997). Like the ideas promulgated by creation sci-entists and astrologers, the ideas promulgated by conspiracy theo-rists are very unpopular among intellectuals. “That’s just a conspir-acy theory,” say the intellectuals, apparently feeling entitled todismiss such theories simply on the grounds that they involve con-spiracies. No matter how hard conspiracy theorists have tried tomake their cases, they are not accorded the same hearing in intellec-tual circles that a proponent of a nonconspiratorial explanation

131

Received 11 April 2000

Thanks to an anonymous referee, an audience at Charles Sturt University, JohnBigelow, John Campbell, Dean Cocking, Neil Thomason, Robert Young, and particu-larly Jakob Hohwy for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

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would be accorded. This situation is more than slightly mystifying.Unlike creation scientists and astrologers, conspiracy theorists haveepistemic “runs on the board,”1 and lots of them. Conspiracies haveconsistently taken place throughout history. Elvis Presley may or maynot have faked his own death, but Richard Nixon really did conspireto cover up his involvement in the Watergate burglary, and CecilRhodes really did conspire to provoke conflict between the BritishEmpire and the Boer Republics.

No doubt history plays its part in explaining the hostility of intel-lectuals toward conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theorizing has longbeen favored by Populists, who are almost invariably antielitist, andtherefore generally anti-intellectual as well. Some intellectuals maydismiss conspiracy theories simply on the basis of guilt by associationwith anti-intellectual Populism.2 American Populists of the late 19thcentury were particularly noted for their propensity to indulge in con-spiratorial reasoning, a feature of their thinking that the historianRichard Hofstadter highlights, informing us that

There was something about the Populist imagination that loved thesecret plot and the conspiratorial meeting. (Hofstadter 1955, 70)

and

At the so-called grass roots of American politics there is a wide and per-vasive tendency to believe—I hasten to add that the majority of Ameri-cans do not habitually succumb to this tendency—that there is somegreat but essentially very simple struggle going on, at the heart ofwhich there lies some single conspiratorial force. (Hofstadter 1955, 16)

Although guilt by association with anti-intellectual Populism cango some way to explaining the contempt that intellectuals haveshown toward conspiracy theories, there are at least two reasons tothink that it cannot explain it all. First, guilt by association is a falla-cious form of reasoning and intellectuals, generally being intelligentpeople, can reasonably be expected to be somewhat resistant to thelure of fallacious forms of reasoning. Second, many American intel-lectuals have shown a marked sympathy for the antielitist tendenciesof Populism that lead Populists to be anti-intellectuals. For such intel-lectuals, association with antielitist movements such as Populism,would be a cause of virtue by association rather than guilt by associa-tion. Liberal intellectuals in America may be part of an elite culture,however they are often self-consciously and somewhat reluctantly

132 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002




part of such a culture. Hofstadter (1955, 1971) paints an unflatteringportrait of 19th-century American Populism, stressing the continui-ties between it and 1950s McCarthyism. However, in the main, Amer-ican historians have been quite sympathetic to 19th-century Ameri-can Populism, emphasizing the extent to which Populist grievancesagainst the urban East Coast elites of America were legitimate andportraying Populism as a “progressive” rather than “reactionary”movement.3

However much we think that an historical association with anti-intellectual movements can explain the antipathy of intellectuals toconspiracy theories, it is hard to see how it could justify such an atti-tude. Given that we know that conspiracies have occurred, couldintellectuals really be justified in dismissing conspiracy theoriesmerely by pointing to the fact that these are just conspiracy theories? Ifso, then surely we ought to be able to say why. This article is anattempt to do so. Although I will not argue that intellectuals are enti-tled to arrogantly dismiss all conspiracy theories, I will argue thatthere is an entitlement to an attitude of prima facie skepticism towardthe theories propounded by conspiracy theorists and I will identify areason that grounds this entitlement.

Conspiracy theories are not a common topic of philosophical dis-cussion; however, I am not the only philosopher who has discussedthem. In a recent article, Brian Keeley has attempted to explain theirapparent popularity and identify their underlying deficiencies.4

Keeley has undertaken an important project but has gone about com-pleting it in the wrong way. Keeley attempts to identify a subclass ofconspiracy theories that he describes as “Unwarranted ConspiracyTheories” (UCTs). These have crucial epistemic deficiencies that gounrecognized by conspiracy theorists according to Keeley. It will beshown that Keeley’s case against UCTs is exaggerated and confused.He intends to attack a class of conspiracy theories but, through a slidein his reasoning, ends up attacking the reasoning patterns of conspir-acy theorists, arguing that they have a tendency to fail to recognize theepistemic weaknesses of the conspiracy theories that they favor andthat they have a tendency to respond inappropriately to evidence thatconflicts with these theories.

