CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL CHANGE · thank the many members of civil society organizations, academics, and public and private sector workers who contributed their expertise to the various

1

C A N A D I A N D E V E L O P M E N T R E P O R T

CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL CHANGE

1 9 9 9

T H E N O R T H - S O U T H I N S T I T U T E

C A N A D I A N D E V E L O P M E N T R E P O R T


1 9 9 9


E d i t e d b y A l i s o n V a n R o o y

The North-South Institute The Institute is a charitable, not-for-profit corporation established in 1976 to provide professional, policy-relevant research on “North-South” issues of relations between industrialized and developingcountries. The results of this research are made available to policymakers, interested groups, and thegeneral public to help generate greater understanding and informed discussion of development ques-tions. The Institute is independent and nonpartisan and cooperates with a wide range of Canadian, overseas, and international organizations working in related activities. For more information about the Institute consult our website at www.nsi-ins.ca.

The contents of these essays represent the views and findings of the authors alone and not necessarily thoseof the North-South Institute’s directors, sponsors, or supporters, or those consulted in their preparation.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication DataCanadian development report

1996/97-Includes bibliographical references.ISSN 1206-2308ISBN 1-896770-27-4 (1999 issue)

1. Developing countries—Social conditions—Periodicals.2. Economic assistance, Canadian–Developing countries—Periodicals.3. International economic relations—Periodicals.4. Civil rights—Developing countries—Periodicals.5. Developing countries—Foreign economic relations—Periodicals.

I. North-South Institute (Ottawa, Ont.)

HF1413.C36 1996/97– 337‘.09172’4 C97-300128-3

Editorial Team Rowena Beamish, Anne Chevalier, Michelle HiblerDesign Shoreline Communications

© The North-South Institute/L’Institut Nord-Sud, 1999

Price $35.00CD ROM $15.00

Available from Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd5369 Canotek Road, Unit 1Ottawa, CanadaK1J 9J3Tel.: (613) 745-2665Fax: (613) 745-7660E-mail: [email protected]: www.renoufbooks.com


G R AT E F U L LY AC K N O W L E D G E S

T H E G E N E R O U S F I N A N C I A L S U P P O R T

O F T H E F O L L O W I N G D O N O R S I N

T H E P U B L I C AT I O N O F

T H E C A NA D I A N D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 1 9 9 9

D O N AT I O N P O L I C Y

A registered charity, the North-South

Institute accepts cash and in-kind

donations from government departments,

foundations, academic institutions,

not-for-profit organizations, corporations,

and individuals. These are accepted with

the understanding that the donor gives

them freely with no expectation of receiving

benefits in return, and that the donation

does not compromise the Institute’s

independence in the way it undertakes

research, the conclusions it reaches, the

policy recommendations it makes, or

the way it disseminates the results

of its activities.

F U N D R A I S I N G P O L I C Y

The North-South Institute adheres to

ethical principles and practices with

respect to donors’ rights, fundraising

practices, and financial accountability.

Copies of our most recent annual report

and financial statement, a list of current

members of the NSI Board of Directors,

and a copy of our ethical fundraising code

can be obtained by writing to the Institute.

DONATION AND FUNDRAISING POLICIES

Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency

Agence canadienne dedéveloppement international

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE

CENTRE DE RECHERCHES POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL

PATRONS(Donations of $10,000 or more)

AGA KHAN FOUNDATION CANADA

FONDATION AGA KHAN CANADA

SUPPORTERS(Donations between $5,000 and $9,999)

International Centre for Human Rightsand Democratic Development

R. HOWARD WEBSTER FOUNDATION

LA FONDATION R. HOWARD WEBSTER

CONTRIBUTORS(Donations between $1,000 and $4,999)

Steelworkers Humanity FundFonds Humanitaire des Métallos

P A R T N E R Sin Rural Development

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD iSharon Capeling-Alakija

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iiiRoy Culpeper

OVERVIEW 1

CHAPTER ONE WHY CIVIL SOCIETY? 7Alison Van Rooy

CHAPTER TWO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY 19Ian Smillie

CHAPTER THREE A SHARED ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 29Faris Ahmed

CHAPTER FOUR FIGHTING HUNGER: THE STRUGGLE FOR FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 39Graham Riches

CHAPTER FIVE DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS 51Georges leBel

CHAPTER SIX CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 61Jacques Bertrand

CHAPTER SEVEN WORKING GLOBALLY FOR GENDER EQUALITY 71Deborah Stienstra

CHAPTER EIGHT CONFRONTING THE “GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION” 83John Foster

CHAPTER NINE THE ART OF MAKING CHANGE 95Alison Van Rooy

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNDING IN CANADA 109

STATISTICAL ANNEX 119

i

FOREWORD

M

As we move into the new millennium, it isapparent that engagement in civil societywill play an increasingly important role.In coming decades, as we move inexorablytoward a more global society, the well-beingof every one of us will hinge, as neverbefore, on the kindness of strangers.

The emergence of civil society organiza-tions—or rather, the emergence of ourawareness of them—as crucial players inthis global world will help us fill a void thathas become all too apparent in the 1990s.We have seen the limited capacity of statepower to address cross-border issues or tomount a coordinated response to globalproblems. There are pressing human needs,at home and abroad, that states will not beable to address because of shrinking author-ity and resources. To be sure, the privatesector is moving into areas that were onceconsidered the prerogative of governmentand NGOs, but as we all know, there arealso many areas of human need that theprivate sector cannot or will not address.

In coming years, a nation’s strength willdepend on its social capital—the “glue”that holds society together. And it is civilsociety with all of its ties, networks,institutions, and norms that will determinethe quality of our social interactions andadvance the common good.

But the question remains: If there is, asI expect, a surge of hands-on civil societyactivism in the next century, will we be pre-pared to organize, support, and maximizethe opportunities this creates? Activism canbe powerful or unfocused. It can producevital results or merely good public relations.It can be transformational or merely recre-ational. It requires strong coordinationand planning, good training, and rigorousevaluation. And finally, if civil societyorganizations are going to help gluesocieties together in the future, they needto figure more prominently on the publicpolicy agenda today.

That is why the subject of the CanadianDevelopment Report 1999 is so important.By focusing attention on the role of civilsociety, The North-South Institute hopes toprovoke debate and stimulate new thinkingabout how policies and programs canbe put in place that foster vibrant civicengagement both internationally andhere in Canada.

Sharon Capeling-AlakijaExecutive Coordinator, United Nations VolunteersBoard Member, The North-South Institute

indful of the complexity of our global world and its

myriad problems, I would like to convey a simple message

about the future. That message is: caring matters. Acts of kindness

and solidarity matter. It is here that life resounds and it is here

where public policy must reside.

The conception, planning, writing, designand production of our flagship publicationrequires the active participation and sup-port of a great many individuals and organi-zations. In addition to the accomplishedresearchers and writers who authored thechapters of this report, we would like tothank the many members of civil societyorganizations, academics, and public andprivate sector workers who contributed their expertise to the various chapters of CDR 1999.

Notably, we would like to recognize the assistance provided by members of areference group who provided fundamentaladvice on the scope and focus of the book:Paul Knox of The Globe and Mail, DonMcRae of the Department of CanadianHeritage, David R. Morrison of TrentUniversity, Rosemary Murray of the CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA),and Brian Tomlinson of the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operationoffered important early recommendations.

Individual chapters further benefited fromthe consideration of our peer reviewers:Marc Dolgin (World University Service ofCanada), Andrew Jackson (Canadian LabourCongress), Lucie Lamarche (Université duQuébec à Montréal), Laura Macdonald(Carleton University), Don McRae (CanadianHeritage), David Runnalls (InternationalInstitute for Sustainable Development),Peggy Teagle (Canadian Consortium for

International Social Development), andBrian Tomlinson. In-house peer review commentators included Julie Delahanty,Heather Gibb, Joanna Kerr, Kerry Max, TedPaterson, and Ann Weston; all contributedtheir own expertise to the research.

Several members of the North-SouthInstitute’s Board of Directors contributed to CDR 1999. Sharon Capeling-Alakija’sthoughtful foreword was drawn from herwork with both the United Nations and the Institute. In addition, the fundraisingefforts and advice of Board members GerryBarr, Tim Brodhead, Louis Comeau, YvesGauthier, Marie-France Labrèque, JohnLoxley, John McCallum, and Chair NormanWebster signal the Board’s continuing commitment to the challenge of “research for a fairer world.”

This report required a great deal of efforton the part of the Institute’s staff. Vitalsupport was provided by all members ofAdministration, Communications, andResearch who invested both time andenergy to make the volume a success. In particular, we would like to thankResearcher Kerry Max who coordinated and assembled the statistical data withthe help of Ken Horricks and Judy Meltzer;research assistant Kate Harrison contributedat the planning stages. Statistical and otherresource material was generously providedby government officials from CIDA,Statistics Canada, Revenue Canada, and

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

O n behalf of the North-South Institute, I am proud

to present the Canadian Development Report 1999. (CDR 1999)

as part of the Institute’s contribution to the challenge of global

change.

the Departments of Finance, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Citizenship andImmigration. Special thanks are due to JulieFujimura, International Finance Officer at FinanceCanada; Andrew Clark, CIDA policy analyst; andHélène Mainville, Manager, Statistical AnalysisSection of CIDA.

Within the Institute, Information Specialist GailAnglin was instrumental in finding research materialand sources while Media Relations Officer MelanieGruer and Marketing Officer Jonathan Wade deter-mined promotional and funding opportunities forthe Report. Diane Guèvremont and Eugenia Gallegosprovided support for the production of the CD-ROM.

Again, special thanks go to the NSI editorial team of Michelle Hibler and Anne Chevalier fortheir usual expertise and humour throughout theinvolved process of producing the CDR. They wereably assisted by freelance editors Rowena Beamishand Michèle Baril. Our in-house editorial and pro-duction efforts were augmented by the painstakingwork of lead translator Hervé Rombaut, in collabo-ration with Sylvie Lee et Associés, Michel Limbos,and Charles Crichton; as well as the design firm,Shoreline Communications.

We also wish to acknowledge the generous financial contributions of the CDR donors, listed at the beginning of this report, for their supportof this major endeavour.

Last but certainly not least, I would like to expressmy gratitude to NSI Senior Researcher Dr. Alison Van Rooy. As the editor of this year’s report, as well as the Institute’s expert on civil society, she waschiefly responsible for the conception of the volumeand for managing its preparation on a tight budget.The report is a testament both to her intellectualprowess and to her ability to manage a complex and occasionally trying enterprise.

Roy Culpeper PresidentThe North-South Institute

iv

1

OVERVIEW

OVERVIEW

C A N A D I A N D E V E L O P M E N T R E P O R T 1 9 9 9

At noon on March 1, 1999, church bellsaround the world proclaimed the entry into force of what has become known as the “Ottawa Treaty”—the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,Production and Transfer of Anti-PersonnelMines and on Their Destruction. The eventwas notable for the speed with which theconvention entered into force. It was also,as some political scientists described it, “atale of David triumphing over Goliath” andthe partnership between civil society andlike-minded states which made the treaty areality was heralded as a new “superpower.”

The success of the global campaign to ban landmines has been very visible. But it is only one example of the way in whichcivil society organizations, from church auxiliaries to political parties, Girl Guides’associations to sporting clubs, bring aboutchange—small and large, at home andabroad (see Box 1).

The work of civil society is vital to our economy and society. It is estimated thatthe Canadian voluntary sector each year

delivers services worth more than $3,000 per person. More than 1.1 billion hours aredonated annually to Canada’s 75,000 chari-ties alone, and close to $90 billion passesthrough their coffers in the form of govern-ment grants and individual and corporatedonations. More important, half of allCanadians—more than 12 million people—participate in some kind of civil societyorganization.

Linking North and SouthIf Canadian civil society organizationsdeliver a substantial part of domestic socialservices, they are also an important vehiclefor Canadian foreign aid, and key actors in forging Canada’s relationships with develop-ing countries. Canadian nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) working on interna-tional development issues—some 300 ofthem—work in at least 79 developing countries, annually raise about $412 millionfrom the public and another $209 millionfrom the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA). Funding from all sourcesbrings the percentage spent by these

oday, some 175,000 nonprofit, voluntary organiza-

tions in Canada provide community services; organize

cultural, educational, and sporting activities; and lobby for change

on the political front. These organizations and their counterparts

around the globe— members of civil society—are credited with much of

the positive change that occurs in the world today. How effective are they?

The Canadian Development

Report 1999 examines how

Canadian society is orga-

nized to support collective

expressions of social,

economic, political, and

environmental justice, both

here and abroad. Each

chapter examines the

actions taken by Canadian

civil society organizations

in one sphere of activity.

Together, the chapters

depict a vibrant, committed

sector of society that has

achieved much success,

against considerable odds.


T

O V E R V I E W

organizations close to 22 percent ofCanada’s overseas development spending,among the highest ratios anywhere in the world.

NGOs are a diverse group: they range fromsmall volunteer initiatives to large, staffedorganizations, whose mandates vary fromraising awareness of global issues at home to carrying out agriculture, health, educa-tion, and other projects in developing coun-tries. And it appears that these organiza-tions are as successful as, if not more thantheir official counterparts in delivering aid, in large part because of their in-depthknowledge of the people and countries theyserve. As development consultant and authorIan Smillie explains, their effectiveness also rests on their flexibility and adaptability.

If development CSOs’ roots date to missionarymovements of the 19th century, they blos-somed during the 1960s and 1970s when their numbers expanded and thousands ofCanadians joined their ranks as volunteers, at home or abroad. Today, says Smillie, theymaintain three types of relationships with theCanadian public: through voluntary contribu-tions of time and labour; through financialdonations; and through their education andadvocacy work. In fact, public support fordevelopment through these organizations,measured in terms of donations, has increasedsteadily since the 1960s (see Box 2).

A W I D E R A N G E O F AC T I O N S

The Canadian Development Report 1999focuses on just a few of the many areas in which internationalist CSOs work—international development, environment,food security, alternative trade, genderequality, human rights, and conflict preven-tion. All these organizations embody thekey attributes of a constructive civil soci-ety: bringing together key stakeholders and engaging in a real debate to shape policies and outcomes.

A large part of Canada’s 1,300 environmen-tal associations, NGOs, and networks, forexample, have links with Southern groups.These relationships have helped many makeconnections between domestic and interna-tional problems—excessive logging, waterpollution from intensive fish farming, and Indigenous rights, for example.Environmental author and activist

Faris Ahmed points out that Canadian envi-ronmental NGOs have earned an enviable reputation for helping shape internationalagreements and processes. Unfortunately, he says, they have less credibility at home.

Organizations concerned about hunger alsobase much of their activity on a commonunderstanding of the structural and politicalcauses of hunger in both North and South:the problem is not too little food, but toolittle political will to see that the availablefood is distributed in an equitable manner.These CSOs argue that, here and elsewhere,governments must recognize the right to

O V E R V I E W 3

BO

X1TAC T I C S A N D S U C C E S S E S

Canadian CSOs employ a variety of public and private tactics to reach

their goals: they make individual contacts; advocate publicly for change;

lobby in national and international venues; build coalitions, networks,

and partnerships; launch media and education campaigns to raise public

awareness; monitor governments and expose failures; create local,

national, and global events; support existing groups; and take action in

international forums. They work with individuals, groups, and coalitions;

loudly in public or quietly behind the scenes; in private meeting rooms,

international forums, and over the internet. They also work on the

ground, at home and abroad, implementing programs and projects.

And they have met with many successes. Here are a few recent examples:

• Since 1972, Public Interest Research Groups on campuses across

Canada have brought ecological problems to the fore. Recent activi-

ties have included pioneering work on James Bay in Quebec, the

Narmada Dam in India, and the Three Gorges Dam in China.

• A network of CSOs spanning at least 70 countries—including

Canada’s Council of Canadians—was instrumental in halting negotia-

tions over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998. The

alliance forced negotiations into the open, broadcast the implications

in detail, and challenged the agreement on democratic principles and

human rights.

• The Global Network on Food Security brought together the Canadian

government, the private sector, and civil society organizations to

shape Canada’s commitments to the 1996 World Food Summit and

subsequent National Action Plan for Food Security.

• NAC and Intercede, (a group of domestic workers in Canada), joined

women’s groups in Asia and the Pacific to host the Second Women’s

Conference against APEC and the International Day of Protest during

the 1997 meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

• CUSO and Inter Pares, in partnership with four Bangladeshi NGOs,

helped put trafficking in women and children on the agenda of the

1997 Heads of Government Meeting of the South Asia Association for

Regional Cooperation, resulting in a regional convention on the issue.

• The Canadian Centre for International Study and Cooperation (CECI)

has brought together conflicting parties in Guatemala, West Africa,

Burundi, and Haiti to learn conflict prevention techniques and

develop action plans.

food as a basic human right, with a legallyenforceable claim. This is an ideal ratherthan a fact, says Graham Riches, Director of the School of Social Work at theUniversity of British Columbia: today, 800million people around the world are severelymalnourished and 25 percent of humanitylives in absolute poverty. In Canada, despitethe country’s wealth, more than 700,000people depended on food banks in March1998 alone.

The global nature of the problem has led to successful domestic and internationalpartnerships, such as the Global Network on Food Security and the Rural Advance-ment Foundation International, to raise the profile of hunger and secure its legitimacy as a public policy issue.

Similarly, says Université du Québec àMontréal law professor Georges leBel,Canadian defenders of human rights haveentered the international arena becausethey now recognize that issues such as eco-nomic integration and trade liberalizationhave a direct effect on social and economicrights worldwide, and that progress willrequire close collaboration and solidaritybetween North and South.

International solidarity and action are alsoneeded to ensure gender equality, a factincreasingly recognized over the past twodecades by Canadian CSOs such as theNational Action Committee on the Status ofWomen. But, says Deborah Stienstra, profes-sor of politics and women’s studies at the

University of Winnipeg, women’s groups andinternational development organizations arestill working independently far too often. If they are to be truly effective, strongerpartnerships are needed in Canada and internationally.

The most complex CSO North-South relation-ship probably revolves around trade andinvestment, key elements in Canada’s for-eign relations. “Canadians have been worldleaders in organizing challenges, campaigns,and alternatives to the projects of whatmight be termed a global political and economic élite,” writes John Foster, a pro-fessor of human rights at the University ofSaskatchewan. Certainly, they were activewith international counterparts in fightingthe Multilateral Agreement on Investment,which CSOs felt enhanced the rights ofinvestors over the decisions of democraticgovernments. Canadian CSOs have also collaborated with Southern counterparts onissues of worker health and safety, the rightto labour organization and collective bar-gaining, and alternative trade initiatives.

Canadian CSOs have also long acted in soli-darity with Southern peoples to prevent orresolve conflict. And, says Jacques Bertrand,professor of political science at the Universityof Toronto, these organizations are wellplaced to play a significant role in preventingconflict because they can work closely withlocal people and organizations. But, he cautions, given the complexity of conflictprevention and peacebuilding, CSOs’ effec-tiveness should not be exaggerated: greatercoordination is needed between the organiza-tions themselves and with government.

Common ChallengesDespite their differing agendas and areas of intervention, Canadian CSOs working internationally face remarkably similar challenges, both from an organizationalstandpoint and in their relationships withone another, with governments, and withthe people they aim to serve. Alison VanRooy, editor of the Canadian DevelopmentReport 1999 and senior researcher at theNorth-South Institute specializing in civilsociety, identifies a few of the most press-ing issues: weak political will; reducedfunding; an often outdated or irrelevant


C H A R I TA B L E FAC T S A N D F I G U R E S

• Canadian NGOs raise almost twice as much money from individuals

and corporations as they receive from government: US$302 million

in individuals grants compared to US$153 million from government.

• Canadian CSOs put their greatest effort in the poorest parts of

the world—Africa, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean,

then Asia.

• Individual contributions to charities have increased by 27%

between 1986 and 1996.

• Some 21 million Canadians—88% of the population over the age

of 15—give to charitable and nonprofit organizations.

• Some 1.5 million Canadians each contribute an average of $90

to international organizations.

• Canadian foundations allocate only about 3% of their grants—

worth some $2 million—to international causes.

“Canadians have been

world leaders in organiz-

ing challenges, cam-

paigns, and alternatives

to the projects of what

might be termed a global

political and

economic élite.”

John Foster, Professor of

Human Rights, the

University of

Saskatchewan.

BO

X2

regulatory environment; shallow publicopinion; and a disinterested private sector.

Lack of pol i t ica l wi l lWhether in environment or human rights,gender or food, CSOs have sounded thealarms and raised public awareness of theissues. But action is often slow to follow:the problem is a lack of political will and a dearth of public participation in policy-making. “The challenge for NGOs and governments,” says Ahmed, “is to set forth a broader agenda which allows for greater participation—especially on issues such as international finance, trade, and climatechange. By creating sufficient nationalpressure, CSOs should be holding politiciansmore accountable.”

And as Van Rooy notes, “downsized govern-ments seem more than willing to divestthemselves of responsibilities and entrustthem to an already overburdened voluntarysector.” This, however, has not beenmatched by the will to provide adequatefunding, or more fully engage the voluntary sector in policy debates.

FundingMany Canadian CSOs active internationallyhave long depended on federal governmentfunding, most of it channeled through CIDA.Repeated cuts to development assistancebudgets, however, have led to the contrac-tion—if not the disappearance—of a numberof NGOs. Increased competition for fewerdollars has also led some groups to modify or distort their mission by privileging thoseactivities more likely to be funded, stokingfear among many of co-optation by govern-ment. And certainly, dependence on government has contributed to the gradualtransformation of some voluntary organiza-tions into public service contractors.

In some fields of activity, such as actionagainst hunger, limited support for preven-tive and development work has led to aprevalence of charity and ad hoc emergencyaid programs. This short-term response provides few incentives and little supportfor investing in and developing long-termstrategies.

Reducing dependence on government is crucial for both independence and survival. In an attempt to do so, notes Van Rooy,

some CSOs, such as the Canadian Organizationfor Development through Education (CODE),have opened up for-profit programs to helpfinance core work.

Regulatory environment“The way in which organizations are regu-lated and taxed also makes a difference totheir ability to effect change,” says Van Rooy.But regulations governing whether or notCSOs qualify for charitable status withRevenue Canada currently hinder or limitCSOs’ advocacy and political activities. These are in need of updating, says Van Rooy.

Shallow public opinionDonations to charitable organizations inCanada indicate strong support for CSOs working at home and abroad. However, that support is “a mile wide but an inch deep,”notes Smillie, making both CIDA’s and CSOs’ work somewhat precarious. It has also led many CSOs to favour high-visibilityemergency work over long-term developmentefforts. “This lack of public understanding mayultimately be most damaging to CSOs’ endeav-ours to bring about change,” says Van Rooy.

A disinterested private sectorWhile the private sector is a potential allyfor CSOs’ attempts to effect change, feworganizations working internationally haveentered into partnerships with the privatesector. Funding statistics also show that the Canadian private sector, as well as foun-dations, have thus far contributed little tothe work of internationalist CSOs. Amongnotable efforts to improve that performanceVan Rooy points to the Imagine campaignled by the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy.

Changing OrganizationsThemselves“Organizations seeking to change the worldare often in need of change themselves,”says Van Rooy. Among the challenges andopportunities she and other authors note are the need for continuing training, forincreased accountability, and for greater proficiency. Also crucial is the need for more equitable partnerships betweenNorthern and Southern CSOs.

Capacity bui lding and trainingTrade liberalization, international UN processes, and a growing body of

O V E R V I E W 5

multilateral agreements mean that CSOs facediverse, increasingly complex issues. “Theability to analyze and critique internationalagreements requires experience, specializedknowledge, and long-term memory,” saysAhmed. Building this capacity is a criticalchallenge for CSOs. To meet the challenge,additional government funding is needed to support organizational infrastructure ofboth Southern and Northern organizations—administrative resources, training, andequipment.

Increased accountabi l i tyVoluntary sector organizations have some-times been accused of serving private spe-cial interests rather than public interests. Tocounter this and reinforce their legitimacy,CSOs need to more visibly apply standardssuch as codes of conduct. They must also beseen to be working with those whose livesthey mean to affect, says Van Rooy.

Professional ismReduced government funding, continuingpoverty overseas, and global challengeshave increased the need for efficiency and for better targeting of resources. Alsoneeded is greater competence throughoutthe voluntary sector. Increased professional-ism is hampered by CIDA’s limited contribu-tion to NGOs’ administrative costs, however,as well as by the public’s expectation—fed by the charities themselves—that an inordinately large percentage of individualdonations will reach developing-countrybeneficiaries directly.

Evaluation is also vital. However, “evaluationis not a systemic part of Canadian NGO cul-ture,” notes Smillie. The reasons include the

difficulty of assessing social development,empowerment, and participation, as well as CSOs’ limited financial and professionalmeans. Evaluation is essential, however, iforganizations are to learn from past experi-ence and thus increase their effectiveness.

Building effect ive partnershipsAs noted earlier, an increasing number ofCSOs work in partnership with domestic andforeign partners, or join broad coalitions.Many, however, acknowledge the difficultiesassociated with international work and partnerships: differing missions and com-mitments; competing funding and resourceissues; the stress of sustaining coalitions;and lack of shared long-term visions.

Problems also arise when Northern govern-ments fund Southern NGOs directly, cuttingout the Northern CSO intermediary. Whilethis poses a threat to the survival of theNorthern CSOs, it can also work against theSouthern partner that loses both its voice in the North and means of eliciting publicsupport. This changing funding dynamicpoints to the need to expand the North-South relationship into one that transcendsprojects and money and leads to joint projects and campaigns, both within Canada and internationally.

The Canadian Development Report 1999stresses that individual Canadians have animportant part to play in bringing aboutglobal change. “It matters what individualsdo,” says Van Rooy. “Without individualinvolvement, civil society becomes anempty arena.” The challenge, she notes, “is to extend participation from our backyard to our global home.”


"...if civil society organi-

zations are going to help

glue societies together in

the future, they need to

figure more prominently

on the public policy

agenda today."

Sharon

Capeling-Alakija,

Executive Coordinator,

United Nations

Volunteers

WHY CIVIL SOCIETY?

A l i s o n V a n R o o y

A l i s o n V a n R o o y i s a S e n i o r R e s e a r c h e r a t

T h e N o r t h - S o u t h I n s t i t u t e , s p e c i a l i z i n g

i n c i v i l s o c i e t y i s s u e s .

WHY CIVIL SOCIETY?

T

C H A P T E R

O N E

Civil society is also at work at home inCanada. For example, the floods that ravagedManitoba in 1997 were beaten back by thou-sands of volunteers marshalled by the RedCross; the ice storm that devastated EasternOntario and Quebec in 1998 was met bywell-organized community groups that set up shelters, served meals, and rescued neigh-bours. Indeed, civil society organizationsaffect most everyone, as André Picard,National Correspondent for The Globe andMail, notes: “Have you ever had surgery?Had a child enrolled in amateur sport? Goneto the opera? Studied English or French as asecond language? Watched public television?Attended university? Gone to a church or

other place of worship? Had a familymember with arthritis, Alzheimer’s, canceror heart disease? Gone to the zoo? Played with your kids at a playground? Eatenat a soup kitchen?”2

If you answer yes to any of these questions,you have likely been involved with a groupbelonging to civil society, whether it bea registered charitable organization, a not-for-profit agency, or one of the tens ofthousands of unregistered groups making a mark in Canada and abroad.

Civil society may have become the darling of international circles, but the picture is not all rosy. These organizations face some

he phrase “civil society” is today often injected into

conversations about the state of the world. Used to

describe peoples’ organizations— those outside government and the

marketplace—civil society is credited with much of the positive

change that occurs in the world today, whether it be moving giant

international organizations to modify how they do business; saving

species from commercial slaughter; or developing innovative ideas to

help the world’s poorest. Notable examples include the coalition that

pushed the World Bank to withdraw from the controversial Narmada Dam

project in India;1 the Greenpeace campaign against tuna fishing

nets that also entrap dolphins; and the Grameen Bank’s successes

in making micro-loans to Bangladesh’s impoverished women.

C I V I L S O C I E T Y :

A D E F I N I T I O N

Civil society: variously,

any grouping of people

for collective interest,

in particular in pursuit

of the public good; any

group not part of the

market or the state sys-

tem; any group that is

voluntarily entered into

and not based on ethnic

or kinship ties; non-

governmental organiza-

tions, collective noun for

NGOs, space where NGOs

work; space for collective

organization; a civilly

organized society with

rule of law; a plurality;

special interest groups;

sometimes also includes

the private sector.


serious challenges. While partnership and collaboration among the “cornerstones” ofsociety—the public, private, and voluntarysectors—may well reaffirm the strength and resilience of goodwill among people,they also hide bitter contests, trade-offs,eviscerating cutbacks, and palpable angerover the moral high ground.

What is Civil Society?“Civil society” is used today to describe a wide range of sometimes contradictoryterms, groups, and activities. Usually, how-ever, it is shorthand for the population oforganizations trying to change some aspectof society, including government policy, cultural values, corporate practices, and the activities of intergovernmental organiza-tions. The term thus has a transformativering, a connotation of righteousness. But it can also conjure up negative images of“special interests,” anti-government militants,and exclusive élites. It is little wonder thatcivil society has become controversial.

Reviewing the history of thought about civilsociety (see Box 1), yields a few touchstonesthat help one arrive at a useful definition.Civil society can be considered both an“arena” in society where people organize, and a “political project” in terms of what it does, or can do.

The notion of arena is important becausecivil society organizations (CSOs) are createdfor reasons that are shaped by society, arecomposed of people imbued with the valuesof that society, and work largely withinthat society’s laws and norms. Civil societyis, therefore, more than a synonym for agrouping of organizations: it is the cultural“space” they inhabit. Much of the conflictabout CSOs in Canada deals with the forcesthat determine the number of CSOs andshape their activities: public opinion aboutdevelopment, the changing rules for inter-national trade, the funding relationshipsbetween the Canadian government andCSOs, the internal disagreements betweenand within organizations, and the interpre-tation of the implications of global change.

Civil society is not only the space in which organizations flourish or flounder: it canalso be a political accomplishment. Indeed, for many organizations throughout the

world—in Burma and Iraq, for instance—the mere struggle to exist is itself political.For this reason, many activists in the formerSoviet satellite states and in Latin Americarefer to civil society as a political project:an aspiration for the freedom and spacenecessary to organize and make their voicesheard. Civil society is thus a political idea,not because political parties are involved,but because politics is about power. Anactive and independent civil society canhelp reallocate that power and thus make change possible.

Why the Interest in Civil Society?Documents issued by both governments and international organizations attest thatthe notion of civil society has moved beyondthat of the latest buzzword (see Box 2). But there are clear reasons for the deepinterest in civil society in Canada. First isthe sheer number of these organizations,which is increasing both in Canada and else-where. CSOs are also responsible for a sub-stantial part of the social services deliveredin Canada and of foreign aid spent abroad.Third, they include increasingly prominent—and loud—advocates for change in domesticand foreign policy. Finally, they are bringingabout change in some parts of the world andin some sectors where governments and themarketplace have failed. Loud, large, andsuccessful, many civil society organizationsare the most visible face of Canada abroad.

C H A P T E R O N E W H Y C I V I L S O C I E T Y ? 9

BO

X1

A B R I E F H I S T O R Y

Although it may appear to be new, the phrase “civil society” dates back

to the writings of Aristotle for whom civil society (koinõnia politiké)

was the society of propertied men grouped together to govern them-

selves. Through the 17th and 18th centuries, Thomas Hobbes, John

Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Thomas

Paine revived the debate to explain how people should relate to each

other, to nature, and to the state. During the social turmoil stirred up

by the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,

the writings of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx—and

early this century, Antonio Gramsci—contributed much to the debate.

When changes swept through East Central Europe in the 1980s, Poles,

Hungarians, and Czechs used the term to explain why and how regimes

were changing. For them, it meant a new kind of political and

economic order. It is no wonder that “civil society” today carries

such complex connotations.

T H E I R N U M B E R S A N D AC T I V I T I E S

Approximately 175,000 organizations inCanada are identified as nonprofits, charities,or other voluntary and community bodies.Every year, 200 more charities are added tothe list. Half of all Canadians—more than12 million people—report participating insome kind of civil society organization andmore than 40 percent of them are involvedin two organizations. While most of theseCanadians participate in work-related, sport-ing, and religious activities, a quarter takepart in community and school-related functions,cultural and educational work, service delivery,and—importantly—political activity.3

Of that number—probably about 350 inCanada—only a small percentage work

on North-South or international issues(see section “Civil Society Organizationsand Funding in Canada,” for a profile of some of these CSOs). They include:

• Churches or faith-based organizationsworking through their development arms,such as the Primate’s World Relief andDevelopment Fund of the Anglican Churchof Canada or the Aga Khan FoundationCanada;

• Cultural and ethnic associations such as the Ukrainian Canadian Committeeor the National Association of Canadiansof Origins in India;

• Domestic social service and advocacyorganizations with an international reach such as the National Anti-PovertyOrganization which works with OXFAMCanada and others on such projects asthe World Summit for Social Development;

• Media organizations such as the CanadianJournalists for Free Expression whichadvocates for the protection of journalistsunder repressive regimes;

• Professional associations such as theCanadian Lawyers’ Association forInternational Human Rights;

• Women’s organizations such as theNational Action Committee on the Statusof Women which was involved in theUN Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, and MATCHInternational Centre which fundsSouthern women’s work;

• Research institutes, such as Human Rights Internet which researches and publishesreports on human rights conditions globally;

• Solidarity groups, such as the Friends ofBurma which is trying to raise awarenessof human rights abuses in Burma;

• Labour organizations, such as theSteelworkers Humanity Fund whichprovides funding to counterpart unionsstruggling for workers’ rights in othercountries; and

• Development nongovernmental organiza-tions (NGOs) such as Inter Pares thatworks with counterparts in many othercountries to combat both the local andglobal causes of poverty.

Development NGOs are fewer still in number,probably numbering less than 150.4 Some,however, are doing such remarkable work and


BO

X2 C I V I L S O C I E T Y I N W O R D S

The term civil society is now often heard in many sectors. For example:

• Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, said about the

landmines treaty (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and

Their Destruction): “These trends—the involvement of civil society

and the information technology revolution—are the foundations on

which a profound democratization of international politics is being

built. We often hear of ‘globalization’ in terms of a growing global

network of trade and commerce. But this is another kind of ‘global-

ization’—the emergence of a global commons as a powerful force....”1

• United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan considers that: “Civil

society constitutes a major and increasingly important force in inter-

national life. In recent years, the United Nations has found that

much of its work ... involves intimately the diverse and dedicated

contributions of nongovernmental organizations and groups.”2

• According to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development

and Good Governance of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development, “Civil society is central to democratization, the rule

of law, and human rights. Civil society denotes a public space between

the state and individual citizens (women and men) in which the latter

can develop autonomous, organized and collective activities of the

most varied nature.”3

Notes

1 Notes for an address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Oslo NGO Forum On Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines,Oslo, Norway, September 10, 1997, numbered 97/32. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/97_state/97_032e.htm(accessed in November 1998).

2 Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, July 14,1997 (A/51/950), New York: The United Nations. www.unug.ch/genet/archive/reform/intro.htm (accessed in January 1999).

3 Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 1997, part 1, page 7, www.oecd.org/dac/htm/pubs/p-pdgg.htm (accessed in January 1999).

play such an important role in Canada’s over-all relationships with developing countries,that one is justified in thinking they aremore numerous.

In other parts of the world, the numbers of civil society organizations are notoriouslydifficult to determine. Some estimate thathundreds of thousands of new communitydevelopment organizations have been created in recent years, primarily in Asiaand Latin America. An estimated 4,700Northern NGOs, for example, are activelyinvolved with more than 20,000 of theirSouthern counterparts (see Box 3).5Obviously, the total number of organizationsdiffers depending on what is considered to be an organization (registered or unregis-tered, permanent or ad hoc, degrees of sepa-ration from government or marketplace), andthe methodology used for arriving at esti-mates. Regardless, however, commentatorsagree that the numbers are growing.

T H E S E R V I C E S T H E Y P R O V I D E

Remarkable work is carried out by Canadiansorganized to help one another, whether it be through food banks, hospice care, boysand girls clubs, or community centres.6What many Canadians don’t realize, how-ever, is how important that work is to oureconomy and society. As journalist AndréPicard notes: “Canadians like to think ofthemselves as generous people, as givers,not recipients of charitable services. Butconsider this: the median level of givingamong Canadians is only $150 annually. Atthe same time, the voluntary sector deliversservices worth more than $3,000 per citi-zen. The simple explanation for this colossalgulf between perception and reality is thatCanadians lack basic knowledge about thevoluntary sector and the role it plays indelivering the services and reflecting thevalues that define us as a nation.”7

Consider, for example, the number of volun-teer hours and the volume of money chan-neled through CSOs. For the subset of75,000 charities (the only group for whichthere is reliable quantitative information),more than 1.1 billion hours are donatedannually, and more than $88 billion passesthrough their coffers in the form of govern-ment grants and private donations. If oneexcludes charities such as hospitals and

teaching institutions that are obviously part of the public sector, an impressive $51 billion still remains (see Box 4). That is 28 times greater than our officialdevelopment assistance (ODA) to all countries (see “Statistical Annex, Table 3:


BO

X3C I V I L S O C I E T Y : A G R O W I N G F O R C E

Civil society organizations are at work on all continents.

Here are a few examples of their importance:

• Brazil. While nonprofits are at work throughout the country, there

is a heavy concentration in São Paulo (45,000) and in Rio (16,000).

These organizations employ at least 1 million people, accounting

for about 2 percent of total employment.

• Egypt. Of the nonprofit organizations spread throughout the country,

17,500 are membership-based, 9,500 are charitable, and 3,200 work

in development. These numbers include 22 professional groups whose

members number 3 million.

• Thailand. There are some 11,000 registered nonprofits in Thailand,

in addition to many more nonregistered organizations.

• India. At least 2 million associations are at work countrywide;

Ghandian-inspired nonprofits alone employ 600,000 people.

• Ghana. Among the 800 registered formal nonprofit organizations,

international groups are particularly prominent.

Source

Helmut K. Anheier and Lester M. Salamon, eds, The Nonprofit Sector in theDeveloping World: A Comparative Analysis (Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress, 1998).

BO

X4C A N A D A’ S C H A R I T I E S : S O M E S TAT I S T I C S

• There were 74,918 charities registered with Revenue Canada as

of December 1996, in addition to an estimated 100,000 nonprofit

organizations. There is no way to estimate the number of non-

incorporated groups, which is likely much higher.

• Charities received an estimated $10.1 billion in donations from

individuals, corporations, and other organizations in 1994; earned

$23.5 billion through their own activities; and received $54.5 billion

from government, most of which—$36.7 billion—was directed to

hospitals and teaching institutions.

• In 1997, 7.5 million Canadians donated more than 1.1 billion

hours of volunteer labour to support charitable and voluntary

organizations, the equivalent of 578,000 full-time jobs.

• Volunteers run 38 percent of charities; an additional 21 percent

have only one full-time staff person.

Sources

See Michael Hall, “Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee onGovernment Operations re: Bill C-224,” Toronto: Canadian Centre for Philanthropy,May 1995, p. 1, posted on www.pagvs.com/mhall.htm (accessed in November1998); and Statistics Canada et al, Caring Canadians, Involved Canadians:Highlights from the 1997 National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating,Ottawa, 1998, Figure 3.1, p. 27.

‘Canadian Official Development Assistance:Basic Data,’” p. 128).

The organizations that work mainly in developing countries display a similarlyremarkable level of activity. Canadian devel-opment NGOs work in at least 79 developingcountries,8 annually raise about $412 millionfrom the public, and are granted another$209 million or so from the CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA),Canada’s official aid agency.9 Those grantsrepresent a substantial portion of CIDA’soverall spending: a full 12 percent in 1996/97.10 Funding from all sources (ODAand voluntary grants together) brings thepercentage spent by development NGOs to a whopping 21.7 percent of Canada’s over-seas development spending—among thehighest ratios anywhere in the world (see“Civil Society Organizations and Funding in Canada, Figure A,” p. 110).

Not only do NGOs undertake a remarkableamount of work abroad, they also carry outa significant amount of development-relatedwork at home. NGOs have also helped raiseawareness of North-South linkages inCanada and have thus fostered support forthe official aid program. Surveys indicatethat many more Canadians recognize thenames of NGOs than they do CIDA’s,11 afinding that compelled Margaret Catley-Carlson, CIDA president from 1983 to 1989, to urge NGOs to “help guide CIDA’s own efforts to reach the public.... This is not only in the interests of CIDA; it is in the interests [of] the promotion and expansion of all Canadian developmentassistance.”12 It would be hard to imagineCanada’s development program withoutNGOs (see Chapter 2).

T H E I R A D V O C AC Y W O R K

Although actions may speak more loudlythan words, civil society organizations alsodo a lot of talking—often loudly—in policyand media circles about their work and thepeople they serve. This growing advocacy hasgiven birth to some spectacular successes inrecent years. The most visible, perhaps, wasthe 1997 signing of the international ban onlandmines, orchestrated by a global coalitionwith strong Canadian CSO input. Thereare other examples, as well: the campaign against child labour that resulted in a

parliamentary committee report, Ending ChildLabour Exploitation, and the subsequentlaunching of an annual $200,000 “ChildLabour Challenge Fund” in 1997; the effortsto toughen Canada’s stance against apartheidduring the 1980s, which led to a change inthen Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s policiestoward South Africa;13 and pressures to limitCanada’s emissions of global warming gases,among others.

For many development NGOs, advocacy is an outgrowth of frustrations experienced inthe field. Even when involved in successfulgrassroots projects, many of these organiza-tions have become painfully aware of thevulnerability of the poorest to macro-policiesover which they have no control: the priceof basic foods, for example, the cost ofhealthcare, or the national debt repaymentschedule which robs them of schooling. Inthe past 20 years, in fact, the standard of living in much of sub-Saharan Africa hasplummeted rather than risen, a fall blamedlargely on the debt burden and the economicmeasures taken to deal with it.14

As macroeconomic changes negate the local work of grassroots institutions, manyNorthern NGOs have felt compelled to lobbyfor changes. For example, the CanadianEcumenical Jubilee Initiative (CEJI), agrouping of Canadian churches, has joinedan international campaign calling for thewrite-off of debts in the world’s poorestcountries by the year 2000. CEJI haslaunched a petition calling on the leaders of developed countries to cancel the foreigndebts of approximately 45 of the world’spoorest nations. The Initiative also calls forthe establishment of an international bodyto develop criteria for debt cancellation andensure that the money saved is directedtoward social development.15

For domestic groups, such as the CanadianLabour Congress and the National ActionCommittee on the Status of Women, the move to advocacy on the international front has also been spurred by an awarenessthat world agreements or events—the FreeTrade Area of the Americas, for example,or the UN World Conference on Women,described later in this volume—have animpact on their members at home.


Not only do NGOs under-

take a remarkable amount

of work abroad, they also

carry out a significant

amount of development-

related work at home. NGOs

have also helped raise

awareness of North-South

linkages in Canada and

have thus fostered support

for the official aid program.

Changes in technology that make communi-cation easier, cheaper, and more accessibleglobally have greatly facilitated advocacy.First by fax, and in the past 10 years by e-mail and telephone, Canadians, linked incoalitions that often span five time zones,have pulled together vast networks.16

Southern organizations are also increasinglyenjoying these benefits, thanks to initia-tives such as the Acacia Project, launchedby the International Development ResearchCentre to help sub-Saharan African commu-nities apply information and communicationtechnologies to their social and economicdevelopment.

T H E I R S U C C E S S E S

Within Canada, there have been someremarkable success stories of organizationsthat have met the needs of Canadians.17

There is also some evidence—though notcategorical—that development organizationshave been more successful than their officialcounterparts in delivering foreign aid.18 Thisis partly because most development CSOs,having limited funds, are stretched to makefewer dollars go further; it is also partlybecause many have geared their work to thespecific and changing needs of their partnerorganizations overseas.

NGOs are also perhaps more vividly aware that projects do not, in themselves, consti-tute “development.” That realization hasled to successful Canadian experiments inmicro-credit, for example, whereby commu-nities have established alternative banksto allow easier access to credit for the poor,mostly women. It has also led to successfulpost-conflict reconstruction, such as in El Salvador where a reforestation effort has contributed to rebuilding the peace.Capacity building has also helped strengthenwomen’s voices in unions, thus improvingtheir working conditions.19

Other innovations have included a focus on smaller projects, decentralized control,and greater attention to people, particularlywomen.20 Perhaps most important, as formerCanadian Member of Parliament WalterMcLean explained, is the NGOs’ in-depthknowledge of other peoples and countries,crucial for any successful aid program.“Throughout the period of turmoil in CentralAmerica, churches and NGOs were the

most informed source of information theGovernment of Canada had in the region,”he wrote in 1993. “The Government hadvery limited staffing, and it was difficultand dangerous to travel. The churches andNGOs had very good connections.”21

Because of the size of its programs, the scrutiny of its actions, and the complexity of its administration, CIDA—like other largegovernmental agencies—finds it costlier andmore difficult to experiment with untriedapproaches.

The Other Side of the CoinThese positive elements are only one sideof the civil society coin, however. If theseorganizations are to be congratulated for thegood work done by a growing number of goodpeople, it must be recognized that they alsoface challenges.

P U B L I C I N T E R E S T O R S P E C I A L I N T E R E S T S ?

Civil society organizations are increasinglypolitically attuned and active in policy cir-cles. For some, this increased political savvyis to be commended. After all, how can anygroup continue to treat the symptoms ofpoverty—whether it be food banks at homeor food aid abroad—without dealing withits causes? Isn’t it in the public interest to raise policymakers’ awareness of the realities of life at the grassroots since their decisions may make a difference?

This is the argument that Betty Plewes,President and CEO of the Canadian Councilfor International Co-operation (CCIC), madein a 1996 letter to the Honourable PierrePettigrew, Minister for InternationalCooperation and Minister responsible for La Francophonie:

If development is about strengthening civilsociety and meeting basic human needs; aboutempowering people through popular participa-tion in the social, economic, political and envi-ronmental decisions that affect their own lives;if in fact it’s democratization through par-ticipation, community-building from below,enabling the poor to have some control of theirdestiny, being responsive to local needs andbuilding the links between economic growthand human development; if it’s about creatinglinkages between civil societies North and


South, then Southern and Northern NGOs areuniquely equiped to play a central role. It’sneither appropriate nor acceptable for NGOs to be regarded simply as a convenient deliverychannel for Canadian ODA, or an extension ofCanadian foreign policy.22

Others, however, are concerned that CSOpolicy work is not in the public interest, butrather for very special interests—their own.In commenting on Maurice Strong’s chairingof the 1992 Earth Summit, Peter Foster of TheGlobe and Mail’s “Report on Business,” wrotethat “... most [NGOs] are, in fact, special-interest groups, in particular environmentalgroups, which, while they take public contri-butions, are not democratic in structure.Moreover, despite their names, they oftenhave access to taxpayers’ money, often viaStrong-created organizations, and they tendto be broadly sympathetic to his interven-tionist, regulatory agenda.”23

Indeed, a number of Canadian policymakershave engaged in the public versus specialinterest debate in recent years. Liberal MPJohn Bryden, for example, has waged a cam-paign for tighter regulatory control of chari-ties, accusing some (unnamed) organizationsof being fronts for terrorist organizations.24

Following the 1993 budget, concerns overundue influence led to a federal Review ofInterest Group Funding to examine federalfunding to “special interest” groups; in theend, the decision was made to delegate funding decisions—whether to fund advocacy work and whether and how much to cut funding to particular CSOs—to individual government departments.

CIVICUS, a global assembly of prominent development groups, argues that: “There are important reasons to justify the partici-pation of CSOs in the public policy debate.For many poor, oppressed, or minoritygroups in society, CSOs provide their onlyvoice. And, too, it is in the best interests ofthe public, and particularly the electorate,to have access to information vital to form-ing sound decisions. Thus, CSOs should bepermitted to carry out public policy activitiessuch as education, research, advocacy, andthe publication of position papers throughall legal means.”25

One way to protect the principle of public policy participation is to meet the critics head on. This is the approach taken by theVoluntary Sector Roundtable. Headed by the former leader of the New DemocraticParty, the Honourable Ed Broadbent, theRoundtable is an unincorporated group ofnational organizations and coalitions formedin 1995 to strengthen the voice of Canada’scharitable, voluntary sector. To enhance the relationship between the sector and thefederal government, as well as encourage a supportive legislative and regulatoryframework, the Roundtable has writtenpapers, sponsored talks, made submissionsto Parliament, and tried to raise the profileof civil society organizations in Canada.26

To improve public awareness of its work, in 1998 it published Helping Canadians Help Canadians, a document intended to initiate discussion on the Roundtable’s proposals for self-regulation, as well as on changes in government taxation andregulatory oversight.

Additional efforts have been made withinthe international development community. A Code of Ethics launched by CCIC in 1995,for example, is intended to both ensure ethical conduct by CCIC members and assurethe public that standards are being applied.The code deals with three main areas:vision, ethical principles, and rules of con-duct. The vision of development sets outideals that focus on the poor, on environ-mental and economic sustainability, and on the equitable distribution of power and wealth. Ethical principles relate to fairand impartial governance, integrity, trans-parency, appropriate use of funds, account-ability to donors, and truth in fundraising.The specific rules of conduct cover suchareas as Board independence and activity,the timely submission of audited financialstatements, and contracting provisions.

Also under debate is whether or notCanadian charities misrepresent their workto a trusting public, as has been claimed by certain media reports in the 1990s.27

Fueling this debate is the particularly insidious trend by private sector public relations firms of “inventing” civil societyorganizations. Nicknamed “astroturf” organizations to distinguish them from


“For many poor, oppressed,

or minority groups in

society, CSOs provide their

only voice.”

CIVICUS World, (May–June

1998), p.3.

“grassroots” organizations, these include,among others, the Vinyl Council of Canada,created to promote the use of PVC plastic;the Forest Alliance of British Columbia whichpromotes logging; and the US-based GlobalClimate Coalition, whose goals include limit-ing potential fossil fuel restrictions. The phenomenon is more pronounced in the US,where one false nonprofit organization—Citizens for a Free Kuwait—succeeded inturning public sentiment in favour of thePersian Gulf War, packaged for the media as“Desert Storm.”28 The practice exists in otherparts of the world as well, as reported inCivil Society and the Aid Industry, whichchronicles the occasional and damaging riseof “fake” organizations in Kenya, Hungary,and Peru in response to donors’ uninformedenthusiasm for funding civil society organizations.29

These accusations and trends threaten thelegitimacy of all civil society organizations, as well as of organized protest. It can beargued that the bad apples, and the over-reaction to them, undermine democracy itself.

In reality, however, most registered andnonregistered organizations in Canada donot engage in advocacy, whether for goodor bad causes: only about 5 percent oforganizations working on developmentissues do so, for instance.30 This reflects the fact that most CSOs are established topursue personal, religious, sports, arts, orhobby interests; some do pursue policiesthat will benefit their own work or property;and only a fraction advocate for changes ofsome kind. Any discussion of civil societyneeds to keep this wide range of goals andactivities in mind.

A Q UA L I F I E D S U C C E S S

A second reason to question the enthusiasmabout civil society is that it may signal fail-ures rather than successes in how we run oursociety. Part of the rhetorical and financialsupport for the voluntary sector is premisedon the hope that unpaid and underpaid sec-tors of society will carry out social programsabandoned by federal and provincial govern-ments. Lauding civil society as a provider ofkey services may simply hide public sectorneglect of core programs.

Throughout the federal bureaucracy, and particularly since the 1993 re-election ofthe present Liberal government, there hasbeen renewed pressure for individual depart-ments to consult more frequently withCanadians through conferences, meetings,surveys, etc., and make information morewidely available.31 Examples discussed inthe chapters of this Canadian DevelopmentReport include the Peacebuilding Committee,the annual Department of Foreign AffairsConsultations on Human Rights, and CIDA’sannual meetings with development NGOs.

The second Liberal Red Book of electionpromises also pledged to support the volun-tary sector. Supported by the Privy CouncilOffice, a cross-departmental federal group hasbeen formed, the Voluntary Sector Task Force.Expected to make recommendations in Fall1999, this task force shows a strong federalcommitment to at least study the situation of civil society organizations. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien spoke at the 1998International Association for Volunteer EffortConference, during which Foreign AffairsMinister Lloyd Axworthy announced a $15 million grant for a new VolNet to linkCanadian organizations across the countryand to the internet. The Prime Minister said:“So, when I speak of our desire to build anew and lasting partnership, I mean justthat—a partnership. A real alliance. Onethat spans the length and breadth of oursociety. All the governments of Canada, the voluntary sector, business, committedCanadians. Each doing our part to build abetter country.”32

This openness is welcomed by many organi-zations, including CCIC, because it legit-imizes the work of CSOs on the policy frontas well as in the trenches. Yet, this encour-agement seems strange at a time when bothfederal and provincial funding for social ser-vices and foreign aid—and to some of theorganizations that provide those services—has fallen. Federal funding to the provinceshas plummeted, and some provinces havechosen to take additional slices out of thesocial services pie.

According to the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives’ reading of recent budgets, spending by all levels of


government decreased from 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1992to 33 percent in 1997. That 7 percentexcised from the system—currently equal to $60 billion—has had significant consequences for Canada’s poor.33 The provincial response, particularly in Albertaand Ontario, has been to limit access tosocial programs and social assistance bene-fits: in Ontario, for instance, 21 percent hasbeen cut out of the welfare budget alone.34

What are the consequences? They are serious, according to those most affected.The Toronto Community Agency Survey, forexample, reports increases in demand bymost of that city’s agencies, particularlythose providing distress lines, drop-in centres,food, clothing, and outreach services.Indeed, many cities, led by Toronto, havenow declared homelessness a “national disaster.” At the same time, the agenciesthemselves have lost part of their funding,from government as well as from individualsand corporations. This has pushed someorganizations over the edge: as the TorontoCommunity Agency Survey reports, five timesas many social services agencies closed in1996 as in 1992, and a third of the organiza-tions had reduced their staff numbers.35

Writing for the Voluntary Sector Roundtable,Susan Phillips reports:

In recent years, government support of volun-tary organizations has been contracting dra-matically. The Mulroney government beganselectively cutting grants and contributions togroups in 1986/87. Almost every budget sincehas announced new and significant across theboard cuts... The Liberals continued the Tories’ policy. The 1995 budget moved away fromacross the board cuts to more selective ones,specifically targeting advocacy and public edu-cation groups, and announced a major reviewof interest group funding. [...] At the sametime, funding for the National VoluntaryOrganization (NVO) was cut in half; welfaregroups funded under National Welfare grants(e.g., the National Anti-Poverty Organization[NAPO] and the Boys and Girls Clubs) were cut 15 percent and multicultural groups by 24 percent over three years. Reductions of this magnitude cannot be easily replaced with private money. It is estimated by theCanadian Centre for Philanthropy that for

every 1 percent cut in government grants tocharities, a 5.8 percent increase in individualdonations and a 49 percent rise in corporatedonations would be needed, just to maintainthe status quo.36

For organizations working abroad, there has been a similar slide. Funding for officialdevelopment assistance as a whole has con-sistently fallen since its 1975/76 high (as a percentage of GNP) of 0.53 percent,37 and is expected to bottom out at 0.27 percent (or $2.36 billion) in 1998/99.38 Between1994 and 1997, funding to NGOs fell from $338 million to $269 million.39 Most NGOsworking exclusively on development educa-tion—trying to educate Canadians aboutNorth-South issues—were completely cut: as a result, many disappeared. Clearly, thestrategy to have voluntary organizations fillthe gaps left as a result of diminishing socialand development funding in Canada is notworking.

A C R I S I S I N R E P R E S E N TAT I O N

These stresses in Canadian society—cuts to social service funding and foreign aid,increasingly vocal (and numerous) voices on public policy—point to the limitationsof the political system. No democraticsystem, and certainly no national parlia-mentary system, can represent all peopleequally, and equally well. It is thus neces-sary for Canadians to participate in policydebates at times and in ways other thanjust at the ballot box. This is the focus ofthe work that the Canadian governmentis undertaking in the promotion of civilsociety in other countries.40

The problem is that the Canadian system is not designed to listen to the voices ofexternal groups: the mechanisms for consul-tation, negotiation, representation, debate,and accommodation are often inadequate,as the stories in this Report make clear.41

And even if they are heard, what are policy-makers to do with these opinions? Theargument is usually phrased in terms of representation—Who does this group repre-sent? Who voted for them?—and account-ability—Who makes the decisions? Who hasto answer for the decisions? In an articlepublished in The Globe and Mail in 1997,former Minister of Foreign Affairs Barbara


McDougall asked just those kinds ofquestions:

The influence of pin-striped diplomats, fromtime immemorial the nation’s eyes and ears in far-flung lands, is being displaced by high-profile pressure from a variety of disconnectedinterests. … Who, for example, defines the public interest, as opposed to “special” interests? … Most important for governments,who is accountable—and to whom? …How government will respond to this fragmentationof interest has yet to be determined, but foreign policy will never be the same.42

Her fear is that no one will be left to weighthe national interest; that policy will be theoutcome of heavy influence peddling by themost vocal CSOs. A similar argument waspresented by academics Fen Hampson andDean Oliver in a critique of Canadian ForeignAffairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s policystance:

It is important to ask for whom this vast array of organizations with different interests,sources of funding, and constituencies (bothnationally and globally) speaks. Do they alwaysspeak in the interests of the Canadian public?Are they always on the side of the angels andseen as such by the average Canadian citizen?Profound issues about the meaning of repre-sentative democracy in an increasingly inter-dependent world are raised by the widespread proliferation of NGOs which increasingly enjoyprivileged access to government preciselybecause they are well funded, well organized,and politically mobilized. As J.L. Granatsteinasked recently before an audience of foreignpolicy experts on peacekeeping, “who electedthe NGOs?”43

These often repeated final words—whoelected the NGOs?—pose entirely the wrongquestion. They assume that the only way in which Canadians can influence how theyare governed is by casting a ballot. Theycriticize those who organize on the groundsthat they do so. They castigate those whoseek to influence the people and organiza-tions whose decisions affect their lives andwork. They assume that bureaucrats—oftenout of touch with their Ministers, who mayalso be far removed from the vote that putthem into power—make more “democratic”decisions than NGO outsiders could suggest.

They seem to forget the time-honouredpractice in Canada of having regular discus-sions between government and businesspeople, labour unions, and political partymembers before making decisions and allocating resources.

The difference today is that the voices areoften loud and rude. They are sometimes irresponsible, frequently embarrassing, andnot without sin or subterfuge themselves.They are not to be welcomed without question into the conversation about how Canada should be governed, but they are not to be denied their say. They are essential for a genuine, engaged, embat-tled, impolite, and vociferous democracy.Isn’t this what democracy should be about?

NOTES

The author wishes to thank those persons who commentedon earlier versions of this chapter. In alphabetical order theyare Roy Culpeper, Michelle Hibler, Don McRae, and BrianTomlinson.

1 A new study suggests that there has been visible and real change in the World Bank after many years of NGOadvocacy. See Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown,The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs,and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge, MA and London:MIT Press, 1998).

2 André Picard, A Call to Alms: The New Face of Charitiesin Canada (Toronto: The Atkinson Charitable Foundation,1998) p. 3; also at http://www.atkinsonfdn.on.ca(accessed in November 1998).

3 Statistics Canada et al, Caring Canadians, InvolvedCanadians: Highlights from the 1997 National Surveyof Giving, Volunteering And Participating, Ottawa, 1998,Figure 3.1, p. 43. “Participation” figures are based on survey responses to questions about membership orinvolvement in an organization or group.

4 The Canadian Council for International Co-operationcounts 100 NGOs among its members; an estimated50 others also work in development.

5 This estimate is from a recent article by Lester M. Salamon,“The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector,” in Foreign Affairs(1994), vol. 73, no. 4, pp. 109-122; figures cited on p.111.

6 See André Picard, A Call to Alms: The New Face of Charities in Canada.

7 Ibid., p. 3.

8 CIDA made grants to NGOs in 1996/97 for work in79 developing countries. CIDA, “Statistical Report onDevelopment Assistance, FY 1996-97,” unpublished mimeo,1998, Table M.

9 These figures are for calendar year 1996, the earliest year possible for comparison. OECD, Development AssistanceCommittee, Efforts and Policies of the Members of theDevelopment Assistance Committee, 1997 Report(Paris: OECD, 1998), Table 13. An exchange rate ofUS$1=C$1.3635 was used. CIDA’s recorded total of contribu-tions to NGOs in fiscal year 1996/97 was $269 million, butno figures for NGO spending are available. See also BrianTomlinson, “Canadian International Cooperation NGOs:Trends in the 1990s” (Ottawa: CCIC, 1998), mimeo, p. 16.

10 Tomlinson, “Canadian International Cooperation NGOs,” p. 16.

11 Angus Reid Group, International Development Study for theCCIC (Ottawa: CCIC, February 1990).


12 Margaret Catley-Carlson, “Moving Ahead in the Eighties:CIDA and Canada’s NGOs.” Notes for an Address to theCCIC’s Briefing on Government, October 6, 1983, pp. 7-8.

13 Nona Grandea, “Choosing the Right Policy Levers: DrawingLessons from the Government of Canada’s Interventions inSouth Africa,” (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1995),unpublished report.

14 The UN Development Programme (UNDP) records a drop of GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa from a peak of$634 in 1980 (in 1987 US dollars) to $507 in 1994. UNDP,Human Development Report 1997 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1997), Table 47, p. 224.

15 “Church groups call for debt relief in 2000,” article postedelectronically in CharityVillage NewsWeek News, October 19,1998, archived at http://www.charityvillage.com/charityvillage/morg41.html(accessed in November 1998).

16 Alison Van Rooy, “The Frontiers of Influence: NGOLobbying at the 1974 World Food Conference, the 1992Earth Summit and Beyond,” in World Development, vol. 25,no. 1 (January 1997).

17 For examples, see Picard, 1998; and the Canadian Councilon Social Development, publications listed athttp://www.ccsd.ca/pubsindx.html (accessed in November 1998).

18 The most comprehensive overview of the literature oneffectiveness is probably Erik Kruse Stein; Timo Kyllönen;Satu Ojanperä; Roger C. Riddell; Jean-Louis Vielajus et al,Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO EvaluationSynthesis Study (Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1997).

19 Some of these examples are drawn from the list ofInternational Cooperation Award winners. See CCIC,Profiling Development Practice: Innovation in CanadianInternational NGOs, Ottawa, 1997 and 1998.

20 Margaret Catley-Carlson, “Making Choices: The FutureRoles of NGOs”. Notes for a talk to the NGO/SpecialPrograms Branch consultation, Ottawa, February 15, 1988,quoted in CCIC, “Mind if I Cut In?” Report of the CCIC TaskForce on CIDA-NGO Funding Relationships, Ottawa, October1988.

21 Walter McLean, Chairperson, Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights, 1993, cited inProfiling Development Practice: Innovation in CanadianInternational NGOs (Ottawa: CCIC, 1997), p. 12.

22 CCIC, letter by Betty Plewes to the Honourable PierrePettigrew, Minister for International Cooperation andMinister responsible for La Francophonie, August 28, 1996.

23 Peter Foster, “The Fixer,” Report on Business Magazine,November 1998, pp. 110-120; p. 118.

24 “Charities could be funding foreign terrorists, MP says:Bryden calls for tighter regulation of non-profit organiza-tions,” The Globe and Mail, November 18, 1998, p. A5.

25 CIVICUS World, newsletter of CIVICUS: World Alliance forCitizen Participation (May-June 1998), p. 3.

26 Description drawn from the Voluntary Sector Roundtablewebsite, found at http://www.web.net/vsr-trsb/brochure-e.html (accessed in November 1998).

27 In 1995, CBC-TV aired a story about CARE Canada whichled to legal action by CARE on the grounds that the reportwas factually inaccurate. Similarly, a book by WalterStewart, The Charity Game: Greed, Waste and Fraud inCanada’s $86-billion-a-year Compassion Industry, publishedin 1996, was withdrawn when threatened by legal actionbecause of alleged inaccurate research. In September1998, Maclean’s Magazine published a similarly controver-sial article on charities’ misspent budgets.

28 Guy Crittenden, “Flack Attack,” The Globe and Mail,October 31, 1998, p. D1.

29 Alison Van Rooy, ed., Civil Society and the Aid Industry: The Politics and Promise (London: Earthscan/The North-South Institute, 1998).

30 Alison Van Rooy, “The Altruistic Lobbyists: The Influenceof Non-Governmental Organizations on Development Policyin Canada and Britain,” D.Phil, International Relations,Oxford University, 1994.

31 Talking with Canadians offers case studies of some of these important consultative mechanisms. Frances Abele;Katherine Graham; Alex Ker; Antonia Maioni; and SusanPhillips, Talking with Canadians: Citizen Engagement andthe Social Union (Ottawa: Canadian Council on SocialDevelopment, 1998).

32 “Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien tothe 15th Biennial World Volunteer Conference of theInternational Association for Volunteer Effort,” August 24, 1998.

33 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and CHO!CES: A Coalition for Social Justice, Alternative Federal BudgetPapers 1998 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for PolicyAlternatives, 1998), p. 64.

34 Ibid., p. 145.

35 Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, the City of Toronto,and the Social Planning Council of Toronto, Profile of aChanging World: 1996 Community Agency Survey, Toronto,1997.

36 Susan D. Phillips, “Redefining Government Relationshipswith the Voluntary Sector: On Great Expectations andSense and Sensibility,” paper prepared for the VoluntarySector Roundtable, www.web.net/vsr-trsb/publications/phillips-e.html(accessed in November 1998).

37 David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo: WilfridLaurier University Press, 1998), pp. 16, 17.

38 Brian Tomlinson, “Canada,” in Judith Randel and TonyGerman, with Deborah Ewing, eds, The Reality of Aid1998/1999 (London: Earthscan, 1998), p. 44.

39 Tomlinson, “Canadian International Cooperation NGOs,” p. 16.

40 Mark Robinson and Alison Van Rooy, “Out of the IvoryTower: Civil Society and the Aid System,” in Alison VanRooy, ed., Civil Society and the Aid Industry: The Politicsand Promise (London: Earthscan/The North-SouthInstitute, 1998).

41 There are exceptions, however. See Abele et al, Talkingwith Canadians, 1998.

42 Barbara McDougall, “How interest groups are shaping for-eign policy,” The Globe and Mail, August 1, 1997, p. A23.

43 Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, “Pulpit diplomacy:a critical assessment of the Axworthy doctrine,” inInternational Journal, vol. LIII, no. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 379-406; p. 401.


INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

I a n S m i l l i e

I a n S m i l l i e , a d e v e l o p m e n t c o n s u l t a n t ,

h a s 3 0 y e a r s o f e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e f i e l d o f

i n t e r n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t a s a p r a c t i t i o n e r ,

a d m i n i s t r a t o r , e v a l u a t o r , a n d w r i t e r .

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

C

C H A P T E R

T W O

Organizations endowed with their ownsources of financing and those funded byCIDA do not comprise the full Canadian CSOinvolvement in development, but they formthe largest and most visible part. This chapterlooks at their evolution and their relation-ship with the Canadian public. It alsoexamines issues of professionalism, evolvingNorth-South partnerships, and the trade-offsbetween independence and high levels offinancial support from government.

Surveying the NGO SectorT H E O R I G I N S O F C A N A D I A N N G O S

Canadian NGOs have their origins in 19thcentury missionary movements, and mostchurches still have outreach efforts forinternational development and relief work.Among the largest are the Canadian CatholicOrganization for Development and Peace(CCODP), the Mennonite Central Committee,and the United Church of Canada. SecularNGOs began to emerge following the SecondWorld War. CARE Canada, OXFAM Canada,

Save the Children, World Vision, and FosterParents Plan were originally branches ofBritish and American organizations, some ofwhich later developed independent programs.

During the 1960s and 1970s there was rapidgrowth in the number of home-grown NGOs,such as the Canadian Organization forDevelopment through Education (CODE),MATCH International Centre, and Horizonsof Friendship. Today, the estimated numberof NGOs varies according to the descriptionused, but the number is probably close to300. In addition, about 200 NGIs undertakeinternational activities, bringing the totalnumber of Canadian nongovernmental bodiesworking on international developmentto about 500.

Among the best-known organizations arethose that send volunteers abroad. Canadahas more than a dozen volunteer-sendingNGOs, including CUSO, World UniversityService of Canada (WUSC), OXFAM Québec,Canadian Executive Services Organization(CESO), the Canadian Centre for

anadian civil society organizations (CSOs) working

in international development live with awkward labels. The

term “NGO” (nongovernmental organization) is best known, although

the federal government’s aid agency, the Canadian International

Development Agency (CIDA), has coined another term— nongovernmental

institution (NGI)— to distinguish organizations for which international

development is a secondary, rather than a primary purpose.1


Canadian NGOs today face

many challenges: profes-

sionalism, learning, evalu-

ation and impact; the

compromises between

independence and a grow-

ing trend for some toward

government contracting;

and the complex question

of partnership between

Canadian and Southern

organizations.

International Studies and Cooperation (CECI),and Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO). Formost, volunteer or “cooperant” placementsare not the sole preoccupation, severalhaving diversified into project activities.Personnel placement on volunteer-like termsand conditions plays a large part in thework of several other organizations as well.At the end of 1998, for example, theCanadian branch of the Mennonite CentralCommittee had almost 100 volunteersserving overseas, compared with about150 serving with CECI, 100 with WUSC,100 with VSO, and 200 with CUSO.

In addition to their contributions overseas,volunteers have returned to virtually everywalk of Canadian life. Many were andremained teachers, and their work has hadan impact on the internationalization ofschool curricula across the country. The rankand file of most Canadian NGOs, CIDA, andother international efforts is heavily pepperedwith people whose international interestbegan with their volunteer assignment(see Box 1).

A significant and growing amount ofCanadian NGO/NGI work—as much as37 percent—is carried out in Africa andthe Middle East.2 Second place goes to theAmericas at 33 percent (of which 40 percentis spent in the Caribbean, where Haiti isby far the largest beneficiary), and thirdplace goes to Asia at 23 percent, where NGOwork is heavily concentrated in the southof the continent. Across the board, NGOsand NGIs are significantly more engagedin social development sectors—health andeducation especially—than CIDA.3

T H E E V O L U T I O N O F N G OP R O G R A M M I N G

Discussions about NGOs are often very general: “NGOs do this” and “NGOs thinkthat.” In reality, however, a broad variety of styles, philosophies, and programmingapproaches has evolved over the past30 years. Most important, perhaps, isan emphasis on partnership.

Until the 1970s, it was common for NorthernNGOs to design and manage their own projectsoverseas, often with a Southern governmentacting as counterpart, gatekeeper, or

chaperone. By the early 1980s, however, amajor shift was under way. In many coun-tries, especially in parts of South Asia andLatin America, fledgling Southern NGOswere beginning to demonstrate that theycould design and manage projects moreeffectively and efficiently than foreigners.An era of “partnership” began, with manyCanadian agencies relinquishing their operational role and turning to a fundingand capacity building function.

This was the preferred model for NGIs as well,most of which today work with counterpartorganizations in the South: for example, theCanadian Auto Workers’ Union has assistedSouth African unions in the areas of workers’health and safety, and sexual harassmenteducation. The Université de Montréal’sInstitut d’urbanisme worked with theUniversity of Architecture of Hanoi and theUniversity of Architecture of Ho Chi MinhCity to produce a comprehensive study ofurban poverty, which led to a CIDA-fundedurban management training program

C H A P T E R T W O I N T E R N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C I V I L S O C I E T Y 21

BO

X1C O N N E C T I O N S

Civil society organizations, government, and the private sector do not

exist in sealed compartments. Many individuals in Canadian public life

have moved in and out of the nongovernmental sector. Several federal

cabinet ministers and one prime minister, for instance, were student

participants in WUSC seminars in Ghana and India in the 1950s and

1960s. Several retired federal and provincial cabinet ministers have

helped NGOs and NGIs with programming and fundraising, and by

serving on their boards of directors.

Some prominent Canadian journalists—Hugh Winsor and Jean Pelletier,

for example—have come out of the NGO experience, while others such

as Ann Medina, Peter Gzowski, and Elizabeth Gray have from time to

time gone into it. There are NGO backgrounds and connections among

provincial and municipal political leaders, several of Canada’s top

corporate leaders, and others in public life. A large part of CIDA’s senior

management started in the NGO sector, while in recent years many

CIDA staff have taken early retirement to work with NGOs. Canadian NGO

workers have gone on to manage international private sector operations

and have headed dozens of United Nations programs and agencies.

An “old boys’ network”— which includes a significant number of “old

girls”—has thus developed in what is essentially a fairly young indus-

try. Because aid growth tapered off in the 1980s and contracted in the

1990s, however, there are fewer opportunities than there once were for

young people, and there has been a concomitant “graying” of Canadian

NGOs’ senior management.

involving the Université de Montréal,the University of Calgary, the ÉcolePolytechnique de Montréal, and theFederation of Canadian Municipalities.

By the early 1990s, partnership had cometo describe so much that the word meantalmost everything, and therefore almostnothing. Some partnerships are complex(see Box 2). Some are little more than afunding connection: a Southern NGO makesan application to a Canadian NGO; it isconsidered, sent back for revision, thenapproved or turned down. A Canadian projectofficer visits occasionally, reports are written,and an evaluation is conducted some timelater. Seeing that this model differed in nolarge way from the relationship betweenNorthern governments and Northern NGOs,some government agencies—includingCIDA—began to bypass the Canadianintermediary NGO, funding Southern NGOsdirectly. Because many Southern NGOsfound little value-added in the NorthernNGO intermediary role, some welcomed thisshift, although it was not without its perils.

Two other trends became evident in the1990s. The first, a growth in Canadian NGOemergency activities, was a response tothe rapid increase in the frequency of warsand violent conflicts after 1989, and theconsequent devastation of entire countries,economies, and peoples. Ironically for someNGOs—CARE Canada and OXFAM Canada,for example—this environment of crisis washow they had begun, and the growth inemergency work was, in some ways, a returnto their “roots.” However, fierce interna-tional debate in the 1990s about the roleand effectiveness of external assistance incomplex emergencies resulted in a periodof deep introspection among humanitarianNGOs, and among bilateral and multilateralagencies about how to improve theireffectiveness and efficiency.4

A second trend in the 1990s was a smallbut perceptible change in the NGO advocacyrole, made possible, in part, by the endof the Cold War, and by public interest inhuman rights and issues of governance.Advocacy, the purview of a few large NGOsand a wide network of smaller activistgroups, changed with the arrival of e-mailand the internet. The new technology didthree things for advocacy: it vastlyimproved access to information; it helpedmake new connections between humanrights, labour, environmental, and develop-ment groups; and it dramatically speeded up communications.

Although advocacy remains something of asideline for many Canadian NGOs, the 1992-97campaign to ban landmines (described inChapter 6) demonstrated to some nonactivistorganizations the value of “getting involved.”The 1998 scuttling (or postponement) ofthe Multilateral Agreement on Investment,largely achieved by a broad North-South NGOcoalition working the internet (describedin Chapter 8), was an example of NGOsbeating diplomats at their own game.In addition to their work on macro-policyissues, there are increasing opportunitiesfor NGOs to influence micro-policies.

