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Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers: A Bridge between Two Nations

Introduction

The general consensus among historians attributes September 1, 1939, when Adolf Hitler

began his invasion of Europe, as the start of World War II. Many scholars have discussed and

written about this aspect of the war, the European front, as well as the subsequent entrance of the

United States to the conflict. In regards to the other side of the world, scholars have generally

focused on the Pacific theater as the United States battled Japan until the war’s end on September

2, 1945. However, it is to the west that we will shift our focus, to the massive country of China

where the majority of the action takes place. The Second Sino-Japanese War, China’s “World

War II,” contributed to the great changes China experienced in the subsequent decades to its

political, social, and international image. The actions the United States and China took during the

war would establish the basis for the contemporary age of US-China relations.

Many of the actions of both these countries can be attributed, at least in part, to one man.

Former United States Air Corps Captain Claire Chennault was inspecting the Chinese Air Force

on behalf of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident sparked the

Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.1 The incident began when Japanese troops on the west side

of the Marco Polo Bridge were practicing night maneuvers without permission from the Chinese

government, which resulted in shots being fired. Chinese troops stationed in the vicinity became

very alarmed and fired back, thinking that they were under attack, and the situation escalated into

a full-blown battle. Tensions that had already been building up between Japan and China finally

spilled over into war.2 In response to the onset of war, Chennault offered his services to Chiang

1 Claire Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949), 38. 2 Duane Schultz, The Maverick War: Chennault and the Flying Tigers (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 56.

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Kai-Shek who gave Chennault the position of chief advisor to the Chinese Air Force.3 Chennault

implemented his solid grasp of fighter tactics against the Japanese bombers, which in theory,

should have been effective.4 The reality of the situation was that the Chinese Air Force was both

undertrained and ill-equipped for war, and thus faced heavy losses against the Japanese forces.

As the Chinese Air Force neared its demise, Chiang Kai-Shek sent Chennault and several

Chinese officials to the United States to request pilots, supplies, and especially planes. President

Roosevelt enacted the Lend-Lease Act and granted Chennault’s requests, in particular helping

Chennault secure 100 P-40B planes. With these planes, Chennault would go on to create the First

American Volunteer Group (AVG), a group of mercenary pilots that eventually become known

as the Flying Tigers. Chennault led the Flying Tigers in air raids against the Japanese, and helped

defend strategic points throughout Southeast Asia and western China over the course of the war.5

Chennault would eventually be reinstated to the United States Air Force as a colonel and the

Flying Tigers became an official United States military force.6 He also developed a close

relationship over the course of the war with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and his wife, Soong

May-Ling.

Chennault and his Flying Tigers served as a bridge between the United States and China,

at a time when the two countries lacked common ground upon which to establish relations. On

top of the fortunate timing of Chennault’s presence in China, when the Second Sino-Japanese

War broke out, Chennault’s thorough grasp of fighter and anti-bomber tactics proved decisive in

helping China establish an effective defense against the Japanese air force. Chiang Kai-Shek also

3 Chennault, 39. 4 Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941-1942 (HarperCollins/Smithsonian Books, 2007), 8. 5 Robert Lee Scott, Jr., Flying Tiger: Chennault of China (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959), 227-228. 6 Ibid., 202.

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demonstrated no qualms about having a foreigner coordinate the Chinese air force. Chennault

would then become an important link when he returned to the United States to request aid,

establishing a connection between Chiang and Roosevelt that had tangible qualities. The Flying

Tigers resulted from that connection and were a physical manifestation of American lend-lease

aid to China. Their role in the war also demonstrated Chiang’s mindset of pushing for American

troops in China to fight the Japanese for him so he could focus on the CCP. Beginning from the

Flying Tigers’ first combat mission, the eyes of the general publics of both countries were

trained on them. The Chinese public recognized and appreciated the significance of having

foreigners come to defend their country. The American public admired the Flying Tigers,

especially right after the bombing of Pearl Harbor when news of the Tigers’ successes against

the Japanese reached stateside. The Flying Tigers became Civil Air Transport after the war

ended, and they continued to work as a link to China by providing transport services to the KMT

during the Chinese Civil War. Chennault always seemed to walk a fine line in his allegiance to

both the Chinese Nationalist government and the United States government. Thanks to

Chennault and the Flying Tigers, they spanned the gap that had separated two countries for so

long, setting the stage upon which relations could be built.

In the greater context of the war itself, we will also shed some light on the state of China

and the United States. In China, the armies of both the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lacked the resources, weaponry, and training to effectively

battle against the Japanese invaders. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-Shek knew that after the Marco

Polo Bridge Incident, he had to take a stand and show the world that China was willing and

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capable of fighting a war.7 The next confrontation would take place on August 13, in Shanghai,

with Japanese forces hoping to quickly eliminate China’s most industrialized city, and Chiang

Kai-Shek, who knew he could not hold the city indefinitely, willing to make a point to the rest of

the world. He committed his finest troops, in particular his prized German-trained divisions, to

the defense of the city.8 Chiang’s risky maneuver ultimately drew the attention of the United

States, which had not yet entered the war but had only spoken against the aggressive actions of

Japan and sent supplies to China. The United States finally recognized China as the best bet in

combatting the Japanese.

In the western hemisphere, as the world broke down into conflict, the United States

maintained its isolationist stance through the 1930’s. However, President Franklin Roosevelt was

a strong proponent of internationalism, and envisioned China as a future major player on the

world scene.9 He also believed that China had the best chance of fighting Japan in the eastern

hemisphere. Roosevelt justified the sending of supplies and financial resources to China by

pointing out that China and Japan had not yet formally declared war on each other.10 After the

attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States entered World War II and China

formally declared war on the Axis two days later. Now that the United States and China had

become formal allies and officially involved in the war, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Allied

commander-in-chief in the China Theater, with the United States’ Joseph Stilwell to be Chiang’s

chief of staff and commander of all American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. Even

7 Chiang Kai-Shek, The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. (New York: The John Day Company, 1946), 1:45. 8 Hsi-Sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-1945, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982), 44-45. 9 Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs,ed. Donald Schewe, vol. 8, 1937-1939 (New York: Garland Press, 1979), doc. 792. 10 Albert Weeks. Russia’s Life-Save: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R in World War II (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004). 24.

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with the American entrance, the war effort in China faced many obstacles, not the least of which

included the very sour relationship between Chiang Kai-Shek and Joseph Stilwell. Chiang did

not embrace Stilwell’s aggressive strategy of engaging the Japanese head-on; rather, he preferred

Claire Chennault’s approach of bombing the enemy, and keeping enemy planes away from

Chinese cities through the use of the AVG.11

In addition to Chennault, two other major figures need to be expanded upon, Chiang Kai-

Shek and Franklin Roosevelt. For Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States was his meal ticket. He

needed the finances and the weaponry that came with lend-lease to carry out his own agenda, and

he needed the American forces to fight the Japanese for him. On an individual basis, Chiang

maintained good friendships with a few Americans aside from Chennault, such as the journalist,

Henry Luce. However, when it came to Chiang’s relationship with the United States, he lacked a

vision for what this relationship would look like, so caught up was he in dealing with the CCP.