Although Keeley has not identified an underlying failing commonto conspiracy theorists, it is perhaps no accident that he ends upattacking the reasoning patterns of conspiracy theorists, because thisis where the real problem lies. I will argue that conspiracy theorists aretypically victims of a form of cognitive failure. They are unusually

Clarke / CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THEORIZING 133




prone to committing what social psychologists refer to as the “funda-mental attribution error.”5 I will describe this error and explain how itleads conspiracy theorists to hold on to theories that they would oth-erwise abandon. I then conclude with a few words in favor of the con-spiracy theorist. Although conspiracy theorists do commit a cognitiveerror that leads them to prefer theories that are otherwise less plausi-ble over theories that are otherwise more plausible, the activities ofthe conspiracy theorists are not to be condemned outright. The preva-lence of conspiracy theorizing is beneficial to us in several ways.

Before I go on, here are a couple of definitions. Charles Pigdendefines a conspiracy as

a secret plan on the part of a group to influence events partly by covertaction. (Pigden 1995, 5)

Keeley defines a conspiracy theory as

a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms ofthe significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons—the conspirators—acting in secret. (Keeley 1999, 116)

Although one author offers a definition of a conspiracy and theother a definition of a conspiracy theory, it is apparent that the twoauthors are largely in agreement. Keeley’s theories are effectively the-ories about Pigden’s conspiracies. The only substantial differencebetween them is that Keeley is more restrictive about the number ofconspirators acceptable in a genuine conspiracy. The reader mayaccept either definition in the argument that follows.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Sometimes it is thought that conspiracy theorists are simply peoplewho are gripped by a desire to believe the truth of their “pet” theory,and because of this desire they are not motivated to go and find evi-dence for the pet theory to the extent that they normally would bemotivated to find evidence for a given theory, before accepting thattheory. It is plausible to believe that people are initially attracted tobelieve in conspiracies because of the emotions that these stir in them.Hume made a similar claim on behalf of miracles when he wrote that“the passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an





agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief ofthose events, from which it is derived” (Hume 1988, 150). Belief in theability of conspirers to carry out their plans, while duping others intobelieving in a cover story, may inspire similar feelings. But while it isplausible to hold that there are people who are emotionally attractedto belief in conspiracy theories, anyone who concluded that becauseof these feelings conspiracy theorists would go on believing in con-spiracies theories on the basis of less evidence than they would other-wise require to substantiate belief, cannot have had much contactwith conspiracy theorists.

Because conspiracy theorists almost always wish to see conspira-cies exposed, they are typically quite dedicated in their search for evi-dence relevant to their favorite conspiracy theory and are usually ableto overwhelm you with a deluge of evidence in favor of that theory.Gail Brewer-Giorgio (1988), the author of Is Elvis Alive?, is one suchtypical conspiracy theorist. Her argument for the conclusion thatElvis Presley faked his own death brings together a vast array of evi-dence. The conventional explanation of the death of Elvis Presley, in1977 at age 42, has a meager evidential base, referring to Elvis’ heartcondition, which is explained by appealing to facts about his life-style.6 The conspiratorial rival theory that Brewer-Giorgio mounts isrich in detail, explaining, inter alia, why Elvis’s middle name is mis-spelled on his tombstone (Elvis was superstitious and wouldn’t wanthis name correctly spelled on a tombstone when he was in fact alive),and why Elvis’s casket was unusually heavy (it contained a waxdummy and an air conditioning unit to stop the wax dummy frommelting). Brewer-Giorgio can also explain away the apparent plausi-bility of the conventional explanation of Elvis’s death. Given thatElvis wished to fake his own death, it would have suited him toappear to be in poor health so as to add plausibility to his cover story.

Conspiracy theories invariably seem to be based on more evidencethan their immediate rival, the nonconspiratorial “received view.”This is because they explain all that the nonconspiratorial receivedview explains—the apparent plausibility of the nonconspiratorialreceived view is a consequence of the success of the cover story orcover-up, according to conspiracy theorists—and then go on toaccount for evidence that the received view is unable to explain. Oncea conspiracy theorist has become committed to a conspiracy theory,she is able to account for almost any relevant evidence that is pre-sented. It is either evidence of the cover-up, which the conspirers areattempting, or it is evidence of discrepancies in the received explana-





tion. Strictly, none of this can be described as ad hoc. A theory thatinvolves an attempt by some people to deceive other people is a the-ory that involves reasons both to expect a cover-up and flaws in thecover-up.7

