Civil Resistance and the Curruption-Violence Nexus

8/3/2019 Civil Resistance and the Curruption-Violence Nexus

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Civil Resistance and theCorruptionViolence Nexus

Shaazka Beyerle

International Center on Nonviolent Confict

There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to violentconict, some direct and some indirect. For ordinary citizens, theexperience o this nexus is the denial o basic reedoms and rights. Inspite o such bleak circumstances, people can move rom being vic-tims and bystanders to becoming a orce or transorming their so-cieties. Citizens are engaging in civil resistance to curb corruptionand win accountability and justice. This article: explores the link-ages between corruption and violence; identifes the conceptual andpractical limitations o top-down, technical approaches to combat-ing corruption; articulates a bottom-up approach in which the civicrealm is included in the anti-corruption equation; and presents casestudies o civic action campaigns and movements under conditionso violence, post-conict transormation or state capture by violentcrime syndicates. From these, general lessons learned are distilled.

Key words: corruption, civil resistance, civic action, nonviolent,people power, accountability, citizen, post-conict transormation,violent conict

Corruption is intimately linked to violent confict, humaninsecurity, and oppression. In a checklist o the root causeso confict and early warning indicators, the EuropeanCommission (2008) includes the corruption troika o briberyin bureaucracies, collusion between the private sector and civilservants, and organized crime. At an aggregate level, corrup-tion has been ound to be positively correlated with higher

risks o political instability (Le Billon, 2003). Human Rights


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54 Journal o Sociology & Social Welare

Watch (2007) cites a direct relationship between corruptionand political violence, in which state ocials use stolen publicrevenues to pay or violence in support o their political am-

bitions. A 2004 report o the Secretary Generals High-LevelPanel on Threats, Challenges and Change states that corrup-tion, illicit trade and money-laundering contribute to Stateweakness, impede economic growth and undermine democ-racy. These activities thus create a permissive environment orcivil confict (United Nations, 2004, p. 20). Finally, corruptionalso creates an overall climate o impunity (Kaumann, 2006).Human rights organizations link corruption to repression, as

it impedes government accountability, and can motivate o-cials and security orces to commit abuses or nancial or otherorms o gain (Ganesan, 2007).

There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked toviolent confict, some direct and some indirect. War economies

by their nature unction through maleasance; the parties inthe confict depend on raud, bribery, and criminal groups toexpedite the smooth unctioning o the system (Scharbatke-Church & Reiling, 2009). Arms trackers and trans-nationalorganized crime add to the deadly mix by readily providingweapons. The global illicit arms trade is estimated at $200-$300million annually and Arica is the largest so-called market. Asa result, the continent tragically suers the most casualtiesrom it (United Nations News Centre, 2010).

Moreover, corruption can draw out or perpetuate bloodyconrontations. Violent groups themselves engage in illicit ac-tivities to acquire weapons and supplies. According to a con-

dential source, Al Qaeda has access to emeralds mined in theNorthern Frontier province o Pakistan, rom which it has beenderiving approximately $150 million income per year. Nowhereis this process more wrenchingly evident than in DR Congo,where approximately 3.5 million lives have been lost sincethe onset o war in 1998 and hundreds o thousands o girlsand women have been systematically raped (Global Witness,2004; UNICEF, 2008). The military, rebel groups, and various

oreign allies have plundered the countrys diamonds, gold,timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt, not only to nance their atroci-ti b t lti t l t i h th l hi h h b


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violent conrontations over the Casamance region have brokenout among Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal, and betweenCameroon and Nigeria in the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula or an

equal length o time. A USAID report concluded that corrup-tion, more oten than not, played a key role in omenting andprotracting these conficts (USAID, 2007).

When corruption is endemic, whereby a complex systemo grat permeates the political system, economic spheres, and

basic provision o services in a country, it can stimulate socialunrest and oment violent confict. For example, in the NigerDelta, insurgent groups are amassing weapons and recruit-

ing young men rom an impoverished, angry and rustratedpopulation that experiences little benet rom oil wealth whileliving amidst horrendous environmental degradation romits extraction and processing (United Nations DevelopmentProgram, 2006).

In the post-confict context, corruption can unction as aninhibitor o sustainable peace, the latter needing human se-curity and stability to take root and fourish (Ahtisaari, 2009).First, grat can allow the entrenchment o the political statusquo that operated during the confict (Le Billon, 2007). Second,it undermines the new governments legitimacy, rule o law,and capacity or reconstruction, economic development andthe provision o basic public services. For ordinary citizens, thehorrors o war are replaced with grueling hardship, to whichpervasive maleasance adds another layer o tangible injustice,such as in Aghanistan. In a 2010 poll, 83 percent o Aghanssaid corruption aects their daily lives (United States Embassy

Kabul, 2010). As a result, the Taliban is recruiting new membersrom among the marginalized population oppressed by unre-lenting grat and poverty.