N G O S A N D T H E C A N A D I A N P U B L I C

NGOs maintain three types of relationshipwith the Canadian public. The first is thevoluntary public contribution of time andlabour (see Chapter 1 and section, “Civil


BO

X2 A N E W T Y P E O F N O R T H - S O U T H PA R T N E R S H I P

The Canada-Bangladesh NGO Policy Education Project (PEP) which began

in 1993 aims to build and support the capacity of Bangladeshi and

Canadian NGOs to undertake collaborative public policy analysis and

promote public participation in development decisionmaking. Supported

by CIDA, the project involves two Canadian NGOs (CUSO and Inter Pares)

and four Bangladeshi organizations (Nijera Kori, UBINIG, the Association

for Land Reform and Development, and the Society for the Environment

and Human Development).

The PEP collaboration has added value to the work of all participating

organizations, making the whole greater than the sum of the parts. One

project focused on issues around shrimp farming in the Ganges delta—

problematic from both a human rights and an environmental perspec-

tive. Working together, the partners have been able to bring regional

attention to this issue and others. For example, it helped make

trafficking in women and children an agenda item for the 1997 Heads

of Government Meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC), resulting in a regional convention on the issue.

And it led to the establishment of a permanent South Asian NGO forum

to study issues of food security from an ecological perspective.

A key to the partnership has been trust. The project has demonstrated

that working in a coalition is far more effective than working alone.

The partners have also learned that maintaining trust—not always

easy—must be an ongoing process. Political clarity is important to

effective strategies, but partners must be willing to accommodate

disagreement and different perspectives.

Society Organizations and Funding inCanada,” p. 109). A strong element ofvoluntarism is also evident in the fundrais-ing and development education work ofCanadian NGOs, as well as in their gover-nance, which is often carried out by broadnetworks of regional committees andboards. The most prominent form of volun-tarism is in the work that tens of thousandsof Canadians have undertaken and continueto perform overseas, for small allowancesor local salaries and benefits. While thepurpose, duration, and nature of thistype of voluntarism has changed over thepast three decades, the number of peopleinvolved in 1999 is probably as highor higher than in 1969.

The second type of relationship, also volun-tary, is the contribution of money, muchof it raised through child sponsorship (seeBox 3). Canadian development NGOs raiseapproximately $300 million annually in theform of private donations,5 the bulk ofwhich are from individuals. In 1996, the17 largest NGOs raised close to 68 percentof all Canadian donations (World VisionCanada alone raised 26 percent of the total).The remaining 32 percent was raised by 200to 300 smaller organizations. Virtually noneof this amount is provided by foundations,and less than 0.3 percent of Canada’scorporate donations go toward internationaldevelopment (about 12 percent of whatAmerican corporations donate).6

It is clear from these figures that “compas-sion fatigue” has become an urban myth,thoughtlessly and endlessly repeated.Opinion polls and donations to NGOs showthat there is little evidence of compassionfatigue anywhere in the industrializedworld.7 In Canada, one study comparingthe private donations to 13 major NGOsbetween 1991 and 1996 found that whilesome were up and some were down, theircumulative fundraising showed a netincrease of 11.6 percent.8 This numberis supported by a Canadian Council forInternational Co-operation (CCIC) studyof 35 member agencies which revealed thatthere was an overall growth of 9.1 percentin their private resources between 1992 and1994.9 Figure 1 shows that public contribu-tions have enjoyed a steady upward trend

since the 1960s, even since the precipitousdecline of CIDA funding in the 1990s.

A myth also exists about the high level ofNGO dependency on CIDA. While the depen-dency of individual NGOs varies dramatically,total CIDA support for NGOs and NGIs(not including universities and colleges)in 1996/97 was $269 million.10 Using


BO

X3C H I L D S P O N S O R S H I P

Except for emergency appeals, child sponsorship is the most successful

long-term fundraising technique in North America, Europe, Australia,

and Japan. Globally, the number of children sponsored by three organi-

zations alone—World Vision, Foster Parents Plan, and Christian

Children’s Fund—grew from 700,000 in 1982 to 4.5 million in 1996.

Almost half of all Canadian fundraising goes to these three organiza-

tions and a fourth, Canadian Feed the Children.

Child sponsorship has been criticized because it is administratively

expensive, and if donations are used primarily for the child—as many

sponsors expect—it can skew relationships and development within

families and entire villages. Most major child sponsorship agencies have

become engaged in community development, and they have taken pains

to expand the sponsorship concept, making a connection for donors

between the child and its community. The appeal of sponsorship is,

nevertheless, the direct contact between the individual donor and recip-

ient, and it remains to be seen how far this simple and extremely effec-

tive fundraising tool can be stretched into the service of a more holistic

approach to development.

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

1966

-68

1969

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

From Government

From Individuals

Source: OECD, Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of theMembers of the Development Assistance Committee, Paris, various years.

F I G U R E 1 Canadian NGO Revenue

(US constant million dollars)

the figure of $300 million in donations fromthe Canadian public, the overall dependencyratio was about 47 percent; and, if earnedincome, in-kind, and other noncash incomewas included in the calculation, the numberwould be lower still. Studies show that allCanadian charitable organizations—domesticand international—receive approximately56 percent of their income from govern-ment.11 International development NGOsand NGIs, therefore, would appear on aver-age to depend considerably less on govern-ment than their domestic counterparts.

The third type of relationship between NGOsand the Canadian public—advocacy anddevelopment education—is more political.This work was originally based, in part, onthe adult education theories of Paulo Freire,Ivan Illich, and others, and in the creativespark provided by the first wave of returnedCUSO volunteers in the 1960s. The resultwas a network of community-based educa-tion activities which sought to link develop-ment to people’s own experiences. Throughthe 1970s and 1980s, development educa-tion was carried out by a multiplicity ofNGOs, learner centres, campaigns, andschool programs throughout the country.

By 1995, CIDA was disbursing $11 millionto approximately 100 organizations fordevelopment education work, makingCanada one of the largest supporters ofdevelopment education among the membercountries of the Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development. But devel-opment education was suffering fromdoubts among NGOs and CIDA about itseffectiveness, from financial dependenceon government, and from worries thatprograms were “talking to the converted.”In 1995, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,André Ouellette, canceled the program.It was decided that learner centres andothers focusing exclusively on developmenteducation would no longer be eligible forCIDA support. Because of their financialdependency on CIDA, many folded.

While this decision damaged a fragiledomestic development education network,CIDA encouraged NGOs with overseas programs to become more active in thefield, allowing up to 10 percent of theirCIDA allocation to be used for public

engagement. Because of overall CIDA cut-backs, however, this provision essentiallyput further pressure on a dwindlingresource. It is unlikely that more than afraction of the 10 percent provision hasbeen used for development education.

N G O S A N D T H E C A N A D I A N G O V E R N M E N T

NGOs have a political relationship with gov-ernment. CCIC, for example, has led severalcampaigns over the years to protect andimprove development assistance. Perhapsits biggest and most professional campaign—in common—was launched in 1998. Supportedby more than 100 Canadian organizations,it is based on a 10-point agenda aimedat reducing global poverty (see Chapter 4,p. 47). Publications, posters, seminars, anda website are used to engage the public anddecisionmakers on human rights, a moreequitable global economic order, sustainabledevelopment, and improved citizen participa-tion in Canada’s international policymaking.

The NGO/NGI relationship with government,however, centres first and foremost onfunding. A number of federal fundingchannels and mechanisms support a broadrange of activities:

CIDA’s responsive program: Initially themost important source of government sup-port, this program was originally designedto fund NGO projects on a matching grantbasis: it would match monies raised byNGOs from other sources on a one-to-oneor other ratio. By the early 1980s, however,the agency had moved toward multi-yearblock program grants for larger organizations.In the 1970s, CIDA began supporting NGIs,including professional institutions, tradeunions, cooperatives, community colleges,and universities, as well. Professional insti-tutions have also received support, such asthe Federation of Canadian Municipalities,the Canadian Bar Association, the CanadianNurses Association, and the CanadianInternational Immunization Programoperated by the Canadian Public HealthAssociation. In recent years, several tradeunions have begun to raise funds from theirmembership for international activities:these funds have also become eligible formatching CIDA support.


By 1995, CIDA was

disbursing $11 million to

approximately 100 organi-

zations for development

education work, making

Canada one of the largest

supporters of development

education among the

member countries of the

Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and

Development.

Special funds: In the early 1980s, CIDAbegan to take a more proactive approachto NGO funding: several special funds werecreated to encourage NGOs to move into newregions or sectors. Usually accompanied bymuch more generous matching arrangements, a dozen or more funds were established forthe Philippines, Mozambique, Cambodia,Haiti, the environment, and peacebuilding.

Country focus: A further evolution wasknown as “country focus” whereby bilateral(government-to-government) programs,which had depended almost solely on theprivate sector as suppliers, expanded theirconcept of “delivery mechanism” to includeNGOs, universities, and professional institu-tions as executing agencies. In a few cases,partnerships were encouraged betweenprofit and nonprofit institutions.

Some NGOs feared that they would be co-opted as executing agencies, losing theirindependence to the needs and demands ofbilateral programs. From the outset, however,the bulk of NGO-run country focus projectswere designed by NGOs rather than by CIDA.NGOs informally submitted their ideas; ifthey fit the objectives and strategy of thecountry program in question, they couldbe—and often were—taken seriously.Country focus thus became another respon-sive window for NGOs with the interest,skills, and experience to exploit it.

The “open bidding system”: In 1994,when an estimated 40 percent of all CIDAcontracts were awarded on a sole-sourcebasis to nonprofits—including NGOs, NGIs,and crown corporations—CIDA adopted thegovernment’s “open bidding system” (OBS).This move was prompted in part by anunwritten concern—the subject of occasionalprivate-sector complaints—that NGOs hadan unfair advantage over the business sectorbecause they do not pay taxes, are uncon-cerned about profit, and have their basiccosts subsidized by CIDA giveaways at the“responsive” window. A more fundamentalconcern for CIDA was that NGOs appearedto have taken over important parts ofCanada’s development agenda and much ofits official development assistance (ODA),and that in delegating large blocks offunding to NGOs, CIDA had lost strategicdirection on key priorities.

The accuracy of these perceptions notwith-standing, the result was a decision toreduce CIDA’s sole-sourcing dramaticallyand to put the bulk of its contracts outto tender through the government’s OBS.In an experiment started in 1997, NGOs hadfull access to the OBS, competing openlyagainst the private sector and in somecases against each other.

There is a clear and powerful trend in theevolution of the government-NGO fundingrelationship. Starting from a simple, respon-sive, hands-off matching-grant arrangement,the government gradually became moreproactive by offering higher matching ratios


BO

X4N E W C O R P O R AT E S T R U C T U R E S

New variations on the North-South partnership theme have been

developed by two organizations with a strong base in Canada, the

Aga Khan Foundation and World Vision.

• The Aga Khan Foundation actually recognizes no institutional divide

between North and South. Established in Geneva in 1967, it is a sup-

port organization for a wide range of autonomous institutions com-

prising the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). Initially

designed to benefit Ismaili communities in Asia and Africa, the net-

work has expanded its efforts to a much wider range of beneficiaries

through its hospitals, clinics, and health centres; educational institu-

tions and university; and cultural, economic, and business support

programs. Large rural development programs in India and Pakistan

have pioneered new approaches to community development and

resource mobilization, and the Aga Khan Foundation Canada has

established long-term partnerships with many independent develop-

ment efforts in both Asia and Africa. With affiliated bodies in Africa,

South and Central Asia, Europe, and North America, the AKDN has

become a unique network of alliances, with strong institutional roots

in both North and South.

• World Vision began like many other Northern relief agencies, its early

years distinguished by a strong American persona and a reputation

for assertive Christian evangelism. In the 1970s, World Vision began

to grow, spreading into new fundraising countries, adopting a devel-

opmental focus in its programming. European influences and a grad-

ual shift to encompass mainstream Christianity further transformed

the organization in the 1980s. The creation of World Vision

International was a significant structural break with the past, with

policy formed by a triennial Partnership Council made up of CEOs

from North and South and by an International Board comprising

members from legally autonomous World Vision members in both

North and South. Today, World Vision Canada is by far the largest

Canadian NGO, and—with a global income of over US$0.5 billion—

World Vision International is the biggest development NGO in the

world. It has also become virtually unique in its ability to create a

global institutional partnership, with 46 full-member World Vision

entities, 29 of them in the South.

for sectors and countries of particularinterest. Unable to design or execute effec-tive poverty reduction programs throughbilateral channels, it then encouraged NGOsto do so, funding them generously andgaining more contractual control in theprocess. Finally, through the OBS, it hasencouraged a relationship—for interestedNGOs—that is indistinguishable from itsrelationship with the private sector. Whilethe responsive program remains intact, it actsin some ways as an entitlement mechanism,with little significant change from one yearor from one organization to the next.

Key Issues for NGOsCanadian NGOs today face many challenges:professionalism, learning, evaluation andimpact; the compromises between indepen-dence and a growing trend for some towardgovernment contracting; and the complexquestion of partnership between Canadianand Southern organizations. (See Box 5 for further reading.)

P R O F E S S I O N A L I S MIn recent years, Canadian NGOs have grap-pled with the need for, and the problemsof professionalism. For some it has meantmoving away from their roots and becomingmore like business or government. But evenNGOs that have remained faithful to theirideology and constituency have had tobecome more efficient and effective becauseof reductions in government funding; thecontinuing growth and depth of povertyoverseas; and the global challenges ofenvironmental degradation, armed conflict, and gender inequity.

Professionalism in programming requires agood knowledge of individual countries andtheir governments’ policies and priorities,as well as those of bilateral agencies,commercial firms, and multilateral lendinginstitutions. Increased fundraising competi-tion and tighter government funding havemade better targeting of resources essen-tial, and have demanded clear indicationsthat funds are being put to the most pro-ductive use possible. Building improvedpublic knowledge and support on develop-ment issues also necessitates a competentanalytical and research base, and a“corporate memory” of what works andwhat does not. Both require money.

L E A R N I N G , E VA L UAT I O N ,A N D I M PAC TWhy evaluate? The first reason has to do with learning—the need to learn fromthe past to be more effective in the future.The second has to do with verificationand control. Both are important, but donoremphasis on the latter can compromise theformer. Between 1989 and 1996, CIDA’s NGODivision carried out 89 institutional assess-ments of 50 organizations at a cost of$4.7 million. Because their focus was theinstitution, however, there was little, if any, information on impact.

This omission would not be problematic ifNGOs themselves were carrying out impactassessments. Some do, although on a limitedscale. These can be thoughtful and innova-tive, and are no less critical of weaknessesthan any other. With these few exceptions,however, evaluation is not a systemic partof Canadian NGO culture. There are bothfinancial and professional reasons, includingthe difficulty of assessing social develop-ment, empowerment, and participation.Social development can be more a processthan an end in itself, further complicatingmeasurement. Nevertheless, limited impactevaluation means that evidence of NGOimpact remains largely impressionistic.12

A stress on verification, along with govern-ment management of the process, isunlikely to foster learning and knowledge.An emphasis on learning, however, couldsatisfy much of the need for verification.A focus on the end—development—willhelp to shape the most appropriate means—planning, management, and efficiency.Several British NGOs have joined togetherto set up a website (M and E News atwww.mande.co.uk) that demonstrates,through examples, case studies, and awide range of links, how this can happen.

The irony of frequent government-ledevaluations is that, while they may havecontributed to better NGO management,they may not have contributed to greaterprogramming effectiveness. In fact, in aneffort to avoid negative findings and fund-ing reductions, an NGO may well concealfailure, reduce risk, and/or undertake activi-ties that conform to the funding agency’sidea of good development. This can stuntlearning, initiative, and independence.


W H O PAY S ?

One of the greatest difficulties for NGOs,both North and South, is the idea thatdevelopment and professionalism areinexpensive. In its responsive NGO funding,CIDA will contribute up to 7.5 percenttoward administrative costs. For most NGOs,however, this amount represents far less thanhalf the cost of managing an institution,carrying out overseas programming, andsupporting a domestic base and a capacityfor learning.13 The problem is compoundedby NGO publicity which has led the Canadianpublic to believe that inordinately largeamounts of their donations will reach thedeveloping-country beneficiary directly. Theresult is a widely played “game” in whichoverheads are parceled out on paper toprojects and field activities, or are soreduced that professionalism and impact arecompromised. There is a toxic disjuncturebetween the donor desire for tiny overheadsand the demand for professionalism. Aslong as low overheads—part myth and partnecessity—prevail, NGOs will be threatenedby, and caught between, competingdemands that can never be satisfied.

S E R V I C E D E L I V E R Y O R C I V I LS O C I E T Y ?

Much has been written about the gradualtransformation of voluntary organizationsinto “public service contractors”—organiza-tions that behave more like nonprofit businesses than organizations offeringCanadians an opportunity to organizearound, and act upon, shared views.14

Certainly the progression of governmentfunding from a responsive approach to one based on competitive contracting has contributed to this transformation.

Voluntary organizations traditionally formedfor two reasons: service provision; andchange and reform. For example, anorganization working with developmentallychallenged children provides services forthem, but is also concerned about theirrights, their role in society, and the lawsthat serve and protect them. The greaterthe dependency on government and themore the funding relationship is basedon a contractual compensation for service,the more an NGO is likely to modify—oreven lose its voice—and, therefore, itsclaim for a place in civil society. There is a

deep irony here because Western policymakershave gone to great lengths in the pastdecade to create and strengthen indepen-dent civil society institutions in the Southand in Eastern Europe—independent media,professional associations, human rightsand other advocacy groups, and voluntaryassociations. At home, however, becauseof the way government funds them, manyNGOs are increasingly—and all too willingly—tied up in contracts and relationshipswhich place little value on flexibility,independence, and advocacy.

Today’s NGO may well be highly professionalwhere its service mandate is concerned, butmandates related to change and reform areincreasingly prone to self-censorship andfinancial starvation. This is a real and pre-sent danger for Canadian NGOs, and is likelyto be more problematic for Southern NGOsif they move from a Northern NGO supportbase to a direct funding relationship withNorthern governments.

N O R T H - S O U T H PA R T N E R S H I P SMany Northern governments fund SouthernNGOs directly, cutting out the “expensive”Northern NGO intermediary. Many see thisas a sign that the days of the Northern NGOare numbered. Where the North-South NGOrelationship is based primarily on funding,this could be valid, although there may wellbe a qualitative difference between whata Northern NGO and a Northern governmentwould support.15 That question aside, itmight not be in the best interest of devel-


BO

X5F U R T H E R R E A D I N G

Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Profiling Development

Practice: Innovation in Canadian International NGOs (Ottawa: CCIC, 1997).

Alan Fowler, Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness

of NGOs in International Development (London: Earthscan, 1997).

Lynne Hately and Kamal Malhotra, Between Rhetoric and Reality: Essays

on Partnership in Development (Ottawa: The North-South Institute,

1997).

David Hulme and Michael Edwards, eds, Beyond the Magic Bullet;

NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (West

Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1996).

David Hulme and Michael Edwards, eds, NGOs, States and Donors: Too

Close for Comfort? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire—Non-Profit

Organizations and International Development (Ottawa: IDRC, 1995).

opment for Southern NGOs to bid theirNorthern counterparts farewell too quickly.Many understand that development writlarge will not occur solely on the basisof aid, or projects, or the work of NGOs.These can help, but they are not enough.

Much of the answer to global developmentlies in the willingness of Northern govern-ments to bargain constructively with theSouth on trade, commodity prices, naturalresource exploitation, pollution, and con-sumption patterns. Northern governmentswill do this only if meaningful public sup-port—currently lacking—can be generated.This support could be generated by the mediaor the school system, but so far, so bad.It could be generated by Northern NGOs,but to do so they will need serious proddingand support from the South, and possiblythe courage to confront their governmentbenefactors with difficult messages.

This suggests a need to change the North-South NGO relationship into one that cantranscend money. Northern and SouthernNGOs do not have to eschew projects ormoney, but their relationships will haveto go further. This is already being doneby new organizations based in the South—Social Watch in Uruguay, Focus on theGlobal South in Thailand, and the ThirdWorld Network based in Malaysia, for instance.Taking it to the next stage, drawing themainstream Canadian NGO movement intothis new approach, will be one of theprimary challenges of the new century.

NOTES

A note on sources: Unless otherwise noted, statisticson Canadian NGOs, child sponsorship, and CIDA fundinghave been drawn from original research conducted by theauthor for Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships forInternational Development, Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich,eds, (London: Earthscan, 1999). Figures on corporate andfoundation giving are drawn from the Canadian Centrefor Philanthropy’s “Charity Facts 1993,” Toronto, 1993and Portrait of Canada’s Charities, Toronto, 1994. Thenote on World Vision is based on Alan Whaites, “PursuingPartnership: World Vision and the Ideology of Development,”World Vision UK, 1998.

1 Even this distinction is not clear. Originally, CIDA neededto divide the responsibilities of its Special ProgramsBranch more or less evenly between two Directors General.One section dealt with ordinary NGOs, the other withinstitutions for which development was not the primaryagenda and which did not have a significant fundraisingcapacity. Because this second division would have beensignificantly smaller than the first, however, all the volunteer-sending NGOs were added to it. Thus CIDA’s definitionof an NGI—and all the statistical data that goes withthe definition—is quite different from definitions usedby CCIC and by NGOs themselves.

2 These 1996/97 figures, compiled by Brian Tomlinson ina September 1998 CCIC paper, “Canadian International

Cooperation NGOs: Trends in the 1990s,” represent CIDAallocations to NGOs and NGIs (excluding universities)by geographic area, rather than NGOs’ total spending,and should therefore be seen as approximate. Tomlinson,“Canadian International Cooperation NGOs: Trends inthe 1990s,” (Ottawa: CCIC, 1998), mimeo, pp. 3-5.

3 Tomlinson, “Canadian International Cooperation NGOs:Trends in the 1990s,” p. 6.

4 For example, in 1997 the OECD issued a comprehensiveset of DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and DevelopmentCo-operation, and more than 130 NGOs signed the Codeof Conduct in Disaster Relief developed in 1994 by theInternational Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.There is an ongoing project to expand this code to includespecific programming standards. Information on this“Sphere Project” is available on the InternationalRed Cross website (www.ifrc.org).

5 This figure is based on the total private donor incomerecorded in the 1995 CCIC’s Who’s Who in InternationalDevelopment, adjusted downward by $35 million that wasincorrectly included by IISD, CUSO, CESO, CECI, and CWY,and upward by $49 million to include two large organiza-tions not counted, AKFC and the Canadian Red Cross.Most environmental organizations are not included,but most church organizations and UNICEF are.

6 Sources for this calculation are: the Canadian Centre forPhilanthropy; the Conference Board of Canada; S. Wong,“Corporate Philanthropy: Overview of Current Trends.”Chronicle of Philanthropy, December 1995; and theConference Board of the United States, “Corporate GivingStrategies that Add Business Value,” 1995. Estimates forthe whole of the voluntary sector are included in thesection, “Civil Society Organizations and Funding inCanada,” p. 109 of this volume.

7 The myth of compassion fatigue was extensively addressedin Colm Foy and Henny Helmich, eds, Public Support forInternational Development (Paris: OECD, 1996). See alsoIan Smillie and Henny Helmich, eds, Public Attitudesand Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1998).

8 Ian Smillie, “Optical and Other Illusions,” in Smillieand Helmich, eds, Public Attitudes and DevelopmentCooperation, p. 25

9 Tomlinson, “Canadian International Cooperation NGOs:Trends in the 1990s,” p. 18.

10 Ibid.

11 These numbers are roughly in line with those presentedfor the CSOs sampled in the section on “Civil SocietyOrganizations and Funding in Canada.”

12 Ian Smillie and Brian Rowe, NGO Evaluation SynthesisStudy, Performance Review Division, CIDA, 1997. Thesefindings were not unlike the findings in a 12-countryreview, Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO EvaluationSynthesis Study. Report Prepared for the OECD/DAC ExpertGroup on Evaluation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Finland, 1997.

13 The Tomlinson study examined the annual reports of35 CCIC member agencies and found that, on average,administration, governance, and fundraising costs totaledonly 12.4 percent of total expenditure. In the absence ofany agreed criteria on NGO accounting practices, however,the author contends that real administrative costs aresignificantly higher than those contained in mostpublished NGO annual reports.

14 Hulme and Edwards, Fowler, and Smillie all dealextensively with this issue.

15 While much has been written in the North on partnership,Southern views are not well documented. One studywhich reflects some of the Southern NGOs’ concernswith Northern NGOs (and Northern governments) is“Perspectives From the South: A Study on Partnership,”by Dennis Muchunguzi and Scott Milne (mimeo, studysponsored by CIDA, 1995). See also Honor Ford-Smith,Ring Ding in a Tight Corner: A Case Study in Fundingand Organizational Democracy in Sistren, 1977-88(Toronto: International Council for Adult Education, 1989);and Lynne Hately and Kamal Malhotra, Between Rhetoricand Reality: Essays on Partnership in Development(Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1997).


A SHARED ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE

F a r i s A h m e d

F a r i s A h m e d i s D i r e c t o r , I n f o r m a t i o n

a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s f o r t h e M i c r o n u t r i e n t s

I n i t i a t i v e a t t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l

D e v e l o p m e n t R e s e a r c h C e n t r e .

C H A P T E R

T H R E E

A vibrant community of voluntary associa-tions, nongovernmental organizations,student activists, scientists, researchers,professionals, and citizens’ committeesmake up Canadian environmental civilsociety (see Box 1). In their level of knowledge, and in the scope of their activities, Canadian environmental organizations now span the globe. Theyhave successfully broadened the boundariesof action on environmental and develop-ment issues at the local and the interna-tional level, in their campaigns and throughpolicy dialogue, in working with and learn-ing from environmental groups in theSouth, in global treaty negotiations, and in multilateral conferences. As they havedepended minimally on governments forfunding, they have had considerable success in keeping their voice vigilant and independent.

However, civil society organizations workingon environmental issues still face seriouschallenges: although the issues of environ-ment, development, and poverty havebecome increasingly part of the publicdomain, they are still not firmly on theagenda of policymakers. The work hasbecome more complex, and the challengesmore difficult, as signaled by daily urgentthreats to the environment: rapid climatechange, the global collapse of fisheries,deforestation, and erosion of the earth’sproductive land. With more global informa-tion, more sophisticated tasks, less time,and limited resources, environmental groupsface arduous struggles. There remainsa great need to work more effectively, atthe local as well as the international level,and to be more creative and collaborativein involving citizens, media, and decision-makers in meeting these shared environ-mental challenges.

ndowed with oceans, temperate rainforests, prairie

grasslands, freshwater lakes, arctic glaciers, and several

mountain ranges, Canada has an immense diversity of natural resources

and ecosystems. It is not surprising that some say “environmentalism”

is a core Canadian value, shaping our attitudes toward our own

country as well as those to the South. Canadians, however, are

increasingly starting to view the environment not only as a shared

heritage, but as a shared global challenge.

“There will be little nature

without justice and little

justice without nature.”

Smitu Kothari and Pramod

Parajuli in Wolfgang

Sachs, ed., Global Ecology:

A New Arena of Political

Conflict (London: Zed

Books, 1995), p. 237.


A SHARED ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE

E

Canadian EnvironmentalistsLook SouthCanadian involvement in internationalenvironmental issues matured in the 1970s,following Canada’s heightened interest ininternational affairs and development. Thisenthusiasm was a function of the Pearsonyears and the energy of activists and“Flower Power Canadian style” blossomedin the 1970s as environmental activistsstarted to gain prominence on the CanadianNGO landscape—Elizabeth May, Pat Mooney,Janine Ferretti, Julia Langer, and others.In 1971, a landmark was reached when afew Canadians and Americans, concernedabout American nuclear testing in the SouthPacific, formed Greenpeace in Vancouver.The watershed, however, was the 1972Stockholm Conference on the HumanEnvironment, the first United Nationsconference to have an NGO forum (chairedby Canadian Maurice Strong), in whichCanadian involvement had a lasting impacton a fledgling environmental movementworldwide.

A series of events further galvanizedCanadian environmentalists in the 1970sand 1980s. Civil society organizations(CSOs) rallied to raise awareness of nucleartesting (in particular, French and Americantesting of nuclear weapons in the SouthPacific), toxic spills (such as the ExxonValdez in Alaska, the pollution of LoveCanal in New York State, leakage from theChernobyl nuclear plant in the Ukraine, andthe Union Carbide spill in Bhopal, India),and large “development” projects in Canadaand overseas (such as the James BayHydroelectric project and the NarmadaDam in India). Public awareness andenvironmental literacy grew as enhancedcommunication facilities allowed NGOs toexchange information and develop linkswith like-minded groups in the South.The experiences of other environmental-ists—such as the Greens of Europe andthe Chipko movement in the Himalayas—informed activists’ views and tactics inCanada. Public knowledge and concern grewover the clear-cutting of rainforests in theAmazon, Sarawak, and British Columbia;desertification and the loss of biodiversity

in sub-Saharan Africa; the destructiveimpact of overfishing worldwide; and thealarming global consequences of industrialpollution, such as acid rain and ozonedepletion.

C H A P T E R T H R E E A S H A R E D E N V I R O N M E N T A L C H A L L E N G E 31

BO

X1W H O A R E T H E E N G O S ?

Environmental nongovernmental organizations encompass a wide

variety of groups of different size, engaged in a range of activities.

They include:

Nature conservation groups: National groups such as the Canadian

Nature Federation, Ducks Unlimited, and the Canadian Wildlife

Federation focus primarily on natural resources in Canada, but are

increasingly involved in global issues. They are some of the largest

ENGOs in Canada.

Larger international environmental groups: World Wildlife Fund of

Canada, Greenpeace Canada, Sierra Club of Canada, and Friends of the

Earth Canada, international in origin, are now firmly Canadian. Their

varied activities include projects in the North and South, national

awareness campaigns, advocacy, fundraising, and political lobbying.

Legal environmental groups: The Canadian Environmental Law

Association (CELA), Canadian Institute for Environmental Law

and Policy (CIELAP), Sierra Legal Defence Fund, and West Coast

Environmental Law Association carry out research, litigation, and

policy work on international and domestic environmental issues.

National and/or regional institutes such as the International

Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Conservation Council

of New Brunswick, David Suzuki Foundation, and Falls Brook Centre

(New Brunswick) also undertake research and public education on

global environmental issues.

Activist groups such as the Toronto Environmental Alliance, Ecology

Action Centre (Halifax), Probe International, and Public Interest

Research Groups (PIRGs) across Canada carry out international and

local campaigns.

Issue-focused groups such as Pollution Probe, Ocean Voice

International, and Nuclear Awareness Project formed around domestic

issues, but now also work on international issues. So do local groups

such as Western Canada Wilderness Committee; Friends of Clayoquot

Sound; and native groups such as the Grand Council of the Cree in

James Bay, Innu of Labrador, and the Nisga’a in BC.

Consulting groups that offer expertise on environmental issues, appro-

priate technology, etc., also undertake education and policy advocacy.

The Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development (Alberta) is one

of them.

National and regional coalitions of Canadian associations working

on a variety of environmental issues also often act as coordinating

and funding organizations. They include the Canadian Environmental

Network, Nova Scotia Environmental Network, and Réseau québécois

des groupes écologistes.

The Rise and Fall of Sustainable DevelopmentTwenty years after Stockholm, Canadianswere again prominent at the 1992 UNConference on Environment and Develop-ment (UNCED; also known as the EarthSummit) in Rio de Janeiro. Almost 1,500development and environment NGOs partici-pated in the NGO Forum, a significant eventin the history of international conferences.For NGO as well as government participants,Rio was instrumental in making conceptuallinks between ecology, poverty, humanrights, and social justice issues. It wasalso a pivotal opportunity for civil societyorganizations to connect with each other.Environment and development issues wererephrased as “sustainable development,”recognizing that true economic andsocial development cannot occur withoutenvironmental conservation.

In Canada, Rio galvanized activists, NGOs,and policymakers, bringing together devel-opment and environmental groups thathad earlier existed largely within their own solitudes. The Government of Canadacreated the Winnipeg-based InternationalInstitute for Sustainable Development(IISD), and environmental awarenessthroughout the country reached new heightswith education programs, solidarity withSouthern groups, policy initiatives, actioncampaigns, and conferences. Moreover, theEarth Day movement, started in the 1960s,penetrated the Canadian mainstream.

The Rio process also accelerated thephenomenal growth of NGOs, ENGOs(environmental NGOs), and other CSOsworking on environmental issues worldwide.A dramatic increase in funding for environ-mental projects led to the creation ofnational vehicles in Canada for consultation(for example, national and provincial round-tables on the environment and economy;the Environment and Development SupportProgram), as well as opening the door forNGO-government cooperation (for example,in biodiversity and ozone depletion workinggroups). Internationally, NGOs playedsignificant roles in the formulation andimplementation of Agenda 21, as well asseveral parallel processes in treaty-making,environmental policy, and advocacy.

But with cooperation also came the risk ofco-optation. The availability of funds alsoled to opportunism, creating NGO eco-cratsand managers: “In the belief that they werewinning ground inch by inch, they failedto notice that they were becoming part ofthe system,” claims Swiss ecologist MathiasFinger.1 Governments around the worldfailed to live up to the promises of Rio,and civil society organizations, deliriouswith all the post-Rio activity, graduallylost their ability to criticize and hold themaccountable. Finally, the economic downturnknocked the wind out of the environmentalmovement, as public concern shifted toissues of debt and deficit reduction.

Canadian NGOs, for their part, won a greatdeal of recognition as strong policy playersglobally, helping shape a variety of interna-tional agreements and processes. At home,however, they have been given less credi-bility, and have had less success shapingenvironmental policies in Canada. In a1998 Report to the House of Commons,Environment and Sustainable DevelopmentCommissioner Brian Emmett observed thatCanada has devoted considerable time andeffort to developing international environ-mental agreements, often playing a leadingrole. Yet, putting environmental commit-ments into effect requires that “sufficienttime and effort be directed towards trans-lating them into meaningful action at homeand abroad.”2 There is still much to do.

The Current LandscapeThe Green List, a directory of Canadianenvironmental groups, includes an impressivearray of 1,300 associations, NGOs, andnetworks, a large percentage of whom have links with environmental groups inthe South.3 Canadian civil society organiza-tions have come a long way, becoming more sophisticated in their scope, thinking,and tactics (see Box 2). As environmentalgroups have evolved, they have confrontedcritical issues and dilemmas—in theireducation of the public, in their advocacy,and in their partnerships with Southernorganizations. Some of these issues arediscussed on the following pages; eachis illustrated by a current example.


“As of 1998, Canada is a

party to or has endorsed

over 230 binding interna-

tional agreements and

non-binding instruments

on the environment... [it]

does not have an overall

picture of how good a job

it is doing at meeting its

international obligations:

where it has been success-

ful; what gaps remain;

what lessons have

been learned.”

Brian Emmett,

Commissioner,

Environment and

Sustainable

Development

I S S U E 1 :T H E G U L F B E T W E E N E N V I R O N M E N T A N D D E V E L O P M E N T

The 1987 Brundtland Commission Report,Our Common Future, the Earth Summit, andother events in the last decade may havehelped build conceptual bridges betweenCanadian environmental and developmentorganizations, but a gulf still remains.Environmental groups think, act, and some-times even relate to their Southern partnersdifferently than do development NGOs.With a diversity of mandates, workingphilosophies, and structures, these differ-ences are inevitable. Many conservation ornature-oriented groups have a good under-standing of the scientific and ecologicalaspects of an issue, for example, but lack—or are unwilling to develop—a social justiceanalysis. Development and social justiceorganizations, conversely, may see thingsin terms of poverty, rights, and humandevelopment, but don’t always make thelink with environmental issues—for example,in the case of climate change. This gulfhas historically inhibited collaborationand inter-sectoral learning betweenthese groups.

Gone f ishin ’ b luesThe issue of industrial aquaculture andfisheries demonstrates the long-standinggulf between environment and develop-ment—and how the current debate isevolving to bridge this gap in a small way.In Canada, as well as in Asia and LatinAmerica, industrial fishing and intensiveaquaculture have taken a devastating toll,not only on natural resources but on thelivelihoods of fishers and farmers as well.Canadian action on commercial shrimpfarming and its destructive environmentaland social impacts was initiated by InterPares, CUSO, and the Sierra Club of Canadaat the request of their Southern partners,including Nijera Kori (Bangladesh) andthe Consumers’ Association of Penang(Malaysia). The global campaign alsoincludes such diverse groups as the Mangrove Action Project, the EnvironmentalDefense Fund (US), Christian Aid (UK), andAcción Ecologica (Ecuador). The campaignhas resonated strongly with coastal activistsin Canada, particularly small fishers from

BC and the Maritimes where overfishingand salmon aquaculture are causing similarproblems.

In October 1997, the groups came togetherto form the Industrial Shrimp ActionNetwork (ISA-Net), a global network ofenvironmental groups, development NGOs,scientists, farmers, and fisheries activistsconcerned about industrial fishing andaquaculture: the destruction of mangroveforests, the pollution of coastal waters andresulting loss of fishstocks, the depletionof biodiversity and endangered species, andthe loss of land and livelihoods for coastalpeople around the world. Working witha diverse set of issues and a broad baseof actors has strengthened the campaignto make commercial aquaculture a morecompelling issue for opinion formers,decisionmakers, and the general public.


BO

X2S T R AT E G I E S F O R C H A N G E

Canadian environmental groups employ a number of strategies to alert

and educate the public, expose and change harmful environmental prac-

tices, and influence government and corporate policies. They include:

• Direct action, such as dramatic acts of public protest for conservation

and awareness-raising of issues like clear-cutting, and carrying out

peaceful blockades of access roads and ports.

• Urgent action alerts and e-mail campaigns to inform the public and

NGOs of new threats to local ecology.

• International boycotts to urge the public not to buy goods whose

production has negative consequences on ecology or nature.

• Door-to-door canvassing to raise citizens’ awareness of and participa-

tion in environmental issues, as well as to raise funds and membership.

• Issuing report cards grading government performance on the

environment, highlighting consistent failures and the lack of

political will and accountability.

• Movement for legal redress by filing cases and setting national

precedents in environmental protection.

• Policy advocacy at the national and multilateral level to influence

multilateral agreements and change or block international trade

negotiations.

• Corporate engagement to market products that are not harmful

to the environment or that encourage its protection (certification

of products, endorsing “green labels”).

• Eco-entrepreneurship to provide services in environmental conservation,

design, alternative energy, recycling, and community development.

• Eco-tourism to promote public awareness and responsibility in

conservation by creating excursions of ecologically interesting sites.

• “Just doin’ it” or “advocacy-by-demonstration” and community

conservation campaigns.

I S S U E 2 :W E H AV E T O S TA R T AT H O M E

Canadians received a jolt when Europeanenvironmental groups began to organizeboycotts of lumber clear-cut from BritishColumbia’s forests. Canadians were moreused to making pronouncements aboutother people’s treatment of their naturalresources. With stronger connections withenvironmental groups worldwide, Canadianorganizations that had focused on theSouth are now integrating domestic concernsinto their work. Their message now is thatold-growth forests in Canada have to bepreserved at the same time as those inBrazil or Borneo (the example presentedbelow); that outrage has to be expressedabout the toxic pollution of our own watersas well as those in Asia; and that soil andbiodiversity erosion has to be highlightedin Canada as well as in sub-Saharan Africa.

Branching out: Linking forestryissues North and SouthCanadian environmental action on old-growth forests now embraces the philosophyof starting at home while working onSouthern issues. In British Columbia,for example, groups such as Friends ofClayoquot Sound, Greenpeace, WesternCanada Wilderness Committee, nativeenvironmental groups, and internationaland Southern NGOs are working togetherand speaking out about Canadian environ-mental policy, the destruction of BC forests

due to clear-cutting, and the violation ofIndigenous peoples’ rights. Forestry groupshave demonstrated that using internationalleverage is at times more effective thanraising voices at home. They have beenparticularly effective in two such arenas:policy advocacy at the international level;and using the export sector as leverage toput pressure on corporations in Canada.

The forestry campaign has dealt with issuesthat are critical in the South but also havea direct domestic link. Canadian NGOs suchas the Sierra Club of Canada have beenvigilant in exposing Southern governments’failure to protect the rainforests of theAmazon and Sarawak, while advocatingstrongly in Canada for the creation of more national parks and adherence to a comprehensive Forest Practices Code.

I S S U E 3 :B E YO N D B E L L R I N G I N G

Environmental groups, North and South, long used to playing the role of bellringers,have been among the first CSOs to embracemedia such as television and the internet,and use them effectively to promote envi-ronmental awareness. Thanks to more thanthree decades of awareness-raising andinstant access to environmental informa-tion, this work is largely done: public envi-ronmental literacy is high (see Box 3). Butsuccess carries its own danger, notably thatof “eco-fatigue” in a public tired of hearingthe alarms and the doomsday messages.

Opinion polls show that Canadians are muchmore amenable to environmental awarenessand action if the message includes informa-tion about both the problem and the possi-ble solution (including individual action).4“It’s no longer enough to sound the alarm,”says Jeanne Moffat of Greenpeace Canada,“we now have to work more and moretoward solutions.”5 The task now facingCSOs is not only to remain vigilant, but alsoto offer viable alternatives that will involvethe public, engage opinion leaders anddecisionmakers, broaden the support forsustainable development, and preserve theenvironment. One element that has beenabsent from the “solutions” side of the picture is the private sector.


BO

X3 G L O B A L P U B L I C D E M A N D S AC T I O N

“Citizens around the world are more concerned today about environ-

mental problems than they were five years ago,” concludes a 1997

Environics survey of environmental views in 24 countries. “There is

a new greenwave happening,” says Angus McAllister of Environics

International, “a new surge of anxiety over the environment.”

Canadians are much more concerned about environmental issues now

than they were in 1992—largely due to increased health concerns and

a sense of “breached trust” and a poor government record on issues

such as pollution and environmental protection. According to

Environics, 73 percent of Canadians believe that environmental protec-

tion is more important than economic growth, and they are “sharply

critical of government and industry inaction.” A majority of people in

17 countries (including 61 percent of Canadians) believe that environ-

mental problems affect their health, says McAllister.

Source

Angus McAllister, Environics International, interviewed by the author on July 19, 1998.

“We have to meet compa-

nies not only in the

woods, but in the market-

place as well.”

Jeanne Moffat,

Greenpeace Canada

Green on the outside: Involving the private sector“The market moves faster than the politi-cians,” says Charles Cray of Greenpeace.6There is general agreement among environ-mental organizations that working selec-tively with the private sector is a necessaryand viable strategy for preserving the envi-ronment. For example, Macmillan Bloedel’srecent decision to log selectively and phaseout clear-cutting is a major step forward.“We’ve been pushing companies on theground, and pushing them in the market-place,” says Moffat of Greenpeace, nowstarting a major campaign on the Amazonrainforest.7 However, as NGOs associate theprivate sector with the problem rather thanthe solution, caution is still the prevalentstrategy: “When getting involved in thecertification of a product as ‘environmentallyfriendly,’ for example, we really need toknow that this is better for the environment,”says Jane Inch of the Canadian EnvironmentalNetwork (CEN). “We also have to anticipateand avoid secondary and long-term conse-quences; for instance, what will be thelong-term impact of logging selectively,or how could our actions here hurtSouthern producers?”8

In addition to partnerships with the privatesector, community green initiatives such asorganic agriculture and food cooperatives—often initiated by ECSOs—are also takingoff. Sales of organic foods have grown20 percent annually in recent years, and in1997 exceeded $5 billion.9 Many initiativesare linked to organic cooperatives and fairtrade organizations in the South, and havethe multiple benefits of educating andengaging the consumer in environmentalaction while providing financial supportand solidarity for producers. Green smallbusinesses in Canada, such as energy servicecompanies, are having the same effect.“The key is that local environmental initia-tives are good for the local economy—they create jobs,” says environment writerWayne Roberts, a founding member of theCoalition for a Green Economic Recovery.10

I S S U E 4 :T H E N E E D F O R S O P H I S T I C AT E D , K N O W L E D G E - B A S E D AC T I V I S M

Environmental activism has come a longway since the early days of Greenpeace.

Trade liberalization, international UNprocesses, and an ever-increasing body ofmultilateral agreements mean that environ-mentalists are faced with diverse, complexissues. The ability to analyze and critiqueinternational agreements requires experi-ence, specialized knowledge, and long-termmemory. “It takes a decade to developcapacity around policy analysis of tradeagreements,” says Ken Traynor of theCanadian Environmental Law Association(CELA). “We were able to fight theMultilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)precisely because we had the experienceof NAFTA and the WTO.”11 Building thiscapacity is a critical challenge for NGOs.“Sometimes we need people like CELA toact as mediators, to demystify the élitistlanguage spoken at higher levels,” saysCEN’s Jane Inch.

Trade l iberal ization and theenvironmentRivers, lakes, clean air, delicate ecosystems,and biodiversity are often in danger ofbeing traded along with goods and servicesas part of trade agreements. CELA assertsthat “a wholesale shift in jurisdiction overenvironmental and health regulations hasoccurred through the establishment of theglobalized free trade regimes. Trade lawrequirements, international standard-settingbodies, and secret dispute processes nowconstitute powerful barriers confrontinggovernments considering public interestmeasures.”12 International trade negotia-tions have continued to erode nationalgovernments’ autonomy over standards ofsustainable human development, bringingthem to their lowest common denominator.

Among the more useful things to come outof the 1995 G-7 meetings in Halifax was theHalifax Initiative, a coalition of CanadianNGOs which advocates for reform of theBretton Woods institutions and for a haltto the destructive environmental and socialimpacts of structural adjustment programs.Members include CUSO, the Inter-ChurchCoalition on Africa, the Social JusticeCommittee of Montreal, OXFAM Canada, the Sierra Club of Canada, and the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operation. TheHalifax Initiative has played an importantrole in demystifying issues of international


debt and financial flows, linking them tosustainable development and livelihood issues.

I S S U E 5 :T H E L AC K O F P O L I T I C A L W I L L

NGOs have sounded the alarms, and recentpolls clearly show that the public is bothaware and concerned about the environ-ment. The Canadian government has madehundreds of international commitments onthe environment. Though there is no lackof ideas and viable alternatives, actionhas yet to follow.

The problem is a lack of political will andthe dearth of public participation in policy-making. Although a small group is active inpolicy dialogue, the average citizen is lessable to participate, says Paul Muldoon ofCELA.13 The challenge for NGOs and govern-ments is to set forth a broader agendawhich allows for greater participation—especially on issues such as internationalfinance, trade, and climate change. Bycreating sufficient national pressure, CSOs should be holding politicians moreaccountable. Lois Corbett of the TorontoEnvironmental Alliance (TEA) argues thatNGOs have had more success when theyhave broadened the avenues for direct par-ticipation—working at the municipal levelto implement traffic regulations to restrictemission, forging relationships betweenactivists and local officials to enforce pollution by-laws, and encouraging citizens’ stewardship of local resources.

Creating a c l imate of changeThe January 1998 ice storm in CentralCanada gave Canadians a glimpse of thealarming ways in which global climatechange could affect everyone. That samewinter, Canadian NGOs were pushingstrongly for commitments at the KyotoConference on the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).Although Canada made a binding commit-ment to reducing greenhouse gases by6 percent below 1990 levels, the prospectsof achieving this small target are bleak,given recent poor performance. Climate-watcher Gary Gallon estimates that, per capita,Canada spends less than half of what theUS does on environmental protection.14

Environmentalists are not hopeful about thecurrent process on climate change: “The

current process will not work; it is designednot to work,” says David Runnalls of the IISD.It is too bureaucratic, too process-oriented,and doesn’t address the real issues.15

The government has evaded scrutiny onclimate change because it is a relatively newissue for CSOs. Much of the work on climatechange has been through the Climate ActionNetwork, a global network of researchersand activists that includes Canadian groupssuch as the Pembina Institute, the SierraClub of Canada, Greenpeace, and the DavidSuzuki Foundation. According to RobertHornung of the Pembina Institute, the net-work has successfully raised climate changeissues at the national and internationallevel, “but the issue now is political will.”In Canada, success has been achievedat the municipal level by action anddemonstration, says Hornung.16

I S S U E 6 :D O I N G M O R E W I T H L E S S ?

Repeated budget cuts by governmentagencies over the past decade have meantthat many small nonprofit organizationshave been forced to shrink or close. Asenvironmental issues become more urgent,the fight is getting harder, and as NGOssearch for more funding opportunities, theyare being distracted from the work at hand:educating and advocating for change.

ENGOs in Canada have traditionally tried tominimize their dependence on governmentfunds. In an era of austerity, this indepen-dence is turning out to be crucial: as thelarger ENGOs become increasingly occupiedwith fundraising or signing agreements withlarge donors, they may find their traditionaladvocacy role restrained. Smaller groupssuch as student organizations and anti-poverty groups have become vital sincethey are more likely to confront policy-makers and companies, and are more proneto engage in “political” advocacy. They alsooften have a committed core of volunteerswho can be highly effective in mobilizingpublic opinion.

Against mega-projects : Activism and the PIRGsStudent activism is a vibrant part ofCanadian civil society, and has often playeda leadership role in bringing ecological


“Our tragedy lies in the

richness of the available

alternatives, and in the

fact that so few of them

are ever seriously

explored.”

Tom Athanasiou,

Divided Planet:

The Ecology of Rich

and Poor (Athens:

University of Georgia

Press, 1996), p. 307.

problems to the fore. This is true of thePublic Interest Research Groups (PIRGs)which have existed on Canadian campusesfor 25 years. According to student activistsKaren Farbridge and Peter Cameron, “thesuccess of PIRGs as a model of youth par-ticipation has been their ability to balanceprocess with goals, training with activism.Students haven’t just talked about theenvironmental problems of incineration.They have stopped incineration in theircommunities. Students haven’t just researchedthe degradation of river habitat. They havecleaned up rivers and planted trees.”17

Since the first PIRG was created in 1972after an inspiring speech by consumeractivist Ralph Nader at the University ofWaterloo, they have carried out pioneeringwork on James Bay in Quebec, the NarmadaDam in India, the Three Gorges Dam inChina, and have exposed Canadian corporateinvolvement in Burma. Through a varietyof tactics—direct action, boycotts, andinvestigative research—PIRGs have influ-enced public opinion about many seriousenvironmental disasters that could haveescaped major public scrutiny.

Looking Ahead: A Shared Environmental ChallengeProspects for the global environmentare bleak. For example, some 13 millionhectares of forest (approximately the sizeof Nepal) are cut or burned each year,and desertification affects a quarter of theearth’s land area. Almost 60 percent ofglobal fish stocks are near exhaustion.18

At the base of these daunting problems isthe North’s affluent lifestyle. The challengeis therefore political: changing standardsof living, helping the South develop andpay for new technology, and reducing thedisproportionate impact of environmentaldegradation on the poor. Increasingly,Canadian CSOs are realizing the need totackle issues such as consumerism at home—and the tough issues and choices involved.As TEA’s Corbett points out: “Even if we doget stricter emission controls, it still doesn’taddress the issue that there are more andmore cars on the road. It’s important tomake links on urban pollution betweenToronto and Mexico City, but we have toaddress the consumption side here as well.”19

Another debate centres on the notion ofsustainable development itself. Originallyintended to foster debate on the environ-ment, development, and poverty, the termhas now lost much of its meaning. Criticscharge that the term, used frequentlyby industry and governments, places farmore emphasis on “development” than on“sustainable,” thus legitimizing continuedeconomic growth under the cloak ofsustainability.20 Ecological economists suchas Herman Daly argue that true sustainabledevelopment can and must take placewithout economic growth, within the carry-ing capacity of local communities, and yetbring about qualitative change and therealization of human potential. He arguesthat “Sustainable development, develop-ment without growth, does not imply theend of economics—if anything, economicsbecomes even more important. But it is asubtle and complex economics of mainte-nance, qualitative improvement, sharing,frugality, and adaptation to natural limits.It is an economics of better, not bigger.”21

Others, such as David Runnalls, say thisview is “anti-development” and overlypessimistic and, like the BrundtlandCommission, feel that sustainable develop-ment is possible with adjustments inlifestyle, consumption, and more eco-efficient production.22

What does this mean for the work ofCanadians trying to make global change?ENGOs have realized some important suc-cesses in their 30-40 years of existence:they are now part of a vibrant global envi-ronmental community; they have forgedalliances with and learned from Southernenvironmental groups; and they havebecome a significant force in global envi-ronmental debates and policy dialogue.Studies indicate that they have had animpact—environmental literacy in Canada ishigh, and there are strong pockets of aware-ness and action throughout Canada. In thelate 1990s, the environment is again apriority as Canadians start to link their ownhealth to that of the environment.23 Finally,as government support has dwindled,citizens have stepped up their actions andvolunteer participation, and donations tocivil society organizations have risen across


the country. But this has yet to translateinto real change in government policy.

Arguably, the most powerful moments inenvironmental and social activism havebeen the rallying of CSOs in the North andSouth to expose and confront the agendas ofgovernments or transnational corporations—as was the case with the recent movementagainst the MAI. It may well be that, asfunding to mainstream NGOs becomes evermore precarious, community groups willtake up this challenge with renewed vigour.Perhaps, as Ugandan author Yash Tandonputs it, resistance will become the mainform of sustainable development.24

By keeping the focus on local communities—where livelihoods are first threatened,where resistance first occurs, and wheresolutions first appear—forest dwellers,Indigenous peoples, fishers, and farmers canincreasingly be brought into the urban andNorthern debate from which they have oftenbeen excluded. To do so, Canadian ENGOsand other CSOs must increasingly mobilizefor global change and connect with popularmovements and pockets of alternative ideasin the South and North. They must create more opportunities for direct citizen partici-pation and political intervention; demandpolitical accountability and transparency to

ensure environmental protection and socialequity; and make governments act on theircommitments to preserving the environmentfor all living beings.

NOTES

The author would like to thank the following people forparticipating in interviews for this chapter: Jeanne Moffat(Greenpeace), David Runnalls (International Institute forSustainable Development), Wayne Roberts (independentenvironment writer), Robert Hornung (Pembina Institute),Jane Inch (Canadian Environmental Network), Ken Traynorand Paul Muldoon (Canadian Environmental Law Association),Lois Corbett (Toronto Environmental Alliance), and AngusMcAllister (Environics International).

1 Mathias Finger, “Politics of the UNCED Process,” inWolfgang Sachs, ed., Global Ecology: A New Arena ofPolitical Conflict (London: Zed Books, 1995), p. 45.

2 Government of Canada, House of Commons, Report ofthe Commissioner of the Environment and SustainableDevelopment (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works andGovernment Services Canada, 1998), pp. 2-24.

3 Canadian Environmental Network, The Green List(Ottawa: CEN, 1994).

4 Environics International Monitor, Global PublicDemands Environmental Action Now (Toronto: Environics International, November 9, 1997).http://www.environics.net/eil/iemnew (accessed July 19,1998).

5 Personal interview by the author, July 15, 1998.

6 Quoted in Wayne Roberts and Susan Brandum, Get a Life!How to make a good buck, dance around the dinosaurs,and save the world while you’re at it (Toronto: Get A LifePublishing House, 1995), p. 268.



9 Wayne Roberts, interviewed by author July 12, 1998.



12 Canadian Environmental Law Association, Stomping on theEarth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada’s Ecological Footprints(Toronto: CELA, 1998), p. 4. http://www.web.net/cela(accessed July 19, 1998).


14 Gallon Environment Newsletter, June 1998.

15 Personal interview by author, June 16, 1998.

16 Personal interview by author, July 17, 1998.

17 Karen Farbridge and Peter Cameron, “PIRG Power,”in Alternatives (Summer 1998), p. 23.

18 Government of Canada, House of Commons, 1998, pp. 2-25.

19 Personal interview by author, June 2, 1998.

20 See, for example, articles by Wolfgang Sachs and NicholasHildyard in Sachs, Global Ecology: A New Arena of PoliticalConflict. Also see Herman Daly, Beyond Growth: TheEconomics of Sustainable Development (Boston: BeaconPress, 1996).

21 Daly, 1996, p. 167.

22 World Commission on Environment and Development, OurCommon Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

23 Environics International Monitor, 1997.

24 Yash Tandon, “Village Contradictions in Africa,” in Sachs,Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflict, p.221.


BO

X4 N O TA B L E C A N A D I A N W E B S I T E S

• Adbusters: www.adbusters.org• Alternatives: www.fes.uwaterloo.ca/Research/Alternatives• Canadian Environmental Law Association: www.web.net/cela• Ducks Unlimited: www.ducks.ca• Ecology Action Centre:

www.ccn.cs.dal.ca/Environment/EAC/EAC-Home.html• The Green Lane (Environment Canada): www.doe.ca• The Green Teacher: www.web.net/~greentea• Greenpeace Canada: www.greenpeacecanada.org• The Halifax Initiative: www.sierraclub.ca/national/halifax/• International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives:

www.iclei.org• International Institute for Sustainable Development: www.iisd.ca• Pembina Institute: www.pembina.org• Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable

Development to the House of Commons, 1998: www.oag-bvg.gc.ca• Sierra Club of Canada: www.sierraclub.ca• The David Suzuki Foundation: www.davidsuzuki.org• Websites on Sustainability:

www.ccn.cs.dal.ca/CommunitySupport/CUSO/coolsites.html• Western Canada Wilderness Committee: www.wildernesscommittee.org• World Wildlife Fund Canada: www.wwfcanada.org

FIGHTING HUNGER: THE STRUGGLE FOR

FOOD SOVEREIGNTYG r a h a m R i c h e s

G r a h a m R i c h e s i s t h e D i r e c t o r o f t h e

S c h o o l o f S o c i a l W o r k a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y

o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a .

FIGHTING HUNGER: THE STRUGGLE FOR

FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

F

C H A P T E R

F O U R

This chapter examines the role played byCanadian civil society organizations (CSOs)working internationally and at home in thefight against global hunger. In exploringthe nature and extent of hunger, the chap-ter also highlights the activities of selectedCSOs, evaluates their impact, and offerssuggestions for future strategies.

Hunger, Food Security, and Sustainable LivelihoodsHunger and food security are complexissues. According to renowned economistsJean Drèze and Amartya Sen, “hunger is amany headed monster … related to a widerange of deprivations (biological, economic,

and social).”3 Sen, awarded the 1998 NobelPrize for Economics, argues that a shortageof food is not the only or main cause ofhunger and famine. Famines, he notes,develop “when people lose the economicmeans of acquiring food” and they rarelyoccur in countries that are independent anddemocratic.4 Others cite the links betweenglobalization and spiraling poverty. JeanotMinla Mfour’ou, speaking at the 1996 NGOForum accompanying the World Food Summitin Rome, declared “... the globalization ofthe world economy, along with the lack ofaccountability of multinational corporationsand spreading patterns of overconsumption,have increased world poverty.”5

or many Canadians, the struggle against hunger, and its

impact on the everyday lives of women, men, and children in

this country and around the world, is linked to the war on poverty

and the extension of basic human rights. The number of people

affected by hunger is staggering: the United Nations reports that

800 million people in the world are severely malnourished and 25 percent

of humanity lives in absolute poverty.1 In Canada, despite its number

one ranking bestowed by the United Nations Development Programme’s

1998 Human Development Report Index, some 716,496 people resorted to

food banks in March 1998 alone.2 Hunger’s continued existence under-

mines the fundamental notion that food is a basic human right, central

to the concept of common citizenship and democratic society.

“Hunger is a many

headed monster… related

to a wide range of depri-

vations (biological,

economic, and social).”

Jean Drèze and Amartya

Sen, Hunger and Public

Action (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1989), p.15.


While there are clear distinctions betweenhunger and food security, they are obviouslyrelated. As Bruce Moore, formerly of theCanadian Hunger Foundation (now Partnersin Rural Development), has written,“...foodsecurity, poverty alleviation and sustainablelivelihoods are inextricably intertwined.”6

In other words, hunger will not be elimi-nated from any society, North or South,until food security is assured for all.

T H E L O N G T E N TAC L E SO F G L O B A L H U N G E RHunger is among the more unfortunate com-mon bonds shared by the peoples of bothNorth and South. While inroads have beenmade—world hunger declined from 918 mil-lion in 1970 to 841 million in 1992 and theproportion of hungry people has droppedfrom 35 percent to 25 percent of the world’spopulation—significant challenges remainin the struggle against global hunger. Forexample, there are regional variations andgrowth of hunger in some regions, espe-cially Africa.7 Moreover, given that womenare more likely to be poor, children aredisproportionately affected by hunger(see Table 1).

Chronic undernourishment is concentratedin the South, particularly in the 82countries defined by the UN’s Food andAgricultural Organization (FAO) as lowincome food deficit countries. Half of thesecountries are located in Africa (see Figure 1).With an average net per capita income ofUS$400, these countries are too poor topurchase food in world markets. Theyare also ineligible to borrow from theInternational Development Association,the World Bank’s soft-loan facility.8

The problem of hunger is also on the risein “first world” societies such as Canada.Canada’s first charitable and emergencyfood bank was established in Edmonton in1981, an early signal of a fraying socialsafety net.9 By 1998, the number of foodbanks in Canada was estimated to havereached more than 1,600.10

The growing incidence of hunger inCanadian society should be of little surprise,considering that:

• Canada has a persistently high unemploy-ment rate: in December 1998, it reached8 percent;11

C H A P T E R F O U R F I G H T I N G H U N G E R 41

BO

X1D E F I N I N G H U N G E R

The Bread for the World Institute (BWI), a Washington-based NGO

which works to eliminate global hunger, defines hunger and its related

issues as:

• Hunger is a condition in which people do not get enough food

to provide the nutrients (carbohydrates, fat, protein, vitamins,

minerals, and water) they need to lead fully productive, active,

and healthy lives.

• Malnutrition, which can impair physical and mental health, results

from inadequate consumption (undernutrition), or an excessive con-

sumption of one or more nutrients. Infectious diseases can be both

a cause and an effect of malnutrition. Thus clean water, safe sanita-

tion, and access to healthcare are essential to good nutrition.

• Food security means assured access for every person, primarily by

production or purchase, to enough safe, nutritious, and culturally

acceptable food to sustain an active and healthy life with dignity.

It includes food availability, food access, and food utilization.

• Livelihood security refers to adequate and sustainable access to

income and other resources to enable households to meet all their

basic needs, including housing, healthcare, access to clean water,

sanitation, community participation, education and training,

adequate time for proper childcare, and knowledge of good

dietary practices.

Source

Adapted from Bread for the World Institute, Hunger in a Global Economy: Hunger1998. Eighth Annual Report on the State of World Hunger (Silver Spring: BWI,1997), p. 8.

TA

BL

E

1E S T I M AT E D P E R C E N TA G E A N D N U M B E R

O F U N D E R W E I G H T C H I L D R E N U N D E R 5

I N D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R Y R E G I O N S , 1 9 9 0

REGION PERCENT NUMBER TOTAL UNDER- UNDER- NUMBER OFWEIGHT WEIGHT CHILDREN

(MILLIONS) UNDER 5(MILLIONS)

Sub-Saharan Africa 30 26 88

Middle East 25 12 49

South Asia 58 91 156

East and Southeast Asia 24 42 180

Latin America and Caribbean 12 6 55

Economic Group

• Low Income 38 148 388

• Middle to High Income 22 31 140

T O TA L 3 4 1 7 9 5 2 8

Source

BWI, Hunger in a Global Economy: Hunger 1998. Eighth Annual Report on the State of World Hunger (Silver Spring: BWI, 1997), p. 9.

• One in five Canadian children lives inpoverty;

• Provincial welfare benefits are thousandsof dollars below Canada’s poverty line. In1996, for example, a single, employableperson typically received only 36 percentof the average provincial poverty lineincome of $15,051; a couple with twochildren received little more than halfthe poverty line income of $29,857;12

• Federal and provincial fiscal restraintpolicies feature significant cutbacks inhealth, education, and social programssuch as unemployment insurance benefitsand social assistance.

Many people who have difficulty meetinghousehold food needs turn to food banksfor help (see Box 2). While food banksbridge that gap temporarily, they are ulti-mately only a band-aid solution. Food banksrun out of food, cannot guarantee nutri-tious food, depend on charitable support,and undermine the right to adequate foodand incomes. A 1998 study of womenin families using food banks in Torontoreported that despite using food banks,“the vast majority of households experi-enced some degree of food insecurity, andover half reported some level of absolutefood deprivation.”13

It is these numbers, and the human andsocietal tragedies they mask, that act asthe driving force propelling Canada’s CSOcommunity, both internationally and domes-tically, in the fight against hunger. Whengovernments and the private sector fail torespond, it is left to civil society organiza-tions to meet the needs of the hungry.

Fighting Hunger: Key Issues for Civil SocietyCanadian CSOs have identified four keyissues confronting them in the fight againsthunger: the political causes of hunger andthe structural links between hunger in theNorth and South; growing CSO involvementand declining government support; issues ofrights and entitlements to food and incomesecurity; and the importance of the strugglefor food sovereignty.

T H E P O L I T I C A L N AT U R EO F H U N G E R

Underlying many Canadian CSOs’ actions,research, and advocacy is their understand-ing of the root causes—structural andpolitical—of hunger in both South andNorth. Many echo Sally Rutherford of theCanadian Federation of Agriculture whoconcluded that: “For more than a decadenow the farmers of the earth have producedenough food to satisfy the world’s popula-tion, yet millions of people still go hungry.The problem isn’t too little food, but rathertoo little political will to see that food isdistributed in an equitable manner. Thispoint must be recognized if solutions toglobal food security are to be found.”14


F I G U R E 1 Trends in Number and Proportion of Undernourished People by Developing Regions

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, The Sixth World Food Survey (Rome:FAO, 1996), p. 46.

BO

X2 H U N G E R C O U N T 1 9 9 8

• 716,496 Canadians received emergency food assistance in the month

of March 1998 alone, representing 2.4 percent of the population;

• Children account for 41.5 percent of the total number of people

assisted;

• Rates of food bank use are highest in Newfoundland, Ontario, PEI,

Quebec, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia;

• Food bank use doubled between 1989 to 1997, and then grew by 5.4

percent from 1996 to 1997.

Source

Canadian Association of Food Banks (CAFB), HungerCount 97/98 and HungerCount98. Reports on Emergency Food Assistance in Canada (Toronto: CAFB, 1997; 1998).

1 Sub-Saharan Africa

2 Near East and North Africa

3 East and Southeast Asia

4 South Asia

5 Latin America and the Caribbean

%1009080706050403020100

5004003002502001501007550250

Proportion Undernourished(percent)

Number Undernourished(millions)

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

1968-711979-811990-92

1968-711979-811990-92

Many CSOs agree that the roots of hungerare mired in the complexities and inequitiesof a global food system, and in trade andagricultural policies where, increasingly,transnational corporations such as theMonsanto Company and Cargill Incorporatedexert enormous influence and power; inthe enforced indebtedness of low incomefood deficit countries; in growing food andincome inequity within and between theNorth and South; in the lack and loss ofemployment, income, and land entitlementcaused by economic reform policies; in thefailure of international institutions andgovernments to accept their internationalhuman rights obligations; in discriminationbased on gender, race, ethnicity, and age;and in the powerlessness and socialexclusion of those who are landless, poor, and hungry.

G R O W I N G N G O I N V O LV E M E N T,D E C L I N I N G G O V E R N M E N T S U P P O R T

Yet, while Canadian civil society organiza-tions have increased their role in the fightagainst food insecurity, locally and interna-tionally, the Canadian government has beena more reluctant player. David MacDonald ofthe Global Network on Food Security arguesthat food security issues are less importantwhen governments define trade as a foreignpolicy priority.15 Similarly, when Julia Bass,Executive Director of the CanadianAssociation of Food Banks (CAFB), statesthat the rise in domestic hunger is causedby unemployment and massive socialspending cutbacks, the implication is thatgovernment priorities are focused elsewhereand not on food security issues.16

Jean Christie, Director, International Liaisonat the Rural Advancement FoundationInternational (RAFI), says that despitea good track record, many of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) workingin this area are stretched thin given theoverwhelming challenges that remain. Inparticular, she notes that the lack of publicfunding to support the organizational infra-structure of Southern CSOs remains a keyobstacle which seriously impedes successand results in fragmented responses.17

If grassroots development and food aidprojects are to have long-term benefits,both Southern and Northern CSOs require

administrative resources, training, andequipment. OXFAM Canada has recognizedthis need, and directs part of its budgetto supporting the institutional costs of itsSouthern partners. In fact, OXFAM receivesgovernment support for this fundamentalwork through the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA). While govern-ment cutbacks increase the pressure onCSOs to respond, the question of organiza-tional capacity remains a major challenge.Overall, government cutbacks negativelyaffect the capacity of CSOs to act againsthunger—what is needed is interdepartmentalsupport and the political will to ensurethose resources are provided to the CSOcommunity for capacity building.

Rod MacRae of the Toronto Food PolicyCouncil points to another key issue con-fronting Canadian CSOs, working here andabroad, which affects capacity building:their high dependence on public funds. Inthe United Kingdom and the United States,the availability of private and philanthropicfunding is significantly greater than inCanada (see “Civil Society Organizations andFunding in Canada,” p. 109), thus enablingthe sector to develop a broader fundingbase and maintain a more independent role.Because government support for preventiveand development activities is restrictedin Canada, charity and ad hoc emergencyfood aid programs are more prevalent and,ultimately, more fundable. In such anenvironment, there are few incentives orlittle support for investing in and develop-ing long-term anti-hunger strategies. TheCanadian government must be urged tofocus on its domestic and internationalobligations in the area of food security.These obligations do not always requireincreased spending on food aid, but ratherincreased respect for the right to food.

R I G H T S A N D E N T I T L E M E N T S

If international organizations and govern-ments are to be persuaded to shift theircurrent emphasis from charity and food aidto development and food security, CSOs willneed to keep alive the social justice debateabout entitlements (the right to income andwork), and the right to food. No CSO seesthe solution to hunger as a simple matterof charity; their approaches to the problemreflect a diversity of motives and capacities.


For example, while the Canadian Associationof Food Banks stresses its charitable roleand the need to provide food directly tohungry citizens, the CAFB, along with theNational Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO),sees the solution to hunger in terms of fullemployment, adequate wages, affordablehousing, and social security benefits. Theyboth rightly stress the crucial importance ofwork and income entitlements. This policystance parallels the position of Partners inRural Development which holds that sus-tainable livelihoods in the South are thekey to poverty alleviation and food security.The notion of sustainable livelihoodsincludes the right of farmers and peasantsto own their land and seeds and sell theirown produce. Income security and foodsecurity are thus compatible anti-hungerstrategies.

Establishing the right to food is criticalin the fight against hunger. Jean Christieargues that basic human rights must beapplied to international trade agreementsas they affect issues of hunger and foodsecurity. RAFI consistently argues this casein multilateral bargaining on matters ofgenetic engineering and the protection ofbiodiversity. Arguments advocating the rightto food must not be ignored: in the South,the impact of structural adjustment policieshas led to the loss of land and sustainablelivelihoods for millions of people; in Canada,welfare reform restructuring (through thescrapping of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966 and the diminishing of nationalwelfare standards) has denied the right to adequate assistance, and thereby food,to hundreds of thousands of Canadians.

Yet advocating for the right to food andmaking it a legally enforceable claimrequiring governments’ respect is morecontentious. A number of CSOs have raisedthese issues—once in 1993 and again in1998—with the UN Committee on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights that monitorsthe compliance of national states with theInternational Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights (1966). They argue that,by ratifying the convention in 1976, Canadacommitted itself to guaranteeing basicsocial rights including the right to food (seeArticle 11). As such, the right to adequate

food and income should be adhered towithin our borders. The dramatic growthof charitable food banks paints a differentpicture, however. Bruce Porter of the CharterCommittee on Poverty Issues has arguedthat there is little consensus even in theCSO community about social rights versusgoals. Hunger alleviation is regarded asa policy objective for government actionand not a human right.

Many Canadian NGOs worked on andendorsed the International Code of Conducton the Human Right to Adequate Foodwhich was spearheaded internationallyby the Food First Information and ActionNetwork in Germany. The Code of Conductprovides for the realization of the rightto food at national and international levelsand is intended to strengthen its implemen-tation. Governments have an obligation toprotect citizens against infringements ontheir rights in the same way that politicalrights are protected. When governmentsignore such rights and the internationalobligations that go with them, theyallow hunger to be left to charity andmarket forces.

FOOD SOVERE IGNTY: THE STRUGGLEF O R C O N T R O L O V E R F O O D

Sharp and heated policy debates continuein a number of forums about the nature andcauses of hunger, and what to do about it.These controversies are reflected in thepolicies and practices of Canadian govern-ments, the private sector, and CSOs workingto combat hunger, particularly in relationto agricultural trade. A concrete exampleof this debate can be seen in the opposingdeclarations made by both governmentsand NGOS at the 1996 World Food Summit.In supporting the official declaration, theCanadian government reaffirmed the rightto food and committed itself to workingto halve the number of the world’s hungryby 2015. Yet in large measure, this pledgewas based on assumptions that expandedtrade liberalization and free markets wouldlead to increased food production andits more effective distribution in fooddeficit countries.

Such assumptions were challenged in thealternative declaration of the parallel NGOForum present in Rome, “Profit for Few or


“The globalization of

the world economy, along

with the lack of account-

ability of multinational

corporations and

spreading patterns

of overconsumption,

have increased

world poverty.”

Jeanot Minla Mfour’ou,

spokesperson for the NGO

Forum of the 1996 World

Food Summit.

Food for All.” It questioned the capacity offree markets to ensure freedom from hungerand insisted that “international law mustguarantee the right to food, ensuring thatfood sovereignty takes precedence overmacroeconomic policies and trade liberaliza-tion. Because of its social and culturaldimensions, food cannot be consideredas a commodity.”18 In other words, food,as an essential and shared community good,was too vital to human health and well-beingto be left to the global market.

In fact, at the Rome Summit, La ViaCampesina, the worldwide peasant, farmers’,and Indigenous peoples’ organization, urgedgovernments and the corporate sector tocommit to food sovereignty, arguing for“an immediate, profound, and genuineagrarian reform, including land redistribu-tion, credit and technical assistance, andfood sovereignty at local and nationallevels, as the right of the people to producefood, control its marketing, and feed our-selves in healthy ways.”19 La Via Campesinahad little faith that agricultural provisionsunder the World Trade Organization wouldensure fair trade and successfully withstandthe power of global food trading corporations.

Today, many Northern (including Canadian)CSOs support their Southern partners andinsist that the landless, local producers,those who are hungry and receiving foodrelief, and individuals (not simply consumers),have direct input into achieving foodsecurity by establishing greater controlover food (see Box 3). CSOs also arguethat governments representing the collec-tive will of peoples have crucial roles toplay in the battle against hunger.

PA R T N E R S H I P S A N D C O A L I T I O N S :N O R T H - S O U T H L I N K A G E S

To fight hunger effectively at the grass-roots, national, and global level means firstraising its profile and securing the politicallegitimacy of hunger as a public policyissue. CSOs in Canada and elsewhere aretherefore building successful partnershipsand coalitions which foster recognition ofthe links between hunger and food securityin the South and North. But the difficultiesassociated with such international workand partnerships are acknowledged by manyCSOs in the field—differing missions and

commitments; competing funding andresource issues; the stress of sustainingcoalitions; and lack of shared long-termvisions.