It is not hard to understand why conspiracy theorists are able toaccommodate new evidence in their theories. What is hard to under-stand is why conspiracy theorists continue to be motivated to do so.Conspiracy theories often have the appearance of forming the core ofwhat Lakatos referred to as “degenerating research programmes”(Lakatos 1970). Research programs are very roughly what Kuhnrefers to as “paradigms,” research traditions built around a core the-ory in which participants are dedicated to advancing the case for thatcore theory and dedicated to protecting it from the effect of appar-ently contradictory evidence by making modifications to the “protec-tive belt” of auxiliary hypotheses and initial conditions. Lakatosurged us to make judgments regarding the success of research pro-grams, distinguishing between progressive and degeneratingresearch programs according to the way in which these relate to newevidence. A progressive research program is one in which novel pre-dictions and retrodictions are made that are generally successful. In adegenerating research program, successful novel predictions andretrodictions are not made. Instead, auxiliary hypotheses and initialconditions are successively modified in light of new evidence, to pro-tect the original theory from apparent disconfirmation.

Social scientists and social commentators are not usually expectedto make exacting predictions and retrodictions. Nevertheless, it isoften possible to discern the expected consequences of a social theory.For example, if classical Marxist social theory is true then we can rea-sonably expect heightened economic instability in capitalist countriesat some stage in the not-too-distant future. Because conspiracy theo-ries typically involve an ongoing conspiracy, it is often particularlyclear what consequences can be expected to result from a conspiracytheory being true. When Bernstein and Woodward formulated thecore of the Watergate conspiracy, they were led to reasonably expectthe complicity of a number of individuals in the conspiracy and tomake rough and ready predictions, as well as retrodictions, about thebehavior of these conspirators. These predictions and retrodictionsturned out, for the most part, to be true and the Watergate conspiracyhas gained acceptance as a successful conspiracy theory.8

In contrast, the theory that asserts that Elvis Presley faked his owndeath is at the core of what appears to be a clear example of a degener-





ating research program. If Elvis Presley really were alive now (morethan 20 years after his supposed death) then we would reasonablyexpect to have some firm evidence of his activities at some time in thepast two decades. The behavior of his relatives, who Brewer-Giorgioalleges are coconspirators and probably in continuing contact withElvis, would also be expected to be highly unusual in a number ofways. But no reliable evidence of the Presley relatives attempting tocontact Elvis after 1977, or inadvertently revealing their complicity ina conspiracy, is forthcoming. Lakatos did not say exactly when itbecomes irrational to cling to a degenerating research program, butthere clearly are cases where a research program has degeneratedbeyond the point where it is reasonable to hold on to it. The problemwith conspiracy theorists is that they usually seem loath to give upconspiracy theories when this occurs.

It might perhaps be thought that we do not need an explanation forthe tendency of people to continue to believe in conspiracy theorieseven when these exhibit signs of having become degeneratingresearch programs. After all, significant numbers of scientists con-tinue to remain committed to research programs when these showsigns of clear degeneration and are no longer dominant in their field.However, there appears to be a relevant difference between these“elderly holdouts” in science and conspiracy theorists. In the case ofscientists, there are compelling sociological explanations for theircontinued commitment to unsuccessful ideas. A scientist who hasinvested a career in a particular research program stands to lose muchof her credibility by renouncing past intellectual commitments. Fur-thermore, the scientists may work as part of a research team that iscommitted to the degenerating research program. She may not be ableto join another research team that is participating in a differentresearch program. Even if she has doubts about the viability of thedegenerating research program, she may find it impolitic to makethese public. Renouncing her chosen research program could involveending her research career.9 In stark contrast, the conspiracy theoristtypically stands to make substantial social gains by abandoning com-mitment to a particular conspiracy theory. Abandoning conspiracytheories means ending the ridicule of intellectuals, and this can allowone the realistic prospect of a return to intellectual “polite society.”

It should be conceded that the thinking of some conspiracy theo-rists could be importantly affected by cultural factors that help toexplain their continued allegiance to degenerating research pro-grams. In some cases, conspiracy theorists may belong to a subculture





of fellow theorists that acts to significantly affect their judgment. It isplausible to believe that some subcultures, such as the subcultures ofreligious cults, can affect the reasoning of their members in such away as to make them believe things that they would otherwise notbelieve. Religious cults expend much effort to indoctrinate or brain-wash their members. However, such cultural explanations will not govery far to explain the continuing popularity of degenerating researchprograms with conspiracy theories at their core. Conspiracy theoriz-ing is most popular among members of the general public who areperhaps affected by, but not actively indoctrinated by, subcultures ofconspiracy theorists. Conspiracy theorizing may be culturally trans-mitted, but in most cases it is not strongly culturally maintained.