Corruption can be an enabler o state-capture in post-con-fict or ragile democracies. Tragically on the rise in CentralAmerica, narco-corruption reers to the interrelationship

between transnational drug cartels and state security orces,as well as the inltration o organized crime interests into

politics, governance and the actual unctioning o institutions,leading to countries such as Mexico and Guatemala beingll d t t I th t 2 5 M i P id t

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lives (Camp, 2009). The United Nations Oce o Drugs andCrime chie has asserted, Corruption, poverty and poor crim-inal justice capacity make Guatemala extremely vulnerable to

organized crime (United Nations Oce o Drugs & Crime,2010). Not coincidentally, the country is experiencing theworst violence since the cessation o the 36-year civil war in1996. Approximately 5,000 people are murdered each year dueto organized crime and gangs, now compounded by Mexicandrug-cartels expanding south across the border (Dudley, 2010;Sanchez, 2007). Narco-corruption, o course, is not limited tothe Americas. The drug trade in Aghanistan also serves as the

main source o nancing or the private armies o local war-lords, which are connected to parts o the post-confict gov-ernment (Condential communication, 2009). The Taliban is inon the game as well, exchanging drugs or weapons (Starkey,2008).

A vicious cycle can develop, whereby authoritarian and/orineectual governance paired with endemic corruption resultsin the urther de-legitimization o authority and rule o law,leading to ragmented tyrannies, which in turn reinorces au-thoritarian and/or ineectual governance, impunity, poverty,and so on. In contrast, civil resistance has the potential to ac-tivate an anti-corruption cycle. Nonviolent social movementsand grass-roots civic campaigns can challenge the corruptionviolence nexus, which in turn create alternative loci o power,thereby empowering the civic realm to continue to wage stra-tegic civic campaigns and movements (Zunes, 2008). The civicrealm reers to the collective non-state, bottom-up initiatives

and relationships in a society. This includes: nonviolent civiccampaigns and movements; civil society organizations (CSOs);nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); community-basedorganizations (CBOs); civic coalitions and alliances; unions;proessional organizations; grass-roots networks, committees,and collectives; local citizen groups; activists, community or-ganizers, and last but not least, citizens.

Echoing this dynamic, a Kenyan civic leader explained:

I people are able to be encouraged to go out, today its CDF[Constituency Development Funds], tomorrow its somethingl d th d it th thi S CDF i t



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corruption is to simultaneously touch the myriad o injusticesto which it is linked, rom violence and poverty, to impunity,human rights abuses, authoritarianism, unaccountability, sub-

standard social services, and environmental destruction. Thus,ghting grat is not a supercial solution that avoids the un-derlying problem; it can be a direct attack on oppression.

Civil Resistance

Civil resistance expresses people power through the useo nonviolent strategies and tactics. It is also called nonvio-

lent struggle and nonviolent confict. People power reers topolitical, social and economic pressure that is exerted by sig-nicant numbers o people organized together around sharedgrievances and goals.

The ecacy o civil resistance is not a matter o theory(Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Nonviolent social movementsand civic campaigns have a rich history o ending oppressionand injustice and the apparatus o state and other orms o cor-

ruption. A 2008 study ound that in the last century, violentcampaigns succeeded historically in only 26 percent o allcases, compared to 53 percent in the case o nonviolent, civil-ian-based campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). A quanti-tative analysis o transitions rom authoritarianism to democ-racy over the past three decades ound that civil resistance wasa key actor in driving 75% o political transitions, and suchtransormations were ar more likely to result in democratic

reorm and civil liberties than violent or elite-led, top-downchanges. O the 35 countries subsequently rated Free accord-ing to a Freedom House index, 32 had a signicant bottom upcivil resistance component (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005).

Over the past twenty years, rom the 1986 People Poweruprising in the Philippines to the Color Revolutions in theormer Soviet Union, corruption has been a source o deeppublic discontent and a key mobilizing issue o nonviolentsocial movements. This shows that people themselves, whoincreasingly experience the nexus o violent confict, crime andcorruption as another orm o tyranny, can move rom being



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Reconceptualizing Corruption