Chiang had a tendency to micromanage his troop movements, and this approach did not change

with the United States forces that arrived in China to fight the Japanese. Chennault would

frequently dictate to Stilwell how he ought to fight the war, which contributed to the enmity

these two men felt for each other.12 It was control, and not cooperation, that Chiang desired,

during the course of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

In contrast to Chiang Kai-Shek, Roosevelt did have an idea of what he wanted for US-

China relations. He envisioned a future where there would be peace through the collective

11 Emily Hahn, Chiang Kai-Shek (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), 259 12 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-45 (New York: Grove Press, 1971), 197. Here, Tuchman cites an analysis of Chiang Kai-Shek in a G-2 report compiled by Joseph Stilwell during one of his tours in China prior to taking command of Allied forces in the China-Burma-India Theater.

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security of unified countries, and reaching out to China was part of that plan.13 Roosevelt wanted

China to join the Allied nations during the war, and even helped elevate China’s status to one of

the “Big Four.”14 From Roosevelt’s perspective, Chennault’s timely presence in China and

subsequent return to America for supplies and pilots was an excellent opportunity for the

president to carry out his intentions for China.

Popular support also played an important role in the relations between China and the

United States. Chinese citizenry recognized and appreciated the efforts of the Flying Tigers and

other American forces. Although it is difficult to determine the majority view of the American

presence in China, various firsthand accounts that will be revisited later described reception from

Chinese locals as nothing short of positive. In the United States, growing sympathy to the

Chinese plight encouraged Roosevelt to take action, and he took advantage of the sentiment to

encourage the American people towards internationalism.15 It looked as if two completely

different peoples could unite together in regards to the war. However, as is it usually is with

politics, each country’s respective government always seemed to be on different pages, and

could never put forth a truly joint effort in combatting the Japanese. This divide did not hinder

the overarching goal of the war, but would leave a scar in these two countries’ relationships, and

futures.

13 David Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941 (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007) 55. Although not explicitly stated in President Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech, Schmitz argues that the president had China in mind when he delivered the speech. Schmitz has a copy of the speech included in his book on page 102. 14 Crozier, 13-14. 15 Kenneth Davis, FDR the War President: 1940-1943 (New York: Random House, 2000), 31.

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US-China Relations in Perspective

Although the history of Sino-American relations dates back to 1784, the two countries

did not have the mutual regard they currently hold today. In fact, for a long time, the United

States took advantage of its military superiority to use China for its own gains. We have to look

at the very beginning of US-China relations in order to understand just how far the two countries

have come in their relationship, as well as decide how much of an impact Claire Chennault had

on the process.

Just after the American Revolutionary War ended in 1783, the United States began

exploring its trade possibilities. Qing Dynasty China emerged as a viable option due to, at the

time, less competition with British trade interests.16 Platonic trade relations continued until the

First Opium War, when the British forces defeated Chinese troops in 1842 in order to force the

legalization of opium trade in China. In 1844, the United States established the Treaty of

Wangxia with China which gave the United States equal status with Great Britain in the Chinese

trade market.17 As a sign of goodwill, the United States banned the opium trade and promised to

hand over any offenders to China. The Second Opium War from 1856 to 1860 resulted in the

Treaty of Tianjin which, among other points, gave the United States permission to set up

legations in Beijing.18

In the United States, the California Gold Rush in 1848 brought waves of Chinese

immigrants seeking to create new lives in the United States. Most immigrants ended up in low-

end labor work, which drew attention from American laborers who felt the Chinese depressed

wage levels. As anti-Chinese sentiment grew, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in

16 Robert Forbes, Remarks on China and the China Trade (Boston: Samuel N. Dickinson Printer, 1844), 30. 17 Kuo Ping Chia, "Caleb Cushing and the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844" In The Journal of Modern History (The University of Chicago Press, 1933), 34-54. 18 James Buchanan, Treaty of Tiensin, 1858.

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1882, which suspended Chinese immigration and did not allow any Chinese people into the

country.19 The ban would last for over sixty years well into World War II.

In the late 19th century, the United States adopted the Open Door Policy in China, which

stipulated that the foreign powers in China would neither interfere with Chinese territorial

integrity nor with treaty ports in their spheres of influence. However, Japan would eventually

violate the tenets of the treaty in 1931 by invading Manchuria and setting up the puppet state of

Manchuko.20 These actions by the Japanese, and their subsequent encroachment into the

mainland fostered increasing public sympathy for China in the United States.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), was also trying to

adapt to the times. Its founder, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, had become frustrated with the KMT’s lack of

unity and drive, and thus he turned to the Soviet Union for aid and inspiration. The Russians sent

their agents to help bring the KMT and the CCP together in order to create an effective party

structure that could run China, and to help the CCP develop while under the shadow of the

KMT.21 Thus the KMT-CCP alliance came into existence in 1922, borne out of necessity on the

part of both parties. With this new alliance, Dr. Sun wanted to pursue his goal of the removing

the various warlords from northern China, but passed away in1925. Chiang Kai-Shek, the

commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, would eventually succeed Dr. Sun.

Chiang used his military standing to form the Nationalist Government on July 1, 1925, and

carried out Dr. Sun’s dream of the Northern Expedition to remove the northern warlords.22

19 An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to the Chinese, May 6, 1882, Enrolled Acts and Resolutions of Congress, 1789-1996, General Records of the United States Government, Record Group 11, National Archives. 20 James Hsiung and Steven Levine, eds., China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan 1937-1945 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), 67. 21 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 520-521. 22 Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai-Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 114-115.

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The joint KMT-CCP force easily swept through southern China before heading east

towards Shanghai and Nanjing. After conquering those two major financial centers and fueled by

his military successes, Chiang ordered KMT troops to turn on CCP supporters, killing their

soldiers and eliminating the labor unions.23 The KMT then settled in Nanjing as its new seat of

government. The KMT betrayal of the CCP set the stage for the ideological and military struggle

that would become the Chinese Civil War.

In September 1931, the Japanese conducted their first act of aggression by occupying

Shenyang, the largest city in Manchuria, and subsequently, the rest of the region.24 Despite the

Japanese advancement, Chiang Kai-Shek focused primarily on battling the CCP, which would

become a major concern throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War. The CCP eventually based

itself in Ruijin, Jiangxi province. However, in 1934, Chiang began to launch a major offensive

against the CCP that focused on encircling Ruijin and the surrounding countryside.25 The CCP

sent out some diversionary troops in order to allow its important leaders escape from Jiangxi,

along with thousands of peasants. The Communist forces were scattered and simply headed west

and north, doing their best to evade KMT troops. The 6000-mile journey that left about a tenth of

the CCP’s original population alive at 60,000 people came to be known as the Long March.26

The CCP managed to avoid majority of KMT forces and found the isolation and time needed to

rebuild its power base.

Chiang’s cooperation and subsequent betrayal with the CCP reflected his political

approach of using others to carry out his plans, before turning against them when they no longer

23 Hsu, 528. 24 Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 60. 25 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1944), 187-188. 26 Bingzhang Yang, From revolution to politics: Chinese communists on the long march (Boulder: Westview Press 1990), 255.

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proved useful. His dogged pursuit of the CCP also came to establish a prevalent theme in his

military strategy of “Internal Pacification must precede the resistance to external aggression.”27

Again, Chiang wanted to be in power and he did not want to have any opposition to his power.