UNWARRANTED CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Keeley, as was already mentioned, attempts to identify a class ofconspiracy theories that are unwarranted because of their epistemicdeficiencies. In addition to satisfying his definition of conspiracy the-ories, Keeley’s UCTs have the following characteristics:

1. AUCT is an explanation that runs counter to some received, official, or“obvious” account.

2. The true intentions behind the conspiracy are invariably nefarious.10

3. UCTs typically seek to tie together seemingly unrelated events.4. The truths behind events explained by conspiracy theories are typi-

cally well-guarded secrets, even if the ultimate perpetrators are some-times well-known public figures. (Keeley 1999, 116-17)

A fifth characteristic is formulated around the activity of conspiracytheorists:

5. The chief tool of the conspiracy theorists is what I shall call “errantdata.” (Keeley 1999, 117)

As used by Keeley, errant data is a relative term. Relative to a receivedtheory, data is errant if it is unaccounted for, or contradictory to, thatreceived theory.

Before we consider Keeley’s arguments for the epistemic weak-nesses of UCTs, we need to say a bit more about his list of characteris-tics for UCTs. Although the theories that have these characteristics aremeant to have the epistemic deficiencies that Keeley argues for, the






list of characteristics is looser than a set of necessary and sufficientconditions for a conspiracy theory being unwarranted. Some unwar-ranted conspiracies do not have all of the listed characteristics, andsome conspiracies that do have all of them are conspiracies that we arewarranted in believing in. Keeley mentions Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair, as conspiracies that have all the characteristics of a UCT,but that we are nevertheless warranted in believing in (Keeley 1999,118). Perhaps the epistemic deficiencies common to UCTs are some-how overridden in these cases? Keeley does not address this question.It is not clear whether Keeley believes that necessary and sufficientconditions for an important class of UCTs could be articulated or not.However, he clearly believes that he has articulated a characterizationof UCTs in sufficient detail to allow for these to be usefully criticizedas a class. I am concerned to attack these criticisms and I will set asidequestions about the worthiness of his characterization of UCTs.

Keeley considers the explanatory virtues of UCTs, which he claimsare “subtly flawed.” The explanatory virtues of UCTs are the verysources of their epistemic deficiencies, and this is what makes it diffi-cult for us to properly assess them; a situation that goes some way toexplaining their enduring popularity, or so he contends. Theepistemic virtues of conspiracy theories are that they provide unify-ing explanations and that they explain errant data. An epistemicoverreliance on the ability to explain errant data is the first flaw ofUCTs, according to Keeley. Keeley suggests that it is appropriate toplace great stress on explaining errant data in the natural sciences butinappropriate in social explanation, because we ought to be modestabout our ability to gather reliable data about the human world.Much of what we accept as the data to be explained in social theoriz-ing will turn out to be false. Apparently, because of this consideration,we respond appropriately to the conspiracy theorist who challengesus to explain errant data by simply shrugging our shoulders.

The other flaw of UCTs, according to Keeley, is that these have aninbuilt undermining feature. If we accept them then we will have rea-son to abandon our confidence in the trustworthiness of the peopleand the institutions that are involved in the conspiracy. Keeley seesthis problem as very serious, as the following quote suggests:

These theories throw into doubt the various institutions that have beenset up to generate reliable data and evidence. In doing so, they revealjust how large a role trust—in both institutions and individuals—playsin the justification of our beliefs. (Keeley 1999, 121)




Acceptance of UCTs threatens to put us in a position where ourconfidence in authorities is so eroded that we are no longer warrantedin holding any beliefs that are socially produced, according to Keeley.Thus, we are left in a position analogous to the lamentable position ofno longer being able to accept the legitimacy of the mechanisms thatwarrant belief production in the sciences; no longer being justified inbelieving that “the platypus is a mammal and that gold is an atomicelement” (Keeley 1999, 121). Such epistemic endpoints appear toembody a degree of skepticism that is too high to be acceptable toanyone.

Keeley’s first charge against conspiracy theories is not at all telling.Keeley is right that social data is generally less reliable than the datathat natural scientists locate, but he fails to inform us as to why thisconsideration should tell particularly against the errant data that con-spiracy theories explain. It appears to be a consideration that tellsequally against all social data. Furthermore, it is very hard to see howthis could be a consideration that tells against errant data more thanagainst nonerrant data. Errant data is only errant in relation to anaccepted theory, and to discount errant data on grounds that apply toboth errant and nonerrant data would be to prejudice oneself in favorof data simply because it happens to be explained by the receivedtheory.

The second charge is slightly more telling, but only slightly more.Keeley is surely right to argue that trust in institutions and individu-als plays a crucial role in the justification of our beliefs, as a number ofphilosophers have recently emphasized (Coady 1992; Lipton 1998).One of the reasons against believing in the Watergate conspiracy,when it was initially propounded, was that this would involve theundermining of our warrant for the beliefs that we had accepted onthe basis of the testimony of Nixon, Mitchell, Ehrlichman, and others.We might similarly hesitate to believe allegations that the Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) conspired in the OklahomaCity bombing because this would involve undermining our warrantfor beliefs that were accepted because of the testimony of representa-tives of the BATF. These sorts of considerations ought to be taken intoaccount when deciding whether or not to accept social theories, but itis difficult to believe in the case of most UCTs that they are the veryserious considerations that Keeley takes them to be.