The global anti-corruption arena is relatively new, having

emerged over the past two decades. While there certainly hasbeen progress, change has been modest (International Councilon Human Rights Policy, 2009). Wide-scale, national anti-cor-ruption programs, avored by donor countries and multilateralinstitutions, have had less than consistent results (Hussmann& Hechler, 2008). Transparency Internationals 2010 GlobalCorruption Barometer ound that 60 percent o those surveyedin 86 countries and territories said that corruption has increasedover the past three years. Eighty percent stated that politicalparties are corrupt or extremely corrupt and hal asserted thattheir governments eorts to stop corruption were ineective.Since 2006, pay-os to police are said to have doubled, whilemore respondents reported paying bribes to the judiciary, andor registry and permit services than in 2005. Poorer interview-ees were twice as likely as more well-o individuals to pay

bribes or basic services.Through the ramework civil resistance and people power,

its not surprising that a predominantly top-down approach haslimitations. One must start with the denition o corruption,commonly characterized as the misuse o entrusted poweror private gain, or the abuse o public oce or privategain (Transparency International, 2010). While concise andaccurate, conceptually they do not convey the systemic natureo corruption, which involves a complex set o relationships,some obvious and others hidden, with established vested in-

terests, that can cut across political, economic and social orces.Moreover, how a problem is dened will aect how it is ad-dressed. Thus, up until this decade, there was an over-empha-sis on the state. Less attention was paid to other groups, suchas agricultural landowners, private sector, multinational cor-porations, oligarchies, crime syndicates, gangs, and paramili-taries, as well as their inter-relationships.

Second, the strategies have been top-down and elite-driven, with a ocus on developing norms, rules and structuresthat mainly target administrative grat. According to a ormerWorld Bank specialist there is the allacy that one ghts cor-



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has translated into a preponderance o international agree-ments, policy diagnoses, legislation, and institution-building,such as anti-corruption commissions, improvement o nation-

al and local government capacity, and public nance manage-ment. The underlying assumption is that once anti-corruptionrameworks are put in place, illicit practices will change. Buthow can institutional mechanisms bring orth change, whenthey must be implemented by the very institutions that arecorrupt? Those who are benetting rom corruption are ex-pected to be the ones to curb it. Its not surprising then, thateven when political will exists, it can be thwarted, because too

many people have a stake in the crooked status quo.Lastly, traditional strategies have not appreciably actoredpeople into the equationalthough they are the ones who bearthe brunt o corruption, have direct experience o it, suer itsill-eects, and can contribute to curbing it. For those on thereceiving end, the experience o corruption can be oppressionand a loss o reedom. Aruna Roy, one o the ounders o the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) Right to Inormationmovement in India, characterizes corruption as the externalmaniestation o the denial o a right, an entitlement, a wage,a medicine (Roy, n.d.). Viewed rom this perspective, thepriorities shit to controlling those orms o grat and abusethat are most harmul or common to citizens, particularly thepoor. The goals are accountability, participatory democracy,and social and economic justice.

The Dynamics o a Bottom-Up Approach to

Curbing Corruption

To its credit, there has been a growing recognition in theinternational anti-corruption community and among donorsand development institutions, especially over the past sixyears, that corruption cannot be challenged unless the civicrealm is involved, including an active citizenry. This para-digm shit was encapsulated in the nal statement o the 14th

International Anti-Corruption Conerence (2010), which stated:Empowered people create change This expanded elemento our conerence points the way or the uture o the anti cor



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Well-organized, strategic civic movements and campaignsmay be particularly suited to a systemic approach to curbingcorruption. First, mobilized people, engaged in organized

collective nonviolent action, constitute a social orce thatcan exert pressure on the state, as well as on other sectors insociety. Second, civil resistance can disrupt both vertical (upand down within an institution) and horizontal (across in-stitutions, groups, sectors) corruption. Third, civil resistancehas a strategic advantage, as it consists o extra-institutionalmethods o action to push or change, when power holders arecorrupt and/or unaccountable, and institutional channels are

blocked or ineective. This involves generating political will,demanding specic measures, and reinorcing new patterns oadministration and governance centered on accountability tocitizens. Hence, top-down and bottom-up approaches are notmutually exclusive. Civic campaigns and movements can com-plement and reinorce legal and administrative mechanisms,which constitute the anti-corruption inrastructure neededor long-term transormation o systems o grat and abuse.Finally, civil resistance can also support honest individuals,within state institutions and other entities, who are attemptingreorms and change. All too oten, lone gures cannot chal-lenge or dismantle entrenched, multi-aceted systems o gratand unaccountability. Such attempts have been compared tothe actions o political dissidents, who stand in singular de-ance beore an entire undemocratic system and are easily sup-pressed (Martin, Callaghan, & Fox, 1997). This was the ate o

John Githongo, a ormer Kenyan anti-corruption chie, who

fed the country in 2004 ater threats to his lie.Civic campaigns and movements, by their nature, emerge

rom the civic realm and include the participation o ordi-nary people united around common grievances, goals anddemands. People power is generated through the sustained,strategic application o a variety o nonviolent tactics that aredesigned to:

Strengthen citizen participation and campaigncapacity;

Di t t ti i l di di h t



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Weaken the sources o support and control orunaccountable and corrupt power holders; entities,systems, and their enablers; and/or

Win support o sectors, groups, institutions, andpeople over to the civic campaign or movement, thelatter including rom the public and rom withincorrupt systems, or example, political leaders andhonest ocials.

