Civil Review Cases Finals

8/12/2019 Civil Review Cases Finals

1/48

AZUELA V. CA (2006)

Will was two pages long. The number of pages were also not

stated in the attestation, only a blank was there.

The will was not properly acknowledged. (Nilagdaanko at

ninotariokongayong 10 unyo, ditosa !anila."#The witnesses also did not sign under the attestation clause but

on the left hand margin of the page.

eld$ %n&alid will.

Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case

because no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere else in

the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the

signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are

referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause

itself. the attestation clause is separate and apart from the

disposition of the will. They should sign below it.

Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to 'rt 0).'cknowledgement is the act of one who has e*ecuted a deed in

going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act

or deed. !oreo&er, will must be acknowledged and not merely

subscribed and sworn to. ' notarial will that is not acknowledged

before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally

defecti&e, e&en if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary

public.

TABAOADA V. ROSAL (1982)

+n the first page (which contained the entire testamentary

dispositions#, the testatri* signed at the bottom, while the

witnesses signed at the lefthand margin. +n the second page

which contained the attestation clause, the testatri* signed at the

left hand margin, and the witnesses signed below the attestation

clause. The attestation clause also did not state the number ofpages.

eld$ -alid. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the

left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the

genuineness of the signature of the testatri* but also the due

e*ecution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.

The obects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and

satisfied when the witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole

page which contained all the testamentary dispositions.

The failure to state the number of pages would ha&e been a fatal

defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discerniblefrom the entire will that it is really composed of only / pages

duly signed by the testatri* and her instrumental witnesses.

AJERO VS. CA

euirements under 'rt 12 and 13 on the authentication of

changes and signing and dating of dispositions refer only to the&alidity of the dispositions, but not its probate. %f the testator fails

to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these

dispositions cannot be effectuated. 4uch failure, howe&er, does

not render the whole testament &oid.

JABONETA V. GUSTILO:

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in t

e*ecution of a will is not whether they actually saw each oth

sign, but whether they might ha&e seen each other sign, had th

chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical positiwith relation to each other at the moment of inscription of ea

signature."

The position of the parties with relation to each other at t

moment of the subscription of each signature must be such ththey may see each other sign if they choose to do so. 5abone

doctrine$ the uestion whether the testator and the subscribi

witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presenceeach other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their ey

were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of

subscription by each of them, but that at that moment e*isti

conditions and their position with relation to each other we

such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction th

could ha&e seen each other sign.

ICASIANO V. ICASIANO (1964) [64]

The inad&ertent failure of one witness to affi* his signature

one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of tw

pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to ust

denial of probate. That the failure of the witness to sign pa

three was entirely through pure o&ersight is shown by his ow

testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, whi

bears a complete set of signatures in e&ery pa

67$ The %casiano holding cannot, and should not, be taken a

departure from the rule that the will should be signed by twitnesses on e&ery page. The carbon duplicate was regular in

aspects. ' ca&alier disregard of the formal reuirements of wi

in reliance on %casiano is not recommended.

JAVELLANA V. LEDESA (19!!) ["

Acknowledgement before a notary publ

6act$ 8odicil signed by testatri* and witnesses at the hospital9 t

notary public brought the codicil to his office, and signed a

sealed it the

Whether or not the notary signed the certification

acknowledgement in the presence of the testatri* and t

witnesses does not affect the &alidity of the codicil. The 8i

8ode does not reuire that the signing of the testator, witnes

and notary should be accomplished in one single a

The subseuent signing and sealing by the notary of

certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by tparticipants therein is not part of the acknowledgement itself n

of the testamentary a

67$ (a# ratio$ The certification of acknowledgement need not

signed in the presence of the testator and the witnesses9

obiter$ 'rt. 0) does not reuire that the testator and t

witnesses must acknowledge on the same day that it we*ecuted.


2/48

CRUZ V. VILLASOR (19"#) ["2]

The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attesting

witnesses.

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged

cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since hecannot acknowledge before himself his ha&ing signed the will. %f

the third witness were the notary public himself, he would ha&e

to a&ow, assent, or admit his ha&ing signed the will in front of

himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his

personality into two so that one will appear before the other toacknowledge his participation in the making of the will.

6urthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others,to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That

function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the

attesting or instrumental witnesses. 6or then he would be

interested in sustaining the &alidity of his own act.

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the

attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would ha&e the effect of

ha&ing only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be incontra&ention of the 'rticle 0: reuiring at least three credible

witnesses to act as such and of 'rticle 0) which reuires that

the testator and the reuired number of witnesses must appear

before the notary public to acknowledge the will.

CAGRO V. CAGRO (19!#) [68]

The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the

attestation clause.

6act$ signature of the three witnesses do not appear on the bottom

of the attestation clause, but the page containing the clause is

signed by the witnesses on the lefthand margin.

The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending

the e*ecution of the will" reuired by law to be made by theattesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signature.

'n unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act ofthe witnesses, since the omission of their signature at the bottom

thereof negati&es their participation.

The signatures on the lefthand margin cannot be deemed as their

signature to the clause because said signatures are in compliance

with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the lefthand

margin of all its pages. %f an attestation clause not signed by the

witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, itwould be easy to add such clause to a will on a subseuent

occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the

witnesses.

;issenting opinion of 7autista 'ngelo$ (a# substantial

compliance9 (b# the uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses

that the clause was already written in the will when the same was

signed ob&iates fear of the maority that the clause may ha&e

been only added on a subseuent occasion and not at the signing

of the will.

CANEDA V. CA (199#) [8

6act$ petitioners a&er that the attestation clause is fata

defecti&e since it fails to specifically state that the instrumen

witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will

their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pagthereof in the presence of the testator and of one anoth

48 agrees with petitioners. The absence of a statement that t

witnesses signed the will and e&ery page thereof in the presen

of the testator and of one another is a fatal defect which munecessarily result in the disallowance of the will. 4uch defect

the attestation clause cannot be characteriroper interpretation of the substantial compliance rule in '

0=$ +mission which can be supplied by an e*amination of twill itself, without the need of resorting to e*trinsic e&idenc

will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct t

allowance to probate of the will being assailed. owe&er, tho

omissions which cannot be supplied e*cept by e&idence aliun

(from another source, from elsewhere, from outside source

would result in the in&alidation of the attestation clause a

ultimately, of the will itself.

ALVARADO V. GAVIOLA (199#) [8

The reuirement has been liberally applied, the 48 declar

substantial compliance to be sufficie

6acts$ The lawyer who drafted the will and subseuent codi

read them aloud in the presence of the testator, the thrinstrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter fo

followed the reading with their own respecti&e copies pre&ioufurnished the

4ubstantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of t

law has been satisfied, because the solemnities surrounding t

e*ecution of wills are intended to protect the testator from

kinds of fraud and trickery but are ne&er intended to be so rig

and infle*ible as to destroy testamentary pri&ile

%t was not only the lawyer who read the documents. The notapublic and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the w

and codicil, albeit silently. With four persons following t

reading word with their own copies, it can be safely concludthat the testator was reasonably assured that what was read

him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with

instructions#, were the terms actually appearing in the typewritt

documents.

RO$AS V. DE JESUS (198!) [10

%ssue$ whether 6?7.@)1" appearing in the holographic will i

&alid compliance with 'rt.

A ' complete date is reuired to pro&ide against su

contingencies as that of two competing wills e*ecuted on t


3/48

same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a

will was e*ecuted. There is no contingency in this case.

's a general rule, the date" in a holographic will should include

the day, month, and year of its e*ecution. owe&er, when, as in

the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undueinfluence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is

established and the only issue is whether or not the date

6?7.@=1" is a &alid compliance with 'rt. 10, probate of the

holographic will should be allowed under the principle of

substantial compliance.

1#. CODO% &'. CALUGA%

6acts$ espondents are de&isees and legatees of the holographic

will of the deceased

>etitioners filed an opposition: to the petition for probate,

alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same

is e&en illegible.

espondents presented fi&e (:# witnesses none of whom saw the

testator actually write her signature.