Potentially, conspiratorial thinking could lead us to doubt beliefsas entrenched in our current thinking as the belief that the platypus isa mammal. But this is a far cry from the usual degree of undermining





that accepting a UCT involves. The Watergate conspiracy (which hasall of the characteristics of a UCT) involved the participation of gov-ernment officials at the highest level and its acceptance ought toundermine our confidence in the truth claims of those particular offi-cials. However, it is unclear why it would erode our confidence inother government officials and agencies, much less induce pervasiveand debilitating skepticism. Consider how the Watergate conspiracymight be adapted to embrace skepticism as far reaching as skepticismabout the taxonomic status of the platypus: in his increasingly para-noid state of mind, Nixon became convinced that the platypuses’ tax-onomic status disposed voters in favor of the Democratic Party, andso he ordered Gordon Liddy to interfere with the documentation ofbasic science so as to have the platypus falsely taxonomized. I take itthat it is clear that no actual version of the Watergate conspiracyinvolves such allegations or allegations remotely like these. Indeed itis hard to see that any of the conspiracy theories Keeley contemplateshave the effect of undermining very entrenched mundane beliefs.11

Keeley makes much more of the importance of the second flaw ofUCTs than he is entitled to because of a slide in his reasoning. Heobserves that some contemporary conspiracy theorists have a ten-dency to react to criticism of their preferred theories by adapting thesetheories and increasing the number of conspirators involved in thealleged conspiracy. Apparently there are some conspiracy theoristswho began by alleging that the BATF was conspiratorially involved inthe Oklahoma City bombing and now allege a conspiracy involvingthe collusion of the FBI and parts of the press. Keeley contends thatsuch a pattern of development in reasoning sets these conspiracy the-orists down the slippery slope toward “almost nihilistic” degrees ofskepticism. This pattern may often be followed, but the fact that it isoften followed is an observation about the fallacious reasoning pat-terns of some contemporary conspiracy theorists and this is simplynot relevant to the epistemic evaluation of UCTs as a class.

In any case, a sophisticated conspiracy theorist could advance aconspiracy theory with the reach that Keeley contemplates, and resistKeeley’s slippery slope to pervasive skepticism, by introducing thefollowing consideration. Due to the nature of conspiracy, we can gen-erally expect conspiring agents to be more reliable than they wouldotherwise be about matters that are not directly relevant to the con-spiracy. Suppose that Nixon really did have Liddy interfere with allscientific records so as to have the platypus falsely taxonomized. IfNixon’s concern is to deceive us about platypuses and not about other





animals, then this need not undermine our confidence that the wom-bat is a mammal and that the kookaburra is a bird. It is important toconspirators that their conspiracies go undetected. Part of one’s coveras a conspirator is to ensure that one has a good reputation, and thiswill typically involve maintaining high standards of honesty andepistemic responsibility on all issues other than those directly rele-vant to the conspiracy.

It might be thought that I am making too much of the distinctionbetween conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists. Aren’t UCTsjust those theories that are propounded by the contemporary conspir-acy theorists whom Keeley attacks? No. UCTs are a set of theories thatoccupy a region of “logical space” that Keeley has roughly locatedthrough his characterization of them. Contemporary conspiracy theo-rists may have persistently advocated the less warrantable of these,but this tells us nothing about the warrant that more acceptable butunfancied conspiracy theories, which Keeley counts as UCTs, mightactually deserve. Keeley has undertaken to say something importantabout the warrantability of UCTs as a class, but he has failed to do this.

It might also be thought that I am being too strict about whatKeeley means by the term theory. I have accused conspiracy theoristsof remaining committed to research programs even when theseexhibit clear signs of degeneration. If Keeley was to be interpreted asusing the word theory to mean developmental series of views chang-ing over time, then a theory in his sense would be something akin toLakatos’s conception of a research program, and Keeley could beunderstood as joining me in claiming that conspiracy theories areunwarranted when they form the core of degenerating research pro-grams. However, Keeley appears to rule out this charitable interpreta-tion when he tells us that “a conspiracy theory deserves the appella-tion ‘theory’, because it proffers an explanation of the event in ques-tion” (Keeley 1999, 116). Theories are understood by Keeley as singleexplanations and not as developmental sequences of explanations.