Nonviolent tactics constitute the methods o civil resis-tance. Scholars such as Gene Sharp have identied over 200tactics, and most campaigns and movements create new ones.

Civic anti-corruption initiatives engage in varieties o: noncooperation, civil disobedience

low-risk mass actions, displays o symbols

street theatre, visual dramatizations and stunts

songs, poetry, cultural expressions, humor

civic report cards or political candidates

citizen report cards or public services monitoring o ocials, members o parliament,

institutions, budgets, spending and public services

social audits and ace the people orums

social networking technologies (e.g., Facebookorganizing and petitioning, blogging, SMScommunication)

education and training, youth recreation

social and economic empowerment initiatives,creation o parallel institutions

anti-corruption pledges; citizen-sponsored anti-corruption awards

protests, petitions, vigils, marches, sit-ins, leafeting

strikes, boycotts, and reverse boycotts (e.g.,patronizing businesses that reuse to pay protectionmoney or bribes)

nonviolent blockades, nonviolent accompaniment



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Civic Campaigns and Movements to Fight Corruption

Though not widely known, there has been a grass-roots,

bottom-up eruption against corruption, to borrow a popularslogan o the Fith Pillar movement in India. The author has been conducting a research project to document and distillgeneral lessons learned rom civic campaigns and movementsto ght grat and abuse, demand accountability and win rights.It is examining the skills, strategies, objectives and demands osuch civic initiatives, rather than the phenomenon o corrup-tion itsel. The ocus is on what civic actors and citizensor-ganized together, exerting their collective powerare doing tocurb corruption as they themselves dene and experience it.

Over 30 cases have been identied, o which 15 are beingdocumented and analyzed in depth. A number o common at-tributes o civic campaigns and movements to ght corruptionare emerging rom the case studies. Bottom-up initiatives can

be ound around the world, among democracies, semi-democ-racies and authoritarian regimes. Contrary to common mis-conceptions that civic mobilization is only possible when there

is political space, a relatively educated populace and a non-violent legacy, they are prevalent in societies enduring poorgovernance, poverty, illiteracy, repression, and violence, thelatter two perpetrated by the state, organized crime, paramili-tary groups and gangs. Rather than spontaneous outbursts,organization and planning precede action, even when a scan-dalous event rst arouses public indignation. Taken together,they conrm what some civil resistance scholars assert; skills

and strategy generally matter more than pre-existing condi-tions (Ackerman, 2007).Women and youth are also playing galvanizing roles in many

campaigns, notably in Muslim settings. Dening methods,around which a host o nonviolent tactics revolve, are common(Schock, 2010). Success in one struggle or context inspires newapplications, knowledge-sharing and campaignslocally andeven across borders and continents. Finally, the struggles arequite oten multidimensional in ocus, refecting the realitythat corruption does not occur in a vacuum; it is linked to otherorms o oppression and injustice



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relevance to peace building and confict transormation con-texts and strategies.

Guatemala: Grass-Roots Resistance to Violence and ImpunityIn Guatemala, innovative grass-roots civil resistance

movements have been undermining the corruption-violencenexus at the community level, maintaining resilience in theace o brutal repression, and ostering social and economicdevelopment. One particularly poignant case is in Santa LuciaCotzumalguapa, a mid-size town populated largely by indig-enous people, which suered great losses during the civil war

(1960-96). It was the cradle o the organized peasant movement,and the site o persecution and mass murder o peasants, churchmembers and unions by state orces, which was sponsored bysugar plantation (Finca) owners. Every guerilla action had apresence as well. Dozens o the organized paramilitary groupshave since been transormed into hit-men operations, and it isnow unortunately situated in a geographical spot convenientto cross-border narco-tracking, rom Columbia up to Mexicoor the North American market (C. Samayoa, personal com-munications, various dates, 2008-2010).

Refecting a collective outcry o despair, a local citizensmovement emerged in the atermath o the civil war. Its ob-

jectives were to recover the community and local governmentrom the hands o drug lords and organized crime, promoteeconomic and social development, create a collective sense oworth and empowerment, challenge the climate o impunity,prevent electoral raud, and deend hard-won gains along the

way. Organizers put together a strong coalition that includedwomen, youth, and community groups. In spite o the legacyo repression, they initially built alliances with Finca owners(which later broke down) to support an honest candidatein the local elections and kick out a drug lord rom the localgovernment.