Chiang Kai-Shek’s mindset and behavior would become major factors in how he dealt with

American intervention during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

In 1936, warlord Zhang Xueliang ambushed Chiang Kai-Shek and forced the

Generalissimo to form a united offensive with the CCP against the Japanese.28 Though it took

several years to realize this plan, the KMT forces cut back their attacks on the CCP and these

various military factions, including the independent warlords, began to set aside their differences

in preparation for the Japanese attack. Major fighting began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

which resulted in the capture of Tianjin and Beijing. That decisive moment came on July 7, 1937,

and with it, the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Soon after the invasion of Manchuria, in the United States President Franklin Roosevelt

was elected to office in 1932. His New Deal policy reformed the American economy, and his

foreign policy changed the world. With the increase in tensions around the globe, the United

States, through the Neutrality Acts, adopted an isolationist stance to the issues of the world.29

However, Roosevelt was an internationalist, and he did have a heart for China. When the Second

Sino-Japanese War broke out, President Roosevelt sent aid to Chiang Kai-Shek under the pretext

that the war was undeclared, and thus not a “true” war.30 Eventually, these actions gave way to

the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 which allowed the United States to lend equipment and resources to

27 Hu Pu-yu, The Military Exploits and Deeds of President Chiang Kai-Shek (Taipei, Chung Wu Publishing Co., 1971), 159. 28 Fenby, 282-283. 29 Davis, 48-49. 30 Henry Morgenthau, Morgenthau Diary (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1965), 15, 295.

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its allies without violating the Neutrality Acts, and also set the stage for the United States to enter

the world war.

Roosevelt’s hope of bringing the countries of the world closer together fueled him to

work with China throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War. Several times, Roosevelt took

chances with Chiang, such as when China was elevated to one of the “Big Four” of the world,

joining the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as a “major” country, especially at

a time when China had still not solidified its own power base. However, Roosevelt was not

without his own ulterior motives, as he foresaw that if China could not sustain its sphere of the

world, then the United States would, by default, enter and help “manage” China’s area,

effectively adding to American reach and influence. Nevertheless, Roosevelt did go to great

lengths to aid China, especially through lend-lease.

By understanding the respective positions of China and the United States at the onset of

the Second Sino-Japanese War, we can more fully understand the role that Claire Chennault

played in developing the relations of these two countries. Before Chennault and his Flying Tigers

took part in the conflict, the United States and China had little to do with each other and did not

bother reaching out to each other. President Roosevelt was one of the few major figures who

actually cared about getting closer to China, but even then, his ability to do so was very limited

due to the political landscape of the United States at the time. Chennault changed all of that. We

will soon see that the more we understand about Chennault’s actions, the more we will be to

appreciate his significant contribution to US-China affairs.

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Enter Claire Chennault

While Roosevelt was trying to figure out how to discreetly lend help out China, Claire

Lee Chennault was on a ship to China for the purpose of surveying the Chinese Air Force in May

1937. While he was certainly not “lent” to the Chinese, at least not in the traditional sense, his

timing could not have been more fortuitous. He had just retired from the United States Army Air

Force with the rank of captain after realizing that he would not be able to keep flying while

trying to prove his theories on air tactics. At the time, the general consensus was that bombers

dominated the air, because of their greater speed and the altitude at which they flew. Chennault

knew that even with the difference in technological advancements between bombers and fighters,

fighter planes could defeat bombers, so long as they adopted the proper strategy and were willing

to improvise on the go.31

Chennault was a man of strong opinions who created polarizing reactions in other people.

As a boy, he grew up fiercely independent as he would embark on hunting trips alone and

disappear from the house for up to a week at times. He described himself as a loner while

growing up, never heavily interacting with his family members aside from his stepmother, who

passed away just five years into her marriage with his father.32 At school, he tended to enrage the

older children with his defiance, and would usually take the weaker and younger children’s side

by protecting them from the older children. This behavior even translated to his military career as

he frequently clashed with his superior officers, but greatly appealed to the men who served

under and alongside him.33 Even during the Second Sino-Japanese War it could be argued that

Chennault took up the “weaker” side’s cause, as in Chiang Kai-Shek and China, while personally

31 Ford, 8-9. 32 Chennault, 4. 33 Byrd, 10-11.

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conflicting with General Joseph Stilwell, commander of the American forces in the China-

Burma-India theatre.

For Chennault, flying was one of his great loves in life since he began to fly in 1918. His

first assignment was with the 94th Fighter Squadron where he began to realize what he felt were

unsound tactics in dogfighting. In Chennault’s words, “There was too much of an air of medieval

jousting in the dogfights and not enough of the calculated massing of overwhelming force…”34

After his stint with the 94th, Chennault went to Hawaii where he commanded the 19th Fighter

Squadron and could explore and experiment on new tactics with his pilots.35 Some strategies

Chennault developed included maintaining a formation during combat in order to concentrate

firepower, an air-raid warning system, and paratrooper drops. Hawaii is also where Chennault

began to really expand upon his approach of fighters against bombers. As a result, Chennault and

two of his pilots formed “Three Men on a Flying Trapeze,” an Air Corps acrobatic team that

performed all sorts of tricks and maneuvers that, in addition to providing great entertainment,

demonstrated the full capabilities of the fighter plane.36 Still, Chennault did not get the

endorsement for fighter planes that he desired from the upper echelons in the Air Corps.

Frustration at his lack of progress and poor health contributed to his resignation in April 1937.

Almost immediately following his resignation, Chennault received an offer from an old friend to

travel to China to inspect its Air Force. He accepted.37

A notable feature about Chennault’s time in China was his connection with the Chiang

family. He developed and maintained a close relationship with two of the most powerful people

in China, thereby ensuring his place in the Generalissimo’s inner circle throughout the Second

34 Chennault, p. 11 35 Ibid., p. 13 36 Ford, pp. 6-7 37 Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1987), 65.

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Sino-Japanese War. Here, the first link of the bridge began to take shape, as Chennault, the

American advisor, became a confidant of the leader of the Chinese people. The bridge would

continue to be built up as Chennault grew closer with the Chiangs to the point where in spite of,

or because of, his professional duties, he allowed personal feelings to enter the equation and truly

bring about a bond of friendship and loyalty.

Chennault actually met Soong May-Ling, or Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, first. After

arriving in China, Chennault met up with an old acquaintance, Roy Holbrook, formerly of the

United States Army Air Corps and at the time a flying instructor in China. Holbrook took

Chennault to meet his new employer, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, whose appearance and

personality greatly surprised Chennault. That first meeting left the former captain smitten, as he

wrote in his diary “She will always be a princess to me.”38 Her attitude and determination to see

China through its toughest times impressed Chennault, as did her communication skills and

political savvy.

Chennault’s initial meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek on the other hand, was not quite as

tender. The former captain, along with one of Chiang’s officers, General Mow, was summoned

to meet the Generalissimo and his wife at their residence in Kuling. There, Chiang asked General

Mow to report on the status of the Chinese Air Force. Mow’s figures showed that there were far

fewer combat-ready planes than the Aero Commission’s records indicated. Chiang was outraged

and almost demanded Mow’s head. However, with some coaxing from Madame Chiang,

Chennault came to Mow’s rescue and verified the general’s numbers, while also sharing his

professional opinion regarding the state of the Chinese Air Force.39 From then on, both men

38 Chennault, 34-35. 39 Ibid., 40-41.

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developed a mutual respect for each other, as Chiang would go to Chennault for the hard facts,

and Chennault trusted Chiang’s decisions, no matter how unpopular.