Keeley greatly overstates the strength of his case against UCTs, andas I have shown, he conflates it with a case he develops against theexplanatory stratagems favored by some contemporary conspiracytheorists. Neither of Keeley’s arguments against UCTs establish thatUCTs are significantly less epistemically reputable than other socialtheories. He does establish that, sometimes, the acceptance of UCTsinvolves a degree of undermining of beliefs that had been warrantedby those who are alleged to be participating in the conspiracy. But it isnot even clear that this problem is something that ought to count par-





ticularly against conspiracy theories. Consider the situation I am inwhen I decide whether or not to accept a nonconspiratorial Marxistsocial theory that involves the view that the beliefs of most, or all, ofthose whose testimony I have hitherto relied on have been ideologi-cally distorted. If I am to accept such a theory then I will underminethe warrant for many of my current beliefs. The problem of beliefsbeing undermined when theories are accepted is a problem that isshared by some conspiratorial and some nonconspiratorial socialtheories.

CONSPIRACY THEORISTS

Instead of attempting to home in on the epistemic flaws of a sig-nificant class of conspiracy theories, as Keeley has, I will focus myattention on the cognitive failures of a significant class of conspiracytheorists—those conspiracy theorists who continue to hold on to con-spiracy theories even when these take on the appearance of formingthe core of degenerating research programs. If we can identify a con-sistent form of cognitive failure among such conspiracy theorists thenwe can go much of the way to justifying the attitude of intellectualswho dismiss conspiracy theories out of hand. The intellectuals can beshown to be entitled to assume (perhaps implicitly) that, like mostconspiracy theorists, the conspiracy theorist being ignored is likely tobe the proponent of a degenerating research program, and the contin-ued advocacy of such a research program is likely to be the result ofcognitive failure on the part of the conspiracy theorist.

There may be many reasons why individual conspiracy theoristsremain committed to their favored conspiracy theories even whenthese exhibit clear signs of degeneration. However, if we are to justifythe attitude of those who dismiss conspiracy theories on the groundsthat these are propounded by conspiracy theorists we need to identifya factor that is present in the overwhelming majority of cases of suchconspiracy theorizing. The factor that I have identified as being com-mon to the thinking of conspiracy theorists who hold on to degenerat-ing research programs is that they commit what social psychologistscall the “fundamental attribution error.” This is a form of cognitiveerror that is endemic to human thinking and that leads to a variety ofunfortunate consequences (Nisbett and Ross 1980, 1991; Ross andAnderson 1982).





Social psychologists studying our interpretation of the behavior ofothers make a primary distinction between situational anddispositional explanations of behavior. When I ask you to explain whatcaused Manfred’s motoring accident, you could provide adispositional explanation by citing what you take to be features ofManfred’s personality. For example, you could tell me that Manfred is(disposed to being) careless. Alternatively you could appeal to rele-vant features of the situation that Manfred was in to explain the occur-rence of the accident. You would be doing this if you told me that theaccident was caused by the difficult driving conditions presented bythe wet road that Manfred’s car was on. Of course there is nothingstopping you from appealing to both sorts of explanation when seek-ing to account for the events in question. Typically though, peoplepresenting causal explanations single out one explanatory factor as“the cause.”

According to many social psychologists, humans systematicallymake the error of severely overestimating the importance ofdispositional factors, as well as the concomitant error of severelyunderestimating the importance of situational factors, when seekingto understand and explain the behavior of others. This error is bothvery widespread and of a significant magnitude. Social psychologistshave marshaled compelling evidence in favor of its existence.

In one experiment that provides strong evidence in favor of theexistence of the fundamental attribution error, research subjects weregiven a set of essays and recorded speeches on controversial topicsand invited to make inferences about the beliefs of the authors of thepieces. The subjects persistently inferred from the fact that a givenauthor had written an essay or presented a speech in favor of (forexample) the legalization of marijuana that she was in fact in favor ofthe legalization of marijuana, even when they were specificallyinformed that the authors and speakers were acting under instruc-tions to argue for a particular side in a debate. A very strong situa-tional factor was consistently ignored by research subjects who exhib-ited a high degree of confidence in their own ability to explain thebehavior of the authors and speakers in dispositional terms (Jonesand Harris 1967).

In another experiment, the Darley-Batson experiment, a largegroup of research subjects who were students at the Princeton Theo-logical Seminary were asked to prepare a presentation at a particulartime and location, which was to be recorded. The seminarians weregiven directions to the location, which involved walking past a per-





son slumped in a doorway coughing and groaning—a person whowas obviously in need of assistance. The purpose of the experimentwas to find out who among the research subjects would offer assis-tance. As it turned out, 63% of the research subjects who were unhur-ried offered some form of assistance. These research subjects wereexamined on a number of dispositional criteria, none of which wasfound to significantly correlate with their behavior. However, oneapparently trivial situational factor that was introduced was found tomake an extremely significant difference. When seminarians whowalked past the person in need of assistance were told beforehandthat they were late and needed to hurry, the assistance rate droppedfrom 63% to 10%. This level of difference between hurried and unhur-ried subjects is a far cry from the expectations of psychologists andmembers of the public who were asked to predict the outcome of theexperiment (Darley and Batson 1973).