Over the years, they conducted a wide range o nonvio-lent actions, such as: civil disobedience; solidarity demonstra-

tions; literacy, education and development programs; radiocall-in programs; theater; art estivals; and recreation projectsi d t th h t th t t i d i



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By 2007, 11 community leaders had been murdered, our at-tempts were made on an honest mayors lie, slandering anddeamation cases were lodged, electoral raud was orchestrat-

ed, and the police, prosecutors and judges avored the drugcartels, an odious conrmation o the extent o corruption andstate capture.

In spite o this extreme intimidation, citizens reused to besubdued. Solidarity demonstrations and civil disobedience per-sisted. People engaged in new methods to disrupt the corruptstatus quo, such as monitoring the actions and spending o thenew authorities in power, as well as criminal activities, report-

ing the latter to the newly instituted International Commissionagainst Impunity in Guatemala, though it appears the case willnot be pursued. However, the Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights has accepted the case o the rst assassinationthat struck the town, which will proceed in 2011.

A signicant dimension was added to the struggletheinternational community. Guatemalan human rights de-enders drew world attention to the movement. They gar-nered support or civic initiatives rom the United NationsDevelopment Program and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stitung. A se-curity plan was devised, bolstered by human rights organiza-tions that networked to bring international observers and non-violent accompaniment to protect people at risk. Santa LuciaCotzumalguapa became the host o national and internationalmeetings, thereby sending a message to the corrupt powerholders that the country and the world were watching andstood together with the townspeople. Finally, home-grown,

grass-roots solidarity and coordination networks have been es-tablished with other indigenous communities engaged in civilresistance both in Guatemala and across borders. They shareinormation, experiences, and strategies, send out alerts, andeven have come to one anothers aid, or example, by blockinga road.

In extending the arena o resistance rom the local to theregional and international, the community is increasing its ca-

pacity o people power, the source being strength in numbers.From unity within, they are building a broader ront involvinglli t ll l l I ti t i l t



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crime, in essence, the citizens movement is now creating analternative system o civil resistance, involving national andtransnational networking, solidarity and action. In seeking to

overcome marginalization and poverty through education anddevelopment initiatives, or women and youth as well as thetown at large, the movement calls to mind Mohandas Gandhisconstructive programme in the nonviolent eort, (Gandhi,1945) in which equality, education, and economic sel-reli-ance were core elements. Finally, the people o Santa LuciaCotzumalguapa embody what Gandhi observed decades ago,Strength does not come rom physical capacity. It comes rom

an indomitable will (Gandhi, n.d.).

Indonesia: People Power Provides ProtectionAter 32 years o authoritarian rule and state violence

under General Suharto, the multi-ethnic Indonesia begana new chapter o governance in 1999. Nonviolent civic co-alitions played a signicant role in his demise (Karatnycky& Ackerman, 2005). The fedgling democracy inherited amultitude o ills not unlike those o post-war contexts, romwidespread poverty to a 30-year armed confict in Aceh thatresulted in close to 15,000 deaths (World Bank, 2005), dysunc-tional state institutions, security orce impunity, and corrup-tion, the latter embedded into the power structures and socialabric o the country. Into this mix was born the CorruptionEradication Commission (KPK) in 2003. When both the institu-tion and leading gures in it were assailed, a nationwide civiccampaign came to its rescue, providing a rich example o how

civil resistance can protect government structures and honestocials in ragile states.

While some anti-corruption commissions are dismissedas window-dressing to satisy donors and multilateral in-stitutions, others are at the oreront o ghting corruptionand gaining transparency. The KPK has earned the publicsrespect and admiration since it was created in 2003. It wasseen as the hope to x a broken country (condential source,

2010). KPK did not hesitate to conront the powers that be,and expose corrupt behavior and relationships among thel l d ti l t P li t Ad i i t ti



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negative reputation with the public. It convicted politicians,governors, judicial gures, and in 2008, the Deputy Governoro the Central Bank, who is also the ather-in-law o President

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonos son (Lindsey, 2009).By threatening the entire tangled system o infuence and

grat benetting the ruling elites, KPK soon became a target.Since early 2009, eorts to weaken, i not destroy, it have inten-sied, including police criminalization o some o its activities,the arrest o its Chairman or murder, investigations o deputycommissioners, and parliamentary attempts to cut its budgetand authority. The situation came to a head mid-year, in the

wake o ongoing investigations o embezzlement in the ina-mous Bank Century bailout, in which a wiretapped conversa-tion documented the senior police ocer handling the Centurycase and a politically connected tycoon, Boedi Sampoerna, dis-cussing an arrangement to saely withdraw Rp 2 trillion de-posited at the bank in return or a Rp 10 billion payo.