Working under Chiang Kai-Shek undoubtedly appealed to more than Chennault’s

interpersonal tendencies. For Chennault, serving in China was an opportunity at a fresh start, a

chance to implement and experiment with the air tactics he had been developing on an air force

entirely under his command. At the same time, Chiang Kai-Shek benefitted heavily from having

a former American Air Force officer work for him who was not afraid to speak his mind, and

actually wanted to make improvement to the Chinese Air Force. Soon after the Second Sino-

Japanese War began, Madame Chiang would turn over Air Force operations to Chennault, who

proceeded to plan and undertake combat missions.

The state of the Chinese Air Force when Chennault first arrived in China was deplorable.

Although the United States first had a hand in helping China establish an air force by building a

school in Hangchow, it was primarily the Italians who eventually cornered the market in Chinese

military aviation. In fact, the numbers issue that General Mow encountered came from a practice

the Italians encouraged in the Chinese Aero Commission of not removing any planes from the

official roster, regardless of the state of the plane.40 In addition, when Chennault paid a visit to

the Italian flying school at Loyang, he discovered the school’s unique policy of graduating every

Chinese cadet who finished their training and ranking them as qualified pilots, regardless of

actual ability.41 Though Chennault had his reservations, Chiang Kai-Shek was originally more

satisfied with the Italian approach than the American one. At the time, most Chinese aviation

cadets were selected from families of high social status and a guaranteed graduation from the

Italian school made Chiang look far better in the eyes of those families than the strict washing

40 Roy Stanley, Prelude to Pearl Harbor (New York: Scribner, 1990), 137. 41 Chennault, 37-38.

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out of inadequate students from the American school. Unfortunately, this practice resulted in

many Chinese pilots being unable to handle a plane properly, let alone enter combat. In addition

the planes that the Italians assembled for the Chinese were of poor quality and obsolete for

modern warfare.42

Chennault overlooked his huge handicap and proceeded to use what little resources he

had to combat the Japanese. The biggest factor that played to his advantage was that the Japanese

Air Force heavily favored bomber tactics similar to what his American colleagues back home

had utilized, and he had regularly defeated during their war games.43 Thus in theory, Chennault

could use Chinese fighter planes to take down the unescorted Japanese bombers. Communication

also became a key factor to combatting the Japanese threat, as Chennault reached out to various

military groups to aid his war effort. One notable example was General Wang, who helped

Chennault move searchlights around Nanjing to create a grid pattern that would detect incoming

bombers. Later on in Yunnan, Chennault would help form the Chinese air-raid warning system

there, which used a network of people, radios, telephones, and telegraph lines to quickly share

information on incoming enemy aircraft.44 In this way, not only did Chennault’s effectiveness at

responding to incoming Japanese threats increase, but the Chinese people felt included in the

defense of their country. In this way, Chennault drew the approval of the ordinary Chinese

citizenry.

Still, even with the proper tactics, the poor quality of the Chinese pilots and planes lead to

the rapid decline of the Chinese Air Force. Discouraged, Chennault applied for reenlistment in

the American Air Corps. However, in the summer of 1938, Madame Chiang sent Chennault to

42 Schultz, 55. 43 Ford, 8, 71-72. 44 Byrd, 78.

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Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, and ordered him to begin the rebuilding process of the

Chinese Air Force, this time training the new pilots in the American method.45 Chennault was

rejected from reenlistment, and thus began the long and arduous process of rebuilding the

Chinese Air Force.

Early in his time at Kunming, Chennault faced many obstacles as he began, under

Madame Chiang’s urgings, to organize the mercenary “International Squadron.” Chennault

wanted to use them as division commanders in his new Chinese Air Force, but many of the older

Chinese pilots, especially those who had gone through the Italian aviation schools, refused to

follow foreigners into combat. In addition, the older pilots tended to be uncooperative with

Chennault’s authority, frequently refusing to practice as well as disobeying orders in combat.

Chennault described them as “indifferent flyers, encrusted in seniority and well versed in the

obstructionist tactics that made their lives profitable, pleasant, and unprogressive.” On the other

hand, the younger Chinese pilots, in spite of their good intentions, were too inexperienced.46

Although he had a difficult time trying to meld foreign pilots and Chinese pilots into an effective

fighting force, the use of these international mercenaries would set the premise for when

Chennault took command of the Flying Tigers. He would lead an exclusively American aviation

unit into combat.

With the increasing frequency of Japanese bombing and the decreasing number of pilots

in China capable of stopping the bombers, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered Chennault to head for the

United States and acquire American planes and pilots in December 1940.47 Upon arrival in

45 Jack Sampson, Chennault, (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 40. 46 Chennault, 79. 47 Wanda Cornelius and Thayne Short, Ding Hao: America’s Air War in China, 1937-1945 (Gretna, Pelican Publishing Company, 1980), 98.

18

Washington D.C., Chennault met with Madame Chiang’s brother, Dr. Tzu-wen (T.V.) Soong,

who had been working in America to obtain support for the Chinese front. The men set out to

create a volunteer air force that would fight in China, and first worked together to acquire

military supplies, with Dr. Soong footing the bill, then searched for pilots and planes.48 They met

with members of President Roosevelt’s inner circle who would become instrumental to

Chennault’s plan of acquiring the needed pilots. Such men included Dr. Lauchlin Currie and

Thomas Corcoran, who backed sending aid to China and helped convince President Roosevelt,

as well as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.49

Taking into account Chennault’s relationships and connections, one might speculate

about where Chennault placed his loyalties, as he would find himself in agreement with Chiang

Kai-Shek, but frequently at odds with American leadership. Perhaps it is because Chiang

followed Chennault’s suggestions that he did not act out against his superiors when working with

Chinese forces, thus giving him the power and authority he had eagerly desired for so long since

serving in the American Air Force. In many ways, Chennault had discovered his perfect fit. His

personality when he was younger always suggested that he protect and lead the weak, while

defying and conflicting with the strong. Martha Byrd describes him as “[he] would rather lead

than follow, that he could teach younger boys more happily than he could be dominated by older

ones.”50 China was clearly the weaker side in its war with Japan, and the Chiangs gave

Chennault full rein to run the Chinese Air Force. As such, Chennault simply filled the role he

had played as a boy, as protector and leader. With the United States’ intervention, and eventual

entry of Joseph Stilwell and Allied Forces, Chennault felt the authority he had craved for so long

48 Cordell Hull Memorandum, 26 November 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, University of Wisconsin. 49 Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen, American, Chinese, and Japanese perspectives on wartime Asia, 1931-1949 (Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 1990), 153; Tuchman, 220-221. 50 Byrd, 10-11

19

slip away from him, leading to his antagonism with General Stilwell. After the war ended,

Chennault expressed his misgivings in his memoir, stating that the mistakes the United States

were committing in China were events that he had predicted, and felt the United States did not do

enough to prevent them.

This is not to say Chennault felt any disloyalty to the United States. Chennault spent an

extensive amount of time surveying China and had even toured Japan prior to the outbreak of

war. As such, he owned numerous notes, documents, and illustrations that contained valuable

information on the Japanese war machine, especially their airplane designs. Recognizing the

need for accurate intelligence, Chennault tried to pass on this information to American forces

several times, but it seemed that every attempt met with failure. Sometimes they were just freak

accidents, such as the bombing of the US gunboat Panay which was carrying salvaged Japanese

planes unbeknownst to Japanese forces and in other cases, pure negligence such as a file on the

details and specifications of a certain Japanese plane which was turned into the US War

Department, but ultimately mysteriously disappeared.51 When the Japanese began their invasion

of Shanghai, Chennault also made the effort to warn the American embassy stationed there to

evacuate.52 It would seem that ultimately, Chennault’s loyalties lay in his personal values. He

desired to be seen as a respected leader who cared for others, and he found that niche in China.

