RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L24022March3,1965

ILOILOPALAYANDCORNPLANTERSASSOCIATION,INC.,ETAL.,petitioners,vs.HON.JOSE,Y.FELICIANO,ETAL.,respondents.

JoseC.ZuluetaandRamonA.Gonzalesforpetitioners.OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforrespondents.

BAUTISTAANGELO,J.:

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and CornAdministration,wrotethePresidentof thePhilippinesurgingthe immediate importationof595,400metrictons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to therecommendationoftheNationalEconomicCouncilasembodiedinitsResolutionNo.70,seriesof1964.

On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and onDecember 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the Presidentdesignated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake theimportation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for saidimportationandsetthebiddingforFebruary1,1965.

Considering that said importation is contrary toRepublicAct 3452which prohibits the government fromimportingriceandthatthereisnolawappropriatingfundstofinancethesame,theIloiloPalayandCornPlantersAssociation, Inc., togetherwithRamonA.Gonzales, inhiscapacityastaxpayer, filedthe instantpetitionbefore thisCourtseeking to restrainJoseY.Feliciano, inhiscapacityasChairmanandGeneralManager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the dateabovementioned,andfromdoinganyotheractthatmayresultinthecontemplatedimportationuntilfurtherorders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and theAuditorGeneralweremadecorespondents.

Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,which,induecourse,thisCourtgranteduponpetitioners'filingabondintheamountofP50,000.00.Thisbondhavingbeenfiled,thewritwasissuedonFebruary10,1965.

Respondents,intheiranswerdonotdisputetheessentialallegationsofthepetitionthoughtheyadducedreasonswhichjustifytheimportationsoughttobemade.TheyanchorthevalidityoftheimportationontheprovisionsofRepublicAct2207which,intheiropinion,stillstand.

It is petitioners' contention that the importation in questionbeingundertakenby thegovernment even ifthereisacertificationbytheNationalEconomicCouncilthatthereisashortageinthelocalsupplyofriceofsuchgravityastoconstituteanationalemergency,isillegalbecausethesameisprohibitedbyRepublicAct3452which,initsSection10,providesthattheimportationofriceandcornisonlylefttoprivatepartiesuponpaymentofthecorrespondingtaxes.TheyclaimthattheRiceandCornAdministration,oranyothergovernmentagency,isprohibitedfromdoingso.

It is true that thesectionaboveadverted to leaves the importationof riceandcornexclusively toprivateparties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other governmentagency,but from this itdoesnot follow thatatpresent there isno lawwhichpermits thegovernment toundertaketheimportationofriceintothePhilippines.Andthiswesaybecause,inouropinion,theprovisionofRepublicAct2207on thematter still stands.We refer toSection2of saidActwherein,amongotherthings,itprovidesthatshouldtherebeanexistingorimminentshortageinthelocalsupplyofriceofsuch

gravityas toconstituteanationalemergency,and this iscertifiedby theNationalEconomicCouncil, thePresident of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he maydesignate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is suchshortagepresentwhich,becauseofitsgravity,constitutesanationalemergency,andactinginpursuancethereofthePresidentlostnotimeinauthorizing,afterconsultinghiscabinet,theGeneralManageroftheRiceandCornAdministration to immediatelyundertake theneeded importation inorder to staveoff theimpending emergency.We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should bepreventedaspetitionersnowdesire.

ThecontentionthatRepublicAct2207hasalreadybeenrepealedbyRepublicAct3452isuntenableinthelight of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws.Admittedly,Section 16 ofRepublicAct 3452containsarepealingclausewhichprovides:"AlllawsorpartsthereofinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisActareherebyrepealedormodifiedaccordingly."Thequestionmaynowbeasked:whatisthenatureofthisrepealingclause?ItiscertainlynotanexpressrepealingclausebecauseitfailstoidentifyordesignatetheActorActsthatareintendedtoberepealed[Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,(1943)Vol.1,p.467].Rather, it is a clausewhichpredicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflictmustbefoundinexistingandpriorActs.Suchbeingthecase,thepresumptionagainstimpliedrepealsandtheruleagainststrictconstructionregardingimpliedrepealsapplyexpropriovigore.Indeed,thelegislatureispresumedtoknowtheexisting lawsso that, ifa repeal is intended, theproperstep is tosoexpress it[ContinentalInsuranceCo.v.Simpson,8F(2d)439Weberv.Bailey,151Ore.2188,51P(2d)832Statev.Jackson,120W.Va.521,199S.E.876].Thefailuretoaddaspecificrepealingclauseindicatesthattheintentwasnottorepealanyexistinglaw(Crawford,ConstructionofStatute,1940ed.,p.631),unlessanirreconcilable inconsistencyandrepugnancyexist in the termsof thenewandold laws.Here there isnosuchinconsistency.

