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Miciano vs Brimo

TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo

CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the

brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is aTurkish

citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed of in accordance with

the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not

imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise

provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the

testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include AndreBrimo, as one of the legatees.

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,

opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motio

for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the

deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are

impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the

deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

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The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G.

Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being

in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the

successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person

whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkis

laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence

of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of

Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to

be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not

having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the

Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary

with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce

competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no

evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary

dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch a

he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on

the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me

by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length

of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that

the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance

with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and

cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with thi

request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the

testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the

laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor

who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from

receiving his legacy.

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The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the

following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not

prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article

10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of

legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition

imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not

appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a

manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by

the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

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CASE DIGEST OF YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES

CASE DIGEST OF YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES [167 S 737] - F: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Kaloocan

City, where he was residing, leaving behind substantial real and personal properties here in the Phils. Petition for

letters of administration filed by his natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy Kiat was legally married

to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China on 1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the legitimate children. The probate court

rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by the CA w/c held that both sets of

children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration.

HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordancew/ said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. In the

case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and customs of China on

marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on

marriage not only bec. they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are

competent to testify on the subject matter.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social

rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the

rules of evidence." On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not

be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any

other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786

FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving

behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a

petition for the grant of letters of administration and alleged that (a) they are the children of the deceased with

Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to

Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that she

is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other oppositors are the

legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee. Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Keeand the other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy Mat. On appeal, CA simply modified probate courts

judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are natural children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for

reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged

marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any

competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Chingcannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving

evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter.

For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with

said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

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Tenchavez vs Escano

TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano

CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24,

1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises

Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civregistry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship

with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and

Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However

after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving

with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and

filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court

of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta

married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship onAugust 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded

Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of

absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would

arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous

relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by

Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between

Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to

validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled

the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.

Escao;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for

damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the decease

Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

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Tenchavez vs. Escao

FACTS:

Vicenta Escao, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic

chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live

together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated

in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada onthe ground of Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. A decree of divorce, final and absolute was

issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several

children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,

against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao whom he charged with having dissuaded and

discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic

Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal

separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicentas parents denied that they had in any way influenced thei

daughters acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos parents were sufficient in form.

RULING:

1. No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.

Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escao was

bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The

acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,

leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again

are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner contrary tomorals,

good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the

basis of adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of

Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration

and were belied by Tenchavez own letters written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of

affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives

on their part.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted

efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,

entitling them to recover damages.

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CASE DIGEST ON AZNAR V. GARCIA

CASE DIGEST ON AZNAR V. GARCIA [61 O.G. No. 46 p. 7303 (1963)] - Where the testator was a citizen of California, and

domiciled in the Philippines, the amount of successional rights should be governed by his national law.

However, since the conflicts of law rules of California provides that in case of citizens who are residents of

another country, the law of the country of domicile should apply, then Philippine law on legitimes was applied.

Hence, under Philippine laws, the acknowledged natural daughter cannot be deprived of her legitime.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will, which

provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter

LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as anacknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased

Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904

to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a

citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so

that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the

time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with

instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of

successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law

of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and

regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term national law is

used therein.

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The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a

testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the

provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of

its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal

law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the

testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of California of which

Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in

accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary

provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its

internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each

in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living inthe State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other

jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with

foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should

govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal

law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens,

one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary in the place wherethe property is situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national

law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law

on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the

question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,

precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the

Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;

such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football,

tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and th

country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the

state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of

California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the

Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of

the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by

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the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of

California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each

state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The

national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply

to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.