When he encountered individuals or entities who did not view him as such, he came into conflict

with them. People like his former Air Force commanders, the Italian-trained Chinese pilots, and

Stilwell were to be confronted and shunted aside. It had to be Chennault’s way, or the highway.

51 Chennault, 93-94; Sampson, 60. 52 Chennault, 43.

20

Through serving the Chinese Air Force, Chennault had found vindication, and Chiang

Kai-Shek had found someone capable of running his air force. Still, there was much more to their

partnership than meets the eye, as after the war, Chennault took the initiative to begin Civil Air

Transport (CAT). This company sent volunteer pilots, many of them former Flying Tigers, to aid

Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Nationalists in their civil war against the Chinese Communists,

despite the lack of recognition and approval from the United States government. In addition,

throughout the war, although Chiang frequently distrusted American intentions, he had complete

faith in Chennault. Beneath all the political intrigue and military logistics laid a true friendship

between Claire Chennault and the Chiangs.

It was a combination of factors that ultimately contributed to Chennault’s success in

acquiring the necessities for forming the first American Volunteer Group (AVG). Although

Chiang Kai-Shek had entrusted Chennault with the mission of recruiting pilots and handling

logistics, Dr. Soong played a major role in bringing Chennault to the attention of important

figures in Washington. Without Dr. Soong’s help, it is very likely Chennault would not have

succeeded in his mission. Having been away from the country for nearly two and a half years,

Chennault was very disconnected from US politics. The timing of Chennault’s visit was also

very fortunate, as President Roosevelt had begun developing the concept of lend. In addition,

although Chennault had difficulty at first in acquiring airplanes, his friend, Vice President

Burdette Wright of Curtiss-Wright Corporation, happened to negotiate for one hundred Curtiss

P-40 Tomahawks. The Tomahawks were originally in production for the British to aid their war

effort against Germany, however, Curtiss-Wright promised the British government that if they

allowed the Tomahawks to be given to Chennault, then the company would replace them with

21

later model P-40’s for the British.53 Everything was quickly settled, and under the pretext of

lend-lease, Chennault had his planes.

Fortunate timing aside, there was also a certain level of orchestration of events from

President Roosevelt and his officials in order to aid China’s cause. Roosevelt’s motives when

Chennault arrived in Washington at first seemed to aid China in dealing with a potential threat in

the form of Japan. Later on, the United States began to pursue deeper relations with the

Nationalist Party partly for the sake of internationalism, and partly to further United States

interests in China.

53 Morgenthau, 135.

22

“Way of a Fighter”

Chennault’s return to his homeland had proved to be a fruitful trip, as he was able to

acquire the airplanes and pilots that Chiang Kai-Shek had requested. Despite the various

obstacles he encountered, it appeared that Chennault had been provided with the necessary

support to realize his dream of leading his own air force unit. From there, the American

Volunteer Group (AVG), as they came to be known, established its base of operations in Burma

where it conducted training and gathered supplies. The group was divided into three squadrons.54

At the time, Burma was still under British control, and the governor of Burma and military

commander were both supportive of Chennault’s project.55 However, the senior officer of the

Royal Air Force (RAF) stationed there did not regard the AVG as highly, which would lead to

some tensions between the AVG and the RAF.

Everything about Chennault embodied toughness and discipline. His appearance was

rugged and leathery from years of flying in open cockpit airplanes, his voice was raspy from

chronic bronchitis, and he generally behaved gruffly and sternly towards others.56 His approach

to discipline was no different as he begin drilling his new pilots by minimizing field

transportation and emphasizing a heavy sports regimen in order to get them into good physical

condition and accustomed to the Burmese humidity.57 Their flight experience also left much to

be desired, as only a few had ever flown an airplane, let alone a P-40 Tomahawk which resulted

in several incidents during training flights. Chennault also poured his years of accumulated

knowledge and wisdom of the Japanese Air Force onto his pilots, explaining Japanese air tactics,

54 Schultz, 126. 55 Chennault, 106. 56 Sampson, 32. 57 Charles Bond and Terry Anderson, A Flying Tiger’s Diary (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984), 38.

23

flight formations, and airplane capabilities. He was determined to forge the most effective anti-

Japanese fighter squadron possible.58

The harsh realities of being stationed in China for training and combat deeply affected

some of the AVG pilots. Since the AVG was not technically an official army unit, the pilots were

under no official pressure to stay in China, which led to several resignations.59 In addition,

Chennault maintained a relatively casual stance towards the pilots when not in combat or training,

allowing the men to voice their opinions regarding their living conditions and various other

issues such as how long the bar would remain open, or when lights would go out.60 This

approach lay in stark contrast to the Royal Air Force members who maintained strict military

discipline. When the pilots began to indulge themselves a bit in excess, their approach to

discipline led to the AVG developing a poor reputation in the official reports made to London

and later on, with the entrance of Stilwell, Washington.61 Nevertheless, Chennault found his

supporters in Asia, such as Chinese Ambassador Gauss, who acquired spare parts for Chennault

to help repair the AVG’s P-40s.62 Meanwhile, back in Washington, supporters of President

Roosevelt’s decision to aid China helped secure those P-40 spares and accessories, such as

Laughlin Currie.63 The Chinese government was also able to secure a lease on the unused RAF

Kyedaw Airdrome which the Flying Tigers appropriated for their usage.64

The AVG had its first taste of combat on December 20, 1941, just days after the attack on

Pearl Harbor. Japanese bombers were reported to be approaching Kunming, and Chennault

58 Ford, 70-73. 59 Bond, 38. 60 Chennault, 116-117. 61 Schultz, 85-86. 62 The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to President Roosevelt, 19 November 1941. 63 Ford, 50. 64 Sampson, 70.

24

immediately scrambled his pilots to meet the enemy.65 All the time and preparation that

Chennault and the pilots had invested into this whole venture paid off at that moment as the

AVG successfully drove away the invading force with only one casualty due to the pilot running

out of fuel. Still, ever the disciplinarian, Chennault sat his men down after the battle and

reviewed their mistakes with them, explaining what they could improve on the next time they

fought.66

It was this victory that lead to the AVG earning the nickname, “Flying Tigers.” The

United States was still reeling from the Pearl Harbor attack and needed to hear some good news.

Henry Luce of TIME magazine, who had been following Chennault’s story for quite some time,

wrote an article entitled “Blood for the Tigers.” Luce depicted Chennault as a hero, guiding his

men into battle in order to defend the Chinese from the Japanese. From this article came the first

usage of the name “Flying Tigers.”67 Disney even made a logo to go with it.68 With the article

came sudden increased awareness by the American populace of the situation in China. The

media in general capitalized upon the success of the Flying Tigers and portrayed them as heroes

in China doing good work.69

In addition to his newfound support back in the United States, Chennault and his

volunteers encountered growing appreciation in the Chinese mainland. Actually, the Chinese

people had already grown to respect the foreign presence in China to a certain extent, as

suggested during an earlier episode when Chennault was attempting to reach Chiang Kai-Shek’s

headquarters in Chungking and had to cross the Yangtze River by rowboat. Chennault did not

have enough cash to pay the rower, which lead to a dispute that drew a crowd. He was rescued

65 Bond, 60-61. 66 Chennault, 130. 67 Theodore White, ed., “Battle of China: Blood for the Tigers,” TIME, December 1941. 68 Ford, 107. 69 Sampson, 110-111.