Tobeginwith, the two laws, althoughwith a commonobjective, refer to differentmethodsapplicable todifferentcircumstances.Thus,thetotalbanningofimportationundernormalconditionsasprovidedforinRepublicAct2207isonesteptoachievethericeandcornsufficiencyprogramoftheAdministration.Thephilosophybehind thebanning is thatany importationof riceduringaperiodof sufficiencyorevenofaminor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which maydiscouragethemfromraisingsaidcrop.Ontheotherhand,apricesupportprogramandapartialbanofrice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiencyprogram.Whilethetwolawsaregearedtowardsthesameultimateobjective, theirmethodsofapproachare different one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same beingapplicableonlytothegovernmentduringnormalperiod.

Thereisanotherareawherethetwolawsfindacommonpointofreconciliation:thenormalcyofthetimeunderlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers threedifferentsituations:(1)whenthelocalproduceofriceissufficienttosupplylocalconsumption(2)whenthelocalproducefallsshortofthesupplybuttheshortageisnotenoughtoconstituteanationalemergencyand (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a nationalemergency.Underthefirsttwosituations,noimportationisallowedwhetherbythegovernmentorbytheprivate sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by thegovernment.

RepublicAct3452,ontheotherhand,dealsonlywithsituations1and2,butnotwith.Nowhereinsaidlawcanwediscern that it covers importationwhere theshortage in the local supply isof suchgravityas toconstitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normaltimes, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a nationalemergency,wehavetoturntoRepublicAct2207.Thesetwolawstherefore,arenotinconsistentandsoimpliedrepealdoesnotensue.

Ourview thatRepublicAct3452merelycontemplates importationduringnormal times isbolsteredbyaconsiderationofthediscussionthattookplaceinCongressofHouseBillNo.11511whichwaspresentedinanswer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in thePhilippines.Onthismatter,wequotethefollowingviewsofSenatorsPadillaandAlmendras:

SENATORPADILLA:ButunderRepublicActNo.3452themisaprovisoinSec.10thereof"thatthe

Rice andCornAdministration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing riceandcorn."

SENATORALMENDRAS:Thatisundernormalconditions.

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left toprivatepartiesuponpaymentofthecorrespondingtax."Sotherefore,thepositionoftheCommitteeasexpressedby thedistinguishedsponsor, is thatSec.10ofRepublicActNo.3452 isapplicableundernormalconditions.

SENATORALMENDRAS:"Yes".(SenateDebate,June16,1964).

MuchstressislaidonthecontentofSection12ofRepublicAct3452whichgivestothePresidentauthoritytodeclareariceandcornemergencyanytimehedeemsnecessaryinthepublicinterestand,duringtheemergency,toconductraids,seizureandconfiscationofriceandcornhoardedinanyprivatewarehouseorbodegasubjecttoconstitutional limitations,tosupporttheclaimthatsaidActalsobansimportationonthe part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on amisinterpretationoftheimportandmeaningofsaidprovision.Notethatthesectionreferstoanemergencywherethereisanartificialshortagebecauseoftheapparenthoardingundertakenbycertainunscrupulousdealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latterexists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real nationalemergency.Congressbynomeanscouldhaveintendedundersuchasituationtodeprivethegovernmentofitsrighttoimporttostaveoffhungerandstarvation.Congressknowsthatsuchremedyisworthlessasthere is no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding andprofiteering,but such remedycannotproduce the riceneeded to solve theemergency. If there is reallyinsufficientricestockedintheprivatewarehousesandbodegassuchconfiscatorystepcannotremedyanactualemergency,inwhichcasewehavetoturntoRepublicAct2207.