8ourt of 'ppeals allowed the will to probate and disregard thereuirement of three witnesses, under 'rticle 11, in case of

contested holographic will, citing the decision in 'aredes, 3G >hil. =29 %n re ?states of 5ohnson, 2= >hil. 1:)#9 a

public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk

occasional errors udgment of courts should become final at som

definite date fi*ed by law. %nterest rei publicae ut finis set litiu(;y 8ay &s. 8rossfield, 2 >hil, :/1,H

7ut the 8ourt of 'ppeals should ha&e taken into account also,a&oid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1=

could only affect the share of the deceased husband, 7ernabe

la 8erna. %t could not include the disposition of the share of t

wife, Eer&asia ebaca, who was then still ali&e, and o&er who

interest in the conugal properties the probate court acuired

urisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be

issue. 7e it remembered that prior to the new 8i&il 8ode, a w

could not be probated during the testatorHs lifetime.

1!. GONZALES V. CA

6acts$ >etitioner i


4/48

former being determined by 'rt. /0 while the latter does not

reuire e&idence of such good standing. 8redibility depends on

the con&incing weight of his testimony in court.

16. ALA* V. RELOVA E.. No. I30/0G 4eptember /,

1=3

6acts$ Eregorio Jalaw, the pri&ate respondent, claiming to be the

sole heir of sister Nati&idad, filed a peition for probate of the

latterHs holographic will in 1=). The will contained / alterations$

a# osaHs name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and

instead DosarioD was written abo&e it. 4uch was not initialed, b#osaHs name was crossed out as sole e*ecutri* and EregorioHs

ma,e was written abo&e it. This alteration was initialed by the

testator.

osa contended that the will as first written should be gi&eneffect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied

the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

%ssue$ Whether or not the will is &alid

?I;$ No.

+rdinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, andinterlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem

not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby

in&alidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particularwords erased, corrected or interlined.

owe&er, when as in this case, the holographic Will in disputehad only one substantial pro&ision, which was altered by

substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration

did not carry the reuisite of full authentication by the full

signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is

&oided or re&oked for the simple reason that nothing remains in

the Will after that which could remain &alid. To state that the

Will as first written should be gi&en efficacy is to disregard the

seeming change of mind of the testatri*. 7ut that change of mindcan neither be gi&en effect because she failed to authenticate it in

the manner reuired by law ('rt. 13# by affi*ing her full

signature.

'rt. 13. %n case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure oralteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the

same by his full signature.

1". GAN &'.%A

6acts$ >etitioner 6austo ?. Ean initiated them proceedings in the!anila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a

holographic will allegedly e*ecuted by the deceased, 6elicidadKap.

+pposing the petition, her sur&i&ing husband %ldefonso Kapasserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor e*ecuted any

testament during her lifetime.

The will itself was not presented. >etitioner tried to establish its

contents and due e*ecution by the statements in open court of

6elina ?sguerra, >rimiti&o eyes, 4ocorro +larte and osario

Ean 5imene


5/48

6acts$!artin ugo died on 1=G3 and he left a will wherein he

instituted 4ofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only e*ecutor. %t

was also pro&ided therein that he was married to ufina Eomeetitioner (4ofia# filed for the probate of the will but the legal

wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured

through improper and undue influence and that there was an

admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testatorHs

admission of cohabitation, hence making the will in&alid on itsface. The 8ourt of 'ppeals re&ersed and held that the will is

&alid e*cept the de&ise in fa&or of the petitioner which is null and

&oid in &iolation of 'rt. G2= and 10/.

%ssue$ Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic &alidityof a will

eld$ Kes, as an e*ception. 7ut the general rule is that the courtHsarea of inuiry is limited to the an e*amination and resolution of

the e*trinsic &alidity of the will. This general rule is howe&er not

infle*ible and absolute. Ei&en e*ceptional circumstances, the

probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains

it to do and may pass upon certain pro&isions of the will. The willitself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator

and the petitioner.

The will was &alidly e*ecuted in accordance with law but the

court didnHt find it to ser&e a practical purpose to remand the

nullified pro&ision in a separate action for that purpose only since

in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the

intrinsic &alidity of its pro&isions.

The de&isee is in&alid by &irtue of 'rt. G2= which &oids a

donation made between persons guilty of adultery@concubinage atthe time of the donations. Fnder 'rt, 10/ it is also prohibited.

21. NOLI ALONSO &'. SOUSES ANDRES

6acts$ !arcelino 'lfonso died intestate, lea&ing his two children

'lfonso and 6elomina (petitioners# which e*ecuted an

e*traudicial settlement of estate thereafter.

'lfonso sold his share in the estate to herein respondents. 4uch

sale later on assailed by petitioners, the heirs of 'lfonso.

>etitioners theori


6/48

uestion of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are

many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to

the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are

denominated insanity or idiocy.

/. ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR &'.LORENZO LA$A

6acts$ Testator >aciencia was a G year old spinster when she

made her last will and testament The Will, e*ecuted in the house

of retired 5udge ?rnestino E. Iimpin (5udge Iimpin#, was read to

>aciencia twice. 'fter which, >aciencia e*pressed in the presence

of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last willand testament.

>etitioners opposed the probate alleging, among others, that

>aciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of

its e*ecution

>aciencia was referred to as DmagulyanD or DforgetfulD

because she would sometimes lea&e her wallet in the kitchen thenstart looking for it moments later.3:

%44F?$ W+N the state of being forgetfulness incapacitate theperson to e*ecute a will .

?I;$ No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily

make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to

e*ecute a Will.) 6orgetfulness is not eui&alent to being ofunsound mind. 7esides, 'rticle G== of the New 8i&il 8ode

states$

'rt. G==. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator

be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his

mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,

inury or other cause.

%t shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making

the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the

proper obects of his bounty, and the character of thetestamentary act.

ere, there was no showing that >aciencia was publicly known to

be insane one month or less before the making of the Will.

8learly, thus, the burden to pro&e that >aciencia was of unsound

mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. owe&er and as

earlier mentioned, no substantial e&idence was presented by them

to pro&e the same, thereby warranting the 8's finding thatpetitioners failed to discharge such burden.

#. LETICIA VALONTE ORTEGA &'.JOSEINA C.

VALONTE

6acts$ Two years after the testators arri&al from the Fnited

4tates and at the age of 0 he wed 5osefina who was then /

years old. 7ut in a little more than two years of wedded bliss,testator died.

Testator e*ecuted a notarial last will and testament written in?nglish and consisting of two (/# pages, and dated 5une 1:, 1=2

but acknowledged only on 'ugust =, 1=2.

>etitioner opposed the will on the ground that it was not e*ecuted

and attested as reuired by law and legal solemnities and

formalities were not complied with9

%44F?$ W+N the will shall be e*ecuted and attested to on t

same date

eld$ No. 's correctly ruled by the appellate court, the confl

between the dates appearing on the will does not in&alidate t

document, Dbecause the law does not e&en reuire that

OnotarialP will * * * be e*ecuted and acknowledged on the sam

occasion.D1 !ore important, the will must be subscribed by t

testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who malso attest to it in the presence of the testator and of o

another.1= 6urthermore, the testator and the witnesses macknowledge the will before a notary public./0 %n any e&ent,

agree with the 8' that Dthe &ariance in the dates of the will as

its supposed e*ecution and attestation was satisfactorily a

persuasi&ely e*plained by the notary public and the instrumen

witnesses.D/1

4. ;ERACIO R. REVILLA &'. ;ON. COURT O

AEALS ORTUNATO REVILLA LUZ REVILL

DAVID LORETO REVILLA GUTIERREZ VENERAND

REVILLA ANI


7/48

after the probate of his will dated 5anuary /, 1=GL The

testimonies of the alleged notary public as well as the three

instrumental witnesses of the alleged second will of the late

8ayetano e&illa cannot outweigh the denial of the late 8ayetano

e&illa.

4. REVILLA &'. CA J/5/= 2" 199#

/7':;on 8ayetano e&illa, a bachelor, owned / pieces

of land with buildings in !anila and ) parcels of land in

his hometown in 7ulacan. These properties are worth

>20!. %n 1=G, he e*ecuted a 12page last will and

testament, beueathing all his properties to his = nephews

and nieces including petitioner, eracio e&illa. To each,

he ga&e 1@10 of his estate reser&ing the last tenth for

masses to be said after his death and for the care of

religious images he kept in a chapel in 7ulacan.