Not only did people not expect that this situational factor would beimportant, it appears that they had extreme difficulty in adjustingtheir beliefs in light of such results. Pietromonaco and Nisbett (1982)asked research subjects who had read about the Darley-Batson exper-iment to predict the rate at which people would help others in a simi-lar situation. Despite the strong evidence of the Darley-Batson experi-ment in favor of the situational factor of being in a hurry being veryexplanatorily significant, the subjects made only insignificant adjust-ments to their predictions about the importance of being in a hurryand no adjustments at all to their assessment of the importance ofdispositional factors. Of course, this result is just what we shouldexpect if the fundamental attribution error really is as generic as socialpsychologists suggest.

As explanations, conspiracy theories are highly dispositional.When conspiracies occur it is because conspirators intend them tooccur and act on their intentions. The conspiratorial dispositions ofthe conspirators play the role of the cause in a typical explanation thatinvolves a conspiracy. In most cases, the received view, the conven-tionally accepted nonconspiratorial alternative to a particular con-spiracy theory, is a situational explanation. If you accept the receivedview that Elvis Presley’s funeral occurred because he died, as a resultof a heart condition, you would explain his death by appealing to thesituational factor of the state of his health. However, if you believethat Elvis Presley faked his own death, you would account for theoccurrence of the funeral by appealing to a dispositional explanation,because you presumably hold that he and his fellow conspirators





went out of their way to deceive the public as to the fact that heremains alive. If you believe that the U.S. military leadership arereluctant to discuss the Roswell Incident because there is no such inci-dent to discuss, you are basing your belief on a situational factor. Bycontrast, if you believe that the U.S. military leadership are conspiringto keep the public unaware of contact with alien species, whichoccurred at Roswell, New Mexico, you would presumably explain theU.S. military leadership’s persistent denials of knowledge of the inci-dent by appealing to their disposition toward conspiratorial paternal-istic behavior.

To be able to explain why conspiracy theorists remain committedto degenerating research programs with conspiracy theories at theircore, in the face of the degeneration of these research programs, wehave to appreciate what is typically involved in the giving up of a con-spiracy theory. To give up a conspiracy theory in favor of a noncon-spiratorial alternative is typically to abandon a dispositional explana-tion in favor of a situational explanation. But this involvesovercoming the fundamental attribution error, which is to go againstour cognitive instincts. This can be done, but it is psychologically dif-ficult for us to do. Those who continue to believe in conspiracy theo-ries, when it is intuitively clear to the majority that the time to aban-don such theories is well overdue, may simply be people who aremore in the grip of the fundamental attribution error than most.

Of course, the proponents of a conspiracy theory will not simplyfeel that a dispositional conspiracy theory is better than itsnonconspiratorial situational alternative despite its degeneration;they will make efforts to rationalize their preference. One way theycan do this is by appealing to the unifying power of conspiracy theo-ries. Dispositional explanations, such as conspiratorial explanations,can appear to exhibit more unifying power than situational explana-tions, because dispositional explanations can relate the occurrence ofevents within the context of an intended plan. Because conspiracytheories typically involve highly elaborate plans, they will usuallyexhibit great unificatory power. Situations, by contrast, can appear tobe “one off” events, and explanations appealing to them can appear tolack unificatory power. But this contrast is fallacious. If you examinethe circumstances of Elvis Presley’s natural death closely enough youwill be able to relate it to other natural events, and with sufficient per-sistence you will be able to relate all of these within the scope of phys-ics, thereby furnishing yourself with an explanation with moreunificatory power than any dispositional explanation can provide.





Some will object to the idea that there are cognitive errors at all,appealing to conceptual arguments that aim to rule out the possibilitythat we could be systematically irrational.12 Others will attempt tobase objections on evolutionary theory and ask how it is that we couldpossibly have evolved to make systematic cognitive errors. Unfortu-nately, there is good evidence to show that we are disposed to make avariety of such systematic cognitive errors (Kahneman, Slovic, andTversky 1982). For example, it is well established that we frequentlymake systematic errors about the extent to which small samples arerepresentative of larger populations (Tversky and Kahneman 1982).