Thetwolawscanthereforebeconstruedasharmoniouspartsofthelegislativeexpressionofitspolicytopromoteariceandcornprogram.Andifthiscanbedone,aswehaveshown,itisthedutyofthisCourttoadopt such interpretation thatwould give effect to both laws.Conversely, in order to effect a repeal byimplication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law[UnitedStatesv.Greathouse,.166U.S.601,41L.Ed.,1130 InrePhoenixHotelCo.,13F.Supp.229Hammond v.McDonald, 32Cal.App. 187, 89P (2d) 407Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction, supra, p.462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compaia General de Tabacos v.Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is notsufficienttocreatearepugnancybetweenthem.Theremustbesuchapositiverepugnancybetweentheprovisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together(Crawford,ConstructionofStatute,supra,p.631).Theclearestcasepossiblemust firstbemadebeforetheinferenceofimpliedrepealmaybedrawn[Naganov.McGrath,187F(2d)759].Inconsistencyisneverpresumed.

RepublicAct3848entitled"AnActProvidingfortheImportationofRiceDuringtheCalendarYearNineteenHundredSixtyFourintheEventofShortageinLocalSupply"cannotbegivenanynullifyingvalue,asitispretended,simplybecauseSection6thereofprovidesthat"exceptasprovidedinthisAct,nootheragencyorinstrumentalityoftheGovernmentshallbeallowedtopurchasericefromabroad."Thereasonisthatitis amere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it ismerely an authority toimport riceduring the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter ofimportation.

NeithercanpetitionerssuccessfullypretendthatasSection4thereofprovidesthatpendingprosecutionsfor any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 theimplication is that the aforesaidActs have already been repealed. That provision ismerely a safeguardplacedthereininorderthattheprosecutionsalreadyundertakenmaynotbedefeatedwiththeenactmentofRepublicAct 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisionswhich call for lesser penalty. Theintentionistoexceptthemfromtherulethatpenalstatutescanbegivenretroactiveeffect if favorabletotheaccused.

TofurtherbolsterourviewthatRepublicAct2207hasnotbeen impliedlyrepealedbyRepublicAct3452,wewishtobrieflyquotehereundertheviewsexpressedbysomesenatorsduringthediscussionofHouseBill11511alreadymentionedabove.Itshouldbehererepeatedthatsaidbillwaspresentedtoaccedetothe request of the President for a standby power to import in case of emergency in view oftheuncertaintyof the law,but thatduring thediscussion thereof itwasstronglyassertedandapparentlyupheldthatsuchrequestforauthoritywasnotnecessarybecauseRepublicAct2207wasstillinforce.Itisprobably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in theconferencecommitteethatconsidered it.Theseviews,whilenotbinding,areofpersuasiveauthorityandthrowlightontheissuerelativetotheeffectivityofRepublicAct2207.

SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case ofemergency, incaseofanimpendingshortage,wecanimportriceundertheprovisionsofR.A.No.2207?

SENATORALMENDRAS:Yes, that iswhatwemean,yourHonor, in thisparagraph(c),Section2,page2,thatwhenwesay"undertheprovisionsofexistinglaw,"wearereferringtoR.A.No.2207.

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SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment bysubstitutionreads:

Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under theprovisionsofexistinglaw.

Isupposethat theexisting lawsreferredtoareRepublicActNo.2207andRepublicActNo.3452.Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of thepertinentprovisionsofRepublicActNo.2207andRepublicActNo.3452onriceimportation?

SENATORALMENDRAS:Yes,thatisthereason,YourHonor,whywestruckoutthestandbypoweronthepartofthePresidenttoimportrice.