;uring his lifetime, ;on 8ayetano sought the probate of

his will to which the 86% !anila admitted. owe&er, the

8ity all of !anila was burned by fire where the records

were also burned. ' petition for reconstitution of the

records was filed and it was granted.

'fter ;on 8ayetano died, eracio e&illa filed another

petition of a will wherein he instituted eracio as sole heir

of his uncles estate and e*ecutor of the will allegedly

e*ecuted in 1=/. The probate was opposed by eracios

brothers and sisters on the grounds that$

4ince 1=G up to 8ayetanos death, he ne&er informed

that he re&oked the will e*ecuted in 1=G

The 1=/ will was not e*ecuted in accordance withlaw and the signature of 8ayetano was different from his

usual and customary signature

8ayetano was of unsound mind when he e*ecuted the

will

That the alleged will was e*ecuted with undue

pressure and influence

That the 1=G will is &oid for the reason that it was

e*ecuted under duress or the influence of fear or threats

8ayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the

alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend

that the instrument be his will at the time of fi*ing his

signature

The trial court disallowed the second will. +n appeal, the

8' affirmed the trial court.

I''5-: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the

second will.

;-,: When ;on 8ayetano testified in the reconstituti

proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which

supposedly made. e identified his first will and declar

that it was his true and only will. e could not ha

e*ecuted a second will because he was sick in the hospi

during that time (he stayed there for / months# and

could not sign any papers while he was confined in t

hospital.

;uring the reconstitution proceedings, the will wproduced. %t was placed in a browned en&elope stati

7uksan ito pagkalibing ko" to which 8ayetano agreed

open. e recogni


8/48

Iim ( as witnesses# was a second will re&oking the

dispositions of property that he made in his first will. ad

he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were

prepared at his own behest, he would not ha&e denied that

he made it. e would probably ha&e caused it to be

probated while he was still ali&e, as he did with his first

will. 7ut apparently, the instrument was foisted on him

without his being aware of its true nature which the

petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court

and the pri&ate respondents, but from ;on 8ayetanohimself.

That the dispositions in the second will were not made by

;on 8ayetano is pro&en by the omission of ;on 8ayetanoHs

reser&ation of onetenth of his properties and the income

thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the

maintenance of his family chapel. That pro&ision in his

first will, for his personal benefit, would not ha&e been

deleted by ;on 8ayetano if his only purpose in making asecond will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. 7ut

eracio o&erdid himself. e wanted e&erything.

R'ssuming for the sake of arguments that the second will

was e*ecuted, the testimonies of the notary public, as wellas those of the three (2# instrumental witnesses were not

gi&en credit because of maor contradictions in testimonies.

!. SEANGIO VS. ;ON. AOR A. RE%ES

E.. No&ember /G, /00)9 'ri&ate respondents opposed the

probate on the ground that the holographic will did not

contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. T8dismissed the petition for probate easoning that the

holographic will clearly shows preterition.

%44F?$ Whether or not the document e*ecuted by 4egundo

can be considered as a holographic will.

FI%NE$ ' holographic will must be written, dated and

signed by the testator himself. 'n intent to dispose mortiscausa can be clearly deducted from the terms of the

instrument, and while it does not make an affirmati&e

deposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of

'lfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance

results in the disposition of the property in fa&or of those

who would succeed in the absence of 'lfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the court belie&es

that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not

preterited in the will. %t was 4egundos last e*pression

beueath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with t

sole e*ception of 'lfredo.

6. NUGUID VS NUGUID EN I/233 1G 48

33= 5FN? /2, 1=))

6'8T4$

osario Nuguid , single, died in ;ecember 20, 1=)/.4

was without descendants but was sur&i&ed by her parenand siblings. +n !ay 1, 1=)2, emedios Nuguid, hsister filed in 86% a holographic will allegedly e*ecuted

osario on No&ember 1G, 1=:1 or 11 years ago, said w

instituted emedios as the uni&ersal heir thereb

compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filtheir opposition to the probate proceeding. They conte

that they were illegally preterited and as a conseuence, t

institution is &oid. The courts order held that the will

uestion is a complete nullity.

%44F?$ Whether or not the compulsory heirs we

preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will &oid.

Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic &alidity of t

will.

FI%NE$ The statute we are called upon to apply in artic

:3 of the ci&il code which states$

The preterition or omission of one, some or all of t

compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether li&ing at t

time of the e*ecution of the will or born after the death

the testator, shall annul the institution of heir9 but the d a

legacies shall be &alid insofar as they are not inofficious

The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were recei&

nothing by the testament. The onesentence will institut

petitioner as the uni&ersal heir. No specific legacies

beuest are therein pro&ided for. %t is in this posture that w

say that the nullity is complete.

>reterition consists in the omission in the testators will

the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they a

not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they a

neither instituted as heirs nor are e*pressly disinherited

heirs nor are e*pressly disinherited. ;isinheritance is

testamentary disposition depri&ing any compulsory h

his@her share in the legitime for a cause authori


9/48

the issue of the &alidity of the pro&isions of the will in

uestion.

". NERI &. AUTIN

GR N+.L>4""99 /= 21 194#

"4 ;IL 18!

6'8T4$ This is a case where the testator 'gripino Neri in

his will left all his property by uni&ersal title to the children

by his second marriage, the herein respondents, withomission of the children by his first marriage, the herein

petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was

contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had

already gi&en each of the children portion of the

inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was

occupied by the respondents o&er which registration was

denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an

aggregate amount of money which the respondents were

indebted to their father.

%44F?$ 4hould there be cancellation of the will, in &iew of

the omission of heirsL %s there disinheritance in this caseL

?I;$ Kes. The 8ourt annulled the institution of heirs and

declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all

his property by uni&ersal title to the children by his second

marriage, without e*pressly disinheriting the children by

his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had

gi&en them already more shares in his property than those

gi&en to the children by his second marriage.

;isinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if

contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it

is preudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a caseof preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

8. C+'7/7?+ C. ACAINpetitioner &s. ;+.

INTEREDIATE AELLATE COURT E.. No.

G/G0), +ctober /G, 1=G

ACTS: 8onstantino 'cain filed on the egional Trial

8ourt a petition for the probate of the will of his late Fncle,

Nemesio 'cain, on the premise that the latter died lea&ing

a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were

instituted as heirs. 'fter the petition was set for hearing inthe lower court, -irginia 6ernande< and osa ;iongson, a

legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased

respecti&ely, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that$

(1# 8onstantino 'cain has no legal capacity to institute the

proceedings9 (/# he is merely a uni&ersal heir9 and (2# the

widow and the adopted daughter ha&e been pretirited. 4aid

motion was denied as well as the subseuent motion for

reconsideration. 8onseuently, 6ernande< and ;iongson

filed with the 4upreme 8ourt a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary inunction which was

subseuently referred to the %ntermediate 'ppellate 8ourt.

%'8 granted 6ernande< and ;iongsons petition and

ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate

the will. ;ue to the denial of 'cains motion f

reconsideration, he then filed a petition for re&iew

certiorari before the 4upreme 8ourt.

ISSUE: Whether or not -irginia 6ernande< and o

;iongson ha&e been pretirited.

RULING:

Article 854 of the Civil Code:

he preterition or omission of one! some! or all of

the compulsory heirs in the direct line! whether

living at the time of the e"ecution of the will or

born after the death of the testator! shall annul the

institution of heir# but the devisees and legacies

shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before

the testator! the institution shall be effectual!

without pre$udice to the right of representation.

>reterition consists in the omission in the testators w

of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because th

are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they a

neither instituted as heirs nor are e*pressly disinherite

%nsofar as the widow is concerned, 'rticle :3 may n

apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testat

although she is a compulsory heir. owe&er, the sam

thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Fnd

'rticle 2= of >.;. No. )02, known as the 8hild and Kou

Welfare 8ode, adoption gi&es to the adopted person t

same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child

the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir the adopter. %t cannot be denied that she was totally omittand preterited in the will and that both the adopted ch

and the widow were depri&ed of at least their legitim

Neither can it be denied that they were not e*press

disinherited. ence, this is a clear case of preterition of tlegally adopted child.

The uni&ersal institution of 'cain together with h

brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testat

results in totally abrogating the will because t

nullification of such institution of uni&ersal heirs witho

any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts todeclaration that nothing at all was written.