25

by an English-speaking Chinese bystander, who read Chennault’s card and declared to the crowd

that he was a foreign military advisor to the government. The crowd applauded and the boatman

left the scene.70 However, it is also possible that the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist

government in combatting the Japanese threat meant the Chinese populace would accept anyone

who was willing to fight. After the Flying Tiger victory at Kunming, the local Chinese

population came out to celebrate and honor the pilots for their efforts. Chinese civilians would

prove pivotal in the war, as they would aid in the air-net warning system that Chennault had

developed, or would risk their lives to protect fallen pilots and help them get back to their

bases.71

Clearly, Chennault and his Flying Tigers had gained popular support in both hemispheres

for their efforts. The American people saw the Flying Tigers as a symbol of hope, a beacon of

light battling against the Japanese across the Pacific, in the heart of China. It reminded the

American people that despite the tragedy of Pearl Harbor, American forces were more than

capable of battling and beating the Japanese. For the Chinese people, the Flying Tigers were a

tangible symbol of foreign aid in China, and the people daily witnessed the Tigers’ training

sessions and dogfights against the Japanese. To the Chinese populace, those volunteer pilots

were heroes, never mind that the government paid them exorbitant fees for their services. They

came from another land to fight for a country that was not their own, they got the job done, and

they succeeded where so many others had failed.

As for the KMT’s reaction, Chiang Kai-Shek and his Nationalists were very eager to

have the Flying Tigers prepped and ready for battle. Prior to Chennault’s arrival, Chiang

recognized the need for an air force. After Chennault’s arrival, Chiang learned just how powerful

70 Chennault 108-109 71 Schultz, 145-146.

26

an effective air force could be, not only to combat the Japanese, but also as a future investment in

fighting the Communists. In addition, Chennault’s style of combat fit Chiang’s grand scheme to

eventually defeat both the Japanese and Communists. Many times throughout the war, Chiang

would purposely hold back troops and resources and simply fight a stalling war with the

Japanese, as he was unwilling to commit assets that could be saved to fight the Communists.72

Chennault emphasized and utilized a strategy that pitted a small amount of fighter planes against

a numerically superior air force, meaning its cost-effectiveness was very good. For the most part,

Chiang and his wife recognized Chennault for the expert he was, and allowed him full rein of his

pilots. Later on, when Stilwell arrived to take command of the China-India-Burma Theater,

Chennault would go frequently undermine Stilwell’s authority by turning to Chiang for

support.73 As long as Chennault produced results, the Generalissimo was willing to let him

handle his affairs the way he pleased.74

On an international scale, the Chinese government held mixed views towards the United

States. The Chinese certainly appreciated President Roosevelt’s generous funding and supplies to

their cause, but as the United States entered the war and sought deeper involvement in Asia,

Chinese sentiment cooled. The arrival of Stilwell caused Chiang Kai-Shek’s habitual suspicion

of foreigners to flare up again and the Generalissimo proved uncooperative with the American

forces.75 It certainly did not help that the American officers insisted on taking full command of

all Chinese forces. In fact, Roosevelt even came to support this action when he realized the

Chinese command structure was not capable of winning against the Japanese.76

72 Crozier, 135. 73 Tuchman, 331-332. 74 Chiang Kai-shek and George Kao, The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945 (New York: The John Day Co., 1946), 669-670. 75 Crozier, 123. 76 Ch’i, 107.

27

In 1942, just a few months after Stilwell arrived, the Flying Tigers were formally

inducted into the United States Army Air Force as the Fourteenth Air Force.77 Though Chennault

did appreciate his men finally being recognized as an official army unit which entailed steady

supplies and resources, he resented the command structure.78 He regarded the military

management as ignorant interference on the part of American officials. For example, in his

memoir Chennault mentions how Stilwell “exhibited a striking lack of interest in the intelligence

problems of the China sector of his command” because Stilwell prohibited the Fourteenth Air

Force from gathering its own intelligence. In response, Chennault worked out a system through

air-raid warning network to gather information.79 To be fair, the American forces were trying to

handle an entire front in Asia, not simply to defend China. Stilwell was also an infantry man, and

thus had little experience working with an air force. Throughout the war, Chennault and Stilwell

would clash over military strategy, as one wanted to continue his aviation approach of small, hit-

and-run groups, while the other stressed ground warfare.80 The two simply could not get along,

which in the long run probably would have made the war much easier on the Allied forces. In

addition, Chennault and the newly-minted Fourteenth Air Force pilots were not very cooperative

as they felt that their skills and experiences were being slighted in the face of their lack of

military discipline and unorthodox structure.

Prior to their merger with the Air Force, Paul Frillman, the AVG chaplain, recounted his

first encounter with Joseph Stilwell while traveling with an AVG detachment to the Chinese

border. Frillman’s group sought out Stilwell’s compound in hopes of finding a place to stop for

the night. Upon arrival, Frillman immediately realized just how uncouth his troops looked, with

77 Sampson, 185. 78 Schultz, 274. 79 Chennault, 257-258. 80 Edward Dreyer, China at War: 1901-1949 (London: Longman Group, 1995), 245.

28

their mismatched outfits and female companions in tow. Stilwell emerged from his house, ripped

into the AVG pilots for being a disgrace to the United States, and returned inside.81 Naturally,

with the official reintegration into the United States Air Force, that placed the Flying Tigers

under the command of Joseph Stilwell. Chennault could see his authority slipping away, as he

had enjoyed the fact that he was the reigning military expert on the China front and on all the

Japanese war matters. Working under another superior officer who did not see matters his way

further bothered him.

In the large picture of US-China relations, the actual induction of the Flying Tigers into

the United States Army Air Force probably did little to affect relations. However, the

implications behind the absorption created tension between the two countries. It was symbolic of

the United States entering the war, and almost immediately taking control of the way the Allies

were to fight. The biggest problem was that the United States and China did not pursue the same

goals. The Chinese government was trying to consolidate its power base. The means by which it

would go about doing so included expelling the Japanese threat, removing or uniting the

warlords, and eliminating the Chinese Communist Party in no particular order. The United States

on the other hand, placed the Far East/Southeastern Asia front as its lowest priority, focusing the

majority of its forces and resources in Western Europe and the Pacific Ocean. Hence, this meant

the United State should have played a more supportive role in China. However, the officers who

were in command, such as Stilwell, wanted to take control of all Allied forces in order to combat

the Japanese, which simply did not match up with Chiang Kai-Shek’s intentions. If anything,

Chiang viewed these actions as undermining his authority, and believed they fulfilled his

suspicions of American imperialism, which led to a deterioration of US-China relations, until it

reached the point where Chiang requested that Stilwell leave.

81 Schultz, 210-211.

29

The Eagle and the Dragon

Before the United States officially entered China in February 1942, it was already

involved in Chinese affairs, primarily through the Lend-Lease Program of sending military

supplies and money to the Chinese government. In a letter written on November 19, 1941,

Chinese Ambassador Clarence Gauss informed President Roosevelt of the situation in China and

his opinions on what action the United States should take.82 Gauss explained in his letter that

China was the best hope in East Asia of containing the Japanese threat, and pointed out that

America would do well to support Chiang Kai-Shek in order to maintain cordial Sino-American

relations. Chennault was also mentioned, as Gauss vouched for Chennault’s objective in

defending the Burma Road from Japanese bombers by requesting President Roosevelt to provide

sufficient planes for effective use.83

On the Chinese side, Chiang Kai-Shek recognized the need to resist the Japanese invasion.