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SENATORALMENDRAS:ThepositionofyourCommittee,YourHonor,becauseoftheexistinglawthat is,RepublicActNo.3452andRepublicActNo.2207that is thereasonyourCommitteeeliminatedthatstandbypowerofthePresidenttoimportrice.Becauseyouknow,YourHonor,whatistheuseofthatstandbypower, inasmuchasunderRepublicActNo.3452andRepublicActNo.2207thePresidentcandesignateanygovernmentagencytoimportrice?

SENATORPADILLA:Well, it is good tomake that clear because in the decision of the SupremeCourt, as I said, therewas no clearcut holding as to the possible coexistence or implied repealbetweenthesetwoActs.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag,informedmethatRepublicActNo.2207hasneverbeenrepealed.

SENATORPADILLA:Well,Ialsoconcurwiththatview,butwewanttomakethatclear....

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left toprivate parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of theCommittee,asexpressedby thedistinguishedsponsor is thatSec.10ofRepublicActNo.3452 isapplicableundernormalconditions.

SENATORALMENDRAS:Yes.

SENATORPADILLA:So,bothprovisionsoflawareinexistence.

SENATORALMENDRAS:Yes.

SENATORPADILLA:Oneisnotrepealedbytheother.

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SENATORTOLENTINO:Mr.President,therearetwoviewsalreadyexpressedonwhetherRepublicActNo.2207hasbeenrepealedbyRepublicActNo.3452.OneviewsustainsthetheorythattherehasbeenarepealofRepublicActNo.2207byRepublicActNo.3452insofarasriceimportationisconcerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearlywhichsideprevails.Itaketheviewthatthetwolawscanbereconciled....

Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totallyrepugnanttoeachother,thatitispossibleforthemtostandtogetherexceptoncertainpoints:First,is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Councilpermissible?Byreading the twoprovisos together Iwouldsayyesbecausethere isnothing in theproviso contained inRepublicActNo. 3452whichwouldbe inconsistentwith importationduringashortageamountingtoanationalemergency.

Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finallyapprovedbytheSenate,itcarriedaclausewhichexpresslyrepeals,amongothers,RepublicActNo.2207(Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitudeclearlyrevealsthatCongresspreferredtofallbackonRepublicAct2207withregardtofutureimportations.

Anentthepointraisedrelativetothelackofnecessaryappropriationtofinancetheimportationinquestion,suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized toborrow,raiseandsecurethemoneythatmaybenecessarytocarryoutitsobjectives.WerefertoSection3(e)ofsaidActwhichempowerssaidcorporationtosecuremoneyandtoencumberanypropertyithasasaguaranty,andRepublicActNo.3452,whichcreatestheRiceandCornAdministration,transferreditsfunctionsandpowerstothelatter,includingthepowertoborrowmoneyunderSection3(e).ThisprovisiongivestheRCAenoughpowerwithwhichtofinancetheimportationinquestion.

WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is herebydissolved.Costsagainstpetitioners.

Paredes,Regala,Makalintal,Bengzon,J.P.,andZaldivar,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

REYES,J.B.L.,J.,dissenting:

It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold theGovernment's power to import rice, underSection 2 ofRepublicAct2207,themajorityopinionseemstohaveoverlookedthattherepealofstatutesisprimarilyamatter of legislative intention and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly intended tosupersedethepriorlaw,RepublicActNo.2207.

Thespecificissue,inbrief,iswhethertheextraordinaryemergencypowertoimportriceandcorn,grantedto the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at present,notwithstandingthetermsofSection10ofthesubsequentRepublicActNo.3452.

Forconvenience,wepresentinparallelcolumnsthespecificprovisionsoftherespectiveacts:

REP.ACTNO.2207(1959)

REP.ACTNO.3452(1962)

SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall beunlawful for any person,