9. VIADO NON &'. CA -@5/= 1! 2000

/7': >etitioners in this case are asserting coownership

the property while respondents claim that they are the

absolute owners by &irtue of a deed of donation e*ecuted

their fa&or by the late patriarch, 5ulian -iado. They also

claimed that petitioner wai&ed her rights o&er her share in

the property of their late mother, -irginia -iado.


10/48

I''5-: Whether there was &alid partition of the inherited

properties formerly coowned by the parties.

R5?: The 48 ruled for respondents.

When the -irginia died intestate in 1=/, her part of the

conugal property was transmitted to her heirs S her

husband 5ulian and their children. The inheritance, which

&ested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained

under a coownership regime among the heirs until

partition.

?&ery act intended to put an end to indi&ision among co

heirs and legatees or de&isees would be a partition although

it would purport to be a sale, an e*change, a compromise, a

donation or an e*traudicial settlement."

%n this case, the deed of donation and deed of e*traudicial

settlement consolidated the title solely to one of the heirs

and ceased the coownership.

The e*clusion of one of the children of the decedent from

the deed of e*traudicial settlement has the effect of

preterition. This kind of preterition, in the absence of proof

and bad faith, does not ustify a collateral attack on the new

T8T. The relief instead rests on 'rt.1103, N88 to the

effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith

and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the

preterited heir shall be paid the &alue pertaining to her.

!oreo&er, the 8ourt found the instruments e*ecuted

showing donation was &alidly e*ecuted as petitioner failed

to submit sufficient e&idence to pro&e otherwise.

>etitioners claimed that the respondents forged her

signature in the deeds of donation and of e*traudicial

partition. The 8ourt found that such claim was &ague onhow and what manner those supposed &ices occurred.

10. EREZ &'. GARC;ITORENA !4 ? 4#1

ACTS$'na !aria 'lcantara (deceased# left >/1,3/.:

on deposit in the 8armenHs name with the associationknown as%a &rbana in !anila, as the final payment of her

liuidated credit against 'ndres Earchitorena, alsodeceased, represented by his son, !ariano.

!ariano Earchitorena held a udgment for >G,G/./2

against 5oauin, husband of 8armen. The sheriff pursuant

to the writ of e*ecution issued in said udgment le&ied an

attachment on said amount deposited with%a &rbana.

8armen secured a preliminary inunction restraining the

e*ecution of said udgment on the sum so attached because

the %a &rbana deposit belongs to her children asfideicommissary heirs of 'na !aria 'lcantara.

>ertinent clauses of the Will$

'(inth. """) so that upon my death and after probate

this will! and after the report of the committee on claim

and appraisal has been rendered and approved! she w

receive from my e"ecutri" and properties composing m

hereditary estate! that she may en$oy them with *od

blessing and my own.

enth. ,hould my heiress Carmen *architorena die!

order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to h

surviving children# and should any of these die! his shashall serve to increase the portions of his survivi

brothers -and sisters by accretion! in such wise that m

estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress

her children in so far as it is legally possible.

/leventh. ,hould my aforesaid heiress! Carm

*architorena! die after me while her children are still

their minority! I order that my estate be administered

my e"ecutri"! 0rs. 1osefa %aplana! and in her default!

Attorney 2amon ,alinas and in his default! by his s

2amon ,alinas# """.3

The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatr

has ordered a simple substitution, while the appel

contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.

ISSUE W+N a fideicommissary e*ists.

;ELD K?4. The reuisites for a fideicommissa

substitution e*ists, namely$

1. 't first heir primarily called to the enoyment of t

estate. %n this case the plaintiff was instituted an heirecalled to the enoyment of the estate, according to clau

% of the will.

/. 'n obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preser

and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of t

estate. 4uch an obligation is imposed in clause whi

pro&ides that the Dwhole estate shall pass unimpaired to h

(heiressHs# sur&i&ing children9D thus, instead of lea&ing t

heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or

lea&ing the law to take its course in case she dies intesta

said clause not only disposes of the estate in fa&or of t

heiress instituted, but also pro&ides for the dispositithereof in case she should die after the testatri*.

2. ' second heir. 4uch are the children of the heire

instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs bothclause and in clause %.

3. The fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from t

time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latt

and not from the fiduciary. The children in this case a

the owners of the inheritance by &irtue of the testatri*


11/48

death. (T6, the deposit cannot be the subect of e*ecution

by Earchitorena as it doesnt belong to 8armen.#

Reasoning:

This will certainly pro&ides for a substitution of heirs but

not ust a simple one considering that clause % in

connection with clause pro&ides for a substitution wherethe heiress instituted dies after the testatri*.

8lause doesnt conflict with the idea of fideicommisary$

The word sole does not necessarily e*clude the idea of

substitute heirs9 and taking these three clauses together,

such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress

instituted in the first instance.

The testatri* had in mind a fideicommissary substitution,

since she limits the transmission of her estate to the

children of the heiress in accordance with the limits fi*ed

by ' G1 88 which prescribed that fideicommissary

substitutions shall be &alid Dpro&ided they do not go

beyond the second degree.D

'nother indication of fideicommissary substitution is this

clause pro&ides that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired

to the heiressHs children, that is to say the heiress is reuired

to preser&e the whole estate, without diminution, in order

to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.

The disposition contained in clause % is not incompatible

with a fideicommissary substitution -it certainly is

incompatible with the idea of simple substitution! where

the heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance:

%n fact the enoyment of the inheritance is in conformity

with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by &irtue of

which the heir instituted recei&es the inheritance andenoys it, although at the same time he preser&es it in order

to pass it on the second heir.

%t should also be noted that said clause % &ests in

the heiress only the right to enoy but not the right to

dispose of the estate. %t says, she may enoy it, but does not

say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the

usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.

8lause % more clearly indicates the idea of

fideicommissary substitution, when a pro&ision is therein

made in the e&ent the heiress should die after the testatri*.That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted

heiress should die after the testatri* and after recei&ing and

enoying the inheritance.

11. RABADILLA &'. CA G.R. N+. 11#"2! J5-

29 2000

ACTS: %n the codicil of testatri*, abadilla was

instituted as a de&isee of a lot, containing the following

pro&isions$

1. abadilla shall ha&e the obligation until he dies,

e&ery year, to gi&e to 7elle


12/48

12. NIEVA V. ALCALA (1920)

/7':

5uliana Nie&a, the natural mother of 4egunda !aria Nie&a,

married

6rancisco ;eocampo. +f said marriage 'lfeo ;eocampo

was born. 5uliana died intestate on 'pril 1=, 1=, and her

son, 'lfeo ;eocampo, inherited from her ab intestate, the

parcels of land in uestion. 'lfeo died intestate and without

issue on 5uly G, 1=0. Thus, the lands passed to his

father, 6rancisco, by intestate succession.

Thereafter,6rancisco married !anuela 'lcala, of which ma

rriage was born 5ose ;eocampo. 6rancisco died on 'ugust

2, 1=13, whereupon his widow and son took possession of

the lands in uestion.

+n 4eptember 20, 1=1:, 4egunda, as acknowledged natural

daughter of 5uliana, instituted the present action for the

purpose of reco&ering from the parcels of land in uestion,in&oking the article 11 of the 8i&il 8ode.

I''5-:

Whether or not an illegitimate relati&e within the 2rddegree

is entitled to the reser&a troncal.

;-,: !anresa, in determining the persons in whose fa&or

the reser&ation is established, says$

D>ersons in whose fa&or the reser&ation is established.

U %n the interpretation of article 11 U the reser&ation is

established in fa&or of the parents who are within the third

degree and belong to the line from which the properties

came.

D%t treats of blood relationshipU %t could not be otherwise,

becauserelationship by affinity is established between each

spouse and the

familyof the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be t

o fa&or thetransmission of the properties of the family of

one spouse to that of the other, which is ust what this

article intends to pre&ent.D%t also treats of legitimaterelationship. The person obliged to reser&e is a legitimate

ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which

proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being

true, there can be no uestion, because the line from which

the properties proceed must be the line of that family and

only in fa&or of that line is the reser&ation established.