Still, he desired to eliminate all internal threats before dealing with external ones. Despite several

attempts of Communist and Nationalist officers at trying to make peace and uniting against Japan,

Chiang Kai-Shek never considered the Chinese Communist Party as allies. When fighting with

the Japanese began, Chiang insisted on preserving his best soldiers, the German-trained army

divisions, in order to send them against the Communists once the war with Japan ended. Even

with the Japanese conquering China, Chiang still sent troops to blockade Yan’an, the center of

CCP operations that had been established after the Long March.84

After the fall of Shanghai, Chinese troops adopted the strategy of “trading space for time,”

an approach of fighting delaying battles which allowed civilians and key industries to retreat to

82 The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to President Roosevelt, 19 November 1941. 83 Ibid., 548 84 Fenby, 365.

30

the city of Chongqing.85 Chinese troops also utilized scorched earth tactics to sabotage dams and

levees that caused the Yellow River to flood and subsequently stalled Japanese troop

advancement. Afterward, the Chinese adopted a survival approach where they avoided directly

engaging Japanese forces and opted to use ambushes and encirclement to fight. The objective

was not to necessarily win, but to definitely “not lose.” In addition, although the KMT and CCP

had been coerced into joining forces due to the efforts of warlord Zhang Xueliang, both sides

never fully trusted the other and they had to operate under the pretext of engaging with two

enemies: the Japanese and each respective party’s counterpart.86 As such, the Chinese never

completely focused on countering the Japanese threat, and instead came to rely upon foreign

support and military forces.

In order to obtain that foreign support, Chiang Kai-Shek did know when to take action in

order to draw positive attention from other countries, such as during the Battle of Shanghai,

when he committed his best troops to defend the city against the Japanese. Chiang knew he had

no way of winning the battle, but he wanted to prove to the Chinese people and the rest of the

world that China would not be brought down easily. He hoped that the results of the battle would

show the western powers that they should feel confident in placing their trust and resources in

China. On July 7, 1938, the anniversary of the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War,

Chiang Kai-Shek delivered a message thanking nations who were sympathetic to China’s cause

as well as uniting all these nations under a common recognition of Japan’s hostility. Throughout

his speech, Chiang Kai-Shek continued to portray China as the valiant underdog, while

85 Peter Worthing. A Military History of Modern China: from the Manchu conquest to Tian'anmen Square. (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007), 123. 86 Schwartz, 40-41.

31

denouncing Japan as an “enemy of humanity.”87 In this manner, Chiang appealed to the western

nations and drew in their support. Ultimately, Chiang hoped to play the major western powers

against Japan. As such, he reacted favorably when he heard the news that Pearl Harbor had been

bombed, because he knew the United States would have to step into the war.88

The day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war on Japan. That

same day, Chiang and Roosevelt exchanged brief messages assuring each other of their mutual

support to fight against the Japanese.89 Roosevelt wished for solid East-West relations for future

generations. Two days later, on December 10, 1941, China officially declared war against the

Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan.90 When the United States entered the war, Roosevelt

continued to send support to China in order for Chiang and his Nationalists primarily in order to

divert a large portion of Japan’s forces from battling on the Pacific front. In addition to the

continued war materials, now the United States sent in military forces, under the command of

General Joseph Stilwell.

Joseph Stilwell’s qualifications made him ideal for participating in the Chinese theater.

He was a seasoned officer who had served a decade in China and while there, he learned the

language. When Stilwell arrived in China, he was charged with holding the Burma Road,

command any Chinese forces assigned to him, help train the Chinese Army, and basically

coordinate US assistance to China in any form or function.91 However, Stilwell was known for

being a hard man, with a fitting nickname of “Vinegar Joe,” who never backed down from his

beliefs and was never afraid to speak his mind, much like Chennault. However, his view of how

87 Chiang, 86. 88 Fenby, 368. 89 Chiang, 640. 90 Ibid., 641. 91 Davis, 410.

32

to conduct the war operations contrasted starkly with Chiang Kai-Shek and Chennault. While

Chiang and Chennault favored air power, Stilwell was an Army man, and fully believed in the

use of ground tactics with large units of infantry in order to secure a solid front and protect air

bases. This stance also meant that he wanted the Generalissimo to contribute his ground troops to

Stilwell’s strategy. From a military standpoint, Stilwell certainly had a point, as later on,

Chennault’s air bases were overrun due to his sparse ground forces.92 Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-

Shek blamed China’s military failures on Stilwell, as he believed that Stilwell’s presence

diverted vital lend-lease supplies, and eventually requested for a replacement to take control of

American operations. The United States acquiesced with the Generalissimo’s wishes, recalled

Stilwell, and replaced him with General Albert Wedemeyer.93

The entrance of Stilwell into the war contrasted sharply with Chennault’s beginnings in

China. In theory, Stilwell should have been an ideal candidate for working in China. Just like

Chennault, he also possessed a brilliant tactical mind and was well versed in the art of war. He

had spent three tours in China prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War, and had a good

appreciation for the language, culture, and history of the Chinese people. Stilwell even had a

similar reaction to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek after their first encounter, and sent her flowers

afterward.94 Yet, the singular point that separated Stilwell from Chennault was that the

Generalissimo trusted Chennault and was willing to go along with his suggestions. Perhaps that

point can be attributed in part to the differences in strategy between Chennault and Stilwell.

Nevertheless, that does not completely account for the general lack of cooperation on Chiang’s

part with Stilwell. For whatever reason, Chiang did not trust Stilwell, and wanted him out of

92 Tuchman, 335. 93 Fenby, 433. 94 Sampson, 207.

33

China. Thus in the greater context of US-China relations, Stilwell did not improve those relations.

Again, Chennault’s role in the war was invaluable, not only as a military leader, but also as one

of the few Americans who could speak eye-to-eye with Chiang Kai-Shek.

From the moment the United States entered World War II, Roosevelt maintained a very

supportive stance of China’s cause against Japan. In addition to ensuring homeland security, he

seemed to earnestly believe that China could become modernized, and eventually stand

alongside the other western powers.95 With these goals, Roosevelt continued to send aid and

military forces to China in order help it overcome its years of being placed in a secondary role to

other countries. Chiang Kai-Shek also wanted to see China assume a greater role on the world

stage.96 In this regard, both leaders had similar visions. However, their approaches were radically

different. Chiang Kai-Shek did not take into consideration the global welfare at the time. Chiang

simply looked to only China’s interests, and continued to pursue the Chinese Communist Party,

while expecting the Allied countries to handle Japan for him. Roosevelt was forced to manage

two fronts of the war, and thus expected the other Allied countries to work together with the

United States in battling the Axis. Roosevelt seemed to hope that Chennault would act as an

American liaison by aiding Chiang Kai-Shek battle the Japanese.97

However, Chennault did not become the liaison that Roosevelt had hoped for, and that

was a good thing. Instead, Chennault became the liaison that the United States needed. Chiang

already distrusted foreign intervention in his country, and anybody coming in to China as a

representative of foreign interests would have caused him to put his guard up. The Stilwell

conflict illustrates this point. What Chiang wanted, and needed, was results. Chennault gave him

95 Davis, 580. 96 Chiang, 750-751. 97 Morgenthau, 335.

34

results. When the Japanese began their full-scale invasion of China, a ground of war of attrition

was not a problem for the massive Chinese armies, and naval warfare was a non-issue. Air power

was the major difference, and Chennault filled that need. Perhaps Chiang and Chennault were

both power-hungry men who sought out their own individual gains. Even if that were to be the

case, Chiang needed someone who could relate to him. Chiang had always looked to his own

interests and ambitions, regardless of what occurred around him. Chennault was technically a

man with no country, who swore no allegiance but to himself, and his values. These two men

recognized the other’s drive and came to respect him for it. In this way, Chiang Kai-Shek did

come to trust a foreigner, which helped place one more brick in the path to relations with the

United States.