Many CSOs have overcome these impedi-ments to forge successful partnerships,internationally and within Canada, to bothestablish hunger as a policy issue and movebeyond the short-term benefits of stand-alone projects. The Global Network onFood Security (GNFS) is one example ofa successful, vibrant coalition workingfor food security. Founded during the NGOAssembly leading up to the World FoodSummit in Rome, the GNFS stresses theimportance of partnerships that create acommon agenda and of developing alterna-tive policies, and was instrumental in bring-ing together the Canadian government, theprivate sector, and civil society organiza-tions in shaping Canada’s commitmentsto the Summit and consequent NationalAction Plans. Working with Agriculture andAgri-Food Canada, the GNFS promoted twomajor Ottawa consultations involving abroad cross-section of leading internationaland domestic NGOs, agri-business represen-tatives, and government officials: one priorto the Food Summit, advising Ministerof Agriculture Ralph Goodale on Canada’sCommitments to the Summit declaration;


BO

X3T H E S T R U G G L E F O R F O O D S O V E R E I G N T Y

Several Canadian CSOs support the efforts of people in both North

and South to gain greater control over food, including:

• Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), through its

research and advocacy directed at protecting biodiversity and the

rights of farmers to save and own their own seeds, challenges trans-

national corporations seeking to control the world’s supply of seeds;

• OXFAM Canada by empowering local farmers, particularly women,

in sustainable agricultural development reforms including land rights

and common lands, and insisting on the right of local people to

control their own livelihoods;

• The Global Network on Food Security (GNFS) in ensuring that the

Canadian Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada consulted

with representatives of NGOs and others in the lead-up to the 1996

World Food Summit and the formulation of the ensuing National

Action Plans on Food Security, guaranteed a voice for civil society;

• The National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO) and the CharterCommittee on Poverty Issues in advocating for the right to food

and income; and

• The Toronto Food Policy Council’s policy work in advocating food

security based on democratic control of local food systems.

the other as a follow-up geared to developCanada’s Action Plan for Food Security.20

In the context of the Summit, these effortsembodied the key attributes of civil society:bringing together key stakeholders andengaging in a real debate to shape policiesand outcomes.

RAFI uses a coalition structure within itsown organization and successfully operatesat the multilateral level to shape and influ-ence policy debates on a number of keyissues that have direct implications for thefight against global hunger: the protectionof agricultural biodiversity and food security;the safeguarding of intellectual propertyrights; the opposition to biopiracy; andthe critique of biotechnology (see Box 4).Its staff and Board of Trustees, composedof members from six continents, are fullyengaged in research, education, and policyadvocacy. RAFI has consulting status withthe UN Conference on Trade and Develop-ment (UNCTAD) and in 1997 received rosterstatus with ECOSOC, the United NationsEconomic and Social Council.21 Whilefocused on research and policy advocacy,RAFI’s work is essentially educational:one of its prime objectives is to assembleadversarial parties—representatives of

governments, transnational corporations,and CSOs—around the table.

Working in partnerships at the local levelis also vital. For example, the UnitarianService Committee’s (USC) Seeds for Survivalproject in Ethiopia, begun in the mid-1980s,demonstrated the importance of bringingtogether local farmers and scientists to useand protect naturally and locally adaptedseeds (landraces or “folkseeds”). These seedvarieties increased yields in marginal landsand provided food and sustainable livelihoodsfor 30,000 farmers and their families.22

Supported by CIDA and RAFI in its earlierstages, the project—which has since beenabandoned by the Ethiopian government—built links with local organizations and hadthe support of government. USC is lookingto transplant the program to Mali.

Within Canada, one of the most successfulpartnerships has been the development offood policy councils in Toronto, Kamloops,and most recently, Vancouver. These cutting-edge organizations assemble a range ofindividuals and organizations from differentsectors concerned about food issues:farmers, community health workers, educa-tors, fishers, and environmental and welfareorganizations, among others. In short,they build a national network of local actorsto address broader policy questions aroundfood security. In Toronto, the Food PolicyCouncil has not only sponsored projectsleading to nutritious school meal programs,field-to-table projects, and supported com-munity kitchen and garden programs, but ithas also actively engaged in public educa-tion and advocacy on food, health, sustain-able agriculture, and welfare policy. Foodpolicy councils focus on research, publiceducation, policy advice, advocacy, andanti-hunger work. Their strengths lie inlocal roots, inclusive membership, a strongbase in health issues, and an ability toengage broad public participation and influ-ence political arenas, particularly at themunicipal levels. What they demonstrate isthat food issues can become a catalyst forcommunity organization and social action.

The importance of partnerships that leadto joint projects and campaigns cannot bestressed too highly. The view of many CSOsis that public education and lobbying are


BO

X4 T E R M I N AT O R T E C H N O L O G Y

RAFI is working to ban the use of Delta-Pinelands’ (now owned by

the Monsanto Company) Technology Protection System. Dubbed the

“Terminator Technology” by RAFI, the system is designed to disable

plants so that they do not produce fertile seeds. If commercialized,

this genetic engineering technology would force Southern farmers

(who are its primary targets) to buy seed every year. Although it has

only been used successfully on cotton and tobacco, the patent covers

all plants. Not only would the technology deny farmers the right to

purchase their own seeds, but they would be unable to save seed from

their crop and breed new varieties.

This new form of biological warfare is also an attack on food security:

as the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization has noted, 1.4 billion

poor depend on farm-saved food for their food security.1 More troubling

still, Zeneca Bio Sciences (UK) is competing globally with Monsanto and

is seeking to patent a new technology which will render it impossible

for farmers to save “protected” seed from growing season to growing

season. In Europe, this technology has been named the “Verminator.”2

Notes

1 RAFI, “And Now, The Verminator,” RAFI News, www.rafi.ca (accessed August 24, 1998), p. 2.

2 Ibid.

essential for governments to function effec-tively and discharge their legislative andpublic mandates, and for corporations tomeet their social responsibilities. Yet workin coalitions is hard to justify when fundingis tight, and when many organizations inthe North and South are hard pressed toensure their own organizational survival.

Canadians for Global Change: What Is to Be Done?What differences have CSOs made in com-bating hunger? What policies and actionsshould continue to be pursued? What is therole of civil society in addressing issuesof global hunger?

Civil society organizations have provento be key agencies in the struggle for foodsovereignty. Northern CSOs have enteredinto partnerships with Southern stakeholders:their common goal is to empower localcommunities—particularly the women inthose communities—supporting their effortsto move away from hunger, landlessness,and crop loss, as well as their commitmentto productive and sustainable agriculture.As earlier examples have shown, the collab-oration between Southern and NorthernCSOs has resulted in a rich diversity ofstrategies and activities, many of whichweld science and appropriate technologyto local knowledge and tradition.

The community development approach iscentral to this work and any success it mayachieve. CSOs have made a difference inhelping people move from food dependencyto sustainable livelihoods. Their work inpolicy, advocacy, and public education hasbeen critical in focusing public and interna-tional attention on hunger and food securityissues and has made the important link inthe public mind between food issues andworld trade. Efforts by the GNFS aroundthe time of the World Food Summit and theCanadian Council for International Co-opera-tion’s (CCIC) in common campaign (see Box5) are evidence of the mounting impact andinfluence CSOs hold in generating publicand political will against global hunger.

In Canada and elsewhere, food banks have-become a mainstay in the lives of the poorand hungry. Yet, some of the energy


BO

X5G L O B A L AC T I O N A G A I N S T P O V E R T Y

More than anything else, the battle against global hunger requires a

new vision that puts food, hunger, and poverty issues back on national

and international agendas. The 1998 in common campaign launched by

the Canadian Council for International Co-operation is just such an ini-

tiative. The in common campaign and its “10-Point Agenda for Global

Action Against Poverty,” represents the ideas, experiences, and commit-

ments of many NGOs seeking to end hunger, poverty, and deeply

entrenched inequalities:

Achieving these 10 goals is necessary if we are to end poverty.

1. Promote and accelerate the implementation of commitments for

sustainable development made at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.

2. Make human rights central to the practice of Canadian foreign policy

and in particular seek Canadian and multilateral trade and invest-

ment practices that protect internationally agreed labour rights.

3. Build a more equitable global economic order by pursuing trade

and investment agreements and regulation of financial flows that

contribute to reduced social inequalities and protection of the

environment, by canceling unsustainable debt for highly indebted

poorest countries, and by ensuring democratic reform of multilateral

trade and financial institutions such as the World Trade

Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

4. Ensure NGOs and government fulfill gender equity commitments made

at recent global United Nations conferences, with particular empha-

sis on promoting women’s human rights, addressing the feminization

of poverty, improving women’s participation in decisionmaking,

ensuring women’s health, and eradicating violence against women.

5. Fulfill Canada’s obligations to improve the lives of children, with

measurable progress toward the targets for reducing malnutrition,

preventable diseases, and illiteracy set out in the 1990 World

Declaration and Plan of Action on the Survival, Protection and

Development of Children and on the standards for children’s rights

in the 1989 UN convention the Rights of the Child.

6. Make the world safer for all people by collaborating with all sectors

of society to foster locally-rooted peacebuilding efforts for war-torn

and war-threatened societies and to make common security and

peacekeeping core objectives for Canadian defence policy.

7. Promote sustainable food security as a basic human right in Canadian

agricultural and international development policy and work to achieve

at a minimum the 1996 World Food Summit’s seven-point Action Plan.

8. Promote corporate social and environmental responsibilityand accountability while seeking a more socially and ecologically

balanced way of life among Canadians.

9. Reverse the decline in Canadian foreign aid, with a demonstrated

improvement in poverty eradication through Canadian development

cooperation over the next five years.

10. Create new opportunities for citizen participation and engagement

in national and multilateral policymaking, reflecting roles and

responsibilities for civil societies and political representatives alike,

promoting more equitable, transparent and accountable institutions.

Source

CCIC, Meeting the challenge to eliminate poverty: A Canadian 10-point agenda,Ottawa, 1998.

expended on organizing food drives andsustaining food banks might be betterredirected, perhaps to the work of foodpolicy councils. Through their research,

public education, policy, advocacy, andanti-hunger work, food policy councils are able to focus on longer-term and moresustainable solutions to hunger and poverty.Food policy councils demonstrate that foodissues can become a catalyst for communityorganizing and social action. In addition,through their links to such grassroots serviceproviders such as community kitchens andcommunity gardens, the councils haveacquired the public legitimacy to educateboth the wider community and governmentsabout what needs to be done.

F U T U R E S T R AT E G I E S

A deeper notion of human rights, informedby a commitment to economic and socialjustice and environmental sustainability,are central to the fight against hunger.Canadian CSOs must ensure that Ottawa andthe provinces respect and act upon theirinternational human rights obligations toextend and protect the right to food, bothdomestically and internationally. Canada’sAction Plan for Food Security, launched bythe Canadian government on World FoodDay, October 16, 1998, must be closelymonitored by CSOs which should continueto hold governments publicly accountablethrough human rights commissions, thecourts, UN monitoring committees, andthrough continued participation in multi-lateral negotiations.

Locally based food security initiativesmust also continue to be high prioritiesboth in the South and North. In the North,a network of food policy councils shouldbe established across the country withNorth-South education and action agendas.They should be independent coordinatingbodies linked to municipal governments,universities, and popular organizations, andshould engage in education and participatoryaction research relating to food and hun-gerissues. Such bodies could provide effec-tive links between local/provincial, national,and international food security organiza-tions. Such action would send a signal tothe federal and provincial governments thatcivil society is fully engaged in the fightagainst hunger and the search for foodsovereignty both at home and overseas.


BO

X6 W E B S I T E S O F I N T E R E S T

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S I T E S

Bread for the World Institute: www.bread.org

Congressional Hunger Center: www.hungercenter.org

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO):

www.fao.org

FoodFirst—The Institute for Food and Development Policy:

www.netscape.org/hungerweb/FoodFirst

FoodFirst Information and Action Network: www.foodfirst.org

Food Research and Action Center: www.frac.org

Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy: www.iatp.org/iatp

International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Foodlinks program:

www.idrc.ca

International Food Policy Research Institute: www.cgiar.org/ifpri

International Institute for Sustainable Development: www.iisd.ca

Monsanto Company: www.monsanto.com/monsanto/index.html

Sierra Club (Canada) www.sierraclub.ca

Third World Network: www.twnside.org.sg

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): www.undp.org

United Nations Development Fund for Women: www.unifem.undp.org

UNICEF: www.unicef.org

World Bank: www.worldbank.org

World Hunger Year: www.iglou.com/why

World Resources Institute: www.wri.org/wri

World Sustainable Agriculture Association: www.igc.org/wsaala

C A N A D I A N S I T E S

Campaign 2000: www.web.net/~rpopham/campaign2000

Canada’s Action Plan for Food Security/World Food Summit—Canadian

Task Force: www.agrc.ca/cb/fao/emain.html

Canadian Association of Food Banks: www.icomm.ca/cafb/about.html

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: www.policyalternatives.ca

Canadian Council for International Co-operation: www.web.net/ccic-ccci

in common Campaign—Canadian Council for International Co-operation:

www.incommon.web.net

Canadian Council on Social Development: www.ccsd.ca/facts.html

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA):

www.acdi-cida.gc.ca

Fair Trade Online: www.web.net/fairtrade

Farm Folk/City Folk-Vancouver: www.ffaf.bc.ca

Global Network on Food Security: www.unac.org/gnfs/index.html

Hunger Count: www.icomm.ca/cafb/hunger_count.html

National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO): www.napo-onap.ca

OXFAM Canada: www.oxfam.ca

Partners in Rural Development: www.partners.ca

Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI): www.rafi.ca

NOTES

Special thanks are due to the NGO representatives whoagreed to be consulted during the preparation of this chapter:Jean Christie (RAFI); Brian Tomlinson (CCIC); David MacDonaldand Gary Sealy (GNFS); Bruce Moore (PRD); Laura Breuer(USC); Elaine Henderson (OXFAM Canada); Julia Bass (CAFB);Mike Farrell (NAPO); Ed Bloos (RFB); Herb Barbolet (FFCF);Rod MacRae (TFPC); Bruce Porter (CCPI); Pat Kerans; and JulieDelahanty (NSI). I trust their views and experiences havebeen accurately represented. The analysis, interpretations,and any errors are those of the author.

1 OXFAM Canada, “Working Together Against Hunger,” 1998World Food Day Kit (St. John’s: D.G. Taylor Inc., 1998), p. 5.

2 Canadian Association of Food Banks, HungerCount 98.Report on Emergency Food Assistance in Canada (Toronto:CAFB, 1998) http://www.icomm.ca/cafb/ (accessedJanuary 25, 1999).

3 Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 15.

4 Amartya Sen, “Nobody Need Starve,” Urban Age (Winter1998), pp. 15-16.

5 FAO, New Mounts to Climb: The World Food Summit andIts Follow-up. Development Education Exchange Papers(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1997), p. 5.This report was edited by Clive Robinson (Christian Aid,UK/Ireland and former convenor of the Food SecurityGroup of the Liaison Committee of the Development NGOsto the European Union).

6 Bruce Moore, “Farmer Centred Development: Actions thatAlleviate Poverty and Reduce Hunger,” in Canadian HungerFoundation, Tough to Swallow: Canadian Perspectives onFood Security (Ottawa: CHF, 1995), p. 30.

7 The Bread for the World Institute (BWI), Hunger in aGlobal Economy: Hunger 1998. Eighth Annual Report on theState of World Hunger (Silver Spring: BWI, 1997), p. 9.

8 Ibid., pp. 8-13.

9 Graham Riches, ed., First World Hunger: Food Security andWelfare Politics (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 8.

10 Canadian Association of Food Banks (CAFB),HungerCount 98, survey published athttp://www.icomm.ca/cafb/hunger_count.html(accessed February 11, 1999).

11 Source: http://www.statcan.ca (accessed January 25, 1999).

12 National Council of Welfare (NCW), Welfare Incomes 1996.A Report by the National Council of Welfare (Ottawa:National Council of Welfare, 1997), pp. 24-25.

13 Valerie Tarasuk; G. Beaton; J. Geduld; and S. Hilditch,Nutritional Vulnerability and Food Security Among Womenin Families Using Food Banks (Toronto: University ofToronto, Department of Nutritional Sciences, 1998), p. 23.

14 Sally Rutherford, “Global Food Security” in CanadianHunger Foundation, Tough to Swallow: CanadianPerspectives on Food Security, (Ottawa: Canadian HungerFoundation, 1995), p. 23.

15 David MacDonald. Personal interview. Interviewed byauthor, May 29, 1998.

16 Julia Bass. Telephone interview. Interviewed by author,May 1998.

17 Jean Christie. Personal interview. Interviewed by author,June 6, 1998.

18 FAO, New Mounts to Climb: The World Food Summit and ItsFollow-up, p. 6.

19 Ibid., p. 6.

20 Canada, Joint Consultative Group, World Food SummitCanadian Task Force, Canada’s Action Plan for Food Security(Ottawa: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 1998).

21 RAFI, 1997 Annual Report, Ottawa, 1997.

22 Laura Breuer, “Seeds of Survival: USC Canada—The Roleof Small Scale Farmers in Food Security for Ethiopia,” inCanadian Hunger Foundation, Tough to Swallow: CanadianPerspectives on Food Security (Ottawa: Canadian HungerFoundation, 1995), pp. 95-97.


DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS

G e o r g e s l e B e l

G e o r g e s l e B e l i s a p r o f e s s o r o f l a w a t

t h e U n i v e r s i t é d u Q u é b e c à M o n t r é a l .

DEFENDINGHUMAN RIGHTS

H

C H A P T E R

F I V E

This use of the law as an instrumentof change—a typically North Americanapproach—probably best demonstratesthe “space” human rights occupy in theCanadian social fabric. The very concept ofrights, however, holds false promise sinceinternational law offers but few ways ofapplying moral sanctions against humanrights violations. Canadian law, for its part,offers little more, except when the state isthe purported agent of the discrimination.With an attitude rare in international law,Canada, in fact, does not give direct effectto the international conventions it ratifies:the only direct way one can invoke theInternational Bill of Human Rights inCanadian courts is if its provisions andguarantees have been specifically integratedinto federal or provincial laws. This explainswhy the struggle for human rights is, firstand foremost, a matter of policy ratherthan of legal rights.

The only avenue open to rights advocates isto invoke the moral suasion of a hypothetical

international public opinion. A number of governments bow to the pressure, butbecause the newly created InternationalCriminal Court deals only with the mostserious crimes, some people consider itthe duty of civil society—national andinternational—to convince those who pay it no heed.

Human rights policy exists within an inter-national context that has greatly evolved inrecent years. Few realize that, even thoughthe concept of the “Rights of Man” goesback to the French Revolution, internationalpolicy based on that concept is very“green”—dating only from the 1960s—and still bears traces of its origins.

In this context, defining civil society istricky when it appears to gain legitimacy bylaying claim to the universality of rights inits opposition to some government regimes.A characteristic of recent times is that“human rights have become a bit like a uni-versal civic religion, whereas Marx perceivedthem as the disguise of bourgeois society

ow many people know that Canadians file more human

rights complaints with the United Nations than the people of

any other country except Jamaica?1 While startling, this tells us less

about the respect of rights in Canada than about the fact that

Canadians—who have the means—are prepared to use international

mechanisms at their disposal to improve conditions at home and defend

their own rights.“...today’s human rights

violations are the causes

of tomorrow’s conflicts.”

Mary Robinson,

United Nations High

Commissioner for

Human Rights

(www.unhchr.ca)


and exploitative relationships.”2 One sign of this quasi-religious character is that thefaithful feel justified in imposing humanrights on everyone and tolerate no opposi-tion to a dogma whose content and scopeare only sketchily defined.

To ensure that the promotion of humanrights does not become a civic religion,itself likely to feed into Western fundamen-talism, it must be linked to the defence of all marginalized, forgotten peoples andtheir struggles, including those in theNorth. The concept of the respect for rightsis thus extended from civil and political(democratic) rights to include economic,social, and cultural rights, and ultimatelythe right to development. This last right,in turn, is then immediately imbued with a number of qualifiers: economic, social,cultural, political, sustainable, and nowhuman. When confronted by dictatorships,by challenges to the welfare state, and bytrade negotiations that introduce mecha-nisms and structures without concern forthe right to development or for sustainabledevelopment, each person adopts a differ-ent stance: no one, however, denies theimportance of understanding, education,and action.

This chapter examines the different tacticsused in the struggle for human rights andassesses their results from an evolutionaryperspective.

Advocating for RightsAn impressive number of organizations andnetworks in Canada include human rightsadvocacy among their activities, if not astheir main activity. Each year, the Canadiangovernment organizes national consulta-tions with these organizations,3 many ofwhose activities it funds. The CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA),for example, reported in 1997 that ithad funded 327 projects, for a total of$31 million, undertaken by “civil societyorganizations” which include nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs), internationalnongovernmental organizations (INGOs),advocacy groups (which account for two-thirds of the projects), universities,research institutes, media, labour unions,and associations.4

But the struggle for rights goes far beyondinternational or state-financed initiatives.Some organizations, such as the CanadianCivil Liberties Association or the QuebecCivil Liberties Union, work primarily inCanada and are only rarely subsidized bygovernments. Others have broken free of thepolitical constraints imposed by the state’srequirements for obtaining tax exemptionstatus. For example, having lost its charitystatus in 1980, the Quebec Civil LibertiesUnion is no longer subject to the regula-tions the government attaches to thistype of indirect funding.

This chapter’s aim is to stimulate thinkingabout the various activities and strategiesemployed in rights advocacy, while fullyrealizing that, depending on individualcircumstances, most organizations rely ona clever mix of all these tactics—and theyoften manage to avoid their pitfalls.

Two things stand in the way of systematicallyidentifying an organization with a particularset of tactics. First, Canadian organizationsare increasingly active in a great manyfields and projects as members of broadercoalitions, making it difficult to determinewhich particular tactics inform the activitiesof each group. For example, many groupscombine forces through various coalitionson Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Second,many organizations, generally backed by

C H A P T E R F I V E D E F E N D I N G H U M A N R I G H T S 53

H U M A N R I G H T S C O M P L A I N T S

Complaints filed with the United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights (as of June 19, 1998)

Jamaica 177

Canada 88

Uruguay 79

Netherlands 60

France 44

Trinidad and Tobago 41

Finland 27

Australia 23

Note

These individual complaints were dealt with by the Human Rights Committeeunder the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights. Two-thirds of the total complaints came from fewer than eight countries:this is greater testimony to the capacity of lodging a complaint than to the statusof rights in the country concerned. The US has not ratified the protocol.

TA

BL

E1

strategic analysis, employ any and all tacticsthat are likely to be funded. Some go togreat lengths to hide the fact that theyoften act as simple subcontracting agenciesimplementing programs controlled by otheragencies. This tendency is further encouragedby CIDA’s tendering procedures for fundingprograms that promote human rights.

Many human rights advocacy groupsemploy the traditional tactics of lobbying,public education, and influencing publicopinion; others prefer more confrontationalapproaches. Often the distinction will befound in the relative position of the rightsstruggle within the chosen strategy. Forsome, it is an absolute; for others, thequestion of rights is only one means ofexposing the duplicitous rationalizationsadvanced by some states. For others, itis purely and simply a matter of assertingone’s rights. And for others still, it is aquestion of challenging the claims to legiti-macy made by oppressive powers here orin other countries.

I N F L U E N C I N G P U B L I C O P I N I O N

Rights advocacy almost always involvesmobilizing public opinion: AmnestyInternational, for example, does so whetherit is exposing individual cases, or carryingout broad or targeted public informationand education campaigns, at home andabroad. Since public opinion is the centraltool in this outreach, success can be almostguaranteed if the main media outlets areconvinced of the cause’s legitimacy.

Although media coverage as a tactic isessential, it has been criticized becauseit often degenerates into an indecent andexploitative display of suffering, particularlysince campaigns waged at times of crisisand disaster elicit the most donations forhumanitarian multinationals. Thus, theInternational Red Cross generally steersaway from such methods, preferring morediscreet activities. It would be interestingto analyze how effective media blitzesare in truly implementing rights reform orwhat comfort they offer the child whosedying moments are broadcast into ourliving-rooms.

Some people see the internet as a powerfulnew communications tool.5 The Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, ascribed ita role in the crusade against anti-personnellandmines. And certainly, those who believethat “the pen is mightier than the sword”can just as easily claim that “the mouse ismightier than the missile.” That remains tobe seen. Internet communications may havebeen an important tool in the campaignagainst the Multilateral Agreement onInvestment (MAI), but what part did theyplay in the defence of rights, for example,during the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas?

A number of religious groups, such as theCanadian Catholic Organization for Develop-ment and Peace and the Religious Societyof Friends (Quakers) in Canada, base theiractions on the respect of human rights as amoral imperative. Although their activitiesare similar to those of Amnesty’s, they differas a result of their religious beliefs andmoral values, as well as their uniqueconcept of the individual and his or herrelation to society. These groups’ indepen-dence from government, both financiallyand in project design, is most evident intheir attempts to influence public opinion.They have long been active in this fieldand have fairly successfully distanced them-selves from the proselytizing missionariesof 50 years ago who saw themselves as thecivilizing force from the West. Those daysare long gone, even though morals—nowcalled ethics—and fundamentalist sectswhich draw from all denominations stillhold considerable sway, especially in CentralAmerica, Latin America, and Africa. In thiscontext, some have proposed a new humanrights ethic that marries old-fashionedmorals with contemporary themes.

L O B BY I N G

Influencing public opinion often has anadditional goal: influencing governmentdecisionmakers to change their attitudesconcerning rights. But to be effective,lobbyists must ensure that they are seenand heard by those they want to influence.Compromises—indeed even compromisingprinciples—are often required to win the earof decisionmakers and may erode the credi-bility of the lobbyist’s message. One couldalso ask how many human rights lobbyistscould continue their work without fundingfrom the very decisionmaking bodies they


are trying to influence? Some of theselobbies act as the gatekeepers of politicalorthodoxy, dismissing extravagant claimsand fringe groups. They then select fromamong those project proposals deemed tobe politically and socially acceptable.

When it is mounted by groups that, becauseof their strong community base, enjoya degree of autonomy from government,lobbying can sometimes be coupled with astrong protest action. No one can ignore thepositions and actions taken, for instance,by Canada’s main churches, trade unions,or large employers’ associations. Thus,in Quebec, Développement internationalDesjardins (part of the Mouvementcoopératif Desjardins) successfully mountslarge, independent international develop-ment projects, especially in the field ofdemocratic rights and self-organization.It is their very real autonomy—political,social, and economic—that enables suchorganizations to go beyond being simplebranch offices of state bureaucracies.

I N C R E A S I N G P U B L I C AWA R E N E S S

A great many activities are carried outto increase public awareness and create mechanisms for the eventual implementationof human rights. Some time ago CIDAsuspended its funding of public awarenessactivities in Canada, even though communitylife and public support are essential to thesurvival of organizations. By severing thelinks between these groups and the generalpublic, funders may have acquired greaterroom to manoeuver, but it has cost themsupport for some of their policies. Obviously,a group with strong community support willbe less at the mercy of its funders’ whims.All studies have demonstrated that increasedpublic awareness of the need for humanrights is a direct result of international solidarity activities, in which groups mustparticipate, regardless of state funding.

However, public awareness programsencounter problems when they must accom-modate different legal systems and ideas.For example, a Vancouver lawyer criticizedan African court for its “inquisitorial” meth-ods (even though most European nationsalso use the same methods), claiming theywere incompatible with the fundamentalright to defence which she considered to be

better protected in the adversarial systemsof Britain and North America. How, exceptthrough extensive public awareness cam-paigns, can people be made to understandthat the presumption of innocence and theright to defence can be fully respectedwithout necessarily following the judicialprocess dramatized daily on North Americantelevision?

S U P P O R T I N G E X I S T I N G G R O U P S

Supporting local groups that championhuman rights goals and principles in wayswhich are compatible with their owncultures and legal systems is certainlya solution to this dilemma.


BO

X1T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L C E N T R E F O R H U M A N R I G H T S

A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E V E L O P M E N T

The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

(ICHRDD) was established by an Act of the Parliament of Canada in

1988, and officially inaugurated in 1990. A Canadian institution with

an international mandate, the Centre is an independent and nonparti-

san organization which initiates, encourages, and supports the promo-

tion, development, and strengthening of democratic and human rights

institutions and programs as defined in the International Bill of Human

Rights. Its mandate therefore covers civil, political, social, economic,

and cultural rights. The intrinsic link between human rights and

democratic development—which is at the heart of the Vienna

Convention—is the foundation of the Centre’s work.

The Centre works closely with citizens’ groups, international organiza-

tions, and governments around the world to encourage democratic

development, reduce the incidence of human rights abuses, and avoid

their recurrence. Its specific efforts combine research and political

analysis, monitoring of events, strategic interventions, financial

assistance to key civil society actors and institutions, as well as

public education and advocacy in Canada and abroad.

Directed by Warren Allmand since February 1997, and by the

Honourable Edward Broadbent from 1989 to 1996, ICHRDD is governed

by a 13-member Board of Directors, named by the Governor General

of Canada. In addition to an annual grant of some $5 million from

the Canadian government, ICHRDD also receives project funding from

other sources.

Although it is a public organization, ICHRDD actively participates in the

work of various bodies open to NGO involvement: Mr Allmand represents

Canadian civil society in negotiations on hemispheric economic integra-

tion, for example. The Centre does not differ from other NGOs by its

mode of action, orientation, or financing.

Source

www.ichrdd.ca

This, for example, is the route taken by theInternational Centre for Human Rights andDemocratic Development (ICHRDD) which,in its fight against globalization, supportedan Indonesian trade union, the SBSI(see Box 1).6 ICHRDD’s modest financialgrant allowed SBSI’s leader to present itsanalysis of the consequences of globaliza-tion—and the reasons for its opposition—first before the People’s Forum on APECorganized by ICHRDD in Vancouver, andagain during a world tour. When repressivemeasures were taken against the SBSIleader as a result of these public denuncia-tions, ICHRDD sent a team of observers tohis trial and provided medical assistancein prison. The Centre then organized a cardsigning campaign to petition for his release.This type of intervention, which goes farbeyond simply funding rights advocacygroups, is quite similar to that of tradeunionists and advocacy groups here at home.

The Human Rights and DemocraticDevelopment Division of the Canadian Centrefor International Studies and Cooperation(CECI) has made institutional and organiza-tional support of existing advocacy groupsthe heart of its intervention tactics. CECIhas received close to $35 million, spreadover five years, to support the recruitmentand training of local advocates for humanrights and principled negotiations. Ratherthan intervening directly, CECI lends itssupport to the claims that are emergingin hearings in Haiti, Guatemala, and theGreat Lakes region of Africa. More than150 volunteers are working on projectsin 20 countries to promote human rights,good governance, and the empowermentof women. And CECI has reason to be proudof its efforts: during a marriage ceremony,for example, a tribal chief played CECI’scassette on the equal rights of women;in Guinea, the Ministry of Education askeda CECI trainee to design a teaching programon civic rights and education.7

This type of intervention, however, presentsdifficulties in the selection of on-site part-ners. There is a risk that the choice will bebased on the donor’s rather than the localstakeholders’ priorities. How can one demo-cratically justify respecting the choice ofthe one who pays rather than that of the

country in need? What guarantees are therethat a group selected by a Canadian agencyto satisfy Canadian funding criteria andpolicy priorities will meet the needs of thecountry in which it is operating? And thereis an additional risk: by favouring certaintypes of interventions—for example, fund-ing groups that combat violence againstwomen—the establishment of equallyessential groups may be stifled.

A study of NGO partnerships in Africadetermined that 80 percent of the Africanpartners of Northern NGOs had been set upby the latter, and that 90 percent of themdepended entirely on funding from theNorth.8 This type of intervention reveals anentirely new development objective targetedat specific local communities and groupsrather than the whole of society, which isthe focus of development in a broadersense. This new orientation results fromthe so-called neo-liberal policies and ideasaimed at limiting the role of the state inthe defence and promotion of the publicinterest.

The themes of intervention programs alsoneed to be scrutinized. Southern organiza-tions, for instance, only managed to secureUnited Nations funding for women’s devel-opment initiatives when they agreed tomake combating violence a priority. Themicro-credits allotted to them are perhapsmeagre compensation for their resultingloss of autonomy.

Moreover, how can the North justify impos-ing intermediary civil society agencies oncommunities that have never needed them?A number of studies on corporatism haveshown that the imposition of representa-tives accredited to the existing state doesnot guarantee democracy.

N AT I O N A L A N D I N T E R N AT I O N A LL E G A L R E M E D I E S

Legal instruments are beginning to havean important social impact in the fight forequality as many groups seek legal or para-legal remedies for their rights complaints.9This is common practice for Canada’sAboriginal people, for example, and thewomen’s movement has enjoyed resoundingsuccess using this approach. Defenders ofadvocates of the rights of immigrants and


refugees have also made the courts theirpreferred battleground, and the mediatheir trusted ally.

The Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms, however, does not provide fordirect recourse to the legal system in mat-ters of economic and social rights, exceptas they apply to Aboriginal people, and rec-ognizes only language as a manifestation ofcultural identity. Canadian courts can onlyhear rights complaints if there is a questionof discrimination, and then only if the stateis the alleged perpetrator. In Canada, onlythe Quebec Charter of Human Rights andFreedoms provides legal recourse for rightsviolations committed by corporations andindividuals, but it does not fully recognizeeconomic and social rights.10

The gaps and weaknesses in Canadian lawregarding the protection of economic,social, and cultural rights lead some groupsto take their complaints to internationalauthorities. Many keep a close watch on theproceedings of various UN agencies, andCanadians can be seen in the corridors ofalmost every international agency, filingmemos, presenting briefs, and trying to gettheir points of view included in an officialtext or their most heartfelt issues placedon the daily agenda. To date, they havehad some success.

For example, the recognition of the discriminatory treatment of Aboriginalwomen who lost their Indian status upon marrying a non-Indian resulted in an amendment to the Indian Act.11

A complaint lodged by a funeral home operator in Quebec concerning the language of signs led to the modification of the Charter of the French Language.12

Action taken in 1993 by such groups as the Canadian Chapter of the AmericanAssociation of Jurists (see Box 2), led the UN to condemn Canada for torture, and concurrently with the National Anti-Poverty Organization and the OntarioCoalition Against Poverty, to condemnCanada for noncompliance with economic,social, and cultural rights: little known,this has had far less impact than did a similar condemnation in 1998.13

TA K I N G AC T I O N I NE C O N O M I C F O R U M S

Without doubt, globalization is bringingthe struggles of North and South closertogether. When everyone’s living conditionsare transformed by the same phenomena,solidarity among those most affected immediately and visibly becomes a newfield of action. The struggle against theconsequences of economic integration and trade liberalization becomes a battle for rights so long as groups from North and South equally demand the inclusion of“social clauses,” or even “social charters,”in trade agreements.

This new battleground has revitalizedinternational rights advocacy. Trade unions,women’s groups, Aboriginal peoples, and allCanadian social advocacy groups understandthat their issues are intimately linked tothose in other countries and that theycannot improve their lot without closecollaboration and solidarity with theircounterparts in the South.


BO

X2T H E A M E R I C A N A S S O C I AT I O N O F J U R I S T S

The Canadian Chapter of the American Association of Jurists (AAJ) has

approximately 100 members, mainly from Quebec. This continental asso-

ciation has chapters throughout the Americas and maintains permanent

representatives to the United Nations, both in New York and Geneva.

AAJ’s Canadian Chapter sponsors many observer missions to oversee

human rights situations in Latin America and Central America, provides

legal counsel in some political cases, and supports appeals before the

Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It also actively participated in

the Truth Commissions of El Salvador and Haiti. The AAJ uses interna-

tional mechanisms to draw attention to economic, social, and cultural

rights. It also does not hesitate to point out that Canada, should it

continue to refuse to recognize these rights in law, will not be able to

boast much longer of its high ranking in the UNDP’s human develop-

ment index. Other similar associations, such as the International

Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Barristers,

and some branches of provincial bar associations, undertake similar

efforts on the question of rights.

In its 1998 presentation before the UN Expert Committee on the

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the AAJ was sup-

ported by numerous citizens’ groups who are part of a broad coalition

for the defence of rights and social programs, notably the Quebec Civil

Liberties Union and Solidarité populaire Québec which itself is a coali-

tion of four large trade unions and 150 community organizations.

Source

www.aaj.org

C O A L I T I O N S

Those who tackle the economic causes ofsocial and cultural rights violations havenow adopted a new strategy: rather thanrely on the work of individual organizations,they build broad coalitions around specificissues.

Working with other groups, however,requires considerable effort. Paradoxically,it also distances groups from their original,fundamental objectives. For example, astudents’ association can join coalitionson Chiapas or Tibet, against the MAI, orfor rights advocacy in Africa’s Great Lakesregion while also demonstrating against theerosion of social programs or the destruc-tion of the environment, but only untilthe association’s General Assembly remindsthem of issues closer to home, such as thehike in tuition fees. Eventually, broadeninga coalition’s fields of interest causes groupsto lose track of their raisons d’être and canlead to their break-up. Nevertheless, it isthese coalitions that launch the initiativesmost likely to foster collaboration betweenQuebec and Canadian rights advocacy groupson the international front which, until now,have seen fit to respect the borders drawnup between the “two solitudes.”

The EffectsHow successful are these various endeavoursand at what cost in terms of both energyspent and funds expended? When CIDAasked itself this question, it realized howdifficult it is to measure progress, bothquantitative and qualitative, toward secur-ing the recognition of “human rights andthe rights to democratic development andgood governance.”14 How does one measurethe development of human rights policies,or changes in culture, attitudes, or behav-iour? How to quantify progress in capacitybuilding, networking, and lobbying? How toassess the results of training programs?

It is equally difficult to evaluate educationor public awareness campaigns. Althoughthe big conferences organized by the UNbetween 1990 and 1995 attracted thousandsof NGOs, few have attended since. Let ushope that the corridors of the UN are not

the best indicator of the efforts and effec-tiveness of NGOs working within interna-tional organizations, because we would thenbe obliged to deplore their inconsistenciesand question the strength of their convic-tions. A Canadian network does exist, however, to initiate ordinary citizens in the workings of international venues andencourage them to participate. We hopethey will persevere in their work and makecontinuity one of their priorities.

Evaluation is all the more difficult in NorthAmerican jurisdictions where, as alreadynoted, human rights advocates can onlybring claims against the state. In economicand social fields, the only way to evaluatereal progress made by rights advocacy is bymeasuring the degree of opposition to thegovernment’s social and economic policies,a true indication of the eminently politicalnature of the struggle for rights.

However, a study of NGO activities inSweden carried out by the British OverseasDevelopment Institute (ODI) deals with theeffectiveness of international cooperationin advancing development (the right todevelopment having now been recognizedas a fundamental right). The authors readilyemploy British understatement to hammerhome their implacable conclusion that, inmatters of international development, thegap between intentions and results is agreat deal wider than it should be.15 Theirfindings mirror those of other studies ofNGO activities in Kenya and in EasternEurope, for example, aimed at privatizingsocial programs.

This raises questions about the contrivednature of civil society, as Professor JulieHearn of the University of Sussex points out:

In Ngunyi’s16 study of eleven civil society insti-tutions promoting ‘democracy’ and human rightsin Kenya, nine were donor-created or promoted.Who needs this aid? In an ideological and politi-cal climate where it seems difficult to imagineautonomous political development without ini-tiative and guidance from the West, we need toremember that Africans successfully fought oneof the most totalitarian forms of state power,the colonial state, without donor aid. Is it theAfricans or is it the donors that need this aid?17


…“Who needs this aid?

In an ideological and

political climate where

it seems difficult to imag-

ine autonomous political

development without

initiative and guidance

from the West, we need to

remember that Africans

successfully fought one of

the most totalitarian

forms of state power…

without donor aid. Is it

the Africans or… the

donors that need

this aid?”

Julie Hearn, ”The NGO-

isation of Kenyan soci-

ety.” Review of African

Political Economy

(March 1998), p.99.

In Central and Eastern Europe, says GuyStanding, an economist with the InternationalLabour Organization, “NGOs are spreading,and to some extent are being expected tofill the vacuum left by the erosion of thestate-based social protection. However, canthey and should they do so? One possibilityis that underpaid voluntary workers couldfind they are being made responsible foradministration and being held responsiblefor any unsatisfactory outcomes.”18

Faced with these findings, some can chooseto bury their heads in the sand and con-tinue to send volunteers abroad. But donorshave access to the same data, and areaware of these facts. If they read the ODIreport, they will also conclude that, if theactivities of Swedish NGOs are not effectivein advancing development, they could wellbe effective as a means of social control,and of “selling” the notion of state disen-gagement, particularly the privatization ofgovernment services that many considersocially regressive.

One might also suggest that NGOs arebecoming subcontracting enterprises per-forming social functions which are tradi-tionally the responsibility of government.Because of the credibility they enjoy as aresult of their expertise and experience inmanaging development projects, NGOs arethus hired on contract to perform well-defined tasks. It doesn’t hurt that theirservices are less expensive than thoseprovided by government.

The Way AheadTraditional human rights advocacy organiza-tions are faced with an inescapable contra-diction: while they support the ideals ofdevelopment, they are acutely aware thatsome of the economic policies Northerngovernments and the International MonetaryFund impose on the South are incompatiblewith the growth of human rights and thatnowhere—least of all in newly industrializedcountries—has increased trade liberalizationallowed the full and complete implementa-tion of these rights.19 As the Asian economiccrisis rages, even liberal ideologues denythere is any link between economic growthand democratization.20 And supporters ofopen competition, globalization, and free

markets vociferously defend human rights inorder to better mask their economic, social,and cultural dimensions.

The focus on building or strengthening civilsociety as a new area of activity, both inthe North and in the South, has sidetrackedrights activists from their original purpose.Instead of devoting themselves to theimmediate implementation of human rights,they have become more interested in theprocess, organization, procedures, andmechanisms of implementation. Therefollow specific criteria for evaluating towhat extent the set goals have been reached:at issue is not determining the level ofrespect for rights, but rather ensuring thatmechanisms have been set up to facilitaterights advocacy, which is far from thesame thing.

The promotion of civil society in the Southtransforms society’s struggle for rights intoa technical, procedural, and legal battle,often fought case by case, which sometimesignores the most important element: peo-ple’s welfare. A great deal remains to bedone to translate the principles of the 1993UN Conference on Human Rights in Viennaand of the International Bill of Rights intoreal instruments of change in Canada. Butas two professors from Windsor suggest, theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights could


BO

X3S O M E C A N A D I A N C I V I L S O C I E T Y A G E N C I E S

F O R H U M A N R I G H T S

Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace:

www.devp.org

Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC):

www.web.net/ccic-ccci

Canadian Council of Churches (CCC): www.web.net/~ccchurch

Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM):

front.web.net/canadem

Human Rights Internet: www.hri.ca

Inter-Church Fund for International Development (ICFID):

e-mail: [email protected]

Canadian Network for International Human Rights (NIHR)

Quebec Civil Liberties Union: [email protected]

Solidarité populaire Québec: Tel: (514) 598-2000

be entrenched into the constitutions ofevery nation by inserting this simplesentence: “No treaty, law or regulation may take precedence over the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.”

“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” proclaimedthe French Revolution. If the fight forliberty alone led to many excesses, thestruggle for the respect of all fundamentalrights will ensure that further excesses areavoided. This dynamic tension betweenestablished rights and the desire to broadenthese rights is an essential part of democ-ratic life. That is the Utopia we need inorder to usher in the era of so-called civilsocieties.

NOTES

1 As of June 1998, more than 88 complaints against Canadahad been lodged with the United Nations Committeeon Human Rights. Canada thus takes second place afterJamaica as the country that has been the object of thelargest number of complaints. Complaints cannot befiled against the United States as it has not ratified theenabling Protocol. (See http://www.unhchr.ch)

2 François Furet, “Marx après le marxisme,” Magazinelittéraire, September 1994, pp. 43-46. “... class solidarityis weakened to the benefit of a utilitarian individualismand of the individual-state relationship.”

3 Annual Meeting of CIDA and the Voluntary Sector, usuallyheld in November.

4 Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA’sActivities in Support of Human Rights and Democratization1996-97, Policy Branch, October 1997, p. 145.

5 Theme of a seminar organized by the Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade, in Ottawa,September 1998.

6 Serikat Buruh Solidaritats Indonesia (SBSI), led byMuchtar Pakpahan.

7 Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperationat http://www.ceci.ca

8 Alan Fowler, NGOs and the Globalization of Social Welfare,quoted in Semboja and Therkildsen, Service Provisionunder Stress in East Africa (London: James Currey, 1995),p. 61.

9 The Canadian Human Rights Commission, in its AnnualReport 1997, emphasizes that the recognition of civil andpolitical rights is not sufficient to stem the growth ofpoverty in Canada.

10 See Lucie Lamarche and Frédérique Poirier, Le régimequébécois de protection et de promotion des droits de lapersonne (Cowansville: Les Éditions Yvon Blais, 1996).

11 For the United Nations Human Rights Committee decisionof July 31, 1998, consult: GAOR 36th Sess, Supp. no 40(A/36/40), Annex XVIII, 166. See also “Micmaq TribalSociety V. Canada” in (1984) 33 Int Com. Jurists Rev. 45.The Indian Act [SRC-1-6 art. 12(1)(b)] was modified byBill C-31 adopted in June 1985.

12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,Human Rights Committee, 47th session, March 22-August 4, 1993. “Communication Nos 359/1989 and385/1989,” CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989.

http://www.unhchr.ch (accessed February 15, 1999).The 1993 UN Human Rights Committee decision regardingthe submission by John Ballantyne and ElizabethDavidson, and Gordon McIntyre brought about changesin Quebec’s Charter of the French Language (Quebec legislation 86, 1994).

13 In 1993, the UN’s Committee on Torture condemnedCanada for the “cruel and inhuman” treatment inflictedon a refugee. For the 1998 condemnation, see Committeeon Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ConcludingObservations E/C.12/1/Add.1; December 4, 1998.http://www.unhchr.ch

14 Ilan Kapoor, “Indicators for Programming in Human Rightsand Democratic Development: A Preliminary Study”(Ottawa; Canadian International Development Agency,1996); and CIDA, “Setting Results in Human Rights,Democratic Development and Governance at CIDA: A NeedsAssessment,” October 1998. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.caSee also Barbara Brown, “Democracy and Human Rights,What are we learning? Summary of lessons learned toNovember 1995 in human rights and democratic develop-ment programs supported by CIDA.” CIDA, Policy Branch,February 1996. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca (accessedFebruary 15, 1999).

15 Roger C. Riddell; Anthony Bebbington; and Lennart Peck,Promoting Development by Proxy: The development impactof government support to Swedish NGOs (London: OverseasDevelopment Institute, February 1995). In spite of theirunfavourable conclusions, the evaluators do not reject outof hand the raisons d’êtres of NGOs in the field of develop-ment assistance, whose role the authors recognize to beimportant: “... some non-developmental criterias: the roleof NGOs in carrying the message about development acrossSweden; the role of NGOs in creating and maintainingsolidarity links between people in developing countriesand in Sweden; and the role of special interest groupsin Sweden wishing to further their views abroad, and toencourage others to support them and the ideals forwhich they stand.”

16 Mutahi Ngunyi, “Promoting Democracy through PositiveConditionality,” mimeo, Leeds University, 1996, p.5,quoted in Julie Hearn, “The NGO-isation of KenyanSociety: USAID and the Restructuring of Health Care.”Review of African Political Economy, vol. 25, no. 75(March 1998), pp. 88-100.

17 Julie Hearn, “The NGO-isation of Kenyan society: USAIDand the Restructuring of Health Care.” Review of AfricanPolitical Economy, vol. 25, no. 75 (March 1998), p. 99.

18 Guy Standing, “The Folly of Social Safety Nets: Why basicincome is needed in Eastern Europe.” Social Research,vol. 64, no. 4 (Winter 1997), p. 1,869.

19 See, among others: “Question of the realization in allcountries of economic, social and cultural rights containedin the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, and Study of Special Problems Which theDeveloping Countries Face in their Efforts to AchieveThese Human Rights,” E/CN.4/1998/26, March 19, 1998;and C/CN.4/1998/23, January 15, 1998.http://www.unhchr.ch (accessed February 15, 1999).

20 See Fareed Zacharia, Foreign Affairs (Nov.-Dec. 1997), and“Il-liberal Democracy,” The New York Times, November 2,1997.


CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

J a c q u e s B e r t r a n d

J a c q u e s B e r t r a n d i s a p r o f e s s o r o f

p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y

o f T o r o n t o .

C H A P T E R


CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

P

S I X

Today, however, attention—and rhetoric—have shifted toward “conflict prevention”reflecting concerns about conflict in thepost-Cold War order. As a result, CSOs arehopping on the bandwagon of world peace-keepers, -makers, and -builders.

But good intentions don’t always translateinto good deeds. Preventing or resolvingconflict—one of the major challenges ofthe end of the 20th century—requiresspecific skills and in-depth understandingof particular contexts. CSOs unfortunatelystill have limited knowledge about how bestto prevent conflicts. The danger of jumpinghastily into conflict-prone countries withoutsufficient preparation is ever present. Thischapter argues that greater CSO activity inconflict prevention must be encouraged,

but with realistic, modest expectations ofits potential reach and effectiveness.

CSOs and Conflict Prevention: An OverviewThe 1990s have witnessed a transformationin the international attention paid todomestic conflict—conflict within, ratherthan between, states. Previously, intra-stateviolence was deemed to be the exclusiveresponsibility of the state, shielded behindthe sanctity of sovereignty. Today, anincreasingly rapid flow of information andthe ability to monitor conflicts in remoteareas of the world means that states are nolonger able to hide the horrors of domesticwars from external scrutiny. Alarmed bybroadcasts of conflict-fostered genocides

eace and development have long been concerns of civil

society organizations (CSOs). During the Cold War, for

example, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) mobilized public opinion

against the use and spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons. NGOs and activitists on university campuses were crucial in

the campaign that led to the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa.

The Canadian branch of Project Ploughshares, through its long-standing

monitoring of the flows and transfers of arms, has been at the fore-

front of Canadian efforts to curb the proliferation of conventional

and nuclear weapons.

“[t]hose of us in govern-

ment must recognize that

civil society has earned a

place at the table.”

The Honourable Lloyd

Axworthy, “Lessons from

the Ottawa Process,”

Canadian Foreign Policy

vol. 5, no. 3

(Spring 1998), p. 1.

in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, andhumanitarian disasters in countries such asSomalia and the Sudan, citizens and the mediain Europe and North America are increasinglypressuring governments to halt the spreadof deadly conflict and rescue victims.

CSOs have been well placed to play asignificant role in preventing this kindof conflict. Not subject to the rules thatrestrict states from intervening in eachother’s affairs, they can work more closelywith local populations and organizations inconflict situations. And although they havefewer resources for undertaking preventiveactions, their work with local populationscontributes instead to strengthening peace-ful relations at the grassroots.1 For example,a long-term commitment to particularcountries and a concomitant sensitivityto local cultures and traditions makes NGOswell placed to identify sources of conflict.They can thus warn the internationalcommunity of brewing crises and promotethe rule of law, human rights, and democra-tic development which reduce the potentialfor violent conflict. Moreover, NGOs “canpromote awareness about the sources,likelihood, and consequences of conflictsas well as about possible alternatives.”2

This is the role played by the Nigerian-basedCommittee for the Defense of Human Rights,for example, which gathers and publishesinformation on human rights in Nigeria. Italso organizes symposia to promote humanrights and democracy. International humanrights groups have complemented theCommittee’s information work in a varietyof ways. Human Rights Watch/Africa (HRW),for example, publishes reports denouncinghuman rights abuses. On one occasion,during a fact-finding mission in 1995, itdiscovered that the Nigerian governmentmanipulated tensions between the Ogoniand Andoni tribes. By sharing this informa-tion within the network, organizing localadvocacy campaigns, and carrying the infor-mation abroad through networks of humanrights organizations, HRW raised awarenessinternationally and maintained pressureon governments to prevent the abuses thatcreate conflict.3

Some CSOs also engage in preventivediplomacy—mediation, negotiation, and

roundtable discussions among conflictingparties. While the United Nations andgovernments are more effective at thishigh-level type of intervention, many NGOsand CSOs have also engaged in mediationand confidence-building measures. CSOs,in fact, may sometimes have access toboth parties and be considered sufficientlyneutral that they have an advantage inbringing together conflicting groups. TheInternational Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), for example, mediated between theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and thegovernment in Sri Lanka “by communicatingconfidential messages between the twosides,” a role which “was important inestablishing the initial contacts and themodalities of conflict resolution regardingpeace talks.”4

Similarly, an Italian-based religious group,the Community of St. Egidio, mediatedbetween conflicting parties in Mozambique.Andrea Bartoli, vice-president of theCommunity of St. Egidio, has deplored thefact that this type of successful NGO media-tion was not replicated in Somalia: “Theinternational community had never soughtto bring in a nongovernmental organizationsuch as the Community of St. Egidio as ameans of mediating among Somalia’s warringfactions. In Mozambique, the Rome-basedcommunity had played a crucial role inbringing the two sides to the negotiatingtable by offering a space for dialogue.”5

Other CSOs work at the community level tobring together members of disputing groupsin search of common solutions. In responseto growing racism and the deteriorationof relations between ethnic groups inGuatemala, Redd Barna—the Norwegian Savethe Children—“decided to take a holisticview of the communities’ problems as thepeople themselves saw them. Our belief wasthat solutions and options should be theresult of community discussion and analy-sis.”6 The emphasis was placed on havingparticipants find their own common groundwhile the foreign NGO provided only avenue and rationale for meetings.

The scientific community and educationalinstitutions have also contributed to conflictprevention. They establish networks ofcooperative research to exchange resources

63C H A P T E R S I X C I V I L S O C I E T Y A N D C O N F L I C T P R E V E N T I O N

and information, conduct research into thecauses of conflict, and educate the publicabout peaceful approaches to conflict reso-lution. The Pugwash Conference on Scienceand World Affairs, for instance, broughttogether American and Soviet scientistsduring the Cold War to foster understandingand cooperation. Since then, the organizationhas continued its work through scientificnetworks, generating reports from its con-ferences to the Pugwash Council, whichin turn issues high-profile statements andreports. It was awarded the Nobel Prizefor Peace in 1995.

It is also important that, at all these differ-ent levels, efforts be made to coordinateactivities. Working groups, for example, canbe formed to discuss and coordinate actions

in a particular country or on particularaspects of conflict. In the United States,for instance, a Burundi Policy Forum wascreated when the intense but disparateactivities of CSOs, governments, and inter-national organizations in Burundi wererecognized. As Lionel Rosenblatt, ExecutiveDirector of Refugees International, noted:

The Center for Preventive Action of the Councilon Foreign Relations and the African-AmericanInstitute joined Refugees International andSearch for Common Ground as founders andconveners of the Burundi Policy Forum. Everyonewe met in Burundi agreed that a humanitariandisaster was in the making. Everyone alsoagreed that the international community’sresponse to the threat of chaos in Burundilacked resources, coordination, and focus. ManyUN agencies, bilateral aid agencies, and privatenongovernmental organizations were workingfuriously—but separately—to prevent Burundifrom falling apart.7

A growing number of coordinating groupshave been formed as governments and CSOsrealize their limitations in addressing con-flict on their own. More cooperation andcoordination bring much better chancesof success.

A number of other actions have also beentaken to address structural problems ofconflict. Sustainable development, theprevention of environmental degradation,the reduction of poverty, the promotionof democracy, and improvements in humanrights are all cited as activities that candirectly impact on potential conflicts.8

Canadian CSOs and Peacebuilding What are Canadian CSOs doing among thesevarious nongovernmental struggles to pre-vent conflict? Although most Canadian workon conflict issues is discussed under thebroad rubric of “peacebuilding” (see Box 1),it is remarkably diverse. A recent survey ofCSOs included the following activities aspeacebuilding work: conflict resolution; earlywarning; environmental security; humanitar-ian relief and emergency assistance; physicalsecurity; individual security; civilianparticipation in peacekeeping operations;human rights; economic reconstruction;


BO

X1 A D E F I N I T I O N O F P E AC E B U I L D I N G

In An Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-

Ghali issued the United Nations’ strongest statement for galvanizing

international organizations, governments, and nongovernmental

organizations toward conflict prevention and resolution. The Agenda

for Peace identifies four categories of action:

• Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising

between parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into

conflicts, and limit their spread when they occur.

• Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essen-

tially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI

of the Charter of the United Nations.

• Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hith-

erto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involv-

ing UN military and/or police personnel and, frequently, civilians.

Peacekeeping expands possibilities for both preventing conflict and

making peace.

• Peacebuilding is action to identify and support structures that will

strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks

out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and

preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the

opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which can prevent the

recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.1 Peacebuilding can

be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after

conflict has occurred.2

Notes

1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemakingand Peace-keeping, June 17, 1992, www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html(accessed September 29, 1998). The Agenda for Peace defined peacemaking,peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, but the latter only referred to post-conflictsituations. The Supplement to the Agenda referred to both peacebuildingand pre-conflict situations.

2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position PaperOf The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of TheUnited Nations, January 3, 1995, www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html (accessed September 29, 1998).

social reconstruction; governance anddemocratic development; institutional/civilcapacity building; policy development,assessment, and advocacy; and training.9

In the realm of peacebuilding, mostCanadian CSOs have focused on advocacy,training, and education. This work hasaimed to provide knowledge and informa-tion to help conflicting parties buildcommon values and goals, reduce the trau-mas of war, and find peaceful solutions toproblems. Peacefund Canada, for example,in partnership with two Senegalese organi-zations—the National Association forLiteracy and Adult Education and the Uniondémocratique des enseignants—held aconference of adult educators from severalWest African countries to focus on buildinga culture of peace. The Primate’s World Reliefand Development Fund of the AnglicanChurch of Canada worked with WorldSolidarity Forum on Sri Lanka for Justiceand Peace, an international group involvinglocal participants, to promote discussionsabout peace and train activists on how tobuild trust between ethnic and religiouscommunities. World Vision (WV) Canada,in partnership with WV-Guatemala and theMennonite Central Committee-Guatemala,spent one year educating Guatemalansabout their country’s peace agreement.

Some training programs involve educationthat reduces the trauma from conflict andhence the predisposition for violence. CARECanada, for example, has cooperated with theCroatian and Bosnian Ministries of Educationin a three-year project to train teachers inyouth activities that address trauma andencourage the search for peaceful meansof resolving conflict. WV-Canada, with itsGerman, Dutch, and Ugandan counterparts,and UNICEF Uganda have established acentre in Gulu, Uganda to “de-traumatize”and enhance psycho-social healing forthousands of child soldiers.

Conflict resolution workshops are anothermeans of education. Often involvingNorthern CSOs that use conflict-resolutionmethodologies developed in Europe orNorth America, such as the Canadian Centrefor International Studies and Cooperation(CECI), these workshops are run in partner-ship with local organizations (see Box 2).

The Canadian Institute for ConflictResolution has used such methodologiesto train local NGOs in Burundi on commu-nity-based conflict resolution techniques.Working in partnership with the London-based International Alert and a local groupof elders focused on peace, it has soughtto train people who will in turn then trainothers in the same methods.

Canadian organizations have also beeninvolved in building coalitions. For example,a group of Canadian NGOs, along with non-governmental institutions, academics, andindividuals, have formed a network explic-itly devoted to peacebuilding, the CanadianPeacebuilding Coordinating Committee(CPCC—see Box 3 for a list of its members).Its members meet to exchange informationabout their respective work and developcommon strategies for enhancing coopera-tion on peacebuilding issues. Its majorachievements have been building strongerrelationships with the government—theMinister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy,has shown particular interest in pushingCanada’s role in peacebuilding—andstarting the collection of comprehensive


BO

X2T R A I N I N G I N C O N F L I C T N E G O T I AT I O N / P R E V E N T I O N

A development NGO, the Montreal-based Canadian Centre for

International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) is also active in conflict

prevention training. CECI’s approach is based on the methodology

developed by Harvard University’s Conflict Management Group (CMG),

with which CECI cooperates. This methodology aims to provide tools

enabling groups to search for their own solutions. CECI has used this

methodology in Guatemala, West Africa, Burundi, and Haiti.

A typical training session involves a two-to-three-day roundtable of

20-25 participants from a variety of organizations representative of the

conflicting parties, including civil society, government, and religious or

ethnic groups. An important feature of the methodology is an attempt

to help participants become more flexible in thinking about their inter-

ests (and how those can be compatible with others’). Through a series

of simple exercises and games, participants learn how their positions

are often a result of particular perspectives. The improvement of negoti-

ation skills and the advancement of interests depends on the ability to

understand the other party’s perspective. Finally, it is up to the partici-

pants to make links to their local context and problems, which they

usually do while designing a local action plan.

Sources

Information obtained from the minutes of a presentation by CECI to the CanadianPeacebuilding Coordinating Committee; interview with Thérèse Bouchard, CECI,August 1998.

documentation about peacebuilding activi-ties and geographic areas where Canadiansare engaged. The Committee has been lesssuccessful in enhancing coordinated actionin the field and at home, either among CSOsor with the Canadian government. Nor hasit increased the role of CSOs in governmentpolicymaking on peacebuilding.

In recent years Canadian organizations havethus been playing a greater role in conflictprevention than ever before. This increasedinvolvement has, in part, been stimulatedby a new peacebuilding thrust by theCanadian government. This impetus is par-tially responsible for the greater coopera-tion that now exists between CSOs andthe government.

Government-CSO CooperationThe Canadian government has recently seta new agenda for peacebuilding. In October1996, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthyannounced the creation of a CanadianPeacebuilding Initiative and a CanadianPeacebuilding Fund to respond to crisesaround the world. In 1998, when Canadawon a seat on the United Nations SecurityCouncil, he declared: “One of Canada’s mainobjectives during its term will be to includehuman security concerns in Council discus-sions. Such concerns include conflict pre-vention, peacebuilding, and respect forhuman rights and fundamental freedoms.”10

It is clear that, for the Canadian government,peacebuilding and conflict prevention arefirm new priorities.

Canada’s peacebuilding agenda has stimu-lated new efforts between NGOs and thegovernment. A spirit of cooperation andinformation exchange on peacebuildingissues now mark the new Annual Peace-building Consultations between Canadianorganizations and the Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade (DFAIT).For a number of reasons—including thehistory of government-CSO collaborationin other areas—the Canadian governmentnow recognizes the need for complemen-tarity between governmental and non-governmental actions.

But while the annual consultations haveincreased the exchange of information,they have yet to produce a real mechanismfor involving CSOs in the development ofcommon policies. The ideas generated atthe consultations feed government thinkingon policy issues, without inviting NGOparticipants to maintain a more regularinput into policymaking. As a result, someNGOs doubt that these consultations canachieve concrete results.

The new Peacebuilding Fund and the Peace-building Program have injected additionalresources into CSOs’ peacebuilding work.With an annual $10 million budget managedby the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA) and DFAIT, the two-yearPeacebuilding Fund was designed for quickresponses to peacebuilding needs, in par-ticular for short-term, limited projects. It


BO

X3 M E M B E R S O F T H E C A N A D I A N P E AC E B U I L D I N G

C O O R D I N AT I N G C O M M I T T E E

CANADEM: front.web.net/canadem

Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation: www.ceci.ca

Canadian Council for International Co-operation: www.web.net/ccic-ccci

Canadian Friends Service Committee: www.web.net/~cfsc

Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee:

www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca

Canadian Voice of Women for Peace

CARE Canada: www.care.ca

CUSO: www.cuso.org

Global Affairs Research Partners: Tel: (613) 729-9564

International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development:

www.ichrdd.ca

International Development Research Centre: www.idrc.ca

International Holistic Tourism Education Centre:

www.geocities.com/RainForest/Vines/6016

Inter Pares: www.interpares.org

Mennonite Central Committee: www.mennonitecc.ca/mcc

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University:

temagami.carleton.ca/npsia

The North-South Institute: www.nsi-ins.ca

OXFAM Canada: www.oxfam.ca

Parliamentary Centre: e-mail: [email protected]

Peacefund Canada: e-mail: [email protected]

Philippine Development Assistance Program

Physicians for Global Survival: www.pgs.ca

Primate’s World Relief and Development Fund, Anglican Church

of Canada: www.pwrdf.org

Project Ploughshares: www.ploughshares.ca

Shelter Unlimited: Tel: (613) 728-7813

United Church of Canada: www.uccan.org

supports CECI’s community training sessionsin Burundi, for example, and funds theMennonite Central Committee’s efforts to“enhance the capacity of local organizationsin the Gaza Strip and West Bank to trainvolunteers in a wide range of conflictresolution techniques,” following traditionalArab conflict resolution methods.11 More-over, DFAIT’s Peacebuilding Program alsosupports activities outside the Fund’s man-date, providing funds for workshops andconferences, research, and exchange withCSOs. Among others, it has supported suchgroups as the International Coalition toStop the Use of Child Soldiers and theCanadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights Experts (CANADEM).

While these initiatives have generated anew momentum for peacebuilding, they alsohave their limitations. Despite a prolifera-tion of forums for greater exchange of infor-mation, the problem of coordination withthe government remains. Many Canadianorganizations complain that the govern-ment’s peacebuilding policy lacks coherenceand focus, thereby creating unmet expecta-tions and fewer, poorer, results. In particu-lar they criticize the government for itsemphasis on quick, results-based thinking:in the CSOs’ view, peacebuilding requiresa longer-term view. And while they laud thegovernment’s recognition of their contribu-tion to peacebuilding, they insist that realcooperation demands that they be treatedas equals in the development of policyand setting of priorities. This goal may beillusory—and some would question whetherit is even desirable—but it reflects thelimits of partnership that are inevitableamong organizations of different sizes, andwith different resource bases and degreesof internal coherence.12

Nevertheless, the enhanced cooperationbetween the Canadian government and CSOsis certainly a recognition of the necessityof coordination. Each side agrees that noorganization alone can effectively meet thechallenges of reducing conflict. This recog-nition has led to a growing number ofcoalitions and networks to address some ofthe structural causes of conflict, includingthe use of anti-personnel landmines.

Building Successful International CoalitionsThe International Campaign to BanLandmines (ICBL) is a remarkably successfulexample of how international coalition-building between Northern and SouthernNGOs, in partnership with like-mindedgovernments, can be a powerful strategyfor change. Launched in 1992, the ICBLled to the adoption of a treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines in December 1997.Canadian NGOs and the Canadian governmentplayed an important role in this effort.

The ICBL was formed by a small group ofNGOs, including Handicap International,Human Rights Watch, Medico International,Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for HumanRights, and the Vietnam Veterans of AmericaFoundation. In May 1993 the first non-governmental International Conference on Landmines was held in London, bringingtogether 50 representatives of 40 NGOs to strategize on building the internationalcampaign. Canadian NGOs joined in 1994and formed a Canadian coalition, MinesAction Canada, that represented more than40 NGOs working in different sectors.13

Under strong pressures by the ICBL cam-paign, representatives of 50 countriesagreed to participate in a conference heldin Ottawa at the end of 1996. For the firsttime ever, governments, international agen-cies, and CSOs came together to developstrategies and actions toward a global banon anti-personnel landmines. Canada tooka leadership role when Foreign AffairsMinister Lloyd Axworthy—in a surprisingdeparture from traditional diplomaticprocess—announced a schedule for thesigning of an international treaty. By settinga target date of December 1997, Canadacapitalized on the momentum that hadbeen set by the NGO campaign, gamblingthat a sufficiently high “critical” numberof countries would be ready to sign a treatyat that date.14

The gamble, known as “the Ottawa process,”paid off when, at the December 1997conference in Ottawa, 122 countriescame together to sign the “Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel


“The Ottawa process ...

may be the most

optimistic representation

of an increasingly

potent civil society.”

Michael Dolan and

Chris Hunt,

“Negotiating the Ottawa

Process,” Canadian

Foreign Policy, vol. 5,

no. 3 (Spring 1998),

p. 46.


Mines and on their Destruction.” This wasa victory for the ICBL, and Canada was thefirst country to sign and ratify the treaty.The key role of the ICBL and Mines ActionCanada were recognized at the conference,and the ICBL and its international coordina-tor, Jody Williams, were awarded the 1997Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. Sincethen, the ICBL has been pressuring signa-tory governments to ratify the conventionand has been lobbying others to join. Whenit entered into force on March 1, 1999,134 countries had signed the conventionand 65 had ratified.

This campaign well demonstrates how coali-tions of NGOs in the North and the South,in partnership with sympathetic governments,can create a strong momentum for change.The process consists of four elements:

• First, CSOs organize large nationalcampaigns to sensitize public opinionand create pressure on governments.

• Second, CSOs keep a constant pressureon governments through continued publicdebate of the issue, while simultaneouslylobbying for change.

• Third, they keep a check on the govern-ment’s public commitments to the issue,publicly disclosing the discrepanciesbetween the commitments and action.They therefore create “peer pressure”by applauding the “good” states andcriticizing the “bad.”

• Finally, they forge alliances with like-minded governments to create pressureon sometimes more powerful stateswhich are opposed to the issue.15

Following the example of landmines,Canadian CSOs, with a supportive Canadiangovernment, are using this strategy to pur-sue other similar objectives, such as a banon the use of small arms and the elimina-tion of conscription of child soldiers(see Box 4).

Problems for Canadian CSOs in Conflict PreventionDespite their many successes, CSO peace-building activities encounter a number ofproblems, not least of which is that manyCSOs undertake peacebuilding work withoutadequate field experience.

Lack of analysis and experienceThe availability of new resources throughthe Canadian government’s funding windowshas also led some CSOs to re-label oldactivities as “peacebuilding,” withoutrevising their work methods. Projects tomeet basic needs of the population, provideorganizational support and training forCSOs in developing countries, and programsagainst family violence are all placed underthe rubric of “peacebuilding.” This dilutesany assessment of how specific activitiesaddress particular sources of conflict.

The problem is more than just one of defin-ition. To develop effective and coordinatedaction to prevent conflict or build peacefulrelations after conflict, foreign organizationsrequire a deep understanding of the localcontext as well as a good analysis of thecauses of conflict. But generic activities aresometimes assumed to address sources ofconflict without a serious analysis of their

BO

X4 G L O B A L N E T W O R K S , G L O B A L C A M PA I G N S

Following the success of the global campaign to ban anti-personnel

landmines, CSOs have launched two new campaigns that use the

landmines model.

The Preparatory Committee for a Global Campaign on Small Arms and

Light Weapons (PrepCom), established in January 1998, is an electronic

network of NGOs dedicated to organizing a campaign against the

accumulation and abuse of small firearms and other light weapons. By

September, its membership had grown to 107 NGOs and 44 individuals

from 62 countries. At a meeting in August 1998, the group decided to

establish the International NGO, Action Network on Small Arms

(IANSA), to be launched in 1999.

The International Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers is seeking

the adoption and implementation of an Optional Protocol to the

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), setting 18 years as

the minimum age for all forms of military recruitment. The coalition

was launched by seven international NGOs: Amnesty International,

Defense for Children International, Human Rights Watch, International

Federation Terre des Hommes, the International Save the Children

Alliance, the Jesuit Refugee Service (Geneva), and the Quaker UN Office

(Geneva). Canadian NGOs have formed a working group linked to the

international campaign and to other national coalitions. The coalition

has established links to several agencies and a group of sympathetic

governments to work toward an international conference.

As in the case of anti-personnel landmines, these coalitions use the

internet extensively to launch preliminary networks, organize as formal

coalitions, enlist the support of friendly governments, form regional

and national campaigns, and inform the international media.

actual effects. For example, an organizationcan invest in environmental conservation,but this investment constitutes a peace-building activity only if it is implementedin a community where the scarcity of envi-ronmental resources is the cause of conflict.

Poor coordination and cooperationBecause of their different mandates andmethodologies, CSOs in Canada exchangeinformation but often fail to coordinatetheir activities in the field, particularly withdeveloping-country agencies and interna-tional organizations. Each organization mayhave its own method of conducting conflictresolution workshops, for example, and itsown set of partners. Each will independentlyselect participating communities. This hasled hundreds of organizations, governmentaland nongovernmental, from Canada, the US,Sweden, and elsewhere, to invest in peace-building in Bosnia. Yet, there is no over-arching strategy to determine how oneorganization’s actions can best complementanother’s. Instead, it is assumed that thecumulative efforts, even if uncoordinated,will be effective.

Mistrust of CSO-government cooperation

Many CSOs fear that they will be co-optedinto the government’s agenda if theycooperate. Some are critical of newresources, such as the Peacebuilding Fund,which force CSOs to abide by governmentpriorities and criteria. In the case of thelandmines’ treaty, government and CSOperspectives converged as public opinionand government officials began to supporta ban; CSOs maintained their independenceand sought the support of governmentswhich shared their views. This is not alwaysthe case, however: in weaker cooperativerelationships, the balance of power isheavily weighted in favour of governments.

Perceived biasCSOs suffer from a problem of perceivedbias. When they engage in peacebuilding,CSOs usually aim to remain neutral, but areoften perceived to favour one group overanother. In Macedonia, for example, “inter-national NGOs are often criticized for takingone side against the other. [T]he averagecitizen is under the impression that inter-national organizations focus on the needs

of one particular ethnic group.”16 In suchcases, it is not always clear whether foreignintervention contributes to peace oractually exacerbates conflict.

Lack of evaluationWell-meaning CSOs implement specificagendas, often in situations where rapidresponse is necessary: there is generallylittle analysis of whether those actions arethe best for addressing specific causes ofconflict. After the fact, the impact of theiractivities is seldom evaluated. As a result,knowledge about what actions can effec-tively contribute to conflict preventionis lacking. And while the InternationalDevelopment Research Centre and theLocal Capacities for Peace Project havemade some efforts to evaluate the impactof CSOs’ work on peace and conflict,these efforts are still scarce.

The Future of Conflict PreventionConflict prevention and peacebuildingwork have thrown into relief the ways thatCanadians have worked in partnership withSouthern counterparts toward a commongoal. As the landmines ban has shown,collaborative work through internationalcoalitions and in consort with sympatheticgovernments can effectively build momen-tum for change. Canadians continue toexchange information through the CanadianPeacebuilding Coordinating Committee andfrequent consultations with the government.Individually, they conduct workshops onconflict resolution, train other organizationson means of resolving conflict peacefully,and occasionally act as mediators betweenconflicting parties. And, most fundamen-tally, Canadians working in civil societyorganizations contribute to building peacethrough their long-term development work.

We should not exaggerate the successes ofcivil society, however. While CSOs contributein several ways to preventing conflict, theirimpact should be assessed modestly andcritically. More analysis, research, and eval-uation are needed to determine how, where,and when conflict can be significantlyreduced or prevented. Additional collabora-tion and cooperation are also required sinceeven successful actions can have a negligible


impact if they are isolated and unrelatedto the work of others.

Nevertheless, given the Canadian govern-ment’s genuine support of peacebuildingand trends within civil society for greatercoordination, there is real momentum tosurmount these problems. The result maywell be a more peaceful world.

NOTES

1 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (New York:Carnegie Corporation, 1997), pp. 111-25.

2 Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “International Preventive Action:Developing a Strategic Framework,” in Robert I. Rotberg,ed., Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing EthnicConflict in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitution Press, 1996), p. 63.

3 Melissa Crow and Clement Nwankwo, “Before ‘Things FallApart in Nigeria: The Role of Non-Governmental HumanRights Organizations in Conflict Prevention,” in Rotberg,ed., Vigilance and Vengeance, pp. 172-73.

4 Neelan Tiruchelvam, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict andPreventive Action: the Role of NGOs,” in Rotberg, ed.,Vigilance and Vengeance, p. 159.

5 Andrea Bartoli, “Somalia and Rwanda vs. Mozambique:Notes for Comparison on Peace Processes.” Communityof St. Egidio http://www.wf.org/somalia.htm (accessed November 9, 1998).

6 Tom Lent, “The Search for Peace and Justice in Guatemala,”in Rotberg, ed., Vigilance and Vengeance, p. 75.

7 Lionel Rosenblatt, “Burundi Policy Forum.” April 1996,http://www.wf.org/burundi.htm (accessed November 9,1998). This essay was written in April 1996.

8 Carnegie Commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict, pp. 109-27.

9 Peggy Teagle and Fen Osler Hampson, “PeacebuildingCensus,” Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee,Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, IDRC,Department of Foreign Affairs, February 1998.http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/censusrep-e.htm

10 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,“Axworthy Welcomes Successful Canadian Security CouncilBid,” Press Release No. 237, October 8, 1998.