By July 2009, a core group o civil society leadersveter-ans rom the Reormasi civic movement against the ormerSuharto regimesaw the signs (non-attributable activists,2010). They decided it was necessary to proactively develop astrategy to protect KPKthe institution, its mandate and au-thority. One activist said, We realized that what we aced wasso big and so strong and has so much authority, we neededto come together. (non-attributable personal communication,April, 2010). They launched the CICAK campaign, which had adual meaning. Its an acronym or Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption, but it also reers to the gecko lizard. During the

Bank Century investigations, the Chie o the Polices criminaldepartment said that the KPK was like the gecko ghting thecrocodile. One hundred civic organizations joined, and a grad-uate student on his own accord created a CICAK Facebookgroup, which soon played a role bigger than anyone imagined.CICAK groups ormed in 20 o the countrys 33 provinces andwell-known public gures came on board.

On October 29, the police arrested two KPK deputy

Chairmen, Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto, oncharges o abuse o power. The arrests came a day aterP id tY dh d d i ti ti i t i t d



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Oce ocial, in which the president was said to supporteorts to quell KPK. On October 30, the President gave a tele-vised address stating he would let the police continue with the

case. People were urious with the police and embittered withtheir leader, who had recently been re-elected on an anti-cor-ruption platorm. This repression backred; CICAK was readyto channel popular anger into civic mobilization. The Facebookgroup grew so quickly that television news ran hourly updateso the numbers, which reached 1.3 million and became a keytool through which to communicate with and rally citizens.CICAK organized actions in Jakarta, while local chapters and

high school and university students spontaneously initiatedevents throughout the country.Campaign tactics included demonstrations, marches to the

Presidential palace, petitions, wearing a black ribbon symbol-izing the death o justice, gecko T-shirts, pins, stickers, leafets,

banners reading Say no to crocodiles, street murals, sit-ins,gatherings in ront o police stations, a hunger strike, streettheater, concerts, and happening art that oten involvedhumor and garnered national media coverage, or example,

jumping o the KPK building with parachutes. Popular singersadded their support and composed an anti-corruption song,which people used or ringtones, with the rerains gecko eatscrocodile, and KPK in my chest. Citizens o all ages, socio-economic groups, and religions participated. CICAK leadersreport that the upper middle and middle classes joined instreets actions; proessionals could be seen standing togetherwith students and poor people. Senior clerics o Indonesias

ve aiths paid solidarity visits to KPK.CICAK demanded an immediate independent investiga-

tion and called on the President to save the KPK. As peoplepower escalated, he agreed to it, and the investigation begansoon ater. Millions around the country heard a wire-tape inwhich senior ocials rom the police and attorney generalsoce and a big businessman planned to rame the KPK o-cials, including killing Chandra. The independent commis-

sion recommended the charges against the KPK ocials bedropped. Bibit and Chandra were released and went back tok S i i th li d tt l

67Civil Resistance and the CorruptionViolence Nexus


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CICAK campaign was the single largest social mobilization inIndonesia since the Suharto dictatorship. Civic leaders remainvigilant against new attacks on the KPK, but also exert pressure

on the KPK itsel, in order to keep it clean and accountable.

Kenya: Overcoming Marginalization, Winning AccountabilityMuslims or Human Rights (MUHURI) is a nongovern-

mental organization (NGO) based in Mombasa that operatesamong impoverished communities in the area, which was asite o political and ethnic violence in 1997 and ater the 2008elections. It is catalyzing grass-roots civic campaigns to accessinormation about budgets, curb corruption, win accountabil-ity, and ultimately, ght poverty. It empowers poor communi-ties in making their voices heard to their elected representativesand local ocials, thereby channeling rustration, hopeless-ness and anger away rom hostilities to changing unjust condi-tions.The immediate ocus is on the use, or rather, misuse oconstituency development unds (CDFs), which are annual al-locations o approximately one million dollars to each Membero Parliament or his/her district. MUHURIs long-term vision

is to cultivate a sense o agency among Kenyans (InternationalBudget Partnership, 2010; Ramkumar & Kidambi, 2010).

CDF is the result o a popular idea in the developmentworld; devolve power and give local communities resourcesor their own development schemes. However, when thereis no meaningul independent oversight and corruption isendemic, the end result is oten mismanagement and grat.For MUHURI, its up to the people to provide the oversight.

Since 2007, the NGO has worked to animate and train citi-zens in civic mobilization. Through a pioneering collabora-tion with the International Budget Partnership and veteranactivists rom the MKSS movement in India, it has developeda dening nonviolent methodthe ve-step social audit. Therst step is inormation gatheringrecords rom the local CDFoce. MUHURI representatives are initially sent, because itsdaunting or ordinary citizens to approach ocials and obtaininormation. The second step is training local men and womento become community activists. They learn how to decipherdocuments and budgets monitor expenditures and scrutinize



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The third step is inspecting the CDF project site. Newlytrained activists conduct systematic, meticulous documenta-tion, comparing records to the reality on the ground. They also

use site visits to speak with local people, in order to gener-ate interest in the social audit, get them to attend the publichearing, and gather additional inormation about corruptionand abuse. The ourth step is educating and motivating ellowcitizens about the CDF and their right to inormation and ac-countability. Community activists and MUHURI attract atten-tion, directly engage people, and encourage them to attenda public hearing through nonviolent tactics such as street

theater, puppet plays, trumpet and drum processions, andleafeting by volunteers. Inormation about CDF misuse andgrat is shared and peoples reactions and input are gathered.