6urthermore, we ha&e already said, the obect is to protect

the patrimony of the legitimate family and it could not be

otherwise. 'rticle =32 denies to legitimate parents the right

to succeed the natural child and &ice &ersa, from which

must be deduced that natural parents neither ha

the right to inherit from legitimate ones9 the law in t

article cited establishes a barrier between the two familie

properties of the legitimate family shall ne&er pass

operation of law to the natural family.

'rticle =32, abo&e referred to by !anresa, pro&ides

follows$D' natural or legitimated child has no right

succeed an intestate the legitimate children a

relati&es of the father or mother who has acknowledged

nor shall such children or relati&es so inherit from t

natural or legitimated child.D To hold that the appellant

entitled to the property left by her natural brother, 'lf

;eocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagra

&iolation of the e*press pro&isions of the foregoi

article (=32#.

1#. SUA%A V. IAC (1991)

aul 7alantakbo inherited from / different ascendants t

/ sets of

properties subect of this case$

1# ' 1@2 interest, proindi&iso in a parcel of la

situated in ;ita, Iilio (Iiliw#, Iaguna from h

father 5ose, 4r., who died on 5anuary /,1=3:9

/# ' 1@G interest proindi&iso in 10 parcels

registered lands from his maternal grandmoth

Iuisa 7autista, who died on No&ember 2, 1=:0.

+n 5une 12, 1=:/, aul died intestate, single, without a

issue, and lea&ing only his mother, 8onsuelo 5oauin -d

de 7alantakbo, as his sole sur&i&ing heir to the re

properties.

+n No&ember 2, 1=:/, 8onsuelo adudicated unto hersthe said properties in an 'ffida&it entitled D8aud

erederario del finado aul 7alantakbo.D

+n ;ecember /1, 1=:=, 8onsuelo 5oauin &da d

7alantakbo sold the property inherited from 5ose, 4r.,

!ariuita . 4umaya. The same property was subseuen

sold by 4umaya to -illa onorio ;e&elopme8orporation, %nc., on ;ecember 20, 1=)2.

'lso on ;ecember 20, 1=)2, 8onsuelo 5oauin &da.

7alantakbo sold the properties inherited from Iui

7autista, to -illa onorio ;e&elopment 8orporation, %n

The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights

the properties in fa&or of Iaguna 'gro%ndustrial 8ocon8ooperati&e, %nc. which properties are presently in

possession.


13/48

+n 5anuary /2, 1=)G, -illa onorio ;e&elopment

8orporation transferred and assigned its rights o&er the

property in fa&or of 'gro%ndustrial 8oconut 8ooperati&e,

%nc. The properties are presently in the name of the

8ooperati&e, /@2 share and the remaining 1@2 share is in the

name of 4ancho 7alantakbo.

The parties admit that the certificates of titles co&ering the

abo&e described properties do not contain any annotation

of its reser&able character. +n 5une 2, 1=), 8onsuelo

5oauin &da. de 7alantakbo died.

+n !arch 3, 1=G0, 'madeo, 4ancho, ;onato, Iuis, and

?rasto, all surnamed 7alantakbo, brothers in full blood of

aul 7alantakbo and Iuisa, 5ose and ;olores, also all

surnamed 7alantakbo, sur&i&ing children of deceased 5ose

7alantakbo, 5r., another brother of the first named

7alantakbos, filed suit to reco&er the properties which they

claimed were subect to a reser&a troncal in their fa&or.

eld$

+n the uestion of registration of reser&a troncal.

Fpon the death of the propositus, aul 7alantakbo, the

reser&ista, 8onsuelo &da. de 7alantakbo caused the

registration of an affida&it of self adudication of the estate

of aul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties

were inherited by aul from his father 5ose, 4r., and from

his maternal grandmother, Iuisa 7autista. 4aid affida&it

was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recordingwith the egistry of ;eeds of the reser&able character of

the properties.

%n 4panish language, the affida&it clearly stated that the

affiant, 8onsuelo, was a lone ascendant and heir to aul7alantakbo, her son, who died lea&ing properties

pre&iously inherited from other ascendants and which

properties were in&entoried in the said affida&it.

'lthough the certificates of titles co&ering the properties in

uestion show that they were free from any liens and

encumbrances at the time of the sale, the fact remains

howe&er, that the affida&it of selfadudication e*ecuted by

8onsuelo stating the source of the properties thereby

showing the reser&able nature thereof was registered with

the egister of ;eeds of Iaguna, and this is sufficient

notice to the whole world.

Thus, in Eatioan &. Eaffud, We held$

DWhen a con&eyance has been properly recorded such

record is constructi&e notice of its contents and all

interests, legal and euitable, included thereinU

DFnder the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaserhas e*amined e&ery instrument of record affecting the title.

4uch presumption is irrebuttable."

e is charged with notice of e&ery fact shown by t

record and is presumed to know e&ery fact shown by t

record and is presumed to know e&ery fact which

e*amination of the record would ha&e disclosed. Th

presumption cannot be o&ercome by proof of innocence

good faith. +therwise, the &ery purpose and obect of t

law reuiring a record would be destroyed.

14. ORENTE V. DELA SANTA 9 ;IL #8

DECEBER 19 190" J. *ILLARD:

FACTS$ 8onsuelo !orente died lea&ing a will whi

states that (1# all her real setate shall pass to her husban

Eremersindo dela 4anta9 (/# that the husband shall n

lea&e her brother after her death and not he shall not mar

anyone9 should he ha&e children by anyone, he shall n

con&ey any portion of the property e*cept 1@2 thereof a

/@2 should be gi&en to her brother -icente or his children

any9 (2# after her death, husband should li&e in which t

bakery id located.

6our months after her death, Eremersindo married aga

?lena !orente, sister of the testatri* filed a petition in t

probate alleging /ndmarriage of Eremersindo and asked f

the annulment of the legacy. The 86% denied the petition

HELD: 'ffirmed. Testamentary pro&ision ma

conditional and prohibiti&e against another marriage m

be &alid against a widow or widower.

ewe&er, under the will of the testatri*, there are se&e

directions gi&en to the husband, but no one of these orde

is attached that condition that he fails to comply with the

he shall lose the legacy. %t is only in one e&ent ha&i

children the disposition will change.

The will should be construed with reference to all t

clauses and with reference to such surroundi

circumstances. There being no e*press condition attach

to the legacy in reference to the second marriage, there c

be no implied condition from the conte*t of the will.

order to make a testamentary pro&ision conditional, su

condition must fairly appear from the language used in t

will.


14/48

1:. LLORENTE &'. RODRIGUEZ 10 !8!

/7': osa Ilorente, a natural daughter of one of the

legitimate children of the deceased !artina '&alle, tried to

inter&ene in the settlement of the estate of the said

deceased in representation of her father, a legitimate son of

!artina '&alle, who had predeceased the latter. 7ut osa

Ilorente was not allowed to inter&ene because, as a natural

child of one of !artina '&alleHs legitimate children, she

had no right to the inheritance.

I''5-: osa may represent her father in the settlement of

the estate.

R5?:N+.

There can be no uestion on the proposition that natural

children do not ha&e the right to represent their natural

father or mother in the succession of the legitimate

ascendants of the latter.

The 8ourt ruled that this doctrine has been affirmed by the

supreme court of 4pain in its decision of the 12th of

6ebruary, 1=02, and in said decision it was held that a

natural child whose deceased father was a legitimate son!

has no right whatever in the inheritance of his grandfather!

even if the latter died without legitimate descendants

surviving him, which appears plainly e&ident, not only

because article =32 of the 8i&il 8ode denies the natural

child the right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate

children and relati&es of the father or mother

acknowledging the said child, included in which was the

grandfather, nor because within the order of succession

established for natural children and their descendants by

article =2= to =33, the natural grandchild, whose father was

legitimate, has no place9 but more especially (considering

the direct application of said doctrine to the case# because,

as children inherit by right from their father, and

grandchildren from their grandfather by representation

according to articles =2/ and =22, this right is only granted

to the legitimate grandchildren and descendants when the

the head of the descending direct line is a legitimate child,in conformity with the secular doctrine admitted by our

code as the basis of the order of succession which the same

establishes and particularly sanctions by article =21, where

it is assumed that the descendants called upon to succeed

by such line shall be the issue of a lawful marriage. 's a

conseuence of the law, the court below held that osa

Ilorente had no right whate&er to the inheritance of the late

!artina '&alle, and denied her all right to inter&ene in the

proceedings regarding the estate of the said deceased.