The United States must have also recognized the significance of having Chennault

stationed in China, because his opponents did not seek to have him removed until the war was

nearly over and the Allied forces had nearly pushed the Japanese all the way back to their home

islands. As the war neared its final days, Chennault would find himself denied the opportunity to

stand with the other Allied commanders to witness the surrender of the Japanese.

35

Conclusion

In a 1985 newspaper article, Claire Chennault’s youngest daughter, Cynthia, stated,

“Times have changed. The United States and China have changed. It has made it easier for us

now to be friends.”98 Much of the credit for this change can be attributed to Claire Chennault and

the many years he spent in service to China. For eight years, the Japanese and the Chinese had

been at war, and for Claire Chennault, it was finally almost the end of what had started off as an

accidental adventure. After the entrance of the United States into the war and the subsequent

arrival of Stilwell to China, the Japanese were steadily beaten back. Unfortunately, Chennault

would not see the end of the war from China, as he returned to the United States just before the

Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.99 During his last days in China, he spent some time with

Chiang Kai-Shek, and visited the towns where his air bases had been situated. Each town

featured Chinese citizens bearing gifts, eager to express their gratitude to the man who had

fought for their country. Jerry Huang, the creator of the War Area Service Corps, which supplied

the American troops in China, even said, “No foreigner since Marco Polo has so endeared

himself to the Chinese.”100 Chennault retired from military service for a second time in October,

1945.

The reasons for Chennault’s withdrawal from China are not very well-defined. In his

memoir, Chennault wrote out three factors that possibly contributed against his continued stay,

the first, and most notable, being that Stilwell had requested General George Marshall for

Chennault’s recall.101 Stilwell was still bitter about his recall back to the United States and this

request was his small bit of revenge against Chennault. Former World War II pilot Jack Sampson

98 Tom Harrer, “Cynthia Chennault seeks to build new ties with China,” Gainesville Sun, November 5, 1985, 2C. 99 Ford, 341. 100 Chennault, 354. 101 Ibid., 346.

36

attributed Marshall’s promotion of General George Stratemeyer over Chennault for the

command of the China Theater Air Forces as the reason for Chennault’s departure.102 Based on

these two accounts, we can cite Chennault’s typical disregard for authority as the cause for his

withdrawal. However, Daniel Ford argues that Marshall sought to tarnish Chennault’s reputation

by taking advantage of his loyalty to his pilots, many whom were involved in less-than savory

affairs. When army investigators began bringing up charges, Chennault stood by his pilots until

he was finally forced to relinquish his command to avoid further trouble.103 Chennault was well

known for reciprocating the loyalty of his subordinates, and even with the war nearly over, he

had not changed.

It is important to know that Chennault had not changed because after the war, Chennault

would continue to work in China. The KMT and the CCP almost immediately fell into civil war

with the end of the Japanese presence. In response to the war, Chennault formed his own civilian

airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT) to support Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists. This airline

served the Chinese people by airlifting in much needed supplies and resources for rebuilding

after the war.104 Many of the former Flying Tigers, among others, joined CAT to fly in China

once again. CAT provided supply movement, and helped transport KMT troops to warzones

against the CCP during the Chinese Civil War. Later on, CAT helped the KMT evacuate the

country after they lost the war. Chennault maintained his desire to serve the country that had

given him a second chance at life.

It is difficult to measure how much effect Chennault had on US-China relations after

World War II, considering how events played out in mainland China. When the Chinese Civil

102 Sampson, 264. 103 Ford, 343-344. 104 Scott, 277-278.

37

War began, President Harry Truman tried to intervene by brokering a peace between the KMT

and CCP. Truman sent General George Marshall to let Chiang Kai-Shek know that the United

States would rescind support if Chiang did not seek peace and unity with the Communists.105

While there seemed to be some positive responses initially, both Chiang and Mao were confident

in their own respective side’s ability to win the war. Chiang had numerical superiority, and was

willing to take his chances with Marshall’s threat about US support. Mao was confident in his

army’s tenacity, having survived this long against the KMT and the Japanese, as well as his

strategic maneuvers. Ultimately, Mao’s tactics and the majority support of the Chinese people

resulted in victory for the Communists.106

Behind the scenes of the Chinese Civil War, CAT continued its operations, transporting

goods and people throughout China. When the KMT lost the mainland, Chennault helped

transport the remnants to Taiwan. Afterwards, Taiwan and the United States maintained

diplomatic relations, with the United States recognizing Taiwan as the official “China.”107 CAT

would then move its operations from the mainland to Taiwan, continuing its work as a courier

service there, as well as in Hong Kong and other parts of Asia. An American presence had been

established in Asia, thanks to Chennault’s efforts.

Looking back at the memoir Chennault wrote over 60 years ago, it is incredible to see,

with the benefit of hindsight, how attuned he was to global affairs. In Chennault’s foreword, he

correctly predicted that the Soviet Union would put great effort into China in order to secure its

eastern borders, and that the Chinese Communists would take over China before the United

105 Worthing, 133-134. 106 Robert Payne, Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China, (New York: Schuman, 1950), 249-250. 107William Whitney Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 137.

38

States could form an effective China policy.108 Whether or not Chennault ever saw himself as a

major figure in US-China relations, we will never know. However, he recognized the

significance of building a strong relationship between these two countries and did his best to aid

in that process. His initial intentions when the Second Sino-Japanese War first broke out may be

questionable, since the Chinese government was paying him and had given him an opportunity to

command an entire air force. However, there is little doubt that the more time he spent in China

developing relationships with the Chinese people, and fighting on China’s behalf, that he became

a centerpiece of US-China relations. Through him, Chiang Kai-Shek had found a solution to

combatting the Japanese. Franklin Roosevelt had someone who could embody the concept of

lend-lease and carry out its intended effect. The Chinese people had a savior, a foreigner who

risked life and limb to defend their homeland. The American people had a hero, the maverick

who stood against tyranny and defended the weak and helpless. Chennault’s impact on US-China

relations cannot be quantified, but it was certainly qualified.

Since that time period, the United States and China have seen drastic improvement in

their relationship. In February 1972, President Richard Nixon landed in the People’s Republic of

China and the United States acknowledged the concept of “One China,” beginning a process of

reconciliation between the two countries. The time period when Cynthia Chennault made her

quote that was mentioned at the beginning of this section was a time of great cultural, scientific,

and economic exchange as both countries made great leaps in their relationship. Other issues

have arisen though since that time, especially with the concern for human rights after the

Tiananmen Square crackdown and the war on terror. Currently, the United States and China

frequently discuss trade policy, energy initiatives, and hope to continue to build upon their

108 Chennault; IX, XVII.

39

friendship. Even in the context of history, Claire Chennault stands as a bridge between two eras:

the time of American spheres of influence in China, and the modern development of a

relationship based on mutual respect and understanding. His legacy will forever be a testament to

the bond of two countries.

40

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