The nal step is the public hearing with CDF ocials, themedia, and in some cases, the Member o Parliament. MUHURIrst leads a procession through the community, complete withslogans, chanting and a youth band. It gathers dancing childrenand adults as it goes along. Once the orum begins, local activ-ists present the results o their investigations, CDF ocials arequestioned, and citizens demand accountability o them. AtMUHURIs rst ever public hearing in August 2007, approxi-mately 1500-2000 residents in the Changamwe slum attended,many standing or over our hours. The MP nally agreed toregister their complaints and charges against the concernedcontractors. MUHURI then rolled out a cloth banner petitiondemanding that accountability and transparency measures beadded to the CDF Act and the RTI law be passed. The MP ini-

tially reused to sign it, but ater all the people and opposi-tion candidates signed it, he acquiesced to civic pressure andadded his name.

In 2009, whilst conducting the Likoni constituency socialaudit, MUHURIs oce was ransacked and their guard wasstabbed. The intimidation backred. The next day a popularradio station interviewed the Executive Director and a localactivist, which gave them another platorm to communicate

with people and increase attendance at the public hearing.That same year, activists rom eight constituencies that con-d t d i l dit j i d ti l i t di



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Kenyan government set up a task orce to review it. MUHURIis increasing its eorts to develop new campaigns (H. Khalid,personal communication, November 12, 2010). For instance,

during the nal week o October 2010, a social audit was con-ducted in the Mwatate constituency. Earlier that month thelocal public Chair and Secretary had been arrested and chargedin court or misappropriation o unds. The audit is investigat-ing whether or not other project unds had been embezzled inaddition to those under scrutiny in the court case.

Turkey: Low-Risk Mass Actions Surmount Fear and Apathy

Public apathy and ear o reprisals rom either the state orvicious non-state actors are common among countries enguledin violent confict or emerging rom it. Nonviolent street actions,such as protests, marches and sit-ins may, at least initially, betoo risky. As was the case in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, thisdid not mean that people were powerless. To the contrary, the

brilliance and creativity o ordinary citizens to disrupt systemso maleasance and impact the corruptionviolence nexus isstaggering. The ollowing case illustrates the orce o civicpressure rom low-risk, mass actions.

In 1996, Turkey was plagued by a nationwide crime syn-dicate that involved paramilitary entities, drug trackers,the maa, businesses, government ocials, members o par-liament, and parts o the judiciary and media. Extra-judicialkillings were common, some linked to the maa and some po-litical in nature. That November a speeding car crashed on ahighway late at night near the town o Susurluk. Among the

passengers were a police chie and police academy director, amember o parliament, and an escaped criminal and paramili-tary member (wanted by the Turkish courts, Swiss police andInterpol) who possessed a ake ID signed by the minister ointernal aairs. The car contained cash, cocaine, and weapons.The ollowing day students held unplanned protests through-out the country, but were harshly repressed by police, whileother youth already on trial or previously breaking the dem-

onstration law were sentenced to 15 months in prison (Akay& Mahoney, 2003; E. Salman, personal communication, June24 2010)



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advocates decided that this scandal provided an opportu-nity to tap public disgust, mobilize people to action, andpush or denable measures. Their demands were to remove

parliamentary immunity, prosecute the ounders o thecriminal groups; protect judges trying such cases; and revealthe crime syndicate relationships. They ormed the CitizenInitiative or Constant Light. From the outset, they made stra-tegic choicescitizens should eel a sense o ownership in theeort and the campaign would be apoliticalin order to builda broad alliance, protect against smear attacks, and attract thewidest possible base o people. Prior to taking action they

dened goals, analyzed the medias views on corruption,and developed a publicity strategy. Because the maa had re-cently been taking control o a major broadcasting corporationthrough manipulating legislation and business links, the pressand National Broadcasters Association were looking or waysto improve the medias image, and prior to the Susurluk crash,had hired a PR expert to help them. Following the scandal, hepersonally became involved in Citizen Initiative or ConstantLight.