The plea that because plaintiffs are poor and defenda

rich, the land in dispute should be adudged to the form

as a measure of social ustice, runs counter to the prese

law on succession and is, therefore, beyond the power

the courts to grant.

1". *--'/ CAC;O &'.J+ G. UDAN /, R5'7?+

UDAN G.R. N+. L>19996 A3? #0 196!

6'8T4$

4il&ina Fdan, single, died lea&ing a will naming her s

6rancisco and one Wencesla 8acho as her sole heirs, share a

share alike. 8acho then filed a petition to probate the said W

which was opposed by the testators legitimate brother, usti

Therafter, 6rancisco filed his opposition to the probate of t

Will while ustico withdrew his opposition. 'fter 6rancisco

death, another legitimate brother of the testator, 5ohn, togethwith ustico, filed their respecti&e oppositions. 8onseuent

8acho filed a !otion to ;ismiss the +ppositions filed by 5oand ustico. 86% issued an order disallowing the two oppositio

for lack of interest in the estate. The subseuent !otions f

econsiderations were denied hence, this appeal.

%44F?$

Whether or not 5ohn and usticoFdan may claim to be he

intestate of their legitimate sister, 4il&ina.

FI%NE$

%t is clear from 'rticle = and 1002 of the go&erning 8i&il 8o

of the >hilippines, in force at the time of the death of the testat

that the oppositor brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate

their legitimate sister, 4il&ina.

'rt. =. %n the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendan

the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of tdeceased.

'rt. 1002. %f there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitima

children, or a sur&i&ing spouse, the collateral relati&es sh

succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance wthe following articles.

These legal pro&isions decree that collateral relati&es of one wdied intestate inherit only in the absence of descendan

ascendants, and illegitimate children. 'lbeit the brothers a

sister can concur with the widow or widower, they do not concbut are e*cluded by the sur&i&ing children, legitimate

illegitimate.

6urther, the death of 6rancisco does not impro&e the situation

appellants. The rights acuired by the former are only transmitt

by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who

legitimate brothers of his mother, pursuant to 'rticle ==/.

'rt. ==/. 'n illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intest

from the legitimate children and relati&es of his father or moth

nor shall such children or relati&es inherit the same manner fro

the illegitimate child.


15/48

owe&er, the hearing on the probate must still proceed to

ascertain the rights of 8acho as testamentary heir.

18. VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO -7 / &'. CA G.R. N+.

12916# A3? 22 200#

The original owners of the contro&erted lot, spouses 'nselmo

7aloyo and !acaria Iiraurificacion 'rbolario, who, in 1=:, died a spinster and

without issue.

ecords disclose moreo&er that decedent >urificacions father,

5uan 'rbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of6rancisca !al&as. 6rom this cohabitation was born the

OpetitionersP, &iartition 'greement e*ecuted by the 8olincos was defecti&e and

thus &oidable as they ('rbolarios# were e*cluded therein. The

'rbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance

of their alleged halfsister, >urificacion 'rbolario9 and, as forced

heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid

lot."

The trial court held that the 'rbolarios were the brothers and the

sisters of the deceased >urificacion 'rbolario, while the 8olincos

were her cousins and nieces. >ursuant to 'rticle 100= of the8i&il 8ode, the 8olincos could not inherit from her, because she

had halfbrothers and halfsisters. Their 1=G ;eclaration of

eirship and >artition 'greement was made in bad faith, because

they knew all along the e*istence of, and their relationship with,

the 'rbolarios. The 4alhays, on the other hand, had no

document to pro&e their acuisition and possession of a portion

of the disputed lot.

%ssue$ Whether or not the 'rbolarios illegitimate children and not

entitled to inherit from their halfsister >urificacion 'rbolario.

%44F?$ W@N the V;eclaration of eirship and >artiti

'greement e*ecuted by the 8olincos was defecti&e.

FI%NE$ K?4. The 1=:1 ;eclaration re&eals that the year

8atalinas death was intercalated.

The first two numbers (1 and =# and the last digit (2# are legib

but the third digit has been written o&er to make it look like

D0.D 6urther, the paragraph uoted by petitioners should show

chronological progression in the heirs years of death$ 'gue

died in 1=30 and ?duardo in 1=3G. ence, if 8atalina had inde

died in 1=02, why then was her name written after 'guedas anot before itL !oreo&er, the document, being in 4panish, reui

an official translation. We cannot readily accept the ?ngl

translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did n

agree to its correctness. 7esides, it consisted of only a paragra

of the whole document.

4econd, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners th

5uan 'rbolarios marriage to 6rancisca !al&as was &al

supposedly because 8atalina 7aloyo was already dead when th

were born. %t does not follow that ust because his first wife h

died, a man is already conclusi&ely married to the woman w

bore his children. ' marriage certificate or other genera

accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as undisputable fact.

Third, clear and substantial e&idence is reuired to support tclaim of petitioners that they were preterited from the 1=

;eclaration of eirship. The T8 ;ecision merely declared th

they were halfbrothers and halfsisters of >urificacion, wh

respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relati&es#

made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitim

or illegitimate siblings. We uote the appellate court$

D* * *. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show th

conugal union of 5uan 'rbolario and 8atalina 7aloyo had be

udicially annulled before 1=:1, or before 5uan 'rbolacohabited with 6rancisca !al&as, it would only be reasonable

conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth

the O'rbolariosP was e*tramarital. 'nd conseuently, * *-oltaire 'rbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of 5u

'lbolario.

DThere is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in t

urisdiction ('rticle /)1, New 8i&il 8ode#9 and whoe&er alleg

the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the dissoluti

of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses m

introduce such e&idence to pro&e his or her allegation (%bid.9 4

3, ule 121, New ules on ?&idence#. %t is the * * * 'rbolario

claiming to be born under a &alidly contracted subseu

marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. 7ut this, thha&e miserably failed to do.D

19. ;EIRS O EVARISTA DELA ERCED V

JOSELITO DELA ERCED G.R. NO. 126"

EBRUAR% 2! 1999

6acts$

?&arista !. dela !erced died intestate, without issue. 4he l

fi&e (:# parcels of land situated in +rambo, >asig 8ity. 't t

time of her death, ?&arista was sur&i&ed by three sets of heirs.


16/48

6rancisco (?&aristas brother# died after a year. e was sur&i&ed

by his wife 7lanuita ?rreadela !erced and their three legitimate

children, namely, Iuisito ?. dela !erced, 7lanuita !.

!acatangay and !a. +li&ia !. >aredes.

+n 'pril /0, 1==, the three sets of heirs e*ecuted an

e*traudicial settlement, entitled ?*traudicial 4ettlement of the

?state of the ;eceased ?&arista !. dela !erced" adudicating the

properties of ?&arista to them, each set with a share of onethird(1@2# proindi&iso.

>ri&ate respondent 5oselito >. ;ela !erced, illegitimate son of

the late 6rancisco de la !erced, filed a >etition for 'nnulment

of the ?*traudicial 4ettlement of the ?state of the ;eceased

?&arista !. ;ela !erced with >rayer for a Temporaryestraining +rder", alleging that he was fraudulently omitted

from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully

aware of his relation to the late 6rancisco. 8laiming successional

rights, pri&ate respondent 5oselito prayed that he be included as

one of the beneficiaries, to share in the onethird (1@2# pro

indi&iso share in the estate of the deceased ?&arista,

corresponding to the heirs of 6rancisco.

%ssue$

Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in the intestate estate

of the late ?&arista !. ;ela !erced in his capacity as

representati&e of his alleged father, 6rancisdo;ela !erced,

brother of the deceased, whose succession is under consideration

eld$

The law in point in the present case is 'rticle GGG of the New8i&il 8ode which pro&ides that the rights to succession are

transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

4ince ?&arista died ahead of her brother 6rancisco, the latter

inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs.

4ubseuently, when 6rancisco died, his heirs, namely$ his

spouse, legitimate children, and the pri&ate respondent, 5oselito,

an illegitimate child, inherited his (6ranciscos# share in the

estate of ?&arista. %t bears stressing that 5oselito does not claim to

be an heir of ?&arista by right of representation but participates

in his own right, as an heir of the late 6rancisco, in the lattersshare (or portion thereof# in the estate of ?&arista.