It may seem hard to believe that humans have evolved to make asystematic error about something as important to us as the interpreta-tion of the behavior of other people. Nevertheless, this is possible. Thefundamental attribution error primarily occurs when we make judg-ments about the behavior of people outside contexts of familiarity(Nisbett and Ross 1991). For the most part, human evolution probablyoccurred when early humans were members of close-knit tribalgroups, in which members would have been highly familiar withother members of the group and in which they were not often exposedto their behavior outside of familiar contexts. It may also be that aheightened awareness of dispositional factors in the understandingof the behavior of others was to our evolutionary advantage, even ifthis came at a cost to our understanding of the importance of situa-tional factors. If another person, with whom I am in close contact, isdisposed to conspire against me then it is very important that I amaware of this. If I commit the error of mistaking their hostile disposi-tions for a situational factor then I potentially expose myself to muchdanger by continuing to interact with them. In general, it may bebetter to “err on the side of caution” and mistake situational factorsfor dispositional factors rather than take the chance of misreadingpeople’s possibly hostile dispositions.

CONSPIRACY THEORIZING

I have suggested that the fundamental attribution error may havesurvived in the human population because in most cases it was notparticularly harmful and because the opposite error of overestimat-ing situational factors to the exclusion of dispositional factors waspotentially very harmful indeed. Perhaps this asymmetry should betaken into account when we consider our attitude toward the activity





of contemporary conspiracy theorists. Most conspiracy theorists whomanage to make the headlines these days produce theories that areharebrained and lacking in warrant. But few are actually harmful.Furthermore, there are several things that can be said in favor of con-spiracy theorizing. First, the conspiracy theorist challenges us toimprove our social explanations. If a nonconspiratorial social expla-nation is better articulated as a result of the challenge of a conspiracytheory then that is all to the good. Second, the conspiracy theoristoccasionally identifies a genuine conspiracy. Giving a thousand con-spiracy theories some consideration is a small price for us to pay tohave one actual nefarious conspiracy, such as the Watergate conspir-acy, uncovered sooner rather than later.

The prevalence of conspiracy theories confers a third benefit uponus, which is that it helps to maintain openness in society. Governmentagencies have a tendency to be less than forthcoming with informa-tion that might prove embarrassing to them but that the public wouldprefer to have made available. The information gathering activities ofconspiracy theorists can help to prevent such secretiveness. The con-spiracy theorist may be a victim of cognitive error, but it is perhaps toour advantage that they remain in error. Although we would not wishto fall victim to the fundamental attribution error, it can sometimes beto our advantage that others do. Perhaps we should thank the con-spiracy theorist for remaining vigilant on our behalf. They may still beout there.

NOTES

1. A measure of success in the game of cricket.2. Opposition to perceived elites and to elite cultures, such as the culture of intellec-

tuals, is endemic in Populist thought. Lazer offers a “working definition” of Populismas the belief that “the majority opinion of the people is checked by an elitist minority”(Lazer 1976, 259). Although Populist movements are almost invariably antielitist, theyare not invariably anti-intellectual, for the simple reason that intellectuals are notalways perceived as being part of an elite. The Russian Populist Narodnik movement ofthe 1870s was a political grouping predominantly consisting of antielitist intellectuals.

3. Canovan (1981, 46-51) describes the development of debate about the status ofnineteenth-century American Populism among historians.

4. Others are Pigden (1995) and, somewhat elliptically, Popper ([1945] 1966).5. The fundamental attribution error has recently become a hot topic in moral phi-

losophy. See, for example, Campbell (1999), Doris (1998, 2002), and Flanagan (1991).6. Proponents of the received nonconspiratorial view about Elvis’s death could pre-

sumably acquire more evidence for their view.





7. Keeley (1999, 121) makes this point quite forcefully.8. The story of the uncovering of the Watergate conspiracy is recounted in Bernstein

and Woodward (1974).9. There is a wealth of recent literature in science studies that provides sociological

explanations for the intellectual commitments of scientists. Biagioli (1999) contains thebest of most of it.

10. Nefarious seems overly strong. If Elvis Presley really did conspire to fake hisdeath is it hard to see his intentions as actually being nefarious. This is certainly not howBrewer-Giorgio (1988) portrays him.

11. Keeley does make an attempt to show that acceptance of one particular conspir-acy theory, the theory that the Holocaust was faked, leads to an unacceptably generallevel of skepticism. He informs us that belief that the Holocaust was faked is akin tobelief that World War II did not happen as well as to various other unlikely beliefs(Keeley 1999, 123). The case is made too swiftly to be convincing.

12. Stein (1997) contains a discussion of such conceptual arguments, focusing par-ticularly on one form of these arguments for the conclusion that claims of human irra-tionality are self-undermining.

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Steve Clarke is a research fellow in the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethicsand a lecturer in philosophy in the School of Humanities at Charles Sturt University. Heis the author of a book, Metaphysics and the Disunity of Scientific Knowledge(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), as well as a number of articles on topics in applied ethics,metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. These have appeared in such journals as theAmerican Philosophical Quarterly and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.





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Clarke 2002