11 CIDA/ACDI, “Canada to Support Peacebuilding Efforts inthe Middle East,” News Release (98-47), June 8, 1998.

12 Peggy Teagle and Fen Osler Hampson, “PeacebuildingCensus,” February 1998.

13 Celina Tuttle and Joanne Epp, “International campaign toban landmines: another step forward,” PloughsharesMonitor, vol. 16, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 15-16.

14 Murray Campbell, “Axworthy sets land-mine treaty date:Surprise move challenges countries reluctant to endorsetimetable on banning the explosives.” The Globe and Mail,October 7, 1996, p. A10.

15 For analysis of the elements of this strategy in the con-text of landmines, see Brian W. Tomlin, “On a fast-track toa ban.” Canadian Foreign Policy/La politique étrangère duCanada, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-24; and MichaelDolan and Chris Hunt, “Negotiating the Ottawa Process.”Canadian Foreign Policy/La politique étrangère du Canada,vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 25-50.

16 Eran Fraenkel, “International NGOs in PreventiveDiplomacy and Early Warning: Macedonia,” in Rotberg, ed.,Vigilance and Vengeance, p. 141.


WORKING GLOBALLY FORGENDER EQUALITY

D e b o r a h S t i e n s t r a

D e b o r a h S t i e n s t r a t e a c h e s p o l i t i c s

a n d w o m e n ’ s s t u d i e s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y

o f W i n n i p e g .

T

C H A P T E R

S E V E N

To be more effective,

women’s groups in the

North and South need to

develop deeper, more

sustained and equitable

partnerships.


WORKING GLOBALLY FORGENDER EQUALITY

For at least 25 years, however, women andmen, in Canada and elsewhere, have workedacross boundaries and oceans to redressthese inequalities through developmentassistance. MATCH International Centre, forexample, has worked with women in Canadaand countries of the South to addressviolence against women. And the NationalAction Committee on the Status of Women(NAC), in collaboration with a Southernwomen’s group, Development Alternativeswith Women for a New Era (DAWN), haschallenged structural adjustment policiesand the resulting poverty of women acrossthe world.

In recent years, this organizing has becomeincreasingly global. Through networksestablished to share information andstrategies, women’s groups undertake joint

research projects to explore commonalitiesin their situations and possible actions forchange. They work in partnership to improvewomen’s lives and ensure their empower-ment. They tell their stories, discuss theirwork, and celebrate their achievementsat international meetings. They organizeinitiatives which are simultaneously localactions and global events. Their activismhas created better access for girls andwomen to education and improved healthservices. For example, work by the Canadian-based Women’s Health Interaction (WHI)led the International Development ResearchCentre to cease funding the development ofa vaccine that was being tested on Southernwomen without their informed consent.As well, MATCH International has fundedwomen’s groups in Senegal over the past10 years to educate the Muslim leadership

he world over, rates of employment, income, access to

decisionmaking, and violence attest to the differences in the

situations of men and women. If many countries—including Canada—

have realized considerable progress in health, education, and income

for their populations, as measured in the United Nations Development

Programme’s (UNDP) human development index, that progress has been

unequal. The UNDP’s gender-related development index reveals real

disparities in the development of men and women and reflects the gender-

based barriers faced by women throughout the world.

about the harmful effects of female genital mutilation: as a result, in 1997, theSenegalese president committed his govern-ment to eradicate female genital mutilation.

But global gender work faces numerousconstraints, not the least of which is thescarcity of resources. For example, the only Canadian government agency with an exclusive mandate to fund women’sgroups—albeit with a limited mandate inthe area of global gender equality—hasseen its funding decrease by 45 percentduring the past decade.

Why do local groups undertake to workbeyond their borders? Many are motivatedby the increased globalization of their ownsocieties; others by the increased need toshare information and strategies, whetherin addressing or resisting state policies suchas structural adjustment, or challengingcorporate actions to promote a globalmarket economy. For some, it is the recog-nition that international commitments and

advocacy provide an additional tool withwhich to prod governments to action ongender equality at home. Still others arespurred by their belief that—in the wordsof Evelyn Drescher, Research Coordinatorof Mothers Are Women—”we do not receivegains for ourselves on the backs of otherwomen, whether women in our neighbour-hood or women in the South. That is notacceptable... That is not the vision of theworld as we see it.”1

This chapter explores the different tacticsand strategies used to make global connec-tions, the issues and tensions that theselinks have raised, and the improvementsneeded by civil society organizations andgovernments alike.

Shifting Horizons: From Local to GlobalCanadian civil society organizations (CSOs)working globally toward gender equalityhave changed in both type and focus over

73C H A P T E R S E V E N W O R K I N G G L O B A L L Y F O R G E N D E R E Q U A L I T Y

TA

BL

E

1G E N D E R E Q UA L I T Y I N D I C AT O R SCountry1 Life Adult Combined Earned Seats Adminis- Professional Adult Number

expectancy literacy primary, income held in trators and and women of NGOs at birth rate (%) secondary share (%) parliament managers technical physically working (years) 1995 and tertiary 1995 workers assaulted by on violence

enrolment an intimate against ratio (%) partner women1995

Female/ Female/ Female/ Female/ (percentage (percentage (percentage Male Male Male Male women) women) women)

Bangladesh 57.01/ 26.14/ 30.9/ 23.08/ 4.9 34.7 23.0 na 21-5056.85 49.37 39.64 76.92

Botswana 53.14/ 59.91/ 71.61/ 38.86/ 36.1 61.4 39.0 na na50.06 80.52 68.98 61.14

Brazil 70.72/ 83.21/ 71.8/ 29.27/ 17.3 62.6 29.0 na 250+62.76 83.32 69.1 70.73

Cameroon 56.72/ 52.13/ 40.97/ 30.40/ 10.1 24.4 30.0 na 1-553.92 75.05 48.29 69.61

Canada 81.78/ 99.0/ 100/ 37.96/ 19.3 42.2 56.1 25 250+76.28 99.0 100 62.04

Haiti 56.28/ 42.2/ 27.99/ 35.98/ 32.6 39.3 36.0 na na52.9 48.05 29.55 64.02

Malaysia 73.71/ 78.06/ 62.0/ 30.36/ 18.8 43.6 30.0 39 6-1069.27 89.05 60.0 69.64

Norway 80.48/ 99.0/ 93.0/ 42.36/ 36.4 31.5 61.9 25 na74.65 99.0 92.0 57.6 (Trondheim)

Note

1 The countries selected rated highest and lowest for their respective continent on the UNDP’s human development index. Where two or morecountries were rated the same, the availability of data determined which would be selected.

Sources

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and The World’s Women, 1995:Trends and Statistics (New York: United Nations, 1995), pp. 160, 163.

the past three decades. In the 1960s and1970s, international work was undertakenprimarily by a few academics interested indevelopment studies, development organiza-tions, and policymakers. Domestic women’sgroups, with the exception of CanadianVoice of Women for Peace, focused theirattention on issues within Canada. By thelate 1990s, however, a small core of devel-opment organizations, including the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operation(CCIC), OXFAM Canada, and Inter Pares,had fully integrated gender equality intheir development work. More interesting,a growing number of domestic women’sgroups, including the NAC, the CanadianResearch Institute for the Advancementof Women (CRIAW), and the CanadianAssociation of Sexual Assault Centres,identify international solidarity and actionas an important component of their work.

In the 1970s, researchers such as EsterBoserup, the pioneering author of Women’sRole in Economic Development, made it clearthat existing development programs eitherignored women or assumed they contributedto society only through their roles as wives

and mothers. This led researchers to challengepolicymakers to incorporate women equallyinto development programs. The US govern-ment led the way in the early 1970s andbrought a similar amendment for change tothe United Nations. These actions, coupledwith increased activism around the issueof women in development, propelled theCanadian International Development Agency(CIDA) to reframe how it addressed womenand development. These policy changes, andtheir manifestations throughout the 1980sand 1990s,2 made it easier for developmentCSOs to find support for their work onwomen and development.

Canadian women who were not involved indevelopment began to find their way intothe international arena as a result of theUnited Nations Decade for Women (1975-85)and its three international conferences andparallel NGO forums. For some, these meetingsacted as catalysts for further internationalwork: Canadians Norma Walmsley andSuzanne Johnson-Harvor used their energyfrom the 1975 world conference on womento create MATCH International Centre, seenas a way for Canadian women to share theirresources and talents with women in otherparts of the world. MATCH Internationalhas since evolved to become a fundingsource for women in the South.3

Although these meeting places opened theinternational debate to Canadians, partici-pation was initially dominated by white,middle-class women, usually acting in theirindividual capacity as professionals oracademics. Soon, however, other groupsbegan to see that their issues could benefitfrom acquiring an international dimension.Aboriginal women, for example, used inter-national forums to press for their rightsearlier than most Canadians. In 1977,Sandra Lovelace, a Tobique woman wholost her Indian status when she marrieda non-Indian, took her claim for rights toIndian status and band membership to theUnited Nations Human Rights Committeeunder the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights.4 The Committee’s strongcriticism motivated Canada to change theIndian Act (see p. 57). The internationalizeddebate on gender was later joined bywomen who conducted health campaignsaround population control and new


BO

X1 C A N A D I A N I N V O LV E M E N T

A number of Canadian groups are involved in promoting gender equalityinternationally. Here is a sampling:

Umbrella advocacy groups: National Action Committee on the Statusof Women (NAC); The Students’ Commission; Réseau national d’action-éducation femmes; Fédération des femmes du Québec.

Research organizations: Canadian Research Institute for theAdvancement of Women (CRIAW); The North-South Institute.

Development organizations: MATCH International Centre;OXFAM Canada; Inter Pares; CUSO.

Issue-based advocacy/networking groups: Mothers are Women (MAW);Women’s Health Interaction; Canadian Association of Sexual AssaultCentres; Intercede; Canadian Women’s Health Network; MediaWatch;Canadian Voice of Women for Peace; Disabled Women’s Network (DAWNCanada); National Farmers’ Union.

International gender equality networks based in Canada: Réseaumondial de groupes de femmes utilisant la langue française comme outilde travail; World March of Women; Indigenous Women of the Americas.

National or local branches of international organizations: NationalCouncil of Women; Women for a Just and Healthy Planet; YWCA;Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood (GROOTS).

Solidarity networks: Maquila Solidarity Network.

Post-Beijing action groups: UN Platform for Action (Manitoba);Newfoundland and Labrador Beijing Committee; Ad-hoc Committeeon Beijing-Alberta.

Labour unions: Public Service Alliance of Canada; the social orhumanitarian funds of the Canadian Auto Workers, Steelworkers, andCommunications, Energy and Paperworkers Unions.

75

reproductive technologies because they recognized the necessary links betweendomestic health policies, the developmentprograms of countries of the North, andwomen’s rights internationally.5

Still, few women’s groups in Canada becameactive internationally until the late 1980s.Some argued that working on a global scalewould drain their limited resources, whileothers suggested that the “international”debate was really dominated by US activists’agendas. Many deliberately chose to workon strengthening women’s groups at homeso that they could resist US dominance.When Canadian groups did become involvedon the global playing field, there was oftena substantial difference between thosemost interested in development abroadand those more interested in women’srights and issues at home.

Global Issues, Divergent StrategiesTwo solitudes exist among Canadians work-ing for global gender equality in the 1990s:women’s groups and the development com-munity. The development community hasbeen at the forefront of building substan-tive relationships with Southern groupsworking on gender equality. These relation-ships, however, have not yet translated intogender equality in their own organizationsor stronger links with Canadian women’sgroups. For some organizations like InterPares or OXFAM, gender and developmentstatements are fully integrated into theirmandate and all projects. Others, like theYMCA or the Canadian Red Cross Society, are aware of the inequalities that may facewomen, but have done little to address itspecifically. Even in the case of organiza-tions with well-integrated gender mandateslike OXFAM, there is little communicationwith Canadian-based women’s groups thatmay be working on similar issues at thedomestic level. If these relationships werefurther developed, Canadian and Southernwomen’s groups could share their knowledgeand experiences in specific areas, like violence against women.

Canadian women’s groups are increasinglyinvolved in global struggles for a number ofreasons: the impact of structural adjustment

on women worldwide; the increased pres-ence of women originally from the South in women’s groups in Canada; the growingmaturity of women’s groups in the South; and the large number of international con-ferences on topics of concern in the 1990s.

Yet they remain overly reliant on governmentfunding and unwilling to partner with thedevelopment community. These solitudesneed to be bridged if global gender equalitywork in Canada is to become stronger.

Only a limited number of developmentorganizations integrate gender equalitythoroughly in their work and mandates. Arecent survey of CSOs funded through CIDA’sCanadian Partnership Branch indicates that92 of 157 CSOs had in place or were draftinga policy on gender equality and development.An additional 45 CSOs had other documentsor policies which reflected a commitment togender equality.6 Yet while the survey suggestsbroad community support for gender equality,there remain significant gaps in implemen-tation. RoseMae Harkness, a Women inDevelopment and Gender Equity Specialistwith the branch, argues that part of theproblem is the lack of monitoring within CIDAto ensure that CSOs truly incorporate genderequity. Others point to a lack of political willto address equity within their own organiza-tions, competing development objectives intheir work, and limited human and financialresources to implement the commitments.To overcome these hurdles, those committedto equality will have to continue to illustratehow and why it is crucial to the work ofdevelopment organizations.

While the negotiations for the Canada-USFree Trade Agreement were underway inthe early 1980s, women’s groups in Canadajoined the debate when they recognizedthat free trade would impact in a substantial,negative fashion on women’s work. But withthe later negotiation of the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement, NAC did more thantalk. It began to work against the agreementwith women’s groups in the US and Mexicoand sought to increase awareness of itsnegative effects on women.

This kind of cross-border advocacy haslong been the norm for Southern women’sgroups. Indeed, Joan Grant-Cummings,current president of NAC, suggests that the

C H A P T E R S E V E N W O R K I N G G L O B A L L Y F O R G E N D E R E Q U A L I T Y

Canadian women’s groups

are increasingly involved

in global struggles for

a number of reasons:

the impact of structural

adjustment on women

worldwide; the increased

presence of women origi-

nally from the South in

women’s groups in

Canada; the growing

maturity of women’s

groups in the South;

and the large number of

international conferences

on topics of concern in

the 1990s.


negative consequences of structural adjust-ment in the North were first raised byDAWN. Many women in the North, especiallywithin NAC, then began to focus on eco-nomic restructuring and increased theirlinks to international women’s groups. ForNAC, as for other Canadian women’s groups,its increased focus on global strategiesresulted partly from changes within its ownmembership. Analysts have noted that:

NAC attempted to listen to the perspectives ofwomen who were traditionally positioned on itsmargins, and these women felt encouraged toparticipate actively and share their viewpoints.Consequently, the challenges and conflicts NACexperienced during the 1980s, and continues toexperience, equip it to deal more sensitivelywith the demands of Third World womenoutside Canada.7

Grant-Cummings argues that, because NAChad dealt with race issues internally andhas always pushed for equal representationfrom the South and the North in the coali-tions, it was asked by other women’s groupsto act as a bridge between North and Southat several international conferences. Thispositioning has been an important successfor Canada.

Between 1992 and 1996, six world confer-ences hosted by the United Nations (on theenvironment, population and development,human rights, social development, women,and habitat) provided opportunities forgreater activism. Groups with long historiesof working through the UN were involved,and many national and community-basedgroups participated, as did many moreinternational women’s networks, such asthe Women’s Environment and DevelopmentOrganization (WEDO) and the Centre forWomen’s Global Leadership. These networksensured that gender equality was addressedat each conference, even when “gender”was in danger of falling off the agenda.Women’s groups organized their global cam-paigns around such widely ranging issuesas the recognition of women’s unpaid work,the knowledge of traditional Aboriginalhealers, reproductive and sexual rights, theincorporation of women in decisionmakingin all areas, ending violence against women,and the feminization of poverty across theglobe. In fact, the groundwork and experienceof these previous UN conferences culminated

in the Plan of Action and parallel NGOactivity generated at the 1995 UN WorldConference on Women in Beijing.

These conferences gave individual Canadiansopportunities to participate in internationalcoalitions, as well as learn from and con-tribute to the development, strategizing,and lobbying of their positions. This resultedin lasting relationships between Southernand Canadian women’s groups—for example,NAC’s and CRIAW’s involvement in theFeminist Global Alliance on Economic andSocial Justice. It also raised the profileof issues back at home and the resultingcommitments made by their governments.Today, there are several provincial post-Beijing groups and CRIAW maintains apost-Beijing clearinghouse. A pan-Canadianpost-Beijing project has been launched bydomestic women’s groups with the objectiveof ensuring their full participation inBeijing+5 meetings scheduled to take placein June 2000 and a greater presence ofCanadian women in the international arena.

Tactics and StrategiesThroughout the 1990s, Canadian womenhave used at least four different tactics orstrategies, alone or in combination, in theirglobal work. Ranging from individual contactsto global events, these strategies providecontinuing, substantive linkages betweenwomen’s groups in Canada and in the South.Groups in Canada participate to the extentof their interest, capacities, and resources.

Individual contactsWomen in Canada continue to use theirlinks with individuals in the South asan important means to work globally.For some, like Marilyn Porter, a sociologyprofessor and women’s equality activistat Memorial University in Newfoundland,the individual contact is the jumping offpoint for institutional cooperation. Porterestablished a linkage project with SaparinahSadli, Director of the Graduate Programin Women’s Studies at the UniversitatacIndonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia, to helpstrengthen the graduate women’s studiesprogram at the Indonesian university. Afterfour years of partnership they argue that:

Most often the greatest achievements within theUN process come when individual women fromdifferent NGOs and from diverse locations come

together around a common concern or a specificproject. They work together primarily as individ-uals and not as “representatives” of their NGOsor diversities. We are suggesting that the routeto “global feminism” begins in these personalrelationships and then builds across otherlinkages in an incremental way.8

Two young women have also used theirindividual connections to create anexciting new resource called Challenge theAssumptions. Denise Campbell and BinduDhaliwal of the Toronto-based Students‘Commission used their contacts from theBeijing conference to create a multi-mediapackage. Written by young women (includ-ing 10 stories from women of the South)for young women, it challenges the assump-tions that many make about young womenin the areas of identity, relationships,opportunities, obstacles, activism, andglobal outlook.

Partnerships withSouthern women’s groupsSome women’s groups build partnershipsdirectly with Southern women’s groups,either around a specific project or overa longer term. In many cases, these part-nerships begin with traditional forms ofdevelopment assistance. The groups oftenstruggle with the meaning of these partner-ships and how to ensure greater equalitybetween partners.

Between 1990 and 1996, for example, theYWCA of Canada pursued a partnership withits Zambian counterpart to fund a studyof violence against women, tours to studyanti-violence initiatives in Zimbabwe,Botswana, Kenya, and South Africa, and anexchange visit of two representatives fromthe Zambian YWCA to Canada.9 Some of theinequalities between the partners becameobvious in these activities. For example,none of the activities enabled Canadiansto learn specifically from the Zambians.Moreover, the Canadian YWCA was alwaysdesignated to obtain the funding.

International networks and coal i t ionsMost women’s groups in Canada interestedin gender equality worldwide are membersof at least one international network orcoalition. These networks are often the bestvehicle for obtaining information about

the situation of women around the world,sharing strategies for action, and sharinginformation about international events.Participation in a network can mean aslittle as joining a mailing list, more activeparticipation such as formally joining acoalition or network to have a say aboutits operations, or as much as taking on aleadership role. Women’s groups in Canadaparticipate at all levels.

Mothers are Women (MAW), a nationalfeminist network for mothers who remainat home to raise their children, establishedunpaid work as one of its priority areas andregularly exchanges information with theInternational Women’s Count Network(IWCN), a global network to promote recog-nition of women’s unpaid work in nationaland international accounting. The work ofboth organizations has increased under-standing of the scope of unpaid work andprovided important examples of strategiesused in other countries.

Other groups in Canada have also createdinternational networks or coalitions toassist in their work. The Réseau mondialde groupes de femmes utilisant la languefrançaise comme outil de travail waslaunched following a meeting of franco-phone women at the Beijing Forum. It iscurrently housed in and maintained by theCentre de documentation sur l’éducation desadultes et la condition féminine (CDÉACF)in Montreal. Annette Pypops, one of thefounders, argued that it was clearly shownthat this network was essential for breakingthe isolation of hundreds of women’s groupsworking in French around the world: “... byorganizing, these many groups will be ableto share, strengthen their solidarity, andmake better known their needs, interests,and expertise.”10

Creating global eventsWomen’s groups in Canada and the Southhave also joined forces to launch globalevents. Women’s groups in Quebec, forexample, initiated global planning for aWorld March of Women that will featurelocal marches or actions simultaneouslywith a global march in the year 2000.NAC and Intercede, a group of domesticworkers in Canada, joined women’s groupsin Asia and the Pacific to host the Second



Women’s Conference against APEC andthe International Day of Protest whenthe leaders of the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) forum were meeting inVancouver in 1997. These groups continueto organize within the APEC context.Another example of global organizing—aninternational conference on women andhealth—will take place in Toronto in 1999.

Issues in International Gender EqualityWorking for gender equality using theseglobal strategies creates particular tensionsand challenges, including the difficultiesin building equitable and effective partner-ships, dealing with the complexity ofgender-based work, accessing newresources, and developing needed skills.

B U I L D I N G E Q U I TA B L E A N DE F F E C T I V E PA R T N E R S H I P S

Finding common ground with people whoselives are very different is often the mostdifficult aspect of working globally. Therelationships between individuals and groupsare shaped by historical inequalities basedin colonization, economic privileges, race,and gender, among many others. Culturaldifferences are also present. For partnershipsto form, coalitions to be built, events tobe organized, and action to be taken,these inequalities and differences need beaddressed. Too often, Northern women enterinto relationships with Southern womenassuming they know more and have accessto greater resources, and should thereforetake leadership of the joint work. The historyof women’s global organizing is litteredwith examples of relationships where exist-ing inequalities have been reinforced.11

Funding programs, including some of CIDA’s,have also prevented equitable partnershipsby giving women from the North greateraccess to the purse strings and thus greatercontrol over projects.

The most successful international connec-tions, such as WEDO and the global women’shealth networks, have ensured that womenfrom the South and North have built relationships of respect and trust.12 Thatrespect and trust is, in turn, built by working on common issues and by ensuringmutually beneficial knowledge, processes,

and participation. Canadian women’s groupsalready working globally have becomeincreasingly sensitive to the global inequali-ties and are unwilling to speak aboutSouthern women’s conditions or strategiesunless clearly mandated to do so.

Yet not all women’s organizations seek aplace on the global stage. Some, such asthe National Farmers’ Union,13 limit theirinvolvement to attending internationalconferences. For others like the CanadianAssociation of Sexual Assault Centres, theneed for global partners is a significantlylower priority than strengthening domesticservices. Still others, like MAW, limit theirinvolvement to informal or ad hoc relation-ships because they do not have the humanor financial capacity to do more. As arguedbelow, there are significant resourcerestrictions to global connections betweenCanadian and Southern women’s groups.Many relationships, such as the Réseaumondial de groupes de femmes, develop onlywhen funding is available: without addi-tional cash, momentum can quickly be lost.

Development organizations involved inglobal gender equality, including MATCHInternational, do make connections withwomen from the South a priority, but oftenfail to bring women’s groups from Canadainto their partnerships. This suggests thatwomen in the North are unnecessary forglobal gender equality, except perhapsas donors. In reality, however, there is areal need for all parties to jointly listen,strategize, and act. This needs to be doneaccording to a proven set of principles,however, including the following:

• Northern organizations need to committo developing sustained relationships ifthey are to learn from their Southerncounterparts.

• Cross-cultural and anti-racist trainingfor participants should be part of allinternational partnerships.

• Groups that engage in international part-nerships should be clear about the extentand duration of the partnership; the role,if any, for joint projects; the mechanismfor ongoing evaluation of the partnership;and the preparation and coordinationneeded within the partnering organiza-tions to develop these relationships.14

79

• Development organizations should supportand reinforce the building of relationshipsbetween those in the North and Southworking for gender equality. For example,MATCH International could work moreclosely with women’s groups in Canadato develop its projects and agenda, tothe benefit of both Canadians andSoutherners.

D E A L I N G W I T H T H E C O M P L E X I T YO F G E N D E R - B A S E D W O R K

Since the early 1970s when the situationof women began to find a place on interna-tional agendas, the complexity of gender-based analysis has increased dramatically.Women’s situations across the world areshaped by their race, ethnicity, ability,sexual orientation, socio-economic status,and education, as well as by their location,the time period, and the issue. Thus, workto improve women’s lives and status canbe carried out by economically better-offwomen in advocacy groups as well as bypoorer women in mixed gender groupswho may not call themselves “feminists.”Policies and projects to address women’ssituations need to reflect this diversity.

Yet when governments—including theCanadian government—and civil societyorganizations turn their attention to inter-national gender equality, they often try tosimplify or separate issues into existingprogram areas such as education, health,and the environment and address problemson a sector-by-sector basis. As a result,sectoral experts often work in isolation.To remedy this problem, governments, inter-national organizations, and CSOs need torenew efforts to ensure that those who workon gender issues in one sector go beyondthe confines of their specialty, use inter-disciplinary methods, and find solutionsthat encompass a number of sectors aswell as their own. CSOs seeking consensuson strategies or issues, as well as officialdocumentation and positions, also needto reflect the diversity of Canadianperspectives and situations.

AC C E S S I N G N E W R E S O U R C E S

No federal program exists to fund the pro-motion of gender equality in developingcountries by Canadian women’s groups. Forexample, they cannot receive funding from

Status of Women Canada for internationalactivities that take place outside Canada,except for the United Nations conferenceson women.15 And although developmentgroups can apply for CIDA funding, domesticwomen’s groups generally fail to meet thecriteria necessary to receive fundingthrough most of CIDA’s funding branches,including the Canadian Partnership Branch.The Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade (DFAIT) has no fundingprogram for international gender equality.

Funding for international gender equalitywork is essential, not only to strengthencivil society, but also to assist in the devel-opment of government policy. As the federalplan on gender equality suggests: “findinglasting solutions to many of the world’sproblems is dependent upon addressinggender inequality.”16 Addressing genderequality requires both the involvement ofwomen’s groups and significant new govern-ment resources targeted for global genderequality work.

It can be argued, however, that Canadianwomen’s groups have depended too greatlyon traditional sources of government fund-ing and have forgotten—or resisted—toexplore other funding avenues such asother government departments, foundations,and labour unions.17 This is essential if theyare to develop significant capacities forinternational networking and policy debate.Groups may also need to reconsider howthey make international connections andmodify their approaches so that theybecome eligible for existing developmentfunding programs. Undertaking this addi-tional work may require that women’s groupsredirect their own very limited resourcesor enter into partnerships with CSOs withgreater capacity.

Funding agencies also have a role to play.For example, a new program supportinggender equality work could be createdat the Department of Foreign Affairs andcoordinated with CIDA’s existing programs.Because of DFAIT’s size and influence, sucha fund would greatly help to mainstreamgender analysis within Canada’s foreignpolicy. Foundations and labour unions couldalso redirect a larger portion of the fundingthey provide for international activities

C H A P T E R S E V E N W O R K I N G G L O B A L L Y F O R G E N D E R E Q U A L I T Y

CSOs seeking consensus on

strategies or issues, as well

as official documentation

and positions, also need

to reflect the diversity of

Canadian perspectives

and situations.

toward gender equality work. This is theapproach recently taken by the MacArthurFoundation which reorganized its fundingpriorities to ensure that two-thirds of itsfunding is directed to projects whichaddress women and globalization. Thiscould be a model for other foundations andunions. And given the limited fundingaccorded by foundations (see “Civil SocietyOrganizations and Funding in Canada”),they could also create new funds for that purpose.

DFAIT should also require that Canadianbusinesses operating internationally meetthe gender equality criteria that CIDArequires of its partners. And by charging amodest fee for its trade facilitation services,the government could establish a fund tosupport groups to monitor the work ofCanadian businesses overseas, with at leasthalf of the funds reserved for groups pro-moting gender equality. Among its tradefacilitation activities, DFAIT could organizeseparate women’s “Team Canada” missionsthat include representatives of business,unions, and civil society organizations tostrengthen linkages between Canadian andSouthern civil societies.

D E V E L O P I N G N E E D E D S K I L L S

For many women’s groups that work primar-ily domestically, international work—partic-ularly that related to the United Nations—is complicated: Where do you start? Who isresponsible? How do you overcome languagebarriers? A few activities have tackled theseproblems. For example, CRIAW provided askills workshop as part of its post-Beijingplan; Voice of Women organizes regular studytours to the United Nations Commission onthe Status of Women. More skills-sharingneeds to be done, however, at all levels.Greater networking is also needed between

women’s groups about existing or proposedinternational partnerships, especially viathe internet.

A number of other actions could also be taken to ensure that women’s groupsdevelop needed skills. For example, women’sgroups and other CSOs could organize workshops on issues of gender equalityaround the world. This training could takeplace in conjunction with a media campaigntargeted at the general public. To ensurethe availability of information, the Post-Beijing Virtual Clearinghouse could houseinformation about projects or contacts withwomen from the South, and PAR-L’s website(a Canadian electronic feminist network)could be further developed to includeCanadian women’s groups’ international connections.

Women involved in international activitiesthemselves have a role to play in mentoringand supporting young women, women withdisabilities, and others who have been atthe margins of women’s organizing.

Toward Gender EqualityOver the past decade, growing relationshipsbetween women in the North and South andthe effective organizing of women’s groupsacross the globe—such as between DAWN,NAC, and CRIAW—have ensured that genderequality is firmly on the agenda of theinternational community. But the workof women’s groups has been hamperedby weaknesses within their organizationsand funders’ lack of recognition of theimportance of their work. They have alsoencountered external constraints such as the negative impacts of globalizationand the rise of fundamentalism with theresulting backlash against feminism.18

To be more effective, women’s groups in the North and South need to developdeeper, more sustained, and equitable partnerships. As these relationships areestablished, dialogue needs to continue on ways of ensuring their effectiveness.Women’s groups also need to acquire agreater capacity to monitor and act on policy questions, thus enabling them torespond effectively to the rapidly changingglobal context. The capacity to addressglobal policy issues in a detailed and


BO

X2 I N T E R N E T S O U R C E S

United Nations Gateway on the Advancement and Empowermentof Women: www.un.org/womenwatch

Post-Beijing Virtual Clearinghouse: www.sympatico.ca/criaw/beijing.html

PAR-L—A Canadian Electronic Feminist Network website:www.unb.ca/PAR-L

Challenge the Assumptions—The Students’ Commission:www.tgmag.ca/ywg/index.htm

Women’s Environment and Development Organization: www.wedo.org

sustained manner would also enable groups to identify opportunities and propose alternatives.

The advancement of gender equality hasbeen hampered by the fact that it has toooften been relegated to women’s groupsalone. Development organizations that havecontributed significantly to the promotionof global gender equality have often failedto develop or maintain genuine relation-ships with Canadian groups active in thissector and thus do not have access to theirexpertise. Gender equality requires the par-ticipation of many more and it needs to berecognized as an organizational priority. Forexample, international and national activistcoalitions in sectors as diverse as humanrights, labour, and the environment alsoneed to ensure that women’s groups arefull and equal participants and that genderequality is among their priorities. The sameis true for other sectors of society, includ-ing foundations, the media, and businesswhich have largely ignored gender equalityand the role gender inequalities play acrossthe world. Much more work is needed toinform, challenge, and promote action forgenuine global change.

NOTES

The author thanks the following for their cooperation andcomments in the preparation of this chapter: Nancy Burrows(World March of Women); Denise Campbell (The Students’Commission); Linda Christiansen-Ruffman (CRIAW); JackieClaxton (Women’s Program, Status of Women Canada); JulieDelahanty (The North-South Institute and Women’s HealthInteraction); Bindu Dhaliwal (The Students’ Commission);Evelyn Drescher (Mothers are Women); Joan Grant-Cummings(NAC); RoseMae Harkness (CIDA); Joanna Kerr (The North-South Institute); Madonna Larbi (MATCH InternationalCentre); Laura Macdonald, Lise Martin (CRIAW); Sheila Regehr(Status of Women Canada); and Diana Rivington (CIDA).The views expressed are those of the author, however, anddo not reflect the views of those consulted.

1 Personal interview conducted by author, August 5, 1998.

2 Canada, Canadian International Development Agency,CIDA’s Policy on Women in Development and Gender Equity(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996). Thebackground to CIDA’s existing policy is found in thedevelopment policies section of CIDA’s website at:www.acdi-cida.gc.ca

3 Linda Cardinal; Annette Costigan; and Tracy Heffernan,“Working towards a feminist vision of development,” inHuguette Dagenais and Denise Piché, eds, Women,Feminism and Development (Montreal and Kingston:McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), pp. 409-26.

4 Janet Silman, Enough is Enough: Aboriginal Women SpeakOut (Toronto: The Women’s Press, 1987).

5 Sari Tudiver, “The strength of links: International women’shealth networks in the eighties” in Kathleen McDonnell,ed., Adverse Effects: Women and the PharmaceuticalIndustry (Toronto, The Women’s Press, 1986), pp. 187-214.

6 CIDA, “Gender equality: Progress of the partners ofCanadian Partnership Branch in developing policies relatedto gender equality” (Ottawa: CIDA, Canadian PartnershipBranch, June 1998).

7 Christina Gabriel and Laura Macdonald, “NAFTA, Womenand Organizing in Canada and Mexico: Forging a FeministInternationality.” Millennium: Journal of InternationalStudies, vol. 23, no. 3 (Winter 1994), p. 551.

8 Marilyn Porter and Saparinah Sadli, “Is Global FeminismPossible? Developing ‘Partnership’ in a University LinkageProject.” Canadian Woman Studies/Les cahiers de lafemme, vol. 17, no. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 76.

9 Beverly A. Suderman, “Spinning Sisterhood: The partner-ship of the YWCAs of Canada and Zambia.” CanadianWoman Studies/Les cahiers de la femme, vol. 17, no. 2(Spring 1997), pp. 88-93.

10 Annette Pypops, “Un suivi de la quatrième Conférencemondiale sur les femmes à Beijing: La création d’un réseaumondial de groupes de femmes utilisant la languefrançaise comme outil de travail.” Canadian WomanStudies/Les cahiers de la femme, vol. 16, no. 3 (Summer1996), p. 136.

11 Northern women’s attempts in the 1980s to stop femalegenital mutilation in Africa illustrate some of theseunequal relations. See Deborah Stienstra, Women’sMovements and International Organizations (London:Macmillan, 1994), p. 105.

12 Deborah Stienstra, “Entering the Gated Community:Gender, Women’s Organizing and the InternationalCommunity,” in P. Conge, ed., Power and Imagery, forthcoming.

13 Karen Pedersen of the National Farmers’ Union highlightshow this group organized a workshop on gender andagricultural policy at the 1996 World Food Summit as partof their post-Beijing activities. See “Taking Stock of Post-Beijing Activities: Where do we go from here?” (Ottawa:CRIAW, May 1997).

14 Suderman, p. 93.

15 Jackie Claxton, Director, Women’s Program, Status of WomenCanada. Telephone interview by author, August 13, 1998.

16 Canada, Status of Women Canada, Setting the stage forthe next century: the federal plan for gender equality(Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1995).

17 Women’s groups who have been active internationallyhave made significant contributions. This comment is notintended to undermine any of their many successes.

18 For a longer discussion of how these factors affectwomen’s global organizing see Stienstra, “Entering theGated Community.”


CONFRONTING THE“GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION”

J o h n F o s t e r

J o h n F o s t e r i s t h e A r i e l F . S a l l o w s

P r o f e s s o r o f H u m a n R i g h t s a t t h e C o l l e g e

o f L a w , U n i v e r s i t y o f S a s k a t c h e w a n .

CONFRONTING THE“GLOBAL ECONOMIC

CONSTITUTION”

T

C H A P T E R

E I G H T

Behind the agreements lie enormouschanges in the size, direction, and com-position of international commerce. Theseagreements, signed by our democraticallyelected government, affect the magazineswe read (under the World Trade Organization—WTO); the air we breathe (under theNorth American Free Trade Agreement—NAFTA); the milk we drink;2 our rights tofreedom of expression (under the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum—APEC); and the security and working

conditions of our jobs (all of the above). In virtually all, but not yet every case, wehave a sense of decisions moving out ofour control. Our predicament as a rich andrelatively powerful nation is a serious one,but it pales in comparison to that of poorerand weaker states that may not even be atthe negotiating table, yet face the imposi-tion of these new “economic constitutions.”

This chapter focuses on how some Canadiancivil society organizations (CSOs) haveresponded to this new generation of

rade expansion is now recognized as the key element

in Canada’s foreign relations, at times threatening to

eclipse all other dimensions. As hundreds of Canadian political,

business, and academic leaders board flights to Asia, Latin America,

or Eastern Europe, “Team Canada”— entrepreneurial; largely affluent,

male, and white— becomes the dominant image projected for the nation

as a whole. The cost of these junkets in terms of the impact on

Canada’s human rights and environmental policies, our values,

integrity, and credibility has been high.1 Intoning their mantra of

globalization and competitiveness, advocates of the trade policy

point to the significant growth in Canada’s trade in services, its

overseas banking and financial engagements, overseas investment, and

the importance of extending the “rules” or the rule of law to protect

these interests.

“The MAI… marks a

stage in international

economic negotiations…

one is seeing the

emergence of a ‘gobal

civil society.”

Catherine Lalumière

et al, Report on the

Multilateral Agreement on

Investment, September

1998.


challenges. At its broadest, the challenge isto democracy itself, raising the questionwhether popular sovereignty can be effec-tively expressed in a world in which domi-nant economic relations are more integratedand “marketized” than ever before.3 Thechallenge has been most pointedly expressedaround the principles, processes, and termsof new economic agreements, principallyin trade and investment—NAFTA, APEC, theproposed (and now scuttled) MultilateralAgreement on Investment (MAI), and theWTO. Canadians have been world leadersin organizing challenges, campaigns, andalternatives to the projects of what mightbe termed a global political and economicélite. Whether that leadership has made adifference in the way the global economicconstitution is structured and imposedis explored below.

From the FTA to the FTAA: Canadians as CanariesThose Canadians questioning trade andinvestment agreements on the internationalstage have felt like an early warning sys-tem. The battle over the US-Canada FreeTrade Agreement (CUSFTA) deeply affectedthe political imagination of many Canadiansand raised a host of issues: would jobs andjob security be lost? Was Canadian sover-eignty over its labour standards at risk?Many believed so. When the Conservativegovernment was re-elected in 1988, oppo-nents to the deal had lost the battle. It was perhaps surprising, then, that the nextround of negotiations—extending the dealto Mexico and beyond—saw a renewal inthe energy, resources, and commitment ofthe early opponents. This time, however,many who had confronted the “devil in thedetails” of the bilateral agreement felt anobligation to share their experience withcounterparts overseas.

T H E N A F TA A N D C O M M O N F R O N T I E R S

The Common Frontiers project, one ofCanada’s most remarkable coalition suc-cesses, became one of the primary channelsfor communicating that earlier experience.Sparked by a 1987 visit of Canadian labour,environmental, and trade activists toMexico’s low-wage production centres

(the runaway shops that CUSFTA multiplied),a project for renewed and expanded opposi-tion to NAFTA was born in Canada. By 1990,the new group, closely allied with theAction Canada Network,4 sought to include,here and elsewhere, counterparts in Mexico.The catalyst meetings held in Mexico in1990 confronted the idea and dangers ofthe economic constitutions—a new kindof economic agreement that threatenedthe future of social development, workingconditions, and the environment.5

When the Mexicans and Canadians turnedtheir attention to Washington late in 1990,they found new allies. American environ-mental, development, and human rightsgroups and labour organizations werechallenging legislation that would makeCongressional criticism and amendment ofbroad trade deals virtually impossible—theso-called “fast track” negotiating authority.They feared that a deal with Mexico mightlower environmental standards and acceler-ate the flow of job transfers to cheap wagefactories south of the Rio Grande.6 These USmeetings, and a 1990 Congressional briefingsession organized around them, laid thebasis for an ongoing tri-national alliancebetween emerging coalitions in EnglishCanada, Quebec, the US, and Mexico.7 Thisinformal but resilient alliance never had itsown resources or staff, yet it managed tocoordinate joint pursuit and critique of theNAFTA negotiations from 1990 until thesignature and ratification of the treatyin 1993-94.

F R O M C O N T I N E N T T O H E M I S P H E R E

The subsequent endorsement of the NAFTAdeal by US President Bill Clinton andCanadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien wasa significant defeat for the budding civilsociety alliance. But once again, this set-back did not end the effort. The tri-nationalalliance took up the challenge of analyzingNAFTA’s impact, particularly on workers andworking conditions, the environment, andsovereignty. At the same time, other linkswere established with counterparts incountries of priority interest to the NAFTAgovernments (like Chile) or those directlyaffected by changes caused by NAFTA (suchas Central America). As the US administra-tion began promoting a Free Trade Area of

C H A P T E R E I G H T C O N F R O N T I N G T H E “ G L O B A L E C O N O M I C C O N S T I T U T I O N ” 85

the Americas (FTAA) at the 1994 MiamiSummit, the alliance confronting that new prospect began to form.

Trade unionists in Brazil and Argentina,nongovernmental and women’s organiza-tions in Uruguay, and others had begunto confront the issues posed by new tradeagreements as early as 1990, focusingon the Mercosur accord binding Argentina,Brazil, Paraguay, and Urugay into a newunit.8 These parallel experiences cametogether in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in May1997. Meeting at the invitation of theBrazilian Unique Workers Central,9 Canadiansjoined counterparts from Brazil, CentralAmerica, Chile, Mexico, and the UnitedStates just as the trade ministers of theircountries huddled nearby to discuss expand-ing the NAFTA into a Free Trade Agreementof the Americas.

The CSOs called for a very different sort ofhemispheric arrangement (see Box 1). Theyset in motion plans to form a Hemispheric

Social Alliance to fight for their alternativevision, and called a broader and morerepresentative group to meet at the time ofthe proposed Hemispheric Summit of headsof state in April 1998. In the quest for anew alliance, Canadian social organizationsapplied their already extensive experiencewith the new generation of trade andinvestment agreements. The SantiagoSummit of the Peoples of the Americas,held in April 1998, found more than 60Canadians crowded into workshops andplenary sessions with more than a thousandrepresentatives of Indigenous, women’s,environmental, human rights, and labourorganizations from other parts of theAmericas.

The People’s Summit challenged the officialFTAA project, already delayed by the defeatof President Clinton’s fast-track negotiatingproposals in Congress, itself the result ofsuccessful environmental and labour pressure.The Canadian governmental response was toassure CSOs that this phase of negotiationswould have public participation and consul-tation. The Minister for International Trade,Sergio Marchi, spoke of a special committeeto be set up precisely to deal with theirconcerns, but criticisms by some, includingthe Canadian Labour Congress’ Secretary-Treasurer, Dick Martin, suggested that thecommittee would be “nothing more than apost office box for alternative views” andnot a truly “open and consultative process”for the whole trade agreement.10

From the small core of groups workingthrough Common Frontiers and the Réseauquébecois, a broad hemispheric alliancehas evolved, tendering a detailed andchallenging set of alternatives on the tradenegotiating table. This is especially timely,given that hemispheric concerns seem tobe gaining priority in Canadian foreign andtrade policy. Canadian CSOs will have ampleopportunity to engage in the many tradeand international forums scheduled overthe next few years in the region, especiallyas Canada is the initial chair of the FTAAnegotiations and will be the site of severalhigh-level meetings.

Canada will also host the 2000 GeneralAssembly of the Organization of AmericanStates and the projected next Hemispheric


BO

X1 S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C A LT E R N AT I V E S

From the Social and Economic Alternatives Forum, Santiago de Chile,

April 1998:

Our proposal brings forward a distinctive economic logic: trade and

investment should not be ends in themselves, but rather the instru-

ments for achieving just and sustainable development.

Basic Principles

1. Promote democracy and participation: Greater democratization in

trade and investment decisionmaking. New instruments to reassert

public control and citizen sovereignty over global corporations.

Ratification and expansion of the basic UN and ILO agreements on

environment, labour, and human rights.

2. National development plans: Preserve the power of individual coun-

tries to set high standards for dignified work, healthy communities,

and a clean environment within their borders.

3. Promote sustainability: Attention to the quality of development.

Sustainability and the welfare of the population should take prece-

dence over short-term profits.

4. Reduce inequalities: National and global economic policies designed

to redistribute income. Compensatory funds for less developed coun-

tries and marginalized zones.

Source

Alliance for Responsible Trade (United States); Common Frontiers (Canada); RedChile por una Iniciativa de los Pueblos (Chile); Red Mexicana de Acción Frente alLibre Comercio (Mexico); Réseau québécois sur l’intégration continentale (Quebec);Alternatives for the Americas: Building a People’s Hemispheric Agreement (Ottawa:CCPA,1998).

Summit planned for 2002. However, whilesome development NGOs in Canada—InterPares, or at times, OXFAM Canada and theCanadian Council for International Co-opera-tion (CCIC)—have taken up issues emergingfrom the trade debates, many have not. Itis also unclear to what extent political par-ties and voters, now that CUFSTA and NAFTAare in place, are willing to support a seriousalternative path.

MAI Day: Corporate Assertion, Democratic ResponseThis new generation of trade treaties isabout much more than trade. Agreements tofacilitate the expansion of trade in services,clauses that protect intellectual property, andterms that enhance the rights of investorsover the decisions of democratic governmentsencompass a wide scope of activity. A newphase in organizing has emerged in responseto one such aggressive attempt to globalizeinvestor protections originally negotiated inthe investment chapter of the NAFTA. Thiswas the proposed Multilateral Agreementon Investment (MAI), negotiated throughthe Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development (OECD).

In the spring of 1998, advocacy groupsin Canada and around the world heraldedthe postponement of the deal at the OECDmeetings in Paris. By the fall, the OECDagain failed to achieve agreement, andFrance withdrew from the table, makingfurther progress through the OECD unlikely.Citing the prior victory of the landminestreaty (discussed in Chapter 6), commenta-tors scored another one for internet advo-cacy and global civil society.11

Advocates were quick to point out thatthe MAI was not dead and likely not evendormant.12 Negotiations continue at theWTO, as the French suggested. An alterna-tive may be negotiated in an investmentchapter for the incipient Free Trade Areaof the Americas.13 There is certainly anongoing commitment by governments,Canada’s included, to an MAI-like agenda.14

What is the MAI and why did it provokethe organization of a complex Canadianand international coalition in opposition?Undertaken by the OECD, the MAI began

to take shape in 1993 as a set of enforce-able rules to govern the relations of govern-ments and foreign investors. After negotiat-ing the deal among the 29 OECD members—the world’s richest economies—Canadaand the United States planned to have itbecome a centrepiece of the WTO agenda,with consequences for all 127 memberstates. The draft MAI sparked reaction fromdevelopment advocates such as Martin Khorof the Malaysia-based Third World Network.Highlighting its implications, he pointedout that the MAI would “radically broadenthe freedom of movement and operationof foreign investors and their investments,while severely restricting the rights andpowers of states to regulate the entry,establishment, and operations of foreigncompanies and their investments.”15

In Canada, those already familiar withthe threat of NAFTA’s investment approachresponded to Khor and other critics withmeetings in Montreal and Ottawa in 1996and the adoption of a campaign by theCouncil of Canadians (COC) early in 1997.The COC challenged the negotiations, stillsecret. When a copy of the draft treaty fellinto its hands, the fight took on greaterproportions and a formal coalition emergedin December 1997. Labour and environ-mental organizations were soon joined bya wide range of cultural and professionalorganizations. University teach-ins, commu-nity meetings, newspaper advertizements,and write-in, phone-in, and petitioncampaigns were organized as a grassrootsmovement sprang up in response to theefforts of the COC and others.

Building on the NAFTA experience, thecoalitions followed the negotiations closely,setting up parallel meetings to the “official”negotiations in Paris. In an innovativeinitiative, the COC commissioned a legalopinion from a leading trade lawyer on thevalidity of Canada’s “reservations” aboutthe treaty. Provincial governments andmunicipalities were lobbied and at leastthree provinces backed away from the deal.Detailed sector-by-sector critiques of thedraft treaty were published.16 Very rapidly,an international network developed, involv-ing civil organizations as various as UrbanEcology Australia, the Hungarian Traffic


“It’s undeniable that

these years of joint work

have resulted in much

stronger relations and

deeper agreements

between counterpart

organizations which have

already been expressed in

concrete joint struggles.

This has already hap-

pened in the maquilado-

ras, in support by north-

ern unions for workers in

subsidiaries in Mexico, in

questions of human

rights and environmental

problems.”

Translated from Bertha

Elena Lujan U.,

President, RMANC Mexico,

La Acción de las Redes

Ciudadanas en la Región

del TLCAN, 1990-1997,

Mexico, 1998.

Club, and Women in Europe for a CommonFuture—in at least 70 countries.

The announcement of a delay and thenhalt to the MAI negotiations was in partdue to the unease that the draft treaty hadprovoked on the part of governments, but itwas also a result of this international civicalliance. Among other things, the allianceforced the negotiations into the open,broadcast the implications in detail, andbased its challenge on democratic principlesand human rights.

The MAI battle continues in other formstoday. Canadians were reminded in July1998 that they are already living with someof the MAI’s key implications (that currentlyexist in the NAFTA) with the settlement ofa $13 million lawsuit brought by a US-basedcompany against the federal government(see Box 2).

In the meantime, Canadian civil organiza-tions organized hearings across the country,and many spokespeople testified in detailbefore the Special Legislative Committeeon the MAI mandated by the Legislative

Assembly of British Columbia in the fall of1998.17 Given the clear need to regulateinvestment, the COC and the internationalcoalition are working on alternatives tothe MAI; not an easy task. While there maybe an emerging consensus within the inter-national network about the need for inter-national regulation, there are others whosimply reject the MAI and internationaltreaty-making altogether.

A clear assessment of the significance ofcivil society organizing was included in aspecial report commissioned by the Frenchgovernment prior to its decision to with-draw from the MAI negotiations. French MPCatherine Lalumière urged the French government to take special note of the phenomenon of opposition to the MAI, andnoted its new characteristics: it “appearedsimultaneously in several countries,” shecommented, and “it goes beyond merelysectoral or technical concerns ... the reso-nance of the discourse hostile to the MAIbears witness to far wider and more funda-mental concerns.” The opposition “puts theinterests of new actors at stake,” movingbeyond traditional trade union or economicactors to environmental and other non-governmental networks.18

Finally, as Canada’s International TradeMinister Marchi had also noted, “the waythe negotiation is carried out is challengedas much as its outcome. More or less legiti-mately, the secrecy which covered the nego-tiations and the deep motivations of theparticipants are questioned.”19 Lalumière iscategorical as to the significance of thesedevelopments. “The MAI thus marks a stagein international economic negotiations. Forthe first time, one is seeing the emergenceof a ‘global civil society’ .... This evolutionis doubtless irreversible.”20

A H I G H C O S T S Y S T E M

Trade in money—and in other financialinstruments—has grown monumentally(see Figure 1). Coupled with the revolutionin communications and technology, we areinstantly aware of the consequences ofspeculation and downturns in currenciesand economies. The Mexican peso crisis of1994-95, the ongoing Asian crisis today,and the Brazilian and Russian meltdownsare now viewed by some experts as the


BO

X2 W H Y C A N A D I A N S W O R R Y: T H E M M T E X P E R I E N C E

While Canadians enjoyed the summer sun in July 1998, the federal government announced an out-of-court settlement with the US-basedEthyl Corporation. The company had charged Canadian authorities with“expropriating” its “property” and damaging its “good reputation”when Parliament banned the sale of a gasoline additive called MMT. The company won the right to resume sales of MMT, received $13 millionin compensation, and had the government declare publicly that“MMT poses no health risks.”

The settlement brought home the import of the NAFTA investmentclause. A company won the right to sell a chemical (whose health andenvironmental impacts concerned the Canadian Parliament) through asecret process in which “expropriation” is defined as a very wide cate-gory of action, and under which Canadian law was limited by Americanprivate corporate interest. “It is the butterfly’s wing over North Americathat will cause a hurricane in Europe,” commented The Guardian on theinternational significance of the deal. With NAFTA “corporations inCanada, the US and Mexico have enjoyed a new and astonishing powerover elected authorities.”1

The MMT or Ethyl case has been cited by Canadian critics of the proposed MAI as the shape of things to come.

Note

1 George Monbiot, “Running on MMT.” The Guardian, August 13, 1998. MMT, ormethylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl, is a fuel additive designed toreduce engine knocking. In the opinion of some scientists, the additive is adangerous neurotoxin: manganese enters the body through the lungs, causingnerve damage that may lead to psychosis, memory loss, and even death.

logical and inevitable periodic cost of awildly expanding and increasingly unregu-lated international trade system.21

It is difficult to grasp the impact of thelargely unregulated expansion of electronicexchange—cybermoney—and the crises ithas spawned (see Box 3). The InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) estimates there havebeen 11 significant crises in the globalsystem since 1973. Millions in Mexicoand various parts of Asia would probablyendorse US billionaire George Soros’ sting-ing critique of financial markets. PrimeMinister Chrétien has, on occasion, madenegative remarks about “28 year oldmoney traders in red suspenders” and whatthey can do to national economies. As theInternational Herald Tribune noted recently,the speculative market can overwhelm“real” factors like productivity andeconomic management:

Facts cannot of course compete with markethysteria. The instant views of overpaid andunder-informed traders in the capital marketscan create flows of funds vastly in excess ofthose mobilized in the short term by the forcesof trade and competitiveness... In recent days,billions of dollars have left Asia because of self-feeding fears based on ignorance of facts andlack of accountability.22

Canadian nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and other CSOs, as well as researchagencies, have been increasingly concerned,not only with the catastrophic results ofthese crises but with their causes.Beginning with debt relief for most seri-ously affected countries, coalitions like theHalifax Initiative23 have put greater priorityon reform and re-regulation of the worldfinancial system. The National Union ofProvincial Government Employees (NUPGE)organized a Canada-wide campaign. Itslively pamphlet, “Paper Tigers,” focuses oncurrency speculators, questioning the calm-ing rhetoric of ministers of finance andbankers that the economic fundamentals are indeed in place.24

John Dillon and the Ecumenical Coalitionfor Economic Justice outlined the problemin Turning the Tide: Confronting the MoneyTraders, just as the Asian crisis was becom-ing evident.25 Among their proposals, theycalled for a re-regulation of finance capital,and a series of corrective measures involvingthe creation of new international financeorganizations, debt relief, capital controls,and re-negotiation of trade and investmenttreaties. The core initiative of these propos-als, which the Halifax Initiative and Dillonpresented to Finance Minister Paul Martinin July 1998, is a version of Nobel-prizewinning economist James Tobin’s taxon foreign exchange (see Box 4).


1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

1989 1992 1995 1998

Spot transactions

Outright forwards and forex swaps

Source: Bank for International Settlements, Press Release,“Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and DerivativesMarket Activity in April 1998, Preliminary Global Data.”

F I G U R E 1 Summary of Global Activityin Foreign Exchange Markets

(daily turnover in US$ billions)

BO

X3H O T M O N E Y

“The financial economy has grown to nearly incomprehensible propor-

tions. Every day, close to US$1.3 trillion worth of currencies change

hands on world markets. The vast majority of these transactions are

speculative. When the famous British economist John Maynard Keynes

first warned against the danger of finance dominating the real econ-

omy, financial exchanges were about twice as large as merchandise

trade. Today financial transactions are 72 times as large as merchandise

trade.”

“Foreign exchange trading only accounts for about 25 percent of the

speculative economy. When the markets for currencies, stocks, bonds,

and commodity futures are taken together, daily transactions total some

US$4 trillion. The Bank for International Settlements estimates that

the pool of ‘hot money’ that can flow instantaneously around the world

through telecommunications networks amounts to US$13 trillion.”

Source

John Dillon/ECEJ, Turning the Tide: Confronting the Money Traders (Ottawa: CCPA,1997).

While the research undertaken by a varietyof nongovernmental, academic, media,and multilateral bodies has been extensive,and the rationale for increased regulationand accountability seems clear, the forcesorganized to achieve such a change seemdisparate and limited. Despite lobbyingefforts directed at the Department andMinister of Finance, the overall politicalorientation of the Canadian government—and many others—is wedded to de-regulating marketization.

Changing the Terms of TradeCanadian civil society organizations andtheir international counterparts and partnershave not restricted themselves to protestalone. As reported in the 1998 CanadianDevelopment Report26 and in a growingliterature, there have been a plethora ofpragmatic attempts to change the termsof trade. Some are highlighted here.

While labour organizations and their alliesseek a worldwide agreement to implementcore labour standards, advocates are chal-lenging working conditions at the factory,mine, cottage, or field level. For example:

• Trade unions, governments, and humanrights organizations are actively address-ing child labour conditions and strategiesto emancipate children.

• Campaigns such as “Break the Sweat”have been initiated by community coali-tions and the Canadian Labour Congressto extend respect for workers’ rights andeducate consumers.

• Canadians contributed extensively to thedevelopment and evaluation of corporatecodes of conduct, through the Taskforceon the Churches and Corporate Respon-sibility, and the work of the InternationalCentre for Human Rights and DemocraticDevelopment, among others.

• Canadian environmental groups and tradeunions are working in partnership withcounterparts in Chile and elsewhere toimprove workplace health, safety, andenvironmental standards.

• Canadian trade unionists are workingwith sister organizations in Mexico, Chile,Brazil, and many other countries to raisethe bar in collective agreements withmultinational companies and to challengeunfair and anti-union practices basedon existing agreements—including thelabour side-agreement to the NAFTA. Theyare also active in public education andpressure campaigns.27

Meanwhile, there have been a number ofexperiments in alternative trade itself.Through the efforts of the Dutch-basedMax Havelaar Initiative and the Café Directinitiative in the United Kingdom, Europeanmarket share and supermarket space hasbeen gained for cooperative and naturallyproduced coffee from partner groups in theAmericas and elsewhere. The current coffeecampaign by a number of Canadian NGOsaims both to increase understanding aboutthe dynamics of commodity trade andexpand the market for fair-trade coffeeamong Canadian consumers. Perhaps thebest known Canadian alternative tradeexperiment is Bridgehead. Like many of itscounterparts trading in crafts, textiles, andfair-trade food, Bridgehead has encounteredthe challenges of fluctuating currencies andmarket competition, as well as the manage-ment of growth and an increasingly complexbusiness. Like many commercial initiatives,Bridgehead has been investment poor anddebt rich, illustrating the importance ofsocially oriented lenders, but also the keyrole that hard-to-get risk capital must play ifsocially conscious enterprise is to succeed.28


BO

X4 T O B I N , S O C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T, A N D C I V I L S O C I E T Y

Canadian CSOs initially seized on the idea of the Tobin Tax because of

its potential to fund basic human needs globally. At the Copenhagen

World Summit on Social Development, NGO advocates and poverty

specialists in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) pro-

moted the vision of reducing speculation and poverty at the same time.

On the basis of modest UNDP estimates, “the global revenue from a

0.05 percent Tobin tax in 1995 would have been two or three times

as great as what would have been required to eliminate the world’s

worst forms of poverty.”1 Canadian nongovernmental participants at the

Summit worked with Australian and European allies to popularize the

idea and to press the UN to undertake a high-level study of its feasibil-

ity. Canadian government representatives were much less enthusiastic

and the representative of the Business Council for National Issues

worked hard to counter the pressure of the NGO advocates.

Note

1 Alex C, Michalos, Good Taxes: The Case for Taxing Foreign Currency Exchange andOther Financial Transactions (Toronto and Oxford: Science for Peace, 1997),p. 26; see also “Factsheet: The Tobin Tax,” available from the Halifax Initiative.

The fair trade and alternative trade initia-tives are demonstrative models in theNorth and have created jobs, particularlyfor women’s cooperatives, in the South.However, few have yet reached a scale thatyields significant developmental impact.Their small success is put into graphicrelief by the hundreds of millions of dollarsof business done by a private corporationwhich claims to share many of the fair tradeobjectives of nongovernmental alternativetraders. The Body Shop International, which imports from less-developed coun-tries, strenuously attempts to develop andapply ethical standards to win the supportof consumers and alternative traders alike.Its market power enables it to press socialand environmental conditions on its suppli-ers, while assuring them of the trade rev-enue needed to make improvements. As onesupplier said, “previously alternative tradingorganizations (ATOs) were not so concernedabout quality control, but The Body Shopput us on our toes. Now this has helped not only us and The Body Shop but theATOs as well.”29

An Unequal ContestAre these successes in organizing protestsand offering alternatives to trade policy andpractice evidence of a global civil society?Have the challenges of trade and investmentagreements brought CSOs to a new focus onadvocacy and systemic reform? Most CSOstaff probably wince at the thought, return-ing to the difficulties of cutting budgets orreconciling partner needs, staff desires, andthe demands of public and private funders.

It is much more likely that we are in the earlystages of a new development—energized inpart by new information technology—whosesignificance and political import are notyet clear. In this incipient movement, someCanadian civil society organizations havebeen pioneers and leaders. That leadershipdoes not mean that CSOs have necessarilywon their various wars. Many, in fact, feelthey are constantly thrown on the defensiveby corporate power and its government pro-moters. Canadian organizations were thrustinto leadership in part because they wereconfronted with some of the key problemsfirst—CUSFTA was a harbinger of much thatcame after. But their response was alsodeeply rooted in a pride in the Canadianway of life threatened by these new treaties.

What has this incipient movement accom-plished? Much of the cumulative work of thepast 15 years has resulted in a focused setof tactics and strategies to counter the official positions presented within the tradeagreement process: challenging the negotia-tion process; mutually reinforced lobbying;coalition building; and deepening criticalanalysis.

The Canadian elements of this global coali-tion movement are at the end of an earlyphase of internationalization. While a fullydeveloped grassroots multilateralism hasneither matured nor gained the strength tocounterbalance the power of multinationalcorporations or multilateral financial insti-tutions, it is a much different creature than it was 15 years ago. These emerginginternational alliances have seen:

• a maturing of North-South and globallinkages based on policy convergencerather than financial dependency;

• the development, particularly in labourorganizations, of North-South solidarityin contractual, strike support, andinformational linkages;

• global campaigns using the internet;• a collaboration in breaking the secrecy

of powerful institutions, negotiatingprocesses, and sharing intelligence.

• some cross-fertilization amongcampaigns, research, and analysis.

At the same time, many of the nationalcoalitions and international alliances faceserious challenges, particularly given thewealth, expertise, and experience of theiropponents. Resources are almost alwaysshort, and few organizations have the kindof funding security that enables develop-ment and pursuit of long-term strategies.Autonomy may also be threatened bydependence on one sector, often organizedlabour. Moreover, given the United States’and US corporations’ leading role in tradeprocesses, a strategy for affecting thoseprocesses needs to be developed. The structure and interests of the media alsopose problems. Finally, these coalitions and alliances will need to engage in partisan, political action—nationally andinternationally—if they are to realize theirvisions. This will also require changes inorganizations’ culture and a growth in


“...the mobility of capital

and of employers both

aggravate the risks

immobile groups face and

render it more difficult

to generate the public

resources needed to

finance social insurance

schemes. ... some

taxation of foot-loose

factors at the global level,

with revenue sharing

among nations, may be

worth considering,”

Harvard academic

Dani Rodrik,

Has Globalization

Gone Too Far?

(Washington: Institute for

International Economics,

1997), p. 73.

professionalism that may appear to be atodds with the voluntaristic origins of somecommercial experiments.

Fundamentally, the struggles of Canadiancivil society organizations and their alliesin trade and investment reform, debt relief,and revision of structural adjustment haverevealed a profound need for a global move-ment toward accountable, more coherent,and democratized governance. The worldeconomy must serve human developmentand welfare as well as the environment.Political economist Susan Strange notesthat too much euphoria has been expressedabout the end of the Cold War, the declineof military dictatorships, and of one-partystates: “the net result of the diffusion ofauthority upwards and sideways from thestate ... adds up to a democratic deficit.”30

Civil society organizations are feeling theirway toward new definitions of sovereigntyto meet that deficit. Could a reformedand renewed United Nations embody anew democratic global sovereignty? TheCommission on Global Governance in 1995proposed an Economic Security Council tomanage global economic interdependencewithin universally recognized human rightsand responsibilities. It also called for aglobal Civil Society Assembly to advise and reinforce General Assembly debates andactions. Others have suggested an electedUN Parliamentary Assembly to “enhance thecollective accountability of its member gov-ernments and its actual decisionmakers andgovernors.”31 Proposals for more equitableand just enforcement of rights for workersaround the world have been developed indetail, as have alternatives for enforcinghuman rights and democratic accountabilityon investors and corporations, thus reducingthe scope and impact of corruption andspeculation in global finance.

There is, of course, hope. The prospect ofglobal civil society forums in Korea andCanada in 1999 and of a Millennium CivilSociety Forum at the UN in 2000 provideopportunities for civil society actors torenew their vision, refresh political strategies,and move governments and the public toan agenda which would harness economicactors to human welfare and thecommon good.

NOTES

The author would like to thank the following people and organizations for their assistance in the preparation ofthis chapter: Patty C. Barerra; Dorval Brunelle; the CanadianCentre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI);Tracey Clarke; John Dillon; the Halifax Initiative; AndrewJackson; Jacqui MacDonald; Alex Michalos; the NationalUnion of Provincial Government Employees (NUPGE); Brant Thompson; Peggy Teagle; and Matt Sanger.

1 See Ted Paterson, “Selling Canadian Values: EncouragingPrivate Sector Activity in the South,” in Michelle Hiblerand Rowena Beamish, eds, The Canadian DevelopmentReport 1998: Canadian Corporations and SocialResponsibility (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1998),pp. 118-31.

2 “Milk Controversy Spills Into Canada,” Rachel’s Environmentand Health Weekly, Electronic edition # 621 (Annapolis:Environmental Research Foundation, October 22, 1998).

3 Linda McQuaig, The Cult of Impotence (Toronto: Viking,1998), p. 26; see also Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson,Globalization in Question: The International Economy andThe Possibilities of Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press,1996), and Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997).Rodrik concludes, “Globalization. . . is part of a broadertrend that we may call marketization. Receding govern-ment, deregulation, and the shrinking of social obliga-tions are the domestic counterparts of the intertwining of national economies,” p. 85.

4 Common Frontiers bridges labour, environment, and devel-opment groups and is essentially a long-term workingparty supported by a small staff based in Toronto. TheAction Canada Network (ACN) was first formed in 1987as the Pro-Canada Network (PCN) by groups opposed tothe US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Approximately100 representatives from 32 national organizations cametogether in the “Maple Leaf Summit” in April 1987 toshare concerns about the trade deal. Key groups includedthe Canadian Labour Congress, the National ActionCommittee on the Status of Women, the National Farmers’Union, and GATT-fly (now the Ecumenical Coalition forEconomic Justice). The PCN engaged in a National Day ofAction (June 12, 1987) and in the pre-election and electioncampaigns of 1988. After the election, the coalitionbroadened its agenda, campaigning against the Goodsand Services Tax and eventually the Mulroney “corporate”agenda. Restructured as the ACN, the group was phasedout in 1998. See Peter Bleyer, “Coalitions of SocialMovements as Agencies for Social Change: The ActionCanada Network,” in William K. Carroll, Organizing Dissent:Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice(Toronto: Garamond, 1992).

5 Alberto Arroyo and Mario B. Monroy, Red Mexicanade Acción Frente al Libre Comercio: 5 años de lucha(1991-1996) (Mexico: RMALC, 1996).

6 Harry Browne, For Richer, For Poorer: Shaping US-MexicanIntegration (Albuquerque and London: Resource CenterPress/Latin America Bureau, 1994).

7 There were different emphases within each partner organi-zation. While American allies were often helpful in dig-ging out current negotiation proposals and the strategiesof US Trade Representatives, the Mexican coalition madeheadway in developing alternatives through discussion ofwhat they termed the “social agenda.” English Canadiangroups urged attention to implications for naturalresources, the broad-reaching aspects of intellectual prop-erty and service provisions, and the impact of “nationaltreatment.” Quebec groups shied away from the postureof sharp rejection common in English Canada, and empha-sized the importance of revising the proposals.

8 Caderno Sobre o Mercosul para Formadores da RedeNacional de Formacão CUT (Ilha de Santa Catarina: CUT-Brasil, November 1997).

9 Common Frontiers, Building a Hemispheric Social Allianceto Confront Free Trade (Toronto: Common Frontiers, 1997).


“Not content with

creating a risk-free casino

for reckless speculators,

the IMF is now seeking to

expand their gambling

outlets.”

Kevin Watkins,

OXFAM UK,

“Poverty strikes when

cyclops is sovereign,”

The Guardian,

July 13, 1998

10 Heather Scofield, “Activists say Mexico blocking groups’participation in trade talks.” The Globe and Mail,November 7, 1998, p. B4.

11 Interview with Brant Thompson, Council of Canadians staffmember, August 19, 1998.

12 Bill Blaikie, MAI Update (Ottawa: House of Commons,May 1998); OECD, Ministerial Statement on the MAI: FinalCommuniqué, Paris, April 28, 1998; and Madeleine Drohan,“MAI talks shunted as trade ministers assess options.”The Globe and Mail, April 29, 1998.

13 Mark Vallianatos, “Update on MAI Negotiations, October27, 1998” (Washington: Friends of the Earth, 1998).

14 Joyce Nelson, “The Art of the Deal.” Canadian Forum (April1998); and Tony Clarke and Maude Barlow, MAI:The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threatto Canadian Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddard, 1997), p. 26.

15 Martin Khor, “The MAI and Developing Countries,” inAndrew Jackson and Matthew Sanger, eds, DismantlingDemocracy: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment(MAI) and its Impact (Ottawa and Toronto: CCPA/Lorimer,1998), p. 275.

16 See An Environmental Primer on the Multilateral Agreementon Investment (Vancouver: West Coast Environmental LawAssociation, 1998); and Jackson and Sanger, DismantlingDemocracy, 1998.

17 See Report: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: TheTranscripts of Proceedings (Hansard) currently available atwww.legisl.gov.bc.ca/cmt

18 Catherine Lalumière, Member of the European Parliament;Jean-Pierre Landau, Inspector General; and FinanceReporter Emmanuel Glimet, Commissioner of Audits,Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI):Interim Report, September 1998 (English translation foundat http://www.islandnet.com/~ncfs/maisite/lalumier.htm(accessed in February 1999).

19 Cited in Lalumière et al, Report on the MultilateralAgreement on Investment (MAI): Interim Report, September1998.

20 Lalumière, et al.

21 Carlos Marichal, “The Rapid Rise of the Neobanqueros,” inNACLA, Report on the Americas XXX:6 (New York: NACLA,May/June, 1997).

22 Philip Bowring, “Currency scare stories feed hysteria.”Reprinted from The International Herald Tribune inThe Globe and Mail, August 18, 1998, p. B2.

23 The Halifax Initiative is a coalition of environment,development, social justice, and faith groups concernedabout the policies and practices of international financialinstitutions. Its coordinating committee includes theCanadian Council for International Co-operation, theCentre International de Solidarité Ouvrière, CulturalSurvival Canada, the Inter-Church Coalition for Africa,RESULTS Canada, and OXFAM Canada.

24 NUPGE, Paper Tigers: Currency Speculators: When theirroar turns to whimper we all pay (Nepean: NUPGE,February 1998).

25 John Dillon/ECEJ, Turning the Tide: Confronting the MoneyTraders (Ottawa: CCPA, 1997).

26 Michelle Hibler and Rowena Beamish, eds, The CanadianDevelopment Report 1998: Canadian Corporations andSocial Responsibility (Ottawa: The North-South Institute,1998).

27 The Report of the Canada-Mexico Bilateral Workshop,October, 1998 (Toronto: Common Frontiers, 1999).

28 Interview with Tracey Clarke, Bridgehead ManagingDirector, October 1998.

29 The Body Shop International, The Road Ahead: A Summaryof The Body Shop Values Report, 1997 (Littlehampton:The Body Shop, 1998), p. 15.

30 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The diffusionof power in the world economy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997), pp. 197-99.

31 Commission on Global Governance, Our GlobalNeighborhood: The Report of the Commission on GlobalGovernance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),Chapter 7; and Erskine Childers with Brian Urquhart,Renewing the United Nations System (Uppsala: DagHammarskjold Foundation, 1994), pp. 212-13.


THE ART OF MAKING CHANGE

A l i s o n V a n R o o y

A l i s o n V a n R o o y i s a S e n i o r R e s e a r c h e r a t

T h e N o r t h - S o u t h I n s t i t u t e , s p e c i a l i z i n g

i n c i v i l s o c i e t y i s s u e s .

THE ART OF MAKING CHANGE

C

C H A P T E R

N I N E

Government funders, foundations, the media—and civil society organizations (CSOs)themselves—often question how effectiveCSOs are in promoting social justice at homeand abroad.1 But effectiveness is not anabsolute: it depends largely on relevance,strategy, and the obstacles to be overcome.

• Relevance. What are CSOs—particularlythose working on behalf of people inother countries—trying to do? Is thisthe right goal? The fundamental goal?

• Strategy. Do CSOs employ the best tacticsavailable to achieve their goal? Are theireyes always on the ever-changing socialand political ball? Are they meeting theright people, making the right friends,holding the right meetings, doing theright research that may lead tomeaningful change?

• Challenge. Given the shape of today’sworld and existing influential organiza-tions, can CSOs realistically expect tobring about change? What is the nature

of the governmental, societal, market-place, and other structures in which peopleorganize? What factors constrain theirwork? Which enable?

These are the fundamental questions thatshould be put to Canadian CSOs and othersworking for global change.

Relevance: Why, and For Whom?To be relevant, CSOs must strive to reachthe right goal, for the right reason. Howcan Canadian CSOs know what that goalshould be? Given the breadth of political,cultural, and social aspirations withinCanada, let alone elsewhere, is it evenpossible to know what is right?

Canadian organizations joining worldwideefforts on a range of issues—development,environment, gender, human rights, conflict,trade, and food security, among others—must always ask why, for whom, and with

anadians working to bring about global change often

meet with success. However, change can be slow, arduous,

uneven, and full of setbacks. Labouring in nonprofit groups with

varying mandates, ideologies, and political persuasions, they employ

an arsenal of tactics in their quest for a better world. And while

not all share the same vision of that better world nor agree on how

to attain it, they generally share a core set of principles. They also

share many of the same dilemmas, frustrations, and impediments.

Organizations seeking to

change the world are

often in need of change

themselves.


whom they are working. Who put the problemon the table? How responsive are they tothe agendas of their partner organizations?Are they “partners” in the true sense of theword? Is the battle also their own?

The importance of partnership is one ofthe key arguments made in this CanadianDevelopment Report (CDR). It is clear thatpartnerships must go beyond the provisionof money and the imposition of leadershipby Northerners to Southerners. The egalitar-ian language of partnership should not beused to mask unequal power relations.

If partnerships link North and South, theyalso link Canadians with their domesticcounterparts around a common cause.Workers influenced by changing trade rules,for example, have joined with Mexicans,Americans, and others to challenge globaleconomic constitutions; Indigenous womenhave confronted Canada’s human rightsrecord at the United Nations; and Canadiansliving in poverty have joined food councilsto advocate for their right to food security.These examples show how CSOs have deep-ened their understanding—and that of theirfellow Canadians—of the meaning of sus-tainable and equitable human development.They are remarkable successes.