SEC.10....Provided, that theRiceand Corn Administration or any

association, corporation orgovernment agency to import riceand corn into any point in thePhilippines: Provided, however,Thatshouldtherebeanexistingorimminent shortage in the localsupply of the abovementionedcommodities of such gravity as toconstitute a national emergency,upon certification to this effect bythe National Economic Council,based on the studies of the Officeof Statistical Coordination of saidbody, the President of thePhilippines may authorize theimportation of thecommodities,throughany government agencythat hemaydesignateinsuchquantitiesastheNationalEconomicCouncilmaydetermine necessary to cover theshortage, subject to the taxes,duties and/or special charges asnow provided bylaw:Provided, further, Thatcontracts forsuch importationshallbeonlyonstraightsalesbasis,andawardedonlyafterapublicbidding,with sealed bids. (Emphasissupplied)

othergovernmentagencyisherebyprohibited from importing rice andcorn: Provided, further, That theimportationofriceandcornislefttoprivatepartiesuponpaymentofthecorresponding taxes. (EmphasisSupplied)

It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy because underRepublicActNo.2207,thegeneralruleisthatnopersonorentity,publicorprivate,shallimportriceandcornwhileunder the laterAct,RepublicActNo.3452, the importationof riceandcorn is left to privateparties,withnorestrictionotherthanthepaymentoftax.Second,inprocedureunderRepublicAct2207,the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities certified by the NationalEconomic Council as necessary,through any government agency that he may designate while by Act3452anygovernmentagency is prohibited from importing riceand corn, saidprohibitionbeingexpress,absolute,total,andunconditional.Notonlythis,butviolationoftheprohibitionissanctionedbyaP10,000fineandimprisonmentfornotmorethan5years(sec.15,Act3452).

Wecannotseehowthemajorityopinioncancontendthatthepresidentialpowertomakeimportationsofriceandcornstillsubsists,inviewoftheunqualifiedtermsofRepublicAct3452.Ifanygovernmentagencyisprohibitedfromimportingriceandcornbythelaterlaw,andtheviolationoftheprohibitionispenalizedby fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the importation? He cannot do sodirectly,sinceAct2207specificallyrequiresthatitbedone"throughanygovernmentagency".How,then,mayheimport?

Itisunnecessarytoresorttolegalgymnasticsinordertorealizewhythismustbeso.SufficeittonotethattheAdministration'spowertoimportriceincertifiedemergenciesunderAct2207wasbutamerecorollaryto the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such exceptional importpowernecessarilydependedonthecontinuationofthattotalprohibition.1 w p h 1 . t

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between theemergencyimportingauthoritygrantedtothegovernmentandthemaintenanceofthenormalnonimportpolicy.

SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or governmentagency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided, however, that shouldtherebeanexistingorimminentshortageinthelocalsupplyoftheabovementionedcommodities,ofsuchgravityastoconstituteanationalemergency,uponcertificationtothiseffectbytheNationalEconomicCouncil, based on the studies of theOffice of StatisticalCoordination of said body, thePresident of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities, through anygovernmentagencythathemaydesignate,insuchquantitiesastheNationalEconomicCouncilmaydeterminenecessarytocovertheshortage,subjecttotaxes,dutiesand/orspecialchargesasnowprovidedbylawprovided,further,thatcontractsforsuchimportationshallbeonlyonstraightsalesbasis,andawardedonlyafterapublicbidding,withsealedbids.(Emphasissupplied)

Socloselylinkedwerethepolicyandtheemergencyimportpowerthatthelatterwasnotevensetapartina section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening portion of thesection quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to import rice and cornestablishedby the laterpartof thesame legalprovision.Where thebasicruledisappears, theexceptiontheretomustnecessarilycease tooperate,since theexceptionbecomesautomaticallyfunctus officio forlackofbasis.

The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic cropbecameinsufficienttosatisfythedemandforriceandcorn,thelatterhadtobebroughtfromoutsidetofillthegapandthelegislaturedecided(inAct2207)thatitshouldbedonethroughgovernmentalagencies.But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private parties wereauthorizedtobringinthecerealsatanytimehence,theexceptionalimportingpoweroftheGovernmentlostallreasonfor itsexistence,becausetheprivateimportsallowedbyAct3452werecontemplatedandintended to make up for the difference between demand and supply, without necessity of governmentintervention.Intruth,theexpressioninSection10ofAct3452

SEC. 10. ... Provided, That theRice andCornAdministration or any other government agency isherebyprohibited from importing riceandcornProvided, further,That the importationof riceandcornislefttoprivatepartiesuponpaymentofthecorrespondingtaxes.(Emphasissupplied)

canonlymeanthattheAdministrationmustdesistfromimporting,and leavetoprivatepartiesthetaskofbringingsuchcerealsfromwithoutinordertomakeupforwhatevershortagesinproductionshouldoccur.