The present case, howe&er, relates to the rightful and undisputed

right of an heir to the share of his late father in the estate of the

decedent ?&arista, ownership of which had been transmitted tohis father upon the death of ?&arista. There is no legal obstacle

for pri&ate respondent 5oselito, admittedly the son of the late

6rancisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his fathers

estate, which estate includes a onethird (1@2# undi&ided share in

the estate of ?&arista.

20. ROSALES &. ROSALES 148 SCRA 69 -@5/=

2" 198"

6'8T4$

>etra osales died intestate. 4he was sur&i&ed by her husba

6ortunato and their /children !agna and 'ntonio. 'nother chi

8arterio, predeceased her, lea&ing behind a child, !acikeuero

and his widow %renea, the petitioner.

The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross &alue of abo

>20,000. %n the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued

+rder declaring the following indi&iduals the legal heirs of t

deceased and prescribing their respecti&e share of the esta

6ortunato (husband#, 1@39 !agna (daughter#, 1!acikeuero*(grandson#, 1@39 and 'ntonio (son#, 1@3. %ren

insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as t

sur&i&ing spouse of the late 8arterio, son of the deceas

claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her motherinl

together with her son, !acikeuero*. The trial court denied h

plea. ence, this petition.

%44F?

W+N the widow whose husband predeceased his mother c

inherit from the latter, her motherinlaw.

?I;$ N+. ' sur&i&ing spouse is not an intestate heir of his@hparentinlaw.

easoning$ %ntestate or legal heirs are classified into / groupnamely, those who inherit by their own right, and those w

inherit by the right of representation. estated, an intestate h

can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order

intestate succession pro&ided for in the 88 or by the right

representation pro&ided for in 'rt =1 of the same law. T

rele&ant pro&isions of the 88 are 'rts. =0, =1, =/ and ==

There is no pro&ision which states that a widow (sur&i&i

spouse# is an intestate heir of her motherinlaw. The entire 8ois de&oid of any pro&ision which entitles her to inherit from h

motherinlaw either by her own right or by the right

representation. The pro&isions of the 8ode which relate to t

order of intestate succession ('rticles =Gto 1013# enumer

with meticulous e*actitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, w

the 4tate as the final intestate heir. %f the legislature intended

make the sur&i&ing spouse an intestate heir of the parentinla

it would ha&e so pro&ided in the 8ode. %renea argues that shea compulsory heir in accordance with the pro&isions of 'rt

The pro&ision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in whi

case the sur&i&ing spouse (widow or widower# is a compulso

heir. %t does not apply to the estate of a parentinlaw. 7y t

same token, the pro&ision of 'rt === does not support %rene

claim. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of t

deceased spouse. The subect matter of the intestate est

proceedings in this case is that of the deceased >etra& osalthe motherinlaw of %renea. %t is from the estate of >etra th

!acikeuero* draws a share of the inheritance by the rightrepresentation as pro&ided by 'rt =1. 'rt =G1 e*plici

declares that !acikeuero* is called to succession by l

because of his blood relationship. e does not succeed his fath

8arterio (the person represented# who predeceased

grandmother, >etra, but the latter whom his father would ha

succeeded. %renea cannot assert the same right of representati

as she has no filiation by blood with her motherinlaw. %ren

also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he han inchoate or contingent right to the properties of >etra osa


17/48

as compulsory heir. 7e that as it may, said right of her husband

was e*tinguished by his death that is why itis their son

!acikeuero* who succeeded from >etra by right of

representation. e did not succeed from his deceased father

8arterio.

21. SOUSES CAITLE &'. ELBABUENA G.R. N+.

16919# N+&-@- #0 2006

espondents 6ortunata ?lbambuena (6ortunata# and osalinda

+lar (osalinda#, spouse and daughterinlaw, respecti&ely, of

+lar, now deceased, claim that +lar relinuished onehalf or0.=0G/ hectare of the lot to osalinda by a DJasunduanD1dated

5uly 1G, 1==/ the e*ecution of which was witnessed by petitioner

8irilo 8apitle9 and that the remaining portion of the lot was

surrendered to 6ortunata by an undated document.

espondents, alleged that on petitioners reuest, petitioners

were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of li&elihood.

4ince 1==0, howe&er, petitioners did not pay rentals despite

demand therefor, and neither did they heed the demand to return

the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a >etition

for eco&ery of >ossession and >ayment of 7ack entals against

petitioners before the ;epartment of 'grarian eform

'dudication 7oard (;''7# .

>etitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they ha&e been in

possession of the lot since 1=)0, presented a DWai&er of ightsDe*ecuted by +lar wherein he renounced in their fa&or his rights

and participation o&er the lot9 a D4inumpaang 4alaysayD wherein

+lar acknowledged that he copossessed the lot with petitioner

8apitle since 1=)09 and a >inagsamang >atunay from the

7arangay 'grarian eform 8ommittee (7'8# 8hairman and

barangay chairman of -alle certifying that they (petitioners# are

the actual tillers and possessors of the lot.

>etitioners further claim that since 1=:=, respondent 6ortunata

was already separated from +lar and she e&en remarried, thusgi&ing her no right to inherit from +lar.

>etitioners concede that although +lars death passed all his

rights and interest o&er the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not

beueathing them to his estranged wife but to a relati&e, who

helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him, should beaccorded respect o&er the intent of the law on hereditary

succession.

%44F?$ W@N wife 6ortunata can inherit intestate from her

husband despite the fact of their separation

FI%NE$

>etitioners argument that DOiPt would be absurd for O+larP to

beueath his property to his estranged wife not to a relati&e who

had indeed helped him in tilling the property and OtookP goodcare of his needs,D is a &irtual admission that their possession was

not in the concept of owners, they ha&ing merely DhelpedD in

tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that +lar was the actual

possessor and tiller.

'lthough estranged from +lar, respondent 6ortunata remained

his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal

ground for the disualification of a sur&i&ing spouse as an heir of

the deceased spouse. osalinda, on the other hand, is the

sur&i&ing spouse of +lars son. The two are thus real parties

interest who stand to be inured or benefited by the udgment

the cancellation of the 8I+' issued in +lars name.

22. CRESENCIANA TUBO RODRIGUEZ(

,--/'-,) '5@'7?757-, @= SUSANA A. LLAGAS

EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ G.R. N+. 1"!"20 S-37-@

11 200"

6'8T4$

5uanito odrigue< owned a fi&edoor apartment locatat 4an 5ose 4treet, Euadalupe Nue&o, !akati 8ity. +n +ctob

/G, 1=2, he e*ecuted a uling abilin at Testamento gi&i

petitioner 8resenciana Tubo odrigueetitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. ence, th

petition.

%44F?$ Whether or not a will which was not probated has eff

or can confer a right.

FI%NE$ N+.

The 8ourt held that respondents failed to pro&e their right

possession, as the uling abilin at Testamento and t

>artition 'greement ha&e no legal effect since the will has n

been probated.

7efore any will can ha&e force or &alidity it must be probate

This cannotbe dispensed with and is a matter of public polic

'rticle 2 of the 8i&il 8ode mandates that OnPo will shall pa

either real or personal property unless it is pro&ed and allowed

accordance with the ules of 8ourt ." 's the will was n

probated, the >artition 'greement which was e*ecuted pursua

to the last will of 5uanito cannot be gi&en effect. Thus, the fa


18/48

that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial

in the determination of the issue of possession. !oreo&er, at the

time the deed of sale was e*ecuted in fa&or of the petitioner,

5uanito odrigue< remained the owner thereof since ownership

would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as

owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of itduring his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was &alid

is an issue that can be resol&ed only in the action filed by

respondents with the T8 of !akati 8ity. The action in this case

is one of unlawful detainer which is summary in nature and

hence the &alidity of the will shall not be subect to a collateralattack. The 8ourts ruling on the issue of ownership is only

pro&isional to determinewho between the parties has the better

right of possession. Thus, the 8ourt re&ersed and set aside thedecision of the 8'.

2#. ZOSIA VERDAD &'. CA [G.R. N+. 1099"2. A3?