Strategy: What and How?The decision of how CSOs should approachtheir goals is more than pragmatic: themethod also shapes their public and politi-cal image, their capacity to continue toraise needed funds and public support, andthus determines their eventual success. Thestrategies used to effect global change haveincluded trust-building, agenda-shaping, andmargin-stretching tactics, among others.

B U I L D I N G T R U S TIn recent years, an important CSO strategyhas been to raise public—and governmental—faith in the ethics of their work. TheVoluntary Sector Roundtable, for example,has been studying options for “self-regula-tion” in the charitable and voluntary sectorin Canada. Its proposal covers the ethicsof operational work, program delivery,fundraising, the involvement of volunteers,governance, and other fundamental issues.For many organizations, like the Roundtable

members, the move to greater accountabilityis part of their survival strategy:

As government funds decline, there is alsoevidence of some lack of faith among electedofficials about the legitimacy of organizationswithin the sector who rely on either publicfunds, or funds supported by charitable statusand related preferential tax treatment. As thepublic faces increased demands from agencieslosing public funding for private donations,more than donor fatigue can be expected;greater scrutiny is almost inevitable, exactly ata time when organizations have fewer resourceswith which to respond. [...] Assuming increasingmistrust and scepticism, it seems likely thatagencies seeking public or private money willneed to be able or required to buy into someset of performance, fund raising, and publicaccountability practices. To be effective,compliance with those practices will haveto be evaluated and enforced.2

S E T T I N G T H E A G E N D AWhile necessary, these steps towardaccountability—to funders as well as tomembers and partners—are insufficient.What can organizations do after they haveensured that they are rooted at home,linked to others, and have invested in theircredibility? The next step is often to tryto change the agenda of change itself.

A large part of the battle is won whenthe problem is clearly identified and setsquarely on the policy table. This is easier,of course, if there is broad consensus onthe nature of the problem and its solution.In the case of the landmines treaty, whichcame into effect on March 1, 1999, therewas evidence of a widespread agreementon both. As Minister of Foreign AffairsLloyd Axworthy said:

Perhaps the best example to date of this newdiplomacy was the international campaign toban landmines. Why? Because it showed thepower behind a new kind of coalition. Like-minded governments and civil society formed apartnership of equals, united around a commonset of core principles. Making maximum use ofmodern communications technology, we mobilizedpublic opinion worldwide to support a total banon anti-personnel mines. Public support convincedmany governments that were hesitating to sign onto the ban. The result was a convention developedwith unprecedented speed and success.3

C H A P T E R N I N E T H E A R T O F M A K I N G C H A N G E 97

Success in getting items on the table ismuch less certain when the very underpin-nings of the system are being questioned.For agencies working to re-fashion thepolitical agenda, the work is far moredaunting.

D E V E L O P I N G TAC T I C SStretching the marginsChange becomes more difficult after policiesare developed, and programs, treaties, andregulations put into place. This is the pointat which CSOs must engage in a remarkablyvaried set of “margin-stretching” tacticsto re-open the debate. Margin-stretchersemploy loud—and often embarrassing andsometimes ‘“irresponsible”—tactics forsocial change. While many such exploits—activists chained to old-growth trees, forexample, or hunger strikes, or sit-in demon-strations—are castigated by some who workthe inside tracks, they are probably muchmore effective than even the activistsbelieve. Until fairly recently, for example,the banning of landmines, the restrictionson imports of child-made goods, and thespecial consideration of women as agents ofdevelopment were all considered unattain-able; today, they are fact. Margin-stretcherscan put issues on the agenda by raisinga fuss, thus making possible the presenceof their more “reasonable” colleaguesat the table.

At one end of the spectrum, margin-stretch-ing tactics include highly visible initiativessuch as demonstrations, media events,report cards, and other embarrassment tac-tics. At the other end are a host of “insider”tactics, such as membership on joint com-mittees, quiet lunchtime tête-à-têtes, andcommissioned think-pieces, that can pushthe debate along more conventional tracks.Because of their expertise and reasonedapproach, the insiders may, in turn, raise thecomfort level of officials or executives, thusmaking change more likely. While these effortsdo not necessarily effect change,4 theycertainly make it more likely (see Box 1).

International networkingIncreasingly, insiders and outsiders bothjoin international networks, such as theinternational campaign against the market-ing of breast milk substitutes, the campaignfor an International Criminal Court, the


BO

X1 A N A D V O C AC Y P R I M E R

Analyze the problem• Select the general issue to be addressed and identify one specific

problem to be resolved.• Break the problem into manageable components and identify how

each is, or could, be affected by official programs and policies.

Define the proposal• Develop one or more policy proposals to address specific aspects

of the problem.• Ensure the proposal is clear, specific, measurable, feasible, and

motivating.Analyze the decisionmaking space• Identify who will make the decision that you are attempting to

affect. (This person becomes the advocacy campaign’s “target.”)• Clarify how this decision will be made, and over what timeframe.

Create a power map• Draw a “power map,” placing your target in the centre, identifying

all actors who influence the target: draw arrows from the actorsto the target. Be sure to include the press, international agencies,churches, civil society organizations, and others.

• Classify the target and each of the actors as allies, opponents, orundecided. Actors for which there is no available information shouldbe classified as undecided and highlighted.

• Prioritize the allies, opponents, and undecided based on the degreeof influence each has on the target. The five to 10 most importantallies and undecided actors will form the basis for a plan of visitsto be made, to be elaborated in the activities section.

Analyze your institutional capacity• Identify the organization or coalition that will coordinate the

advocacy strategy.• Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of this group.• Brainstorm possible solutions to address the weaknesses identified.• Select two or three activities to strengthen the group’s capacity to

carry out advocacy and include these in the activity plan.

Develop a strategy for influencing the target and undecided actors• Analyze the target. Brainstorm about the target’s general interests

and motivations; its interests and motivations related to the specificproposal; and the arguments it might make.

• Define the arguments and strategies that could be used to helpconvince the target of the proposal’s merits.

• Review the central points of the strategy: Will the campaign be publicor private, grassroots or high-level? How long will it take to carry out?

• If the campaign is aimed at influencing public opinion, define amedia and outreach strategy.

Plan and implement activities• Plan all the specific activities necessary to refine and approve the

advocacy plan and achieve the strategies outlined. For each activity,define the individuals responsible, the timeline, and the humanand material resources needed.

Reflect and evaluate• Periodically stop to reflect on the success or failure of specific

initiatives and the overall campaign.

Source

The Central American Advocacy Training Project of the Washington Office on LatinAmerica, summarized in CIVICUS World (May-June 1998), p. 14.

Social Watch network, and CIVICUS (seeBox 2). This kind of networking imposesburdens on CSOs, including the cost oftravel; the need to educate themselvesabout new issues and instruments suchas treaties and agreements; and time spentin coordination and monitoring.

Despite these difficulties, however, thenumber of international coalitions continuesto grow. One reason is that there are few“development” problems which Canada doesnot share: when natural or humanitariancrises occur, Canada intervenes as a reliefaid donor or peacekeeper; when currencycatastrophes strike, Canada’s trade falters;when structural adjustment rules are appliedin Canada, our own social spending iscurtailed; when trade rules evade sovereignty,the Canadian cultural industry is affected;and when genocide occurs, all of humanityloses. Development today is not about otherpeople, it is about us.

The growth of coalitions on internationalplatforms is also another way to advocatefor domestic policy. United Nations humanrights tribunals have pronounced on Canadaand on Burma alike; the MultilateralAgreement on Investment (MAI) protestwas launched to protect domestic freedomsfrom international corporate influence;and the 20/20 goal of the World Summitfor Social Development was meant toincrease domestic spending on basic humanneeds.5 These are all domestic policypursuits carried out in other venues.

Taking the inside trackAnother tactic for effecting change is tojoin working groups of governmental andinternational agencies, and—less frequently—corporate boards. Collaboration as mem-bers of advisory or working groups is grow-ing and is an important element of aninsider strategy. Some organizations fear,however, that these efforts carry the dangerof co-optation, that excessive proximity—through funding dependency or by “buyinginto the government or corporateagenda”—endangers the process of change.

But insider strategies can be effective.Canada’s experience in the preparations forthe 1992 United Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development (UNCED) is

a case in point. Through an unusual combi-nation of policy choice and bureaucraticcoincidence, $1 million was made availableto enable Canadian development andenvironmental organizations to join thepreparations for what came to be known asthe Earth Summit. That money was availableonly to members of the NGO-led CanadianParticipatory Committee for UNCED (CPCU).The committee’s funneling function meantthat nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)had to collaborate, often for the first time.It also meant that there was an organizedpool of NGO experts for officials to meetand consult.

Over the two years of UNCED preparations,relationships of trust were built, debateswere resolved, and in many cases, the voiceof Canada’s nongovernmental communitybecame international law.6 Known as the Riomodel, this set the standard for subsequentmeetings around the World Conference onWomen in Beijing and the World Summit forSocial Development in Copenhagen in 1995.For the Earth Summit, an insider strategywon remarkable success—not co-optation—for Canadian activists.

Just doing i tLast, but not least, Canadian strategies forchange involve tasks completely outside thepolicy realm. Most international NGOs’ effortsand funds are spent on concrete projects farfrom meeting rooms in Ottawa: the Aga KhanFoundation Canada’s support for healthcarein Pakistan, CARE Canada’s humanitarianefforts in Rwanda, and the work of theCanadian Bar Association to train lawyersin Hungary are all important examplesof change made on the ground.


BO

X2C I V I C U S : W O R L D A L L I A N C E F O R C I T I Z E N

PA R T I C I PAT I O N Only five years old, CIVICUS is a novel experiment in global networking.

As a permanent alliance of NGOs, other CSOs, foundations, donors, cor-

porations, and individuals, the network has held international meetings

on global issues affecting civil society, organized databases, and pub-

lished and promoted research. With representation from some 80 coun-

tries, CIVICUS tries to strengthen the visibility and understanding of

civil society; develop a more supportive environment of laws, policies,

and regulations; and promote permanent, self-sustaining, and creative

resource mechanisms.

Source

CIVICUS at www.civicus.org

Indeed, as a survey of 119 developmentNGOs shows (see Figure 1), although almostall pay lip service to development educa-tion, less than 20 percent explicitly identifypolicy or advocacy as part of their work;68 percent finance projects overseas;57 percent undertake training; 26 percentpromote exchanges; 20 percent send goodsor materials abroad; and 19 percent sendpersonnel abroad. Although there is muchtalk about the importance of policy workand advocacy, the truth is that most inter-nationalist CSOs spend most of their timeand money carrying out projects abroad.

Challenges: Against What Odds?A key aspect of CSO effectiveness is theirrecord in meeting challenges. In the caseof UNCED, for example, there were tangibleinternal and external obstacles: conflictswithin the CPCU over allocations of money,and the subsequent lack of political willto match the Earth Summit’s resultingAgenda 21 commitments with hard currency,respectively. For some, the CPCU experience(and the other conferences that followed)were ultimately failures: while Agenda 21may have abounded with CSO statements,some seven years later, money still hasnot been put on the table.

Success, however, is not an absolute quantity;it must be measured against the obstaclesto be surmounted. When the stakes are highand challenges formidable, small successes

can be major victories. Major challenges facedby Canadian CSOs working internationallyinclude weak political will, reduced funding,an often outdated or irrelevant regulatoryenvironment, shallow public opinion, anda disinterested private sector.

P O L I T I C A L W I L L

How deep is the political will to support thework of Canadian voluntary organizations?On the one hand, downsized governmentsseem more than willing to divest them-selves of responsibilities and entrust themto an already overburdened voluntarysector. This downloading is done, in part,because governments have overestimatedthe role and capacity of civil society. AsCanadian Minister of Finance Paul Martinrecently noted:

The voluntary or “third” sector is truly an inte-gral part of Canada’s social safety net. This rolerepresents a partnership with government—partners who are united by a desire to improvethe quality of life for Canadians by protectingthe weakest, the poorest, and the most vulner-able in society. [...] More often than not, it ischarities, non-profit organizations and indi-vidual volunteers—not the government—thathave a direct hand in caring for and protectingthose in need. For some unknown reason, how-ever, there is a tendency to undervalue much ofthis crucial work, or take it for granted. Wemust never let ourselves lose sight of the factthe work does not do itself.7

Praise, however, is often matched by mis-trust about CSOs’ work, particularly whenthey tackle policy issues in addition to“caring for and protecting those in need.”The Voluntary Sector Roundtable, forexample, writes that:

Due to both the enormous growth in the num-ber of voluntary organizations and their loudervoices, however, some politicians feel that theymust compete to be heard. Instead of suchactivity being seen as a positive reflection of ahealthy democracy, the credibility of voluntaryorganizations is often attacked. They havebeen portrayed as “special interest groups,”and calls made for tighter restrictions on theiractivities. Ironically, this has occurred at thevery time when governments need an evenstronger voluntary sector.8


F I G U R E 1 Canadian NGO Activities

Percentage of 119 agencies by type of activity

Source: Compiled from data in CCIC, Who’s Who in International Development, Ottawa: CCIC, 1995.

Research

Sponsorship

Policy/Advocacy

Personnel

Material

Exchanges

Training

Funding

DevelopmentEducation

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

7

11

18

19

20

26

57

68

76

The Roundtable has tried to deal directlywith concerns about CSOs’ ethics andaccountability. If there is political will todownload services to the voluntary sector,there must be concomitant will to providefunding and to engage in policy debatesin a more democratic manner.

F U N D I N G D E C I S I O N S A N D S T R AT E G I E S

Political will drives many other factors thataffect CSOs’ ability to act, most notablyfunding. Cuts in federal and provincial fund-ing have had a significant impact on thetype and scope of CSO activity, indeed onthe very existence of some organizations.

At the same time, however, there is a needfor CSOs to rethink how and by whom theyare funded. A controversial solution forsome organizations has been to open for-profit wings in order to help finance corework. This was the approach taken by theCanadian Organization for Developmentthrough Education (CODE), for example,which 10 years ago set up a profit-makingprogram—CODE Inc. As CODE Inc. CEORobert Dyck explains:

The reality for charitable organizations inCanada today is survival; NGOs and charitableorganizations must re-invent themselves tomeet the needs and opportunities of today’senvironment, or go under. The environment ischaracterized by an epidemic of cutbacks inthe government funding available for NGOsoperating internationally, and for socialprograms run by charitable organizations inCanada. It is also over-loaded with increas-ingly sophisticated, aggressive fundraising pro-grams—all targeting the same limited philan-thropic urges and spare-change budgets ofCanadians. The opportunities in this frugal,competitive environment are the current popu-larity of the private sector (business is beauti-ful these days), and the continuing trend ofgovernments to contract out the deliveryof their programs.9

Without alternative sources of funding,many organizations tied to governmentpurse strings have simply disappeared.

T H E R E G U L AT O R Y E N V I R O N M E N TThe way in which organizations are regulatedand taxed also makes a difference to their

ability to effect change. A simple regulatoryenvironment, for instance, can encouragethe establishment of organizations and theirincorporation. This, in turn, makes it easierfor CSOs to operate: bank accounts can beopened, official funding can be received,and partnerships can be sought. Legalincorporation also shields individual mem-bers from legal action, and protects theorganization’s rights. Incorporation can alsohelp protect citizens from abuses or fraud,and safeguards the reputation of CSOs gen-uinely committed to civic, charitable, orother nonprofit work. In Canada these stepsare easy compared to Japan, for example,Malaysia, Cuba, or Slovakia.

The difficulty has been in the next level ofregulation. To benefit from tax relief, manyCSOs are registered with Revenue Canadaas charitable organizations. In legal terms,charities are simply incorporated bodies thatdo not distribute profit to shareholders,and whose exclusive purpose and activitiesmeet a 1891 ruling (based on a 1601 Britishcommon law decision) which defines charityas: (1) the relief of poverty; (2) education;(3) the advancement of religion; and(4) “other purpose beneficial to thecommunity.”10

Whether an organization qualifies forcharitable status rests with a small divisionwithin Revenue Canada. Those decisions,and the imprecision of the law, areoccasionally challenged in the courts.As one judge complained:

Somewhat anomalously, the [Income Tax] Actdoes not provide a useful definition of ‘charity’or ‘charitable’ so that the Courts of necessityare thrown back to an obscure and not alwaysentirely consistent corner of the law of England.Judging from the number of times that thisCourt has been called upon in recent years toapply that ancient law to the circumstances oflife on the eve of the third millennium, I may beforgiven for expressing the wish that this is anarea where some creative legislative interventionwould not be out of order.11

This kind of legislative creativity would helpmeet a genuine need. Charitable status isimportant: it confers tax advantages toboth the organization and donors whosedonations are income tax deductible, thusfacilitating the charity’s fundraising efforts.


It also imparts a sense of legitimacy to theorganization. These are valuable assets.

In exchange, charities agree to abide byrules that govern how that tax-excludedmoney is to be spent. For internationalistcharities, the most important rules governspending abroad and spending on advocacy.For example, Canadian charities cannot“give” money to foreign organizations; theycan only engage their Southern counterpartsas agents in pursuit of Canadian charitablegoals. Rightly intended to ensure thatcharities take responsibility for the useof their funds, this precision nonethelessconflicts with the ideals of partnership;notably who decides what monies are spent on what goal.12

Charitable status also constrains organiza-tions’ “political” activities. An organizationwhose primary intent is to bring aboutchanges in law or policy, or to persuadethe public to adopt a particular view, cannotqualify for charitable status.13 If an existingcharity modifies its mandate and makespolitical work its primary activity, its statusmay be revoked.14 However, organizationscan spend up to 10 percent of their revenueson advocacy work and still retain theircharitable status. The determination ofwhat constitutes advocacy rather thanpublic education, for example, and of whatpercentage of a CSO’s activities it representshas become a bit of a guessing game. Howcan organizations ensure their advocacywork does not disqualify them as charities?What mechanisms will ensure that charitiescan engage in public debate on issuesabout which they are knowledgeable so thattheir views can balance those of business orcorporate interests? To what extent shouldcharities be permitted to attempt to changeor retain legislation?15

In negotiating such murky regulatory waters,CSOs face a clear challenge in pursuingtheir work for global change. Some regula-tory creativity could indeed be applied.

S H A L L O W B U T W I D E : P U B L I C O P I N I O N

Another enabling—and sometimes dis-abling—factor for CSO work is the strengthof public opinion, its influence on wider

political will, and its manifestation in the form of volunteering and donations. If donations by Canadians to all charities,including those working internationally, are a reliable indication, public opiniontoday is strongly supportive of CSOs (see“Civil Society Organizations and Funding inCanada”). While federal funding to develop-ment NGOs is down, some of the shortfallhas been made up by increases in individualdonations, directed mostly to large NGOs.

Those increases correspond to a continuinglevel of public support for overseas aid ingeneral. An October 1998 survey showedthat some 75 percent of Canadians supportofficial development assistance (ODA);16 afigure that has been more or less consistentfor most of the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency’s (CIDA) history.17

Yet these high numbers do not tell thewhole story. Indeed, long-time aid watcherIan Smillie has characterized public supportin Canada as being “a mile wide but an inchdeep,”18 making support for both CIDA’s andNGOs’ work somewhat precarious. Writing forthe Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development (OECD) about CIDA’spolling records, Smillie noted that:

• When asked which they believed was mostimportant for Canada to provide, after1991 more Canadians chose aid foremergencies over support for long-termdevelopment;

• The majority of Canadians were neutralin their opinions about aid. They did notthink of aid very often, did not feel ithad an impact on them, and did not con-sider themselves part of the global com-munity. Of neutral Canadians, 40 percenttended to support aid while 20 percenttended to oppose it.19

Moreover, the proportion of Canadians whothink that Canada spends too much on aidseems to be growing, and a majority considersthat the demands of domestic fiscal healthjustify cutting aid spending abroad.20

Although poll results can be questioned,21

the shallowness of support has raisedalarm bells within CIDA, concerned that itsdomestic constituency already favours high-visibility emergency work over longer-termdevelopment efforts, and among CSOs them-


Another enabling—and

sometimes disabling—

factor for CSO work is the

strength of public

opinion, its influence on

wider political will, and

its manifestation in the

form of volunteering and

donations.

selves, who share the same constituency.One of the outcomes has been noteworthytimidity on the part of many internationalCSOs. Fears that policy work or nondramatic,nonfilmable work on the ground would dryup public support have limited them toundertaking “safer” projects, as Figure 1illustrated. Indeed, self-censorship may bea larger impediment to advocacy work thanRevenue Canada regulations. John Foster,a former CEO of OXFAM Canada, argues thata number of organizations have engaged inself-censorship for fear that advocacy workmay scare away conventional donors whowant every charitable dollar to be spenton relieving poverty on the ground.22 Whilethis volume highlights those that havechosen an internationalist policy route, theyare a minority.

To counter the shallowness of public support,there is a clear need to mount continuingefforts to increase understanding of andsupport for ODA. This lack of public under-standing may ultimately be most damagingto CSOs’ endeavours to bring about change.

P R I VAT E S E C T O R S U P P O R TThe private sector is a potential ally inattempts to effect change. CSOs’ cautiousforays into corporate sponsorship and part-nership have yielded some successes at home(see Box 3). CSOs working internationallyhave entered into fewer such relationships,but are similarly willing to explore thepossibilities. As Betty Plewes, President andCEO of the Canadian Council for InternationalCo-operation, noted: “I acknowledge thatsome NGOs in the past have tended toignore or belittle the role of the market; wetoo have had to learn from the failures wehave witnessed. But the current imbalanceshould prompt us to examine the respectiveroles of each sector, their relative part inthe aid regime, and the opportunities forincreased cross-sectoral collaboration.”23

This potential collaboration, however, has notyet led to noticeable support from the privatesector (see Box 3). Canadian corporate grantsto the voluntary sector are low: while US corporations allocate 1.2 percent of profits to the voluntary sector,24 Canada’s privatesector spends well under 1 percent, account-ing for less than 2 percent of revenues forthe whole of the charitable sector.25

Efforts are underway to improve that per-formance, however. The Imagine campaignled by the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy,for example, now counts 450 membercompanies, all pledged to spend 1 percentof their net profits on charitable work. In1995, the last year for which full informationis available, Imagine companies donated$234 million (or an average of 1.37 percentof net income) to charitable and nonprofitorganizations, a figure that amounts tosome 40 percent of total corporate contri-butions that year.26 Although it is difficultto gauge the impact of the campaign,circumstantial evidence is remarkable: inthe 1980s Canadian corporations reportedgiving 0.65 percent of pretax profits tovoluntary sector organizations. In the yearsfollowing Imagine’s 1988 launch, that figurerose to 0.97 percent, translating into anincrease of almost $1 billion for charity.27

Most of these funds, however, are directedtoward education and social services at home,rather than to international programs.28

Donations for international work are mostoften made by Canadian companies tocommunity organizations in the country ofoperation, rather than to home-based CSOsworking abroad.29 Box 4 illustrates thismixed record of international giving.

A similar story can be told of support byprivate foundations. Canadian foundationsare modest supporters of international work.


BO

X3T H E C A L E D O N I N S T I T U T E ’ S S O C I A L PA R T N E R S H I P S

P R O J E C T

A private, nonprofit organization, The Caledon Institute of Social Policy

has recently embarked upon a project to explore the concept and

practice of social partnerships. The main objectives are to: develop a

conceptual and practical understanding of business/nonprofit partner-

ships throughout the country; share this learning with a broad audience;

and stimulate others to explore, discuss, and experiment with social

partnerships. Caledon has produced a video entitled “Partners ... the

sum is greater,” which features innovative examples of collaborative

initiatives including the Canadian Women’s Foundation’s work with

The Body Shop International in an anti-violence campaign; Chevron

Canada Resources’ employee volunteerism program; and the Community

Opportunities Development Association’s work with local economic

development projects.

Source

The Caledon Institute. For more information, visit “Social Partnership Projects,”at www.caledoninst.org (accessed in January 1999).

Our sample of 21 foundations that fundinternational work (see page 116), for example, showed that only $99,000 wasspent on international causes in 1996, amere 3.3 percent of their total giving; orless than 1 percent of CARE’s total income.As the Canadian Centre for Philanthropypoints out, most foundations focus on wel-fare, education, and healthcare in Canada;almost half of all foundations have revenuesof less than $50,000; and a full 80 percentof grants are for sums of $5,000 or less.30

For the moment, “social partnerships” ininternational development with the corpo-rate and foundation worlds are a potential,but not yet realized, source of support.

O R G A N I Z AT I O N A L C A PAC I T I E S

Last, but not least, organizations seekingto change the world are often in need ofchange themselves. By their mission, CSOsbear a heavy load of ethical responsibilityand are thus subject to a correspondinglevel of ethical scrutiny. Not all bear upequally well. In comparative work on NGO-private sector relationships, for example,the UK-based International NGO Trainingand Research Centre noted a dramaticchange in the nature and form of somedevelopment NGOs. They argue that thesechanges blur the edges between the ethi-cally charged civil society arena and thesupposedly ethically challenged corporateworld:

Even the language used to describe NGOs ischanging and identities and boundaries areclearly shifting. We see NGOs with no valuebase, as against commercial enterprises withvery strong ethical values; certain non-profitorganisations run counter to the traditionalspirit of voluntarism; commercial consultancyfirms compete with established NGOs to operateprogrammes in areas formerly considered “NGOterritory,” and NGOs are setting up commercialconsultancy wings.31

It is evidently not enough for CSOs to claimthe ethical high ground simply by virtue oftheir membership in “civil society;” mem-bership does not mean that they can avoidbeing scrutinized about their values, behav-iour, and impact. Indeed, as the VoluntarySector Roundtable illustrates, membershipin civil society calls for even higher standards.

Toward a Fairer World: Some ThoughtsThe Canadian Development Report 1999chronicles remarkable successes byCanadians, achieved in spite of significantobstacles at home and despite the funda-mental challenges CSOs sometimes pose to the global order. The stories do not,however, carry simplistic messages of civilvirtue called to action against the turgidpublic sector or the suspect intentions ofthe corporate world. Rather, these accountsclearly identify weaknesses within CSOs aswell as without, conflicts among even thoseCSOs working toward the same goals, andclimates of mistrust and ambiguity in bothCanadian and international circles. But theseare not reason to dismiss the work of CSOs:they are a challenge to all those working for global change to do even better.

What, then, is needed for CSOs to reach stillfurther toward a fairer world?

F O R C S O s W O R K I N G I N T E R N AT I O N A L LYApplied accountabi l i tyThe efforts undertaken on codes of conduct(CCIC’s membership code, the fundraisingguidelines promoted by the Canadian Centrefor Philanthropy,32 and the work by theVoluntary Sector Roundtable) are paramountto CSOs’ future in Canada. They respond


BO

X4 S O M E C A N A D I A N C O M PA N I E S ’ S P E N D I N G A B R O A D

(1997/98 Totals)

• The Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan spent $83,250, evidence of

an increase over 10 years.

• Great West Life made an unusual international grant of $5,000 this

year; normally, all its contributions go to domestic organizations.

• Pfizer Canada greatly increased its spending over 10 years, to reach

a total of $3.7 million in donations of pharmaceutical products in

1997.

• The Royal Bank Financial Group increased its Canadian spending on

international issues from $2,000 in 1987 to $30,631 in 1997/98; its

overseas operations overwhelmed that amount by further contribut-

ing $475,000.

• The Toronto-Dominion Bank spent $10,000, an unusual contribution;

normally, TD makes most of its contributions in Canada.

Source

The Conference Board of Canada, Taking Action on International Contributions,Ottawa, 1998, p. 5.

directly to the “special interests” accusationthat Canadian voluntary organizations arenot always widely accountable to con-stituencies at home or communities abroad.By visibly applying the accountabilitystandards that many already employ, CSOscan shape how they are viewed both bythe communities where they work and theCanadian government and public, thusreinforcing their legitimacy. Good will isnot enough to change the world: CSOsmust be seen to be working with thosewhose lives they mean to affect.

Real partnershipIn particular, CSOs must take the demands of“partnership” with other organizations veryseriously.33 While there has been an explosionin the use of partnership language,34 theimplications for change in CSO behaviourare far greater than a shift in vocabulary.Who decides what is to be done, who isto benefit, and under what conditions?The questions arise not only from Southernconcerns, but also—as this CDR makesabundantly clear—from like-minded domesticorganizations as well. Because demands forgenuine partnership are complicated bycharity rules in Canada, the imbalances inpower and resources among organizations,differences in capacity, patterns of quasi-colonial behaviour, struggles over territory,and the increasingly shared nature of someinternational issues (especially on tradeand debt), they are not easily met.

Heightened profic iencyFor many organizations created as a resultof ethical energy rather than organizationalexpertise, effecting change in the world alsoinvolves bringing about change within theorganizations themselves. Accountability,after all, also means that one is able todo the work promised. It involves demandsfor increased competence throughout thevoluntary sector: professionalism in generat-ing solutions and implementing program-ming; developing credible country and issueexpertise; tapping new sources of funds;engaging meaningfully with government andthe private sector; and evaluating the workcompleted in order to learn to do better.Faced with an ambivalent funding environ-ment and shallow public support, manyinternationalist CSOs may prefer to camou-

flage difficulties, keep a low profile, or goit alone rather than push past obstacles.Though understandable, this head-in-the-sand behaviour is a serious impediment toglobal change.

F O R F E D E R A L A N D P R O V I N C I A LG O V E R N M E N T A G E N C I E SExpand educationPublic support for Canada’s continuinginterest in the rest of the world, let alonedevelopment aid, is a key driver for moreand better social justice work. The sad truthis that Canadians, while of broad good willtoward “development,” know little aboutthe depth of the challenges faced by peopleliving in many parts of the South. And,while funding cuts eviscerated the work of development education NGOs, re-instatedfunding is not the full answer. A CIDA-rundevelopment education program is not acomplete solution either, partly becauseCanadians consider other agents and media—television, churches, NGOs, magazines,and newspapers, in that order—to be more credible.35 A key way to deepen educationabout the world (only a part of whichinvolves Canada’s aid program) is toentrench global studies into provincial primary and secondary school curricula. The education needed to make Canadiansagents for social change requires a larger,more fundamental, and much deeper com-mitment from our provinces.

Enlightened regulationThe rules governing charitable organizationstatus are in need of creative revision.While regulations are needed to ensure thatCSOs and public agencies alike are account-able, the system has not kept up withthe changing definitions of public benefit,partnership, and the international reach ofmany Canadian organizations.36 Legal reformis rightly the responsibility of Parliament,whose debates and eventual decisions mayfurther improve CSOs’ ability to effect changeat home and elsewhere. Other regulatoryreforms could easily be made within theexisting public service: charitable registrationand oversight, for example, is the purviewof a small division within Revenue Canada;a Voluntary Sector Commission, as recom-mended by the Panel on Accountability, might


The sad truth is that

Canadians, while of broad

good will toward “devel-

opment,” know little

about the depth of the

challenges faced by

people living in many

parts of the South.

usefully supplement and update government’scontributions to the work of CSOs.

Revised rolesThe most important challenge to Canadiangovernments, however, is the most difficult.There is a disabling ambiguity within ourgovernmental and political institutionsabout the role of the public sector, particu-larly in the provision of domestic socialservices, and the relative role of civil societyorganizations. Suspicion, service offloading,and funding cuts are dispensed to CSOsalong with lavish praise. Organizationshave, in turn, responded with offers of cut-rate service delivery and with indignantself-justification. These roles must be re-negotiated and the ambiguity resolved.

A number of efforts underway offer somehope. The Privy Council Office, for example,has been helping the cross-departmentalVoluntary Sector Taskforce engage moremeaningfully with CSOs across the country;the nongovernmental Voluntary SectorRoundtable has just published its reporton the future of the sector; and the practiceof government consultation—albeit imper-fect—continues.37 If anything, some ofthe longest-running and most successfulconsultations have been between CIDA andCanadian development NGOs. That 30-yearhistory— conflicts and all—has generatedimportant lessons for other CSOs andgovernment agencies wishing for a moremeaningful relationship.38

Reconsidered funding choicesThe rationale for cutting funding to keyCSOs has become visibly thin, particularlynow that federal budgets have tilted to thesurplus side of the balance sheet. Linkedto revised government roles must be thenotion that Canadians, organized in groupsto promote the public interest, have a legit-imate claim to their own tax dollars whenthey pursue causes in the public interest,whether at home or internationally. Whileregulatory reform will help determine whatconstitutes the “public interest,” thatclarification ought to be met with renewedenthusiasm for civil society organizationsand for supporting their efforts. And, whileCSOs should apply intelligent self-restraintand careful planning to avoid domination byany funder, government explanations that

CSOs are too dependent on public fundingshould not be an excuse to water downofficial commitment to civic activism. Asa nation, we need to show that support forcivil society strengthening in other countries,through a host of international commit-ments, is matched by support at home.

F O R F O U N D AT I O N S A N D T H E C O R P O R AT E S E C T O RMeaningful engagementThere are some noteworthy efforts inCanada to couple voluntary organizationswith private sector firms for a range ofactivities.39 While CSOs and corporationsmay not always be motivated by the samefactors, carefully negotiated relationshipsbetween them can do more than liberatemuch needed funds for voluntary efforts.Joint undertakings raise the profile of socialjustice efforts, tie the financial economymore firmly into the moral economy, andcreate norms of ethical behaviour andcompromise throughout society.

International ist spir i tIt also matters that Canadian firms, increas-ingly working abroad in highly visibleindustries such as mining, demonstrate theirinternational civic commitments.40 Settingand enforcing high standards for labourrights, environmental protection, commu-nity involvement, and ethical investment ofprofits are deeply important for social justice.Canadian firms, encouraged by appropriatelegislation, can set precedents abroadand lead at home by promoting consistentethical standards.

Similarly, Canadian foundations—manyof which draw their endowments from thesuccess of the corporate sector—need totake a closer look at the lack of their inter-national presence. Canadians, althoughremarkably active in both intergovernmentaland nongovernmental organizations world-wide, are conspicuously absent as philan-thropic organizations. As the Canadiancorporate community looks more closely atits role in the world, so too must Canadianfoundations. For the world of organizedphilanthropy, this must be the next challenge.

F O R I N D I V I D UA L C A N A D I A N S

Individual Canadians also have a part toplay in bringing about global change. It


matters what individuals do: what groupsthey join, what demonstrations they hold,what letters they write, what money theydonate (both through the tax system anddirectly), and what opinions they hold. Itmatters that people travel to other parts ofthe world, read about it, and make connec-tions between their lives and those of otherworld citizens. Self-education and self-moti-vation is a prerequisite for making largerchange. Without individual involvement,civil society becomes an empty arena.That involvement builds on a real culturalprecedent: half of all Canadians alreadybelong to civil society organizations of onekind or another. The challenge is to extendparticipation from our backyard to ourglobal home.

NOTES

1 For a sample of this literature, see Alan Fowler, Strikinga Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Development(London: Earthscan, 1997); Roger C. Riddell, et al,Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO Evaluation SynthesisStudy. Report prepared for the OECD/DAC Expert Group onEvaluation, Helsinki: Department for InternationalDevelopment Co-operation, 1997; Michael Edwards andDavid Hulme, eds, NGO Performance and Accountability:Beyond the Magic Bullet (London: Earthscan and WestHartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1995); and Louisa Goslingwith Mike Edwards, Toolkits: A Practical Guide toAssessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation(London: Save the Children, 1996).

2 Havi Echenberg, “Self-Regulation of the Voluntary Sector:A Preliminary Literature Review.” Paper written for theVoluntary Sector Roundtable, May 14, 1996, athttp://www.web.net/vsr-trsb/publications/echen.html(accessed February 1999).

3 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy,Minister of Foreign Affairs to the NGO Global Forum on theFive-Year Review of the Vienna World Conference on HumanRights, Ottawa, June 23, 1998, no. 98/47.

4 For a review of the effectiveness of NGO campaigning, seeJennifer Chapman and Thomas Fisher, Effective NGOCampaigning, summary paper and full technical report(London: New Economics Foundation, 1999).

5 The 20/20 proposal asks both national governments andforeign donors to contribute, respectively, 20 percent ofpublic expenditure and 20 percent of overseas develop-ment assistance to the priority basic social service sectorsof low-cost water and sanitation, primary healthcare,basic education, and nutrition. For details, see “20/20 is a springboard,” by Social Watch, online athttp://www.socwatch.org.uy/2020.htm (accessed March 8, 1999).

6 For a more detailed account, see Alison Van Rooy, “TheFrontiers of Influence: NGO Lobbying at the 1974 WorldFood Conference, the 1992 Earth Summit and Beyond.”World Development, vol. 25, no. 1, (January 1997).

7 The Honourable Paul Martin, “New Ways for a NewCentury: The Voluntary Sector and the Government,” inAssociation, vol. 16, no. 1, Canadian Society of AssociationExecutives, (December 1998/January 1999), pp. 10-11.

8 Panel on Accountability and Governance in the VoluntarySector, Building on Strength: Improving Governance andAccountability in Canada’s Voluntary Sector, Final Report,February 1999, p. 15, http://www.pagvs.com(accessed March 1999).

9 Robert Dyck cited in Martin Garber-Conrad and RobertDyck, “Charity-Run Business Ventures: Are They Worth theTime, Energy, and Risks Involved?” in Canadian Centre forPhilanthropy, Front & Centre, (September 1998) p. 14.

10 A February 1998 challenge to the Supreme Court of Canadaby the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible MinorityWomen on the definition of “charity” was resolved inFebruary 1999. While dismissing the appeal, the courtnonetheless expanded the definition of education, andargued that Parliament needs to intervene and modify theconcept of charity through statute law. The issue has alsobeen taken up by the Province of Ontario, which publishedits suggestions for reform On the Law on Charities athttp://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/reports.htm(accessed March 8, 1999).

11 Mr Justice James K. Hugessen, July 16, 1996 majorityjudgement for the Federal Court of Appeal in VancouverRegional FreeNet Assn. v. The Minister of NationalRevenue, cited in Frances K. Boyle, “Charitable Activity”Under The Canadian Income Tax Act: Definition, Process AndProblems. (Ottawa: Voluntary Sector Roundtable, January1997), available on http://www.web.net/vsr-trsb/publications/fullrprt/toc(accessed September 1998).

12 Arthur Drache, “Donating to Foreign Charities.” CanadianNot-For-Profit News (March 1994), pp. 18-19.

13 Canada, Revenue Canada Taxation, “Registering YourCharity for Income Tax Purposes,” Form T-4063 E, p. 15.

14 Until 1987, official restrictions on political activity bycharities were quite stringent. While charities could pre-pare briefs or make representations to ministers or theirstaffs, technically “they were prohibited from actuallyundertaking any action in support of their goals (such asorganizing a letter-writing campaign, or suggesting leg-islative changes). To some, it appeared to be the differ-ence between merely seeking to influence, and actuallybeing effective.” Tim Brodhead, Brent Herbert-Copley withAnne-Marie Lambert, Bridges of Hope? Canadian VoluntaryAgencies and the Third World (Ottawa: The North-SouthInstitute, 1988), p. 51. After a storm of protest, and inreaction to the growth of charities which clearly had apolitical element, the law was changed to allow for agreater allocation of resources to political activity. A 1987Revenue Canada information circular explained that whilepolitical activity must remain “incidental” (accounting forless than 10 percent of expenditure), it could now includeefforts to influence and mobilize public opinion in orderto pressure officials to take a certain course of action,including letter-writing, public demonstrations, and thedistribution of literature. Canada, Revenue Canada Taxation,“Registered Charities: Ancillary and Incidental PoliticalActivities,” Information Circular 87-1, February 25, 1987.In an effort to make the rules on political activity moreflexible, Revenue Canada is circulating a new discussionpaper on possible reforms.

15 Boyle, “Charitable Activity” Under The Canadian Income TaxAct.

16 CIDA, Communications Branch, “Canadians and DevelopmentAssistance: Environics Poll Results, October 1998, andTrend Analysis,” unpublished mimeo, Ottawa, 1998.

17 A 1974 study reported that 88 percent of respondents werein favour of ODA; a 1980 survey showed that 65 percentwere in favour; and a 1990 survey reported that 71 percentthought Canada did not spend enough or spend the rightamount on foreign aid. Rakid Buckridian, “CanadianAttitudes to International Development: A Pilot Study inthe National Capital Region,” MA thesis, Carleton University,1974; CIDA, A Report on Canadians’ Attitudes Toward ForeignAid, Ottawa, November 1980; CIDA, Report to CIDA: PublicAttitudes Toward International Development Assistance,Ottawa, 1990.


18 Ian Smillie, personal communication, March 1999.

19 Ian Smillie, “Canada,” in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich incollaboration with Tony German and Judith Randel, eds,Public Attitudes and International Development Co-operation(Paris: North-South Centre of the Council of Europe andthe Development Centre of the OECD, 1998), p. 55.

20 CIDA, Canadians and Development Assistance, Angus ReidPoll Results and Trends Analysis, August 1997.

21 Ibid., p. 56.

22 John Foster, personal communication, January 1999.

23 Letter to the Honourable Pierre Pettigrew, Minister forInternational Cooperation and Minister responsible for LaFrancophonie, from Betty Plewes, President and CEO, CCIC,August 28, 1996.

24 “Setting Standards for Corporate Giving.” New Directions,vol. 3, no. 1, 1998, newsletter of the Imagine campaign,http://www.ccp.ca/imagine (accessed March 1999).

25 Kathleen Freimond, “Partners in philanthropy.” Business inVancouver (January 20, 1998), athttp://www.biv.com/s430.html (accessed November 1998).

26 “Imagine makes a difference,” found athttp://www.ccp.ca/imagine/about/differ.html(accessed March 1999).

27 “Imagine’s new program: It’s about more than justcharity,” supplement published in The Globe and Mail,November 6, 1998, also online athttp://www.ccp.ca/imagine/awards/g&m98-7.html(accessed March 1999).

28 Michael H. Hall and Laura G. MacPherson, “What Typesof Charities are Getting Corporate Donations?” ResearchBulletin, The Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, vol. 3,no. 4 (Fall 1996), athttp://www.ccp.ca/information/research/rb62.htm(accessed November 1998).

29 Conference Board of Canada, Taking Action on InternationalContributions, Ottawa, 1998, p. 2. Many corporations alsofunnel contributions through corporate foundations that,as charities, are not permitted to make contributions out-side Canada.

30 Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, “Foundations:A Potential Source of Funding For Charities?” inResearch Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 4 (October 1995), athttp://www.ccp.ca/information/research/rb37.htm(accessed October 1998).

31 INTRAC, excerpt from the Millennium Paper in “NGOs andCompanies: Principles and Profits,” in OnTrac, no. 10(August 1998), p. 2.

32 The CCP’s Ethical Fundraising & Financial Accountability Codeis available online at http://www.ccp.ca/information/documents/cp126.htm(accessed March 1999).

33 CCIC published a pointed criticism by Southern NGOs oftheir Canadian counterparts. CCIC, Conversations withSouthern Partners: The Search for Meaningful Partnerships,Ottawa, 1996, available online athttp://www.web.net/~ccicsos/policy/doc124.htm(accessed March 1999).

34 Lynne Hately and Kamal Malhotra, Between Rhetoric andReality: Essays on Partnership in Development (Ottawa: TheNorth-South Institute, 1997).

35 CIDA, Report to CIDA: Public Attitudes Toward InternationalDevelopment Assistance, 1991, Ottawa.

36 See the recommendations in the Panel on Accountabilityand Governance in the Voluntary Sector, op cit.

37 See Frances Abele; Katherine Graham; Alex Ker; AntoniaMaioni; and Susan Phillips, Talking with Canadians: CitizenEngagement and the Social Union (Ottawa: CanadianCouncil on Social Development, 1998).

38 See, for example, David Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide:A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998); and

CIDA, CIDA’s Policy on Consultation with Canadian (CivilSociety) Stakeholders, Hull, 1993, available online athttp://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidapo-e.htm(accessed March 1999).

39 In addition to those noted elsewhere in this CanadianDevelopment Report, see “Common Interests: ExploringOpportunities for NGO-Private Sector Collaboration,” May1996, conference report available online athttp://www.web.net/ccic-ccci/policy/doc19.html(accessed March 1999).

40 Michelle Hibler and Rowena Beamish, eds, CanadianDevelopment Report 1998: Canadian Corporations and SocialResponsibility (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1998).


CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND

FUNDING IN CANADA

Compiled by Judy Meltzer

with Alison Van Rooy

Table A describes some of the organizations discussed throughout the nine chapters of the Canadian Development Report 1999. While not an exhaustive list of CSOs working in international development, nor a statistically random sample, thetable is an important sample of Canadian activity in this sector. Manyof the issues raised in the various chapters are transformed into datain the following tables and graphs: where does the money come from?where are people working? in what parts of the world? on whatkinds of issues? Supplemented by data gathered by the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operation (CCIC)1, this table provides an interesting insight into the broader world of Canadian CSOs.

L O C AT I O N P O L I T I C SIt is of little surprise that the vast majority of groups described in this volume are based in Ottawa. Canadian NGOs—and many ofthe other organizations that also work in development—are deeplyinvolved in what Canada does as a government. Much of theirfunding comes from government, and as many are involved in lobbying on broader issues of foreign policy, both sides benefit from this cheek by jowl relationship.

There are problems, however, with this geographical concentration.Only two of the 46 organizations described in Table A lie outside theOttawa-Montreal-Toronto ”golden triangle,“ an exaggerated but accu-rate reflection of the allocation of addresses across the country. Thisconcentration has generated justified complaints that Eastern Canadadoes not listen to the development debates occurring in Western,Northern, or Maritime Canada. It is also important, and conspicuous,that French and English language-based organizations are too infre-quently involved in each other’s work and meetings. The problem isrecognized, however: CCIC’s annual award for innovation in develop-ment seeks examples of success across the country, and this yearawarded prizes to BC’s Co-Development Canada and Trois-Rivières’Comité de Solidarité Tiers-Monde for their work in union training in Latin America and public education in Quebec, respectively. CIDA also makes the effort in its annual meeting with the Canadian CSOs it funds. The size and linguistic differences in Canada make theseefforts expensive but important for learning and sharing success stories—one of the challenges so strongly underlined in Chapter 2.

F U N D I N G A N D R E V E N U E S O U R C E S

Where does the money to do the work come from? In Canada, nongovernmental groups’ own fundraising is now double what they receive from government (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2 for a historical record). When government grants to NGOs and other CSOs are added to the total they raise on their own, the result ismore than US$450 million, a good 21.7 percent of Canada’s entire

development assistance (once ODA and voluntary grants areadded—see Figure A). This number alone raises the CSO community’s importance to the overall Canadian effort, and ranks Canadian CSO work among the most prominent in the entire Development Assistance Committee community.

The amounts raised and spent by individual organizations, however,illustrate a remarkable range. From the cross-section sampled inthis volume, total revenues for the latest available year range from$114 million (World Vision Canada, the largest NGO in Canada) to $65,000 (Common Frontiers). In both the CCIC survey andour sample, the bulk of the combined total revenues of all the orga-nizations is highly concentrated among those few with more than$25 million in revenue. In our survey, the combined revenue of

110

F I G U R E A Money Through NGOs

(Figures in US$ millions)

Government Grants

to NGOs

Individual Grants

to NGOs

NGO Share as % of Total ODA Plus

Individual Grants

Luxembourg 12 16 28.6Ireland 0 68 27.5Canada 153 302 21.7United States ~ 2,509 21.1Switzerland 56 182 19.7Netherlands 300 353 18.1New Zealand 3 16 13.8United Kingdom 65 382 12.5Germany ~ 1,044 12.1Spain ~ 122 8.9Austria 3 47 8.3Australia 4 76 6.7Sweden 109 22 6.5Belgium 2 60 6.4Norway 2 80 5.9Japan 236 232 4.8Italy 34 31 2.7Denmark 9 36 2.5Portugal 2 -1 0.5France 22 ~ 0.3Finland 0 0 0.0

Note: ~ No data available.Source: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Annual Report, 1998, Table 13, pp. A21-A22.

A Sampling of Canadian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)


C S O s A N D F U N D I N G

C S O s A N D F U N D I N G 111

16 organizations in 1997/98 was approximately $345 million—fully80 percent of the total in our sample—and one-half from only twoorganizations, World Vision Canada and CUSO. That amount equalsonly about 1 percent of the revenue of the whole voluntary sectorin Canada—not a spectacular showing (see Box 4 in Chapter 1).

The sources of these funds are similarly varied. In our sample, revenue from government ranged from 90 percent of total income(Voluntary Service Overseas) to nearly none at all (Canadian Feed the Children). Where we had numbers, we found on average thatsome 46 percent came from the government, less than 1 percent from foundations, none from business, 34 percent from individualdonations, 5 percent was earned, and 11 percent arrived from othersources. In both the CCIC survey and our sample, there is a continueddependence on government as a source of revenue, particularly forsmaller organizations and despite the decline in government funding.It is important to emphasize that this level is lower than it has beenin a long time. CCIC’s data indicates that dependence on governmentfunding is at its lowest level since the 1970s.

Furthermore, in both studies, larger organizations were generally less dependent on government funds. Of the 46 we surveyed, those with turnovers of more than $10 million received only an average of 29 percent of their revenue from government; among the large church-based organizations (including World Vision, the United Church of Canada, and the Mennonite Central Committee), no more than 8 percent came from government.

Other sources of revenue include grants from Canadian foundations,individual contributions, earned revenue, membership contributions,as well as revenue from business, multilateral banks, and foreign governments. Canadian foundations and businesses were the leastsignificant source of revenue in the sample: only two organizations,Rural Advancement Foundation International and the Unitarian ServiceCommittee, received more than 1 percent of total revenue from foun-dations. Revenue from individual donations, however, constituted asignificant percentage—for example, 52 percent of CUSO’s total ofapproximately $25.2 million came from individual donations. Privatesector donations were not recorded by any of our respondents,although those amounts may be hidden in other categories.

Our profile reflects some of the funding trends identified over time by CCIC. Over a three-year period, CCIC’s survey showed that smallorganizations (with revenue of less than $2 million) experienced adramatic decline of 25 percent in overall revenue, led by a 54 percentdecline in government funding between 1993/94 and 1996/97. Incontrast, organizations with more than $25 million in total revenuesaw their overall income increase by 15 percent, primarily due to anincrease in contributions from multilateral sources outside Canada.2

CCIC’s data from 50 of their members indicates that overall revenuegrew by approximately 4 percent from 1993/94 to 1996/97, but revenue from CIDA fell by 12 percent, while revenue from individualdonations increased by 6 percent.3 The overall picture shows a gradual increase in funding: a picture that hides significant drops

in government funding (which caused many small organizations tocontract or disappear), but partly overcome by increases in individualdonations to the large NGOs.

S T A F F I N GPart of the financial picture is reflected in the way CSOs are staffed andthe contributions of their volunteers. Our sample illustrates that lessthan half have more than 20 full-time staff in Canada, and only 14 per-cent have more than 100 full-time paid employees. Of the organizationsworking internationally, half also had full-time staff working overseas.

This staffing contingent is multiplied by the efforts of volunteers. Of allthe sampled organizations that responded, half had volunteers workingwith them. Of the organizations working internationally, a third hadvolunteers working with them overseas, including cooperants.

G E O G R A P H I C A L A N D S E C T O R A L E M P H A S I SCanadian CSOs have put their greatest effort in the poorest parts ofthe world. Our numbers, though piecemeal, show a familiar picture:29 percent to Africa, 26 percent to Latin America and the Caribbean;17 percent to Asia; 18 percent within Canada, and 7 percent to otherareas. With the exception of the focus on Canada—given the empha-sis in this volume on the role of CSOs as policy advocates withinCanada—this allocation is roughly in line with CIDA’s own priorities.In 1996/97, CIDA allocated 37 percent to Africa/Middle East (andwithin Africa, 90 percent concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa); 33 percent to the Americas; 23 percent to Asia; and 8 percent in Canada.4

Within the poorest geographic areas, Canadian CSOs also have a concentration on poverty-specific issues. Of all the CIDA funds allocated to NGOs in 1996/97, 34 percent was spent on basic humanneeds projects5—a vivid contrast with CIDA’s overall record of 19 percent (when emergency food aid and humanitarian assistance are removed).6

We also asked our sampled organizations to identify the issues onwhich they worked. While this information is particularly hard toanalyze (given varying categories and overlap), some interestingpatterns emerged. For one, among those who offered information,we found that 34 percent had three or more areas of focus. Ofthese, 88 percent claimed gender issues as one of their areas offocus; 25 percent listed trade and trade alternatives; and 63 percentlisted one or more of food security, environmental issues, peace-building, and human rights. This multi-tasking and concentrationon gender and trade issues underlines arguments made throughoutthe book that Canadians are doing much more than administeringtraditional development projects.

T A B L E A A S A M P L I N G O F C A N A D I A N C I V I L S O C I E T Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N S

Location Foundation Number Number of NumberYear of Staff Volunteers of Members

Cana

da

Abro

ad

Cana

da

Abro

ad

Organization

1 Action Canada Network* Ottawa 1987 50

2 Aga Khan Foundation Canada Ottawa 1980 20 700

3 Amnesty International Canada* Vanier 1973 26 60,000

4 Canadian Feed the Children Toronto 1985 15

5 Canadian Association of Food Banks (CAFB) Toronto 1987 3 5 129

6 Canadian Auto Workers’ Social Justice Fund (CAWSJF) North York 1991 3

7 Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI)1 Montreal 1958 55 47 125 179 90

8 Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) Ottawa 1968 23 >100

9 Canadian Environmental Network (CEN)* Ottawa 1977 9 >200 2,000

10 Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA)* Toronto 1970 4

11 Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (CICR) Ottawa 1988 4 45

12 Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) Ottawa 1956 10 1

13 Canadian Organization for Development through Education (CODE) Ottawa 1959 16 15 200 50

14 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC)2 Ottawa 1994 1

15 Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women (CRIAW) Ottawa 1976 4 25 700

16 CUSO Ottawa 1961 58 53 194 620

17 CARE Canada3 Ottawa 1977 53.8 48 20

18 Christian Children’s Fund (CCF)4 Scarborough 1960 60 16 10

19 Common Frontiers5 Toronto 1988 1 >30

20 Council of Canadians* Ottawa 1985 12 90,000

21 Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice (ECEJ)* Toronto 1973 4

22 Foster Parents Plan of Canada Toronto 1937 50 4,390

23 Global Network on Food Security (UN Association Canada)* Ottawa 1946 10 200 12,000

24 Greenpeace Canada* Toronto 1971 50 375,000

25 Inter Pares Ottawa 1975 12

26 MATCH International Centre Ottawa 1975 9

27 Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)6 Winnipeg 1920 113 117 357

28 Mothers are Women (MAW) Ottawa 1984 35 650

29 National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) Toronto 1973 4 30 700

30 National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO) Ottawa 1971 6 16 2,200

31 National Council of Women of Canada* Ottawa 1893 1 100

32 National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE)* Nepean 1976 14 308,970

33 The North-South Institute Ottawa 1976 20 6 25

34 Ontario Public Interest Research Group (OPIRG)* Toronto 1976 18 55,000

35 OXFAM Canada Ottawa 1966 41 9 600 350

36 OXFAM Québec7 Montreal 1973 33 27 139

37 Partners in Rural Development (PRD) Ottawa 1961 13 8 7

38 Réseau national d’action-éducation femmes* Ottawa 1983

39 Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI)8 Winnipeg 1986 3

40 Toronto Food Policy Council Toronto 1990 3 20

41 United Church of Canada Toronto 1925 176 24 >100 300,000

42 Unitarian Service Committee Canada (USC)9 Ottawa 1945 18 54

43 Voluntary Service Overseas Canada (VSO) Ottawa 1992 9 140 110

44 World University Service of Canada (WUSC) Ottawa 1939 60 120

45 World Vision Canada (WVC)10 Mississauga 1950 279 26 35 300,000

46 YWCA Toronto 1870 21

NOTES:Sources for data in Table A are NSI e-mail and telephone surveys of those organizations given significant treatment in the text. Where information was unavailable, the organization was omitted from the list. Where (*) appears, the information was obtained from Associations Canada 1998/99, (Toronto: IHS/Micromedia, 1998). 1 CECI: CECI counts 23% of revenue from UN agencies and multilateral development banks, 13.5% from other development agencies, and 11% from unpaid professional services of Canadian volunteers abroad. (Note: adding the value of volunteer work is not a common practice among other NGOs.) 2 CPCC: As a Canadian network, its budget is spent in Canada, but its members are engaged internationally. 3 CARE: 51% of revenue comes from international sources (multilateral and other); 18% comes from contributions in kind; and less than 1% is from miscellaneous and interest income. 4 CCF: 61% of revenue is from other sources. 5 Common Frontiers: Although 90% of the budget is spent in Canada, all of the work has a “Trade in the Americas” focus.

112

• • 100

•

1994/95 16,100,100 5

100

1994/95 1,371,000 30.6 9.4 • • a

1997/98 39,162,000 50 2.5 47.5 • • • • b 12.5 34.5 48 0 5

1997/98 2,578,972 84.4 4.9 • • • • • • c 100

• 100

100

1998/99 130,000 80 • 100

1997/98 311,600 82 10 • 100

1997/98 25,187,000 47 1.0 • • • • d 28 23 38 11

1997/98 73,130,192 24 < 1 70.0 • • • • • e 12 62 18 8 0

1994/95 38,021,453 8.5 61.0

1997/98 65,000 0.5 • 10 90

100

100

1994/95 10 5.0

1994/95 3,133,308 39.2

1996/97 36,843,504 5 26 24.6 • • • • f 21 18.8 11.4 13.6 35.2

75 2 • • 100

1997/98 780,000 30 70 • • • 100

1997/98 531,000 40 • • g 100

100

100

1997 2,224,362 91 3.3 • • • • • 100

100

1996/97 10,743,203 41 2 13.0 • • • • • h 60.5 27 12.5

1995 16,370,483 60 34.2

1997/98 4,323,620 73 1 1.0 • • • f 18 35 43 0 4

100

1996/97 440,000 65 12 < 1 22.0 i 15 8 15 2 60

1997/98 210,000 100 • • • 100

1997/98 45,000,000 10 • • • • 30 30 30 10

1995 4,649,859 66 5 7.5 .05 j

1997/98 1,750,000 90 • • •

1994 20,952,700 60

1997/98 113,966,000 8.5 22.5 • • • • • k 16.9 42.2 16.6 2.2 1

6 MCC: Donated material resources account for 21.4% of revenue. Grants make up 3.2%. More than 35% of the budget is spent in Canada and the United States. 7 OXFAM Québec: Individual donations account for 5.8% of revenue and international sources provide 34.2%. 8 RAFI: 8% of revenue is from UN and multilateral bodies and 14% is from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 60% of the budget is spent globally. 9 USC Canada: 0.5% is from Solidarité Canada Sahel. 10 WVC: The 279 staff includes 95 part-time employees. The total of 26 staff abroad includes 12 interns.

KEY ISSUES:a Trade union support b Economic and social development, communications for development, humanitarian aid c ODA reform d Cultural survival e Emergency relief; small enterprisedevelopment f Community development g Poverty h Democratic rights and health security i Agricultural biodiversity, biotechnology, indigenous knowledge j Capacity building k Relief, nutrition, transformational development, microenterprise development.

Annual Revenue Source of Revenue (%) Main Issues Regional Emphasis (% of budget)Ye

ar

Amou

nt(C

$)

Gove

rnm

ent

Foun

dati

on

Busi

ness

Earn

ed

Othe

r

Indi

vidu

al D

onat

ions

an

d M

embe

rshi

p

Trad

e &

Alte

rnat

ives

Food

Se

curi

ty

Envi

ronm

ent

Gend

er

Peac

ebui

ldin

g

Hum

an R

ight

s

Othe

r

Asia

Afri

ca

Lati

n Am

eric

a&

Cari

bbea

n

Euro

pe

(inc

l. M

iddl

e Ea

st)

Cana

da

Othe

r


95

60

10.3

20

8

52

6

> 30

99

> 85

60.8

44.4

22

60

5.7

44

5.8

25

90

21

10

40

69.2

Paralleling the statistical description of CSOs in Canada is a profile of other Canadians’ work to support them. As individuals, orthrough companies, foundations, and government agencies,Canadians have supported international development efforts fordecades. What the tables illustrate, however, is how small that support is in relation to CSO activities at home, and how large theindividual contribution is in relation to the support from business and government agencies. Although the numbers in this field aresparse and often contradictory, the message is clear: while many funders are talking the development talk, not everyone is walking the walk.

I N D I V I D UA L G I V I N GThe statistics in Table B measuring individuals’ contributions to all charities—those working in Canada and abroad—record a cleargrowth in generosity. Data published more recently by Revenue Canada7

shows that Canadians increased their contributions by 27 percent (in1996 dollars) between 1986 and 1996. The most substantial slice ofthat total goes to places of worship: one in three Canadians madecharitable contributions to religious organizations, accounting for 51 percent of the total value of all donations made (see Figure B).

Moreover, most Canadians do give. In 1997, approximately 21 millionCanadians (representing 88 percent of the population aged 15 andolder) donated to charitable and nonprofit organizations. Althoughdonors with higher incomes tend to make larger donations in dollarterms, poorer donors consistently give a larger proportion of theirincome. The depth and breadth of Canadian support for voluntaryand “charitable” work is impressive.

When the numbers are sorted to focus on international groups (defined in the latest survey as “organizations promoting culturalunderstanding between peoples of various countries and historicalbackgrounds and also those providing relief during emergencies andpromoting development and welfare abroad”8), a similar picture of generosity appears. Canadians who give to international organiza-tions give an average of $90 per donor, and some 1.5 million peoplecontribute.9 The picture is, however, a miniaturized version. In 1997, charitable donations to organizations working internationally made up approximately 3 percent of the amount of totaldonations—some $133.2 million.

F O U N D AT I O N S A similarly small part of the charitable pie is allocated by Canadian foundations. Table C identifies the top 21 foundations in Canada that gave to international causes of any kind (a useful cut-off; there were few others that gave substantial amounts).10 Those 21 gave more than $60 million in 1995, but only 3.3 percent (or $2 million) went towardinternational issues, up from 1 percent in 1988. Yet of the top 21 that made grants to international causes in 1988, two-thirds had significantly decreased the amount granted to this sector in 1995.

Only the Three Guineas Charitable Foundation and the McLeanFoundation increased their donations to the international sector.11

In 1995, the (government-funded) Wild Rose Foundation donated

the largest amount to Canadian organizations working internationally with its grant total of more than $1 million.

The international issues that inspire foundation donations are wide-ranging and include food security, human rights, various aspectsof human and social development, trade, conflict prevention, health, education, and emergency relief (see Figure C). Notably, none of thetop 21 Canadian foundations made grants to organizations workinginternationally on environmental issues in 1995.12

Of the international grants made in 1995, the majority went to organizations working in various (nonspecified) aspects of humanand social development; for example, to World Vision or CARE, without a theme-by-theme breakdown. The second largest amountof grant money was given to organizations working specifically in international health, and the third was targeted to education.Approximately half of these foundations gave 100 percent of theirinternational grants to one organization or cause; 19 percent to two organizations/causes; and 29 percent to various organizations and issues in international development.

Compared to foundation funding in the United States, Canadian foundations are particularly thin on the ground.13 Compared to the3.3 percent allocated by our sample foundations (or an estimated 1 percent of all foundations), international programs made up 11.5 percent of all US foundation financial support in 1994, itself a doubling since the 1980s. Between 1990 and 1994, internationalgrantmaking by US foundations increased by 18 percent in real terms, matching general growth rates for all funding (unlike Canada!).Total grants from US foundations in 1996 were in the order ofUS$13.8 billion, and are predicted to be US$15.5 billion in 1997 (a 12 percent increase).

A Profile of Canadian Support

114

T A B L E B Individual Giving to CSOs

Individual Charitable Donations 1984–96

Year Number Donors as Total Donations Averageof Donors % of Tax Filers ($000) Donation

($)

1984 3,984,548 25.7 1,826,887 458

1985 4,357,811 27.5 1,995,877 458

1986 4,671,150 28.2 2,172,085 465

1987 4,972,490 29.1 2,441,493 491

1988 4,989,380 28.4 2,639,382 529

1989 5,253,250 29.0 2,884,034 549

1990 5,538,220 29.5 3,068,174 554

1991 5,598,340 29.4 3,191,054 570

1992 5,596,760 28.8 3,285,298 587

1993 5,512,260 27.8 3,367,991 611

1994 5,397,680 26.8 3,378,948 626

1995 5,416,010 27.3 3,520,407 650

1996a 5,471,940 26.8 4,036,727 738Notes: All figures are in current dollars. The amounts for total donations were converted from 1984 dollars. a 1996 data is from Revenue Canada, unpublished interim Table 5.Source: Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, Research Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 1997).

G O V E R N M E N TA L A N D PA R A - G O V E R N M E N TA LF U N D I N GOf the departments and para-governmental agencies we sampled—notedas major funders of the groups described in the volume—only CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, theInternational Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development(ICHRDD), and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)gave to Canadian NGOs working internationally; the others spent theirmoney on Canadians working at home. Table D shows that by 1997/98,the total amount allocated to all CSOs by the agencies had dropped 20-50 percent from 10 years earlier.

Among the surveyed agencies, Status of Women Canada funded the greatest number of Canadian organizations: 345 in 1997/98,down from 702 10 years earlier, a halving in numbers with a concomi-tant fall in volume from more than $16.4 to $8.2 million. This pictureis similar throughout the agencies we contacted. Three-quarters ofthe agencies had decreased the amount of funding allocated toCanadian organizations between 1987/88 and 1997/98.

For organizations working abroad, CIDA was by far the greatestprovider of resources (both in amount and number of grants), primarily through its Partnership Branch. In 1997/98, CIDA’sPartnership and bilateral branches funded approximately 321Canadian NGOs for a total of more than $217 million (including the Peacebuilding Fund). Ten years earlier, the total reached $270 million (excluding the then-nonexistent Peacebuilding Fund). These numbers show an overall decline of some 20 percent.

C O R P O R AT E C O N T R I B U T I O N SWhile government contributions are falling, there has been hope for some CSOs in looking to the corporate sector. Overall, there is a growth in corporate philanthropy; the Conference Board ofCanada reported that average contributions in 1996 were up almost20 percent from the previous year.14 Yet that increase begins from a low figure. According to the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy,Canadian businesses account for less than 9 percent of revenue forcharitable and voluntary organizations in Canada, let alone thoseworking internationally.15 Moreover, that contribution represents a microscopic portion of their profits: while the 438 members ofImagine, a campaign to encourage corporate philanthropy, con-tributed approximately $234 million to all CSOs, that amount wasan average of 1.37 percent of their net profit. For non-Imaginemembers, the average is probably far lower.

Looking for data on international funding is even more complicated.According to a 1998 Conference Board of Canada survey, contributionsto organizations working internationally are often made by corpora-tions’ international offices to local businesses, charities, and NGOs,with numbers consequently hard to find.16 In the US, a growing average of 14 percent of total corporate contributions go to inter-national giving; in Canada, there is currently no way of knowing.

There also seems to be little correlation between the amount of international donations, and the amount of profit earned overseas.17 It is clear that most Canadian corporations focus themajority of their community funds on groups within Canada andwithin the communities where companies work, and that themajority of their funds go to the largest organizations. Half of all corporate donations are allocated to the largest charities andvoluntary organizations with revenues of more than $1.5 million;only 15 percent goes to those with less than $500,000 (two-thirdsof the total number of charitable and voluntary organizations).18

F I G U R E B Distribution of Donations by Type of Organization


F I G U R E C Foundation Giving by Issue

Food Security 2%

Human Rights 5%

Conflict Prevention 11%

Human Development 37%

Education 22%

Health 23%

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source: Statistics Canada, et al., Caring Canadians, Involved Canadians: Highlights from the 1997 National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating, Table 1.3, p. 19, Ottawa, 1998.

Organization type

Dist

ribu

tion

of

tota

l do

nati

ons

(%)

Mis

cella

neou

s

Envi

ronm

ent

Cult

ure

and

Arts

Inte

rnat

iona

l

Educ

atio

n an

d Re

sear

ch

Phila

nthr

opy

and

Volu

ntar

ism

Soci

al S

ervi

ces

Relig

ion

Hea

lth

2 2 3 3 46

11

17

51

116

T A B L E C F O U N D A T I O N S U P P O R T F O R C S O I N T E R N A T I O N A L W O R K

1995 1988 Areas of Emphasis (% of 1995 International Grants)

Top

21 C

anad

ian

Foun

dati

ons

Givi

ng

to C

anad

ian

Orga

niza

tion

s W

orki

ng I

nter

nati

onal

ly

Gran

ts t

o Ca

nadi

an O

rgan

izat

ions

W

orki

ng I

nter

nati

onal

ly (

C$)

Tota

l Gr

ants

(C$

)

Inte

rnat

iona

l Gr

ants

as

a %

of

Tota

l Gra

nts

Gran

ts t

o Ca

nadi

an O

rgan

izat

ions

Wor

king

Int

erna

tion

ally

(C

$ in

199

5 do

llars

)

Tota

l Gr

ants

(C$

in 1

995

dolla

rs)

Inte

rnat

iona

l Gr

ants

as

a %

of

Tota

l Gr

ants

Food

Sec

urit

y

Hum

an R

ight

s

Hum

an D

evel

opm

ent

Trad

e

Envi

ronm

ent

Conf

lict

Prev

enti

on

Hea

lth

Educ

atio

n

Hum

anit

aria

n Re

lief

Othe

r

1 Wild Rose Foundation 1,080,842 7,086,282 15.3 2,143,652 52 2 33 10 3

2 Fondation Edward Assh 116,000 310,300 37.4 67.3 4.3 28.4

3 Three GuineasCharitable Foundation 77,000 104,300 73.8 6,346 49,055 12.9 14.3 78 8

4 Fleming Foundation 67,000 435,600 15.4 238,085 22 32.8 45

5 The DonkervlietFoundation 62,000 69,000 89.9 100

6 McLean Foundation 60,000 1,069,700 5.6 12,692 997,832 1.3 8 8 84

7 The G.C. MetcalfCharitable Foundation 55,000 877,580 6.3 172,612 814,793 21.2 27 27 36 10

8 The Eaton Foundation 55,000 2,215,000 2.5 1,174,409 40 60

9 The Body ShopCharitable Foundation 55,000 363,992 15.1 100

10 La Fondation Marcelleet Jean Coutu 50,000 2,030,424 2.5 60 40

11 W.M. Young Foundation 50,000 77,900 64.2 100

12 The Morrison Foundation 32,000 241,000 13.3 38 62

13 The Molson Foundation 30,000 3,066,000 1.0 152,305 2,222,391 6.9 100

14 Donner CanadianFoundation 30,000 3,194,790 0.9 3,634,876 100

15 FondationJ.A. Bombardier 25,000 1,263,255 2.0 680,039 100

16 Felsen Foundation 25,000 537,000 4.7 100

17 Sifton Foundation Inc. 25,000 535,752 4.7 706,666 100

18 Panicaro Foundation 20,000 41,280 48.4 100

19 Vancouver Foundation 20,000 25,336,828 0.1 253,842 19,646,948 1.3 100

20 The J.W. McConnellFamily Foundation 20,000 10,966,010 0.2 31,730 34,144,610 0.1 100

21 The Nickle FamilyFoundation 17,500 540,000 3.2 803,716 58 42

Totals 1,972,342 60,361,993 629,527 67,257,072

Source: Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, The Canadian Directory of Foundations and Grants (9th and 12th Editions), Toronto, 1987 and 1996.


T A B L E D C A N A D I A N G O V E R N M E N T S U P P O R T T O C S Os

% Change

Major Contributors

Year

For

Wor

k in

Can

ada

For

Inte

rnat

iona

l Wor

k

Tota

l

For

Wor

k in

Can

ada

For

Inte

rnat

iona

l Wor

k

Tota

l

Year

Num

ber

For

Wor

k in

Can

ada

For

Inte

rnat

iona

l W

ork

Tota

l

Number of Canadian CSOs Funded (latest year)

Volume of Funding (latest year)

Number of CSOs Funded

(10 years earlier)

Volume of Funding (10 years earlier)

in 1997 C$

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)1

Partnership Branch 1997/98 228 228 118,200,000 118,200,000 1987/88 369 193,113,226 193,113,226 (38.8)Americas Branch 1997/98 19 19 22,427,127 22,427,127 1987/88 18 15,210,705 15,210,705 47.4Asia Branch 1997/98 28 28 43,526,896 43,526,896 1987/88 16 21,506,889 21,506,889 102.4Africa Branch 1997/98 40 40 31,709,073 31,709,073 1987/88 25 39,927,910 39,927,910 (20.6)Peacebuilding Fund 1997/98 6 6 1,420,000 1,420,000

CIDA Total 321 321 217,283,096 217,283,096 428 269,758,730 269,758,730 (19.5)

Foreign Affairs and International Trade2

Centre for Foreign Policy Development 1996/97 4 4 250,000 250,000 na naa

Canadian Heritage3 1997/98 129,385,115 129,385,115 ~

Environment Canada4 1997/98 28 24,344,158 24,344,158 ~

Industry Canada5 1998/99 8 1,000,000 1,000,000 1988/89 14 2,284,583 2,284,583 (56.2)

Status of

Women Canada6 1997/98 345 345 8,415,000 8,415,000 1987/88 702 16,413,964 16,413,964 (48.7)

ICHRDD7 1997/98 7 7 127,000 127,000 1992/93 9 201,976 201,976 (37.1)

IDRC8 1997/98 20 31 51 347,950 3,771,374 4,119,324 1987/88 11 4,765,574 (13.6)

Notes: a Not applicable. Government departments normally make no distinctions between NGOs and CSOs.

Grants and contributions to individuals and universities have not been included in any of the totals; only grants to NGOs are tabulated. 1 The bilateral and Peacebuilding Fund information is from CIDA’s Corporate Memory system; the Partnership Branch information is directly from the branch. For Partnership Branch, thenumber of NGOs indicates the number of projects in which NGOs are primary executing agencies; the volume of funding includes totals for the whole project. Only NGOs are included.2 DFAIT: Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Annual Report 1996/97, funding of NGOs through the Civil Society Fund, excluding its primary support to individuals and universities.3 Canadian Heritage: These figures are from the Canadian Heritage Performance Report for the period ending March 1998, Table 9B: “Grants and Contributions to All Indicated Non-Profit Organizations.”4 Environment Canada: Figures are from Policy and Communications; Estimates Part 3, 1997/98 and represent forecast spending from the departmental budget.5 The Department of Trade and Industry provided all numbers in this row.6 Status of Women Canada: These totals are from the Women’s Program, record of grants and contributions.7 International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD): The earliest figures available are from 1992/93.8 International Development Research Centre (IDRC): The totals are from Canadian Partnership Grants 1997/98 and IDRC projects with NGOs in 1997/98 and 1987/88. Some figures include contributions to Canadian NGOs in partnership with international NGOs.

118

NOTES

1 Brian Tomlinson, “Canadian International Cooperation NGOs: Trends in the 1990s,”mimeo (Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Co-operation, 1998).

2 Tomlinson, p. 3 and p. 9.

3 The CCIC survey records 52% of funds from private sources in 1996/97. This discrep-ancy with our sample—showing 15 percent— may be due in part to different definitions of “private sources of funding.” The CCIC survey includes individual,foundation, and corporate contributions as “private.”

4 According to Table 1, p. 4, of Tomlinson.

5 Tomlinson, p. 8.

6 CIDA, How CIDA Spends ODA Program Funds—The 1996/97 Priority Coding Report,Ottawa, October 17, 1997. For a discussion of CIDA’s approach to basic human needsfunding, see Alison Van Rooy, A Partial Promise: Canadian Support to SocialDevelopment in the South (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1995).