The civic group systematically built a coalition by reach-ing out to non-political entities, including the IstanbulCoordination o Chambers o Proessions, the Bar Association,unions, nongovernmental organizations, and the proessionalassociations o pharmacists, dentists, civil engineers and elec-trical engineers. The organizers sought to create an innovativenonviolent action that would overcome real obstacles, such asviolent crackdowns, imprisonment, and public ear and eel-

ings o powerlessness. The teenage daughter o a lawyer in-volved in the campaign came up with the idea o turning olights. A chain o mass axes and press releases signed by ananonymous aunt, who became the image o the campaign,got the word out.

On February 1, 1997, citizens began to turn o their lightsat 9:00 p.m. or one minute. Ater two weeks, approximately30 million people participated throughout the country, adding

their own embellishments such as banging pots and pans andstaging street actions. Neighborhood squares took on a estiveh t l th i d th d t th

71Civil Resistance and the CorruptionViolence Nexus


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strong taboo over conronting corruption. It empowered citi-zens to ght corruption and orced the government to launch

judicial investigations. What was not anticipated was that the

military would remove its support or the government, whichwas orced to resign. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan re-mained in power until a new government was approved bythe parliament six months later.

The next prime minister continued the court cases, handedout verdicts, and set up an investigative committee, which pre-pared a report listing the names o all people murdered by thecrime syndicate. A parliamentary committee was also created

to document the syndicates activities. In 2001, the interior min-ister launched a series o investigations. In cooperation withthe Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, widespreadembezzlement was exposed, and well-known business execu-tives were arrested. What was not achieved, one o the originalobjectives, was the removal o parliamentary immunity, whichwould have allowed an investigation o the Susurluk parlia-mentarian. However, by 2003 most o old guard was voted out.Analysts believe that voters punished both the political estab-lishment and the military by electing the AK (White) Party, themoderate Islamic party.

Lessons Learned

The case studies provide general lessons learned aboutthe application o civil resistance to curb corruption and winaccountability, rights and equity. Whether within one com-

munity or on a larger ront, unity is essential. This includesunity around goals, and among people and groups wantingchange. This goes hand-in-hand with shared ownership, thesense that everyone is part o the struggle and can play a rolein it. Both unity and ownership can be strategically cultivated.Civic campaigns and movements link corruption to widely-held concerns, such as state capture to grievances and tangi-

ble injustices that impact peoples daily lives, including basic

human security, poverty, lack o medical care, access to water,etc. Inormation itsel, in the orm o budgets, spending, andpower holders assets is a source o power when accompa-


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73

as was the case in Kenya.Creativity is a hallmark o eective mobilization, tacti-

cal development, and communication. Eective tactics can

derive rom local circumstances and refect local culture.Consequently, while a particular tactic may not necessarily betranserable across situations, the strategic considerations andimpact can be emulated. For example, low-risk mass actionscan activate people power even under conditions o intimida-tion and public resignation, and once enacted, can emboldencitizens to urther action. In Turkey, it began with coordinatedswitching o o lights, soon augmented by unanticipated out-

pourings on the street. In the digital age, joining a Facebookgroup and uploading SMS ringtones in Indonesia had a similarunction, and led to urther dissent.

Communications are strategically important to build aware-ness, win support and actively involve citizens. Depending onthe audiences and objectives o the messaging, the medium ocommunicating can be the media itsel, rom songs to streettheater. Though not oten considered part o the nonviolenttactical repertoire, education, training and youth recreation can

be vital to build campaign capacity, condence and resilience.Tactical innovation, such as turning everyday actions into actso resistance, can thus be crucial to build support, overcomerepression, human rights abuses, and maintain campaign re-silience. An honest image is critical or winning support. Theassociation o groups and individuals who are seen as incor-ruptible can have a galvanizing eect.

As in other nonviolent struggles, in disrupting systems

o grat and the corruption-violence link, power comes romnumberslocally, nationally, and even internationally, in thecase o Guatemala, when citizens conront endemic corruptioninvolving national and cross-border relationships and actors.Power is indeed not monolithic; allies and support can bewon rom within corrupt systems and individual institutions,which can yield inormation, access and strategic negotiations,especially when backed by citizen mobilization.

Conclusion

Civil Resistance and the CorruptionViolence Nexus


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a bleak picture o human anguish. In spite o dicult circum-stances, or perhaps because o them, citizens are mobilizing,engaging in civil resistance and wielding people power to curb

corruption and injustice, in some cases weakening linkageswith violence. They exempliy the capacity o civil resistanceto potentially prevent some orms o violent confict, osterconfict transormation, and strengthen post-confict peace

building. As importantly, the achievements o citizen cam-paigns and movements ghting grat and abuse plant seeds ohopehope that those living under oppression have options

beyond quietly suering or resorting to violence.

Acknowledgement: This project is supported through a grant romthe United States Institute o Peace and by the International Centeron Nonviolent Confict.

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Civil Resistance and the Curruption-Violence Nexus