That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in thelegislative journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing thetranscriptoftheSenatedebatesonthebillthatlaterbecameRepublicActNo.3452,thefollowingappears:

CUENCOAMENDMENT

Mr.CUENCO.Mr.Speaker,onpage3,line16,changetheperiod(.)tocolonandaddthefollowing:PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAGENCYISHEREBYPROHIBITEDFROMIMPORTINGRICEANDCORN:PROVIDED,FURTHER,THATTHEIMPORTATIONOFRICEANDCORNISLEFTTOPRIVATEPARTIESUPONPAYMENTOFTHECORRESPONDINGTAXES.

Mr.OCAMPO.Supposethereisacalamity,Mr.Speaker.

Mr.CUENCO.Leavethattoprivateparties.

Mr.OCAMPO.Accepted,Mr.Speaker.

The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any. Theamendmentisapproved.(CongressionalRecord,No.48,March30,1962,p.1360)

TheSenateJournal,No.59,May8,1962,alsocontainsthefollowingilluminatingremarks:

SENATORLEDESMA:So it ison theunderstanding then,YourHonor, thatwecouldproceedwith

thediscussion.

YourHonor,HouseBillNo.339,asIhavealreadystated,specificallyprovidesthatappointmentofpersonnelshouldbeinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLawaswellaswiththeWAPCO.Itseemstomethatthisprovisionisverylaudableandvery,veryreasonable.Thesecondimportantfeatureinthis proposed measure is that it prohibits importation by the government. I think this should beclarified in the sense that, at the same time, it allows importation by private parties but with thepaymentofthecorrespondingduties.Orrather,underHouseBillNo.339,thegeneralpolicywhichisbeingsetintheproposedmeasureisthatthegovernmentshouldnotresorttoimportationbutthatimportationof thecereal isopenatall timesto any citizenof this country so longashepays thecorrespondingdutiesandothertaxeswhichare imposedbyourgovernment.(SenateJournal,No.59,May8,1962)

Itisthusclearthatifsection16ofRepublicAct3452providingthat

AlllawsorpartsthereofinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisActareherebyrepealedormodifiedaccordingly",.

intendedtorefertoanyprecedingstatuteatall,itmusthavereferredtoRepublicActNo.2207.Hence,thePresidentialpowertoimportnolongerexists.

InarguinginfavoroftheGovernment'spowertoimportevennow,themajorityopinionaversthatRepublicActNo.3452isdesignedtoapplyonlytonormaltimesandconditions.Thisisplainlyabsurd,forinnormaltimes,whenproductionequalsconsumption,noimportationneedbeauthorized,fornonewillberequired.

The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms.Grantingarguendothatthisweretrue,despitetheexpressprohibitionofgovernmentimportsinsection10ofthelaterAct,yetitdoesnotelucidatewhythelegislaturefounditnecessary,orexpedient,toenactanentirelydifferentlaw,insteadofmerelyprovidingfortheamendmentofthepriorstatute(R.A.2207).Ifbothlawsweredesignedtoattainthesameend,riceandcornsufficiencyforourcountry,andonlyachangeofmethod was intended, why enact two statutes not only unconnected with each other, but actuallycontradictory?

That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person orentity,publicorprivate,couldimportriceorcorn,sinceunderSection2thereof"itshallbeunlawfulforanyperson,association,corporationorgovernmententity to import riceandcorn"whileunderAct3452,onthe contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time,with no otherrestrictionthanthepaymentoftaxes.Howcanitbesaidthatthetwolaws,withsodiametricallyoppositephilosophies,wereintendedtocoexist?

Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since privateimportationof riceandcorncannot,at thesame time,beunlawfulunderAct2207and lawful underAct3452),itisinescapabletoconcludethatthelaterstatute(3452)is,andmusthavebeen,intendedtorevise,supersede,andreplacetheformerlaw(Act2207).Theestablishedruleinthisjurisdictioninsuchacaseisthat

Whileasageneral rule, implied repealofa formerstatutebya laterone isnot favored,yet if thelater act covers thewhole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it willoperatesimilarlyasarepealoftheearlieract(Posadasvs.NationalCityBankofNewYork,296U.S.497,80LawEd.351)(quotedandappliedinInreGuzman,73Phil.52).

pinesadoptedtheAmericandoctrinethatinsucharevisionofthelaw,whateverisexcludedisdiscardedandrepealed(InreGuzmansupra,atpp.5253).1

Ithasbeenheldthat"wherethelegislatureframesanewstatuteuponacertainsubjectmatter,andthe legislative intentionappears from the latterstatute tobe to frameanewscheme in relation tosuchsubjectmatterandmakearevisionofthewholesubject,thatwhateverisembracedinthenewstatuteshallprevail,andthatwhatever isexcludedisdiscarded".(Peoplev.Thornton,186Ill.162,

173,75N.E.841.)

And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at differentdates,anditisplainfromtheframeworkandsubstanceofthelastthatitwasintendedtocoverthewholesubject,andtobeacompleteandperfectsystemorprovisioninitself,thelastmustbeheldtobealegislativedeclarationthatwhateverisembracedinitshallprevailandwhateverisexcludedisdiscardedandrepealed."

Or,asmoreterselyputinMadisonvs.SouthernWisconsinR.Co.,10A.L.R.910,atpage915:

6.Asubsequentstatute,evidentlyintendedasasubstituteforonerevised,operatesasarepealofthe latterwithoutanyexpresswordsto thateffectandsoanydistinctprovisionof theold law,notincorporated into the later one, is tobe, deemed tohavebeen intentionally annulled.Smith,Stat.Constr.sec.784Bartlettv.King,12Mass.537,7Am.Dec.99:

This rule, expressly adoptedby this verySupremeCourt, utterly destroys the contentionof themajorityopinionthatbecausetheGovernment'spowerunderRepublicAct2207,tomakeimportsofriceandcornincaseofcertifiedemergency,isnowhereexpresslyrepealedbyRepublicAct3452,suchpowermustbestilldeemedtoexist.NosuchpowercannowexistforthereasonthattheActconferringitwastotallyandunconditionallysupersededandrepealedbyAct3452.ThecontradictoryphilosophiesofbothActstestifytothateffect.

ThemajorityalsoaversthatRepublicActNo.3452doesnotcontemplatesituationswheretheshortageinlocalsupply isofsuchgravityas toconstituteanationalemergency. Italsoasserts thatAct3452 refersonlytoartificialshortagesthroughhoarding,anddoesnotcovernaturalshortageswherethericeandcorncropsdonotsufficetomeetthedemandsofconsumption.Unfortunately,theoppositeoftheseassertionsispreciselytrue.Thus,

Section1ofAct3452provides:TheGovernmentshallengageinthepurchaseofthesebasicfoodsfrom tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines ... and whenevercircumstancesbroughtaboutbyanycause,naturalorartificial,shouldsorequire,(theGovernment)shallsellanddisposeofthesecommoditiestotheconsumers....

Section3ofAct3452Withaviewtoregulatingthelevelofsupplyofriceandcornthroughoutthecountry, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in suchquantitiesasitmaydeemproperandnecessarytomeetanycontingencies....