7 Revenue Canada, Tax Statistics on Individuals, Basic Table 5, 1986 and 1996(Items 46 and 51, respectively).

8 Statistics Canada, et al., Caring Canadians, Involved Canadians: Highlights from the1997 National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating, Ottawa, 1998, p. 50.

9 Note that not all international organizations and international spending is devotedto development or to Southern countries. There is no way to disaggregate thoseamounts from existing statistics.

10 Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, The Canadian Directory of Foundations and Grants,12th edition, Toronto, 1996/97.

11 However, other foundations that did not give in 1995 may have given in 1988.

12 Based on The Canadian Directory to Foundations and Grants, 1996/97, listing of”Grant“ and “Interests” for each foundation listed and each of the 21 foundationssampled.

13 The data on US foundations is based on a survey by the US Foundation Center ofapproximately 39,000 grantmaking foundations (http://fdncenter.org/trends/high-light.html). International grantmaking in this survey encompasses both giving in the US for international activities, and giving throughout the world. As a point ofinterest, Canadian organizations received US$11.3 million in 1994 from Americanfoundations, up from US$8.7 million in 1984.

14 J. Rostami, Corporate Community Investment Canada 1997— Survey Results, 26thedition (Ottawa: The Conference Board of Canada, 1997), p. 1.

15 M. Hall and L. MacPherson, “What Types of Charities are Getting CorporateDonations,” Research Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 4, Fall 1996 (Toronto: Canadian Centre for Philanthropy).

16 However, according to the 1997 Corporate Community Investment Survey by theCanadian Centre for Business in the Community, there are increasing improvementsin mechanisms for tracking community involvement. The Canadian Centre forBusiness in the Community, Taking Action on International Contributions, 1998Survey (Ottawa: The Conference Board of Canada, 1998).

17 Ibid., (based on 1997 survey of trends among US corporations).

18 Hall and MacPherson.

STATISTICALANNEX

Kerry Max

with Ken Horricks

T h e d a t a i n t h i s S t a t i s t i c a l A n n e x

f o r t h e 1 9 9 9 C a n a d i a n D e v e l o p m e n t R e p o r t

w a s a s s e m b l e d a n d a n a l y z e d b y a t e a m

o f r e s e a r c h e r s a n d a s s o c i a t e s f r o m t h e

N o r t h-S o u t h I n s t i t u t e, l e d b y r e s e a r c h e r

K e r r y M a x .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE 1 CANADA AND OTHER HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 122ECONOMIES: SELECTED INDICATORS

TABLE 2 THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SELECTED INDICATORS 124

TABLE 3 CANADIAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: 128BASIC DATA (1996-97)

TABLE 4 CANADIAN BILATERAL AID BY CHANNEL AND BY COUNTRY 132(1996-97)

TABLE 5 CANADIAN MULTILATERAL ODA BY AGENCY AND BY 136COUNTRY (1996-97)

TABLE 6 CANADIAN BALANCE OF TRADE WITH DEVELOPING 140COUNTRIES (1997)

TABLE 7 TRADE: TOP EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITH DEVELOPING 144COUNTRIES (1997)

TABLE 8 CANADIAN FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING 148COUNTRIES (1997)

TABLE 9 MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES 152

TABLE 10 HUMAN LINKAGES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE 156DEVELOPING WORLD

TABLE 11 CANADA-DEVELOPING COUNTRY LINKAGES INDICES 160

TECHNICAL NOTES 164

122

ODA as a Percentage of the GNP of Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1997

Table 1 provides a context for Canada’s relations with developing countries by comparing Canada with other high human develop-ment countries (those countries with a human development index [HDI] of 0.890 or greater in 1995). The United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) HDI measures countries’ level of development through a combination of health, education, andincome indicators. The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)adjusts these HDI standings to reflect some of the gender-basedbarriers faced by women throughout the world.

As column 2 shows, Canada continued to rank first in the world withan HDI of 0.960 (out of a theoretical maximum of 1.000), followedby France, Norway, the United States, and Finland as the five high-est human development countries. Column 1’s GDI measures for all countries are, however, an average 0.034 points below theirHDIs, reflecting continuing gender disparities (see Table 2 for a discussion of developing country GDIs). When GDI rankings areused, France and the US are replaced by Iceland and Sweden, where fewer gender barriers result in higher relative standards of living for women. Ireland and South Korea record the greatestdiscrepancies between HDI and GDI measures.

At US$19,290, Canada’s 1997 GNP per capita figure in column 3ranks us 19th overall, below the high human development countryaverage of US$23,527. However, GNP per capita measures do notreflect relative costs of living, and Canada ranks highly in terms of purchasing power.

Columns 4 through 10 highlight the main features of each coun-try’s aid program. Column 4 shows a continuing downward trend; a7 percent decline to US$47.6 billion in global official developmentassistance (ODA). While the top donors (Japan, France, the UnitedStates, and Germany) accounted for more than half the total aid,their 1997 combined disbursement of US$27.8 billion was 26 per-cent lower than in 1996. The most generous donors in relativeterms continue to be the Scandinavian countries and theNetherlands, although even most of their ODA/GNP ratios fell in 1997. Once again, the least generous were Japan, Italy, and the US, with American ODA a shocking 0.08 percent of GNP.

Although Canada appears to have improved its standing relative to other donor countries, the official Development AssistanceCommittee (DAC) figures presented in columns 4 to 7 are misleading for two reasons. First, Canada accidentally included$164 million of debt forgiveness to Poland in its 1997 DAC report (assistance to Poland and other transition economies does notcount as ODA). Second, the 1997 figures reflect a replenishmentto the International Development Association (IDA) fund of theWorld Bank for both 1996 and 1997. Correcting for IDA replen-ishments according to calendar year, and using the revisedCanadian ODA reported to the DAC, the correct figures are:1996—US$1,954 ODA, for an ODA/GNP ratio of 0.35 percent, and 1997—US$1,843 ODA, for an ODA/GNP ratio of 0.31 percent.

Using these figures, Canada’s 1997 contributions fell 5.8 percent in real terms (the adjusted 1996 decline was 7.4 percent). OnlyGermany, the United States, and Italy reduced their expenditures bya greater percentage. Furthermore, these adjustments put Canada in13th place, below Ireland and Belgium. In spite of the fall to Canada’slowest ODA/GNP levels since the late 1960s, an additional decline isanticipated in 1998.

Columns 8 through 10 present other aspects related to the qualityof a donor’s aid program. A general rule is that a higher share ofmultilateral aid results in more efficient development spending dueto the absence of domestic procurement requirements (i.e., tiedaid). In 1996, a quarter of Canada’s aid was delivered through multilateral channels. This figure increases slightly when the 1996IDA replenishment is factored in. As in 1995, most European Union(EU) countries have higher multilateral shares, although much was channeled through EU aid programs, which are only partiallyuntied. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Japan, New Zealand,Australia, and France channel the highest percentages of their aidthrough bilateral channels.

Column 9 shows that most countries—Canada included—deliver their aid primarily as grants rather than soft loans. Only Japan, Spain, Germany, France, Denmark, and Austria provided aid at less than 95 percent grant-equivalent levels.

The share of aid going to the poorest countries is another indicatorof whether an aid program is targeted to address poverty. Canadaranks exactly in the middle of DAC donors although, at 69.7 percent,Canadian aid to low income countries remains above the 1995-96OECD average. As a result of ongoing ODA budget reductions,Canada’s concentration of aid among the poorest countries hasincreased. It is important to note, however, that there is no data todetermine what proportion of Canada’s aid actually responds to thepriorities of the poorest people in these countries.

Beyond aid relations, Canada’s economic ties with developing countries are weak, in part due to the predominance of the United States as Canada’s primary trading partner. As shown incolumns 11 and 12, Canada had only 7.4 percent of its exportsdirected to developing countries—a slight decline since 1995, and the lowest share of all high human development economies.Canada also had the sixth lowest percentage of total imports com-ing from developing countries.

Canada’s relative decline in trade with developing countries was mirrored by a fall in financial flows, as illustrated in column 13. Netprivate long-term flows to developing countries include foreign directinvestment and portfolio investments, as well as private transfersthrough nongovernmental organizations.1 Canada’s net long-term

TA B L E 1 CANADA AND OTHER HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES : SELECTED INDICATORS

0.10.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Denmark

Norway

Netherlands

Sweden

Luxembourg

France

Finland

Switzerland

Ireland

Belgium

Canada

Australia

Germany

United Kingdom

Austria

Portugal

New Zealand

Spain

Japan

Italy

United States

0.97

0.86

0.81

0.76

0.50

0.45

0.33

0.32

0.31

0.31

0.31

0.28

0.28

0.26

0.26

0.25

0.25

0.23

0.22

0.11

0.08

S TAT I S T I C A L A N N E X 123

private flows of US$1.9 billion rank ninth among high human devel-opment countries and well below all G-7 countries other than Italy.

Column 14 gives Eurodad’s estimated projections of debt owed in1995 by developing countries to industrial country governmentsand their agencies, such as export/import banks, or bilateral

development banks. Canada ranked sixth among creditors, withUS$10.4 billion in official debts owed by developing countries.

1 The figures on net long-term private financial flows to developing countries shown in this table are taken from the OECD and are substantially lower than figures onfinancial flows recently released by the World Bank. This disparity is due in part todifferences in indicators and sources, but it also reflects a considerable statisticaldiscrepancy among international agencies on the magnitude of these flows.

T A B L E 1 C A N A D A A N D O T H E R H I G H H U M A N D E V E L O P M E N T E C O N O M I E SSelected Indicators of Relations with Developing Countries

Australia 0.918 0.932 20,540 1,076 3.6 0.28 12 19.8 100.0 44.5 51.4 30.6 ~ 1,251Austria 0.891 0.933 27,980 531 8.4 0.26 15 26.0 94.3 58.2 25.5 15.7 938 6,953Bahamas 0.876 0.893 11,830 0 na na na na na na 19.1 25.5 ~ ~Barbados 0.889 0.909 6,590 0 na na na na na na 35.8 15.8 ~ ~Belgiumb 0.893 0.933 26,420 764 -4.8 0.31 11 42.1 95.6 68.0 14.5 12.9 4,528 3,319Canada 0.940 0.960 19,290 2,146 20.8 0.36 7 24.5 100.0 69.7 7.4 13.8 1,859 10,368Cyprus 0.847 0.913 14,930 0 na na na na na na 61.0 21.3 ~ ~Denmark 0.917 0.928 32,500 1,635 3.3 0.97 1 40.3 94.1 77.9 17.9 15.3 188 1,594Finland 0.929 0.942 24,080 379 3.7 0.33 8 47.5 97.3 78.4 29.2 19.9 472 783France 0.925 0.946 26,050 6,348 -3.8 0.45 6 22.8 84.1 55.7 21.2 20.0 11,115 39,566Germany 0.888 0.925 28,260 5,913 -10.9 0.28 13 40.3 77.7 73.5 25.6 25.1 12,336 49,137Greece 0.876 0.924 12,010 ~ ~ ~ na ~ ~ ~ 34.6 20.9 ~ ~Iceland 0.932 0.942 27,580 ~ ~ ~ na ~ ~ ~ 8.9 11.7 ~ ~Ireland 0.859 0.930 18,280 187 8.9 0.31 10 36.3 100.0 83.6 11.6 16.0 125 ~Israel 0.873 0.913 15,810 0 na na na na na na 23.7 11.3 ~ ~Italy 0.868 0.922 20,120 1,231 -45.2 0.11 20 66.4 98.2 70.1 28.8 25.8 289 13,439Japan 0.902 0.940 37,850 9,358 9.6 0.22 19 13.1 34.1 60.3 52.8 53.8 27,469 123,975Luxembourgb 0.836 0.900 45,330 87 19.6 0.50 5 31.7 100.0 67.1 ~ ~ ~ ~Netherlands 0.905 0.941 25,820 2,946 2.7 0.81 3 29.9 100.0 68.7 13.5 22.2 5,858 6,824New Zealand 0.920 0.939 16,480 145 22.1 0.25 17 16.4 100.0 42.3 35.6 20.9 9 ~Norway 0.935 0.943 36,090 1,306 5.9 0.86 2 28.0 99.1 74.2 8.4 13.7 294 959Portugal 0.852 0.892 10,450 251 27.3 0.25 16 28.0 100.0 93.3 10.4 16.0 593 518Singapore 0.848 0.896 32,940 0 na na na na na na 57.0 47.4 ~ ~South Korea 0.826 0.894 10,550 ~ ~ ~ na ~ ~ ~ 50.9 31.4 ~ ~Spain 0.877 0.935 14,510 1,227 10.9 0.23 18 29.1 70.5 49.3 20.3 21.7 2,865 8,108Sweden 0.932 0.936 26,220 1,672 -5.9 0.76 4 30.2 100.0 72.6 20.5 15.0 -17 2,591Switzerland 0.887 0.930 44,320 839 -4.2 0.32 9 29.6 100.0 74.8 23.5 10.1 395 2,808United Kingdom 0.907 0.932 20,710 3,371 -2.2 0.26 14 40.0 96.4 77.0 22.3 20.3 18,196 8,337United States 0.927 0.943 28,740 6,168 -35.5 0.08 21 26.2 99.2 45.1 43.5 45.8 42,848 37,597

Average or Total 0.892 0.926 23,527 47,580 -7.1 0.22 29.5 76.7 62.3 29.0c 29.5c 130,360 318,127Notes: a Projected figures.b Called Belgium-Luxembourg in the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. c Totals for export and import shares to developing countries are for all industrialized countries (see Technical Notes).

Sources: OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Press Release, June 1998; DAC, Annual Report 1997; World Bank, World Development Report (WDR) 1998; UNDP, Human Development Report 1998; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997; Eurodad, World Credit Tables 1996.

1995 1995 1997 1997 1997/96 1997 1997 1996 1996 1995-96 1996 1996 1996 1995a

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Offi

cial

Bila

tera

l De

bt S

tock

s Ow

ed

by D

evel

opin

gCo

untr

ies

(US$

mill

ions

)

Net

Pri

vate

Fin

anci

al F

low

s to

Dev

elop

ing

Coun

trie

s(l

ong-

term

)(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Shar

e of

Tot

al I

mpo

rts

from

De

velo

ping

Cou

ntri

es

Shar

e of

Tot

al E

xpor

ts t

o De

velo

ping

Cou

ntri

es

Shar

e of

Net

ODA

to

Low

Inc

ome

Coun

trie

s

Gran

t Sh

are

of T

otal

ODA

Mul

tila

tera

l Sh

are

as %

of

Net

ODA

ODA/

GNP

Rank

Am

ong

DAC

Coun

trie

s

ODA/

GNP

Rati

o

% C

hang

e Ov

er P

revi

ous

Year

(re

al t

erm

s)

Tota

l N

et O

DA (

US$

mill

ions

)

GNP

Per

Capi

ta (

US$

)

UN

DP H

uman

De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

dDe

velo

pmen

t In

dex

124

Graph 2.1 Key Development Indices, 1996

This table sets Canada’s relations with developing countries intocontext by providing a statistical snapshot of developing countriesthemselves. The table includes basic information on GNP per capita,economic growth rates, total GDP, population, the adult literacyrate, and the under-5 mortality rate.

As in Table 1, the first two columns provide two versions of the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) development index: the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Gender-RelatedDevelopment Index (GDI). Again, as in Table 1, the 1995 GDI forevery country is lower than the HDI, indicating that biases favouringmen exist in all countries. In contrast to last year when Asia showedthe greatest disparity between women and men, the difference thisyear is greatest in the Americas, even though women in the Americasare “better off”—in absolute terms—than women in other conti-nents. Oman shows the greatest gender disparity, while Vietnamshows the least among all countries, developed or developing.

As indicated in column 3, 1997 GNP per capita ranges from a lowof US$90 in Mozambique (a $10 increase over 1995) to US$22,110in oil-exporting Kuwait. The Americas, with the highest regionalincome per capita at $3,813, are followed by Eastern Europe(US$2,459), Asia (US$848), and Africa (US$653). These regionaltotals, however, mask profound discrepancies. For the least-developed countries (LLDCs) as a whole, GNP per capita stood atUS$217. The other low income countries (LDCs) had an averageper capita GNP of US$660, followed by US$2,969 for the remainingdeveloping countries. These totals stand in stark contrast to anaverage per capita GNP of US$23,527 for the high HDI countries.

When read in isolation, column 4’s presentation of GNP per capita average annual growth rates seems to hold great promise.Africa registers a 1.9 percent annual growth rate; the Americas,2.9 percent; and Asia, 4.4 percent. Among LLDCs, the average was 2.4 percent, while the other low income countries fared evenbetter at 4.8 percent. Indeed, the lower income countries havegenerally outperformed their richer developing-country counter-parts. However, in view of the ongoing crisis in Southeast Asia,the numbers in column 4 should be used with caution. Although

many of the fastest growing countries are located in Africa and the Americas, rather than in Asia, statistics for 1997-98 will likely show a dramatic dampening of growth throughout the developing world.

Columns 7 and 8 show adult literacy and under-5 mortality rates.While the literacy rate for Asia increased from 64.8 percent to69.2 percent in 1995, the rates for Africa, the Americas, andEastern Europe have either been stable or declined slightly. Thestory is more promising with under-5 mortality rates, where thenumber of deaths of children under the age of five has declinedsince 1995 by 20 percent in Africa, 11 percent in the Americas, 9 percent in Asia, and 12 percent in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless,the LLDC average of 155 deaths for every 1,000 births—in contrastwith six in high HDI countries—indicates that still far too many children are dying.

Columns 9 through 11 provide some indication of the dependenceof developing countries on external debt and aid. Average debt-to-GNP figures for Africa increased from 81 percent in 1995 to 106percent in 1996, and remained two-and-a-half times those for theAmericas, at 41 percent. For the LLDCs as a whole, debt-to-GNPstood at close to 100 percent, a clearly unsustainable level. LLDCsare spending more on debt service—at times, two to three timesmore—than they spend on education.

Aid dependency, indicated by the aid-to-GNP ratio in column 10,can hamper the ability of governments to focus on domestic priori-ties and to set national development goals. Although the degree ofaid dependency declined for both Africa and the Americas between1995 and 1996, Africa remained by far the most aid-dependentregion in the world, with ODA accounting for 8.5 percent of its GNP in 1996, compared to 1.4 percent in the Americas and 0.9 percent in Asia. The average LLDC aid-to-GNP ratio of 10.4 percent was 10 times that of the middle-income country averages.Although debt-to and aid-to-GNP ratios were significantly lower inthe Americas and Asia, some countries still struggled with exces-sive debt burdens and high aid dependency. In the Americas,Guyana, Honduras, Chile, Ecuador, and Jamaica all spent over twiceas much on debt service as they did on education, as did thePhilippines in Asia.

Such debt burdens also reduce options when faced with difficultenvironmental choices, as shown in column 12, measuring 1995emissions of CO2 per capita. Although Canada is a signatory tothe Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention for ClimateChange, a mechanism has yet to be agreed that attracts the parti-cipation of developing countries in sustainable, greenhouse gasreducing activities. As a whole, the high human development coun-tries emit more than five times as much CO2 per capita as do devel-oping countries, and close to 100 times the per capita emissions ofLLDCs. While CO2 emissions have increased worldwide, the onusremains on the high human development countries both to reducetheir own emissions, and facilitate a sustainable shift toward a lowerCO2 emitting path of economic growth for the developing world.

T A B L E 2 T H E D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S : S E L E C T E D I N D I C AT O R S

160.0

140.0

120.0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0

20.0

0

Least-DevelopedCountries

Other Low IncomeCountries

RemainingCountries

45.6

155

97.7

68.3

82

33.0

85.2

41 37.7

Adult Literacy Rate Under-5 Mortality Rate External Debt/GNP


UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

d De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

1995

UN

DP H

uman

Dev

elop

men

tIn

dex

1995

GNP

Per

Capi

ta 1

997

(US$

)

GNP/

Capi

ta G

row

th A

vera

gePe

r Ye

ar (

1996

-97)

(%

)

GDP

1997

(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Popu

lati

on (

mill

ions

) 19

98

Adul

t Li

tera

cy

Rate

199

5 (%

)

Und

er-5

Mor

talit

y Ra

te 1

996

(per

1,0

00liv

ebi

rths

)

Exte

rnal

Deb

t/GN

P 19

96 (

%)

Aid/

GNP

1996

(%

)

Debt

Ser

vice

Pai

d as

% o

fEx

pend

itur

e on

Edu

cati

on 1

994-

95

CO2

Emis

sion

s Pe

r Ca

pita

(met

ric

tons

) 19

95

T A B L E 2 T H E D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S : S E L E C T E D I N D I C A T O R S

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

AFRICAAlgeria 0.627 0.746 1,490 -0.1 45,997 30.2 61.6 39 76.7 0.7 ~ 3.02Angola 0.331 0.344 340 12.1 7,396 12.0 42.0 292 307.1 15.8 ~ 0.38Benin 0.364 0.378 380 2.3 2,137 5.9 37.0 140 73.5 13.5 82.1 0.11Botswana 0.657 0.678 3,260 5.7 4,936 1.6 69.8 50 12.9 1.7 21.2 1.45Burkina Faso 0.205 0.219 240 4.0 2,441 11.4 19.2 158 51.2 16.5 58.2 0.08Burundi 0.230 0.241 180 1.1 1,137 6.6 35.3 176 100.4 18.1 114.5 0.03Cameroon 0.455 0.481 650 5.3 9,115 14.3 63.4 102 112.8 4.9 ~ 0.29Cape Verde 0.565 0.591 1,090 19.9 425 0.4 71.6 73 37.4 28.7 ~ ~Central African Republic 0.340 0.347 320 3.4 954 3.5 60.0 164 89.4 16.1 ~ 0.07Chad 0.301 0.318 240 4.2 1,603 6.9 48.1 149 88.0 26.9 70.5 0.01Comoros 0.402 0.411 400 -2.9 230 0.6 57.3 122 89.6 17.4 ~ ~Congo–Brazzaville 0.503 0.519 660 -2.2 2,298 2.8 74.9 207 279.0 22.9 180.6 0.45Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.376 0.383 110 -0.1 6,904 49.2 77.3 108 212.0 2.8 ~ 0.04Côte d’Ivoire 0.340 0.368 690 4.2 10,251 14.6 40.1 150 201.3 9.9 ~ 0.71Djibouti ~ 0.324 ~ ~ 485 0.5 46.2 157 ~ ~ ~ ~Egypt 0.555 0.612 1,180 3.0 75,482 65.7 51.4 78 46.3 3.3 73.1 1.40Equatorial Guinea 0.446 0.465 1,050 101.4 285 0.4 78.5 173 116.0 12.8 77.2 0.31Eritrea 0.269 0.275 210 ~ ~ 3.5 25.0 120 6.1 ~ ~ ~Ethiopia 0.241 0.252 110 2.0 6,330 62.1 35.5 177 169.4 14.3 61.2 0.06Gabon 0.551 0.568 4,230 3.8 5,435 1.2 63.2 145 87.4 2.6 ~ 3.03Gambia 0.277 0.291 350 2.2 ~ 1.2 38.6 107 ~ ~ 135.7 0.18Ghana 0.466 0.473 370 0.5 6,762 18.9 64.5 110 100.0 10.5 ~ 0.21Guinea 0.258 0.277 570 4.6 3,998 7.7 35.9 210 85.6 7.8 ~ 0.14Guinea-Bissau 0.284 0.295 240 5.0 265 1.1 54.9 223 352.3 67.5 ~ 0.20Kenya 0.459 0.463 330 -0.1 9,899 29.0 78.1 90 76.9 6.8 141.3 0.23Lesotho 0.457 0.469 670 2.9 950 2.2 71.3 139 53.0 8.7 54.5 ~Liberia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2.7 ~ 235 ~ ~ ~ 0.12Libya 0.664 0.806 ~ ~ ~ 6.0 76.2 61 ~ ~ ~ 6.59Madagascar 0.345 0.348 250 1.6 3,552 16.3 45.8 164 104.7 9.1 ~ 0.07Malawi 0.325 0.334 220 0.5 2,424 10.4 56.4 217 107.2 23.2 150.1 0.07Mali 0.229 0.236 260 3.5 2,532 11.8 31.0 220 116.3 19.4 162.8 0.04Mauritania 0.346 0.361 450 3.2 1,068 2.5 37.7 183 227.6 26.4 226.4 1.25Mauritius 0.753 0.833 3,800 4.2 4,151 1.2 82.9 23 42.9 0.5 133.7 1.29Morocco 0.511 0.557 1,250 -4.4 33,258 28.0 43.7 74 61.1 1.8 205.6 1.05Mozambique 0.264 0.281 90 5.7 1,944 18.7 40.1 214 378.6 59.8 ~ 0.05Namibia 0.620 0.644 2,220 1.3 3,453 1.7 76.0 77 ~ 5.7 ~ ~Niger 0.196 0.207 200 0.1 1,858 10.1 13.6 320 79.5 13.2 ~ 0.11Nigeria 0.375 0.391 260 1.2 36,540 121.8 57.1 191 100.9 0.6 ~ 0.74Rwanda ~ ~ 210 -2.0 1,771 6.5 ~ 170 78.5 51.2 ~ 0.08São Tomé and Principe ~ 0.563 270 -5.1 ~ 0.1 75.0 80 636.6 114.7 ~ ~Senegal 0.326 0.342 550 1.6 4,542 9.0 33.1 127 72.9 11.6 155.0 0.34Seychelles ~ 0.845 6,880 0.6 515 0.1 88.0 19 28.8 3.7 ~ 0Sierra Leone 0.165 0.185 200 7.6 940 4.6 31.4 284 126.6 21.2 ~ 0.10Somalia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 10.7 ~ 211 ~ ~ ~ 0South Africa 0.680 0.717 3,400 -0.5 129,094 44.3 81.8 66 19.1 0.3 33.8 6.90Sudan 0.318 0.343 280 4.2 ~ 28.5 46.1 116 ~ ~ ~ 0.12Swaziland 0.573 0.597 1,440 -0.2 1,042 0.9 76.7 97 21.2 2.9 23.8 0.49Tanzania 0.354 0.358 210 4.4 6,707 32.2 67.8 144 129.7 15.6 ~ 0.08Togo 0.358 0.380 330 2.1 1,279 4.4 51.7 125 105.4 12.0 41.5 0.17Tunisia 0.670 0.744 2,090 9.7 19,069 9.5 66.7 35 53.6 0.7 128.1 1.61Uganda 0.331 0.340 320 2.3 6,555 21.3 61.8 141 60.5 11.3 ~ 0.05Zambia 0.372 0.378 380 5.3 4,051 8.7 78.2 202 215.9 18.6 4,587.8 0.28Zimbabwe 0.497 0.507 750 0 8,512 11.9 85.1 73 69.3 5.2 121.7 0.82Total Africa 0.397 0.422 653 1.9 480,573 777.3 54.2 140 105.5 8.5 92.0 0.96

➤

126

AMERICAS

Antigua and Barbuda ~ 0.895 7,380 1.0 ~ 0.1 95.0 22 ~ 2.5 ~ ~Argentina 0.777 0.888 8,570 4.7 322,730 36.1 96.2 25 32.3 0.1 77.5 3.58Belize 0.689 0.807 2,740 -1.0 640 0.2 70.0 44 47.0 3.0 107.9 1.80Bolivia 0.557 0.593 950 ~ 8,108 8.0 83.1 102 80.9 13.3 97.0 1.32Brazil 0.751 0.809 4,720 1.1 786,466 165.2 83.3 52 24.5 0.1 ~ 1.51Chile 0.783 0.893 5,020 6.1 74,292 14.8 95.2 13 37.9 0.3 276.2 2.98Colombia 0.810 0.850 2,280 ~ 85,202 37.7 91.3 31 35.3 0.3 159.2 1.79Costa Rica 0.818 0.889 2,640 0.7 9,350 3.7 94.8 15 38.4 -0.1 161.2 1.43Cuba 0.705 0.729 ~ ~ ~ 11.1 95.7 10 ~ ~ ~ 2.62Dominica ~ 0.879 3,120 ~ ~ 0.1 94.0 20 50.2 19.4 ~ ~Dominican Republic 0.662 0.720 1,670 9.8 14,936 8.2 82.1 56 33.8 0.8 184.3 1.43Ecuador 0.667 0.767 1,590 2.3 18,887 12.2 90.1 40 82.1 1.5 249.0 1.86El Salvador 0.583 0.604 1,810 0.9 10,416 6.1 71.5 40 27.9 3.1 136.7 0.86Grenada ~ 0.851 3,000 2.9 295 0.1 98.0 31 42.0 3.7 ~ ~Guatemala 0.549 0.615 1,500 0.9 17,784 11.6 65.0 56 24.3 1.4 141.0 0.62Guyana 0.630 0.670 800 3.8 717 0.9 98.1 83 246.0 21.7 496.0 1.09Haiti 0.335 0.340 330 -0.8 2,360 7.5 45.0 134 34.4 14.4 ~ 0.08Honduras 0.544 0.573 700 4.5 4,490 6.1 72.7 35 111.2 9.2 358.9 0.63Jamaica 0.724 0.735 1,560 1.0 4,051 2.5 85.0 11 94.3 1.4 208.6 3.56Mexico 0.774 0.855 3,680 6.2 334,766 95.8 89.6 32 48.9 0.1 185.8 3.73Nicaragua 0.526 0.547 410 10.4 1,971 4.5 65.7 57 354.6 57.1 ~ 0.60Panama 0.804 0.868 3,080 2.6 8,244 2.8 90.8 20 86.6 1.1 95.5 2.49Paraguay 0.651 0.707 2,010 11.6 10,180 5.2 92.1 34 22.4 1.0 111.8 0.73Peru 0.664 0.729 2,460 -0.1 62,431 24.8 88.7 58 49.1 0.7 57.2 1.24St Kitts and Nevis ~ 0.854 6,160 6.1 247 0 90.0 38 25.0 3.0 ~ ~St Lucia ~ 0.839 3,620 2.7 598 0.1 82.0 22 25.6 7.0 ~ ~St Vincent/Grenadines ~ 0.845 2,500 4.3 ~ 0.1 82.0 23 80.4 10.0 ~ ~Suriname 0.735 0.796 1,240 4.3 ~ 0.4 93.0 31 ~ 17.9 ~ 4.87Trinidad and Tobago 0.823 0.880 4,230 5.5 5,894 1.3 97.9 17 44.9 0.3 ~ 13.24Uruguay 0.841 0.885 6,020 2.8 18,180 3.2 97.3 22 32.8 0.3 176.2 1.66Venezuela 0.790 0.860 3,450 5.3 67,316 23.2 91.1 28 53.7 0.1 125.4 7.76Total Americas 0.734 0.800 3,813 2.9 1,870,551 493.7 86.4 42 41.1 1.4 97.2 2.44

ASIAAfghanistan ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 23.4 ~ 257 ~ ~ ~ 0.05Armenia 0.670 0.674 530 5.4 1,401 3.6 98.8 30 34.1 18.2 ~ 1.00Azerbaijan 0.617 0.623 510 2.6 4,399 7.7 96.3 44 12.1 3.0 9.0 5.52Bahrain 0.746 0.872 7,820 ~ ~ 0.6 85.2 22 ~ ~ ~ ~Bangladesh 0.342 0.371 270 3.7 32,838 124.0 38.1 112 50.5 3.9 120.0 0.17Bhutan 0.330 0.347 400 2.8 321 1.9 42.2 127 32.1 23.0 ~ 0.12Burma 0.478 0.481 ~ ~ ~ 47.6 83.1 150 ~ ~ ~ 0.15Cambodia 0.415 0.422 300 ~ 3,095 10.8 65.0 170 67.7 14.5 ~ 0.05China 0.641 0.650 860 7.8 825,020 1,255.1 81.5 47 16.0 0.3 95.5 2.54Georgia 0.626 0.633 840 ~ 3,028 5.4 99.0 29 30.3 7.1 9.2 1.43India 0.424 0.451 390 3.2 359,812 975.8 52.0 111 25.6 0.6 118.1 0.93Indonesia 0.651 0.679 1,110 2.8 214,593 206.5 83.8 71 59.7 0.5 ~ 1.43Iran 0.643 0.758 1,780 1.2 ~ 73.1 69.0 37 14.9 0.1 ~ 3.61Iraq 0.443 0.538 ~ ~ ~ 21.8 58.0 122 ~ ~ ~ 4.54Jordan 0.647 0.729 1,570 1.5 7,927 6.0 86.6 25 114.3 7.2 150.5 2.23Kazakhstan 0.685 0.695 1,340 2.2 21,039 16.9 99.0 45 13.9 0.6 27.2 13.14Kuwait 0.773 0.848 22,110 ~ ~ 1.8 78.6 14 ~ 0 ~ ~Kyrghzstan 0.627 0.633 440 4.0 1,754 4.5 97.0 50 ~ 13.9 57.4 1.21Laos 0.451 0.465 400 3.8 1,753 5.4 56.6 128 121.9 18.2 61.4 0.06Lebanon 0.707 0.796 3,350 ~ 14,962 3.2 92.4 40 30.1 1.8 97.0 4.18Malaysia 0.785 0.834 4,680 5.2 97,523 21.5 83.5 13 42.1 -0.5 140.6 4.97Maldives 0.668 0.683 1,150 3.3 306 0.2 93.2 76 58.8 11.5 ~ ~Mongolia 0.658 0.669 390 ~ 862 2.6 82.9 71 55.0 21.3 88.4 3.22Nepal 0.327 0.351 210 0 4,899 23.2 27.5 116 53.4 8.9 71.5 0.07

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Table 2 (continued)

➤

UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

d De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

1995

UN

DP H

uman

Dev

elop

men

tIn

dex

1995

GNP

Per

Capi

ta 1

997

(US$

)

GNP/

Capi

ta G

row

th A

vera

gePe

r Ye

ar (

1996

-97)

(%

)

GDP

1997

(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Popu

lati

on (

mill

ions

) 19

98

Adul

t Li

tera

cy

Rate

199

5 (%

)

Und

er-5

Mor

talit

y Ra

te19

96(p

er 1

,000

live

birt

hs)

Exte

rnal

Deb

t/GN

P 19

96 (

%)

Aid/

GNP

1996

(%

)

Debt

Ser

vice

Pai

d as

% o

fEx

pend

itur

e on

Edu

cati

on 1

994-

95

CO2

Emis

sion

s Pe

r Ca

pita

(met

ric

tons

) 19

95


North Korea 0.749 0.766 10,550 3.8 ~ 23.2 95.0 30 ~ ~ ~ 11.07Oman 0.580 0.771 4,950 ~ 13,438 2.5 59.0 18 ~ ~ 100.3 4.56Pakistan 0.399 0.453 490 0 64,360 147.8 37.8 136 46.3 1.4 ~ 0.58Papua New Guinea 0.494 0.507 940 -15.9 5,165 4.6 72.2 112 49.3 8.0 194.6 0.54Philippines 0.661 0.677 1,220 3.6 83,125 72.2 94.6 38 47.3 1.0 318.3 0.85Qatar 0.714 0.840 11,570 ~ ~ 0.5 79.4 21 ~ 0 ~ ~Saudi Arabia 0.589 0.778 6,790 ~ 125,266 20.2 63.0 30 ~ 0 ~ 12.58Sri Lanka 0.700 0.716 800 5.8 15,128 18.5 90.2 19 58.3 3.6 104.8 0.32Syria 0.638 0.749 1,150 -0.6 17,115 15.3 70.8 34 130.5 1.4 ~ 3.00Tajikistan 0.571 0.575 330 0.7 1,990 6.2 99.0 76 34.8 5.6 0 0.61Thailand 0.812 0.838 2,800 -1.3 157,263 59.6 93.8 38 50.3 0.5 124.3 2.94Turkey 0.753 0.782 3,130 6.4 181,464 63.8 82.3 47 43.4 0.1 196.5 2.60Turkmenistan 0.652 0.660 630 ~ 4,399 4.3 98.0 78 19.0 0.5 ~ 6.56United Arab Emirates 0.718 0.855 17,360 ~ 45,147 2.4 79.2 18 ~ 0 ~ 29.02Uzbekistan 0.653 0.659 1,010 0.3 23,857 24.1 99.0 60 9.7 0.4 11.1 4.10Vietnam 0.559 0.560 320 ~ 24,893 77.9 93.7 44 114.7 4.0 ~ 0.41West Bank and Gaza ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Yemen 0.336 0.356 270 ~ 5,442 16.9 38.0 105 120.2 4.9 20.6 0.85Oceania ~ 0.658 1,748 -0.3 3,065 1.9 72.8 33 25.3 5.3 ~ 0.59Total Asia 0.550 0.574 848 4.4 2,366,649 3,404.1 69.2 75 29.6 0.9 89.3 1.92

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0.644 0.656 750 ~ 2,276 3.4 85.0 40 28.4 8.1 8.7 0.54Belarus 0.771 0.783 2,150 11.5 22,462 10.3 97.9 18 4.8 0.4 4.9 5.74Bosnia Herzegovina ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4.0 ~ 17 ~ ~ ~ 0.46Bulgaria 0.782 0.789 1,140 -6.1 9,484 8.4 98.0 19 107.8 1.9 ~ 6.76Croatia 0.741 0.759 4,610 ~ 19,081 4.5 98.0 11 24.3 0.7 ~ 3.79Czech Republic 0.864 0.884 5,200 0.8 54,890 10.2 99.0 7 37.1 0.2 30.2 10.96Estonia 0.747 0.758 3,330 7.7 4,617 1.4 99.0 16 9.3 1.4 2.1 11.40Hungary 0.834 0.857 4,430 4.3 44,845 9.9 99.0 12 62.1 0.4 237.0 5.63Latvia 0.697 0.704 2,430 ~ 5,024 2.4 99.0 20 9.4 1.6 4.1 3.81Lithuania 0.738 0.750 2,230 2.9 9,265 3.7 99.0 18 16.7 1.2 2.8 3.99Macedonia, FYR 0.728 0.749 1,090 ~ 2,061 2.2 94.0 30 82.8 5.3 8.9 ~Moldova 0.605 0.610 540 ~ 1,803 4.5 98.9 32 47.0 2.1 14.7 2.43Poland 0.834 0.851 3,590 6.7 135,659 38.7 99.0 14 30.5 0.6 ~ 8.74Romania 0.751 0.767 1,420 -6.3 35,204 22.6 98.0 25 23.6 0.6 30.0 5.36Russian Federation 0.757 0.769 2,740 ~ 440,562 147.2 99.0 25 28.9 0 18.0 12.35Slovak Republic 0.861 0.875 3,700 5.9 19,565 5.4 99.0 11 40.7 0.7 ~ 7.10Slovenia 0.867 0.887 9,680 ~ 17,905 1.9 96.0 6 21.5 0.4 29.2 6.10Ukraine 0.660 0.665 1,040 -2.3 44,007 51.2 98.0 24 21.5 0.9 ~ 8.56Ex-Yugoslavia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 10.4 ~ 22 ~ ~ ~ 3.17Total Eastern Europe 0.723 0.735 2,459 0.8 868,710 342.4 94.4 22 29.1 0.5 18.2 9.21

Total Developing Countries 0.557 0.584 1,219 3.6 5,586,483 5,017.5 70.3 79 42.5 2.1 41.9 2.32Of which:

LLDCs 0.309 0.325 217 2.4 129,237 629.1 45.6 155 97.7 10.4 107.8 0.13Other Low Income Countries 0.539 0.559 660 4.8 1,650,169 2,946.4 68.3 82 33.0 0.9 84.8 1.61Remaining Countries 0.700 0.749 2,969 1.8 3,807,077 1,442.0 85.2 41 37.7 1.0 77.5 4.72

Total High HumanDevelopment Countries 0.892 0.926 23,527 2.1 22,154,073 890,372.0 98.6 6 na 0 na 12.45

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1998; World Bank, Global Development Finance 1998; UNDP, Human Development Report 1998; World Resources Institute, World Resources 1996-97; OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, 1992-96; Instituto del Tercer Mundo, The World 1995/96.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ASIA (continued) UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

d De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

1995

UN

DP H

uman

Dev

elop

men

tIn

dex

1995

GNP

Per

Capi

ta 1

997

(US$

)

GNP/

Capi

ta G

row

th A

vera

gePe

r Ye

ar (

1996

-97)

(%

)

GDP

1997

(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Popu

lati

on (

mill

ions

) 19

98

Adul

t Li

tera

cy

Rate

199

5 (%

)

Und

er-5

Mor

talit

y Ra

te19

96(p

er 1

,000

live

birt

hs)

Exte

rnal

Deb

t/GN

P 19

96 (

%)

Aid/

GNP

1996

(%

)

Debt

Ser

vice

Pai

d as

% o

fEx

pend

itur

e on

Edu

cati

on 1

994-

95

CO2

Emis

sion

s Pe

r Ca

pita

(met

ric

tons

) 19

95

128

In 1996-97—the latest year for which data is available—totalCanadian official development assistance (ODA) was $2.68 billion,a marginal decline from the year before and 14 percent less thanin 1994-95. As a share of Gross National Product (GNP), Canadianaid has declined from 0.42 percent in 1994-95 to 0.34 percent in1996-97, its lowest level since 1970.1 Of this year’s $2.68 billion,32 percent ($863 million) was delivered through multilateralchannels (e.g., international financial institutions such as theWorld Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the regionaldevelopment banks, and the UN system), while the remaining68 percent was delivered on a country-to-country (bilateral)basis by Canadian government agencies and nongovernmentaland private organizations.

Canada’s aid program is one of the most geographically dispersedof all donors. The top three recipients of Canadian ODA in 1996-97were Egypt ($161 million), Bangladesh ($111 million), and China($96 million). These countries, together with Vietnam, Côted’Ivoire, Haiti, India, Ghana, Rwanda, and Pakistan (all low incomeor least-developed countries, or LLDCs, save Côte d’Ivoire), make up the top 10 recipients of Canadian aid. Altogether, they accountfor 38 percent of all allocated aid, a drop in concentration of 5 percent from the top 10 country allocations in 1995-96. Canadamaintains bilateral aid programs in more than 100 individual countries and has substantial bilateral programs (over $10 million)in 29 countries. In contrast, the Nordic countries concentrate theirbilateral assistance in a limited number of countries. For example,Norway focuses on just 12 countries.

Though dispersed among many countries, Canada’s ODA is mostconcentrated in Africa—the poorest continent in the world. Half of the top 50 beneficiaries of Canadian aid were in Africa,with 15 in Asia, nine in the Americas, and one (ex-Yugoslavia) inEastern Europe. In terms of the percentage of overall disbursements,Africa and the Americas saw an increase relative to 1995-96,to 50 percent and 18 percent of total allocated bilateral Canadianaid, respectively, while disbursements to Asia decreased to 30 per-cent. Eastern Europe remained constant at 2 percent.

Changes between 1995-96 and 1996-97 in bilateral aid disburse-ments to individual countries ranged from decreases of 100 percentfor Iraq, to increases in excess of 1,000 percent in North Korea,Tajikistan, Congo-Brazzaville, and Tunisia. Among the top recipientsof bilateral aid, Egypt, Haiti, and Rwanda saw substantial increasesin their aid programs, while China, Ghana, and Bangladesh hadtheir aid programs reduced. Overall, LLDCs received 28 percent of allocated bilateral aid, while other LDCs received 32 percent.

Column 4 shows Canada’s ranking among other bilateral donorsand gives a sense of Canada’s potential leverage in using aid asan instrument for change. In 1996, Canada ranked among the top five donors in 26 of the 129 aid-eligible developing countries:11 in Africa, 11 in the Americas, three in Asia, and one in EasternEurope. Canada was extremely important in the Caribbean, althoughnot the top donor to any one country, and in Eastern Europe,where it was the second largest donor to ex-Yugoslavia. In Africa,Canada was the second largest donor to Gabon and the third for

Cameroon. For the LLDCs as a whole, Canada is ninth on the listof top donors; but sixth for the other LDCs.

The imputed value of Canadian contributions via multilateralagencies sometimes exceeds Canada’s bilateral presence in manycountries. In some countries, such as the Comoros, Saudi Arabia,and Iraq, multilateral aid is our sole contribution. Overall, multi-lateral agencies allocate a higher proportion of funds to the poor-est countries than does Canada through its bilateral program. Theleast developed countries receive 40 percent of allocated multilat-eral disbursements (compared to only 28 percent of Canadianbilateral aid), while the other LDCs receive 30 percent.

The sectoral allocation of bilateral aid has remained relatively sta-ble since 1995-96. Of the $1.2 billion of Canadian bilateral aid allo-cated by sector in 1996-97, 31 percent went to human resourcedevelopment (e.g., education and institutional support), and 16percent was disbursed to health and population projects (health,nutrition, population, human settlement, and water and sanitationinfrastructure). Allocations to economic and financial support,including revenues from selling food aid, fell to 21 percent,replaced in part by slight increases to agriculture (10 percent,including forestry and fisheries), transportation and communica-tions (7 percent), and industry (7 percent). Within the energy andmining sector, energy projects accounted for most of the increaseto 8 percent of all sectoral allocations.

1 This figure differs from the ODA/GNP ratio given for Canada in Table 1 because itcorresponds to the 1996-97 fiscal year. Data in Table 1 is for the 1997 calendar year.

T A B L E 3 C A N A D I A N O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C E : B A S I C D ATA ( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 )

Human Resource Development 31%

Transportation & Communications 7%

Industry 7%

Energy & Mining 8%

Agriculture 10%

Health & Population 16%

Economic & Financial Support 21%

Distribution of Bilateral Aid by Sector, 1996-97


AFRICAAlgeria 2.63 0.01 74.6 6 0.42 3.05Angola 3.69 5.40 -3.7 16 6.75 10.44 48Benin 8.60 1.00 24.0 7 6.73 15.33 32Botswana 1.16 15.18 -22.7 13 1.32 2.48Burkina Faso 10.16 16.60 -4.8 8 6.60 16.76 30Burundi 1.76 2.12 -1.8 6 3.71 5.47Cameroon 16.78 20.58 -2.0 3 4.66 21.44 24Cape Verde 0.36 0.39 -0.8 14 0.90 1.26Central African Republic 0.53 0.46 1.4 8 2.06 2.59Chad 0.57 2.01 -11.8 8 11.05 11.62 44Comoros 0 0.63 -100.0 ~ 1.10 1.10Congo–Brazzaville 11.29 0.72 31.7 5 3.74 15.03 34Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 3.72 26.91 -18.0 10 1.50 5.22Côte d’Ivoire 22.84 13.78 5.2 4 33.79 56.63 5Djibouti 0.15 0.11 3.2 5 0.95 1.10Egypt 155.71 8.56 33.7 5 5.31 161.02 1Equatorial Guinea 0.19 0.42 -7.6 6 0.30 0.49Eritrea 2.37 na na 9 0.63 3.00Ethiopia 8.61 25.82 -10.4 9 19.15 27.76 17Gabon 5.45 5.02 0.8 2 0.58 6.03Gambia 0.50 1.67 -11.4 8 1.53 2.03Ghana 25.78 30.02 -1.5 8 18.18 43.96 8Guinea 14.41 5.51 10.1 5 3.42 17.83 27Guinea-Bissau 0.36 1.08 -10.4 12 2.38 2.74Kenya 7.66 36.90 -14.5 10 20.60 28.26 16Lesotho 0.55 5.44 -20.5 13 1.77 2.32Liberia 2.08 0.18 27.7 8 0.28 2.36Libya 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0Madagascar 0.98 4.72 -14.5 10 6.87 7.85Malawi 12.43 8.07 4.4 8 10.70 23.13 23Mali 15.23 28.35 -6.0 5 11.65 26.88 19Mauritania 1.66 0.60 10.7 6 7.51 9.17Mauritius 0.66 0.46 3.7 6 0.85 1.51Morocco 9.21 9.09 0.1 6 1.26 10.47 47Mozambique 13.19 9.18 3.7 14 14.32 27.51 18Namibia 0.74 0.15 17.3 18 0.65 1.39Niger 4.90 28.69 -16.2 10 5.23 10.13 49Nigeria 1.88 1.09 5.6 10 5.21 7.09Rwanda 31.31 8.13 14.4 5 11.78 43.09 9São Tomé and Principe 0.19 0 ~ 8 0.66 0.85Senegal 23.73 34.73 -3.7 5 14.77 38.50 11Seychelles 0.56 0.22 9.8 6 1.09 1.65Sierra Leone 4.08 1.92 7.8 12 9.95 14.03 36Somalia 0.20 1.15 -16.0 13 2.07 2.27South Africa 14.52 3.28 16.0 10 0.39 14.91 35Sudan 1.79 19.51 -21.2 9 1.58 3.37Swaziland 0.88 3.96 -14.0 6 0.44 1.32Tanzania 11.74 54.56 -14.2 12 17.11 28.85 15Togo 0.99 6.99 -17.8 12 3.48 4.47Tunisia 3.87 6.73 -5.4 5 0.72 4.59Uganda 4.63 4.17 1.1 15 19.88 24.51 22Zambia 11.26 19.78 -5.5 11 8.76 20.02 25Zimbabwe 11.10 14.10 -2.4 10 1.57 12.67 40Regional Africa 61.91 60.99 0.1 na 7.31 69.22Total Africaa 551.55 557.14 -0.1 9 325.22 876.77

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

T A B L E 3 C A N A D I A N O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C E : B A S I C D A T A ( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 )

(In millions of Canadian dollars) Bilateral

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

199

6-97

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

198

6-87

Perc

ent

Chan

ge

Per

Year

198

7-97

Rank

of

Cana

da A

mon

gDA

C Bi

late

ral

Dono

rs i

nRe

cipi

ent

Coun

try

(199

6)

Tota

l M

ulti

late

ral

(all

agen

cies

) 19

96-9

7

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an A

id

(all

sour

ces)

199

6-97

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y fo

r To

tal

Cana

dian

Aid

(inc

ludi

ng m

ulti

late

ral)

(if

in t

op 5

0) 1

996-

97

➤

130

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0.77 -100.0 2 0.87 0.87Argentina 1.91 3.66 -6.3 8 5.31 7.22Belize 0.24 7.98 -29.6 3 0.41 0.65Bolivia 10.35 11.07 -0.7 11 23.22 33.57 12Brazil 6.18 7.07 -1.3 10 6.80 12.98 39Chile 2.29 6.71 -10.2 12 0.41 2.70Colombia 4.69 13.34 -9.9 9 5.19 9.88 50Costa Rica 2.37 15.36 -17.0 7 0.93 3.30Cuba 5.66 0.19 40.4 6 0.25 5.91Dominica 1.28 2.69 -7.2 4 1.02 2.30Dominican Republic 0.42 3.14 -18.2 13 2.16 2.58Ecuador 4.39 2.81 4.6 12 4.09 8.48 El Salvador 9.21 9.23 0 7 2.17 11.38 45Grenada 0.02 5.85 -43.3 6 0.44 0.46Guatemala 5.74 3.11 6.3 8 2.37 8.11Guyana 8.18 4.18 6.9 4 7.92 16.10 31Haiti 42.27 17.47 9.2 3 9.75 52.02 6Honduras 6.39 4.94 2.6 7 7.22 13.61 38Jamaica 5.03 31.53 -16.8 4 0.88 5.91Mexico 3.82 4.77 -2.2 7 0.67 4.49Nicaragua 6.32 8.51 -2.9 10 5.56 11.88 43Panama 1.31 1.53 -1.5 5 2.07 3.38Paraguay 0.44 0.30 3.9 9 1.06 1.50Peru 23.06 30.46 -2.7 6 8.68 31.74 13St Kitts and Nevis 0 0.97 -100.0 ~ 0.15 0.15St Lucia 0.63 3.09 -14.7 3 0.23 0.86St Vincent/Grenadines 0 6.61 -100.0 ~ 0.30 0.30Suriname 0.17 0.08 7.8 5 0.03 0.20Trinidad and Tobago 0.51 0.09 18.9 4 0.29 0.80Uruguay 2.33 0.62 14.2 7 0.66 2.99Venezuela 1.43 0.17 23.7 5 0.36 1.79Regional Caribbean 16.00 ~ ~ na 0.08 16.08Regional Latin America 16.93 ~ ~ na 0.62 17.55Other Americas 11.24 ~ ~ ~ 3.24 14.48Total Americas 200.81 208.30 -0.4 8 105.41 306.22

ASIAAfghanistan 4.35 ~ ~ 6 15.14 19.49 26Armenia 0.35 na na ~ 11.72 12.07 44Azerbaijan 0.13 na na ~ 1.44 1.57Bahrain 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0Bangladesh 67.94 128.27 -6.2 7 42.66 110.60 2Bhutan 0.58 0.69 -1.7 9 0.38 0.96Burma 0.12 1.66 -23.1 10 0.88 1.00Cambodia 4.56 ~ ~ 11 7.34 11.90 42China 52.69 36.35 3.8 5 43.07 95.76 3Georgia 0.08 na na ~ 16.77 16.85 29India 15.97 71.02 -13.9 7 35.30 51.27 7Indonesia 25.16 46.44 -5.9 7 1.46 26.62 20Iran 0.05 ~ ~ ~ 0.79 0.84Iraq 0 ~ ~ 11 0.64 0.64Jordan 4.89 1.10 16.1 8 3.29 8.18Kazakhstan 1.80 na na 6 0.24 2.04Kuwait 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0Kyrghzstan 0.39 na na ~ 6.48 6.87Laos 1.21 ~ ~ 12 5.69 6.90Lebanon 3.45 3.39 0.2 6 2.04 5.49Malaysia 5.05 5.08 -0.1 5 0.79 5.84Maldives 0.15 0.14 0.7 7 0.27 0.42

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Bilateral

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

199

6-97

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

198

6-87

Perc

ent

Chan

ge

Per

Year

198

7-97

Rank

of

Cana

da A

mon

gDA

C Bi

late

ral

Dono

rs i

nRe

cipi

ent

Coun

try

(199

6)

Tota

l M

ulti

late

ral

(all

agen

cies

) 19

96-9

7

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an A

id

(all

sour

ces)

199

6-97

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y fo

r To

tal

Cana

dian

Aid

(inc

ludi

ng m

ulti

late

ral)

(if

in t

op 5

0) 1

996-

97

Table 3 (continued)

➤


Mongolia 0.05 ~ ~ 16 2.22 2.27Nepal 10.13 12.00 -1.7 10 3.79 13.92 37North Korea 1.21 0.20 19.7 9 0.01 1.22Oman 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0Pakistan 13.15 57.61 -13.7 7 25.90 39.05 10Papua New Guinea 0.03 3.15 -37.2 10 0.51 0.54Philippines 23.83 16.65 3.7 7 2.03 25.86 21Qatar 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 0Saudi Arabia 0 ~ 0 ~ 0.83 0.83Sri Lanka 5.84 32.93 -15.9 8 5.15 10.99 46Syria 0.13 1.06 -18.9 10 1.34 1.47Tajikistan 0.76 na na ~ 1.20 1.96Thailand 14.50 31.69 -7.5 6 0.61 15.11 33Turkey 4.87 -2.21 ~ 4 0.42 5.29Turkmenistan 0.10 na na ~ 0.08 0.18United Arab Emirates 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0Uzbekistan 0.17 na na ~ 0.23 0.40Vietnam 17.68 0 ~ 11 40.60 58.28 4West Bank and Gaza 10.7 0.41 38.6 12 7.08 17.78 28Yemen 0.77 0.65 1.7 10 8.88 9.65Oceania 4.15 6.23 -4.0 9 3.91 8.06Asia Regional 22.19 13.09 5.4 na 5.88 28.07Other Asia 8.11 ~ ~ ~ 1.15 9.26Total Asia 327.29 467.60 -3.5 6 308.21 635.50

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0.71 ~ ~ ~ 1.33 2.04Belarus 0.14 na na na na 0.14Bosnia Herzegovina 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bulgaria 0.05 na na na na 0.05Croatia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Czech Republic 2.09 na na na na 2.09Estonia 1.78 na na na na 1.78Hungary 2.70 na na na na 2.70Latvia 1.34 na na na na 1.34Lithuania 3.98 na na na na 3.98Macedonia, FYR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Moldova 0.02 na na na na 0.02Poland 178.28 na na na na 178.28Romania 2.86 na na na na 2.86Russian Federation 25.03 na na na na 25.03Slovak Republic 1.23 na na na na 1.23Slovenia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ukraine 18.03 na na na na 18.03Ex-Yugoslavia 20.81 ~ ~ 2 10.06 30.87 14Other Europe -0.03 0 ~ ~ 0.54 0.51Total Eastern Europe 21.49 0 ~ 10 11.93 33.42

Total Allocated 1,101.14 1,233.04 -1.1 750.77 1,851.91Countries not Specified 270.73 161.92 5.3 112.01 382.74Unallocable by Country 441.77 133.91 12.7 0 441.77

Total Developing Countries 1,813.64 1,528.87 1.7 862.78 2,676.42Of which:LLDCs 310.58 473.86 -4.1 9 302.37 612.95Other Low Income Countries 354.27 352.65 0 6 224.25 578.52Remaining Countries 436.32 406.53 0.7 7 224.15 660.44

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes). a Due to rounding, column totals may not match row totals.

Sources: CIDA, Statistical Report 1996-97; CIDA, Annual Report 1986-87; OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, 1992-96.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Bilateral

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

199

6-97

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

198

6-87

Perc

ent

Chan

ge

Per

Year

198

7-97

Rank

of

Cana

da A

mon

gDA

C Bi

late

ral

Dono

rs i

nRe

cipi

ent

Coun

try

(199

6)

Tota

l M

ulti

late

ral

(all

agen

cies

) 19

96-9

7

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an A

id

(all

sour

ces)

199

6-97

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y fo

r To

tal

Cana

dian

Aid

(inc

ludi

ng m

ulti

late

ral)

(if

in t

op 5

0) 1

996-

97

ASIA (continued)

132

As Canada’s most direct contribution, bilateral (country-to-country)aid can be a powerful tool to assist and influence developingcountries. Although Canada maintains bilateral aid relationshipswith more than 100 countries, about half its bilateral aid is concen-trated on 17 countries. In 1996-97, 26 percent of government-to-government assistance (excluding official debt relief) was allocatedamong Bangladesh (at $67.4 million), China ($43.2 million), Haiti($33 million), Ghana ($24.9 million), and Senegal ($21.2 million).The next top five recipients—the Philippines, Peru, Indonesia,Egypt, and Cameroon—received 13 percent, or $95.9 million of government-to-government assistance. Of these 10 countries, two(Bangladesh and Haiti) are LLDCs, while four more (China, Egypt,Ghana, and Indonesia) are LDCs. In total, of the 120 countries in Table4 eligible for official development assistance (ODA), the 48 LLDCs(including four in Oceania) received 28 percent of country-specificCanadian ODA, while 15 other LDCs received 34 percent. Theremaining 38 percent went to middle-income countries. Although theconcentration of aid on the poorest countries has increased as theaid budget declined, Canada’s bilateral aid remains widely disbursedcompared to other middle-sized donor nations. Only seven countrieshad bilateral aid programs in excess of $20 million in 1996-97,compared to 19 at the start of the decade.

Considerable debate continues concerning the long-term benefitsof food aid. Composed mainly of wheat and milk powder, foodaid expenditures through bilateral channels and the World FoodProgramme (WFP—see Table 5) fell 4 percent between 1995-96 and 1996-97. Overall, food aid continues to account for close to10 percent of the declining Canadian aid program. Bilateral foodaid dwindled by 37 percent in total. Of the bilateral food aidallocated in 1996-97, 79 percent went to LLDCs and other lowincome countries.

Unfortunately, the decline in food aid was not paralleled by areduction in the need for International Humanitarian Assistance(IHA). At $78.6 million, CIDA’s IHA budget increased by a thirdover the previous year, caused mainly by the more-than-doublingof aid to ex-Yugoslavia, from $12.5 million to $29.2 million. Nextto ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda accounted for a quarter of IHA, whileAfghanistan, Angola, Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaire), Cambodia, andLiberia were also major recipients.

Debt relief increased 80 percent between 1995-96 and 1996-97:$164 million in debt was written off, equaling 9 percent of thebilateral aid budget. Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, andHaiti accounted for virtually all that amount, with Egypt aloneabsorbing $131.7 million or 80 percent. Although LLDCs still owethe Canadian government more than $275 million (see Table 8),only $5.6 million in debt relief was granted to this income group.

CIDA’s Partnership Branch delivered approximately 15 percent of Canada’s bilateral aid, a slight decline from 1995-96. Close to 80 percent of this aid is channeled through the not-for-profit sector; the rest goes through the private sector via CIDA’sIndustrial Cooperation Program (CIDA INC). The not-for-profit sec-tor comprises nongovernmental institutions (NGIs)—universities,colleges, and research centres such as the North-South Institute,and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like OXFAM, CARECanada, and the development agencies of the Canadian churches.Because most NGO aid is for program support (i.e., a series of projects directed toward an overall goal, which mayencompass many countries), rather than for individual projects, lit-tle can be allocated to a specific country. Based on a 1998 surveyof member NGOs by the Canadian Council for International Co-oper-ation (CCIC), it is likely that 37 percent of aid delivered throughPartnership Branch goes to Africa, with 32.5 percent channeled tothe Americas, 23 percent to Asia, and 7.5 percent within Canada.Of the $57.5 million channeled by CIDA INC to the private sector,LLDCs received less than 10 percent, while other LDCs received 42percent. Note that many not-for-profits and private sector firmsplay major roles as executing agencies for CIDA’s programs outsideof Partnership Branch, and often receive more aid money throughthe government-to-government channel.

Finally, $442 million was spent in 1996-97 that is not allocated byrecipient country. In a controversial change in 1993, Canada nowincludes the cost of resettling refugees and supporting studentsfrom the developing world as ODA. Nine percent of bilateral aidwas spent in Canada on resettlement costs for refugees fromdeveloping countries, and another 3.6 percent was spent on directand indirect costs of supporting students from developingcountries in Canada.

T A B L E 4 C A N A D I A N B I L AT E R A L A I D BY C H A N N E L A N D BY C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 )

International Humanitarian Assistance 4%

IDRC 5%

Bilateral Food Aid 5%

Other 7%

Administrative Costs 9%

Government-to-Government Aid 37%

Refugee Costs in Canada 9%

Official Bilateral Debt Relief 9%

Partnership Branch 15%

Distribution of Bilateral Aid by Channel, 1996-97


AFRICAAlgeria 2.57 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 2.63Angola 0.27 0 0 0 0.07 0.10 3.16 0.08 0 3.69Benin 7.99 0 0.03 0.09 0 0.14 0 0.38 0 8.60Botswana 1.10 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.04 0 1.16Burkina Faso 9.31 26 0 0 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.43 0 10.16Burundi 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1.25 0 0 1.76Cameroon 16.20 11 0 0 0.07 0.31 0.19 0 0 0 16.78Cape Verde 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0.36Central African Republic 0.53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.53Chad 0.50 0 0 0.01 0 0.06 0 0 0 0.57Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Congo–Brazzaville 11.29 20 0 11.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.29Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.65 0 0 0 0.12 0 2.95 0 0 3.72Côte d’Ivoire 21.90 6 0 15.49 0 0.04 0.24 0 0.66 0 22.84Djibouti 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15Egypt 151.23 1 4 131.73 0.02 0.06 3.69 0 0.71 0 155.71Equatorial Guinea 0.14 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.19Eritrea 2.19 0 0 0.08 0 0.03 0 0.06 0.02 2.37Ethiopia 7.77 3.02 0 0.04 0.03 0.61 0 0.16 0 8.61Gabon 5.37 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 5.45Gambia 0.36 0 0 0.05 0.09 0 0 0 0 0.50Ghana 24.86 5 0.01 0 0.51 0.10 0.16 0 0.15 0 25.78Guinea 13.83 14 0.01 0 0.24 0.01 0.24 0 0.09 0 14.41Guinea-Bissau 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.36Kenya 5.12 0.04 0 0.43 0.25 0.45 0 1.34 0.08 7.66Lesotho 0.18 0 0 0 0.34 0 0 0.03 0 0.55Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.08 0 0 2.08Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Madagascar 0.91 0 0 0 0.05 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.98Malawi 11.63 18 2.35 0 0.08 0.11 0.47 0 0.15 0 12.43Mali 14.56 13 3.44 0 0 0 0.02 0.50 0.15 0 15.23Mauritania 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.66Mauritius 0.17 0 0 0.10 0 0.39 0 0 0 0.66Morocco 7.83 0 0 0.36 0.01 0.79 0 0.23 0 9.21Mozambique 12.84 16 5.05 0 0.11 0 0.02 0 0.22 0 13.19Namibia 0.53 0 0 0.08 0 0 0.13 0 0 0.74Niger 4.89 1.95 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 4.90Nigeria 1.32 0 0 0.24 0.01 0.03 0 0.26 0.02 1.88Rwanda 11.49 19 0 0 0 0 0.11 19.40 0.15 0.16 31.31São Tomé and Principe 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.19Senegal 21.46 7 0 0.28 0.06 0.37 1.13 0 0.70 0 23.73Seychelles 0.56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.56Sierra Leone 3.60 3.27 0 0.23 0 0 0.25 0 0 4.08Somalia 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.20South Africa 10.42 23 0 0 0.08 0.15 1.03 0.75 2.08 0 14.52Sudan 0.29 0.10 0 0 0 0.19 1.32 0 0 1.79Swaziland 0.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.88Tanzania 10.49 22 0 0 0.09 0.03 0.34 0.18 0.61 0 11.74Togo 0.56 0 0 0 0 0.21 0 0.18 0.04 0.99Tunisia 3.30 0 0 0.07 0 0.40 0 0.10 0 3.87Uganda 2.31 0 0 0.03 0.31 0.16 1.22 0.60 0 4.63Zambia 11.14 21 0 0 0 0.07 0.03 0 0.01 0 11.26Zimbabwe 9.89 24 0.09 0 0.11 0.02 0.15 0 0.92 0 11.10Regional Africa 56.38 7.25 0 0.08 0.95 0.63 0 3.62 0.24 61.91Total Africaa 484.18 30.58 158.68 3.45 3.57 12.37 33.24 14.14 0.56 551.55

T A B L E 4 C A N A D I A N B I L A T E R A L O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C EB Y C H A N N E L A N D B Y C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 )

(In millions of Canadian dollars) Partnership Branch

Gove

rnm

ent-

to-G

over

nmen

t Ai

d(i

nclu

ding

bila

tera

l fo

od a

id)

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y (i

f in

top

30)

Bila

tera

l Fo

od A

id

Offi

cial

Bila

tera

l De

bt R

elie

f

Inst

itut

iona

l Co

oper

atio

n (I

CDS)

Non

gove

rnm

enta

l Or

gani

zati

ons

(NGO

s)

Indu

stri

al C

oope

rati

on

Prog

ram

(CI

DA I

NC)

Inte

rnat

iona

l H

uman

itar

ian

Assi

stan

ce (

IHA)

Inte

rnat

iona

l De

velo

pmen

t Re

sear

ch C

entr

e (I

DRC)

Int’l

Cen

tre

for

Hum

an R

ight

s an

dDe

moc

rati

c De

velo

pmen

t (I

CHRD

D)

Tota

l

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

➤

134

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Argentina 0.24 0 0 0.21 0 1.04 0 0.42 0 1.91Belize 0.20 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0.24Bolivia 9.29 27 0 0 0 0.28 0.52 0 0.26 0 10.35Brazil 2.21 0.63 0 1.45 0.49 0.81 0 1.23 0 6.18Chile (0.08) 0 0 0.56 0.05 1.20 0 0.55 0 2.29Colombia 3.02 0 0 0.01 0.06 1.09 0 0.50 0 4.69Costa Rica 0.98 0 0 0.37 0.01 0.47 0.06 0.48 0 2.37Cuba 3.57 0 0 0.41 0.19 1.35 0.07 0.08 0 5.66Dominica 1.28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.28Dominican Republic (0.05) 0 0 0 0.13 0.05 0 0.29 0 0.42Ecuador 2.89 0 0 0.22 0.19 0.73 0 0.36 0 4.39El Salvador 8.37 29 0 0 0.18 0.02 0.59 0 0.04 0.03 9.21Grenada 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.02Guatemala 4.19 0 0 0 0.25 0.81 0 0.42 0.07 5.74Guyana 7.62 0 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.18 8.18Haiti 38.55 4 5.90 5.56 0.52 1.49 0.88 0.75 0 0.08 42.27Honduras 5.25 0 0 0.26 0.09 0.68 0 0.11 0 6.39Jamaica 4.19 0 0 0.28 0.25 0.11 0 0.19 0 5.03Mexico 0.44 0 0 0.57 0.02 2.34 0 0.41 0.03 3.82Nicaragua 5.32 0 0 0.23 0.26 0.27 0 0.25 0 6.32Panama 0.42 0 0 0 0.06 0.83 0 0 0 1.31Paraguay 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 0 0.44Peru 20.01 9 0 0 0.24 0.01 0.48 0.55 1.67 0.10 23.06St Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0St Lucia 0.38 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.63St Vincent/Grenadines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Suriname 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.17Trinidad and Tobago 0.25 0 0 0.17 0 0.08 0 0 0 0.51Uruguay 0.38 0 0 0.07 0 0.60 0 1.28 0 2.33Venezuela 0.25 0 0 0.07 0 1.03 0 0.08 0 1.43Regional Caribbean 14.86 0 0 0.23 0.65 0.24 0 0.04 0 16.02Regional Latin America 14.43 0 0 0.18 0.12 0.65 0.50 1.05 0.02 16.95Other Americas 9.74 0 0 0 0 0 0.90 0.51 0.08 11.23Total Americas 158.60 6.53 5.65 6.68 4.70 16.96 2.89 10.60 0.41 200.84

ASIAAfghanistan 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 3.85 0 0 4.35Armenia 0.34 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.35Azerbaijan 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Bangladesh 67.37 2 20.03 0 0.09 0.05 0.28 0 0.16 0 67.94Bhutan 0.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.58Burma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.12Cambodia 1.38 0 0 0.05 0.04 0 2.15 0.95 0 4.56China 43.20 3 0 0 1.46 0.01 7.11 0.15 0.76 0 52.69Georgia 0.08 6.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08India 8.23 30 0 0 0.17 1.71 4.31 0 1.53 0.01 15.97Indonesia 19.51 10 0 0 0.25 0 4.54 0.30 0.55 0.01 25.16Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.05Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Jordan 3.95 0 0 0.19 0 0.59 0 0.16 0 4.89Kazakhstan 1.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.80Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Kyrghzstan 0.39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.39Laos 0.27 0 0 0 0.10 0.19 0.25 0.39 0 1.21Lebanon 2.09 0 0 0.23 0.01 0.27 0.77 0.08 0 3.45Malaysia 3.19 0 0 0.08 0 1.75 0 0.03 0 5.05Maldives 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0.15Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.05

Partnership Branch

Gove

rnm

ent-

to-G

over

nmen

t Ai

d(i

nclu

ding

bila

tera

l fo

od a

id)

Rank

Rec

ipie

nt C

ount

ry

(if

in t

op 3

0)

Bila

tera

l Fo

od A

id

Offi

cial

Bila

tera

l De

bt R

elie

f

Inst

itut

iona

l Co

oper

atio

n (I

CDS)

Non

gove

rnm

enta

l Or

gani

zati

ons

(NGO

s)

Indu

stri

al C

oope

rati

on

Prog

ram

(CI

DA I

NC)

Inte

rnat

iona

l H

uman

itar

ian

Assi

stan

ce (

IHA)

Inte

rnat

iona

l De

velo

pmen

t Re

sear

ch C

entr

e (I

DRC)

Int’l

Cen

tre

For

Hum

an R

ight

s an

dDe

moc

rati

c De

velo

pmen

t (I

CHRD

D)

Tota

l

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Table 4 (continued)

➤


Nepal 8.74 28 2 0 0.06 0.49 0.49 0 0.36 0 10.13North Korea 1.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.21Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Pakistan 11.74 17 0.01 0 0.05 0.04 1.09 0 0.19 0.05 13.15Papau New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0.03Philippines 20.71 8 0 0 0.07 0.15 1.32 0.15 1.43 0 23.83Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Sri Lanka 3.48 2.96 0 0.25 0 0.51 1.30 0.29 0 5.84Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 0.13Tajikistan 0.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.76Thailand 13.15 15 0 0 0.08 0 0.74 0.08 0.33 0.12 14.50Turkey 4.13 0 0 0 0 0.62 0 0.12 0 4.87Turkmenistan 0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.10United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Uzbekistan 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17Vietnam 14.91 12 0 0 0.87 0.15 1.15 0 0.60 0 17.68West Bank and Gaza 9.66 25 0 0 0 0.13 0.04 0 0.87 0 10.70Yemen 0.36 0 0 0.04 0 0.20 0 0.18 0 0.77Oceania 4.01 0 0 0.11 0.02 0.03 0 0 0 4.15Asia Regional 21.25 0 0 0.39 0.01 0 0 0.42 0.11 22.19Other Asia 6.62 0 0 0 0 0 1.45 0.04 0 8.11Total Asia 274.07 31.5 0 4.45 2.91 25.35 10.55 9.57 0.42 327.29

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0.20 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.50 0 0 0.71Belarus 0.14 na na na na na na na na 0.14Bosnia Herzegovina 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bulgaria 0.05 na na na na na na na na 0.05Croatia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Czech Republic 2.09 na na na na na na na na 2.09Estonia 1.78 na na na na na na na na 1.78Hungary 2.70 na na na na na na na na 2.70Latvia 1.34 na na na na na na na na 1.34Lithuania 3.98 na na na na na na na na 3.98Macedonia, FYR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Moldova 0.02 na na na na na na na na 0.02Poland 177.28 na 170.63 na na na na na na 178.28Romania 2.86 na na 0.01 na na na na na 2.86Russian Federation 24.65 na na 0.03 na na na na na 25.03Slovak Republic 1.23 na na na na na na na na 1.23Slovenia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ukraine 17.82 na na na na na 0.22 na na 18.03Ex-Yugoslavia (8.67) 0 0 0.32 0 0 29.17 0 0 20.81Other Europe (0.03) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.03)Total Eastern Europe (8.50) 0 0 0.33 0 0 29.67 0 0 21.49

Country not Specified 18.92 16.13 0 71.18 119.63 2.79 2.24 52.85 3.11 270.73Refugee Costs in Canada na na na na na na na na na na 163.71Scholarships na na na na na na na na na na 8.61Imputed Foreign Student Costs na na na na na na na na na na 65.00Administrative Costs na na na na na na na na na na 154.52Other (See Technical Notes) na na na na na na na na na na 49.95Total not Allocable by Country 441.79

Total Developing Countries 927.27 84.74 164.33 86.09 130.81 57.47 78.59 87.16 4.50 1,813.69Of which:LLDCs 254.73 47.12 5.59 2.11 3.49 5.13 39.36 5.40 0.42 310.58Other Low Income Countries 312.44 7.11 131.82 5.02 2.76 24.23 1.81 7.84 0.17 354.27Remaining Countries 341.21 14.38 26.92 7.78 4.93 25.32 35.18 21.07 0.80 436.35

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes). aDue to rounding, column totals may not match row totals.

Source: CIDA, Statistical Report 1996-97.