29 1996]

The petitioner, osima -erdad, is the purchaser of a

/3suare meter residential lot (identified to be Iot No. :/=, Ts

): of the 7utuan 8adastre, located along !agallanes 4treet, now

!arcos !. 8alo 4t., 7utuan 8ity#. >ri&ate respondent, 4ocorro8ordero -da. de osales, seeks to e*ercise a right of legal

redemption o&er the subect property and traces her title to the

late !acaria 'tega, her motherinlaw, who died intestate on 0

!arch 1=:).

;uring her lifetime, !acaria contracted two marriages$

the first with 'ngel 7urdeos and the second, following the

latters death, with 8anuto osales. 't the time of her own

death, !acaria was sur&i&ed by her son amon '. 7urdeos and

her grandchild (by her daughter 6elicidad '. 7urdeos# ?stela

Io


19/48


20/48

depri&ing the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees# of the

deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights

to succession or inheritance, taking ad&antage of the total

physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Eenerosa de

-enecia aggra&ated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded

and conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulatedgrossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be e*ecuted on 'ugust

21, 1== and ointly on the same date, caused the e*ecution of

the deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by Eenerosa de

-enecia co&ering the same property described in the deed of

e*traudicial partition and by &irtue of the said acts, appellantswere able to secure new land titles in their fa&or (ecords, pp. 2

3, 8omplaint#. 'ppellees thus prayed that the ;eed of ?*tra

udicial >artition, ;eed of 'bsolute 4ale and Transfer 8ertificateof Title No. :3)31 be declared &oid from the beginning.

4ignificantly, in their answer, defendants alleged$

1). That the deceased 4ps. 5ose J. 6ernande< and Eenerosa

were husband and wife blessed with one child the herein

defendant odolfo -. 6ernande< whom they acknowledged

during their lifetime. (underscoring supplied#

1. That the ;eed of ?*traudicial >artition and ;eed of

'bsolute 4ale e*ecuted by the late Eenerosa de -enecia anddefendant odolfo -. 6ernande< which are now in uestion were

all made with the full knowledge, consent and appro&al of the

parties thereto and for &alue." (ecords, pp. /0/1, 'nswer#."

%44F? 1$

W@N the e*traudicial partition e*ecuted by petitioner odolfo

6ernande< and Eenerosa 6ernande/,000.00, with right to repurchase within eig

(# years. The three (2# siblings di&ided the proceeds of the s

among themsel&es, each getting a share of >))).)).


21/48

?I;$

When ufino 8abales died intestate, his wife 4aturnina and his

si* ()# children, 7onifacio, 'lbino, 6rancisco, Ieonora, 'lberto

and petitioner ito, sur&i&ed and succeeded him. 'rticle ==) of

the New 8i&il 8ode pro&ides that OiPf a widow or widower and

legitimate children or descendants are left, the sur&i&ing spouse

has in the succession the same share as that of each of the

children." -erily, the se&en (G# heirs inherited eually on subectproperty. >etitioner ito and 'lberto, petitioner Nelsons father,

inherited in their own rights and with eual shares as the others.

7ut before partition of subect land was effected, 'lberto died.

7y operation of law, his rights and obligations to onese&enth of

subect land were transferred to his legal heirs [ his wife and his

son petitioner Nelson.

28. ARAS &. CALISTERIO 'pril ), /000 (E No.

12)3)G#

6'8T4$

+n /3 'pril 1==/, Teodorico 8alisterio died intestate, lea&ingse&eral parcels of land with an estimated &alue of >)03,G:0.00.

Teodorico was sur&i&ed by his wife, herein respondent !arietta8alisterio.

Teodorico was the second husband of !arietta who hadpre&iously been married to 5ames William 7ounds on 12 5anuary

1=3) at 8aloocan 8ity. 5ames 7ounds disappeared without a

trace on 11 6ebruary 1=3G. Teodorico and !arietta were married

ele&en years later, or on 0 !ay 1=:, without !arietta ha&ing

priorly secured a court declaration that 5ames was presumpti&ely

dead.

+n 0= +ctober 1==/, herein petitioner 'ntonia 'rmas y

8alisterio, a sur&i&ing sister of Teodorico, filed with the

egional Trial 8ourt (DT8D# of Queetitioner,D claiming to be inter alia, the sole sur&i&ing heir of

Teodorico 8alisterio, the marriage between the latter and

respondent !arietta ?spinosa 8alisterio being allegedly

bigamous and thereby null and &oid. 4he prayed that her son

4infroniano 8. 'rmas, 5r., be appointed administrator, without

bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be

adudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would

ha&e been settled.

espondent !arietta opposed the petition. !arietta stated that

her first marriage with 5ames 7ounds had been dissol&ed due to

the latterHs absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for morethan ele&en years before she contracted her second marriage with

Teodorico. 8ontending to be the sur&i&ing spouse of Teodorico,

she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the

decedent.

+n 0: 6ebruary 1==2, the trial court issued an order appointing

ointly 4infroniano 8. 'rmas, 5r., and respondent !arietta

administrator and administratri*, respecti&ely, of the intestate

estate of Teodorico.

%44F?$

W+N the marriage between deceased Teoderico 8. 'nd !arie

8. is &alid.

?I;$

Kes. The law in force at the time of their marriage was the 8i

8ode, not the 6amily 8ode which took effect only on 02 'ugu

1=. 'rticle /:) of the 6amily 8ode : itself limited

retroacti&e go&ernance only to cases where it thereby would n

preudice or impair &ested or acuired rights in accordance w

the 8i&il 8ode or other laws. 'rticle 2 of the New 8i&il 8o

which pro&ides$

'rt. 2. 'ny marriage subseuently contracted by any pers

during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with a

person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and &oid fro

its performance, unless$

1# The first marriage was annulled or dissol&ed9 or

/# The first spouse had been absent for se&en consecuti&e yea

at the time of the second marriage without the spouse prese

ha&ing news of the absentee being ali&e, or if the absentthough he has been absent for less than se&en years, is genera

considered as dead and belie&ed to be so by the spouse presentthe time of contracting such subseuent marriage, or if t

absentee is presumed dead according to articles 2=0 and 2=1. T

marriage so contracted shall be &alid in any of the three ca

until declared null and &oid by a competent court.

Fnlike in the 6amily 8ode, the New 8i&il 8ode does n

necessitate a udicial declaration of absence of the absen

spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.

29. ARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ EDROSA &'. C

RODRIGUEZ -7 / G.R. N+. 118680. / ! 2001

+n 'pril , 1=3), the spouses !iguel odrigue< and osalina

de odrigue< initiated proceedings before the 86% of +edrosa. +n 'ugust 1, 1=3), the 86% granted t

petition and declared petitioner >edrosa the adopted child

!iguel and osalina.

+n 'pril /=, 1=G/, !iguel died intestate. Thereafter, petition

and osalina entered into an e*traudicial settlement of !igue

estate, adudicating between themsel&es in eual proportion testate of !iguel.

+n No&ember /1, 1=G/, pri&ate respondents filed an action annul the adoption of petitioner before the 86% of +


22/48

The ;eed of ?*traudicial 4ettlement and >artition co&ered

fourteen parcels of land co&ering a total area of //3,2 suare

meters. These properties were di&ided among 5ose, 8armen,

!ercedes, amon and the heirs of !iguel, represented solely by

osalina. The heirs of !iguel were gi&en //) suare meters of

parcel /, and =,:)G suare meters and /3,3:G suare meters ofparcels G and =, respecti&ely. The total land area allocated to the

heirs of !iguel was 23,/:0 suare meters.

'rmed with the ;eed of ?*traudicial 4ettlement and >artition,

respondents odrigueartition

is &alid

?I;$ N+. 6ollowing ule G3 and the ruling in 7eltran &s.

'yson, since !aria ?lena did not participate in the said

partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

4ection 1 of ule G3 of the ules of 8ourt is the applicable rule

on publication of e*traudicial settlement. %t states$

The fact of the e*traudicial settlement or administration shall bepublished in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner

pro&ided in the ne*t succeeding section9 but no e*traudicial

settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not

participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Fnder said pro&ision, without the participation of all persons

in&ol&ed in the proceedings, the e*traudicial settlement cannot

be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice

which must be sent out or issued before the ;eed of 4ettlement

and@or >artition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested

parties to participate in the said deed of e*traudicial settlementand partition, not after, which was when publication was done in

the instant case. 6ollowing ule G3 and the ruling in

Documents

Civil Review Cases Finals