Section12,Act3452"ThePresidentofthePhilippinesisherebyauthorizedtodeclareariceandcornemergencyanytimehedeemsnecessaryinthepublicinterest.Duringtheemergencyperiod,theRiceandCornAdministration,uponthedirectionofthePresident,shall,subjecttoconstitutionallimitation, conduct raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice and con hoarded in any privatewarehouseorbodega:Provided,ThattheRiceandCornAdministrationshallpaysuchconfiscatedrice and corn at the prevailing consumer's price of the Rice and Corn Administration. (Emphasissupplied)

Certainly thewords used by the statute, "any cause,natural orartificial", "any contingencies", "rice andcornemergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due to insufficientproduction,aswellasartificialshortagesduetohoarding.Thetermsemployedexemptthelegislaturefromtheaccusationthatitstillhasleftsomeemergencyunprovidedfor.WhatitdiddenytheGovernmentwasthepowertoimportriceandcornwheneveritsochoosesinstead,thelawexpresslyprescribed"thattheRice and Corp. Administrationor any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice andcorn"(sec.10,R.A.3452),acommandthat,aspreviouslyobserved,squarelycontradictsandvacatesthatpermission to import previously granted underRepublicAct 2207. TheGovernment, therefore,may notnowbring in rice and corn fromabroad,unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, aswasdonefor1964byRepublicActNo.3848.

The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import300,000metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), andmade use of that

permission, isthebestproofthattheExecutivefeltthatitsformerpowerunderRepublicActNo.2207nolonger existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the Administration inestoppel to assert the contrary.Why should it seek authority to make importation during 1964 if it stillpossessedthatgrantedbyRepublicAct2207?

Note that, in consenting theGovernment's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature oncemorereaffirmed theprohibitionof furthergovernment imports insection6of theenabling law,RepublicActNo.3848:

SEC.6ExceptasprovidedinthisAct,nootheragencyorinstrumentalityoftheGovernmentshallbeallowedtopurchasericefromabroad."(Emphasissupplied)

whichisavirtualrepetitionoftherestraintimposedbyRepublicAct3452.Inaddition,thelawimposedthefurtherconditionthattheimportationbemadeonlyupontwothirdsvoteoftheNationalEconomicCouncil,whereRepublicAct2207specifiednoparticularmajority.

Themainopinionseekstominimizetheeffectofthesereiteratedprohibitionsbyclaimingthatsaidsection6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was absolutelyunnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848was a limitation in itself, as it only permitted theimportationof300,000metrictonsforthecalendaryear1964.Undersuchagrant,anyexcessbeyondthequantityfixed,andanyimportafter1964,wereautomaticallyforbidden.Theenactmentofsection6ofAct3848, therefore,wasanactualreassertionof thepolicyofoutlawingGovernment imports,asdeclared inRepublicAct3452.Ifanything,itmeantthattoimportricenow,theExecutivemustfirstobtainanenablinglaw.

Moreover,thefinancingbytheGovernmentofitsforeignpurchaseofricewouldviolatetheConstitutionalrestraintagainstpayingmoneyoutoftheTreasury,"exceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw"(Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no lawmaking such appropriation has been enacted. Under theRevisedAdministrativeCode,sections606and607,nocontract involving theexpenditureofpublic fundscanbemade without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the Auditor General. Nor can theseinhibitionsbeevadedby the ruseofcausingaGovernmentagency toborrow the funds required for thepurpose,consideringthatanyandallgovernmentagenciesareflatlyforbiddentoimportrice(RepublicAct3452,sec.10),andtheborrowingoffundstofinanceimportationisessentialfortheexecutionthereof.

Finally,weseenopointinthequotationsfromstatementsmadeintheSenateduringthedeliberationsonHouseBillNo.11511.Thatbillneverbecamelaw,andisnotbeforetheCourt.Thestatementsquotedarenotbinding,thisCourthavingtheexclusiveprerogativeofconstruingthelegislativeenactments.

Theeffect inthemajoritydecisionis,aftertheLegislaturehadexpresslyprohibitedgovernmentagenciesto import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill No. 11511)grantingtheExecutiveastandbyauthoritytoimport,adecisionofthisCourtnowreversesthisclearpolicyoftheLegislature,andhandstheExecutiveablanketpowertodowhatthelawshaveexpresslyforbidden.

Bengzon,C.J.,Concepcion,BarreraandDizon,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

REYES,J.B.L.,dissenting:

1RulereiteratedinJoaquinvs.Navarro,81Phil.373InreResaba,95Phil.247Beysavs.CourtofFirstInstance,52Off.Gaz.,No.7,p.3572.