Partnership Branch

Gove

rnm

ent-

to-G

over

nmen

t Ai

d(i

nclu

ding

bila

tera

l fo

od a

id)

Rank

Rec

ipie

nt C

ount

ry

(if

in t

op 3

0)

Bila

tera

l Fo

od A

id

Offi

cial

Bila

tera

l De

bt R

elie

f

Inst

itut

iona

l Co

oper

atio

n (I

CDS)

Non

gove

rnm

enta

l Or

gani

zati

ons

(NGO

s)

Indu

stri

al C

oope

rati

on

Prog

ram

(CI

DA I

NC)

Inte

rnat

iona

l H

uman

itar

ian

Assi

stan

ce (

IHA)

Inte

rnat

iona

l De

velo

pmen

t Re

sear

ch C

entr

e (I

DRC)

Int’l

Cen

tre

For

Hum

an R

ight

s an

dDe

moc

rati

c De

velo

pmen

t (I

CHRD

D)

Tota

l

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

ASIA (continued)

136

Through its contributions to multilateral agencies, Canada supportsdevelopment initiatives which complement CIDA’s own projects,and which contribute to international efforts to address problemsthat are too big, or too politically charged, for any one donorcountry to tackle alone. As well, multilateral aid can be moreefficient than bilateral assistance. For example, with the exception of Canada’s contribution to the World Food Programme (WFP),1

Canadian multilateral aid is almost completely untied, and international competitive bidding rules usually mean that cheaper,or more appropriate, goods and services can be purchased.

Contributions to multilateral agencies also allow Canada to maintain a dialogue on development with countries in which it has no ongoingbilateral aid program, and to influence the multilateral agenciesthemselves. As a major multilateral donor, Canada sits on the gov-erning councils and executive boards of these multilateral agencies, and has a say both in overall policy direction and in the specific allocation of the agency’s funds. Thus, even for countries whereCanada’s aid contributions are dwarfed by those from other donors,its diplomatic influence can sometimes serve as a counterbalance.

Perhaps because of these various advantages, multilateral aid has declined at a lower rate—from $975 million in 1994-95 to $863 million in 1996-97, or just over 11 percent—than the 14.5 percent decline in bilateral spending over the same period.

Table 5 imputes Canada’s multilateral contributions for 1996-97to specific countries by allocating Canada’s portion according tothe overall pattern of spending for each multilateral agency. Forexample, the World Bank provided 1 percent of its concessionalresources to Haiti, so Canada’s 1996-97 contribution to the Bankwas allocated proportionately.

In 1996-97, more than 55 percent of multilateral disbursements (a slight decline over the previous year) went to the internationalfinancial institutions (IFIs): the World Bank, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), and the Regional Development Banks(RDBs)—one each for Africa, Asia, the Americas, and theCaribbean. Canada’s contributions to the World Bank and IMF,which are disbursed by the Department of Finance rather than byCIDA, remained the first and second largest channels for Canadianmultilateral aid. Relative to 1995-96, however, Canada’s contribu-tion to the World Bank fell by more than 20 percent, reflecting

more the agreed schedule of replenishments than any specific pol-icy decision to reduce support to the Bank.

Among total disbursements by the IFIs, the least developed countries(LLDCs) were allocated 38 percent of country-specific funds, whileother LDCs received 37 percent. This represents a higher concen-tration on poor countries (although not always on poor peoplein those countries) than Canada’s own bilateral aid allocations.The actual pattern of allocations varied from agency to agency.The RDBs recorded a substantially higher concentration on poorcountries, with 56 percent of country specific funds going toLLDCs, while the IMF allocated 34 percent of its low-interest loansto LLDCs and 39 percent to middle-income countries.

The IMF, through its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility(ESAF), has become a major provider of cheap development loans.Canada’s contribution to the ESAF increased slightly in 1996-97,to almost 21 percent of total multilateral spending. The RDBs,which continue to be an important source of regionally focuseddevelopment initiatives and aid funds, received an additional$48 million in 1996-97 as a result of newly negotiated Canadianreplenishments. This amount, however, remains $20 million belowCanada’s 1994-95 commitments.

Support for United Nations agencies increased slightly in 1996-97,rising from 29 to 34 percent of Canadian country specific multilat-eral spending. Most of this increase was due to $165 million in food aid administered through the WFP, a contribution that aloneaccounts for 19 percent of Canada’s multilateral spending. Both theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN’s spe-cialized agencies (including the Food and Agriculture Organization[FAO], the World Health Organization [WHO], and the InternationalLabour Organization [ILO]) suffered a slight decline in Canadianfunding, receiving $57 million in total. The least-developed coun-tries generally fared better with the UN agencies than with the IFIs,receiving 44 percent of total country specific UN allocations. Heretoo, allocations varied from agency to agency, with only 29 percentof UNDP country specific allocations directed toward LLDCs, andclose to 60 percent sent to middle-income countries. Those numberscontrast with the 55 percent of WFP country specific allocationsmade to LLDCs, largely to the poorest countries, like Bangladeshand Rwanda, that are least able to deal on their own with naturalor other crises.

While other multilateral channels largely avoided cuts in 1995-96,allocations to the Commonwealth and Francophonie agencies fellsharply (33 percent) in 1996-97, in spite of the importance ofthese agencies as a platform to raise Canada’s standing amongdeveloping-country members. Perhaps because of greater LLDCrepresentation in these organizations, 46 percent of their country-specific allocations were made to LLDCs.

1 Most of Canada’s contribution to the WFP is in the form of food aid, and is directly tied to Canadian procurement.

T A B L E 5 C A N A D I A N M U LT I L AT E R A L O D A BY A G E N C Y A N D BY C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 )

World Bank 25%

IFIs Unspecified 3%

UNDP 5%

Other Multilateral 7%

Other UN 10%

RDBs 10%

IMF 21%

WFP 19%

Distribution of Canadian Multilateral ODA by Agency, 1996-97


AFRICAAlgeria 0 0 0 0 0.40 0 0.02 0.02 0.36 0.02 0.42Angola 1.32 1.30 0 0.02 4.65 2.93 0.14 0.33 1.25 0.77 6.74 Benin 6.30 1.38 3.41 1.51 0.38 0 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.04 6.72Botswana 0.22 0 0 0.22 0.19 0 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.90 1.31Burkina Faso 4.58 1.73 1.65 1.20 0.56 0 0.24 0.10 0.22 1.46 6.60 Burundi 1.66 0.58 0 1.08 1.66 0.07 0.14 0.15 1.30 0.39 3.71 Cameroon 2.93 2.90 0 0.03 0.28 0 0.03 0.04 0.21 1.45 4.66 Cape Verde 0.65 0.26 0 0.39 0.09 0 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.91 Central African Republic 0.79 0.78 0 0.01 0.35 0 0.10 0.03 0.22 0.92 2.06 Chad 8.20 2.34 4.14 1.72 1.73 1.40 0.17 0.07 0.09 1.12 11.05 Comoros 0.22 0.22 0 0 0.18 0 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.70 1.10 Congo–Brazzaville 3.55 0.06 3.49 0 0.11 0 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07 3.73 Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.01 0 0 0.01 1.09 0.47 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.40 1.50 Côte d’Ivoire 33.07 8.05 23.90 1.12 0.36 0 0.03 0.05 0.28 0.35 33.78 Djibouti 0.67 0.04 0 0.63 0.10 0 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.94 Egypt 3.78 2.81 0 0.97 1.39 0 0.37 0.11 0.91 0.13 5.30 Equatorial Guinea 0.16 0.04 0 0.12 0.12 0 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.30 Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0.63 0 0.26 0.18 0.19 0 0.63 Ethiopia 13.80 4.85 3.68 5.27 5.05 3 1.16 0.38 0.51 0.30 19.15 Gabon 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.58 Gambia 1.08 0.35 0 0.73 0.24 0 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.23 1.55 Ghana 16.90 8.35 6.88 1.67 0.77 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.49 18.18 Guinea 2.18 1.60 0 0.58 0.68 0 0.10 0.07 0.51 0.57 3.43 Guinea–Bissau 1.92 0.48 0.53 0.91 0.21 0 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.26 2.39 Kenya 14.78 5.34 6.24 3.20 5.28 4.52 0.05 0.14 0.57 0.52 20.60 Lesotho 1.08 0.41 0 0.67 0.24 0 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.45 1.77 Liberia 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.27 Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Madagascar 6.18 2.66 3.41 0.11 0.58 0 0.23 0.10 0.25 0.09 6.87 Malawi 9.76 4.85 3.84 1.07 0.74 0 0.34 0.16 0.24 0.19 10.69 Mali 9.38 2.88 5.19 1.31 0.85 0 0.42 0.12 0.31 1.42 11.65 Mauritania 5.59 1.23 3.59 0.77 1.70 1.36 0.15 0.06 0.13 0.22 7.51 Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.77 0.84 Morocco 0.38 0 0 0.38 0.55 0 0.11 0.05 0.39 0.33 1.26 Mozambique 12.85 7.57 3.17 2.11 1.28 0 0.57 0.30 0.41 0.19 14.32 Namibia 0.15 0 0 0.15 0.40 0 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.65 Niger 3.64 1.15 2.44 0.05 0.59 0 0.16 0.10 0.33 1.01 5.24 Nigeria 3.59 3.09 0 0.50 1.33 0 0.74 0.30 0.29 0.30 5.22 Rwanda 2.10 1.45 0 0.65 8.98 6.46 0.67 0.47 1.38 0.69 11.77 São Tomé and Principe 0.55 0.28 0 0.27 0.09 0 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.66 Senegal 10.59 3.76 5.98 0.85 1.69 0.80 0.10 0.11 0.68 2.49 14.77 Seychelles 0.03 0 0 0.03 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.02 1.03 1.09 Sierra Leone 5.52 1.21 2.56 1.75 3.90 3.44 0.23 0.07 0.16 0.54 9.96 Somalia 0.40 0 0 0.40 1.60 1 0.29 0.29 0.02 0.06 2.06 South Africa 0 0 0 0 0.39 0 0.10 0.05 0.24 0 0.39 Sudan 0 0 0 0 1.28 0 0.23 0.60 0.45 0.30 1.58 Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.35 0.45 Tanzania 14.70 4.61 6.46 3.63 1.38 0 0.30 0.23 0.85 1.03 17.11 Togo 2.44 1.93 0 0.51 0.40 0 0.16 0.03 0.21 0.64 3.48 Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.41 0.71 Uganda 17.53 4.24 10.92 2.37 1.49 0 0.56 0.27 0.66 0.87 19.89 Zambia 7.24 6.21 0 1.03 0.63 0 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.89 8.76 Zimbabwe 0.41 0.41 0 0 0.56 0 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.60 1.57 Regional Africa 0.66 0 0 0.66 3.34 0 0.85 0.02 2.47 3.31 7.31 Total Africa 233.54 91.40 101.48 40.66 61.34 25.75 10.86 6.19 18.54 30.25 325.19

T A B L E 5 C A N A D I A N M U L T I L A T E R A L O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C EB Y A G E N C Y A N D B Y C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 )(Estimated in millions of Canadian dollars)

Wor

ld B

ank

IMF

(ESA

F)

Regi

onal

Deve

lopm

ent

Bank

s

Tota

l UN

Agen

cies

WFP

UN

DP

UN

ICEF

Othe

r U

N A

genc

ies

Othe

r M

ulti

late

ral

Chan

nels

Tota

l

OF WHICH OF WHICH

Tota

l Int

erna

tion

al

Fina

ncia

l Ins

titu

tion

sCountry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

➤

138

Wor

ld B

ank

IMF

(ESA

F)

Regi

onal

Deve

lopm

ent

Bank

s

Tota

l UN

Agen

cies

WFP

UN

DP

UN

ICEF

Othe

r U

N A

genc

ies

Othe

r M

ulti

late

ral

Chan

nels

OF WHICH OF WHICH

Tota

l Int

erna

tion

al

Fina

ncia

l Ins

titu

tion

sAMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 0 0.53 0 0 0 0.53 0.34 0.87 Argentina 0.67 0 0 0.67 4.59 0 4.24 0.05 0.30 0.04 5.30 Belize 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.33 0.41 Bolivia 13.78 3.42 8.45 1.91 9.39 8.29 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.06 23.23 Brazil 1.25 0 0 1.25 5.45 0 3.62 0.46 1.37 0.11 6.81 Chile 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.34 0 0.23 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.41 Colombia 0.31 0 0 0.31 4.87 2.74 1.86 0.11 0.16 0.02 5.20 Costa Rica 0.06 0 0 0.06 0.79 0.44 0.08 0.02 0.25 0.09 0.94 Cuba 0 0 0 0 0.24 0 0.04 0.06 0.14 0 0.24 Dominica 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 1.01 1.02 Dominican Republic 0.73 0 0 0.73 1.40 1.12 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.02 2.15 Ecuador 0.73 0 0 0.73 3.34 2.43 0.54 0.10 0.27 0.02 4.09 El Salvador 0.81 0 0 0.81 1.33 0.60 0.53 0.07 0.13 0.02 2.16 Grenada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.43 0.43 Guatemala 0.50 0 0 0.50 1.82 1.18 0.36 0.06 0.22 0.04 2.36 Guyana 6.31 0.56 4.50 1.25 0.55 0.45 0.06 0.02 0.02 1.05 7.91 Haiti 7.02 2.27 3.81 0.94 2.09 1.03 0.59 0.19 0.28 0.63 9.74 Honduras 4.63 1.77 0 2.86 2.54 1.86 0.36 0.05 0.27 0.04 7.21 Jamaica 0.03 0 0 0.03 0.11 0 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.73 0.87 Mexico 0.08 0 0 0.08 0.54 0 0.10 0.10 0.34 0.06 0.68 Nicaragua 3.58 2.36 0 1.22 1.89 1.06 0.44 0.07 0.32 0.09 5.56 Panama 0.05 0 0 0.05 2.01 0.69 1.28 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.08 Paraguay 0.60 0 0 0.60 0.46 0 0.37 0.02 0.07 0 1.06 Peru 0.18 0 0 0.18 8.37 5.57 2.37 0.17 0.26 0.13 8.68 St Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 St Lucia 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.20 0.23 St Vincent/Grenadines 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.29 0.30 Suriname 0.02 0 0 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.03 Trinidad and Tobago 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.03 0 0 0 0.03 0.21 0.29 Uruguay 0.03 0 0 0.03 0.60 0 0.52 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.65 Venezuela 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.28 0 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.35 Regional Caribbean 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0.03 0.05 0 0.08 Regional Latin America 0.46 0 0 0.46 0.17 0 0.09 0.03 0.05 0 0.63 Other Americas 0 0 0 0 1.38 0 0.40 0.02 0.96 1.87 3.25 Total Americas 42.00 10.40 16.76 14.84 55.31 27.46 18.98 2.00 6.87 8.05 105.36

ASIAAfghanistan 0 0 0 0 14.93 12.97 0.58 0.19 1.19 0.22 15.15 Armenia 11.47 2.99 8.48 0 0.25 0 0.01 0.04 0.20 0 11.72 Azerbaijan 1.23 1.23 0 0 0.21 0 0.03 0.06 0.12 0 1.44 Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Bangladesh 11.42 9.56 0 1.86 31.11 29.15 0.32 0.51 1.13 0.13 42.66 Bhutan 0.06 0.04 0 0.02 0.27 0 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.37 Burma 0 0 0 0 0.82 0 0.17 0.17 0.48 0.06 0.88 Cambodia 1.76 1.56 0 0.20 5.57 3.77 1.10 0.18 0.52 0 7.33 China 27.78 27.78 0 0 15.02 13.27 0.84 0.38 0.53 0.26 43.06 Georgia 16.54 2.62 13.92 0 0.22 0 0.03 0.04 0.15 0 16.76 India 31.05 31.05 0 0 3.23 0 0.65 1.31 1.27 1.01 35.29 Indonesia 0.22 0 0 0.22 1.12 0 0.36 0.29 0.47 0.13 1.47 Iran 0 0 0 0 0.79 0 0.07 0.02 0.70 0 0.79 Iraq 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0.02 0.34 0.29 0 0.65 Jordan 0 0 0 0 3.24 0 0.07 0.03 3.14 0.04 3.28 Kazakhstan 0.04 0 0 0.04 0.19 0 0.03 0.04 0.12 0 0.23 Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kyrghzstan 6.30 2.10 4.04 0.16 0.17 0 0.07 0.03 0.07 0 6.47 Laos 4.04 2.03 1.48 0.53 1.58 1.00 0.34 0.08 0.16 0.06 5.68

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Table 5 (continued)

➤

Tota

l


Wor

ld B

ank

IMF

(ESA

F)

Regi

onal

Deve

lopm

ent

Bank

s

Tota

l UN

Agen

cies

WFP

UN

DP

UN

ICEF

Othe

r U

N A

genc

ies

Othe

r M

ulti

late

ral

Chan

nels

OF WHICH OF WHICH

Tota

l Int

erna

tion

al F

inan

cial

Inst

itut

ions

Lebanon 0 0 0 0 2.02 0 0.19 0.05 1.78 0.02 2.04 Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.61 0.78 Maldives 0.13 0.09 0 0.04 0.07 0 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.27 Mongolia 1.98 0.37 1.40 0.21 0.23 0 0.10 0.03 0.10 0 2.21 Nepal 2.56 2.12 0 0.44 1.10 0 0.25 0.18 0.67 0.13 3.79 North Korea 0 0 0 0 0.28 0 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.30 Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 11.99 9.59 0 2.40 13.78 12.64 0.22 0.21 0.71 0.13 25.90 Papua New Guinea 0.04 0 0 0.04 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.51 Philippines 0.81 0.50 0 0.31 1.12 0 0.18 0.16 0.78 0.11 2.04 Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0.81 0 0.14 0 0.67 0.02 0.83 Sri Lanka 4.49 3.57 0 0.92 0.44 0 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.21 5.14 Syria 0 0 0 0 1.32 0 0.07 0.02 1.23 0.02 1.34 Tajikistan 1.04 1.04 0 0 0.17 0 0.07 0.06 0.04 0 1.21 Thailand 0 0 0 0 0.51 0 0.15 0.06 0.30 0.11 0.62 Turkey 0 0 0 0 0.37 0 0.10 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.41 Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0 0.08 United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0.22 0 0.09 0.07 0.06 0 0.22 Vietnam 36.95 6.47 30.30 0.18 3.52 2.43 0.35 0.25 0.49 0.14 40.61 West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0 0 7.07 0 1.38 0.06 5.63 0 7.07 Yemen 3.27 3.27 0 0 5.46 4.62 0.21 0.08 0.55 0.15 8.88 Oceania 0.25 0.17 0 0.08 0.34 0 0.11 0.04 0.19 3.31 3.90 Asia Regional 0 0 0 0 2.88 0 0 0 2.88 1.94 4.82 Other Asia 0 0 0 0 1.92 0 1.40 0.04 0.48 0 1.92 Total Asia 175.42 108.15 59.62 7.65 123.50 79.85 10.31 5.34 27.75 9.20 308.12

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 1.10 1.10 0 0 0.22 0 0.06 0.04 0.12 0 1.32 Belarus na na na na na na na na na na naBosnia Herzegovina na na na na na na na na na na naBulgaria na na na na na na na na na na naCroatia na na na na na na na na na na naCzech Republic na na na na na na na na na na naEstonia na na na na na na na na na na naHungary na na na na na na na na na na naLatvia na na na na na na na na na na naLithuania na na na na na na na na na na naMacedonia, FYR na na na na na na na na na na naMoldova na na na na na na na na na na naPoland na na na na na na na na na na naRomania na na na na na na na na na na naRussian Federation na na na na na na na na na na naSlovak Republic na na na na na na na na na na naSlovenia na na na na na na na na na na naUkraine na na na na na na na na na na naEx-Yugoslavia 5.28 5.28 0 na 4.77 0 0.20 0.43 4.14 0 10.05 Other Europe 0 0 0 na 0.13 0 0 0 0.13 0.4 0.53 Total Eastern Europe 6.38 6.38 0 0 5.12 0 0.26 0.47 4.39 0.40 11.90

Country not Specified 20.43 0.02 (0.04) 20.44 48.72 31.80 2.69 0.11 14.12 12.65 112.01

Total Developing Countries 477.77 216.35 177.82 83.60 293.99 164.86 43.10 14.11 71.67 60.55 862.58 Of which:

LLDCs 173.23 77.74 60.28 35.21 107.23 72.67 11.84 6.53 16.19 21.85 302.33Other Low Income Countries 167.50 104.19 47.92 15.39 51.59 36.53 4.94 3.55 6.57 5.10 224.23Remaining Countries 116.61 34.40 69.66 12.55 86.45 23.86 23.63 3.92 34.79 20.95 224.01

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes).

Source: CIDA, Statistical Report 1996-97.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11ASIA (continued) To

tal

140

Canada’s total trade (exports plus imports) with developing coun-tries is heavily concentrated; just four countries—China, Mexico,Brazil, and Malaysia—account for almost half (49.5 percent). AsGraph 6.1 illustrates, Canadian trade is highest with developingcountries in Asia, while the Americas region comes a close second.In terms of income groups, almost a third of our developing-countrytrade is with low income and least-developed countries, while coun-tries with a middle income or higher account for 68 percent.

The deficit in Canada’s trade in goods with developing countries,now at $13 billion, is nearly 35 times larger than a decade ago.This may be offset by a surplus of trade in services, however, aswell as Canada’s goods surplus with the US ($45.7 billion in 1997).

The surge in the deficit with developing countries reflects the factthat Canadian exports have barely doubled since 1987, whereas ourimports more than quadrupled. The situation in 1997 was exacer-bated by the financial crisis in Southeast Asia: from 1996 to 1997,our imports from developing countries in Asia rose by 27 percentwhile our exports fell slightly, resulting in a doubling of the tradedeficit with that region to almost $7 billion. Only in the case ofthe Americas is there a deficit of roughly similar size ($6.6 billion).We have a small deficit of $138 million with Africa and a some-what larger one, of $0.4 billion, with Eastern Europe. Chinaaccounted for the largest absolute growth in imports to Canada in 1997, and with a drop in exports, the bilateral trade deficit with China grew to more than $4 billion.

The revenue from duties or tariffs on our imports from developingcountries in 1997 was nearly $1 billion, compared with $0.8 billionin 1996 and $1.1 billion in 1995; it is too early to see any indica-tion of declining tariffs resulting from the Uruguay Round. Thistariff revenue is equivalent to a full 36 percent of the aid Canadagives to developing countries.

In terms of absolute value, imports from Asia generate the mostrevenue for Canada—$742 million, followed by the Americas ($161 million), Eastern Europe ($45 million), and Africa ($16 million). China, Mexico, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil,Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are the top 10 countries generating the most tariff revenue for Canada. Eight generated more revenue for Canada than they received in aid.In the case of Africa, South African goods paid $5.8 million in1997 (39 percent of aid), Egypt $2.7 million (2 percent), andMauritius $2.6 million (171 percent).

In relative terms, countries hardest hit by the Canadian tariff struc-ture (i.e., whose exports to Canada paid more than a 10 percentaverage tariff) were: Kuwait (21.0 percent), Botswana (20.6 percent),and Lesotho (20.0 percent), while 14 other developing countriesfaced average tariffs of between 10 and 20 percent. On average,Asia pays the highest tariff: 5.6 percent, compared to 0.76 percentfor Africa. It should be recalled, however, that imports from the US pay only 0.2 percent on average.

It is often suggested that exports to poorer countries depend onbilateral aid, much of which is tied. Graph 6.2 shows that bilateralaid was equivalent to about one-third of Canadian exports to EasternEurope in 1997, while for Africa the share was one-fifth. In contrast,the ratio was insignificant for the Americas and Asia. However, forthe least-developed and other low income countries, there appearsto be a much higher correlation between bilateral aid and exports.

T A B L E 6 C A N A D I A N B A L A N C E O F T R A D E W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 7 )

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

Africa Americas Asia Eastern Europe

Exports Imports Total Trade

Graph 6.1 Canadian Trade with Developing Countries byRegion, 1997

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

Africa Americas Asia Eastern Europe

LLDCs

Exports Bilateral Aid

Graph 6.2 Canadian Exports and Bilateral Aid, 1997

C$ m

illio

ns

C$ m

illio

ns


AFRICAAlgeria 582,949 610,645 (27,696) 200,653 22,124 178,529 11.3 39.3 2.49 0

Angola 11,277 80 11,197 4,772 121,836 (117,064) 9.0 -51.9 0 0

Benin 11,304 6 11,298 3,309 1 3,308 13.1 19.6 0.11 1.74

Botswana 34,712 1,591 33,121 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 327.55 20.58

Burkina Faso 1,400 19 1,381 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.16 6.08

Burundi 38 119 (81) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.01 0.01

Cameroon 3,490 7,622 (4,132) 15,752 1,173 14,579 (14.0) 20.6 106.84 1.40

Cape Verde 709 62 647 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.37 2.18

Central African Republic 261 217 44 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.13 0.06

Chad 274 62 212 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.68 1.08

Comoros 82 37 45 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.01 0.03

Congo–Brazzaville 3,381 7,725 (4,344) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.44 0.01

Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 7,640 10,227 (2,587) 17,206 30,646 (13,440) (7.8) -10.4 2.82 0.03

Côte d’Ivoire 7,425 61,766 (54,341) 11,192 13,226 (2,034) (4.0) 16.7 59.45 0.10

Djibouti 729 6 723 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.05 0.76

Egypt 173,761 29,038 144,723 83,529 34,018 49,511 7.6 -1.6 2,728.35 9.39

Equatorial Guinea 35 94 (59) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.01 0.01

Eritrea 0 0 0 na na na na na 0.03 0.03

Ethiopia 5,483 7,397 (1,914) 34,593 1,876 32,717 (16.8) 14.7 0.56 0.01

Gabon 9,428 106 9,322 1,378 5,757 (4,379) 21.2 -32.9 1.65 1.55

Gambia 215 138 77 570 113 457 (9.3) 2.0 3.76 2.71

Ghana 52,109 12,672 39,437 25,506 6,264 19,242 7.4 7.3 19.33 0.15

Guinea 7,563 25,995 (18,432) 3,410 19,453 (16,043) 8.3 2.9 2.65 0.01

Guinea-Bissau 307 176 131 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0

Kenya 22,142 19,019 3,123 9,361 12,637 (3,276) 9.0 4.2 165.04 0.87

Lesotho 150 7,921 (7,771) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1,587.50 20.04

Liberia 1,634 35 1,599 3,958 1,822 2,136 (8.5) -32.6 2.30 6.42

Libya 196,713 1 196,712 28,781 22,727 6,054 21.2 -63.3 0 ~

Madagascar 660 5,758 (5,098) 3,689 111 3,578 (15.8) 48.4 103.59 1.80

Malawi 8,795 2,943 5,852 3,749 1,007 2,742 8.9 11.3 52.43 1.78

Mali 11,154 13,720 (2,566) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 33.89 0.25

Mauritania 609 111 498 1,672 0 1,672 (9.6) na 5.76 5.19

Mauritius 5,568 15,287 (9,719) 992 27,612 (26,620) 18.8 -5.7 2,583.81 16.91

Morocco 184,714 65,730 118,984 203,608 29,429 174,179 (1.0) 8.4 1,051.96 1.60

Mozambique 22,224 1,166 21,058 18,386 1,520 16,866 1.9 -2.6 5.24 0.45

Namibia 590 16,582 (15,992) na na na na na 3.94 0.02

Niger 8,768 8,402 366 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 51.38 0.61

Nigeria 71,923 520,570 (448,647) 22,435 251,504 (229,069) 12.4 7.5 29.93 0.01

Rwanda 4,738 227 4,511 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0

São Tomé and Principe 53 42 11 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.36 0.86

Senegal 18,049 3,558 14,491 12,805 156 12,649 3.5 36.7 18.83 0.53

Seychelles 368 1,601 (1,233) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.40 0.21

Sierra Leone 2,001 9,799 (7,798) 318 10,186 (9,868) 20.2 -0.4 109.83 1.12

Somalia 1,124 83 1,041 825 0 825 3.1 na 0.04 0.05

South Africa 350,557 494,457 (143,900) 113,170 155,389 (42,219) 12.0 12.3 5,778.20 1.17

Sudan 15,638 76 15,562 11,749 1,480 10,269 2.9 -25.7 0.95 1.25

Swaziland 78 5,360 (5,282) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 54.44 1.02

Tanzania 13,945 2,905 11,040 25,426 2,254 23,172 (5.8) 2.6 47.03 1.62

Togo 5,805 54,619 (48,814) 763 14,076 (13,313) 22.5 14.5 0.04 0

Tunisia 66,730 9,172 57,558 75,368 2,312 73,056 (1.2) 14.8 408.69 4.46

Uganda 8,781 10,254 (1,473) 809 1,967 (1,158) 26.9 18.0 2.88 0.03

Zambia 5,901 32,261 (26,360) 18,877 23 18,854 (11.0) 106.4 0.28 0

Zimbabwe 12,972 17,579 (4,607) 8,792 13,680 (4,888) 4.0 2.5 596.72 3.39

Other Africa na na na ~ ~ ~ na na na na

Total Africa 1,956,956 2,095,038 (138,082) 967,403 806,379 161,024 7.3 10.0 15,957.89 0.76

T A B L E 6 C A N A D I A N B A L A N C E O F T R A D E W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 7 )

(In thousands of Canadian dollars)

Tota

l Ex

port

s 19

97

Tota

l Ex

port

s 19

87

Bala

nce

of T

rade

199

7

Bala

nce

of T

rade

198

7

Tota

l Im

port

s 19

97

Tota

l Im

port

s 19

87

% C

hang

e Pe

r Ye

ar

Expo

rts

1987

-97

% C

hang

e Pe

r Ye

ar

Impo

rts

1987

-97

Aver

age

Tari

ff R

ate

(%)

1997

Tota

l Ta

riff

Rev

enue

Co

llect

ed 1

997

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

➤

142

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 8,649 1,261 7,388 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 23.96 1.90

Argentina 339,179 231,466 107,713 96,588 111,550 (14,962) 13.4 7.6 4,888.45 2.11

Belize 9,451 12,750 (3,299) 6,070 5,849 221 4.5 8.1 47.19 0.37

Bolivia 755 15,590 (14,835) 4,487 3,657 830 (16.3) 15.6 75.97 0.49

Brazil 1,457,720 1,312,496 145,224 636,825 850,542 (213,717) 8.6 4.4 34,835.24 2.65

Chile 366,736 324,869 41,867 98,596 153,300 (54,704) 14.0 7.8 2,540.18 0.78

Colombia 380,733 296,779 83,954 224,330 132,997 91,333 5.4 8.4 5,784.97 1.92

Costa Rica 63,778 184,863 (121,085) 30,700 63,223 (32,523) 7.6 11.3 5,120.93 2.77

Cuba 319,058 353,113 (34,055) 272,892 51,567 221,325 1.6 21.2 1,305.24 0.37

Dominica 1,560 1,406 154 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 81.61 5.80

Dominican Republic 76,066 109,888 (33,822) 55,399 29,489 25,910 3.2 14.1 6,985.19 6.36

Ecuador 84,646 140,822 (56,176) 41,345 95,697 (54,352) 7.4 3.9 1,476.15 1.05

El Salvador 17,793 43,569 (25,776) 15,611 43,151 (27,540) 1.3 0.1 3,120.13 7.09

Grenada 3,062 1,113 1,949 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.88 0.08

Guatemala 67,779 132,937 (65,158) 20,182 33,008 (12,826) 12.9 14.9 2,563.20 1.93

Guyana 9,028 203,381 (194,353) 5,162 33,777 (28,615) 5.7 19.7 2,503.28 1.23

Haiti 24,958 4,246 20,712 25,386 8,664 16,722 (0.2) -6.9 556.94 13.08

Honduras 15,716 54,055 (38,339) 14,043 16,945 (2,902) 1.1 12.3 4,872.82 9.00

Jamaica 80,804 257,598 (176,794) 94,780 113,774 (18,994) (1.6) 8.5 4,635.04 1.80

Mexico 1,163,740 6,970,008 (5,806,268) 521,980 1,169,566 (647,586) 8.3 19.5 72,745.73 1.04

Nicaragua 10,564 9,816 748 9,820 28,661 (18,841) 0.7 -10.2 794.02 8.09

Panama 37,036 45,613 (8,577) 34,366 30,749 3,617 0.8 4.0 196.61 0.43

Paraguay 10,143 3,286 6,857 4,008 808 3,200 9.7 15.1 23.80 0.72

Peru 257,294 134,389 122,905 120,523 75,210 45,313 7.9 6.0 2,051.67 1.53

St Kitts and Nevis 1,772 4,434 (2,662) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 130.98 2.95

St Lucia 7,502 1,293 6,209 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 48.89 3.78

St Vincent/Grenadines 3,379 139 3,240 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2.47 1.77

Suriname 5,482 25,168 (19,686) 1,004 3,551 (2,547) 18.5 21.6 42.76 0.17

Trinidad and Tobago 78,191 26,364 51,827 70,505 36,875 33,630 1.0 -3.3 579.28 2.20

Uruguay 17,945 66,156 (48,211) 25,935 130,198 (104,263) (3.6) -6.5 765.64 1.16

Venezuela 452,956 969,846 (516,890) 336,684 551,238 (214,554) 3.0 5.8 1,988.82 0.21

Total Americas 5,373,475 11,938,714 (6,565,239) 2,767,221 3,774,046 (1,006,825) 6.9 12.2 160,788.05 1.34

ASIAAfghanistan 366 817 (451) 44 161 (117) 23.6 17.6 11.58 1.42

Armenia 2,364 79 2,285 na na na na na 9.85 9.02

Azerbaijan 1,714 167 1,547 na na na na na 2.58 1.54

Bahrain 10,616 2,391 8,225 11,439 1,649 9,790 (0.7) 3.8 365.65 15.29

Bangladesh 91,609 120,125 (28,516) 124,365 23,024 101,341 (3.0) 18.0 19,318.88 16.08

Bhutan 0 57 (57) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8.86 15.31

Burma 0 0 0 1,074 717 357 (100.0) -100.0 ~ ~

Cambodia 1,891 4,180 (2,289) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 809.77 19.37

China 2,169,409 6,299,424 (4,130,015) 1,432,079 770,901 661,178 4.2 23.4 427,393.47 6.77

Georgia 18,538 442 18,096 na na na na na 7.36 1.61

India 450,805 740,306 (289,501) 270,999 170,867 100,132 5.2 15.8 58,786.34 7.94

Indonesia 769,203 808,658 (39,455) 305,079 168,010 137,069 9.7 17.0 57,662.02 7.13

Iran 624,320 505,928 118,392 168,093 110,304 57,789 14.0 16.5 566.89 0.11

Iraq 1,192 132,507 (131,315) 119,636 80,801 38,835 (36.9) 5.1 1.74 0

Jordan 11,181 885 10,296 5,713 587 5,126 6.9 4.2 81.05 9.07

Kazakhstan 6,549 7,312 (763) na na na na na 266.24 3.64

Kuwait 48,710 1,970 46,740 20,133 564 19,569 9.2 13.3 414.72 20.98

Kyrghzstan 11,269 110 11,159 na na na na na 21.08 19.06

Laos 257 7,895 (7,638) 87 30 57 11.4 74.6 342.89 4.34

Lebanon 57,289 5,667 51,622 10,139 1,570 8,569 18.9 13.7 239.54 4.22

Malaysia 667,443 1,985,419 (1,317,976) 118,387 187,277 (68,890) 18.9 26.6 32,609.51 1.64

Maldives 8,247 197 8,050 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 39.02 19.80

Tota

l Ex

port

s 19

97

Tota

l Ex

port

s 19

87

Bala

nce

of T

rade

199

7

Bala

nce

of T

rade

198

7

Tota

l Im

port

s 19

97

Tota

l Im

port

s 19

87

% C

hang

e Pe

r Ye

ar

Expo

rts

1987

-97

% C

hang

e Pe

r Ye

ar

Impo

rts

1987

-97

Aver

age

Tari

ff R

ate

(%)

1997

Tota

l Ta

riff

Rev

enue

Co

llect

ed 1

997

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Table 6 (continued)

➤


Mongolia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Nepal 4,679 5,423 (744) 3,744 846 2,898 2.3 20.4 723.72 13.31

North Korea 4,252 137 4,115 7,063 1,621 5,442 (4.9) -21.9 ~ ~

Oman 19,766 842 18,924 4,050 49,617 (45,567) 17.2 -33.5 ~ ~

Pakistan 107,428 205,024 (97,596) 82,055 61,554 20,501 2.7 12.8 26,567.05 12.96

Papua New Guinea 23,307 1,749 21,558 2,424 11,650 (9,226) 25.4 -17.3 ~ ~

Philippines 398,565 723,414 (324,849) 122,095 107,146 14,949 12.6 21.0 28,253.91 3.90

Qatar 15,238 37,839 (22,601) 3,616 290 3,326 15.5 62.8 105.96 0.28

Saudi Arabia 478,106 647,695 (169,589) 267,862 175,134 92,728 6.0 14.0 ~ ~

Sri Lanka 39,629 82,999 (43,370) 30,579 34,260 (3,681) 2.6 9.3 10,540.44 12.71

Syria 22,841 1,375 21,466 8,875 439 8,436 9.9 12.1 167.33 12.16

Tajikistan 59 690 (631) na na na na na 0 0

Thailand 444,177 1,170,834 (726,657) 194,929 200,776 (5,847) 8.6 19.3 45,903.09 3.92

Turkey 294,563 194,288 100,275 266,074 78,321 187,753 1.0 9.5 12,115.69 6.23

Turkmenistan 241 7 234 na na na na na 0.26 3.59

United Arab Emirates 214,311 13,822 200,489 22,292 48,698 (26,406) 25.4 -11.8 1,135.82 8.20

Uzbekistan 8,468 12,069 (3,601) na na na na na 0.78 0.01

Vietnam 50,115 148,645 (98,530) 2,337 7,709 (5,372) 35.9 34.4 17,292.81 11.62

West Bank and Gaza na na na na na na na na na na

Yemen 9,668 28,924 (19,256) 8,525 1,659 6,866 1.3 33.1 0.10 0

Oceania 10,209 3,443 6,766 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 103.61 3.05

Total Asia 7,098,594 13,903,755 (6,805,161) 3,613,787 2,296,182 1,317,605 7.0 19.7 741,869.58 5.59

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 1,146 177 969 540 11 529 7.8 32.0 0 0

Belarus 1,098 1,248 (150) na na na na na 71.92 5.76

Bosnia Herzegovina 755 266 489 na na na na na ~ ~

Bulgaria 8,790 77,916 (69,126) 35,752 9,606 26,146 (13.1) 23.3 3,564.39 4.57

Croatia 14,220 10,025 4,195 na na na na na 852.06 8.49

Czech Republic 66,450 109,752 (43,302) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3,760.90 3.43

Estonia 6,379 9,089 (2,710) na na na na na 254.32 2.80

Hungary 87,772 74,646 13,126 16,226 47,366 (31,140) 18.4 4.7 3,394.42 4.55

Latvia 9,924 2,181 7,743 na na na na na 55.60 2.55

Lithuania 5,009 22,090 (17,081) na na na na na 333.54 1.51

Macedonia, FYR 1,403 4,579 (3,176) na na na na na 780.45 17.04

Moldova ~ ~ ~ na na na na na 250.41 7.76

Poland 135,381 145,514 (10,133) 12,455 68,648 (56,193) 26.9 7.8 5,788.50 3.97

Romania 64,228 68,255 (4,027) 53,678 57,046 (3,368) 1.8 1.8 5,560.99 8.16

Russian Federation 335,290 625,695 (290,405) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 14,412.57 2.20

Slovak Republic 34,973 55,134 (20,161) na na na na na 2,937.39 5.33

Slovenia 28,593 41,774 (13,181) na na na na na 1,559.00 3.73

Ukraine 21,974 26,912 (4,938) na na na na na 1,460.97 5.43

Ex-Yugoslavia 17,104 10,127 6,977 16,516 70,713 (54,197) 0.4 -17.7 ~ ~

Total Eastern Europe 840,489 1,285,380 (444,891) 135,167 253,390 (118,223) 20.1 17.6 45,037.41 3.45

Total Developing Countries 15,269,514 29,222,887 (13,953,373) 7,483,578 7,129,997 353,581 7.4 15.1 963,652.93 3.36Of which:

LLDCs 345,893 371,855 (25,962) 317,306 243,472 73,834 0.9 4.3 24,259.75 6.52

Other Low Income Countries 3,954,863 9,151,876 (5,197,013) 2,301,776 1,610,787 690,989 5.6 19.0 609,951.59 6.66

Remaining Countries 10,968,758 19,699,156 (8,730,398) 4,864,496 5,275,738 (411,242) 8.5 14.1 329,441.59 1.72

Total Other Countries (excluding US) 34,508,603 58,852,766 (24,344,163) 22,222,360 29,856,617 (7,634,257) 4.5 7.0 1,756,555.01 2.96United States 229,091,000 183,421,000 45,670,000 91,756,404 79,252,000 12,504,404 9.6 8.8 394,000.00 0.21

Total World 278,869,117 271,496,653 7,372,464 121,462,342 116,238,614 5,223,728 8.7 8.9 3,114,207.94 1.15Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

Sources: Statistics Canada; Department of Finance; Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Tota

l Ex

port

s 19

97

Tota

l Ex

port

s 19

87

Bala

nce

of T

rade

199

7

Bala

nce

of T

rade

198

7

Tota

l Im

port

s 19

97

Tota

l Im

port

s 19

87

% C

hang

e Pe

r Ye

ar

Expo

rts

1987

-97

% C

hang

e Pe

r Ye

ar

Impo

rts

1987

-97

Aver

age

Tari

ff R

ate

(%)

1997

Tota

l Ta

riff

Rev

enue

Co

llect

ed 1

997

ASIA (continued)

144

This table lists the top three products of the export and importtrade between Canada and developing countries in 1997. We also note the value of military goods shipped directly from Canada to developing countries, and the nature of the major items involved.

Used clothing is still a major export from Canada to Africa—infact, eight of the top 10 markets for used clothing from Canadaare in Africa (Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Ghana,Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda). In 1997, used clothing wasthe most important Canadian export to 11 countries in Africa andwas second or third in another eight (compared to seven and 12,respectively, in 1996). At the same time, seven African countrieswere producers of new clothing for the Canadian market (comparedto eight in 1996). These are Botswana, Egypt, Lesotho, Madagascar,Mauritania, Mauritius, and Swaziland. Used clothing figured as a leading Canadian export for only two other, Asian, countries—Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Asia continues to be a major sourceof clothing imports: 19 countries provide major sales to Canada.This number is the same as in 1995, when the Multi-FibreArrangement (MFA) was beginning to be dismantled, as agreed in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (the GATT).1 In contrast, clothing is a key Canadian importfrom only five countries in the Americas, and from five countriesin Eastern Europe.

Our trade with the United States consists largely of manufactures,and commodities now account for less than 30 percent of our total exports.2 But in 1997, commodities still dominated Canadianexports to five countries in Africa, 15 countries in the Americas,seven in Asia, and one in Eastern Europe. These included bothfoodstuffs such as wheat, lentils, milk powder, vegetable oils, andfish, as well as industrial raw materials such as coal, wood pulp,copper, and aluminum.

Primary commodities are still the three largest products supplied to Canada by as many as 11 countries in Africa, 19 in theAmericas, one in Asia, and one in Eastern Europe. What is of inter-est is that, for many countries, there is at least one export whichis a manufactured product, whether it be a high-tech electronicproduct such as digital circuits, or a more traditional textile prod-uct or footwear.

The continued dominance of primary commodities in our two-waygoods trade with South America is shown in Table 7.1. This picturesuggests major differences between the ongoing negotiations overthe Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement that had raised many issues relating tointra-industry trade.

Table 7.1 Leading Items in Canadian Trade with South America,1997

Exports C$000 Imports C$000Newsprint 444.3 Crude oil 757.3Meslin/wheat 430.2 Roasted coffee 236.8Telephone parts 183.3 Gold 206.2Potassium chloride 170.3 Oil products 150.7Durum wheat 121.4 Bananas 127.3Coal 112.7 Semi-finished steel 101.9Transmission apparatus 102.6 Car radios 87.6Oil products 93.8 Frozen orange juice 77.9Airplanes 89.5 Grapes 74.8Sulphur 73.0 Leather shoes 73.7All others 1,583.1 All others 1,829.1Total exports $3,404.2 Total imports $3,723.3Source: www.strategis.ic.gc.ca

Nonetheless the data here illustrates that Canada’s trade withdeveloping countries includes an increasing range of products. Of particular note are: imports of digital circuits and radioreceivers from Cape Verde; golf and tool bags from Liberia; safetyseat belts from Mozambique; computer parts from the Seychelles;eyeglasses from Tunisia; metal furniture from Suriname; printedbooks from Kyrghzstan; and computers from the Maldives. Amongmajor Canadian exports are: herbicides to Vietnam; poultry incu-bators to Burma; pet food to Iraq; motorboats to Kuwait; corsets to Costa Rica; exercise equipment to Burundi; vitamins to Lesotho;and orange juice to Namibia.

Although the value of military exports to developing countries fellby 41 percent in 1997, developing countries continue to accountfor the majority of Canada’s non-US military trade. A $113 mil-lion drop in sales to Saudi Arabia accounts for the bulk of thedecline in exports, with Asia overall registering a 54 percent drop, while sales to Africa and the Americas both increased, by 60 and149 percent, respectively. LLDCs purchased $34 million of Canadian military equipment, the equivalent of 87 percent of Canadian bilat-eral humanitarian aid to LLDCs. Sales to Saudi Arabia, Botswana,Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela accounted for 92 percent of all Canadian military exports to developing countries.

1 While it is too early to see changes at this level of aggregation, information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) shows that the ending of all quotas on tailor-collared shirts in July 1997 led to an increase in imports from China and its share of the Canadian market. This change suggeststhat, when all quotas end in the year 2005, there will be a major reshuffling of suppliers, with less competitive countries losing sales in Canada and other developed-country markets. Source: http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/cgi-bin/tdst-bin/wow/wow.code

2 DFAIT, CanadExport, “Insert,” vol. 16, no. 16 (October 5, 1998), p. 3.

T A B L E 7 T R A D E : T O P E X P O R T S A N D I M P O R T S W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 7 )


AFRICA

Algeria durum wheat meslin milk powder crude petroleum petroleum products dates 0

Angola used clothing transmitters asbestos aircraft parts gears and bearings nickel-cadmium 0

Benin transmitters telephone answering used clothing live animals medicines imitation jewelry 0machines

Botswana aircraft aircraft parts flight simulators men’s shirts women’s nightclothes women’s trousers 34,221,636 aircraft

Burkina Faso mining equipment drilling parts dies candles statuettes electrical goods 0

Burundi exercise equipment hydraulic equipment ~ coffee tea roasted coffee 0

Cameroon tractors electronic parts iron petroleum products bearings coffee 0

Cape Verde electrical machinery original sculptures metal furniture digital circuits radio receivers saddlery 0

Central African Republic wheat flour educational & religious ~ coffee lumber heterocyclic compounds 0materials

Chad educational & religious used clothing ~ computers digital processing equipment portable computers 0materials

Comoros used clothing ~ ~ essential oils monolithic integrated circuits cloves 0

Congo–Brazzaville used clothing rolled iron tractors cobalt returned goods cadmium 0

Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) used clothing low value exports construction equipment cobalt industrial diamonds wine 0

Côte d’Ivoire paper products printing equipment machinery and appliances cocoa beans cocoa butter, fat & oil petroleum products 0

Djibouti low value exports lentils used clothing toys low value imports automobile mufflers 0

Egypt newsprint bituminous coal paper products raw iron and steel t-shirts carpets 1,240,276 aircraft parts

Equatorial Guinea ~ ~ ~ cocoa paste tuna low value imports 0

Eritrea ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0

Ethiopia wheat & meslin canola, colza & mustard oil turbo propellers coffee oil seeds & fruit camera & projector lenses 0

Gabon tractors iron & steel structures tires paper products insulated wire kaolin 0

Gambia ships & fishing vessels glass sauces & condiments lemons parts for optical equipment motor vehicles 0

Ghana wheat & meslin used clothing aluminum wire & cable petroleum products precious metal ores aluminum ores 0

Guinea educational & religious asbestos corn aluminum ores natural rubber coffee 0materials

Guinea–Bissau printed matter mining equipment educational & religious coffee entertainment articles ~ 0materials

Kenya wheat used clothing zinc coffee tea woven fabrics 87,224 aircraft parts

Lesotho medicine alkaloids vitamins men’s/boys’ pants women’s/girls’ pants women’s/girls’ 0blouses & shirts

Liberia used clothing canola, colza & mustard oil wheat golf & tool bags coins computer parts 0

Libya durum wheat milk other wheat natural gas petroleum products low value exports 0

Madagascar used clothing human vaccines iron & steel vanilla beans women’s/girls’ underwear shrimp 0

Malawi used clothing printed matter computers tea tobacco nuts 0

Mali telephone parts transmission equipment mining & drilling equipment cotton rubber gloves digital circuits 0

Mauritania wheat motor vehicles tires (new) olive oil brassieres nails and pins 0

Mauritius helicopters lentils telephones women’s/girls’ blouses & shirts men’s/boys’ shirts women’s/girls’ pants 0

Morocco sulfur wheat butter citrus fruit fluorspar olives 427,305 simulator parts

Mozambique used clothing wheat medicine cashew nuts apple juice safety seat belts 0

Namibia orange juice iron & steel structures low value exports uranium fish parts of turbo jets 0

Niger instruments for chemical lumber mining equipment uranium petroleum products steel lathes 0analysis

Nigeria wheat telephone parts petroleum products crude petroleum petroleum products cocoa beans 0

Rwanda kidney beans used clothing canola, colza, or mustard seed tea photosensitive semiconductors, computer parts 0photovoltaic cells

São Tomé and Principe drilling tools office furniture personally carried appliances railcar parts jewelry low value exports 0

Senegal rail locomotives paper products airplane parts steam & sandblasting storage units for computers computer parts 0equipment

Seychelles gelatin agricultural equipment ethylene film, plates, sheets, foil airplane parts computer parts cinnamon 0

Sierra Leone transmission equipment lentils kidney beans forging or die-stamping coffee computer parts 0machines

Somalia transmission equipment other electrical equipment office furniture ceramic bathroom furnishings coffee electric trains 0

South Africa airplanes wheat sulfur platinum metallic ash & residue oranges 525,580 wire-strike protection, rockets, launchers & parts

Sudan wheat computers mining equipment machinery for public works sesame seeds recording tape 0

Swaziland iron & steel goods medicine used clothing herbicides casting machines t-shirts 0

Tanzania used clothing wheat tobacco tea tobacco coffee 5,962 firearms, ammunition

Togo wheat railcar parts used clothing calcium phosphates cocoa beans vegetable products 0

Tunisia sulfur wheat barley petroleum products eyeglasses dates 1,265 vehicle parts

Uganda used clothing medicines sulfur coffee acrylic polymers vanilla beans 0

Zambia used clothing earth moving equipment mining & drilling equipment copper cobalt digital circuits 930 firearms

Zimbabwe earth moving equipment mining & drilling equipment reservoirs & tanks tobacco cement copper granite 319,700 aircraft

Total Africa 36,829,878

T A B L E 7 TRADE : TOP EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITH DEVELOP ING COUNTRIES (1997)

Top Three Domestic Exports from Canada, 1997 Top Three Imports into Canada, 1997 Total Military Top Military

Exports 1997 Exports from

Country 1 2 3 1 2 3 (C$) Canada

➤

146

AMERICAS

Antigua and Barbuda ~ low value exports prefabricated buildings turbo jet parts cow & horse leather aircraft parts 0

Argentina newsprint telephone parts aircraft cow & horse leather grape juice ground nuts 54,966 firearms & parts

Belize electric conductors wooden poles & fence posts aluminum wire & cable cane sugar Brazil nuts lobster 0

Bolivia transmitting devices wheat & meslin telephone parts silver ore tin Brazil nuts 0

Brazil newsprint potassium chloride wheat & meslin coffee radios orange juice 3,620,968 ammunition,aircraft & helicopter parts

Chile wheat & meslin bituminous coal durum wheat grapes fishmeal copper ore 406,866 aircraft instruments, fire control systems

Colombia wheat & meslin refined copper for wire newsprint coffee bananas flowers 0

Costa Rica newsprint potassium chloride corsets, braces, suspenders bananas coffee pineapples 0

Cuba peas edible offal sulfur nickel oxide raw cane sugar shrimps & prawns 0

Dominica ~ low value transactions lumber table/kitchenware monolithic integrated circuits clothing 0

Dominican Republic newsprint smoked herring salt fish gold silver coffee 0

Ecuador wheat & meslin newsprint paper products bananas shrimp flowers 0

El Salvador wheat & meslin paper products malt coffee women’s underwear electrical capacitors 0

Grenada low value goods meat & edible meat offal telephone parts nutmeg cocoa beans mace 0

Guatemala wheat & meslin newsprint potassium chloride coffee raw sugar cane sesame seeds 0

Guyana ammonium nitrate ammonium sulphate low value exports gold aluminum rum & tafia 250 firearms

Haiti athletic equipment kidney beans low value exports t-shirts scrap copper baler twine 0

Honduras newsprint potassium chloride semi-chemical fluting paper coffee bananas t-shirts 0

Jamaica low value exports salt fish newsprint aluminum oxides rum & tafia liqueurs & cordials 0

Mexico rape or colza seeds wheat motor vehicle parts motor vehicles ignition wiring colour TVs 343,512 body armour

Nicaragua newsprint ethylene film, plates, sheets, foil front end loaders coffee men’s/boys’ pants women’s/girls’ pants 0

Panama malt lentils newsprint gold bananas coffee 6,000 circuit boards

Paraguay injection molding machines cigarettes graders hybrid integrated circuits digital circuits leather 10,138 body armour

Peru wheat (incl. durum wheat) telephone parts newsprint coffee lead inedible fish meal 72,900 body armour

St Kitts and Nevis salt fish heat treating equipment audio visual equipment parts electric switches heterocyclic compounds live animals 0

St Lucia liquor liquid milk low value exports tin articles women’s/girls’ outfits paper products 0

St Vincent/Grenadines low value exports wooden barrels & casks semi-chemical fluting paper fish lobster fruits & nuts 0

Suriname gold beef low value exports gold fish metal furniture 0

Trinidad and Tobago newsprint low value exports potatoes iron & steel petroleum products soft drinks 0

Uruguay newsprint fine paper telephone parts beef leather citrus fruit 0

Venezuela wheat newsprint durum wheat crude petroleum petroleum products iron & steel products 4,689,144 aircraft parts, body armour

Total Americas 9,204,744

ASIA

Afghanistan almonds used clothing self-adhesive plates, tape, film grapes pistachios cashews 0

Armenia construction equipment baking machines elevators & escalators nuts & seeds men’s/boys’ pants men’s/boys’ underwear 0

Azerbaijan educational & religious articles iron & steel structures human vaccines caviar ferro-chromium carbon & graphite articles 0

Bahrain wood pulp motor vehicles carbon & graphite articles women’s/girls’ pants shrimp women’s/girls’ shirts & blouses 1,755 radar parts

Bangladesh wheat & meslin mustard seeds peas men’s/boys’ anoraks & jackets shrimp men’s/boys shirts 616 sonar parts

Bhutan ~ ~ ~ women’s/girls’ nightwear wood pulp parts of pumps 0

Burma educational & religious materials ejector pumps poultry incubators shrimp clothing t-shirts 0

Cambodia low value exports used clothing motor vehicles men’s/boys’ anoraks & jackets shrimp women’s/girls’ 0anoraks & jackets

China wheat & meslin potassium chloride wood pulp toys golf & tool bags sports footwear 3,935 radar parts

Georgia ethyl alcohol medicines fax/television/radio transmitters returned goods chromium trioxide parts for optical instruments 0

India newsprint wheat machines & appliances t-shirts men’s/boys’ shirts women’s/girls’ nightclothes 0

Indonesia wheat wood pulp ethlyne glycol natural rubber video recording equipment sports footwear 190,840 aircraft parts

Iran wheat barley ventilation hoods crude petroleum wool & hair carpets naphthylamine 0

Iraq medicine kidney beans pet food crude petroleum coffee carpets 0

Jordan paper baby food medicine digital circuits airplane parts sweaters & sweatshirts 129,478 ammunition

Kazakhstan telephone parts iron & steel structures mining & drilling equipment iron & steel products ferro-chromium chromium ores & concentrates 0

Kuwait motor vehicles motorboats motor vehicle parts women’s/girls’ jackets women’s/girls’ overcoats men’s/boys’ jackets 64,860 test equipment

Kyrghzstan mining equipment construction equipment motor vehicle parts women’s/girls’ night clothes printed books hydrometers, hygrometers 0& psychrometers

Laos truck tractors human vaccines electrical machines & appliances petroleum products men’s/boys’ shirts coffee 0

Lebanon aluminum wheat low value exports nuts & seeds olive oil scrap copper 0

Malaysia electric railway cars potassium chloride signaling & safety equip. for railways digital integrated circuits other integrated circuits storage units 2,890,081 helicopter and for computers eletronic parts

Maldives religious & educational materials airplane parts transmission equipment men’s/boys’ jackets tuna computers 0

Mongolia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0

Nepal fine paper unused postage, cheques, banknotes airplane parts men’s/boys’ shirts carpets sweaters & sweatshirts 0

North Korea wood pulp lead telephone parts ski suits electric lamps computer equipment 0



1 2 3 1 2 3 (C$) Canada

➤

Table 7 (continued)


Oman wheat ejector pumps gears & torque converters women’s/girls’ pants men’s/boys’ shirts men’s/boys’ pants 100 aviation related parts

Pakistan wheat coal low value exports men’s/boys’ shirts cotton synthetic yarn 369,696 ship defence system repairs

Papua New Guinea airplanes taps, cocks, valves, etc. truck tractors coffee natural rubber digital integrated circuits 0

Philippines wheat copper zinc integrated circuits digital integrated circuits storage units for 368,144 propellant, firearmscomputers

Qatar heat treatment equipment motor vehicles engine parts petroleum products urea men’s/boys’ shirts 0

Saudi Arabia barley tanks & armoured vehicles lumber crude petroleum acyclic ethers petroleum products 82,474,645 LAV’s & parts, radio equipment

Sri Lanka wheat printed matter asbestos men’s/boys’ jackets footwear golf & tool bags 0

Syria iron tubes & pipes textile fabrics aluminum t-shirts olives footwear 0

Tajikistan used clothing human vaccines ~ aluminum low value exports ~ 0

Thailand asbestos wood pulp fax/television/radio transmitters shrimp computer equipment tuna & other fish 14,680,084 helicopter & parts,aircraft parts

Turkey bituminous coal tobacco wheat iron & steel worsted fabrics tiles 6,814,848 navigation systems, aircraft parts

Turkmenistan paper products mining & drilling equipment mining surveying equipment motor vehicle parts jewels antiques 0

United Arab Emirates airplanes wheat motor vehicles stainless steel jewelry portable computers 401,268 ship control systems

Uzbekistan telephone answering machines telephone parts textiles uranium recorded media antiques 0

Vietnam potassium chloride artificial filament tow herbicides coffee footwear sports footwear 491,154 helmets & body armour

Yemen paper products printed materials mining & drilling equipment crude petroleum petroleum products coffee 0

Total Asia 108,881,504

EASTERN EUROPE

Albania textile fabrics educational & religious materials machines & appliances women’s/girls’ blouses, shirts footwear returned goods 0

Belarus machines & appliances perfumes knitted fabrics woven fabrics men’s/boys’ jackets & blazers synthetic fibers 0

Bosnia Herzegovina sanitary articles iron & steel structures wheat perfumes adrenal cortical hormones footwear 0

Bulgaria zinc medical equipment textile fabrics copper ores & concentrates unrefined copper; copper anodes copper waste, scrap 0

Croatia wheat low value exports asphalt wooden furniture footwear candles 0

Czech Republic pet food low value exports textile fabrics boring machines tractors electrical capacitors 62,541 ammunition, firearms

Estonia pork iron & steel structures butter shrimp ophthalmic instruments grand pianos 0

Hungary computer parts electric static converters pork storage units for computers parts for agricultural equipment parts for electric lamps 1,249 firearm parts

Latvia telephone parts iron & steel structures printed matter shrimp plywood canned fish 0

Lithuania medicine plywood & veneer wood-working equipment petroleum products shrimp fish 0

Macedonia, FYR textile fabrics pork ethylene footwear wooden bedroom furniture sweaters & sweatshirts 0

Moldova woven fabrics ethyl alcohol petroleum products iron & steel apple juice women’s/girls’ 0jackets & blazers

Poland filtering & purifying machinery plastic articles durum wheat turbo jet parts & propellers urea brass 990 firearms

Romania coal transmission equipment textile fabrics copper ores & concentrates boots ball bearings 884 firearms

Russian Federation pork telephone parts textile fabrics cod natural uranium iron & steel products 0

Slovak Republic electrical machines & appliances gas turbines refrigeration equipment iron & steel products metal lathes wooden bedroom furniture 3,098 firearms parts

Slovenia low value exports turbo propellers liquor pork heterocyclic compounds snow skis 104,245 gas mask parts firearms

Ukraine iron & steel structures textile fabrics agricultural equipment ferro-silico-manganese iron & steel products railcar parts 0

Ex-Yugoslavia medicine heterocyclic compounds chassis w. engines iron & steel products women’s/girls’ anoraks raspberries, mulberries 0

Total Eastern Europe 173,007

Total Developing Countries 155,089,133

Of which:

LLDCs 34,229,144

Other Low Income Countries 2,703,075

Remaining Countries 118,156,914

Total Other Countries (Other than US) 149,178,658

Total World (Other than US) 304,267,791

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes). Items in brown contributed to at least 75 percent or more of total bilateral trade with Canada.Sources: Statistics Canada, International Trade Division; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Export and Import Control Bureau.



1 2 3 1 2 3 (C$) Canada

ASIA (continued)

148

This table offers a partial picture of Canada’s financial relationswith developing countries. One must be cautious in using the data:reporting agencies often do not supply figures for individual coun-tries, and the information provided often covers different periods,thus preventing efforts to impute missing figures.

In 1997, total claims by Canadian public agencies and commercialbanks on developing country organizations and individuals wereestimated at $48.3 billion, an increase of almost $5 billion over1996. More than two-thirds of the bank lending was to developingcountries in the Americas, with most of the rest to Asia. Mexico,Brazil, and Argentina account for one-third of Canadian bank lend-ing to developing countries, but significant amounts are also owedby organizations and individuals in China, Thailand, Trinidad andTobago, Chile, and Indonesia.

The figures available on commercial bank loans are from September-October 1997—the onset of the Asian financial crisis. At that time,Canadian banks had only limited exposure to countries that werethen considered as “problem” debtors. In fact, the Bank of NovaScotia cut its provision for loan losses stemming from country riskby $500 million (almost one-half) over the previous year. However,as shown in column 9, Canadian banks had more than $3 billion inloans outstanding to Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia at the onsetof the crisis, so provisions for country risk may since have increased.

The Canadian government had approximately $20 billion in loansoutstanding to developing countries in 1997, slightly more than the previous year. Nine percent ($1.7 billion) was owed directly tothe federal government—mainly CIDA loans (CIDA no longer givesloans, and the amount owed is declining as debts are repaid or forgiven). In the year ending March 31, 1998, repayments and debtforgiveness reduced the principal and interest owed to CIDA by over $77 million. Four Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka) account for more than 80 percent of the remaining debt.

The bulk of Canada’s official debt was held by two crown corpora-tions: the Export Development Corporation (EDC) and the CanadianWheat Board (CWB). In 1997, the EDC had about $7.3 billion inloans outstanding to developing countries, or about 37 percent of all official debt. Almost 70 percent of that total is held in itsCorporate Account; that is, loans provided on strictly commercialterms, thus managing to avoid overexposure in any single countryor industry.1 Corporate Account loans outstanding to developingcountries declined by $1.2 billion (19 percent) in 1997. The remain-ing EDC loans are authorized by the federal government throughthe “Canada Account.” Canada Account loans can be concessional ornonconcessional. Over 1996-97, the value of nonconcessional loansdeclined slightly while the value of concessional loans increased aslarge disbursements were issued to China and Turkey.

The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) held $6.4 billion in credits from13 developing countries, a slight decline over the 1996-97 year.About 70 percent of these loans are repayable in US dollars, so theCWB stands to gain substantially from the recent fall in the valueof the Canadian dollar. While the CWB does not release figures bycountry, Russia, Algeria, and Brazil likely account for the bulk ofits outstanding loans.

Column 11 provides a rough indication of Canadian direct investment abroad (CDIA) in developing countries, comprising investment in physical assets and ownership of businesses incorpo-rated in host countries, but not financial assets such as bonds andminority holdings of corporate shares.2 In 1997, CDIA in the listedcountries was estimated at $18.4 billion (15 percent higher than in1996), two-thirds of which was invested in the Americas, particu-larly in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. Interestingly, CDIA in Mexico,our NAFTA partner, declined by 14 percent in 1997 to $1,090 mil-lion. Asia, and particularly Indonesia, accounts for most of the remaining CDIA in developing countries.

Relative to other industrialized countries, Canada’s direct invest-ment in developing countries remains modest. It is worth notingthat CDIA in Bermuda and various Caribbean countries or dependentterritories excluded from our list of developing countries (Barbados,the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, and theBritish Virgin Islands), was estimated at almost $20 billion—morethan all CDIA in developing countries. At $10.74 billion, CDIA inBarbados alone is more than double all our direct investment in all developing Asian and African countries combined! Most of thisinvestment is in the financial services industries and is located in countries offering favourable tax treatment.

Column 12 provides information on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada by developing-country firms. At just more than$1 billion, this total is tiny: only Brazil and Mexico have investedmore than $200 million in FDI in Canada. Again, FDI from Mexico,our NAFTA partner, actually declined in 1997.

1 This claim may be true. The EDC profits on its loans, but does not provide sufficientinformation to determine if it is cross-subsidizing certain countries or industries.

2 Even less information is available concerning Canadian portfolio investment in developing-country bonds and stocks. Canadian portfolio investment in non-OECDcountries, including some not classified as developing countries, stood at almost $11 billion, a 345 percent increase since 1990.

T A B L E 8 C A N A D I A N F I N A N C I A L R E L AT I O N S W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 7 )

Official Debt by Agency: 1997 total $19.6 billion (est.)

CIDA 9% $1,695.61

Unknown 22% $4,274.48

EDC 37% $7,293.74

CWB 32% $6,365.53


T A B L E 8 C A N A D I A N F I N A N C I A L R E L A T I O N S W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 7 )(In millions of Canadian dollars)

AFRICAAlgeria 49.52 22.58 12.02 448.00 > zero 743.60 ~ ~ 29 773 ~ ~Angola 0 0 0 ~ 0 4.60 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Benin 0 0 0 ~ 0 0.90 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Botswana 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Burkina Faso 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Burundi 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Cameroon 0 11.30 20.57 386.00 0 412.90 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Cape Verde 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Central African Republic 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Chad 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Comoros 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Congo–Brazzaville 0 0.80 3.20 53.00 0 55.53 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 0 0 0 ~ 0 36.80 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Côte d’Ivoire 0 0 0 262.00 0 259.40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Djibouti 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Egypt 44.96 2.76 18.17 ~ > zero 317.10 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Eritrea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ethiopia 0 0 0 ~ > zero 0.50 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Gabon 0 20.33 12.55 > zero 0 100.60 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Gambia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ghana 0 0 0 ~ 0 8.87 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Guinea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Guinea–Bissau 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Kenya 0 11.98 10.24 > zero 0 91.90 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Lesotho 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Liberia 0 0 0 ~ 0 4.30 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Libya 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Madagascar 0 0 24.80 ~ 0 33.80 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Malawi 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mali 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mauritania 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mauritius 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Morocco 14.69 134.17 142.12 ~ 0 319.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mozambique 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Namibia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Niger 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Nigeria 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Rwanda 0 6.21 0 ~ 0 6.40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~São Tomé and Principe 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Senegal 0 0 0 ~ 0 9.80 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Seychelles 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Sierra Leone 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Somalia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~South Africa 0 0 0 ~ 0 234.90 ~ ~ 277 512 172 42Sudan 0 9.10 0 ~ 0 13.10 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Swaziland 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Tanzania 0 0 37.87 ~ 0 67.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Togo 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Tunisia 89.68 0 0 ~ 0 101.20 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Uganda 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Zambia 0 0 8.17 ~ > zero 84.80 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Zimbabwe 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 14 ~Africa Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 23 386 ~ 576 ~Total Africa 198.85 219.23 289.71 1,149.00 > zero 2,907.00 0 23 692 3,599 762 42

31-Mar-97 31-Mar-97 31-Mar-97 31-Dec-97 31-Jul-97 31-Mar-98 31-Oct-97 31-Oct-97 30-Sept-97 1997 1997 1997

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Stoc

k of

For

eign

Dir

ect

Inve

stm

ent

Abro

ad

Stoc

k of

For

eign

Dir

ect

Inve

stm

ent

in C

anad

a

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an D

ebt

Clai

ms

(Est

imat

e)

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an B

ank

Clai

ms

Gross Exposure(Designated LDCs only)

Roya

l Ba

nk o

f Ca

nada

Bank

of

Nov

a Sc

otia

Tota

l Of

fici

al D

ebt

as o

f

Cana

dian

Whe

at B

oard

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Corp

orat

e Ac

coun

t

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Cana

daAc

coun

t Se

ctio

n 23

Con

cess

iona

l

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Cana

daAc

coun

t Se

ctio

n 23

Non

conc

essi

onal

Gove

rnm

ent

of C

anad

a (C

IDA)

PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL DEBT PRIVATE OR COMMERCIAL DEBT TOTAL FDI

➤

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 ~ 0 58.70 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Argentina 0.38 125.93 12.96 ~ 0 483.40 1,196 230 2,195 2,678 1,469 ~Belize 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bolivia 1.06 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 32 ~Brazil 6.69 9.12 0 486.00 > zero 773.10 1,279 542 2,992 3,765 3,137 289Chile 2.35 0 0.70 ~ 0 244.25 ~ ~ 1,154 1,398 3,518 ~Colombia 15.46 0 0 ~ 0 396.30 ~ ~ ~ ~ 384 ~Costa Rica 18.17 0 0 > zero 0 19.36 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Cuba 9.55 32.52 0 ~ 0 73.60 ~ ~ ~ ~ 103 ~Dominica 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Dominican Republic 7.68 0 0 ~ 0 2.90 ~ > zero ~ ~ 136 ~Ecuador 7.55 5.59 0 ~ 0 39.40 ~ > zero ~ ~ 70 ~El Salvador 0a 0 0 ~ 0 0a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Grenada 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Guatemala 2.99 0 0 > zero 0 21.70 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Guyana 0 0 0 > zero 0 2.70 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Haiti 0 0 0 ~ > zero 2.40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Honduras 0a 0 0 > zero 0 29.14a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Jamaica ~ 7.79 10.13 ~ > zero 65.90 ~ ~ ~ ~ 513 ~Mexico 0.06 4.78 20.34 609.00 0 615.20 1,216 ~ 4,362 4,977 1,090 223Nicaragua 0a 0 0 ~ 0 0a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Panama 0 0 0 > zero 0 2.70 ~ > zero ~ ~ 139 94

Paraguay 0.40 0 0 ~ 0 0.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Peru 0.07 1.04 0 633.00 > zero 651.70 ~ > zero 221 873 264 ~St Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~St Lucia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~St Vincent/Grenadines 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Suriname 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 ~ 0 27.20 ~ ~ 1,281 1,308 ~ ~Uruguay 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Venezuela 0 25.12 0 372.00 0 423.93 ~ 279 776 1,200 429 ~Caribbean Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 42 ~ ~ ~ ~Latin America Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 198 ~ ~ ~ ~

Americas Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 2,181 ~ 6,707 ~ 1,165 ~Total Americas 72.41a 211.89 44.13 2,100.00 > zero 3,933.58a 5,872 1,291 19,688 23,622 12,449 606

ASIAAfghanistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Armenia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Azerbaijan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bahrain 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bangladesh 0 0 0 ~ 0 0.90 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bhutan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Burma 8.31 0 0 ~ 0 8.30 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Cambodia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~China ~ 91.25 592.29 1,155.00 0 2,129.10 ~ ~ 1,470 3,599 377 79Georgia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~India 547.65 0 70.26 ~ 0 838.40 ~ ~ 994 1,832 125 ~Indonesia 227.39 0 44.54 560.00 0 827.00 ~ ~ 1,275 ~ 1,467 ~Iran 0 0 0 ~ > zero 441.20 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Iraq 0 0 0 ~ > zero 621.70 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Jordan 0 0 0 ~ 0 24.70 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Kazakhstan 0 10.89 0 ~ 0 29.65 ~ ~ ~ ~ 311 ~Kuwait 0 0 0 ~ 0 14.20 ~ ~ 36 50 ~ ~Kyrghzstan 0 0 0 ~ 0 70.80 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Laos 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Lebanon 0 0 0 ~ 0 0.08 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Malaysia 6.12 0 0 ~ 0 5.50 ~ ~ 817 823 128 121Maldives 0 0 0 ~ 0 12.50 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mongolia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~


Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Stoc

k of

For

eign

Dir

ect

Inve

stm

ent

Abro

ad

Stoc

k of

For

eign

Dir

ect

Inve

stm

ent

in C

anad

a

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an D

ebt

Clai

ms

(Est

imat

e)

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an B

ank

Clai

ms


Roya

l Ba

nk o

f Ca

nada

Bank

of

Nov

a Sc

otia

Tota

l Of

fici

al D

ebt

as o

f

Cana

dian

Whe

at B

oard

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Corp

orat

e Ac

coun

t

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Cana

daAc

coun

t Se

ctio

n 23

Con

cess

iona

l

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Cana

daAc

coun

t Se

ctio

n 23

Non

conc

essi

onal

Gove

rnm

ent

of C

anad

a (C

IDA)


150

Table 8 (continued)

➤


Nepal 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~North Korea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Oman 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Pakistan 463.56 0 10.04 ~ > zero 611.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Philippines 2.96 0 0 ~ 0 147.30 ~ ~ 661 808 448 ~Qatar 0 0 0 ~ 0 3.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 114 114 ~ 58Sri Lanka 131.75 0 0 ~ 0 127.40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Syria 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Tajikistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Thailand 27.92 0 28.40 ~ 0 293.20 ~ ~ 1,282 1,575 271 ~Turkey 8.69 0 150.65 > zero 0 380.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Turkmenistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 ~ 0 9.50 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Uzbekistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Vietnam 0 0 0 ~ 0 2.70 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Yemen 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Oceania 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~East Asia & the Pacific Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 4,974 ~ 125 1,386 ~ ~Middle East & North Africa Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 953 ~ ~ ~Total Asia 1,424.35 102.14 896.18 1,715.00 > zero 6,598.13 4,974 ~ 7,727 14,325 4,513 258

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Belarus 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bosnia Herzegovina 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bulgaria 0 0 0 > zero 0 35.40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Croatia 0 0 ~ ~ 61.50 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Czech Republic 0 0 0 ~ 0 5.25 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Estonia 0 0 0 ~ 0 3.50 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Hungary 0 0 0 ~ 0 4.60 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Latvia 0 0 0 ~ 0 4.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Lithuania 0 2.66 0 ~ 0 2.50 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Macedonia, FYR 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Moldova 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Poland 0 0 43.07 ~ > zero 3,458.30 ~ > zero 3,492 ~ ~Romania 0 310.75 0 ~ 0 360.10 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Russian Federation 0 92.27 0 117.00 > zero 2,224.10 ~ ~ 95 2,319 653 ~Slovak Republic 0 0 0 ~ 0 12.30 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Slovenia 0 0 0 ~ ~ 19.10 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ukraine 0 0.71 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ex-Yugoslavia 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Europe Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 41 ~ ~ 45 ~Eastern Europe & 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~Central Asia Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 457 ~ ~ ~Total Eastern Europe 0 406.39 43.07 117.00 > zero 6,190.65 ~ 41 586 6,777 698 0

Developing Country Unspecified 6,365.53 134Total Developing Countries 1,695.61 939.65 1,273.09 5,081.00 6,365.53 19,629.36 10,846 1,355 28,693 48,322 18,422 1,040Of which:LLDCs 8.31 15.31 70.84 0 > zero > 276.30 ~ ~ ~ > 276.30 > zero > zeroOther Low Income Countries 1,415.31 105.99 745.54 > zero > zero > 4,985.31 ~ ~ ~ > 4,985.31 > 1,969 > 79Remaining Countries 271.99 818.35 456.71 > zero > zero > 8,177.10 ~ ~ ~ > 8,177.10 > 12,614 > 827Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes). a Totals have been adjusted to reflect debt conversions in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Costa Rica and Colombia have also converted CIDA debt (see Technical Notes).Sources: Canada, Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97; Export Development Corporation, Canadian Wheat Board, Royal Bank, and Bank of Nova Scotia 1997 Annual Reports;Statistics Canada, Balance of Payments Division; Department of Finance, International Finance and Economic Analysis Division; CIDA, Policy Branch.


Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Stoc

k of

For

eign

Dir

ect

Inve

stm

ent

Abro

ad

Stoc

k of

For

eign

Dir

ect

Inve

stm

ent

in C

anad

a

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an D

ebt

Clai

ms

(Est

imat

e)

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an B

ank

Clai

ms


Roya

l Ba

nk o

f Ca

nada

Bank

of

Nov

a Sc

otia

Tota

l Of

fici

al D

ebt

as o

f

Cana

dian

Whe

at B

oard

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Corp

orat

e Ac

coun

t

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Cana

daAc

coun

t Se

ctio

n 23

Con

cess

iona

l

Expo

rt D

evel

opm

ent

Corp

orat

ion

Cana

daAc

coun

t Se

ctio

n 23

Non

conc

essi

onal

Gove

rnm

ent

of C

anad

a (C

IDA)


ASIA (continued)

152

To smooth large year-to-year fluctuations, Table 9 uses average figures for 1995-97—the last three years for which Canadian immigration data is available. During this period, just over two-thirds of all immigrants came from developing countries; up from about 60 percent in 1987, but still significantly belowthe developing countries’ 85 percent share of world population.While total immigration has grown about 3.5 percent annually over the past decade, immigration from developing countriesexpanded at almost triple the annual rate of immigration growthfrom developed countries: 4.7 percent compared to 1.6 percent,respectively. Immigrants from Asia and Eastern Europe accountedfor most of the growth, while immigration from the Americas (both the US and developing countries) fell.

As Table 9.1 shows, Asia is by far the most significant source of immigrants by region—42 percent—but this remains far below its 58 percent share of world population. At 8.5 percent, immigrationfrom the Americas is roughly in line with its share of worldpopulation, while Africa is underrepresented, and Eastern Europe provides a relatively high share of total immigration.

Table 9.1 Immigration to Canada by Region

Region % of Immigrants % of World Population

Africa 6.8 13.2Americas 8.5 8.4Asia 42.0 57.6Eastern Europe 10.2 5.8

Immigration from the war-torn Balkans grew particularly quickly, as did immigration from the Middle East, facilitated by assistancefrom relatives already in Canada. Conversely, the past decade saw a fall in immigration from Indo-China, Central America, andSouthern Africa—all regions experiencing political upheavals inthe latter half of the 1980s. The top three contributing countrieswere India (18,997 immigrants), China (16,422), and the Philippines(12,958), while Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran, Bosnia Herzegovina,Romania, Jamaica, and Saudi Arabia rounded out the top 10. Egypt is the most important source country from Africa, while the Caribbean, and particularly Guyana, provide the largest number of immigrants relative to their populations.

There are four broad classes of immigrants. In order of size, theyare: family class (for family reunification or sponsorship by a rela-tive in Canada), independent, refugee, and business. Family classmade up 45 percent of all developing-country immigrants from 1995-97, mostly from India, the Philippines, and China. Independentapplicants made up 32 percent of total developing-country immi-gration, provided largely by China and the Philippines—many from the latter immigrated as domestic workers. More than 96 percent of all refugees into Canada come from developing countries. Mostcome from Bosnia Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, China, Iran, Afghanistan,Iraq, India, and Somalia. Almost half of all refugees came from Asia,and another quarter came from Eastern Europe. Only 14 percent ofall refugees came from Africa, even though the continent is home toperhaps one-third of the world refugee population. Entrepreneursand investors admitted under the business class made up 9 percentof all immigrants to Canada, but only one-quarter of these camefrom developing countries. The most important source countries for business class immigrants within the developing world wereChina, India, Iran, and Pakistan, but significant numbers were alsorecorded from the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UnitedArab Emirates, and Jordan) and from Egypt.

Overall, and for developing countries, women and men are equallyrepresented in the immigration figures. The breakdown within immigration classes is not so balanced, however. Women made up 57 percent of all family class immigrants from developing countries,45 percent of refugees, and 48 percent of business and independentclasses. The relative balance in the business category may suggestthat most immigrating entrepreneurs or investors have families.Within the independent category, women make up half theimmigration figures because significant numbers enter Canadaas domestic workers.

The share of immigration from developing-country members ofla Francophonie has fallen almost by half over the past decade to6.4 percent of the total for developing countries, mainly becauseof far lower numbers from Indo-China, now recovering from thepolitical conflicts of the late 1980s.

T A B L E 9 M O V E M E N T O F P E O P L E S

Developing-Country Immigration by Class, 1995-97

Graph 9.1 Immigration by Region, 1987 and 1995-97

Business 4%

Refugee 19%

Independent 32%

Family 45%

100,000

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

Africa Americas Asia EasternEurope

All Other

1987 1995-97

Num

ber

of i

mm

igra

nts


TABLE 9 M OV E M E N T O F P E O P L E S : I M M I G R AT I O N TO C A NA DA F R O M D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E SBY I M M I G R AT I O N C L A S S A N D G E N D E R

(Average of last three years available, 1995-97)

AFRICAAlgeria 77 119 196 295 163 458 8 9 16 394 323 717 774 613 1,387 122 27.52Angola 1 1 2 16 6 22 0 0 0 1 0 1 18 7 25 67 -9.39Benin 6 4 10 1 0 2 0 0 0 4 2 5 11 6 17 8 8.04Botswana 4 4 8 2 1 3 0 0 0 17 15 32 24 20 43 11 14.69Burkina Faso 3 4 7 3 1 4 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 6 13 24 -5.95Burundi 5 7 12 120 118 239 0 0 0 2 2 5 128 128 256 35 22.00Cameroon 23 16 39 16 9 25 2 2 3 28 19 47 68 47 115 33 13.26Cape Verde 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 2 3 5 4 2.92Central African Republic 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 2 6 3 9 2 16.23Chad 3 3 6 11 2 12 0 0 0 1 0 1 15 5 20 5 14.68Comoros 2 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 1 5 1 17.46Congo–Brazzaville 4 2 6 4 1 5 0 0 0 1 1 2 9 4 13 4 12.22Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 57 63 120 261 215 476 3 1 4 17 12 29 338 291 629 113 18.74Côte d’Ivoire 32 28 60 16 9 26 6 6 11 27 18 45 81 61 142 57 9.58Djibouti 14 19 33 11 11 22 0 0 0 1 0 1 25 31 56 5 27.33Egypt 281 369 650 101 87 188 109 98 207 808 535 1,343 1,299 1,089 2,388 1,084 8.22Equatorial Guinea 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 naEritrea 17 35 53 3 4 8 0 0 0 1 0 1 21 40 61 na naEthiopia 158 301 459 198 180 377 0 1 1 23 19 42 379 500 880 1,013 -1.40Gabon 5 4 9 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 2 5 9 7 16 11 3.60Gambia 3 8 11 2 1 2 1 1 2 5 2 7 11 11 22 23 -0.44Ghana 422 514 936 118 81 199 1 1 3 76 62 138 617 658 1,275 942 3.07Guinea 11 13 24 13 5 18 0 0 0 5 3 7 29 20 50 11 16.27Guinea-Bissau 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 8.84Kenya 150 187 337 73 67 140 8 11 19 56 61 117 287 327 613 774 -2.30Lesotho 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 3 4 4 8 5 4.37Liberia 6 2 8 31 15 47 2 1 2 3 0 3 42 19 60 12 17.53Libya 19 28 47 25 3 28 5 6 11 68 51 119 117 88 205 81 9.71Madagascar 4 6 10 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 9 16 12 17 28 52 -5.89Malawi 3 3 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 3 7 8 6 15 19 -2.56Mali 12 9 21 5 2 7 0 0 0 5 3 8 23 14 37 10 13.98Mauritania 2 1 3 4 3 7 0 0 0 2 0 2 8 4 11 4 10.98Mauritius 30 46 76 0 0 0 2 2 4 25 21 47 58 69 127 521 -13.16Morocco 197 244 442 6 8 14 33 34 67 243 188 431 479 474 954 513 6.40Mozambique 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 4 32 -19.48Namibia 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 2 4 4 4 8 14 -5.84Niger 3 0 3 1 0 1 2 0 2 4 3 7 10 3 13 5 10.31Nigeria 103 94 198 94 62 156 8 8 17 96 69 165 302 234 535 251 7.87Rwanda 6 8 14 64 72 135 1 1 1 4 5 9 74 86 160 74 8.02São Tomé and Principe 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 naSenegal 25 14 39 8 6 15 5 5 10 21 13 34 59 38 97 31 12.12Seychelles 5 5 10 4 2 6 0 0 0 2 2 4 11 9 20 19 0.51Sierra Leone 10 16 26 12 8 20 1 1 2 7 7 14 30 31 61 61 0Somalia 109 148 257 451 458 909 0 1 1 15 10 25 575 617 1,192 198 19.67South Africa 279 336 615 3 3 6 55 53 108 551 506 1,057 887 898 1,786 1,837 -0.28Sudan 16 38 53 308 171 480 5 3 8 31 22 53 360 234 594 106 18.81Swaziland 1 2 3 2 3 5 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 6 11 7 4.30Tanzania 69 87 156 4 5 9 11 9 20 25 28 54 110 129 239 469 -6.53Togo 9 7 16 20 9 29 0 0 0 5 4 9 34 20 54 29 6.35Tunisia 39 50 89 10 8 19 3 2 5 91 45 135 143 105 248 85 11.30Uganda 12 15 27 11 9 20 0 0 0 4 3 8 27 28 55 124 -7.86Zambia 23 21 45 7 8 15 4 3 6 34 36 71 69 68 137 58 8.98Zimbabwe 11 11 22 3 2 6 1 2 3 12 9 21 27 24 52 83 -4.63Total Africa 2,278 2,902 5,180 2,345 1,823 4,169 278 264 542 2,740 2,122 4,862 7,642 7,111 14,753 9,050 5.01

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

%Ch

ange

Per

Yea

r 19

87 t

o 19

95-9

7

Tota

l Im

mig

rati

on 1

987

FAMILY REFUGEE BUSINESS INDEPENDENTAVERAGE TOTALIMMIGRATION

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

➤


154

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 11 14 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 14 16 29 65 -7.65Argentina 72 94 166 35 30 65 50 52 102 85 79 164 242 254 496 567 -1.33Belize 11 14 25 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 4 16 18 34 22 4.45Bolivia 15 19 33 11 12 22 0 0 0 3 3 6 28 33 62 158 -8.98Brazil 88 149 238 3 5 7 31 29 61 153 129 283 276 313 588 266 8.26Chile 66 104 170 28 31 59 1 1 2 23 21 45 118 157 276 1,419 -15.11Colombia 65 121 187 21 22 43 11 13 24 92 86 178 190 242 431 371 1.52Costa Rica 34 47 81 8 8 16 0 0 1 11 14 25 54 69 122 177 -3.63Cuba 111 182 292 113 80 193 0 0 0 10 8 18 233 270 503 141 13.56Dominica 24 24 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11 16 30 35 65 85 -2.70Dominican Republic 123 139 262 4 4 9 0 0 0 6 7 12 133 150 283 447 -4.48Ecuador 113 143 256 22 27 49 2 1 4 14 13 27 151 185 336 354 -0.53El Salvador 146 216 362 138 131 269 1 1 1 22 19 41 307 366 674 3,546 -15.30Grenada 117 136 252 2 3 4 0 0 0 27 73 100 146 211 357 295 1.93Guatemala 95 126 220 197 177 374 0 0 0 16 12 29 308 315 623 1,082 -5.37Guyana 1,098 1,372 2,470 11 13 24 2 5 7 40 90 130 1,151 1,479 2,630 5,986 -7.89Haiti 674 780 1,453 144 160 304 0 0 0 30 45 76 848 985 1,833 2,070 -1.21Honduras 52 79 131 52 43 96 1 2 4 12 14 25 117 139 256 140 6.22Jamaica 1,350 1,437 2,787 1 3 4 3 3 6 131 265 395 1,485 1,708 3,193 5,309 -4.96Mexico 276 408 685 35 36 71 34 32 66 221 187 408 566 663 1,230 825 4.07Nicaragua 40 55 95 41 49 90 0 0 0 20 20 39 101 124 225 1,093 -14.62Panama 15 25 40 12 6 18 1 1 2 7 8 15 34 41 75 29 9.97Paraguay 10 13 23 4 3 7 11 14 24 1 1 2 25 31 56 113 -6.72Peru 133 187 320 168 173 341 6 4 10 42 52 94 350 416 766 858 -1.13St Kitts and Nevis 8 4 12 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 8 19 38 -6.70St Lucia 29 39 68 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 22 32 39 61 100 91 0.95St Vincent/Grenadines 72 100 171 0 3 4 0 0 0 17 50 67 89 153 242 221 0.91Suriname 14 19 33 3 3 6 3 2 5 4 6 10 23 30 53 61 -1.40Trinidad and Tobago 803 884 1,687 6 8 14 16 17 33 214 226 440 1,039 1,135 2,174 1,707 2.45Uruguay 27 28 55 23 18 41 1 1 3 24 25 50 76 73 149 272 -5.86Venezuela 80 136 216 73 76 148 13 15 28 85 81 166 251 307 558 274 7.37Total Americas 5,770 7,093 12,864 1,156 1,126 2,282 191 194 385 1,333 1,573 2,906 8,450 9,987 18,437 28,082 -4.12

ASIAAfghanistan 80 125 205 834 730 1,564 0 1 1 30 25 55 944 880 1,824 998 6.22Armenia 10 20 30 10 13 23 2 1 3 16 11 27 38 45 83 na naAzerbaijan 2 5 7 9 9 18 0 0 1 5 3 8 16 17 33 na naBahrain 40 40 80 1 1 2 11 10 21 148 133 281 200 183 383 41 25.04Bangladesh 435 521 956 453 290 744 13 11 23 379 274 653 1,280 1,096 2,375 468 17.64Bhutan 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 naBurma 16 17 33 65 34 99 2 1 3 8 6 14 91 58 149 29 17.76Cambodia 60 146 206 6 9 15 0 0 0 2 2 4 68 158 225 1,607 -17.84China 2,463 4,007 6,470 1,065 809 1,874 336 343 679 3,827 3,572 7,399 7,691 8,731 16,422 2,608 20.20Georgia 6 9 15 10 8 18 0 0 0 11 9 20 27 26 53 na naIndia 6,535 7,515 14,050 578 346 924 126 122 248 2,265 1,490 3,755 9,504 9,473 18,977 9,598 7.05Indonesia 33 56 89 1 1 2 36 37 74 13 13 26 83 108 191 218 -1.33Iran 543 752 1,295 947 702 1,649 321 309 630 1,120 946 2,066 2,930 2,710 5,641 3,101 6.17Iraq 104 173 276 890 436 1,326 40 36 76 82 70 152 1,116 715 1,831 299 19.87Jordan 144 196 340 49 45 95 124 99 223 268 203 470 585 543 1,129 198 19.01Kazakhstan 6 14 20 54 60 114 1 3 4 64 65 128 125 142 267 na naKuwait 74 72 147 84 50 134 258 218 476 361 321 682 778 662 1,440 423 13.03Kyrghzstan 1 4 5 1 1 3 0 0 0 6 6 12 9 12 20 na naLaos 6 23 29 3 2 5 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 25 35 457 -22.66Lebanon 310 593 904 161 113 274 45 36 81 246 145 391 763 886 1,649 3,401 -6.98Malaysia 83 151 235 9 11 20 6 7 14 42 42 84 141 212 352 711 -6.78Maldives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 naMongolia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 11.61

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

%Ch

ange

Per

Yea

r 19

87 t

o 19

95-9

7

Tota

l Im

mig

rati

on 1

987

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Table 9 (continued)

➤



Nepal 11 12 23 2 1 3 2 3 4 43 35 78 58 50 108 8 29.73North Korea 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 3 1 10.31Oman 40 39 79 2 1 3 6 4 10 94 84 178 143 127 270 14 34.44Pakistan 1,229 1,280 2,509 424 288 712 303 262 565 2,396 1,459 3,855 4,352 3,289 7,641 980 22.80Papua New Guinea 4 4 7 0 1 1 2 1 3 4 4 8 10 10 20 15 2.75Philippines 3,740 3,657 7,398 11 11 22 41 40 81 1,866 3,591 5,457 5,659 7,299 12,958 7,292 5.92Qatar 27 25 52 3 3 6 16 12 28 108 88 196 154 128 282 41 21.25Saudi Arabia 232 189 421 55 21 76 199 161 360 1,115 917 2,032 1,602 1,288 2,889 466 20.02Sri Lanka 730 1,503 2,233 2,316 1,842 4,158 5 4 9 160 136 296 3,211 3,485 6,696 4,211 4.75Syria 99 170 269 53 42 95 45 40 84 216 154 370 413 406 819 688 1.75Tajikistan 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 2 5 na naThailand 33 89 121 45 19 64 5 4 9 18 36 54 100 148 248 118 7.72Turkey 139 193 331 77 36 112 24 24 47 110 78 188 349 330 679 387 5.79Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 2 2 4 na naUnited Arab Emirates 286 250 535 17 11 29 165 155 320 730 632 1,362 1,198 1,048 2,246 552 15.07Uzbekistan 3 8 11 8 10 18 0 0 0 15 14 29 26 33 58 na naVietnam 824 1,778 2,601 56 54 111 0 1 1 12 13 25 892 1,845 2,737 5,706 -7.08West Bank and Gaza 4 3 7 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 7 5 11 na naYemen 12 21 33 15 11 26 7 6 14 16 12 28 50 51 101 4 38.11Oceania 246 298 544 6 5 11 7 7 14 9 10 18 267 320 587 527 1.09Total Asia 18,610 23,960 42,571 8,325 6,030 14,355 2,148 1,959 4,107 15,814 14,602 30,416 44,898 46,551 91,448 45,168 7.31

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 8 17 25 17 15 32 0 0 1 44 41 85 69 73 143 5 39.81Belarus 11 20 31 4 3 7 1 2 2 93 79 172 109 104 213 na naBosnia Herzegovina 64 88 152 2,484 2,381 4,865 0 0 0 25 24 49 2,572 2,493 5,065 1 134.67Bulgaria 70 94 164 77 74 150 4 4 7 194 176 371 345 347 692 83 23.62Croatia 78 125 203 338 322 660 1 2 3 51 51 102 468 500 969 2 85.57Czech Republic 19 62 81 4 2 6 2 2 3 29 45 74 53 111 164 11 31.02Estonia 9 18 27 26 26 51 1 1 3 26 26 52 62 71 132 na naHungary 74 114 188 6 6 12 6 5 11 69 64 133 155 188 343 714 -7.06Latvia 14 22 36 17 13 30 2 1 3 65 59 123 98 94 192 na naLithuania 15 31 47 2 4 6 2 3 6 19 21 40 39 60 98 1 58.22Macedonia, FYR 40 56 96 4 4 8 1 0 1 14 12 26 59 72 131 na naMoldova 18 28 46 85 89 174 3 4 6 27 28 55 133 148 282 na naPoland 551 1,761 2,312 17 12 28 4 4 8 209 172 381 781 1,949 2,730 6,997 -8.98Romania 342 530 872 146 92 237 8 9 16 1,382 1,292 2,674 1,878 1,922 3,800 1,544 9.42Russian Federation 197 329 526 164 166 330 32 28 60 897 819 1,716 1,290 1,341 2,631 234 27.38Slovak Republic 22 55 77 2 2 4 2 2 4 45 74 119 70 133 204 na naSlovenia 4 9 13 10 9 19 1 2 3 7 5 12 22 25 47 na naUkraine 228 379 607 91 115 206 18 14 32 750 696 1,445 1,087 1,204 2,291 na naEx-Yugoslavia 242 355 597 339 263 603 7 6 13 455 388 843 1,043 1,012 2,056 1,055 6.90Total Eastern Europe 2,008 4,091 6,099 3,831 3,597 7,428 94 89 183 4,401 4,071 8,472 10,334 11,848 22,182 10,647 7.62

Total Developing Countries 28,667 38,046 66,713 15,657 12,576 28,233 2,711 2,506 5,217 24,289 22,368 46,657 71,324 75,496 146,821 92,947 4.68Of which:LLDCs 2,114 2,773 4,887 3,094 2,551 5,645 63 52 115 755 602 1,357 6,025 5,979 12,004 8,749 3.21Other Low Income Countries13,971 18,821 32,792 4,935 3,746 8,681 937 897 1,834 9,793 7,544 17,337 29,637 31,007 60,644 33,674 6.06Remaining Countries 12,583 16,452 29,034 7,628 6,279 13,907 1,711 1,557 3,268 13,741 14,222 27,963 35,662 38,510 74,172 50,524 3.91Total Other Countries(excluding US) 12,241 13,972 26,213 508 503 1,011 7,649 7,473 15,122 11,734 11,244 22,977 32,131 33,191 65,321 52,420 2.22United States 1,243 1,888 3,131 32 38 70 123 110 233 980 922 1,902 2,379 2,958 5,337 7,997 -3.96

Total World 42,151 53,906 96,057 16,197 13,117 29,314 10,483 10,089 20,572 37,003 34,534 71,536 105,834 111,645 217,479 153,364 3.55

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

Source: Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

%Ch

ange

Per

Yea

r 19

87 t

o 19

95-9

7

Tota

l Im

mig

rati

on 1

987

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Mal

e

ASIA (continued)

156

While aid, trade, and investment are important elements of Canada’sinternational relations, Canada’s linkages with developing countriesare much more far-reaching. More visible for the average Canadianare the people who come to Canada as students, workers, andtourists, and the opportunities for Canadians to travel abroad todeveloping countries. This table provides some indicators of theselinkages. More than 90,500 Canadians were registered with ourdiplomatic missions as working or living in developing countries in 1997—an 18.5 percent increase over 1996.1 Most of those regis-tered work with private firms or as aid workers, and are concernedabout war (e.g., Cambodia), political turmoil (Haiti), draconianlegal systems (Saudi Arabia), or natural disasters (the hurricane-prone Caribbean). In both South Africa and China, more than5,100 Canadians were registered, while more than 4,000 were registered in each of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Haiti.

Canadians also made almost 2.5 million trips to developing countriesin 1997, or 4.3 percent of all trips outside Canada, an increase of 13 percent over 1996. Mexico (667,300), Cuba (201,200), theDominican Republic (149,900), Jamaica (73,300), and St Lucia(60,700) were particularly popular destinations, largely becausethese countries attract sun-seeking Canadian tourists. Large numbersof Canadians also traveled to China (77,500), India (51,800), andThailand (51,700) in Asia, and Morocco (32,700), South Africa(31,900), and Tunisia (24,400) in Africa. Five percent more visitorscame to Canada from developing countries—782,090 in 1997 com-pared to 745,098 the previous year—although this total remainsbelow the comparable figure for 1995. Large numbers of developing-country visitors came from Mexico, China, Brazil, and India, whichtogether accounted for 39 percent of the total. With most develop-ing countries, however, Canadians are more often visitors thanhosts to nationals from abroad.

Over 46 percent of all foreign students in Canadian universities andcolleges come from developing countries. The largest numbers comefrom China (1,835 or 12.5 percent of all foreign students), Malaysia(1,114), India (771), Iran (717), Morocco (646), and Mexico (471).The total of 14,720 students from developing countries representsa 1.5 percent increase over 1996—a modest but welcome rise,given the 13 percent decline of the previous year, blamed onincreased fees for foreign students. About 26 percent of the stu-dents were from developing-country members of la Francophonie,roughly in line with the Francophone percentage in Canada. As inthe recent past, a significant proportion of the total (35 percent)were African students, fully 70 percent of whom were male.Overall, only one-third of foreign students from developing coun-tries are female, with the Commonwealth Caribbean being the onlyregion in which this profound gender imbalance is reversed.

Canada has 69 high commissions or embassies in the 146 countriesor country groupings included in our list. In addition, Canada hasconsulates or offices in another 24 of the listed countries. A totalof 804 Canadian diplomats are posted in developing countries, giv-ing an average mission size of 11.6 personnel, not including locallyengaged staff. Our largest developing-country mission is in China,with 85 Canadian personnel. One hundred and thirteen developingcountries have embassies in Canada, while another 18 are repre-sented by a consulate or office. China has the largest number ofdiplomats (114), but large missions are also maintained by Mexico(49), Russia (45), Poland (34), India (27), Thailand (25), Indonesia(24), and Brazil (23).

1 Canadians are not obliged to register with Canadian missions when resident abroad,so these figures are likely far below the actual numbers.

T A B L E 1 0 H U M A N L I N K A G E S B E T W E E N C A N A D A A N D T H E D E V E L O P I N G W O R L D

Graph 10.1 Foreign Students by Gender and Region of Origin, 1997

5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Africa CommonwealthCaribbean

OtherAmericas

Asia EasternEurope

Male Female


AFRICAAlgeria 513 700 1,388 85 23 108 • 11 • 10Angola 149 400 160 8 2 10 Office 0 Consulate 5Benin 120 1,600 270 68 26 94 Côte d’Ivoire 0 • 9Botswana 229 1,100 246 36 8 44 Office 0 • 2Burkina Faso 319 1,600 282 51 36 87 • 1 Consulate 7Burundi 89 ~ 69 36 12 48 Kenya 0 Consulate 2Cameroon 438 1,700 546 163 95 258 • 6 • 5Cape Verde 6 1,400 29 0 0 0 Senegal 0 Consulate 2Central African Republic 33 ~ 10 16 8 24 Cameroon 0 • 3Chad 49 ~ 50 43 6 49 Cameroon 0 • 2Comoros 5 ~ 7 9 4 13 Tanzania 0Congo–Brazzaville 26 ~ 209 27 11 38 Gabon 0 Consulate 3Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 318 600 383 129 47 176 • 3 • 7Côte d’Ivoire 848 1,600 1,077 241 90 331 • 12 • 14Djibouti 14 200 88 4 2 6 Ethiopia 0 • 1Egypt 919 20,200 5,582 93 31 124 • 18 • 20Equatorial Guinea 11 200 12 0 0 0 Gabon 0 • 1Eritrea 80 ~ ~ 0 0 0 Office 0 • 3Ethiopia 381 600 655 29 12 41 • 6 • 3Gabon 310 500 524 125 67 192 • 2 • 6Gambia 51 ~ 49 133 31 164 Senegal 0 • 4Ghana 365 200 907 139 49 188 • 13 • 10Guinea 588 2,100 467 81 34 115 • 3 • 9Guinea-Bissau 4 ~ 15 0 0 0 Senegal 0 • 3Kenya 1,734 6,300 2,903 150 94 244 • 21 • 8Lesotho 77 300 50 8 5 13 Office 0 • 4Liberia 5 ~ 64 7 0 7 Ghana 0 Consulate 7Libya 492 800 2,007 219 21 240 Tunisia 0 • 1Madagascar 83 ~ 230 25 19 44 Office 0 • 9Malawi 452 1,100 162 19 12 31 Office 0 • 6Mali 255 2,600 397 73 29 102 • 2 • 7Mauritania 10 ~ 51 16 8 24 Office 0 • 4Mauritius 81 300 1,108 91 52 143 Office 0 • 2Morocco 983 32,700 6,393 472 174 646 • 8 • 15Mozambique 251 500 115 4 1 5 • 1 • 1Namibia 43 1,000 198 1 2 3 South Africa 0 • 5Niger 158 500 68 34 20 54 Office 0 Office 5Nigeria 1,188 1,800 1,462 102 47 149 • 0 • ~Rwanda 169 ~ 186 14 16 30 Office 1 • 3São Tomé and Principe 7 ~ 0 1 0 1 Gabon 0 Office 2Senegal 376 2,800 914 164 99 263 • 8 • 9Seychelles 19 300 52 4 5 9 Tanzania 0 Office 3Sierra Leone 11 ~ 52 11 4 15 Ghana 0 • 2Somalia 19 ~ 86 43 30 73 Kenya 0South Africa 5,153 31,900 23,187 61 65 126 • 16 • 17Sudan 185 1,000 132 14 7 21 Ethiopia 0 Office 2Swaziland 89 ~ 51 4 5 9 South Africa 0 • 5Tanzania 1,107 2,700 928 82 44 126 • 6 • 4Togo 48 900 169 50 14 64 Office 0 • 13Tunisia 485 24,400 3,164 332 97 429 • 8 • 13Uganda 448 1,800 589 21 19 40 Office 0 • 6Zambia 352 1,000 413 21 5 26 • 3 • 3Zimbabwe 678 5,000 1,365 40 38 78 • 13 • 7Other Africa na 1,000 22 ~ ~ ~Total Africa 20,823 155,400 59,543 3,599 1,526 5,125 20, plus 12 Offices 162 40, plus 10 Offices 294

T A B L E 1 0 H U M A N L I N K A G E S B E T W E E N C A N A D A A N D T H E D E V E L O P I N G W O R L D

Cana

dian

Vis

its

to (

1997

)

Visi

ts t

o Ca

nada

fro

m (

1997

)

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Cana

dian

Em

bass

y or

Hig

hCo

mm

issi

on i

n Co

untr

y(D

ec.

1997

)

Num

ber

of D

iplo

mat

ic S

taff

in C

ount

ry (

Dec.

199

7)

Coun

try

Emba

ssy

or H

igh

Com

mis

sion

in

Cana

da

(Dec

. 19

97)

Num

ber

of D

iplo

mat

ic S

taff

in C

anad

a (D

ec.

1997

)

FOREIGN STUDENTS ENROLLED 1996-97

Cana

dian

s Re

gist

ered

Abro

ad (

Apri

l 19

98)

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

➤

158

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 112 33,400 1,208 17 16 33 Barbados 0 Officea 3Argentina 2,445 16,500 25,048 42 44 86 • 14 • 15Belize 838 13,000 421 4 6 10 Office 0 • 6Bolivia 1,766 7,000 853 6 1 7 Office 0 • 6Brazil 2,586 24,200 62,281 192 158 350 • 18 • 23Chile 1,451 22,400 9,176 50 31 81 • 12 • 18Colombia 1,250 18,700 11,503 56 70 126 • 14 • 11Costa Rica 704 36,200 6,343 13 7 20 • 8 • 7Cuba 118 201,200 3,074 32 15 47 • 12 • 16Dominica 72 26,600 906 10 16 26 Barbados 0 •a

Dominican Republic 310 149,900 2,578 10 4 14 Office 0 Office 2Ecuador 545 3,600 2,373 10 6 16 • 2 • 8El Salvador 372 2,700 1,589 2 1 3 • 1 • 8Grenada 110 37,000 1,657 5 7 12 Barbados 0 Officea 3Guatemala 1,200 13,500 1,976 4 2 6 • 9 • 10Guyana 437 9,000 4,472 20 11 31 • 5 • 8Haiti 4,009 23,400 5,166 69 50 119 • 12 Office 8Honduras 377 9,100 866 7 6 13 Office 1 • 8Jamaica 716 73,300 18,841 40 53 93 • 15 • 13Mexico 3,571 677,300 103,155 266 205 471 • 27 • 49Nicaragua 239 7,000 525 4 7 11 Office 1 • 7Panama 449 25,300 1,350 6 4 10 • 2 • 6Paraguay 3 6,500 1,044 5 6 11 Office 0 Office 2Peru 1,167 14,700 4,119 35 16 51 • 13 • 16St Kitts and Nevis 105 16,300 504 5 8 13 Barbados 0 •a

St Lucia 129 60,700 1,539 21 31 52 Barbados 0 •a

St Vincent/Grenadines 97 6,900 1,562 5 7 12 Barbados 0 •a

Suriname 20 0 162 0 1 1 Office 0 • 5Trinidad and Tobago 3,275 24,600 16,080 91 129 220 • 13 • 14Uruguay 480 2,500 2,339 9 6 15 • 2 • 8Venezuela 1,225 81,700 10,750 60 82 142 • 11 • 19Other Americas 0 33,000 305 19 10 29Total America 30,178 1,677,200 303,765 1,115 1,016 2,131 18, plus 7 Offices 192 23, plus 5 Offices 299

ASIAAfghanistan 2 ~ 426 2 3 5Armenia 12 700 131 1 1 2 Russia 0 • 6Azerbaijan 16 500 61 0 0 0 Turkey 0 • 1Bahrain 244 400 817 20 13 33 Saudi Arabia 0 • 3Bangladesh 370 3,400 1,395 69 27 96 • 9 • 7Bhutan 9 ~ 19 11 3 14 India 0Burma 12 700 280 4 1 5 Thailand 0 • 4Cambodia 367 500 310 7 4 11 • 1China 5,138 77,500 80,098 1,193 642 1,835 • 85 • 114Georgia 24 ~ 83 0 1 1 Turkey 0 • 5India 1,652 51,800 60,961 578 193 771 • 47 • 27Indonesia 1,630 22,100 15,956 225 114 339 • 16 • 24Iran 186 1,600 5,931 596 121 717 • 10 • 15Iraq 51 1,000 198 13 3 16 Jordan 0 Office 3Jordan 784 13,700 1,729 66 22 88 • 11 • 6Kazakhstan 44 1,000 428 4 1 5 • 2 • 10Kuwait 1,969 1,300 2,972 65 22 87 • 4 • 6Kyrghzstan 77 1,600 132 0 1 1 Kazakhstan 0Laos 82 600 96 1 1 2 Thailand 0 Office 6Lebanon 4,114 4,500 4,107 96 34 130 • 6 • 6Malaysia 892 43,200 28,586 634 480 1,114 • 10 • 15Maldives 38 2,100 46 0 0 0 Sri Lanka 0Mongolia 14 500 187 0 0 0 Office 0 • 4Nepal 115 6,600 386 40 11 51 India 1 Office 4

Cana

dian

Vis

its

to (

1997

)

Visi

ts t

o Ca

nada

fro

m (

1997

)

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Cana

dian

Em

bass

y or

Hig

hCo

mm

issi

on i

n Co

untr

y(D

ec.

1997

)

Num

ber

of D

iplo

mat

ic S

taff

in C

ount

ry (

Dec.

199

7)

Coun

try

Emba

ssy

or H

igh

Com

mis

sion

in

Cana

da

(Dec

. 19

97)

Num

ber

of D

iplo

mat

ic S

taff

in C

anad

a (D

ec.

1997

)


Cana

dian

s Re

gist

ered

Abro

ad (

Apri

l 19

98)

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Table 10 (continued)

➤


North Korea 7 ~ 70 53 40 93 0Oman 132 1,000 668 8 0 8 Saudi Arabia 0 • 2Pakistan 1,212 6,200 20,552 165 38 203 • 22 • 9Papua New Guinea 154 2,100 506 3 2 5 Australia 0 • 2Philippines 2,445 40,600 38,280 49 51 100 • 27 • 18Qatar 456 600 973 5 1 6 Kuwait 0 • 1Saudi Arabia 4,934 7,400 11,514 311 41 352 • 15 • 15Sri Lanka 311 3,400 2210 85 54 139 • 8 • 7Syria 904 3,500 1181 15 3 18 • 18 • 4Tajikistan 14 ~ 28 1 5 6 Kazakhstan 0Thailand 812 51,700 20,205 61 104 165 • 17 • 25Turkey 732 35,800 5,206 62 40 102 • 12 • 15Turkmenistan 0 ~ 11 0 0 0 Turkey 0 • 2United Arab Emirates 2,603 13,500 5,103 7 1 8 • 3 • 3Uzbekistan 11 100 77 1 0 1 Office 0 • 1Vietnam 397 12,900 1,922 61 43 104 • 8 • 7West Bank and Gaza 2,347 ~ ~ 2 3 5 0Yemen 238 ~ 252 6 1 7 Saudi Arabia 0 • 7Oceania 105 12,000 2,145 7 3 10 Australia & New Zealand 0Other Asia 0 na 4 ~ ~ ~Total Asia 35,656 426,100 316,242 4,527 2,128 6,655 20, plus 2 Offices 332 31, plus 3 Offices 388

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 26 500 175 4 2 6 Hungary 0 • 2Belarus ~ 1,700 907 3 0 3 Moscow 0 • 3Bosnia Herzegovina 109 ~ ~ 2 4 6 • 1 • 1Bulgaria 23 2,700 1,165 25 26 51 Romania 0 • 5Croatia 346 8,200 3,196 6 7 13 • 2 • ~Czech Republic 420 35,800 15,693 36 17 53 • 8 • 13Estonia 102 9,100 1,275 5 4 9 • 0 • 5Hungary 456 32,300 13,600 40 22 62 • 8 • 12Latvia 113 6,300 935 1 2 3 • 2 • 3Lithuania 229 2,800 1,055 3 6 9 Office 0 • 6Macedonia, FYR 89 ~ ~ 0 0 0 Yugoslavia 0 • ~Moldova 5 ~ 81 0 3 3 Romania 0 • 2Poland 414 24,200 22,375 93 50 143 • 15 • 34Romania 481 7,500 5,897 59 52 111 • 10 • 16Russian Federation 462 26,500 15,995 119 84 203 • 41 • 45Slovak Republic 30 15,400 4,029 6 2 8 Office 1 • 12Slovenia 29 6,900 3,837 4 8 12 Office 0 • 4Ukraine 212 10,400 5,816 33 23 56 • 11 • 15Ex-Yugoslavia 393 4,600 6,509 30 28 58 • 19 • 7Total Eastern Europe 3,939 194,900 102,540 469 340 809 11, plus 3 Offices 118 19 185

Total Developing Countries 90,596 2,453,600 782,090 9,710 5,010 14,720 69, plus 24 Offices 804113, plus 18 Offices 1,166Of which:LLDCs 11,430 71,500 17,005 1,302 565 1,867 177Other Low Income Countries 16,291 232,500 199,809 2,863 1,372 4,235 256Remaining Countries 62,875 2,149,600 565,276 5,545 3,073 8,618 733Total Other Countries(excluding US) 28,732 6,403,700 4,586,247 7,147 6,815 13,962 24 455 26 371United States 916 50,942,000 40,490,000 1,503 1,498 3,001 1 175 1 88

Total World 120,244 57,345,700 45,076,247 18,360 13,323 31,683 94 1,434 140 1,625

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes). a Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia, St Kitts & Nevis, and St Vincent/Grenadines are represented by the Canadian Offices of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

Sources: Statistics Canada; Department of Citizenship and Immigration; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Cana

dian

Vis

its

to (

1997

)

Visi

ts t

o Ca

nada

fro

m (

1997

)

Mal

e

Fem

ale

Tota

l

Cana

dian

Em

bass

y or

Hig

hCo

mm

issi

on i

n Co

untr

y(D

ec.

1997

)

Num

ber

of D

iplo

mat

ic S

taff

in C

ount

ry (

Dec.

199

7)

Coun

try

Emba

ssy

or H

igh

Com

mis

sion

in

Cana

da

(Dec

. 19

97)

Num

ber

of D

iplo

mat

ic S

taff

in C

anad

a (D

ec.

1997

)


Cana

dian

s Re

gist

ered

Abro

ad (

Apri

l 19

98)

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ASIA (continued)

160

Drawing on the previous tables, the two indices presented herehighlight Canada’s human, political, and economic linkages withdeveloping countries. Columns 1 to 4 rank the importance of eachdeveloping country to Canada, while columns 5 to 8 rank theimportance of Canada to the various developing countries.1

The numbers in columns 4 and 8 are a composite of three separateindices—for immigration, trade, and aid—each accounting for athird of the overall linkage index. These serve as proxies for peoplelinkages, economic ties, and political relations, respectively. Theformulation of each index differs, depending on whether it mea-sures the importance of the developing country to Canada orvice versa (see “Technical Notes,” p. 164).

The Importance of Developing Countries to CanadaIn 1995-97, India, China, the Philippines, and Pakistan accountedfor 38 percent of all developing country immigrants, making themthe four most important countries to Canada in “people” terms,measured in terms of immigration by country as a proportionof total immigration to Canada. In 1997, China and Mexico wereCanada’s top developing-country trading partners, as indicatedby column 2, which measures import and export trade with eachcountry as a percentage of Canada’s total trade with developingcountries. With Brazil and Malaysia, these four countries accountfor half of all developing-country trade, while China and Mexicoalone account for more two-way trade than the bottom 130 countriesput together. China also retains its predominance in terms of aid,where, as shown by column 3’s measurement of each country’sshare of total bilateral aid in 1996-97, it joins Egypt, Bangladesh,and Haiti as the top recipients of Canadian bilateral ODA.

As with last year, column 4’s composite results show China,Mexico, India, the Philippines, and Egypt were the most “impor-tant” developing countries to Canada. China—the top country inthe list—has a score almost twice as high as second-place Mexico,and 10 times that of Vietnam (ranked 20th). Only one least-developed country (LLDC), Bangladesh, appears on the list,and there only in 10th place. Of the remaining nine countries,four (China, India, Egypt, and Pakistan) are low income countries(LDCs). On a continental basis, countries with the largest popula-tions and/or economies, namely China and India, Mexico andBrazil, and Egypt and South Africa, are at the top of the list. The top 10 countries per continent are:

Asia Africa Americas

1 China Egypt Mexico

2 India South Africa Brazil

3 Philippines Algeria Venezuela

4 Pakistan Ghana Haiti

5 Malaysia Rwanda Jamaica

6 Iran Nigeria Guyana

7 Bangladesh Morocco Peru

8 Sri Lanka Côte d’Ivoire Cuba

9 Indonesia Senegal Colombia

10 Thailand Ethiopia Chile

Eight of Asia’s top 10 countries were also present in last year’s top10 list. The majority of Asia’s countries continue to be fromSoutheast Asia, while one is from the Middle East and four are fromthe Indian sub-continent. For all these countries but Bangladesh

(Canada’s second largest recipient of aid), immigration or trade arethe strongest linkages with Canada. Among the five LDCs, India,Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have stronger immigration ties, whileChina and Indonesia’s trade linkages dominate. Trade linkages also predominate in the middle-income countries: Malaysia andThailand.

As with Asia, eight of Africa’s top 10 countries for 1999 were pre-sent in last year’s list. Once again, largely through trade linkages,the better-off countries of North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco),plus the Republic of South Africa, retain their dominance.Countries from the West, East, and the Horn of Africa regions haveCanadian links mainly through aid or immigration. Immigration isthe key factor for Rwanda, while Ethiopia, Egypt (Canada’s largestrecipient of aid), and Ghana are large recipients of aid. Aid alsoexplains the presence of Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, while tradeaccounts for the remaining low income country, Nigeria.

In the Americas, while some rankings have changed, the samecountries made up the top 10 lists for both this year and last.Trade accounts for the dominance of the top and bottom threecountries. Guyana and Jamaica appear mainly because of strongimmigration ties, while aid is the strongest link for Peru. Bothimmigration and aid contribute to Haiti’s ranking. Once again,Central America is absent from the top 10 listing.

The Importance of Canada to Developing CountriesThe second index illustrates Canada’s importance to developingcountries. The ranking highlights the strength of Canadian rela-tions with the Americas, and especially with the Caribbean, whosemembers represent six of the top 10.2 Of the remaining four high-ranking countries, one is from Central America, one from SouthAmerica, and two are from Africa. Among the top 10 countries, theonly LLDC is Haiti, while Guyana and Egypt are the only LDCs.

While trade plays an important role in the cases of Belize and Guyana(column 6 shows combined trade with Canada valued at 22 percentof Guyana’s GDP), column 7 shows that bilateral aid from Canada,relative to total aid received from both bilateral and multilateraldonors, is the dominant influence in seven of the top 10 countries.Immigration, measured in column 5, is very important for thesmall island states of Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago. Becausethis index is calculated as total emigration as a percentage of totalpopulation, heavily populated countries with higher emigration toCanada, such as China and India, score lower in rank.

Per continent, Canada has stronger roles (relative to its other recipient countries) in these 10 countries:

Asia Africa Americas

1 Bangladesh Egypt Guyana

2 Philippines Cameroon Jamaica

3 Maldives Ghana Costa Rica

4 China Togo Haiti

5 Lebanon Guinea Peru

6 Turkey South Africa Grenada

7 Indonesia Mali Trinidad and Tobago

8 Thailand Rwanda Belize

9 Afghanistan Benin St Lucia

10 India Seychelles Venezuela

T A B L E 1 1 C A N A D A - D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R Y L I N K A G E I N D I C E S


Six of Asia’s top 10 countries were in last year’s list, and Canadaplays a particularly strong role in Bangladesh, the Philippines,China, Indonesia, Thailand, and India. With the exception of theMaldives, where trade was most important, aid explains the posi-tioning of all other Asian countries in this list. The dominance ofaid also explains nine of Africa’s top 10 placements. Only for Togodoes trade figure more prominently. In the Americas, aid is the keyfactor in seven of the top 10 countries, while trade dominates forGuyana and Belize, and immigration plays the most important rolefor Grenada. While only three LLDCs or LDCs figure in the overall

top 10, among the countries listed by continent, six Asian, sevenAfrican, and two Americas countries are either LLDCs or LDCs.

1 These indices do not, nor do they intend to, cover all of the many, often subtle andcomplex, ways countries are linked to Canada and vice versa. The indices should beused with caution, not weighting any one country’s ranking too heavily.

2 Because CIDA’s aid figures do not provide breakdowns by country of its large sub-regional aid programs in the Caribbean, the aid index scores for the micro-states ofthe Eastern Caribbean (Grenada, St Vincent/Grenadines, St Lucia, Dominica, Antiguaand Barbuda, and St Kitts and Nevis), are well below their actual totals. If the coun-try breakdown was available, the top 10 list would be more heavily dominated byCaribbean countries.

1 China 11.185 19.034 2.905 11.040 1 Guyana 3.073 21.723 3.338 9.3772 Mexico 0.838 18.281 0.211 6.442 2 Jamaica 1.257 6.127 6.177 4.5203 India 12.925 2.677 0.881 5.494 3 Costa Ricaa 0.034 1.950 7.480 3.1544 Philippines 8.826 2.522 1.314 4.220 4 Haiti 0.243 0.908 6.503 2.5515 Egypt 1.626 0.456 8.585 3.555 5 Egypt 0.036 0.197 5.154 1.7966 Brazil 0.401 6.226 0.341 2.322 6 Peru 0.031 0.460 4.563 1.6857 Pakistan 5.205 0.702 0.725 2.210 7 Grenada 3.880 1.039 0.000 1.6408 Malaysia 0.240 5.963 0.278 2.160 8 Trinidad and Tobago 1.682 1.301 1.775 1.5869 Iran 3.842 2.540 0.003 2.128 9 Belize 0.148 2.544 1.657 1.45010 Bangladesh 1.618 0.476 3.746 1.946 10 Cameroon 0.008 0.089 4.113 1.40311 Sri Lanka 4.561 0.276 0.322 1.719 11 Ghana 0.068 0.703 3.213 1.32812 Indonesia 0.130 3.546 1.387 1.688 12 St Lucia 0.709 1.079 2.067 1.28513 Thailand 0.169 3.630 0.799 1.533 13 Togo 0.012 3.465 0.301 1.25914 Saudi Arabia 1.968 2.530 0.000 1.499 14 Guinea 0.006 0.616 3.080 1.23415 South Africa 1.216 1.899 0.801 1.305 15 Venezuela 0.024 1.550 2.036 1.20316 Algeria 0.945 2.683 0.145 1.257 16 South Africa 0.040 0.480 3.046 1.18917 Venezuela 0.380 3.198 0.079 1.219 17 Mali 0.003 0.720 2.832 1.18518 Haiti 1.249 0.066 2.331 1.215 18 Bangladesh 0.019 0.473 2.989 1.16019 Bosnia Herzegovina 3.450 0.002 0.000 1.151 19 Rwanda 0.025 0.206 3.025 1.08520 Vietnam 1.864 0.447 0.975 1.095 20 Benin 0.003 0.388 2.836 1.07521 Jamaica 2.175 0.761 0.277 1.071 21 Seychelles 0.274 0.280 2.632 1.06222 Guyana 1.792 0.477 0.451 0.907 22 Senegal 0.011 0.349 2.752 1.03723 Peru 0.521 0.880 1.271 0.891 23 Mauritius 0.110 0.368 2.551 1.01024 Ex-Yugoslavia 1.400 0.061 1.147 0.869 24 Philippines 0.180 0.990 1.857 1.00925 Ghana 0.868 0.146 1.421 0.812 25 Mexico 0.013 1.782 1.211 1.00226 Cuba 0.343 1.511 0.312 0.722 26 Gabon 0.013 0.129 2.846 0.99627 Colombia 0.294 1.523 0.259 0.692 27 Zimbabwe 0.004 0.263 2.512 0.92628 Chile 0.188 1.554 0.126 0.623 28 Uruguay 0.046 0.339 2.330 0.90529 Rwanda 0.109 0.011 1.726 0.615 29 Dominica 0.743 ~ 1.865 0.86930 Turkey 0.463 1.099 0.269 0.610 30 Côte d’Ivoire 0.010 0.495 2.088 0.86431 Nigeria 0.365 1.332 0.104 0.600 31 Honduras 0.042 1.140 1.225 0.80232 Trinidad and Tobago 1.480 0.235 0.028 0.581 32 Cuba 0.045 ~ 2.360 0.80233 Argentina 0.338 1.283 0.105 0.575 33 Algeria 0.046 1.903 0.388 0.77934 Morocco 0.650 0.563 0.508 0.573 34 Mozambique 0.000 0.882 1.452 0.77835 Iraq 1.247 0.300 0.000 0.516 35 Maldives 0.004 2.021 0.307 0.77736 Côte d’Ivoire 0.097 0.156 1.259 0.504 36 Eritrea 0.017 ~ 2.290 0.76937 Afghanistan 1.243 0.003 0.240 0.495 37 St Kitts and Nevis 0.463 1.841 0.000 0.76838 Lebanon 1.123 0.141 0.190 0.485 38 Zambia 0.016 0.691 1.547 0.75139 Senegal 0.066 0.049 1.308 0.474 39 China 0.013 0.753 1.467 0.74440 Guatemala 0.425 0.451 0.316 0.397 40 Lebanon 0.516 0.309 1.369 0.731

T A B L E 1 1 C A N A D A - D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S L I N K A G E I N D I C E STr

ade

Inde

x

Aid

Inde

x

Com

posi

te L

inka

geIn

dex

(33/

33/3

3)

Imm

igra

tion

Ind

ex

Trad

e In

dex

Aid

Inde

x

Com

posi

te L

inka

geIn

dex

(33/

33/3

3)

IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO CANADA

IMPORTANCE OF CANADA TO DEVELOPING COUNTRY

Imm

igra

tion

Ind

ex

Country Country1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

➤

162

41 El Salvador 0.459 0.138 0.508 0.368 41 Turkey 0.011 0.198 1.978 0.72942 Ethiopia 0.599 0.029 0.475 0.368 42 St Vincent/Grenadines 2.180 ~ 0.000 0.72743 Jordan 0.769 0.027 0.270 0.355 43 Nicaragua 0.050 0.758 1.352 0.72044 Cameroon 0.078 0.025 0.925 0.343 44 Burundi 0.039 0.010 2.111 0.72045 Ecuador 0.229 0.507 0.242 0.326 45 Indonesia 0.001 0.539 1.607 0.71646 Kenya 0.418 0.093 0.422 0.311 46 Tunisia 0.026 0.292 1.820 0.71247 Mali 0.025 0.056 0.840 0.307 47 Thailand 0.004 0.753 1.287 0.68148 Guinea 0.034 0.075 0.795 0.301 48 Guatemala 0.054 0.828 1.157 0.67949 Tanzania 0.163 0.038 0.647 0.283 49 Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.013 0.190 1.792 0.66550 Somalia 0.812 0.003 0.011 0.275 50 Malawi 0.001 0.355 1.597 0.65151 Zambia 0.093 0.086 0.621 0.267 51 Congo–Brazzaville 0.004 0.354 1.582 0.64752 Mozambique 0.002 0.053 0.727 0.261 52 Colombia 0.011 0.583 1.316 0.63753 Costa Ricaa 0.083 0.559 0.131 0.258 53 El Salvador 0.111 0.432 1.356 0.63354 Malawi 0.010 0.026 0.685 0.241 54 Nigeria 0.004 1.189 0.678 0.62455 Zimbabwe 0.035 0.069 0.612 0.239 55 Ethiopia 0.014 0.149 1.625 0.59656 Croatia 0.660 0.054 0.000 0.238 56 Afghanistan 0.078 ~ 1.708 0.59557 Honduras 0.174 0.157 0.352 0.228 57 India 0.019 0.243 1.518 0.59358 Congo–Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.429 0.040 0.205 0.225 58 Sri Lanka 0.363 0.595 0.809 0.58959 Oceania 0.400 0.031 0.229 0.220 59 Burkina Faso 0.001 0.043 1.722 0.58860 Congo–Brazzaville 0.009 0.025 0.623 0.219 60 Niger 0.001 0.678 1.082 0.58761 Nepal 0.074 0.023 0.559 0.218 61 Swaziland 0.011 0.383 1.311 0.56962 Bolivia 0.042 0.037 0.571 0.216 62 Bolivia 0.008 0.148 1.471 0.54263 Dominican Republic 0.193 0.418 0.023 0.211 63 Vietnam 0.035 0.586 0.982 0.53464 Syria 0.558 0.054 0.007 0.206 64 Ecuador 0.028 0.876 0.690 0.53165 West Bank and Gaza 0.008 0.000 0.590 0.199 65 Pakistan 0.052 0.356 1.106 0.50566 Libya 0.139 0.442 0.000 0.194 66 Nepal 0.005 0.151 1.345 0.50067 Burkina Faso 0.009 0.003 0.560 0.191 67 Jordan 0.190 0.112 1.187 0.49668 Tunisia 0.169 0.171 0.213 0.184 68 Chile 0.019 0.683 0.737 0.48069 Nicaragua 0.153 0.046 0.348 0.182 69 Sudan 0.021 ~ 1.389 0.47070 Sudan 0.405 0.035 0.099 0.180 70 Morocco 0.034 0.552 0.768 0.45171 Benin 0.012 0.025 0.474 0.170 71 Panama 0.027 0.735 0.559 0.44072 Uruguay 0.101 0.189 0.128 0.140 72 Bosnia Herzegovina 1.268 ~ 0.000 0.42373 Cambodia 0.153 0.014 0.251 0.140 73 Malaysia 0.016 1.995 -0.749 0.42174 Uganda 0.037 0.043 0.255 0.112 74 Kenya 0.021 0.305 0.924 0.41775 Gabon 0.011 0.021 0.301 0.111 75 Dominican Republic 0.034 0.913 0.284 0.41076 Niger 0.009 0.039 0.270 0.106 76 Tanzania 0.007 0.184 1.029 0.40777 Kazakhstan 0.182 0.031 0.099 0.104 77 Sierra Leone 0.013 0.921 0.255 0.39678 Panama 0.051 0.186 0.072 0.103 78 Kazakhstan 0.016 0.048 0.969 0.34479 Sierra Leone 0.042 0.027 0.225 0.098 79 Brazil 0.004 0.258 0.759 0.34080 Bahrain 0.261 0.029 0.000 0.097 80 Botswana 0.028 0.539 0.371 0.31381 Burundi 0.174 0.000 0.097 0.091 81 Lesotho 0.004 0.623 0.280 0.30282 Grenada 0.243 0.009 0.001 0.085 82 Oceania 0.309 0.327 0.191 0.27683 Angola 0.017 0.026 0.203 0.082 83 Bhutan 0.001 0.013 0.801 0.27284 Oman 0.184 0.046 0.000 0.077 84 Saudi Arabia 0.143 0.659 ~ 0.26785 Togo 0.037 0.136 0.055 0.076 85 Gambia 0.018 ~ 0.779 0.26686 Yemen 0.069 0.087 0.042 0.066 86 Liberia 0.022 ~ 0.726 0.24987 Slovenia 0.032 0.158 0.000 0.063 87 Bahrain 0.680 ~ 0.000 0.22788 Botswana 0.030 0.082 0.064 0.058 88 Yemen 0.006 0.520 0.154 0.22789 St Vincent/Grenadines 0.165 0.008 0.000 0.058 89 Laos 0.007 0.341 0.295 0.21490 Eritrea 0.042 0.000 0.131 0.057 90 Cambodia 0.021 0.144 0.464 0.21091 Mauritius 0.087 0.047 0.036 0.057 91 West Bank and Gaza ~ ~ 0.620 0.20792 Liberia 0.041 0.004 0.115 0.053 92 Namibia 0.005 0.365 0.212 0.19493 Albania 0.097 0.003 0.039 0.046 93 Argentina 0.014 0.130 0.397 0.18094 St Lucia 0.068 0.020 0.035 0.041 94 Mauritania 0.005 0.049 0.475 0.17695 Dominica 0.044 0.007 0.071 0.040 95 Angola 0.002 0.113 0.404 0.17396 Suriname 0.036 0.069 0.009 0.038 96 Kyrghzstan 0.005 0.476 0.000 0.160

Trad

e In

dex

Aid

Inde

x

Com

posi

te L

inka

geIn

dex

(33/

33/3

3)

Imm

igra

tion

Ind

ex

Trad

e In

dex

Aid

Inde

x

Com

posi

te L

inka

geIn

dex

(33/

33/3

3)

IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRYTO CANADA


Imm

igra

tion

Ind

ex

Country Country1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

➤

Table 11 (continued)


97 Laos 0.024 0.018 0.067 0.036 97 Cape Verde 0.013 0.133 0.333 0.15998 Burma 0.101 0.000 0.007 0.036 98 Iraq 0.084 ~ 0.387 0.15799 Macedonia, FYR 0.089 0.013 0.000 0.034 99 Georgia 0.010 0.460 0.000 0.156100 Mauritania 0.008 0.002 0.092 0.034 100 Uganda 0.003 0.213 0.251 0.155101 Uzbekistan 0.040 0.046 0.009 0.032 101 Antigua and Barbuda 0.438 ~ 0.000 0.146102 Paraguay 0.038 0.030 0.024 0.031 102 São Tomé and Principe 0.008 ~ 0.426 0.144103 Madagascar 0.019 0.014 0.054 0.029 103 Djibouti 0.113 0.111 0.205 0.143104 Belize 0.023 0.050 0.013 0.029 104 Paraguay 0.011 0.097 0.309 0.139105 Namibia 0.005 0.039 0.041 0.028 105 Central African Republic 0.003 0.037 0.360 0.133106 Georgia 0.036 0.043 0.004 0.028 106 Papua New Guinea 0.004 0.356 0.000 0.120107 Armenia 0.057 0.005 0.019 0.027 107 Burma 0.003 ~ 0.356 0.120108 North Korea 0.002 0.010 0.067 0.026 108 Guinea-Bissau 0.002 0.134 0.222 0.119109 Papua New Guinea 0.013 0.056 0.002 0.024 109 Equatorial Guinea 0.002 0.033 0.322 0.119110 Swaziland 0.007 0.012 0.049 0.023 110 Somalia 0.112 ~ 0.220 0.110111 Kyrghzstan 0.014 0.026 0.022 0.020 111 Madagascar 0.002 0.133 0.192 0.109112 Lesotho 0.005 0.018 0.030 0.018 112 Slovenia 0.024 0.288 0.000 0.104113 Seychelles 0.014 0.004 0.031 0.016 113 Croatia 0.216 0.093 0.000 0.103114 Djibouti 0.038 0.002 0.008 0.016 114 Suriname 0.120 ~ 0.180 0.100115 Tajikistan 0.003 0.002 0.042 0.016 115 Macedonia, FYR 0.059 0.213 0.000 0.091116 Chad 0.013 0.001 0.031 0.015 116 North Korea 0.000 ~ 0.234 0.078117 Gambia 0.015 0.001 0.028 0.014 117 Oman 0.108 0.112 0.000 0.073118 Antigua and Barbuda 0.020 0.022 0.000 0.014 118 Chad 0.003 0.015 0.197 0.072119 Central African Republic 0.006 0.001 0.029 0.012 119 Ex-Yugoslavia 0.197 ~ 0.000 0.066120 Azerbaijan 0.023 0.004 0.007 0.011 120 Syria 0.053 0.104 0.000 0.052121 Bhutan 0.001 0.000 0.032 0.011 121 Armenia 0.023 0.128 0.000 0.050122 Maldives 0.001 0.019 0.008 0.009 122 Albania 0.041 0.043 0.000 0.028123 St Kitts and Nevis 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.009 123 Iran 0.077 ~ 0.000 0.026124 Cape Verde 0.004 0.002 0.020 0.008 124 Uzbekistan 0.002 0.063 0.000 0.022125 Guinea-Bissau 0.002 0.001 0.020 0.008 125 Comoros 0.008 0.038 0.000 0.015126 Equatorial Guinea 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.004 126 Azerbaijan 0.004 0.031 0.000 0.012127 São Tomé and Principe 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.004 127 Libya 0.034 ~ 0.000 0.011128 Turkmenistan 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.003 128 Tajikistan 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.009129 Mongolia 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 129 Turkmenistan 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002130 Comoros 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 130 Mongolia 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000131 Belarus 0.145 0.005 ~ ~ 131 Belarus 0.021 0.008 ~ ~132 Bulgaria 0.471 0.195 ~ ~ 132 Bulgaria 0.083 0.671 ~ ~133 Czech Republic 0.112 0.396 ~ ~ 133 Czech Republic 0.016 0.235 ~ ~134 Estonia 0.090 0.035 ~ ~ 134 Estonia 0.092 0.246 ~ ~135 Hungary 0.234 0.365 ~ ~ 135 Hungary 0.035 0.266 ~ ~136 Kuwait 0.981 0.114 ~ ~ 136 Kuwait 0.796 ~ ~ ~137 Latvia 0.131 0.027 ~ ~ 137 Latvia 0.078 0.177 ~ ~138 Lithuania 0.067 0.061 ~ ~ 138 Lithuania 0.027 0.215 ~ ~139 Moldova 0.192 0.000 ~ ~ 139 Moldova 0.063 0.000 ~ ~140 Poland 1.859 0.631 ~ ~ 140 Poland 0.071 0.152 ~ ~141 Qatar 0.192 0.119 ~ ~ 141 Qatar 0.589 ~ ~ ~142 Romania 2.588 0.298 ~ ~ 142 Romania 0.168 0.276 ~ ~143 Russian Federation 1.792 2.160 ~ ~ 143 Russian Federation 0.018 0.160 ~ ~144 Slovak Republic 0.139 0.203 ~ ~ 144 Slovak Republic 0.038 0.338 ~ ~145 Ukraine 1.560 0.110 ~ ~ 145 Ukraine 0.045 0.081 ~ ~146 United Arab Emirates 1.530 0.513 ~ ~ 146 United Arab Emirates 0.954 0.371 ~ ~Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes).a 1995 totals were used for Costa Rica in column 7.

Trad

e In

dex

Aid

Inde

x

Com

posi

te L

inka

geIn

dex

(33/

33/3

3)

Imm

igra

tion

Ind

ex

Trad

e In

dex

Aid

Inde

x

Com

posi

te L

inka

geIn

dex

(33/

33/3

3)

IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO CANADA


Imm

igra

tion

Ind

exCountry Country1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

164

Virtually all data in these tables is available or derived from existing,publicly accessible information issued by the Government of Canada,the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),the World Bank, and United Nations agencies. The North-SouthInstitute selects the data for this annex chiefly for its developmentinterest. However, data availability, including annual updates, is also an important factor. Some additions have been made to this year’s report, such as the inclusion of the Gender-RelatedDevelopment Index (GDI) in Table 1, and income-grouped totals in Tables 2-10. We hope future Canadian Development Reports will contain expanded, and more complete statistics.

Selection of Developing CountriesTables 2 through 10 list a common set of developing countries.We have classified countries as “developing” if their United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI)in 1995 (the latest year available) was below 0.890. For compara-bility with previous Canadian Development Reports, Antigua andBarbuda and Chile, with HDIs above 0.890, have been retained inthis year’s report. The selection of the HDI cut-off point is neces-sarily arbitrary, but consideration is given to ensuring a list thatbroadly includes countries commonly identified as part of thedeveloping world. The use of the HDI index as a development indi-cator was thought preferable to an indicator based only on percapita income, which would have excluded a number of oil-richdeveloping countries. Our list also includes 16 countries that areineligible for official development assistance (ODA) according tothe criteria of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).The treatment of these countries is discussed below.

None of the countries on the list are dependent or colonial territories.However, three entities listed in these tables and identified in ital-ics—the West Bank and Gaza, ex-Yugoslavia, and Oceania—are not, strictly speaking, “independent countries.” The West Bankand Gaza, at the time of writing, had not yet been grantedindependent status under the Palestinian Authority. Althoughsome countries that used to be part of Yugoslavia, such as BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia are now treatedseparately, many sources continue to aggregate information onthese countries within the category of ex-Yugoslavia. Finally,Oceania comprises eight Pacific island micro-states with a totalpopulation of 1.9 million. These are Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, theSolomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.

The Asian CrisisMany statistics contained in this report represent periods prior tothe beginning of the Asian financial crisis, whose effects continueto be felt at the time of writing. As such, the direct and indirecteffects of this crisis are not reflected in this year’s report. Giventhe impacts the crisis likely will have on aid, trade, financial flows,and the movement of people, extrapolation from this year’s CDRstatistics to the present should be made with caution.

ODA Ineligible CountriesThere are 16 countries categorized as “developing” that were ineligible for official development assistance in 1996-97. These are Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, andUkraine. Although these countries may receive “official assistance”from Canada and other donors, that aid is not included in calcula-tions of official development assistance. Statistics for these coun-tries are excluded from regional, world, and income-based totals in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

Year of CoverageData generally is given for the latest calendar year for whichcomplete information exists—normally 1997. However, in the case of official development assistance in Tables 3, 4, and 5, the figuresare for fiscal year 1996-97 (April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997).In other cases where the data is not for calendar year 1997, the relevant date is indicated.

Symbols na = “not applicable”

~ = “not available”

0 = zero

Unless otherwise indicated, figures are in Canadian dollars.

Income-Grouped TotalsSub-totals for country income-groupings have been added to thebottom of columns in Tables 2 through 10. These groupings followthe United Nations’ classification of countries by income level,as listed in the UNDP’s Human Development Report and in CIDA’sStatistical Report on Development Assistance for fiscal year 1996-97.The list of least-developed countries (LLDCs), and other low incomecountries (originally termed less developed countries, or LDCs) isprovided below. Remaining recipient countries refer to all othercountries, with the exception of Tables 3, 4, and 5 in which the 16 ODA-ineligible countries have been excluded.

LLDCs: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana,Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, CentralAfrican Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire), Djibouti,Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, SãoTomé and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan,Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, and Yemen.

Other low income countries: China, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana,Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan,Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

Note that totals by income-group may differ from totals for alldeveloping countries because income-group totals are based oncountry-specific information only, while overall totals for develop-ing countries also include allocations to regions that cannot beattributed to specific countries.

T E C H N I C A L N O T E S G E N E R A L C O M M E N T S


TA B L E 1Canada and Other High HumanDevelopment Economies: Selected IndicatorsCountries included in this table had an HDI in 1995 of 0.890 or greater. The HDI and Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) are from the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1998. The GNP percapita numbers are from the World Bank’s World Development Report1998. Data on foreign aid and net private financial flows is takenfrom the DAC’s Development Cooperation Report 1997. Numbers onexport and import shares to and from developing countries arefrom the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997, withtotals approximated using the figure for all industrialized nations.The information on Official Bilateral Debt Stocks comes fromEurodad’s World Credit Tables 1996.

T A B L E 2 The Developing Countries: Selected IndicatorsFigures on the GDI, HDI, Adult Literacy, and Under-5 Mortalityrates are taken from the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1998.Figures on GNP per capita, annual growth rate, and total GDP aretaken or derived from the World Bank’s World Development Report1998. This report is also the source for aid-to-GNP ratios with theexception of the figures for Oceania, which are 1995 values fromthe UNDP’s Human Development Report 1998. Population figures are taken from the World Resources Institute, World Resources1998-99, with gaps filled through the Instituto del Tercer Mundo’s, The World 1995/96. The external debt-to-GNP ratio comes fromGlobal Development Finance 1998 (a World Bank publication). Debt service paid as a percentage of expenditure on education was derived by the North-South Institute (NSI) from information contained in the Global Development Finance tables and WorldResources 1998-99. CO2 emissions per capita for 1995 are also taken from World Resources 1998-99.

T A B L E 3 Canadian Official Development Assistance: Basic Data (1996-97)

T A B L E 4 Canadian Bilateral ODA by Channel and by Country (1996-97)

T A B L E 5 Canadian Multilateral ODA by Agency and by Country (1996-97)The basic data on Canadian official development assistance inTables 3, 4, and 5 is taken or derived from the Statistical Report on Development Assistance for fiscal year 1996-97, published byCIDA’s International Development Information Centre. Most of theinformation in the tables is taken from “Table M: Total Disbursementsby Country.” To ensure conformity with CIDA totals, aid allocationsfor developing countries which do not match NSI criteria (suchas South Korea and the Bahamas) are included as Regional Africa,Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia, and as Other Americas, Asia,and Europe. Information on Canada’s rank among other bilateraldonors in recipient countries is derived from the OECD’s GeographicalDistribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, 1992-96. Includedunder the classification, “Other,” at the bottom of Table 4 areimputed interest costs, other government department costs andservices, provincial government support to development, andCIDA’s Public Outreach (Development Information) program.

Finally, the imputed shares of Canadian Multilateral Assistance byAgency and Country were computed from supplementary informa-tion provided to the North-South Institute by CIDA. These figuresonly estimate the allocation of Canadian funds to particular coun-tries by multilateral agencies. The figures understate the amountof multilateral aid going to relatively small developing countries.Note that, except for Albania and ex-Yugoslavia (BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia), countries in Eastern Europe are not eligible for ODA and are classified as “countries in transition” rather than developing countries.

T A B L E 6 Canadian Balance of Trade with Developing Countries (1997)

T A B L E 7 Trade: Top Exports and Imports with Developing Countries (1997)The data on exports and imports is obtained from Statistics CanadaCatalogues #65-002 and #65-003 for 1997 and 1987. The informa-tion on customs revenue on imports from developing countries wasprovided by the Department of Finance, while Revenue Canada pro-vided rough estimates of comparable US figures. The average tariffrate was calculated by the North-South Institute by dividing thetotal tariff revenue collected by total imports for each country andexpressing the results as a percentage. The world total of customsrevenue was taken from the Public Accounts of Canada, 1996-97,prepared by the Receiver General for Canada. The information onthe Top Three Exports and Imports was obtained from IndustryCanada’s “Strategis: Trade Data On-line.” Some of the categorynames have been simplified for presentation purposes. The data on military exports is taken directly from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and its 1997 annual report, The Export of Military Goods from Canada.

T A B L E 8 Canadian Financial Relations with Developing Countries (1997)Data on the stock of Canadian government debt and the debtof the “Canada Account” of the Export Development Corporation(EDC) is taken directly from the Public Accounts of Canada, 1996-97,Volume 1, Chapter 9, “Loans, Investments and Advances.” Data on the Corporate Account of the EDC is derived from the EDC’s1997 Annual Report. Data on the developing-country debt stock of the Canadian Wheat Board is derived from its 1997 Annual Report.The information on the debt stocks of the Royal Bank of Canadaand the Bank of Nova Scotia is from their annual reports and is forsovereign debt with “Designated Less Developed Countries” only.These are countries that have been identified by the Office of theSuperintendent of Financial Institutions Canada as countries wherefull sovereign debt repayment is at risk.

Finally, numbers on Canadian Direct Investment Abroad (CDIA) indeveloping countries and foreign direct investment (FDI) by devel-oping countries in Canada were provided by Statistics Canada’sBalance of Payments Division.


166

T A B L E 9 Movement of Peoples: Immigration to Canada from Developing Countries by Immigration Class and Gender

T A B L E 1 0 Human Linkages between Canada and the Developing WorldInformation on immigration to Canada from developing countriesby immigration class and gender was provided by the Departmentof Citizenship and Immigration. For presentation purposes theNorth-South Institute simplified the immigration classes into fourcategories. “Refugee Class” includes both Convention refugees,“Designated Class,” and “CR8 dependents.” “Business Class” includesboth the investor and entrepreneur classes. “Independent Class”covers all other classes including live-in caregivers, self-employed,and retired classes. In order to smooth out year-over-year fluctua-tions, average immigration levels were calculated for the last threeyears: 1995-97. Data on Canadian visitors to developing countriesand visits to Canada from developing countries, as well as foreignstudent enrolment, was provided by Statistics Canada. Data onCanadians registered abroad was provided by the Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade, as was the informationon diplomatic representation in Canada and abroad.

T A B L E 1 1 Canada-Developing Country Linkage IndicesTwo composite indices have been designed to encapsulate themany and complex linkages between Canada and developingcountries. The first composite index measures the “importance” of a given developing country to Canada; the second index mea-sures the “importance” of Canada to a given developing country.Countries are then ranked according to each index. Both indicesare a simple average of three sub-indices: one for trade, one forimmigration, and one for aid relations, which are also indicatedin the table for each developing country. The sub-indices for thefirst composite index are calculated as follows:

• The immigration index is the country’s immigration to Canada as a percentage of total immigration from developing countriesto Canada for the period 1995-97.

• The trade index is the country’s two-way trade with Canada as a percentage of total developing country two-way trade withCanada in 1997.

• The aid index is Canada’s bilateral aid with that country as a percentage of Canada’s total bilateral aid for fiscal year 1997. All cal-culations are based on the data presented in Tables 1 through 10.

The sub-indices for the second composite index are calculated asfollows:

• The immigration index is the country’s annual average immigra-tion to Canada from 1995-97 as a percentage of the country’stotal population in 1998. Ideally, the denominator for this indexwould be total immigration from this country but such data isnot readily available. As the resulting number is so small—and in order for the immigration index to have an impact on thecomposite index rankings—the immigration index for each country was multiplied by 10.

• The trade index is the total two-way trade of a country withCanada as a share of that country’s GDP.

• The aid index measures total bilateral aid from Canada to thatcountry as a share of the total aid received by that country in 1996.Data for this aid index was taken from the OECD publication,Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, 1992-96.

This year, to facilitate readability and use, all indices (includingthe already grossed up second immigration index) have beenmultiplied by 100.

Unlike 1998, although data sets for both these indices are incom-plete, all ODA eligible countries have been included in Table 11.Where figures for GDP, immigration, or aid are lacking, a ~ hasbeen entered. The 16 ODA ineligible countries have been excludedfrom calculations, moved to the bottom of the list, and listedunder “na.”



The Canadian Development Report 1999 examines how Canadian society is organizedto support—well or poorly—collective expressions of social, economic, political, andenvironmental justice, both here and abroad. Chapters examine the actions taken byCanadian civil society organizations (CSOs) in the areas of international development,environmental activism, hunger, human rights, conflict prevention, gender equality,and trade policy. Together, the nine chapters depict a vibrant, committed sector ofsociety that has achieved much success.

Statistical annexes examine the funding of CSOs in Canada and analyze the full rangeof Canada’s relations with countries in the South.

The North-South Institute55 Murray Street, Suite 200Ottawa, Canada K1N 5M3Tel: (613) 241-3535E-mail: [email protected]: www.nsi-ins.ca

ISBN 1-896770-27-4Printed in Canada